Paul Holmes and Erebus
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we're still going around in circles
Boss to Employee: Shut up, or I'll nail your other foot to the floor
We all have a cross to bear. With Easter an all, nails and crosses seem appropriate. Hope you all had a good one.
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We are not going around in circles, we are asking and answering different questions.
Some of us are asking if Collins was in any way responsible for the crash. In particular should he be exonerated as demanded by Poor Gnomes, and, it seems, a faction in NZALPA.
Some are asking how and why accidents happen and what we can do to stop them. Quite rightly so. I would say, though, accusing others of being blinkered is a bit shortsighted.
I don't agree with Brian Abraham that if it hadn't been Collins it would have been someone else, but I do agree it might have been someone else. I have no way of assessing how many flights might have occurred before a PIC:
Didn't check the McMurdo coordinates he entered into the AINS on a chart
Didn't seek clarification of "McMurdo" at a dodgy briefing
Didn't wonder why the "nowhere" waypoint he charted was not BYRD
Didn't ponder the VHF, radar, TACAN not working
Didn't proceed as planned and trained
Didn't check his position on the AINS
Didn't use the acft radar
Didn't see any substantial risk going through a "hole" to 1500ft
Didn't abort when nobody saw Erebus (or "anything") anywhere
Didn't climb out over the sea
Didn't have other pilots challenge him
Nevertheless, the crash occurred once, and accidents happen all the time. To prevent accidents we must have systems in place so there is no single point of failure, such as Collins so spectacularly demonstrated.
Mind the gap - National - NZ Herald News
Here Dr Kathleen Callaghan compares Erebus and Pike River Mine disasters. In my opinion, while there are similarities, there are fundamental differences. Airline pilots mostly only have to fly an aircraft high, mine owners must employ and pay labourers to dig deep in a "minefield" and make a profit.
When I sit in an airliner I just hope nothing goes wrong, and if it does, the pilot knows what he is doing. For that reason I am mightily relieved to see someone I know. For if I know him he will be a display pilot, who knows how to fly, not a train driver of rather limited intellect.
Maybe when airlines train pilots better, so they can fly the aircraft not just monitor its flight, or stall as with AF447, I will relax.
In the meantime I won't fly Air NZ, although I know some very good pilots, because to me the Perpignan crash shows they are still up themselves. "Hubris", for any sensitive Australians.
Some of us are asking if Collins was in any way responsible for the crash. In particular should he be exonerated as demanded by Poor Gnomes, and, it seems, a faction in NZALPA.
Some are asking how and why accidents happen and what we can do to stop them. Quite rightly so. I would say, though, accusing others of being blinkered is a bit shortsighted.
I don't agree with Brian Abraham that if it hadn't been Collins it would have been someone else, but I do agree it might have been someone else. I have no way of assessing how many flights might have occurred before a PIC:
Didn't check the McMurdo coordinates he entered into the AINS on a chart
Didn't seek clarification of "McMurdo" at a dodgy briefing
Didn't wonder why the "nowhere" waypoint he charted was not BYRD
Didn't ponder the VHF, radar, TACAN not working
Didn't proceed as planned and trained
Didn't check his position on the AINS
Didn't use the acft radar
Didn't see any substantial risk going through a "hole" to 1500ft
Didn't abort when nobody saw Erebus (or "anything") anywhere
Didn't climb out over the sea
Didn't have other pilots challenge him
Nevertheless, the crash occurred once, and accidents happen all the time. To prevent accidents we must have systems in place so there is no single point of failure, such as Collins so spectacularly demonstrated.
Mind the gap - National - NZ Herald News
Here Dr Kathleen Callaghan compares Erebus and Pike River Mine disasters. In my opinion, while there are similarities, there are fundamental differences. Airline pilots mostly only have to fly an aircraft high, mine owners must employ and pay labourers to dig deep in a "minefield" and make a profit.
When I sit in an airliner I just hope nothing goes wrong, and if it does, the pilot knows what he is doing. For that reason I am mightily relieved to see someone I know. For if I know him he will be a display pilot, who knows how to fly, not a train driver of rather limited intellect.
Maybe when airlines train pilots better, so they can fly the aircraft not just monitor its flight, or stall as with AF447, I will relax.
In the meantime I won't fly Air NZ, although I know some very good pilots, because to me the Perpignan crash shows they are still up themselves. "Hubris", for any sensitive Australians.
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For that reason I am mightily relieved to see someone I know. For if I know him he will be a display pilot, who knows how to fly, not a train driver of rather limited intellect.
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Ornis,
Thanks for that link, a very good article, especially the end 2. and 3.
Thanks for that link, a very good article, especially the end 2. and 3.
Quick fixes- and why they often don't work
1 Fire someone: A new person may make the same mistake
2 More training: Useless if staff were already trained but knowingly did the wrong thing
3 New rules: Unlikely to work if the old rules were ignored, often with the tacit approval of managers
1 Fire someone: A new person may make the same mistake
2 More training: Useless if staff were already trained but knowingly did the wrong thing
3 New rules: Unlikely to work if the old rules were ignored, often with the tacit approval of managers
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Thank you, Brian, for your answer, and best wishes. Sometimes people are just at cross purposes and nothing can be done about it. I don't expect the owner of the hangar I was in until recently to fly his A340 the way he displays so brilliantly his Tiger Moth, let alone his Hawker Hunter. All I am saying is he knows how to fly, like a bird.
One Saturday I watched a Tiger burn after the very experienced pilot stalled in a turn climbing out; she must have looked inside and lost the "horizon" against the hills at Taumarunui. The very next Wednesday an instructor I had trusted with my daughter's life failed to recover from an inverted spin in a Steen Skybolt near Ardmore; aircraft grossly over weight. I was in that same hangar; then an Olympic yachtsman took out a Fouga Magister and killed the airport manager (former Skyhawk pilot). Another tenant took a young woman out in his Smyth Sidewinder, stalled taking off from a beach after he got lost; ex Iraqi Air Force I seem to remember.
Two Saturdays ago I had lunch with a pilot at Dargaville who crashed Sunday week when his engine stopped. This is all in the last 10 years and not all the pilots I knew now dead.
I have just completed a trip to Wanaka, some of it, into Balclutha and past Dunedin, in conditions I would not take passengers. Fortunately I fly with a German pilot who is happy to be a navigator. Only once have we been caught short, but it was home territory and we landed on a farm strip. Only once has the engine stopped. Alone, and never having fiddled with the fuel cocks before, I had switched one off instead of the other on. Looking down 5000ft I saw Rangitaiki Aerodrome. Then I "clicked". Lucky, eh?
One Saturday I watched a Tiger burn after the very experienced pilot stalled in a turn climbing out; she must have looked inside and lost the "horizon" against the hills at Taumarunui. The very next Wednesday an instructor I had trusted with my daughter's life failed to recover from an inverted spin in a Steen Skybolt near Ardmore; aircraft grossly over weight. I was in that same hangar; then an Olympic yachtsman took out a Fouga Magister and killed the airport manager (former Skyhawk pilot). Another tenant took a young woman out in his Smyth Sidewinder, stalled taking off from a beach after he got lost; ex Iraqi Air Force I seem to remember.
Two Saturdays ago I had lunch with a pilot at Dargaville who crashed Sunday week when his engine stopped. This is all in the last 10 years and not all the pilots I knew now dead.
I have just completed a trip to Wanaka, some of it, into Balclutha and past Dunedin, in conditions I would not take passengers. Fortunately I fly with a German pilot who is happy to be a navigator. Only once have we been caught short, but it was home territory and we landed on a farm strip. Only once has the engine stopped. Alone, and never having fiddled with the fuel cocks before, I had switched one off instead of the other on. Looking down 5000ft I saw Rangitaiki Aerodrome. Then I "clicked". Lucky, eh?
Boy oh boy , I think we're entering new territory.
1/ Fire someone...........this will only work if you have a "rogue employee" ie someone who is blatently reckless and violating rules and regulations because "they know best". More often than not tied to ego and/or narcacism. If the person isn't a rogue, then the systems or culture of the place is more likely to be where your trouble lies.
2/ More training is great if lack of training was the problem. In my experience there is normally sufficient quantity of training but the quality is lacking. This again links back into an outfits "culture". (try not to cringe when you hear that word)The poor quality of the training strengthens any negative attitudes towards training and safety in general ,and a sort of safety culture spiral dive ensues.
3/New Rules........again, only works if the old rules were followed, but were inadequate.
The common theme is that the safety culture of the outfit is what determines how safe the operation is. Some people don't like that sort of terminology and dismiss such statements as "new age CRM fluff" etc but safety cultures have always existed in every squadron and on building sites and in shipping companies and airlines etc etc, but recently it has been given a name.
A safety culture is never static, it's either improving or worsening and depends mainly on the leadership of the outfit although the attitudes of just a few senior operators within the operation can have great influence on it as well.
In my opinion, Chief Pilots, CEO's, Training Managers and Check Airmen need to be taught the basic concepts of how a positive safety culture is developed and maintained, then, they need to formally acknowledge that they are responsible for the safety culture of their operation and need to actively tend to it. Doing so requires very difficult decisions to be made (commercial v's safety) and not every senior person is born with the neccessary skills. I do think it can be taught in a classroom.
It takes strong leadership to reverse a culture that is worsening. It requires someone to stick their neck out a little bit in the process of reversing the trend. They certainly won't be a leader concerned with winning popularity contests.
In my opinion, a good example of where leadership of this calibre was in order but never displayed is the 2010 ANZAC Day crash of Iroquois NZ3806. The investigation revealed a dismal safety culture.
1/ Fire someone...........this will only work if you have a "rogue employee" ie someone who is blatently reckless and violating rules and regulations because "they know best". More often than not tied to ego and/or narcacism. If the person isn't a rogue, then the systems or culture of the place is more likely to be where your trouble lies.
2/ More training is great if lack of training was the problem. In my experience there is normally sufficient quantity of training but the quality is lacking. This again links back into an outfits "culture". (try not to cringe when you hear that word)The poor quality of the training strengthens any negative attitudes towards training and safety in general ,and a sort of safety culture spiral dive ensues.
3/New Rules........again, only works if the old rules were followed, but were inadequate.
The common theme is that the safety culture of the outfit is what determines how safe the operation is. Some people don't like that sort of terminology and dismiss such statements as "new age CRM fluff" etc but safety cultures have always existed in every squadron and on building sites and in shipping companies and airlines etc etc, but recently it has been given a name.
A safety culture is never static, it's either improving or worsening and depends mainly on the leadership of the outfit although the attitudes of just a few senior operators within the operation can have great influence on it as well.
In my opinion, Chief Pilots, CEO's, Training Managers and Check Airmen need to be taught the basic concepts of how a positive safety culture is developed and maintained, then, they need to formally acknowledge that they are responsible for the safety culture of their operation and need to actively tend to it. Doing so requires very difficult decisions to be made (commercial v's safety) and not every senior person is born with the neccessary skills. I do think it can be taught in a classroom.
It takes strong leadership to reverse a culture that is worsening. It requires someone to stick their neck out a little bit in the process of reversing the trend. They certainly won't be a leader concerned with winning popularity contests.
In my opinion, a good example of where leadership of this calibre was in order but never displayed is the 2010 ANZAC Day crash of Iroquois NZ3806. The investigation revealed a dismal safety culture.
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framer, a good post at #600, and further immediately above. You are on the money with "culture", which is what my previously mentioned "Normalisation of Deviance" is all about.
The following is from Dekker
Dekker (2002) proposed an alternative model of organisational accidents that is based on failure drift. Although he acknowledges with thanks the work of Reason, he criticises the Swiss Cheese model because it does not explain what the holes consist of or why they line up to let a failure become an accident. He maintains that without the benefit of hindsight, error is hard to define and seeing the holes is difficult and therefore the Swiss Cheese model is not necessarily helpful in accident prevention. Therefore to try and understand why an accident occurs, it is necessary to reconstruct the unfolding mindset of the organisation and individuals concerned without the benefit of hindsight. This is the perspective from which Dekker has developed his ‘Drift into Failure’ model and his new view of human error.
Dekker’s ‘Drift into Failure’ model consists of three points:
1. People involved in accidents are not criminals or immoral deviants: “Failure drift and accidents that follow them are associated with normal people doing normal work in normal organizations” (Dekker, 2005, p. 24)
2. Often work involves deciding between conflicting goals: Organisations that involve critical safety work are essentially trying to reconcile irreconcilable goals (staying safe and staying in business) (Dekker, 2005)
3. Drifting into failure is incremental. “Accidents don’t happen suddenly, nor are they preceded by monumentally bad decisions or bizarrely huge steps away from the ruling norm” (Dekker, 2005, p. 24).
Under this model “the potential of having an accident grows as a normal by-product of resource scarcity and competition“ (Dekker, 2005, p. 24).
1. The Old View
Human error is a cause of accidents
The New View
Human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system.
2.The Old View
To explain failure, investigations must seek failure
The New View
To explain failure, do not try to find where people went wrong.
3. The Old View
They must find people’s inaccurate assessments, wrong decisions and bad judgements
The New View
Instead, investigate how people’s assessments and actions would have made sense at the time, given the circumstances that surrounded them.
4. The Old View
Murphy’s Law: Whatever can go wrong will.
The New View
Murphy’s law is wrong: What can go wrong usually goes right, but then we draw the wrong conclusion.
prospector, I'm most taken with your proposition that the 6,000 foot MDA was a result of Skuas.
I've been in correspondence with a scientist who studied the Skuas down there (a New Zealander, so we can take his word as being the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth). He says they fly at no more than 100 metres AGL, do not fly in flocks, though they might sometimes follow one another enroute to a food source, doesn't think he saw more than 6 birds in flight at any one time.
So naturally you are going to find them scavenging on the human remains on the mountain side, but they are not going to be an in flight hazard to an aircraft, unless you're engaging in nap of the earth flight.
Any authoritative source you are able to cite? I can find nothing.
The following is from Dekker
Dekker (2002) proposed an alternative model of organisational accidents that is based on failure drift. Although he acknowledges with thanks the work of Reason, he criticises the Swiss Cheese model because it does not explain what the holes consist of or why they line up to let a failure become an accident. He maintains that without the benefit of hindsight, error is hard to define and seeing the holes is difficult and therefore the Swiss Cheese model is not necessarily helpful in accident prevention. Therefore to try and understand why an accident occurs, it is necessary to reconstruct the unfolding mindset of the organisation and individuals concerned without the benefit of hindsight. This is the perspective from which Dekker has developed his ‘Drift into Failure’ model and his new view of human error.
Dekker’s ‘Drift into Failure’ model consists of three points:
1. People involved in accidents are not criminals or immoral deviants: “Failure drift and accidents that follow them are associated with normal people doing normal work in normal organizations” (Dekker, 2005, p. 24)
2. Often work involves deciding between conflicting goals: Organisations that involve critical safety work are essentially trying to reconcile irreconcilable goals (staying safe and staying in business) (Dekker, 2005)
3. Drifting into failure is incremental. “Accidents don’t happen suddenly, nor are they preceded by monumentally bad decisions or bizarrely huge steps away from the ruling norm” (Dekker, 2005, p. 24).
Under this model “the potential of having an accident grows as a normal by-product of resource scarcity and competition“ (Dekker, 2005, p. 24).
1. The Old View
Human error is a cause of accidents
The New View
Human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system.
2.The Old View
To explain failure, investigations must seek failure
The New View
To explain failure, do not try to find where people went wrong.
3. The Old View
They must find people’s inaccurate assessments, wrong decisions and bad judgements
The New View
Instead, investigate how people’s assessments and actions would have made sense at the time, given the circumstances that surrounded them.
4. The Old View
Murphy’s Law: Whatever can go wrong will.
The New View
Murphy’s law is wrong: What can go wrong usually goes right, but then we draw the wrong conclusion.
prospector, I'm most taken with your proposition that the 6,000 foot MDA was a result of Skuas.
I've been in correspondence with a scientist who studied the Skuas down there (a New Zealander, so we can take his word as being the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth). He says they fly at no more than 100 metres AGL, do not fly in flocks, though they might sometimes follow one another enroute to a food source, doesn't think he saw more than 6 birds in flight at any one time.
So naturally you are going to find them scavenging on the human remains on the mountain side, but they are not going to be an in flight hazard to an aircraft, unless you're engaging in nap of the earth flight.
Any authoritative source you are able to cite? I can find nothing.
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The danger of possible bird strike was only one of the reasons 6,000ft was the MDA, and skua's were no doubt only one of the bird species considered. I must admit to no skills as an ornitholigist, I can remember reading somewhere why 6,000ft was chosen, one of the reasons being there would never be a requirement to land down there and among other things it would keep them out of the hair of local traffic. The probability of hitting a skua was probably as remote as being hit by a boulder tossed out of Erebus perhaps.
In the grand scheme of things it is a very minor point, there have been many more very good points made, and I believe the consensus must be that no exoneration is justified, and that is what the intent of the thread was, whether such an exoneration is justified.
In the grand scheme of things it is a very minor point, there have been many more very good points made, and I believe the consensus must be that no exoneration is justified, and that is what the intent of the thread was, whether such an exoneration is justified.
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The old: Know what you are doing.
The new: You're dumb.
The old: Be careful.
The new: Can't beat the culture.
The old: Stick to the plan.
The new: Had any brainwaves?
The old: Beware, things go wrong.
The new: It's God's will.
The old: Learn from mistakes.
The new: What mistakes?
The old: A tomato is a fruit.
The new: Put it in the fruit salad.
The new: You're dumb.
The old: Be careful.
The new: Can't beat the culture.
The old: Stick to the plan.
The new: Had any brainwaves?
The old: Beware, things go wrong.
The new: It's God's will.
The old: Learn from mistakes.
The new: What mistakes?
The old: A tomato is a fruit.
The new: Put it in the fruit salad.
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Ornis, you are so in error.
A local, North Carolina preacher said to his congregation, "Someone in this congregation has spread a rumor that I belong to the Ku Klux Klan. This is a horrible lie and one which a Christian community cannot tolerate. I am offended and do not intend to accept this. Now, I want the party who did this to stand and ask forgiveness from God and this Christian Family."
No one moved. The preacher continued, "Do you have the nerve to face me and admit this is a falsehood? Remember, you will be forgiven and in your heart you will feel glory. Now stand and confess your transgression."
Again all was quiet.
Then slowly, a drop-dead gorgeous blonde with a body that would stop traffic rose from the third pew. Her head was bowed and her voice quivered as she spoke, "Reverend there has been a terrible misunderstanding. I never said you were a member of the Ku Klux Klan.
I simply told a couple of my friends that you were a wizard under the sheets."
The preacher fell to his knees, his wife fainted, and the congregation roared.
KNOWLEDGE is knowing a tomato is a fruit; but -
WISDOM is not putting it in a fruit salad.
A local, North Carolina preacher said to his congregation, "Someone in this congregation has spread a rumor that I belong to the Ku Klux Klan. This is a horrible lie and one which a Christian community cannot tolerate. I am offended and do not intend to accept this. Now, I want the party who did this to stand and ask forgiveness from God and this Christian Family."
No one moved. The preacher continued, "Do you have the nerve to face me and admit this is a falsehood? Remember, you will be forgiven and in your heart you will feel glory. Now stand and confess your transgression."
Again all was quiet.
Then slowly, a drop-dead gorgeous blonde with a body that would stop traffic rose from the third pew. Her head was bowed and her voice quivered as she spoke, "Reverend there has been a terrible misunderstanding. I never said you were a member of the Ku Klux Klan.
I simply told a couple of my friends that you were a wizard under the sheets."
The preacher fell to his knees, his wife fainted, and the congregation roared.
KNOWLEDGE is knowing a tomato is a fruit; but -
WISDOM is not putting it in a fruit salad.
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Ah, Brian, you caught my little barb. Not entirely blinded by your faith, then, you do know what wisdom is. Now consider:
You stop at a red light but you really really want to go. So you look both ways, see nothing, and go. Out of nowhere appears a motorbike; the rider is killed.
You plead it was a very dull overcast day, there was a dip in the road, the bike had no lights, the rider wore grey clothes and helmet, he was speeding ...
Judge One says, yes, the council should fix up the road, by law bikes must show lights, the rider didn't slow or swerve, drivers need to be "educated" to look for bikes, you are a doctor who was rushing to an emergency, other people go through red lights, it's the culture. Human factors: tragic accident.
The police appeal; Judge Two says, no, you went through a red light. No excuses. You are going to jail.
Now change perspective: the motorcyclist is your son. He has been to see you and his mother and was going home to his wife and young children.
Which judgement seems right to you? Bit of waffle keep you happy?
Brian, we are all victims of our circumstances, all different yet woven from the same cloth. The Universe works in a way we don't understand, at the subatomic level it is entirely random and unpredictable (indeterminant). And yet, a pair of particles generated together but separated by an arbitrarily large distance remain somehow connected (entanglement).
Nobody can explain this "spooky action at a distance" (Einstein), yet you propose with a few simple analogies (gruyere cheese) and mumbo jumbo (drift into failure) to explain the human mind and control human interactions. It's nothing more than a cult: a bee in the bonnet and buzz words.
If anyone might have added something useful, it might have been Paul Callaghan FRS. One genius outweighs a million others, as Richard Feynman showed after the space shuttle Challenger disaster.
Give me two pilots who watch or guard each other; independent yet working as a team to keep the aircraft flying and safe. Each and both knowing what they're doing, for example, to wind the trim wheel when the Airbus throws the flight controls at them; not shoot up and roll inverted (Perpignan) or drop into the sea (maybe AF447).
You can have the the humbug. You can have the pilot who flies into a mountain he knows is there, somewhere, but can't see, anywhere.
You stop at a red light but you really really want to go. So you look both ways, see nothing, and go. Out of nowhere appears a motorbike; the rider is killed.
You plead it was a very dull overcast day, there was a dip in the road, the bike had no lights, the rider wore grey clothes and helmet, he was speeding ...
Judge One says, yes, the council should fix up the road, by law bikes must show lights, the rider didn't slow or swerve, drivers need to be "educated" to look for bikes, you are a doctor who was rushing to an emergency, other people go through red lights, it's the culture. Human factors: tragic accident.
The police appeal; Judge Two says, no, you went through a red light. No excuses. You are going to jail.
Now change perspective: the motorcyclist is your son. He has been to see you and his mother and was going home to his wife and young children.
Which judgement seems right to you? Bit of waffle keep you happy?
Brian, we are all victims of our circumstances, all different yet woven from the same cloth. The Universe works in a way we don't understand, at the subatomic level it is entirely random and unpredictable (indeterminant). And yet, a pair of particles generated together but separated by an arbitrarily large distance remain somehow connected (entanglement).
Nobody can explain this "spooky action at a distance" (Einstein), yet you propose with a few simple analogies (gruyere cheese) and mumbo jumbo (drift into failure) to explain the human mind and control human interactions. It's nothing more than a cult: a bee in the bonnet and buzz words.
If anyone might have added something useful, it might have been Paul Callaghan FRS. One genius outweighs a million others, as Richard Feynman showed after the space shuttle Challenger disaster.
Give me two pilots who watch or guard each other; independent yet working as a team to keep the aircraft flying and safe. Each and both knowing what they're doing, for example, to wind the trim wheel when the Airbus throws the flight controls at them; not shoot up and roll inverted (Perpignan) or drop into the sea (maybe AF447).
You can have the the humbug. You can have the pilot who flies into a mountain he knows is there, somewhere, but can't see, anywhere.
Last edited by Ornis; 11th Apr 2012 at 18:59. Reason: clarification
The New View
Human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system.
Human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system.
The old: Be careful.
The new: Can't beat the culture.
The new: Can't beat the culture.
The old: Stick to the plan.
The new: Had any brainwaves?
The new: Had any brainwaves?
The old: Beware, things go wrong.
The new: It's God's will.
The new: It's God's will.
The old: Learn from mistakes.
The new: What mistakes?
The new: What mistakes?
I am getting the feeling Ornis that you have very strong opinions about all these "modern attitudes" but I'm not convinced you actually know what they are. Your analogy about the red light that ends with
it's the culture. Human factors: tragic accident.
we are all victims of our circumstances, all different yet woven from the same cloth. The Universe works in a way we don't understand,
Each and both knowing what they're doing, for example, to wind the trim wheel when the Airbus throws the flight controls at them; not shoot up and roll inverted (Perpignan) or drop into the sea (maybe AF447).
I am not suggesting that we have reached a place where we fully understand how accidents occur but I do think that we are moving in the right direction and that our attitudes have to keep evolving. We have to avoid getting stuck in the mud and saying " arrggghh we did it best 30 years ago gggrrr"
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framer, Brian Abraham said I was in error and offered a joke. I returned the serve, mocking his list of causes.
Of course the pilots to blame for Perpignan are still alive and well in Air NZ. They thought they knew better than Airbus Industrie. Writing recently in the NZ Herald, one blamed the maintenance not being done in NZ. Still couldn't see if you test an aircraft you have to be ready waiting for failure. Dullard. Nevertheless the pilots did stall the aircraft on an approach, with the gear down, such that it "thought" it was landing, and apparently nobody knew the need to wind the THS manually.
When the A320s arrived, the CAA congratulated themselves for the speedy completion of the paperwork. Piffle, piffle and more piffle from the regulator.
I don't think I am as obstinate and ignorant as accused. I do see how accidents happen. I can almost understand how a young woman can run into a group of cyclists and kill several. But I am talking about a commander taking an aircraft and forgetting his primary responsibility to keep it safe when it is flying perfectly.
My perspective is that of an informed (and opinionated) airline passenger, but I'm not stupid. I know you know more than I do.
Of course the pilots to blame for Perpignan are still alive and well in Air NZ. They thought they knew better than Airbus Industrie. Writing recently in the NZ Herald, one blamed the maintenance not being done in NZ. Still couldn't see if you test an aircraft you have to be ready waiting for failure. Dullard. Nevertheless the pilots did stall the aircraft on an approach, with the gear down, such that it "thought" it was landing, and apparently nobody knew the need to wind the THS manually.
When the A320s arrived, the CAA congratulated themselves for the speedy completion of the paperwork. Piffle, piffle and more piffle from the regulator.
I don't think I am as obstinate and ignorant as accused. I do see how accidents happen. I can almost understand how a young woman can run into a group of cyclists and kill several. But I am talking about a commander taking an aircraft and forgetting his primary responsibility to keep it safe when it is flying perfectly.
My perspective is that of an informed (and opinionated) airline passenger, but I'm not stupid. I know you know more than I do.
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mocking his list of causes
Sidney Dekker
Associate Professor
Centre for Human Factors in Aviation, IKP
Linköping Institute of Technology
SE - 581 83 Linköping
Sweden
tel. + 46 13 281646
fax. + 46 13 282579
A gentleman pre-eminent in the field of aviation safety, and well known among the professional aviation community. You can even talk to him on 'sidde at ikp dot liu dot se' should you wish.
It'd be a brave man to tell him he knows nowt about the subject.
mumbo jumbo (drift into failure) to explain the human mind and control human interactions. It's nothing more than a cult: a bee in the bonnet and buzz words.
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 12th Apr 2012 at 01:52.