Paul Holmes and Erebus
Why would anyone do something like that 'live'?
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**Except possibly in the early sixties when the Electras constantly succeded in landing on 16 at Wellington when all others were unsuccessful.
Lockheed had a spectacular handling gimmick that the company liked to demonstrate. The Electra could be flown over the runway threshold at 1,000ft and, with full flap and throttled right back to flight idle and standing on the propellors, descend almost vertically at 140 knots and land on the runway. It had absolutely no relevance to anything that might be encountered at any time in airline flying, where standard approach procedures and decision points are rigorously maintained, but it was a last- ditch method which somehow became an exercise to be performed on a flight check.
Such an approach was dangerous and had to be flown with absolute accuracy, at no less than 140 knots, Only that speed would give enough energy for the airliner to flare into a landing attitude because the propellors at flight idle effectively blanketed the airflow over the wings.
Such an approach was dangerous and had to be flown with absolute accuracy, at no less than 140 knots, Only that speed would give enough energy for the airliner to flare into a landing attitude because the propellors at flight idle effectively blanketed the airflow over the wings.
Without enough airspeed in the descent the aircraft landed very heavily, collapsing the undercarriage and shedding engines, wings and tail as it slid of the runway and across the grass to the accompaniment of emergency sirens and alarm bells ringing throughout Whenuapai RNZAF base.
Perhaps not directly related to Erebus thread, but further example of the Hubris that existed in the Company, TEAL, before the change to Air New Zealand
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Crikey: Not much point in wasting breath calling for a go-around.
It looks as if they had a better excuse for the 1966 incident: Due to a design defect in the DC8's throttle, the engine went past idle and slipped into reverse.
It looks as if they had a better excuse for the 1966 incident: Due to a design defect in the DC8's throttle, the engine went past idle and slipped into reverse.
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Due to a design defect in the DC8's throttle, the engine went past idle and slipped into reverse
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Crikey Number Two: Then why do it a second time, for no reason?
Put yourself in the position of an AirNZ (or TEAL) line captain in the 1960s, which Capt Collins was. Biggest danger? Kai Tak Checkerboard approach? No. Missing Honolulu and ditching in the Pacific? No. Mad-Cap training for things that would probably never happen? Definitely.
Put yourself in the position of an AirNZ (or TEAL) line captain in the 1960s, which Capt Collins was. Biggest danger? Kai Tak Checkerboard approach? No. Missing Honolulu and ditching in the Pacific? No. Mad-Cap training for things that would probably never happen? Definitely.
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TEAL was really just the "Air Transport Division" of the RNZAF
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Court Decisions
NZ Court of Appeal:
HOT FREE BOOKS • Judgments of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on Proceedings to Review Aspects of the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mount Erebus Aircraft Disaster • Sir Owen Woodhouse, R. B. Cooke, Ivor L. M. Richard
Privy Council:
http://www.nzalpa.org.nz/Portals/4/D...0v%20Mahon.pdf
US District Court for District of Columbia (Justice Greene):
FindACase™ | BEATTIE v. UNITED STATES
HOT FREE BOOKS • Judgments of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on Proceedings to Review Aspects of the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Mount Erebus Aircraft Disaster • Sir Owen Woodhouse, R. B. Cooke, Ivor L. M. Richard
Privy Council:
http://www.nzalpa.org.nz/Portals/4/D...0v%20Mahon.pdf
US District Court for District of Columbia (Justice Greene):
FindACase™ | BEATTIE v. UNITED STATES
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Book Review
Recently paid NZD43 for Holmes’ book. As expected, it’s garbage. The analysis of the causes is all taken from previous books. He certainly goes to town on Chippindale (and of all the available photos of the inspector, the one he selects is one that he hopes will show the man looking slightly dodgy.) Interestingly, there is no such full-frontal attack on Gemmell. It’s all innuendo and insinuation. From this, I would conclude that Gemmell, unlike Chippindale, isn’t dead yet and can still sue for defamation. The money spent on the book, however, was worth it, because it contains a piece of relevant evidence that never came out. The irony is that the evidence puts the final nail in the coffin of the ‘no blame on the Captain’ argument – so Holmes’ attempted snow-job has precisely the opposite effect.
Whatever transcript you look at, Captain Collins, while at 18000 feet and after being advised that McMurdo Station was covered in cloud, said that it was “very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice”. The danger of flying VMC below cloud was not covered in AirNZ’s briefing, but the captain clearly had some appreciation of the problem. How? It could have been from his days in the RNZAF, or from his private reading, but thanks to Paul, we have a far better candidate. At page 369, Holmes writes: “We know that Lucas had been diligent in his preparation for the flight because he and Jim Collins had paid a visit to Operation Deep Freeze for a briefing a month before, a visit confirmed by Chippindale, according to ALPA investigator First Officer Peter Rhodes.” (A footnote to the above sentence provides the source: “Email to Paul Davison, 5 December 2009”.)
Well, well. Now it comes out, 33 years later. I wonder how long the union has been sitting on that piece of information. If members of NZALPA knew about this air force briefing at the time of the Royal Commission, then they have some explaining to do. Mahon obviously knew nothing about it, and neither did Sir Rochford Hughes.
The significance is obvious: Given the state of his knowledge, Captain Collins wasn’t entitled to fly VMC below cloud. He could only go below MSA on instruments. Was the AINS sufficient? Definitely not:
Whatever transcript you look at, Captain Collins, while at 18000 feet and after being advised that McMurdo Station was covered in cloud, said that it was “very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice”. The danger of flying VMC below cloud was not covered in AirNZ’s briefing, but the captain clearly had some appreciation of the problem. How? It could have been from his days in the RNZAF, or from his private reading, but thanks to Paul, we have a far better candidate. At page 369, Holmes writes: “We know that Lucas had been diligent in his preparation for the flight because he and Jim Collins had paid a visit to Operation Deep Freeze for a briefing a month before, a visit confirmed by Chippindale, according to ALPA investigator First Officer Peter Rhodes.” (A footnote to the above sentence provides the source: “Email to Paul Davison, 5 December 2009”.)
Well, well. Now it comes out, 33 years later. I wonder how long the union has been sitting on that piece of information. If members of NZALPA knew about this air force briefing at the time of the Royal Commission, then they have some explaining to do. Mahon obviously knew nothing about it, and neither did Sir Rochford Hughes.
The significance is obvious: Given the state of his knowledge, Captain Collins wasn’t entitled to fly VMC below cloud. He could only go below MSA on instruments. Was the AINS sufficient? Definitely not:
“Even with the granted accuracy of the inertial navigation system, no pilot should descend in instrument meteorological conditions beneath his minimum safe altitude until he is perfectly certain of his position. He can do this by checking with ground aids, or by visually identifying the terrain over which he is flying. Should he even look like straying into unclear weather at lower heights, he should fly out immediately – unless of course his position can be monitored exactly with ground radio aids or radar.” (Vette p169)
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Given the same set of facts, it is amazing that two legal minds can come to such different conclusions. Justice Greene of the District of Columbia has come up with a finding that agrees in the main with Ron Chippindales findings. Completely different to Justice Mahons findings.
Could it be due to the fact that Justice Greene had no outside influence from other interested parties, unlike Justice Mahon, who undoubtedly put a lot of weight on the testimony of Captain Vette.
Justice Greene disagreed with Vette, especially over what the radar operators meaning of an offer of Radar vectors was intended to convey.
Could it be due to the fact that Justice Greene had no outside influence from other interested parties, unlike Justice Mahon, who undoubtedly put a lot of weight on the testimony of Captain Vette.
Justice Greene disagreed with Vette, especially over what the radar operators meaning of an offer of Radar vectors was intended to convey.
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That's just another of many rumours, but there's no evidence of it. If it had a source, it would have to be someone who listened to the tape, thought they might have heard something, and then told someone else. Trouble is, numerous persons listened to the tape.
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chris lz,
That piece pf information was posted by bbq. It is the first time I have ever heard it, and I have been following this and other relative threads for a long time now, and read just about all that has been printed on the subject.
It would appear from bbq's posting that he was employed by ANZ as aircrew at the time of the crash. Perhaps if he still follows this thread he may elucidate further on his statement.
It perhaps gains some credence due to the fact that F/O Lucas was not in the cockpit at the time the CVR recordings were being recorded, which would appear to be unusual given that he was a member of the crew and important decisions were being made.
That piece pf information was posted by bbq. It is the first time I have ever heard it, and I have been following this and other relative threads for a long time now, and read just about all that has been printed on the subject.
It would appear from bbq's posting that he was employed by ANZ as aircrew at the time of the crash. Perhaps if he still follows this thread he may elucidate further on his statement.
It perhaps gains some credence due to the fact that F/O Lucas was not in the cockpit at the time the CVR recordings were being recorded, which would appear to be unusual given that he was a member of the crew and important decisions were being made.
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It's a pity that Lucas was back in the cabin, given that he also attended the air force briefing at Operation Deep Freeze.
Old Fella's post at #73 is interesting: "I was involved as part of Operation Deep Freeze during December 1978 and we were certainly well briefed re 'white-out'. "
Old Fella's post at #73 is interesting: "I was involved as part of Operation Deep Freeze during December 1978 and we were certainly well briefed re 'white-out'. "
Last edited by ampan; 19th Jan 2012 at 02:25.
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Broadcaster, Aviator, Author & Lawyer
“Why was the airline so intent on blaming the dead aircrew? As always, we must follow the money. If the pilots were proven to have caused the accident through their own negligence, the airline’s insurers were protected in terms of the amount of damages for everyone on board by the Warsaw Convention – replaced in 1999 by the Montreal Convention – which would limit the airline’s liability to USD42,000 per dead passenger. If the airline itself were proven to have been grossly negligent, however, then the claims for damages would be unlimited and would have filled New Zealand courts for a long time. The costs to the airline and the country could have reached several hundred million dollars in compensation awards. Juries in courts, in the United States particularly, had been lavish in their awards against negligent airlines. It could well happen here. So the pilots had to be blamed. The airline could not be found to be culpable.” (Holmes p240)
Really, Paul? The pilots were employees of the airline, as were the navigation staff, the flight operations people, and every single other person involved (except the US Navy staff at McMurdo Station). Things done by the pilots were things done by the airline. AirNZ was liable for the decisions made by Captain Collins, because he was an employee of Air NZ.
The limit under the Warsaw Convention did not apply if the accident was caused by the airline’s “wilful misconduct”. The airline employees most often accused of such conduct were pilots. For example, in the Korean Airlines disaster, the airline was successfully sued in the US courts, it being found that the accident was caused by the airline’s wilful misconduct, in allowing the aircraft to enter Soviet airspace. In other words, the airline was liable for the navigation error made by the captain.
http://openjurist.org/932/f2d/1475
There was no financial incentive for AirNZ to pin the blame on the pilots. In fact, it was the opposite. If there was a clear unambiguous directive that 16,000 feet was the minimum altitude (which there wasn't), then Captain Collins’ deliberate breach of the directive would probably have amounted to wilful misconduct, by AirNZ. Far better to have individual acts of carelessness by numerous different employees, which then came together, in combination with the weather, to cause a disaster. In other words, lots of people were careless, but no-one wilfully broke the rules.
Follow the money again, Paul. You’ll end up in a very different place, with nothing to write a book about.
Really, Paul? The pilots were employees of the airline, as were the navigation staff, the flight operations people, and every single other person involved (except the US Navy staff at McMurdo Station). Things done by the pilots were things done by the airline. AirNZ was liable for the decisions made by Captain Collins, because he was an employee of Air NZ.
The limit under the Warsaw Convention did not apply if the accident was caused by the airline’s “wilful misconduct”. The airline employees most often accused of such conduct were pilots. For example, in the Korean Airlines disaster, the airline was successfully sued in the US courts, it being found that the accident was caused by the airline’s wilful misconduct, in allowing the aircraft to enter Soviet airspace. In other words, the airline was liable for the navigation error made by the captain.
http://openjurist.org/932/f2d/1475
There was no financial incentive for AirNZ to pin the blame on the pilots. In fact, it was the opposite. If there was a clear unambiguous directive that 16,000 feet was the minimum altitude (which there wasn't), then Captain Collins’ deliberate breach of the directive would probably have amounted to wilful misconduct, by AirNZ. Far better to have individual acts of carelessness by numerous different employees, which then came together, in combination with the weather, to cause a disaster. In other words, lots of people were careless, but no-one wilfully broke the rules.
Follow the money again, Paul. You’ll end up in a very different place, with nothing to write a book about.
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Careful there ampan, you will be starting another conspiracy theory, Ron Chippindale was also involved in that investigation.
From Johnj King publication.
Not the sort of job to be handed to the Aircraft Accident Inspector that Holmes tries to portray.
Also from John King publication. This is relevant but has not been mentioned in the thread yet,
From Johnj King publication.
Recently, for instance, he was appointed to the five strong United Nations team to investigate the loss of Korean Airlines Boeing 747 airliner, Flt KAL007 shot down by a Soviet fighter near the Island of Sakhalin in 1983.
Also from John King publication. This is relevant but has not been mentioned in the thread yet,
So even before the Royal Commission began its lengthy hearings, Judge Mahon had preconceived idea's about the deeper motives behind it-and about the c ause of the disaster, so had W.D. Baragwanath and G.M. Harrison, counsel assisting the Commissioner.
In Sydney a few weeks before the commission started, while viewing QANTAS training procedures for its own Antarctic flights the two lawyers publicly stated that pilot error on Flt901 was not the problem. The disaster was caused by a navigational error by Flight operations.
Everything from then on was made to fit that theory and all evidence which suggested the captain was responsible was rejected by the Royal Commission.
Everything from then on was made to fit that theory and all evidence which suggested the captain was responsible was rejected by the Royal Commission.
Last edited by prospector; 20th Jan 2012 at 03:55.
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Prospector / Desert Dingo:
The critical witness at the Royal Commission hearing was Captain Leslie Simpson, who ended up in the unique position of getting it in the neck from both sides. His "eye-balling"/ "10 miles" evidence when describing, we all think, two whole degrees of longitude is derided, by me and plenty of others. But what if he was looking at a flight plan that read:
"7751.0S16641.0E"
remembering that Captain Wilson had the co-ordinates of the TACAN up on the screen:
"7752.7S16658.0E".
17 minutes of longitude. Very easy to estimate that as 10nm. In NZ latitudes, it's 13nm. At 78S, it has to be less, so lets call it 10nm (and get back to following the briefing).
Second question: "7752.7S" means, to me, 77 degrees 52 minutes plus 0.7 of a minute. Is that right?
The critical witness at the Royal Commission hearing was Captain Leslie Simpson, who ended up in the unique position of getting it in the neck from both sides. His "eye-balling"/ "10 miles" evidence when describing, we all think, two whole degrees of longitude is derided, by me and plenty of others. But what if he was looking at a flight plan that read:
"7751.0S16641.0E"
remembering that Captain Wilson had the co-ordinates of the TACAN up on the screen:
"7752.7S16658.0E".
17 minutes of longitude. Very easy to estimate that as 10nm. In NZ latitudes, it's 13nm. At 78S, it has to be less, so lets call it 10nm (and get back to following the briefing).
Second question: "7752.7S" means, to me, 77 degrees 52 minutes plus 0.7 of a minute. Is that right?
Last edited by ampan; 21st Jan 2012 at 20:18.
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Looks as if his voice was never heard on the CVR tape:
The main lesson I’m learning from Holmes’ book, apart from the fact that be couldn’t even be bothered checking his spelling, is that of all the books he read, he should at least have read his own. It’s difficult to find a better example of someone shooting themselves in the foot, or somewhere worse:
As is to be expected, he makes no reference to the captain’s cloud/ice comment, because it doesn’t suit. At the point in the narrative where you would expect him to mention it, we get: “The fates were malevolent this day. The fates were conspiring. The fates wanted to kill this day.”(p62) Very good information about the fates, but nothing on the captain’s appreciation of the visual problem flying below cloud. So Holmes obviously had a snow-job in mind, but then, 300 pages later, he tells the world that the captain attended a briefing at the RNZAF, where the visual problems would have been referred to, thereby explaining the cloud/ice comment. With one single sentence, he destroyed his entire argument. Worse still, he turned an accident where the captain only had some of blame into one where he gets most of it. If I were a daughter of Erebus, I would regret letting Holmes inside the house.
“For Captain Arthur Cooper, the role of ‘Brick’ Lucas in the accident is constantly underestimated, not so much for what he did but for what he didn’t do. At no point in that final 30 minutes of the cockpit voice recorder is the voice of First Officer Lucas to be heard. In other words, he was back in the cabin, chatting to passengers or resting, without a doubt as fascinated as everyone else was with the Antartic scenes below them through the cabin windows, and not at all concerned. … And like Captain Arthur Cooper, Vette knew that if Jim Collins and Greg Cassin were flying foolishly that Lucas would have been straight up on the flight deck demanding to know what the hell they thought they were doing.” (Holmes p316)
When the aircraft began to descend, Lucas probably assumed that its position had been confirmed by the Tower’s radar. With the benefit of hindsight, it could be said that he should have wondered to himself why the aircraft was orbiting, instead of going straight down. So he has to cop a bit of the blame, but not much.The main lesson I’m learning from Holmes’ book, apart from the fact that be couldn’t even be bothered checking his spelling, is that of all the books he read, he should at least have read his own. It’s difficult to find a better example of someone shooting themselves in the foot, or somewhere worse:
“But what no-one on the flight deck knew, Collins’ understanding of the meaning of flying visually bore no relation to the realities of Antarctic flying. The normal VMC requirement round the world is that you must be able to see anything eight kilometres away. Air New Zealand had increased that requirement to 20 kilometers in Antarctica but it wasn’t enough. In fact the visibility requirement meant nothing in whiteout. Whiteout is a unique and fatal trap. Collins didn’t know this. Mac Centre had told him he would have 40 miles’ visibility which, in aviation terms, is infinite. Air New Zealand never discussed the kind of whiteout he was now flying into and had not advised the Antartic pilots never to descend beneath cloud with white snow and ice beneath them and a low sun behind them. The failure to inform the crews about the dangers of whiteout was a grossly negligent omission. It was a gross dereliction. If the airline had arranged for the briefings to include instructions into the variety and perfidiousness of Antartic whiteout, then even in what he perceived to be visual conditions, Jim Collins would never have flown beneath cloud in Antarctica with mountains all around him, and the crash would not have happened.” (Holmes pp65,66)
As is to be expected, he makes no reference to the captain’s cloud/ice comment, because it doesn’t suit. At the point in the narrative where you would expect him to mention it, we get: “The fates were malevolent this day. The fates were conspiring. The fates wanted to kill this day.”(p62) Very good information about the fates, but nothing on the captain’s appreciation of the visual problem flying below cloud. So Holmes obviously had a snow-job in mind, but then, 300 pages later, he tells the world that the captain attended a briefing at the RNZAF, where the visual problems would have been referred to, thereby explaining the cloud/ice comment. With one single sentence, he destroyed his entire argument. Worse still, he turned an accident where the captain only had some of blame into one where he gets most of it. If I were a daughter of Erebus, I would regret letting Holmes inside the house.
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Copied this from another thread re Hercs. It the best example I've seen of whiteout conditions. The horizon is mid-screen, but you would never know.
FARK.com: Fark Video Player (6857861) Skier 52 is executing a navigator directed Airborne Radar Approach on the Western Antarctic Ice Sheet. Let's drop into the cabin and see what's happening
FARK.com: Fark Video Player (6857861) Skier 52 is executing a navigator directed Airborne Radar Approach on the Western Antarctic Ice Sheet. Let's drop into the cabin and see what's happening