Paul Holmes and Erebus
"We're 26 miles north. We'll have to climb out of here."
If you're 26 miles north on a track to a waypoint 20nm west of Mac Station, you don't have to climb out of anything.
If you're 26 miles north on a track to Mac Station, then you have Erebus dead ahead and definitely do have to climb out.
If you're 26 miles north on a track to a waypoint 20nm west of Mac Station, you don't have to climb out of anything.
If you're 26 miles north on a track to Mac Station, then you have Erebus dead ahead and definitely do have to climb out.
I can see how you might come to the conclusion you have regarding this statement however I don't have the same take on this as you do, and see this as a generic statement. Just another example of differences in interpretations of whats on the CVR, or whats actually meant by what was said.
Also I see the choice to climb as being perfectly reasonable (in fact almost instinctive) in almost any situation when a crew becomes unhappy with the situation they are in, no matter what the terrain is around them.
Dreamland
We're not talking about a short VFR trip to the Grand Canyon here, we are talking about a trip to one of the most remote, inhospitable parts of the world, and in conditions that many people know nothing about.
I would suggest that some of your comments don't apply on this thread.
I never once needed an AINS, VOR or anything else to fly tours in the Grand Canyon on the way to the South rim, that's because it was a VMC mission, if I couldn't see the canyon, I didn't do the tour.
I would suggest that some of your comments don't apply on this thread.
Prospector,
You seem to always find blame with the crew, yet never make comment as to whether or not there are other parties and or factors to blame. In your opinion in what others areas could blame lie in this accident?
Also I'd be interested to see your reply to the following question.
In the prevailing conditions and knowing how previous flights had been conducted, who on here can hold their hand on their heart and say they would not have done the same?
You seem to always find blame with the crew, yet never make comment as to whether or not there are other parties and or factors to blame. In your opinion in what others areas could blame lie in this accident?
Also I'd be interested to see your reply to the following question.
In the prevailing conditions and knowing how previous flights had been conducted, who on here can hold their hand on their heart and say they would not have done the same?
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27/09
See post 86 this thread.
I do believe many could. To take a DC10 below 1,500ft, at a minimum speed of 250kts+ in an area well known for visual trickery, without absolute certainty of your position,on your very first flight to that area is not something I believe many would have done.
See post 86 this thread.
In the prevailing conditions and knowing how previous flights had been conducted, who on here can hold their hand on their heart and say they would not have done the same?
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"We're 26 miles north. We'll have to climb out of of here."
27/09 #202
"We're 26 miles north. We'll have to climb out of here."
F/O: "It's clear to the right and (well) ahead"
What about the second option? Stay on the track and just pull back the stick. Why turn?
"We're 26 miles north. We'll have to climb out of here."
F/O: "It's clear to the right and (well) ahead"
What about the second option? Stay on the track and just pull back the stick. Why turn?
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I agree with Prospector. Some others might have done what he did, but plenty would not. He also changed the plan twice: About 100 miles out, McMurdo was no good and he was going to go somewhere else. Then they offered a radar letdown, so he accepted. Then he spotted the ground, and decided to go VMC.
0018:05 (GMT) – Mac Centre via HF radio: “Yes sir If you have copied our latest weather we have a low overcast in the area (at) about 2000 feet and right now we’re having some snow but our visibility is still about 40 miles and if you like I can give you an update on where the clear areas are around the local area”
0018:11 – Captain: “Clouds come down a bit * * * may not be able to * * McMurdo. Very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice * *”
0018:52 – Mac Centre via HF:”901 this is the forecaster again it looks like the clear areas around McMurdo are at approximately 75 to 100 miles to the northwest of us (but) right over McMurdo we have a pretty extensive low overcast over”
0019:39 – Captain: “Doesn’t look very promising does it?”
F/O: “No”
0019:56(GMT) – Mac Centre via HF radio: “Roger within a range of 40 miles of McMurdo we have a radar that will, if you desire, we can let you down to one thousand five hundred feet on radar vectors”
0020:17 – Captain: “that’s what we want”
0020:30 – Captain over PA: “Gents we’re going initially to eighteen thousand and the cloud cover in the McMurdo area has increased although the visibility is forty kilometres so ground visibility is good and we --- will be taking advantage of the radar facilities at MvMurdo for letdown which should take us below the cloud and give us a view of the McMurdo area, that is always likely to change of course depending on any variations in the weather but we’re hopeful we’ll be able to give you a look at McMurdo today. Thank you.”
[Various attempts at VHF communications by Mac Centre and crew]
0031:08 – Captain: “Well actually its its clear out here if we can get down --- and
0031:20 – Captain: “If you can get HF contact tell him that, we’d like a further descent – we have contact with the ground and we could if necessary descend doing an orbit”
0032:07 – F/O via HF radio: “We’d like further descent or we could orbit in our present position which is approximately forty three miles north – descending VMC
0032:08 – Mac Centre: “Roger Kiwi New Zealand nine zero one, VMC descent is approved and keep Mac Centre advised of your altitude
0032:10 – F/O: “Roger New Zealand none zero one we’re vacating one eight zero we’ll advise level
0018:05 (GMT) – Mac Centre via HF radio: “Yes sir If you have copied our latest weather we have a low overcast in the area (at) about 2000 feet and right now we’re having some snow but our visibility is still about 40 miles and if you like I can give you an update on where the clear areas are around the local area”
0018:11 – Captain: “Clouds come down a bit * * * may not be able to * * McMurdo. Very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice * *”
0018:52 – Mac Centre via HF:”901 this is the forecaster again it looks like the clear areas around McMurdo are at approximately 75 to 100 miles to the northwest of us (but) right over McMurdo we have a pretty extensive low overcast over”
0019:39 – Captain: “Doesn’t look very promising does it?”
F/O: “No”
0019:56(GMT) – Mac Centre via HF radio: “Roger within a range of 40 miles of McMurdo we have a radar that will, if you desire, we can let you down to one thousand five hundred feet on radar vectors”
0020:17 – Captain: “that’s what we want”
0020:30 – Captain over PA: “Gents we’re going initially to eighteen thousand and the cloud cover in the McMurdo area has increased although the visibility is forty kilometres so ground visibility is good and we --- will be taking advantage of the radar facilities at MvMurdo for letdown which should take us below the cloud and give us a view of the McMurdo area, that is always likely to change of course depending on any variations in the weather but we’re hopeful we’ll be able to give you a look at McMurdo today. Thank you.”
[Various attempts at VHF communications by Mac Centre and crew]
0031:08 – Captain: “Well actually its its clear out here if we can get down --- and
0031:20 – Captain: “If you can get HF contact tell him that, we’d like a further descent – we have contact with the ground and we could if necessary descend doing an orbit”
0032:07 – F/O via HF radio: “We’d like further descent or we could orbit in our present position which is approximately forty three miles north – descending VMC
0032:08 – Mac Centre: “Roger Kiwi New Zealand nine zero one, VMC descent is approved and keep Mac Centre advised of your altitude
0032:10 – F/O: “Roger New Zealand none zero one we’re vacating one eight zero we’ll advise level
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Remember that the left turn was commanded through the autopilot. Correct me if I'm wrong but if the maneouvre is supposed to be evasive - as you seem to be suggesting - how many pilots do you know that would use the autopilot rather than cramming on the power and turning the yoke as far as they can safely manage?
Regarding your CVR trace, there wasn't really anywhere else he *could* go laterally, other than doing a few circuits where he was and go home - again, correct me if I'm wrong, but that would require improvising a new nav plan that may or may not be as safe as the one which he thinks is already programmed (which avoids all high ground until the left turn around Ross Island). Mac Central came back over the radio and gave him the conditions that he needed to go down, which meant he could use the INS as a backup, would have all eyes outside for visual referencing and as far as he knew would be a lot safer.
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Far better to have 250 annoyed passengers than 250 dead ones. AirNZ were going to can the flights in any event, because they were losing money.
The captain didn't say "I can't see where I'm going. We'll have to climb out of this." The climb out comment was linked to the aircraft being 26 miles north of somewhere. There's no evidence of what the captain could see, but the F/0 believed it was clear ahead. Assuming that they both had approximately the same level of vision, then the question remains as to why he turned, if he believed he was in the middle of the Sound.
The last twenty seconds of the flight are not consistent with Mahon's theory. To me, it looks far more like someone who is becoming increasingly uncertain of his position. It looked clear ahead but he knew that it was "very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice". He knew about the conflicting information he had been given about the final waypoint -and he knew he hadn't checked it, so the possibility of the waypoint being at Mac Station would have occurred to him. To give the captain some credit, he rapidly worked out the correct thing to do, which was to turn left. If he was in the middle of the Sound, he had enough room to avoid Ross Island. If he was in Lewis Bay, then he had Erebus ahead and other high ground to his right, so the only way out was left.
Perhaps he should have firewalled the engines and shoved the stick over, but he was probably still thinking about things.
The captain didn't say "I can't see where I'm going. We'll have to climb out of this." The climb out comment was linked to the aircraft being 26 miles north of somewhere. There's no evidence of what the captain could see, but the F/0 believed it was clear ahead. Assuming that they both had approximately the same level of vision, then the question remains as to why he turned, if he believed he was in the middle of the Sound.
The last twenty seconds of the flight are not consistent with Mahon's theory. To me, it looks far more like someone who is becoming increasingly uncertain of his position. It looked clear ahead but he knew that it was "very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice". He knew about the conflicting information he had been given about the final waypoint -and he knew he hadn't checked it, so the possibility of the waypoint being at Mac Station would have occurred to him. To give the captain some credit, he rapidly worked out the correct thing to do, which was to turn left. If he was in the middle of the Sound, he had enough room to avoid Ross Island. If he was in Lewis Bay, then he had Erebus ahead and other high ground to his right, so the only way out was left.
Perhaps he should have firewalled the engines and shoved the stick over, but he was probably still thinking about things.
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Is there a good book available that gives an objective account of what happened before, during and after the event?
Last edited by caneworm; 12th Dec 2011 at 01:12. Reason: spelling
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The one with the most information is "The Erebus Papers" by S.McFarlane. It's quite good, as long as you ignore the author's mad ravings.
For the dedicated researcher, all the evidence given to the Royal Commission is at the Auckland Public Library, while the exhibits are at Archives NZ.
For the dedicated researcher, all the evidence given to the Royal Commission is at the Auckland Public Library, while the exhibits are at Archives NZ.
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f that's the case then why erase the tapes? Why erase the one thing that could prove pilot error and exonerate the controllers?
The only argument I would have with radar is that previous crews reported that Ross Island was discernable with the aircraft radar in mapping mode. Mahon went to great lengths, and taxpayer expense, by managing to get a trip to America and quizzing the manufacturers of the radar, they told him there was not enough water content in the cloud and ice covered slopes of Ross Island and Erebus to get a decent return.. What then about a radar return from the black rock cliffs that you spend so much time explaining they could see, and THOUGHT were not the cliffs of Ross Island?
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Dozy,
I concede we can't know for sure exactly what the crew saw, since only they were there at the time. But everyone seems to agree that most of the land area was cloud covered, including all of Ross Island and its high peaks. Going by Vette's own cloud maps (Impact Erebus, p48, top map), prior to the aircraft descending, one can see that the only visible terrain was to their right. Vette speculates, apparently, that the crew might just have been able to make out terrain to their left:
How many pilots would interpret a faint trace of darkness as a positive visual fix?
About the “scientific proof” regarding what most crews would "probably" have mistaken the terrain for, the claim only begins to look plausible once below the clouds, where much more of the terrain was visible. Though this is open to debate, it doesn’t affect my point here, because above MSA, there was to their left only a faint glimmer of terrain. I’m curious why you would interpret the inability to see virtually all of the terrain to one side of your cockpit as “certainty” of position. Is there at least some room for debate here?
I concede we can't know for sure exactly what the crew saw, since only they were there at the time. But everyone seems to agree that most of the land area was cloud covered, including all of Ross Island and its high peaks. Going by Vette's own cloud maps (Impact Erebus, p48, top map), prior to the aircraft descending, one can see that the only visible terrain was to their right. Vette speculates, apparently, that the crew might just have been able to make out terrain to their left:
Just beneath the edge of this cloud, indistinct but promising, they noted a faint tracery of darkness. It was where they expected to see the western coast of Ross island.
About the “scientific proof” regarding what most crews would "probably" have mistaken the terrain for, the claim only begins to look plausible once below the clouds, where much more of the terrain was visible. Though this is open to debate, it doesn’t affect my point here, because above MSA, there was to their left only a faint glimmer of terrain. I’m curious why you would interpret the inability to see virtually all of the terrain to one side of your cockpit as “certainty” of position. Is there at least some room for debate here?
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Yet another bizarre thing about this accident: It's the leading 'sector white out' case, yet it involved an airline that operated in the South Pacific. North American pilots have always known about snow and ice and cloud, yet AirNZ's foolhardy adventures to Antarctica are now a reference work on the subject.
According to Vette's theory, if you have two points of reference either side of your field of vision, your brain generates a false horizon. Once those points go, then you feel like you're flying in milk. So I would have to agree with him when he said that this was why F/E Brooks was the first to raise the alarm. F/E Brooks would have been leaning forward between the two front seats, with his head lower than the captain's and the F/O's.
According to Vette's theory, if you have two points of reference either side of your field of vision, your brain generates a false horizon. Once those points go, then you feel like you're flying in milk. So I would have to agree with him when he said that this was why F/E Brooks was the first to raise the alarm. F/E Brooks would have been leaning forward between the two front seats, with his head lower than the captain's and the F/O's.
Prospector,
Thanks for answering the second question, perhaps you would like to have a go at the first question. Here it is again.
You seem to always find blame with the crew, yet never make comment as to whether or not there are other parties and or factors to blame. In your opinion in what others areas could blame lie in this accident?
Thanks for answering the second question, perhaps you would like to have a go at the first question. Here it is again.
You seem to always find blame with the crew, yet never make comment as to whether or not there are other parties and or factors to blame. In your opinion in what others areas could blame lie in this accident?
ampan
I was only commenting on your questioning the decision to climb we weren't debating the decision to turn.
Since you raised it, why not stay on track? My answer to that is a bit like the decision to climb, it's partly instinctive, you know what's behind you as you've just come from there. The crew were already asking questions about their situation, some things weren't adding up so to me at least, a climb and a turn to head back to where you've just come from is entirely a reasonable option.
What about the second option? Stay on the track and just pull back the stick. Why turn?
Since you raised it, why not stay on track? My answer to that is a bit like the decision to climb, it's partly instinctive, you know what's behind you as you've just come from there. The crew were already asking questions about their situation, some things weren't adding up so to me at least, a climb and a turn to head back to where you've just come from is entirely a reasonable option.
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27/09,
Here is my reply, same as last time, refer to post 86, and here is post 86.
27/09
See post 86 this thread.
.
Here is my reply, same as last time, refer to post 86, and here is post 86.
27/09
See post 86 this thread.
.
All been stated in a previous thread but my estimation would be,
CAA: 5% for lack of proper oversight, although I do believe there
was an airline inspector scheduled to travel on the flight but had to pull
out due to family circumstance. I very much doubt the flight would
have been conducted the way it was if it was known a CAA inspector
was onboard.
Company: 10% for sloppy operating procedures, and not following up on
reports of low flying. An invitation from a McMurdo Radar operator to
perform a low level run surely does not overide CAA regs or Co SOPs.
Crew: 85% for not complying with either CAA requirements for these flights
or company SOP's, and for not confirming their position before
commencing descent. If even just one of the mandatory requirements
for descent were compled with the accident would have been avoided.
The tools for getting a precise position were available to them prior to
descent, and as this was their first flight to the ice one would have
thought a high degreee of caution would have been the order of the day.
CAA: 5% for lack of proper oversight, although I do believe there
was an airline inspector scheduled to travel on the flight but had to pull
out due to family circumstance. I very much doubt the flight would
have been conducted the way it was if it was known a CAA inspector
was onboard.
Company: 10% for sloppy operating procedures, and not following up on
reports of low flying. An invitation from a McMurdo Radar operator to
perform a low level run surely does not overide CAA regs or Co SOPs.
Crew: 85% for not complying with either CAA requirements for these flights
or company SOP's, and for not confirming their position before
commencing descent. If even just one of the mandatory requirements
for descent were compled with the accident would have been avoided.
The tools for getting a precise position were available to them prior to
descent, and as this was their first flight to the ice one would have
thought a high degreee of caution would have been the order of the day.
Last edited by prospector; 12th Dec 2011 at 22:15.
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For those who wish to assign blame.
Accidents do not occur in isolation, they are made up of many slices of Swiss cheese, and holding each of those slices is an individual, department or organisation. Any one of those slices is able to break the chain and prevent an accident occurring. Had the "Ops Flash" been used as intended, for example, may have gone a long way to doing just that.
Seeking blame is for ambulance chasers and lawyers, not for anyone who seeks the reasons why and how to prevent a recurrence.
Know what EGPWS stands for and why it was invented? – Even Good People Will make an error Someday
The operating crew are the last line of defence for every ones mistakes.
The tenacious retention of ‘pilot error’ as an accident ‘cause factor’ by governmental agencies, equipment manufacturers and airline management, and even by pilot unions indirectly, is a subtle manifestation of the apparently natural human inclination to narrow the responsibility for tragic events that receive wide public attention. If the responsibility can be isolated to the momentary defection of a single individual, the captain in command, then other members of the aviation community remain untarnished. The unions briefly acknowledge the inescapable conclusion that pilots can make errors and thereby gain a few bargaining points with management for the future.
Everyone else, including other crew members, remains clean. The airline accepts the inevitable financial liability for losses but escapes blame for inadequate training programmes or procedural indoctrination. Equipment manufacturers avoid product liability for faulty design,. Regulatory agencies are not criticised for approving an unsafe operation, failing to invoke obviously needed precautionary restrictions, or, worse yet, contributing directly by injudicious control or unsafe clearance authorisations. Only the pilot who made the ‘error’ and his family suffer, and their suffering may be assuaged by a liberal pension in exchange for his quiet early retirement – in the event that he was fortunate enough to survive the accident. Stanley Roscoe, 1980
Everyone else, including other crew members, remains clean. The airline accepts the inevitable financial liability for losses but escapes blame for inadequate training programmes or procedural indoctrination. Equipment manufacturers avoid product liability for faulty design,. Regulatory agencies are not criticised for approving an unsafe operation, failing to invoke obviously needed precautionary restrictions, or, worse yet, contributing directly by injudicious control or unsafe clearance authorisations. Only the pilot who made the ‘error’ and his family suffer, and their suffering may be assuaged by a liberal pension in exchange for his quiet early retirement – in the event that he was fortunate enough to survive the accident. Stanley Roscoe, 1980
Seeking blame is for ambulance chasers and lawyers, not for anyone who seeks the reasons why and how to prevent a recurrence.
Know what EGPWS stands for and why it was invented? – Even Good People Will make an error Someday
The operating crew are the last line of defence for every ones mistakes.
Allowing for the intensity of personal opinions and also that this maybe a little of the trend of this topic, I venture one of my own. Some years ago as a FO I got to wondering what I would have done if I was in Greg Cassins's place on board TE 901. After reading or viewing the available material, and considering what my actions or flight deck input would have been, even with the benefit of hindsight, I came to the chilling conclusion that the only difference I could have made to the operation would have meant that my life would have ended slightly higher up the slopes of Mount Erebus. Even revisiting the subject as a captain when the issue was raised here on PPrune, didn't change that conclusion. That doesn't mean to say that what was done was 100% in accordance with written procedures or policy - we always try, but I doubt that any flight ever has or will be. The nature of airline operations and in particular the intent of the mission that day so long ago was so unlike a normal airline flight, with the unique linking of a multitude of seemingly non-related events, made it inevitable that the tragedy would occur - and it did.
As part of my revisiting the flight, I made up the chart below (which may be difficult to read in this format) to highlight some of the different tracking scenarios that were part of the process that ended at S77 25.5 E 167 27.5. Seen in this form, it all was somewhat confusing, notwithstanding the issues of letdown altitudes and the conduct of the very few previous flights.
As part of my revisiting the flight, I made up the chart below (which may be difficult to read in this format) to highlight some of the different tracking scenarios that were part of the process that ended at S77 25.5 E 167 27.5. Seen in this form, it all was somewhat confusing, notwithstanding the issues of letdown altitudes and the conduct of the very few previous flights.