Paul Holmes and Erebus

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by Chronic Snoozer

Look, this is getting tedious. After receiving a mission briefing for his first trip to Antarctica, most would say it is fair to assume the Captain had an 'awareness' of whiteout and its dangers. The original quote from prospector is fair and uncontroversial. The captain was even quoted on the CVR saying that it doesn't look good.

I'd familiarise myself with the details of the case before making such sweeping statements. First, the briefing contained information on whiteout, but it was whiteout of the kind caused by snow flurries and high winds at low altitude (as might be encountered when making an emergency landing on the ice runway for example) - not "sector whiteout" of the kind it is likely they encountered in this case. The "doesn't look good" statement is difficult to draw conclusions from because there's no context stating *what* didn't look good - he may have been talking about the overcast to (what he was expecting to be) the southeast obscuring the ground, and the knock-on effect that would cause a flight that was supposed to be for sightseeing.

In any case, the the brief trepidation was ended when the Mac Central controller told them that they had 40 miles plus visibility under 2,500ft and as such VFR was completely possible as long as they let down when they did.

The descent - despite what prospector claims - was performed with the consent of all flight crew in the cockpit at the time. Prospector's claims are based on the unauthorised transcript changes made by Chippindale with ANZ Chief (management) Pilot Gemmell's "assistance".

No it doesn't but prospector is saying that some blame rests with the crew. Flying into terra firma is unequivocal proof of that.

CFIT is proof that something went wrong, but it does not automatically follow that it is the flight crew's fault. Remember that the advent of computerised flight plans meant that for the first time responsibility for navigation was taken out of the flight deck, and it was the action of the Chief Navigator - not the flight crew - that had them starting their descent 26 miles east of where they expected to be, exacerbated by the visual illusions for which they had not been trained providing a false visual confirmation of their location. Prospector's position is predicated on a set of regulations that were out of date in terms of responsibility for navigation, along with an almost fawning regard for the management of ANZ at the time. I have to wonder whether he is related in some way to Muldoon, Morrie Davies or one of the management at this point.

[FGD135]

... some blame rests with the crew. Flying into terra firma is unequivocal proof of that.

Chronic Snoozer, how about you put your thinking cap on?

If you were to fly into a hill whilst conducting an RNAV approach because Jeppesen accidentally shifted all the waypoint coordinates by a few miles, then that would be your fault would it?

[Chronic Snoozer]

FGD135

Chronic Snoozer, how about you put your thinking cap on? If you were to fly into a hill whilst conducting an RNAV approach because Jeppesen accidentally shifted all the waypoint coordinates by a few miles, then that would be your fault would it?

Thinking cap firmly on thanks mate. No requirement for straw men. I paraphrased prospector and added my observation that flying into the ground is proof enough (for me anyway) that 'some' blame (I prefer to say responsibility) rests with the crew in view of all that has been discussed. (That is the crew of this particular ANZ flight)

Dozy

I'd familiarise myself with the details of the case before making such sweeping statements.

I commented that this quote from prospector

The captain........must have been aware that there was a very good chance of encountering whiteout at the altitude he descended to

was fair and uncontroversial after 27/09 said it was jumping to conclusions. Semantically, there is little to be gained from discussing it further.

Not sure about this 100% blameless agenda being pushed which is detracting from a highly educational and useful discussion. You and I are of course entitled to our own opinions.

[DozyWannabe]

Except for the fact that the only whiteout he had been briefed to expect was the kind that happens close to the ground in a snow squall - sector whiteout was little understood at the time, and sadly it took this crash to make it common knowledge among the piloting fraternity.

The crew had been briefed to expect a particular track to a waypoint that turned out to be incorrect when the previous flight queried the waypoint position. Chief Navigator Hewitt realised he'd messed up, "corrected" the track (which while technically errant, was nevertheless the one flown as a matter of routine for over a year) and the change was made a few hours before the aircraft departed. The problem was that, for whatever reason, Nav Section failed to notify anyone of the change and so the meticulously plotted course that Collins thought he was following based on the briefing was not in fact the course programmed into the INS. What followed was a devil's brew of weather, misunderstanding, visual illusion, coincidence and rotten luck.

[ampan]

I don't see the relevance of the lack of any briefing on sector whiteout. The captain's comment, about it being very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice, did not refer to snow flurries or things of that nature. It referred to the difficulty of distinguishing one white thing from another white thing. If the F/O had responded to the comment with "So should we fly VMC below the cloud base?", what would the captain's answer have been? "Better not", I suggest.

[DozyWannabe]

Ampan, that's a 20/20 hindsight call right there. Remember that sector whiteout was not well understood and it becomes clear that the crew were convinced they were on the briefed track and had good reason to be.

[ampan]

20/20 hindsight would be 'He should have appreciated the problem with flying VMC below the cloud base'. The CVR shows that he did, in fact, appreciate the problem.

If he thought that the visual problem was overcome because he had his AINS track, then his mistake was lumping visual rules in with instrument rules, taking bits from both. He couldn't have his cake and eat it too. If it wasn't VMC below the cloud, that was the end of it. If he wanted to go down there, he had to do it on instruments.

[DozyWannabe]

Can you really be so certain? You're taking words plucked from a partial transcription with several unintelligible words and forming it into a statement of understanding and intent. Sector whiteout was not a well-understood phenomenon on the line, and it's possible that he might have been reasoning it out for himself while at the same time not being fully aware of the implications. Had he been on the track he believed he was on, then it would have made little or no difference, but it was the undisclosed change of track - over which the flight crew had neither control nor knowledge - that turned the situation deadly.

[ampan]

That could well have been his thought process, but that means that he was, in reality, flying on instruments. He knew that he wasn't allowed to go below MSA relying soley on the AINS, so maybe that's the reason for the VMC comments. In other words, he deliberately misdescribed an instrument descent as a VMC descent, in order to get around the rules.

[Dark Knight]

That could well have been his thought process, but that means that he was, in reality, flying on instruments. He knew that he wasn't allowed to go below MSA relying soley on the AINS, so maybe that's the reason for the VMC comments. In other words, he deliberately misdescribed an instrument descent as a VMC descent, in order to get around the rules

Now we are totally in the realm of speculation, 20/20 hindsight, fantasy, maybes, whatifs and could haves.

What has the annual rehash acheived this time?

As usual, exceedingly little.

Similar to the next rehash of the Lindy Chamberlain saga, maybe it is time to let sleeping dogs lie?

[ampan]

Hardly fanatsy. It's the captain's own words, uttered 12 minutes before he went down that hole, allegedly VMC: "Clouds come down a bit * * * may not be able to * * McMurdo. Very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice * * "

[Dark Knight]

In which case it can be assumed he screwed up?

You were not there; you do not know; one can only speculate.

The usual annual rehash has changed or proved nought.

Time to let sleeping dogs lie.

[27/09]

Chronic Snoozer

You posted

No it doesn't but prospector is saying that some blame rests with the crew. Flying into terra firma is unequivocal proof of that.

My comment to prospector was in reply to this from Prospector:

The only relevant one here is the 20km vis. And it is patently obvious they never, for whatever reason had that. .

In other words I take it that Prospector thinks the visibility was poor.

To which I asked

Prospector, How can you say that?

And he replied

Yes, they flew into Ross Island.

I don't believe there is any absolute proof of poor visibility.

prospector is saying that some blame rests with the crew

I agree some blame rests with the crew, but not on the degree of blame, however that wasn't being debated at this point, we were debating the visibility.

Regarding the 100% blame or no blame. Prospector seems to only find things to blame on the crew for the accident even though early on he did say there were others who contributed to this accident

Why was there such a cover up from Air New Zealand and other parties? There was the inference crew were in cloud, the skewing of the CVR transcripts, the break in to Jim Collins house, the removal of the pages from his diary that was found in the wreckage. The missing portions of the ATC tapes at MCMurdo. What were they trying to hide, what did they have to be worried about?

Prospector does not seem to be able to accept that the crew were possibly deceived by the conditions. How many people have not been fooled by an optical illusion whether it be in the ground or airborne?

Yes, it is time to let things lie.

[prospector]

Prospector does not seem to be able to accept that the crew were possibly deceived by the conditions.

There is no "possibly" about it. They were deceived by the conditions.

I agree some blame rests with the crew,

Then you agree with me, the whole point of this thread is Holmes scribing a book trying to convince the general public that no blame be attached to the crew, and that the New Zealand Government apologise to the Captains family for even hinting at the fact the crew could have in any way been responsible for this crash.

(Is it coincidence that this book appears after 30years, and after Chippindale's death??)

The object of Accident Investigation is to find the cause, if possible, of the accident. This whole controversy has been over the interpretation of two separate findings, one by a highly experienced, trained, Aviation Accident inspector, who stated a "Probable Cause", and a High Court Judge, whose methodology was hightly criticised by both the NZ Appeal Court, and the Privy Council.

You can take your pick of which interpretation of facts you wish to believe, I have stated that I believe the findings of Chippindale to be far more plausible as to the cause of the crash. There is no doubt Mahon made some contribution by extending the enquiry outside the hitherto boundaries of Accident Investigation, but as to whether his version of events is more realistic then the findings of Chippindale is up to the individual, after hopefully looking fully at all aspects of the findings of both parties, and using their own experience in Aviation to fine tune their views.

[ampan]

Quite right. The whole "no blame to the crew" thing is just plain stupid. Could we at least give Capt Collins 10%? The response would be a howling "no" from NZALPA. They remind me of a brain-dead cult.

[27/09]

Prospector

I think we might agree on the dwarf as well, pompous, self opinionated person that he is.

I don't fully accept either the Chippendale report nor the Mahon version. There are some things in the official report that don't stand up to scrutiny, for example some of the transcripts. I don't wish to denigrate Ron Chippendale, because I think he did the job honestly to the best of his ability but I do think he might have been steered in certain directions on some things. Justice Mahon also did a good job but as a layman I'm not sure he came up with interpretations on some things that an industry expert would necessarily have.

The way I see it both gentlemen were doomed to failure to some degree both by the system and some of the people manipulating that system.

There were people who could not afford for Ron Chippendale to come to certain conclusions leading to some parts of his report to come into question.

Justice Mahon was appointed to run a Royal Commission which I suspect was originally intended as window dressing but to the surprise of certain people his report contained details of actions/events which were perhaps not the original intent of his report. Someone who is a Judge of his standing does not coin a phrase "Orchestrated litany of lies" with out good reason. His report embarrassed certain people, the fall out eventually leading to him falling from favour.

[reubee]

I found it interesting when reading of the Court of Inquiry report into the crash of the RNZAF Iroquois on Anzac Day last year and thinking how in 2011, how much of their key causes could relate to events in 1979 ...

The Court of Inquiry into the Iroquois crash on Anzac Day last year made about 169 findings during its investigation, which boiled down to six key causes.

• The loss of awareness experienced by the Iroquois crew after they inadvertently flew into heavy cloud.
  
• None of the Iroquois crews flying that day took such a scenario into account when performing their pre-flight preparation.
  
• The failure of those on the crashed Iroquois to comply with orders, instructions and procedures for flying in low and heavy cloud, as well as the deficiencies in those procedures that resulted in the crew not being fully qualified, competent and up to date with their training in such a scenario.
  
• The radar warning system on the crashed Iroquois was set to five feet rather than 200ft, like the other two aircraft. It is likely the radar only activated seconds before the crash.
  
• The air force did not effectively identify and mitigate the risks associated with night vision flying.
  
• The operational culture of 3 Squadron was one where occasional "rule breaking" was permitted if servicemen felt it would successfully achieve a task.

In 1979 that could've read ...

• The loss of awareness experienced by the crew of 901 crew after they inadvertently encountered sector white-out.
  
• The training and route planning departments in Air New Zealand did not take such a scenario into account in any training or pre-flight preparation
  
• The failure of the 901 crew to comply with orders, instructions and procedures for descending, as well as the deficiencies in those procedures that resulted in the 901 crew not being fully qualified, competent, familiar and up to date with their training in such a scenario.
  
• No equivalent
  
• Air New Zealand and CAD did not effectively identify and mitigate the risks associated with sector white-out.
  
• The operational culture of Air New Zealand was one where occasional "rule breaking" was permitted if pilots felt it would successfully achieve a task. (same could be said for navigation department)

I've bolded sector white-out as it is different from white-out, and I bolded familiar because when people say the crew didn't follow Air New Zealands descent guidelines, there were 5 crew on-board the DC-10 and not one of them ever said out loud, hey we aren't allowed to descend yet. I don't believe all 5 purposefully silently disobeyed something, rather it hadn't been drummed into them what was permitted and what wasn't.

[DozyWannabe]

They did follow ANZ's descent guidelines though - it was the NZCA's 6,000ft lower limit that seems to be the sticking point, even though ANZ explicitly briefed crews that they could descend to any level suggested or invited to by the Mac Central controllers and that in those circumstances the controllers' directions superseded the NZCA "rule".

In short, what was presented by NZCA as a hard-and-fast rule was diluted to a guideline by ANZ, and ANZ went to some trouble to try to put that fact down the memory hole (via the company shredder).

[#1AHRS]

Originally Posted by AMPAN

If he thought that the visual problem was overcome because he had his AINS track, then his mistake was lumping visual rules in with instrument rules, taking bits from both. He couldn't have his cake and eat it too. If it wasn't VMC below the cloud, that was the end of it. If he wanted to go down there, he had to do it on instruments.

The operator I fly for descend both VMC both IMC using LNAV/VNAV coupled to the guidance. When flying visually or even VFR (which we occasionally do though not in Antactica) we still use the Area nav to manage the navigation, though we are flying visually and avoiding the rocks by looking out of the window. No lumping together of visual or instrument rules there, just good utilization of what the aircraft offers us. As I suspect Jim Collins was doing.

[Dark Knight]