Paul Holmes and Erebus

[FGD135]

While there is no doubt some blame must rest with the crew ...

There is considerable doubt. I believe the crew deserve NO blame at all.

They were lured into a very carefully laid trap. Very few pilots, myself included, would not have fallen for it.

Can any pilot here say that this accident would not have happened had they been the captain that day?

If somebody comes forward and says "yes - it would not have happened to me because I would have been observing that descent SOP" then I will inform you that you are deluded.

... prior to descending it's the Captains responsibility to ensure, by whatever means he/she thinks is neccessary, that they are not going to hit a hill.

Ok, framer, just how do you go about making an instrument approach? You do it by placing trust in people that have designed and drawn up the procedure.

This is the whole point that Mahon was making.

If, for several years, your fellow pilots make successful RNAV approaches into a place, then after a datacard update that accidentally shifted the waypoints, you attempted the approach but crashed into a hill, would that be your fault?

[framer]

Ok, framer, just how do you go about making an instrument approach? You do it by placing trust in people that have designed and drawn up the procedure.

Yes you do FGD. Good point.There is a certain amount of trust required to operate. You also do it with a lot of checking and cross checking and a healthy amount of distrust. eg do you just assume that the glidepath is accurate or do you use your altimeter to cross check and confirm it is by referenceing to a DME when you commence the approach? That cross check isn't part of the proceedure, it is an SOP or a personal habit designed to identify any holes in the cheese or loss of S.A.
Although I was talking about confirming position prior to descending through MSA the concept is similar. Do you assume that the RNAV system is faultless and that flight planing and your crew and you yourself have made no errors? Or do you relentlessly cross check, confirm and verify things? It is a constant part of the job, we are always doing this.

Framer, the only checks they had at the time were visual

I don't think that is true.
Prior to leaving 16,000ft they needed to verify their position.
If they had plotted the lat/longs onto a map it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until a radial DME check confirmed their position it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until visually past Erebus it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until overhead the station their position would have been verified.
I imagine you'l respond to this by saying that they couldn't get the DME or a radial, my response to that is that is even more reson to remain at MSA, it casts doubt as to why things aren't as expected.
When I argue this point it always sounds as though I'm saying I would have done better. I'm not. I don't know how I would have gone in the same situation. I'm using the luxury of hindsite and reports and also have the decades of learning the industry has gone through to help me. I'm lucky enough to be able to learn from the mistakes this crew made.
By saying they never made a mistake we are running the risk of missing out on some very important lessons.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by framer

Although I was talking about confirming position prior to descending through MSA the concept is similar. Do you assume that the RNAV system is faultless and that flight planing and your crew and you yourself have made no errors? Or do you relentlessly cross check, confirm and verify things? It is a constant part of the job, we are always doing this.

As did Collins and his crew to a reasonable level. The problem in their case was that they were not given all the information that should have been required.

I don't think that is true.

The NDB at McMurdo had been withdrawn and was to all intents and purposes unusable. The TACAN could give them a DME, but it's position south of Ross Island meant they couldn't rely on it until south of the volcanoes. What was there other than visual fixes and radar letdowns?

If they had plotted the lat/longs onto a map it would have highlighted the anomaly.

They did plot the lats/longs on a map, but did it the previous night - based on the co-ordinates they were given in their briefing. They were not told that it had changed the following morning and as such had no reason to believe that the work they had done was invalid.

If they had remained at MSA until a radial DME check confirmed their position it would have highlighted the anomaly.

Radial DME check from what? The TACAN was of no use until they were south or Ross Island if, as they believed, they were following the McMurdo Sound track.

If they had remained at MSA until visually past Erebus it would have highlighted the anomaly.

And risked getting complaints from passengers that they couldn't see anything. Again, even at 16,000ft they couldn't really see Erebus because of the overcast - the whole point of the let-down was because between sea level and 2,500ft the air was clear.

If they had remained at MSA until overhead the station their position would have been verified.

The track they were expecting to fly never went overhead the station, that was the whole point - no-one noticed this until Captain Simpson reported the anomaly.

I imagine you'l respond to this by saying that they couldn't get the DME or a radial, my response to that is that is even more reson to remain at MSA, it casts doubt as to why things aren't as expected.

They weren't expecting to get it until they had passed south of Erebus and Ross Island - again, that's the point. There were no other navaids in the area to help them and they had been told that they could rely on the AINS and Mac Central radar to keep them out of trouble until they passed south of the island.

By saying they never made a mistake we are running the risk of missing out on some very important lessons.

No-one's saying they never made a mistake - simply that the mistake was entirely understandable given the information they had, or more importantly the information they didn't have - and that *if* they had been told the nav track had been changed, *if* they had been properly trained on sector whiteout, and *if* they had known to take radar letdowns with a pinch of salt then the accident would not have happened.

[prospector]

DozyWannabe,

" Only Chippindale's mates and those with a vested interest in ANZ - the rest of the public sided with Mahon."
That is a quite ridiculous statement. As this and other threads on the subject have shown, many people, pilots and others, share the view that there were errors made by everyone involved. and the reason this thread has been resurrected is the stupid claim by Paul Holmes that an apology to the family of Collins is due from the NZ Parliament because the crew were blameless

Following from Capt Dereck Ellis appeared in the British Airline Pilots magazine "The Log"

From John Kings publication "NZ Tragedies."

Ellis was at the time a British Airways Captain, flying Concordes, later flying 747's for Singapore Airways.

"Before reading Impact Erebus my knowledge of the event led me to gratefully and happily accept the view of the Hon P.T. Mahon as stated in the findings of the Royal Commission of Enquiry-" In my opinion, neither Capt Collins nor First Officer Cassin, nor the Flight Engineers made any error which contributed to the cause of the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.

The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the Commissioner, has been in fact to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of the Air Accidents Investigation are infinitely more realistic".

There are many other publications along the same lines by very experienced aviators, but as you stated earlier you have read them all.

But it would appear you and others do not really understand what the Captains responsibilities were after requesting a VMC descent. At no time was Mt Erebus ever sighted, that alone should have rung very loud warning bells before descent below MSA.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"that conditions existed whereby it would be possible for Erebus to be lost in whiteout - even in clear air, and "

That is a complete figment of your imagination, the whole of Ross Island was covered in cloud with a reported base, just before descent began, of 2,000ft.

"They did plot the lats/longs on a map, but did it the previous night - based on the co-ordinates they were given in their briefing. "

You completely miss the point, if there was any doubt about their position, and there was considerable doubt, as Peter Mulgrew stated just prior to impact 4 minutes I believe it was, that when he had any idea of their position he would let the pax know, this was announced from the cockpit.
The Lat and Long should have been checked before descent below 16,000ft. The readout was just above their heads.
One thing that has not been mentioned in this thread is where was First Officer Lucas during this critical phase of the flight. We have been told there was up to eight people in the cockpit during this time, may be there was no room left in there for him???

From a different thread on the same subject that may or not be true but from people who knew the man say it was the response they would expect.

" did see a hand written transcript of the voice recorder that commenced with "You are wrong, stick it up your arse." Bang door slammed( ostensibly from Lucas). thence the rest of the 30 minutes of tape recording."

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by prospector

That is a quite ridiculous statement. As this and other threads on the subject have shown, many people, pilots and others, share the view that there were errors made by everyone involved.

No-one is doubting that errors were made by the crew. Where Mahon's findings were distinct from those of Chippindale related solely to findings of responsibility, specifically that to hold a crew that had not been made aware of the change in the INS co-ordinates, the alleged shortcomings of the Mac Central radar operators or the insidious effect of sector whiteout responsible for an accident in which all of these played a part was not fair.

and the reason this thread has been resurrected is the stupid claim by Paul Holmes that an apology to the family of Collins is due from the NZ Parliament because the crew were blameless

It's not a stupid claim at all, whatever you may think of the man. If a crew is told to expect to be placed in a given situation and that situation is changed without their knowledge, and with limited facilities to work that change out for themselves, then it is ludicrous on the face of it to hold that crew responsible for any problems that occur - this isn't an aviation-specific thing, it's just common sense.

"The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the Commissioner, has been in fact to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of the Air Accidents Investigation are infinitely more realistic"

Now this is something I haven't seen, and I would like to. However there is at least one error in the statement he makes. Firstly, it was Vette's research that set Mahon on the track of research he took - not the other way around. Not having read the article, I find it hard to see how he could come to that conclusion. The NZCA report said that Collins' crew were in cloud, when Impact Erebus has more than enough proof that they were not. It also takes as read that the briefed track always went over Erebus, when it did not (and Morrie Davis went to considerable lengths to shred any evidence to the contrary, including permitting B&E at the family homes of both Collins and Cassin). He may have come to the conclusion that there should have been more checks performed on the flight itself, but I for one do not see how that was possible - they were not informed that anything had changed, the ground aids were severely limited and they had been briefed that a let-down from the Mac Central tower was valid to altitudes as low as 500ft.

Was Ellis aware that Chippindale had falsified the CVR?

There are many other publications along the same lines by very experienced aviators, but as you stated earlier you have read them all.

I never said I had "read them all", I said that I had read most of the relevant excerpts over the years, and while I understand where they are coming from, it does not alter my opinion.

Not all "experienced aviators" are right - just look at Capt. Van Zanten. If this flight was briefed as one requiring all the aviation know-how that the crews had, then I'm sure the argument would stand, but it was not. As I said before, ANZ had been shaving the safety margins away year-on-year and informing neither their crews nor the NZCA that they were doing so. The flights were briefed such that a combination of AINS, visual fixes and supervision from Mac Central were enough to ensure safe passage and that is exactly what Collins and his crew did.

But it would appear you and others do not really understand what the Captains responsibilities were after requesting a VMC descent. At no time was Mt Erebus ever sighted, that alone should have rung very loud warning bells before descent below MSA.

Oh, b*gger "Captain's responsibilities". If this were a military or one-off civil flight in which every potential "gotcha" had been briefed, or if Collins had been briefed at all to expect to have to improvise in a navigational sense, then maybe that argument would hold water. But it wasn't and neither was he. To all intents and purposes this was treated as a regular scheduled flight with the only operational difference from the norm being the manual keying of the AINS co-ordinates, which with tragic irony was performed perfectly. Collins and his crew had all been given briefing materials that showed a track down McMurdo Sound, with an NZCA dispensation to descend to altitudes as low as 500ft if invited to do so by Mac Central control tower. They had not been briefed on the phenomenon of sector whiteout, which was a regular occurrence in the area they were flying to and they were not informed via what should have been a compulsory NOTAM that their track had been changed overnight. Every preceding flight since the AINS track was adopted had been let down to between at least 2,000ft in order to satisfy the advertised purpose of the flight, which was sightseeing. Visual letdown with radar confirmation was all they had to go on since the withdrawal of the McMurdo NDB, and the crew followed their briefing to the letter.

That is a complete figment of your imagination, the whole of Ross Island was covered in cloud with a reported base, just before descent began, of 2,000ft.

My docs have it as 2,500-3,000ft, but it is immaterial as the letdown was performed north of Ross Island, where the cloud was broken and it was possible to discern landmarks below, as proven by the recovered still photographs and film from the unfortunate passengers. Even if the base was 2,000ft it would still shoot down Chippindale's assertion that they were in cloud at 1,500ft.

[prospector]

" No-one is doubting that errors were made by the crew" You said


"Originally Posted by 27/09
While there is no doubt some blame must rest with the crew...

"I doubt it wholeheartedly" You said..

"No-one's saying they never made a mistake" You said.

" and it was possible to discern landmarks below"

And they discerned them wrongly, is that not a mistake? Beaufort Is shows up quite clearly in some of the photo's, not twigging they were on the wrong side of it, is that not a mistake??

I am not implying they were negligent, and the cards were stacked against them, but they could have broken that chain of errors by confirming their position before descent below MSA, As has been written many times in this thread there were a number of ways this could have been achieved.

That is what this whole thread has been about, whether the crew were blameless as claimed by Mahon, Vette, and now Holmes.

You agree some errors, and mistakes were made by the crew but they are blameless???

That would be a nice world to live in where one is not responsible for one's mistakes or errors.

[FGD135]

eg do you just assume that the glidepath is accurate or do you use your altimeter to cross check and confirm it is by referenceing to a DME when you commence the approach?

In Australia that check is a required part of the procedure - and every ILS procedure has a means for facilitating that check.

Do you assume that the RNAV system is faultless and that flight planing and your crew and you yourself have made no errors?

They had crosschecked the accuaracy of the AINS visually at Cape Hallett (about 45 mins before the accident), but there is only so far you can *reasonably* go to check errors that have made by others.

If they had plotted the lat/longs onto a map it would have highlighted the anomaly.

This is nothing like something that could reasonably be expected of the pilots. At which stage of proceedings should they have done this?

If they had remained at MSA until ...

Is that what you would have done?

They had been informed that the cloud base was 2,000' with visibility below the base >20km. While still north of Ross Island and in VMC, they had the opportunity to descend to below the cloud base, and they took that opportunity.

prospector,
I appreciate your thoughts and contributions to this and the earlier Erebus threads. To make your posts more readable when quoting others, could you please show the quoted section the way posters normally do.

To do that: "select" all the text that you are quoting (click at the start of the text, then drag the mouse pointer down to just past the end of the text). Then press the little button above (near the "YouTube" button) that looks like a speech bubble. Please PM me if you need further assistance. Thanks.

[framer]

Dozy it looks like we'l just have to agree to disagree. Some things look white to you and appear black to me. I guess thats an indication of how many grey areas there are in this episode.

you said

The TACAN could give them a DME, but it's position south of Ross Island meant they couldn't rely on it until south of the volcanoes.

then wait until you're south of the volcanoes or radar identified or can clearly see the terrain.

They did plot the lats/longs on a map, but did it the previous night

That doesn't cut it. Seriously.

And risked getting complaints from passengers that they couldn't see anything.

Yes.

No-one's saying they never made a mistake - simply that the mistake was entirely understandable given the information they had, or more importantly the information they didn't have

I agree that the mistakes are understandable. Most mistakes are. That doesn't mean that we can't defend against them.

[prospector]

FGD135,
Thanks, was wondering how that was done , certainly makes replies easier to read. (Even if I had to read your PS with a magnifying glass

[framer]

Is that what you would have done?

I honestly can't say FGD.
I have had completely different training in completely different times from that crew, flying different equipment.
What I can say is that if I am flying an aircraft without ANP alerting and GPS input to the FMS I confirm position prior to descending below MSA. Normally this is done using a VOR and a DME, sometimes by being radar identified, and rarely by overheading a station.Maybe I do that because of lessons learnt back then and if I was there I would have done the exact same thing as they did. Unless you were a Captain back then (I wasn't)I don't think you can say what you would have done.Times have changed.

[chris lz]

If I may chime in hear again, homing in on general prinicples of fail-safe flying:

if you asked most commercial pilots both today and in 1979, would there be/have been a consensus that a visual descent below MSA must ALWAYS be preceded by something more "positive" than the unquestioned assumption your (actual !!) AINS flight plan, unaccompanied by any additional crosschecks or corroboration, could not possibly be fallible? The "Vette" position would appear to say no, not always. Isn't this essentially what the debate reduces to?

[chris lz]

Hi Dozy,

Originally Posted by DozyWannabe

If a crew is told to expect to be placed in a given situation and that situation is changed without their knowledge, and with limited facilities to work that change out for themselves,

But doesn't this cut to the heart of the issue though? Doesn't this show that AINS is much more subject to error than a ground aid, which (I presume) is not being programmed and re-programmed every day, thus not as prone to slips of the finger? ( I am not a pilot, so please correct me.)

Also, how difficult would it have been for the crew to check the coordinates of the end point to McMurdo? They had what, 4 hours after take off to do this? That wouldn't have required more than a check of a few waypoints on the final leg of the inbound route. (Again, this is all with hind sight of course, and the context of some really bad luck coincidences. This is not an attempt to villify Collins.)

[Dream Land]

The "Vette" position would appear to say no, not always. Isn't this essentially what the debate reduces to?

I agree, and I feel the company had little responsibility due to the fact that the INS coordinate was changed. This tour was to be conducted in VFR conditions, specifically mentioned in the brief to be above 160, the responsibility lies with the decision to drop through 160. Leave the tours to tour pilots!

Flame suit on

[grusome]

Prospector,
Thanks for the lecture - I used to install and flight check the things. And what was that you said about the DME frequency?

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by prospector

if there was any doubt about their position, and there was considerable doubt, as Peter Mulgrew stated just prior to impact 4 minutes I believe it was

He then said "Taylor on the right now" after they came out from beneath the cloud, indicating he firmly believed they were over McMurdo Sound.

" did see a hand written transcript of the voice recorder that commenced with "You are wrong, stick it up your arse." Bang door slammed( ostensibly from Lucas). thence the rest of the 30 minutes of tape recording."

Presumably that would be Chippindale's notes - though I find the provenance to be highly dubious and I've never seen it in 20 years reading about it, but we already know he falsified the agreed CVR transcript with assistance from ANZ's Chief Pilot Gemmell.

As a result of this, even if it was on the tape and his transcription is correct (which requires a considerable pinch of salt in the first place), shorn of context it is completely useless. It could be about anything, not necessarily to do with the flight. Even if all these things are satisfied it does not gel with the otherwise good CRM ("crew loop" in those days) on the rest of the tape.

Originally Posted by framer

(Re: checking against the map the previous night)

That doesn't cut it. Seriously.

Really? Given that the whole basis of the NZCA's argument was that the pilots left themselves ill-prepared, I'd say it demonstrates that they went to considerable lengths to have all their ducks in a row. How many pilots of late '70s vintage would have checked the printout they received in the morning against the one they received at the briefing if they had no idea that a change had been made?

I agree that the mistakes are understandable. Most mistakes are. That doesn't mean that we can't defend against them.

Defend against them yes - to do so by falsifying evidence to make the crew seem more responsible for the mistake than they were is completely out of line.

Originally Posted by chris lz

Doesn't this show that AINS is much more subject to error than a ground aid, which (I presume) is not being programmed and re-programmed every day, thus not as prone to slips of the finger? ( I am not a pilot, so please correct me.)

The AINS is not normally subject to significant error (I think 2 miles was the max on a trip of that length), neither were any tracks being "programmed and reprogrammed every day". Hewitt's "mistake" was in the computer for practically a year before anything changed!

Also, how difficult would it have been for the crew to check the coordinates of the end point to McMurdo? They had what, 4 hours after take off to do this?

Why do this if you're not aware of any change, nor are you expecting any to be made?

[prospector]

Grusome,
See post 115 this thread for DME associated with TACAN,

Can only surmise you a referring to the AWA 200 Mhz DME, this was only used in Australia and New Zealand to the best of my knowledge.

[framer]

Really? Given that the whole basis of the NZCA's argument was that the pilots left themselves ill-prepared

Dozy checking a map at home the night before is fine, nothing wrong with it, but it is not the same thing, and it in no way replaces or changes the actions required during the flight.It seriously doesn't cut it and is not an argument that many profesionals pilots would accept. To many things change between the night before and when you go flying. (Maybe that is one of the lessons we have learnt?)

I'd say it demonstrates that they went to considerable lengths to have all their ducks in a row.

I agree with that. I imagine that their efforts and intentions were spot on. No argument from me there. It still doesn't change the fact that when the MSA is FL160, and there are mountains around you, you should not leave the safety of MSA until you can verify your position. There was uncertainty as to what they were seeing, there was no explanation as to why they were having trouble with VHF comms, they were low level high speed in an unfamiliar area. Mahon said time and time again that there was no signs of alarm on the flight deck. I suggest that he doesn't understand the subtilties of flight deck communication and things were becoming progressively less comfortable for the crew by the second. Questions like "where is Erebus now?" are asked for a reason.

Defend against them yes - to do so by falsifying evidence to make the crew seem more responsible for the mistake than they were is completely out of line.

You lose focus here, i didn't mention anything about behaviour subsequent to the crash (I won't call it an accident), we're not arguing about whether Air NZ behaved poorly after the event, I agree they did behave poorly. I'm talking about identifying the mistakes the crew made and learning from them. ie what can we do different today?
eg, verifying position before descending below MSA, and creating a culture within our airlines where we don't breach SOP's, if the SOP's are too restrictive then management can change them.

[prospector]

And another one of the holes in this Swiss cheese that has not been discussed is the fact that ANZ could well have only used two senior, or management pilots for these flights. They then would have accumulated some experience in AntArctic conditions.

But, it is a known fact that ALPA put pressure on the Company to share these flights around the senior captains. This in itself sounds a fairly innocuous thing to do, but surely shows up why all the other operators going to the ice required a minimum of three trips as an observer or first officer before going down as P1

Dozywannabe,
The CVR tapes were obviously not easy to interpret. One of the reasons being that there were up to eight different voices recorded. What were all these people doing in the cockpit at this critical time??

The remark attributed to First Officer Lucas, was to those who knew him, just the way he would react if he did not agree with something, in this case the descent procedure.

Your insistance that Ron Chippendale and Capt Gemmel were involved in some sort of conspiracy is ridiculous. The one third to CAA and 2 thirds of the cost to ANZ of the enquiry, that Mahon awarded to be paid to the estates of Collins and Cassin, and some of that to cover the costs of NZALPA, and the $150,000 fine to ANZ, were thrown out by the Appeal Court, and upheld by the Privy Council because as they stated there was no evidence of , or as they stated "No clear proof " of any plan of deception.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by framer

...it in no way replaces or changes the actions required during the flight.

What actions? The CVR indicates they were checking progress off against a map and/or Collins' notes from the previous night.

To many things change between the night before and when you go flying.

Changes were not that frequent, as I said before - and any changes should have been NOTAMed on the printout given to Collins that morning. They were not.

It still doesn't change the fact that when the MSA is FL160, and there are mountains around you, you should not leave the safety of MSA until you can verify your position.

They verified their position to the best of their ability with the materials they had to hand.

There was uncertainty as to what they were seeing

Not once they were out under the clouds.

there was no explanation as to why they were having trouble with VHF comms, they were low level high speed in an unfamiliar area.

Not that high speed, and the loss of communication only happened in the last minute or so. In fact it can be argued that the loss of comms was the trigger that convinced the crew to abandon the low-level part of the flight, unfortunately they were a few seconds too late.

Mahon said time and time again that there was no signs of alarm on the flight deck. I suggest that he doesn't understand the subtilties of flight deck communication and things were becoming progressively less comfortable for the crew by the second. Questions like "where is Erebus now?" are asked for a reason.

I think you underestimate the late Justice. He didn't do all the work himself based on his knowledge alone, he went to Washington D.C. to visit the NTSB and the AAIB at Farnborough to canvas their opinions. "Where is Erebus now" was immediately followed by an emphatic assertion that it was to their left.

verifying position before descending below MSA, and creating a culture within our airlines where we don't breach SOP's, if the SOP's are too restrictive then management can change them.

As I said, they verified their position as best they could and they did *not* breach SOPs, because they had a dispensation to descend as low as 500ft if invited to do so by Mac Central under radar guidance.

Originally Posted by prospector

And another one of the holes in this Swiss cheese that has not been discussed is the fact that ANZ could well have only used two senior, or management pilots for these flights. They then would have accumulated some experience in AntArctic conditions.

The management pilots were certainly fast learners - they managed to master breaking and entering with considerable aplomb.

But, it is a known fact that ALPA put pressure on the Company to share these flights around the senior captains. This in itself sounds a fairly innocuous thing to do, but surely shows up why all the other operators going to the ice required a minimum of three trips as an observer or first officer before going down as P1

Or they could have been doing it to save money. Nothing stopping them from sending senior non-management captains down with experienced F/Os or F/Es now, is there?

What were all these people doing in the cockpit at this critical time??

They weren't - the flight deck door was open.

The remark attributed to First Officer Lucas, was to those who knew him, just the way he would react if he did not agree with something, in this case the descent procedure.

Any proof? Which brings to mind another question - if this supposed altercation had taken place and the door had been slammed, what was it doing open again shortly afterwards?

Your insistance that Ron Chippendale and Capt Gemmel were involved in some sort of conspiracy is ridiculous.

I think that heavy pressure was applied from Morrie Davis and Rob Muldoon on down to make the company look good - that does not necessarily imply a conspiracy between Chippindale and Gemmell, but it does make their alterations to the CVR transcript look suspicious.

The one third to CAA and 2 thirds of the cost to ANZ of the enquiry, that Mahon awarded to be paid to the estates of Collins and Cassin, and some of that to cover the costs of NZALPA, and the $150,000 fine to ANZ, were thrown out by the Appeal Court, and upheld by the Privy Council because as they stated there was no evidence of , or as they stated "No clear proof " of any plan of deception.

Actually it's less clear cut than that - they said that there was no clear proof of an "orchestrated" plan of deception - they did not dispute the findings regarding the accident and they did not dispute that some ANZ personnel had lied at the inquiry. Two of the panel dissented and wanted the rest thrown out, both of them had family working for ANZ.

[prospector]

DozyWannabe,

Could you please name the family links to the Privy Council???

You obviously are so convinced of the invicinbility of Mahon and Vette you do not read and digest fact.

Your comment re communications is wrong, they never at any time lost communication, but it was all via HF, no VHF.

You were invited by a previous poster, henry crun, from memory, to give your version of how a tower, or radar controller would 'Invite" a descent to 500ft. You have not supplied an answer yet. Regardless of Company SOP's it was a CAA mandatory requirement that no flight below 6,000ft was permitted. The fact that a senior Check and Training captain carried out such a descent at the invitation of a controller, and made it public that he had done so, certainly made a rod for the back of later crews, especially when the weather was not SKC and unlimited visibility.

You have not as yet described how the transponder could possibly be working when it was physically impossible for radar to get any returns when the descent was carried out as it was, and there is no dispute on the reported track of this descent. They got a return for a min or two, no more.