Paul Holmes and Erebus
Thanks, I'll have a look at it.
I've just had a quick look at the royal commission report, and it seems that he was issued with a large "topographic map" the morning of the flight. This, along with much other evidence, was (conveniently is the implication) never recovered....
It's not stated though, what area it covered. I'll hold fire now and do some rereading.
I've just had a quick look at the royal commission report, and it seems that he was issued with a large "topographic map" the morning of the flight. This, along with much other evidence, was (conveniently is the implication) never recovered....
It's not stated though, what area it covered. I'll hold fire now and do some rereading.
Last edited by compressor stall; 5th Dec 2011 at 00:50. Reason: Predictive text.
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The check against the atlas at home was just that - a check to get the best idea of where he was going. The issue is that those co-ordinates were changed the night before they left, so all of Collins' crew thought they were on the McMurdo Sound track that had been discussed at the briefing with Captain Simpson (of the previous flight) and his crew.
The data sent to McMurdo by ANZ that morning was also incorrect - the co-ordinates for the waypoint simply substituted with the term "MCMURDO", so a second chance to catch the error was missed.
The data sent to McMurdo by ANZ that morning was also incorrect - the co-ordinates for the waypoint simply substituted with the term "MCMURDO", so a second chance to catch the error was missed.
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DozyWannabe,
The changed co-ordinates that Mahon thought so important are to my way of thinking irrelevant as to the cause of the accident.
The mandatory descent requirements stated that 16,000ft be maintained until overhead TACAN29, and then commence .the approved let down.
No where it would appear is there any approval for a VMC descent prior to reaching the TACAN.
Other flights apparently commenced descent earlier, but they had all been identified by radar and were in CAVOK weather conditions.
If one wishes to disregard the rules one must make sure your reasons are fireproof.
In this case they were not, the obvious proof is the end result.
The changed co-ordinates that Mahon thought so important are to my way of thinking irrelevant as to the cause of the accident.
The mandatory descent requirements stated that 16,000ft be maintained until overhead TACAN29, and then commence .the approved let down.
No where it would appear is there any approval for a VMC descent prior to reaching the TACAN.
Other flights apparently commenced descent earlier, but they had all been identified by radar and were in CAVOK weather conditions.
If one wishes to disregard the rules one must make sure your reasons are fireproof.
In this case they were not, the obvious proof is the end result.
[picky]
Several aircraft have inadvertently been flown into the ground in Antarctica in CAVOK conditions....
SKC however is a different story. That's, as I am sure you are aware, one of the traps of whiteout and that until you have seen it for real is just so hard to imagine for most out of a textbook.
I once had an experienced met forecaster on her first ice deployment on board and brought her up to the flight deck to show her whiteout under a thin 6000 agl altostratus deck over the plateau. She was speechless.
[/picky]
End of digression....
and were in CAVOK weather conditions
SKC however is a different story. That's, as I am sure you are aware, one of the traps of whiteout and that until you have seen it for real is just so hard to imagine for most out of a textbook.
I once had an experienced met forecaster on her first ice deployment on board and brought her up to the flight deck to show her whiteout under a thin 6000 agl altostratus deck over the plateau. She was speechless.
[/picky]
End of digression....
Last edited by compressor stall; 5th Dec 2011 at 02:29.
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You are correct, I should have used SKC, and that is no doubt why the descent requirements state that the only VMC descent procedure between 16,000ft and 6,000ft must be carried out in the specified area, for no other reason than to avoid Erebus.
It may also be worth remembering that the initial flights were limited to not below FL160. Even from that altitude people must have enjoyed the experience, the visiblity being so good many probably thought they were lower.
It may also be worth remembering that the initial flights were limited to not below FL160. Even from that altitude people must have enjoyed the experience, the visiblity being so good many probably thought they were lower.
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The mandatory descent requirements stated that 16,000ft be maintained until overhead TACAN29, and then commence .the approved let down.
Sometimes, what appear to be SOPs are not really SOPs. I wrote an essay (post #100) called "SOPs ain't SOPs".
Mahon's reason for why this one was not an SOP comes in at number 4 on my list. I listed 5 circumstances where SOPs could be later found by a court to be not SOPs afterall. There are probably a few more.
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You may think that, and Mahon obviously thought that, and the result of not complying with a CAA requirement, and a Company SOP is perfectly obvious in this case.
" not a requirement they were lawfully obliged to observe'
At what time, and by whom, do you think this crew was advised there was no legal requirement to comply???? must have been prior to the descent below 16,000ft, who of the crew was legally qualified to state such a thing??
For a starter why would you say that the route MSA was established. You would agree that it was not a legal requirement??
This from John Kings publication:
"This was referred to in a Company Memorandum to AntArctic crews', OAA: 14/13/28 dated 9th November 1979 Headed MCMURDO NDB NOT AVAILABLE; it was succinct and unambiguous." and then the mandatory requirements as printed many times on this and other threads.
So many people think for some reason that the radar was the prime requirement for any descent, but read what the SOP stipulates.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have OTHER TRAFFIC IN THE AREA.
How much more specific could these instructions be??? Note the only let down procedure available is VMC below 16,000ft to 6,000ft..
"where SOPs could be later found by a court to be not SOPs afterall"
That may well be so, but the SOP's are not written for a court, they would , I think, be normally written by company ops people, not lawyers. And the intent, as in this case, was perfectly obvious for Aviation experienced people. Obviously very murky for legal people.
" not a requirement they were lawfully obliged to observe'
At what time, and by whom, do you think this crew was advised there was no legal requirement to comply???? must have been prior to the descent below 16,000ft, who of the crew was legally qualified to state such a thing??
For a starter why would you say that the route MSA was established. You would agree that it was not a legal requirement??
This from John Kings publication:
"This was referred to in a Company Memorandum to AntArctic crews', OAA: 14/13/28 dated 9th November 1979 Headed MCMURDO NDB NOT AVAILABLE; it was succinct and unambiguous." and then the mandatory requirements as printed many times on this and other threads.
So many people think for some reason that the radar was the prime requirement for any descent, but read what the SOP stipulates.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have OTHER TRAFFIC IN THE AREA.
How much more specific could these instructions be??? Note the only let down procedure available is VMC below 16,000ft to 6,000ft..
"where SOPs could be later found by a court to be not SOPs afterall"
That may well be so, but the SOP's are not written for a court, they would , I think, be normally written by company ops people, not lawyers. And the intent, as in this case, was perfectly obvious for Aviation experienced people. Obviously very murky for legal people.
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" not a requirement they were lawfully obliged to observe'
At what time, and by whom, do you think this crew was advised there was no legal requirement to comply???? must have been prior to the descent below 16,000ft, who of the crew was legally qualified to state such a thing??
At what time, and by whom, do you think this crew was advised there was no legal requirement to comply???? must have been prior to the descent below 16,000ft, who of the crew was legally qualified to state such a thing??
And the intent, as in this case, was perfectly obvious for Aviation experienced people.
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" The de facto status quo for the Antarctic flights was that you were allowed to descend below 6,000ft upon invitation from Mac Central. This turns out to have been the de jure case as well - the only reason there's any argument over this is because ANZ led an inexperienced (in terms of line operations) investigator around by the nose."
Yes, there was a precedent set by people who should have known better, but it still did not make it legal. Since when does an invitation by a radar operator overule a regulation set by CAA????
Ron Chippendales qualifications and experience have been documented many times, they were impeccable.
Mr Mahon had never had anything to do with anything aeronautical, and I could just as easily state, with a lot more veracity, that Mahon was led around by the nose by members of ALPA, some of whose members surely had a vested interest in Mahons findings ending up the way they did.
" the rest of the public sided with Mahon."
Did they? many who have a knowledge, and experience of things aeronautical certainly did not.
Yes, there was a precedent set by people who should have known better, but it still did not make it legal. Since when does an invitation by a radar operator overule a regulation set by CAA????
Ron Chippendales qualifications and experience have been documented many times, they were impeccable.
Mr Mahon had never had anything to do with anything aeronautical, and I could just as easily state, with a lot more veracity, that Mahon was led around by the nose by members of ALPA, some of whose members surely had a vested interest in Mahons findings ending up the way they did.
" the rest of the public sided with Mahon."
Did they? many who have a knowledge, and experience of things aeronautical certainly did not.
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Ron Chippendales qualifications and experience have been documented many times, they were impeccable.
Mr Mahon had never had anything to do with anything aeronautical, and I could just as easily state, with a lot more veracity, that Mahon was led around by the nose by members of ALPA, some of whose members surely had a vested interest in Mahons findings ending up the way they did.
Did they? many who have a knowledge, and experience of things aeronautical certainly did not.
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DozyWannabe: In relation to McMurdo radar you have used the term "invited to" a number of occasions.
It is not, to the best of my knowledge, a term that would be used by a controller, so can you please explain how it would be phrased, and what you understand that invitation to mean in respect of the authority it commands.
It is not, to the best of my knowledge, a term that would be used by a controller, so can you please explain how it would be phrased, and what you understand that invitation to mean in respect of the authority it commands.
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I'm jumping into this discussion from another Erebus thread. In it, I was hoping to get feedback from pilots on two very basic questions that seem to get lost in the shuffle of technical points thrown back and forth. As an amateur aviation safety enthusiast, I'm wondering if there is general pilot consensus here:
1) that reliance on AINS (at the time) is/was not considered a fail safe alternative to ground-based instrument guidance, and therefore is not permitted as a substitue when in IMC?
2) A visual descent not only requires being VMC, but requires firmly establishing your position visually BEFORE dropping below MSA? (If this is so, how can anyone find the crew of 901 100% blameless?)
After reading countless debates on many forums on F901 I still am not sure I have the definitve answers to these questions.
Thanks
1) that reliance on AINS (at the time) is/was not considered a fail safe alternative to ground-based instrument guidance, and therefore is not permitted as a substitue when in IMC?
2) A visual descent not only requires being VMC, but requires firmly establishing your position visually BEFORE dropping below MSA? (If this is so, how can anyone find the crew of 901 100% blameless?)
After reading countless debates on many forums on F901 I still am not sure I have the definitve answers to these questions.
Thanks
This is just a circular argument thats been going on for years. At the end of the day, regardless of how many mistakes were made by people who work on the ground, regardless of how corrupt Air NZ were in covering up, regardless of how terrible the whole event was, regardless of what other pilots did on other days in other weather, prior to descending it's the Captains responsibility to ensure, by whatever means he/she thinks is neccessary, that they are not going to hit a hill. If thats by overheading the TACAN, great, if if it's by doing a radial/DME check, great, if it's by radar identification, great, plotting lat/longs on a map, great. But verifying position prior to descending below MSA was not done satisfactorily. That is a mistake by the crew that would have prevented the crash just as successfully as if the coordinate change mistake had not been made. The diference is that the Captain is soley responsible for keeping the aircraft in one piece all of the time, not just when flight planning make no mistakes, but all of the time.There is no moment in time when the flight planners are soley responsible for the aircrafts safety. As pilots we enjoy the respect of the position, the pay packet, and the responsibility when things are going nicely, we have to own that responsibility when things go wrong as well.
I fully acknowledge that this crew was set up to a large extent and that it was a very very tricky situation that would have caught many crews out, so although it may read like it, I'm not actually having a go at the crew. It just seems so short sighted when people put ALL of the blame on one party and refuse to acknowledge that the crew also made mistakes.
All of the parties involved made mistakes.
I fully acknowledge that this crew was set up to a large extent and that it was a very very tricky situation that would have caught many crews out, so although it may read like it, I'm not actually having a go at the crew. It just seems so short sighted when people put ALL of the blame on one party and refuse to acknowledge that the crew also made mistakes.
All of the parties involved made mistakes.
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Originally Posted by framer
prior to descending it's the Captains responsibility to ensure, by whatever means he/she thinks is neccessary, that they are not going to hit a hill.
White Out vs Sector White Out
Yes, Sector White Out is the more widely accepted term. I'm prone (for the sake of brevity) to use the term "whiteout" with the knowledge that my colleagues are aware of the double entendre and that I'm meaning no ground definition but 100km visibility. Yes, not the best approach on this inter web thingy though.
I was recently told a great story about some of the guys exploring in the Southern PCMs back in the 50's mistaking a sleddog turd on a nearby snowdrift for a distant mountain range on a cloudy dat. It had them fooled for a while.
Yes, Sector White Out is the more widely accepted term. I'm prone (for the sake of brevity) to use the term "whiteout" with the knowledge that my colleagues are aware of the double entendre and that I'm meaning no ground definition but 100km visibility. Yes, not the best approach on this inter web thingy though.
I was recently told a great story about some of the guys exploring in the Southern PCMs back in the 50's mistaking a sleddog turd on a nearby snowdrift for a distant mountain range on a cloudy dat. It had them fooled for a while.
I take it then that AINS alone isn't good enough? (Or is it, provided you've checked the actual inputs with a map?)
I'm not familiar with Air NZ SOP's from that time (or now for that matter) , I'm not suggesting it was an SOP to do this check.It's just a way of ensuring that you are where you think you are prior to descending towards the earth.
What a fascinating thread. Having known of the Erebus accident, this thread prompting me to research it further. One cannot help but put yourself in the same situation and think what you (as Captain) would or could have done differently to prevent the outcome. The Impact Erebus program talks about 'Sets' and clearly from a psychological standpoint I think there is trememdous merit in Vette's discussion of mindset and expectancy. These 'sets' can invariably lead to a loss of situational awareness because data which contradicts the 'set' is either disregarded or deemed invalid. Worse, poor data ie weather conditions, is accepted because it fits what you expect.
To simply point to pilot error would ignore the specific circumstances and deny everyone the opportunity to learn the full extent of the causes. I suggest that the thread has descended somewhat into a tit for tat on certain points. I see no reason why both investigators' reports should not be able to coexist without one's merit having to be challenged over the other. Good has come from both viewpoints. Nor is it necessary to denigrate the characters, it seems both carried out their duties, not faultlessly, but with honest intent.
Ultimately I can agree with the assessment of pilot error, however not in isolation. Similarly, absolution of the crew is a laudable goal but not one that I understand Vette was pursuing. The nub of his quest was mentioned earlier
However as is human want, blame must be apportioned, but it is not the purpose of investigations. I like to think that of the slices of Swiss cheese which formed the barriers preventing this accident, those responsible for each barrier were holding a slice of cheese with differing sized holes.
I guess the answer would be if you worked for ANZ doing pre-planned Antarctic scenic flights. Part of the 'set', its been done before, this is normal, this is how you do it.
It is a very good question particularly in view of comments on the CVR such as
and
Didn't sound all that 'comfortable' did it?
That is chilling. The factors that put an aircraft and its crew in such 'situational unawareness' are factors I want to know about and learn from.
To simply point to pilot error would ignore the specific circumstances and deny everyone the opportunity to learn the full extent of the causes. I suggest that the thread has descended somewhat into a tit for tat on certain points. I see no reason why both investigators' reports should not be able to coexist without one's merit having to be challenged over the other. Good has come from both viewpoints. Nor is it necessary to denigrate the characters, it seems both carried out their duties, not faultlessly, but with honest intent.
Ultimately I can agree with the assessment of pilot error, however not in isolation. Similarly, absolution of the crew is a laudable goal but not one that I understand Vette was pursuing. The nub of his quest was mentioned earlier
"I realised that if Jim Collins, a Captain I had known for 20-odd years, [and] an exceptional pilot in all respects, could be a victim of this terrible crash then so could I, and so could any of the rest of us".
In what situation, under what circumstances, would you, as Captain of an airliner weighing 150 tonnes, feel comfortable doing 250 knots, clean, straight and level, below 1500 feet?
It is a very good question particularly in view of comments on the CVR such as
Doesn't sound very promising, does it?
Actually, these conditions don't look very good at all, do they?
Where's Erebus in relation to us a the moment? Left, about 20 or 25 miles.
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Actually, these conditions don't look very good at all, do they?
My guess is that they weren't attempting to escape high ground as much as get out of the conditions that were affecting their perception.
Framer, the only checks they had at the time were visual, and it's just a tragic coincidence that they happened to be at the one spot in the sky where it was possible to mistake the set of features defining Lewis Bay for those defining McMurdo Sound.
Silberfuchs
Thank you for your post on on sector whiteout and the conditions present prior to the crash.
While there is no doubt some blame must rest with the crew I think one or two on here find it hard to accept how this crew were trapped by circumstances, some they didn't know about and some they didn't understand, and cannot be solely blamed for the crash.
Right until a minute or two before they crashed they thought they were in clear air with good visibility tracking over an area 25 miles to the west of where they actually were, an area devoid of high terrain.
In the prevailing conditions and knowing how previous flights had been conducted, who on here can hold their hand on their heart and say they would not have done the same?
Thank you for your post on on sector whiteout and the conditions present prior to the crash.
While there is no doubt some blame must rest with the crew I think one or two on here find it hard to accept how this crew were trapped by circumstances, some they didn't know about and some they didn't understand, and cannot be solely blamed for the crash.
Right until a minute or two before they crashed they thought they were in clear air with good visibility tracking over an area 25 miles to the west of where they actually were, an area devoid of high terrain.
In the prevailing conditions and knowing how previous flights had been conducted, who on here can hold their hand on their heart and say they would not have done the same?
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I doubt it wholeheartedly.
Could they have done more? Possibly - but they did everything it was in their power to do and in complete accordance with how the flights were managed and regulated. Would they have done more, or done things differently if the information was presented properly and completely as opposed to systematically withheld from them? Almost certainly.
By "systematically withheld", I mean the following. If Collins knew that he would be entirely reliant on INS, visual fixes and US Navy controllers and had been informed :
then there's no way he'd have made the descent under those conditions.
This was a company for which a lot was at stake and one which was not in the rudest of health - companies in that situation tend to cut corners. As such, ANZ shaved the safety margins year on year, but didn't bother telling their line crews they were doing so, after all - had the crews known that barely 2 years prior there were SOPs that stated 2 Captains were to be carried and that no-one was allowed to command an Antarctic flight without first taking on a familiarisation flight - both of which had been quietly dropped, then you might have found some crews unwilling to go.
Qantas were about to start their own Antarctic flights with larger and longer-ranged aircraft (747s), which would almost certainly have put a dent in ANZ's profits - Mahon notes this, but it doesn't get brought up very often.
For their part, NZCA never said "Hang on a minute, we authorised these flights based on your assurance that you would stick to these conditions - you're now degrading those conditions, so we should take another look at it".
Could they have done more? Possibly - but they did everything it was in their power to do and in complete accordance with how the flights were managed and regulated. Would they have done more, or done things differently if the information was presented properly and completely as opposed to systematically withheld from them? Almost certainly.
By "systematically withheld", I mean the following. If Collins knew that he would be entirely reliant on INS, visual fixes and US Navy controllers and had been informed :
- That the nav computer co-ordinates were changed overnight,
- that conditions existed whereby it would be possible for Erebus to be lost in whiteout - even in clear air, and
- that the US military flights did not consider those controllers reliable
then there's no way he'd have made the descent under those conditions.
This was a company for which a lot was at stake and one which was not in the rudest of health - companies in that situation tend to cut corners. As such, ANZ shaved the safety margins year on year, but didn't bother telling their line crews they were doing so, after all - had the crews known that barely 2 years prior there were SOPs that stated 2 Captains were to be carried and that no-one was allowed to command an Antarctic flight without first taking on a familiarisation flight - both of which had been quietly dropped, then you might have found some crews unwilling to go.
Qantas were about to start their own Antarctic flights with larger and longer-ranged aircraft (747s), which would almost certainly have put a dent in ANZ's profits - Mahon notes this, but it doesn't get brought up very often.
For their part, NZCA never said "Hang on a minute, we authorised these flights based on your assurance that you would stick to these conditions - you're now degrading those conditions, so we should take another look at it".
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 6th Dec 2011 at 12:21.