Paul Holmes and Erebus
Guest
Posts: n/a
Could be, it was Paraparaumu, not Raumati that I attended, actually I would have said that he got hysterical trying to answer my question.
He spent a lot of time explaining how Jim Collins, and his family, were poring over the charts for the flight, and how it went down McMurdo Sound.
My question was that if the weather was as good as he was trying to portray, and they knew the route so well from their chart perusal, why did nobody pick up they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island, a very distinctive landmark.
The answer was that Mahon had explained that, but nowhere have I seen any explanation that ties up with how good the weather was with the fact that they missed this obvious anomoly.
He mumbled something about a DC10 cruises with an 8 degree nose up attitude which may explain why the Island was not sighted, even though during the second descending orbit they were tracking directly towards the Island, and a number of photographs recovered showed the Island.
The general public lapped up his story, even though very few, if any, have any knowledge of the CAA rules, Company SOP's, that had been formulated for these trips, were completely ignored, with the end result that the rules that were in place to prevent just this scenario were negated.
Is it just coincidental, that after 33 years Holmes book comes out after Ron Chippendale is not here to answer these charges of malfeasance??
He spent a lot of time explaining how Jim Collins, and his family, were poring over the charts for the flight, and how it went down McMurdo Sound.
My question was that if the weather was as good as he was trying to portray, and they knew the route so well from their chart perusal, why did nobody pick up they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island, a very distinctive landmark.
The answer was that Mahon had explained that, but nowhere have I seen any explanation that ties up with how good the weather was with the fact that they missed this obvious anomoly.
He mumbled something about a DC10 cruises with an 8 degree nose up attitude which may explain why the Island was not sighted, even though during the second descending orbit they were tracking directly towards the Island, and a number of photographs recovered showed the Island.
The general public lapped up his story, even though very few, if any, have any knowledge of the CAA rules, Company SOP's, that had been formulated for these trips, were completely ignored, with the end result that the rules that were in place to prevent just this scenario were negated.
Is it just coincidental, that after 33 years Holmes book comes out after Ron Chippendale is not here to answer these charges of malfeasance??
Is it just coincidental, that after 33 years Holmes book comes out after Ron Chippendale is not here to answer these charges of malfeasance
PH spends a lot of time denegrating RC and crapping on about how little he knew about jet airliner accidents, but never addresses the fact that he himself knows less. He also spends a lot of time expaining how the good name of JC was smeared and tarnished when he was no longer there to defend himself.......and then goes on to smear and tarnish the name of RC now that he also is not here to defend himself.
And the worst bit? PH doesn't actually understand what he is talking about. I am sure that he thinks/ believes he does, but he doesn't.
He never will either, just like the people who read his book and take all the flowery romantic rubbish in like it's gospel. It's all very emotional, but he'l never understand why so many airliners DON'T fly into hills. Thats one thing he'l never understand. If you asked him he'd probably think its because airlines have such good navigation sections now and systems are so reliable that they never need cross checking , if only he knew. I had a flight plan a few months ago that put me more than 400nm off track at my destination and the fuel burn predicted was out by six tonnes......by PH's reckoning its a miracle we made it.
RC did his job, it's sad to see his character assaulted publicly by a novice chasing some quick cash.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by Gordon Vette
"I realised that if Jim Collins, a Captain I had known for 20-odd years, [and] an exceptional pilot in all respects, could be a victim of this terrible crash then so could I, and so could any of the rest of us".
A DC-10 captain in 1979 might not usually have checked all the waypoints against the chart, but what if he had received conflicting information about one of them? What if he had been told at the briefing that the final waypoint was at X and then discovered, the night before, that an old flightplan he had taken from the briefing had the waypoint at Y?
As Prospector points out, he went down without verifying his position.
How, other than visually (which he did - and was misled by optical illusion and whiteout) was he supposed to verify his position? As I've said in another thread, Prospector makes much of the position of Beaufort Island, but if you look at the descent track flown, the aircraft would have emerged from clouds south of Beaufort Island, with the island itself out of visual range of the flight deck. This would have happened even if he was on the McMurdo track, as the longitude at which the aircraft came out of clouds would have been the same in both cases.
The briefing video (that mentioned the limits *and* Erebus) was shown to Chippindale, but Chippindale was *not* shown the photocopied sheet depicting the track with the error, nor was he even made aware that the error even existed until much later, when his report was almost finished - ANZ management presented it to him almost as an afterthought, and acknowledgement of the existence of that error occupies only a small section of that report as a consequence, just as I suspect ANZ intended.
Because of the fallout from the reports, I get the idea that amongst the NZ aviation fraternity the tendency has been to come down firmly on Chippindale's or NZALPA/Mahon's side - and by extension that to believe Mahon's report necessitates a belief that Chippindale was complicit in the shenanigans that ANZ was playing. This is a false dichotomy - I accept from people who knew Chippindale that he was a very honest man and a good investigator for the time who held his convictions to the very end. I also understand that given his military background it may have been inconceivable to him that airline operations were not as stringent when applying their rules as the military operations he was used to. I find it harder to accept the willingness with which he brought Chief Pilot Gemmell into the process of re-writing the CVR transcript, and with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight over 32 years it looks very much to me like he was a good man who in this case was led around by the nose by ANZ management - who made sure that the only evidence they supplied would support the conclusion they wanted. As such I believe Chippindale was an honest man put in an impossible position by his employers at NZCAA (who also had a vested interest in a pilot error conclusion), and who based his conclusions on his military experience and the incomplete information he was provided.
Remember that the only fault the Court Of Appeal found (and Privy Council upheld) with the Mahon report was the accusation of a top-down campaign of deception. They neither disagreed with his assertion that ANZ management were lying to him, nor did they find fault with any of his findings regarding the crash itself - though it did not stop Muldoon from spinning it that way and causing most of the continuing acrimony on the subject.
Mahon certainly never intimated that "SOPs should be thrown out of the window" even slightly. What Mahon and Vette uncovered was that Chippindale had only been given half the story. The hard MSAs applied to IFR only, and the Collins flight was under VFR rules at the time. SOPs and regulations stated that under radar guidance, the flight could legally descend to altitudes as low as 500ft if invited to do so by the radar controller. Collins was invited to descend to 1,500ft and his transponder was coding during the descent, giving him the indication that Mac Central was tracking him on radar. Visual range below the overcast (i.e. below 2,500ft) was all the way to the horizon and so he was in VFR and thus not breaking any regulations. Whether it was Chippindale's own erroneous conclusion that they were in IMC, or whether that suggestion was advanced to him by Captain Gemmell as they reviewed the tape will never have a satisfactory answer.
NB: As mentioned on the other thread, Capt. Vette's "Impact Erebus" documentary has been uploaded in it's entirety to YouTube by NZALPA. Part 1 is here (Double-click to open in a new window and get the rest of it) :
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 30th Nov 2011 at 19:22.
Guest
Posts: n/a
DozyWannabe,
Just a few points from your post I would like to question.
" He was invited down by Mac Central and at the time, his transponder was coding, giving the impression that they had him on radar."
Really? the only record appertaining to descent was that a VMC descent was requested, as you are no doubt aware that makes the crew responsible for their own terrain and traffic clearance during the descent requested.
I know Gordon Vette in his book Impact Erebus states that his (Collins) transponder was coding, but I find it very difficult to understand how this could be ascertained by anyone who was not in the cockpit at the time.
One would think if they were indeed on the radar then their VHF and DME would also have been giving a reading.
The question of McMurdo Radar was very well covered by Judge Harold Greene's hearing in the US District Court in Washington who wrote in his ruling
"It is clearly established that, when the pilot told MacCentre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively told the controllers he could see where he was going. In so doing he took sole respnsibility for separating the aircraft from other aircraft and from terrain, and he was on his own"
" the aircraft would have emerged from clouds south of Beaufort Island, with the island itself out of visual range of the flight deck"
Really? after requesting a VMC descent? naughty naughty.
"
The hard MSAs applied to IFR only, and the Collins flight was under VFR rules at the time. SOPs and regulations stated that under radar guidance, the flight could legally descend to altitudes as low as 500ft if invited to do so by the radar controller. Collins was invited to descend to 1,500ft and his transponder was coding during the descent, giving him the indication that Mac Central was tracking him on radar. Visual range below the overcast (i.e. below 2,500ft) was all the way to the horizon and so he was in VFR and thus not breaking any regulations. Whether it was Chippindale's own erroneous conclusion that they were in IMC, or whether that suggestion was advanced to him by Captain Gemmell as they reviewed the tape will never have a satisfactory answer."
Are you trying to say that McMurdo radar could see through Ross Island and Mt Erebus? That must have come from the Holmes account, from where else could it have come?? Not even Mahon came up with that proposition.
There is only one answer to that statement, it has been made many times but here it is again
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the ONLY LET/DOWN procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 Grid from McMurdo Field within 20nm of TACAN Ch29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
There is no doubt the crew were aware of these requirements, a copy was recovered from the cockpit after the crash.
"
'"Mahon certainly never intimated that "SOPs should be thrown out of the window" even slightly. What Mahon and Vette uncovered was that Chippindale had only been given half the story"
In view of the mandatory descent requirements printed above, which were required to be complied with both by the company and CAA, and the lack of credence given these requirements by Mahon, I find that statement hard to digest.
Just a few points from your post I would like to question.
" He was invited down by Mac Central and at the time, his transponder was coding, giving the impression that they had him on radar."
Really? the only record appertaining to descent was that a VMC descent was requested, as you are no doubt aware that makes the crew responsible for their own terrain and traffic clearance during the descent requested.
I know Gordon Vette in his book Impact Erebus states that his (Collins) transponder was coding, but I find it very difficult to understand how this could be ascertained by anyone who was not in the cockpit at the time.
One would think if they were indeed on the radar then their VHF and DME would also have been giving a reading.
The question of McMurdo Radar was very well covered by Judge Harold Greene's hearing in the US District Court in Washington who wrote in his ruling
"It is clearly established that, when the pilot told MacCentre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively told the controllers he could see where he was going. In so doing he took sole respnsibility for separating the aircraft from other aircraft and from terrain, and he was on his own"
" the aircraft would have emerged from clouds south of Beaufort Island, with the island itself out of visual range of the flight deck"
Really? after requesting a VMC descent? naughty naughty.
"
The hard MSAs applied to IFR only, and the Collins flight was under VFR rules at the time. SOPs and regulations stated that under radar guidance, the flight could legally descend to altitudes as low as 500ft if invited to do so by the radar controller. Collins was invited to descend to 1,500ft and his transponder was coding during the descent, giving him the indication that Mac Central was tracking him on radar. Visual range below the overcast (i.e. below 2,500ft) was all the way to the horizon and so he was in VFR and thus not breaking any regulations. Whether it was Chippindale's own erroneous conclusion that they were in IMC, or whether that suggestion was advanced to him by Captain Gemmell as they reviewed the tape will never have a satisfactory answer."
Are you trying to say that McMurdo radar could see through Ross Island and Mt Erebus? That must have come from the Holmes account, from where else could it have come?? Not even Mahon came up with that proposition.
There is only one answer to that statement, it has been made many times but here it is again
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the ONLY LET/DOWN procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 Grid from McMurdo Field within 20nm of TACAN Ch29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
There is no doubt the crew were aware of these requirements, a copy was recovered from the cockpit after the crash.
"
'"Mahon certainly never intimated that "SOPs should be thrown out of the window" even slightly. What Mahon and Vette uncovered was that Chippindale had only been given half the story"
In view of the mandatory descent requirements printed above, which were required to be complied with both by the company and CAA, and the lack of credence given these requirements by Mahon, I find that statement hard to digest.
Last edited by prospector; 2nd Dec 2011 at 03:16.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 669
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
prospector,
How would you apportion blame for this accident? Was it 100% the fault of the flight crew?
Or maybe 50% to the crew and 50% to the airline, or somewhere between the two?
As you are well versed in the associated evidence, I am interested to hear you opinion as to the blame allocation.
My leaning is towards 50/50.
How would you apportion blame for this accident? Was it 100% the fault of the flight crew?
Or maybe 50% to the crew and 50% to the airline, or somewhere between the two?
As you are well versed in the associated evidence, I am interested to hear you opinion as to the blame allocation.
My leaning is towards 50/50.
Guest
Posts: n/a
FGD135,
All been stated in a previous thread but my estimation would be,
CAA: 5% for lack of proper oversight, although I do believe there
was an airline inspector scheduled to travel on the flight but had to pull
out due to family circumstance. I very much doubt the flight would
have been conducted the way it was if it was known a CAA inspector
was onboard.
Company: 10% for sloppy operating procedures, and not following up on
reports of low flying. An invitation from a McMurdo Radar operator to
perform a low level run surely does not overide CAA regs or Co SOPs.
Crew: 85% for not complying with either CAA requirements for these flights
or company SOP's, and for not confirming their position before
commencing descent. If even just one of the mandatory requirements
for descent were compled with the accident would have been avoided.
The tools for getting a precise position were available to them prior to
descent, and as this was their first flight to the ice one would have
thought a high degreee of caution would have been the order of the day.
All been stated in a previous thread but my estimation would be,
CAA: 5% for lack of proper oversight, although I do believe there
was an airline inspector scheduled to travel on the flight but had to pull
out due to family circumstance. I very much doubt the flight would
have been conducted the way it was if it was known a CAA inspector
was onboard.
Company: 10% for sloppy operating procedures, and not following up on
reports of low flying. An invitation from a McMurdo Radar operator to
perform a low level run surely does not overide CAA regs or Co SOPs.
Crew: 85% for not complying with either CAA requirements for these flights
or company SOP's, and for not confirming their position before
commencing descent. If even just one of the mandatory requirements
for descent were compled with the accident would have been avoided.
The tools for getting a precise position were available to them prior to
descent, and as this was their first flight to the ice one would have
thought a high degreee of caution would have been the order of the day.
PPRuNe supporter
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Planet Earth
Posts: 1,677
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For crying out loud, this mission is a VFR tour, if the pilot decides to take it upon himself to go scud running in a DC-10, where he dives through a hole down to 1500 foot, how can this be anyone else's responsibility other than the PIC?
Running for cover...
Running for cover...
Dreamland
Perhaps you should check your facts. They weren't scud running and he didn't dive down through a hole to 1500 feet.
The phenomena they experienced was sector white out, something not well known or understood at that time nor nowadays either judging by the comments of some posters on this forum.
if the pilot decides to take it upon himself to go scud running in a DC-10, where he dives through a hole down to 1500 foot,
The phenomena they experienced was sector white out, something not well known or understood at that time nor nowadays either judging by the comments of some posters on this forum.
My apportioning would be
Regulator 10%
Company 35%
Crew 55%
there are always two camps in this discussion, and the notion that one is right and the other wrong is just not realistic.
People tend to argue that it is like this
Company 100%
Crew 0%
or Crew 100%
Company 0%
Things just aren't that simple.
Regulator 10%
Company 35%
Crew 55%
there are always two camps in this discussion, and the notion that one is right and the other wrong is just not realistic.
People tend to argue that it is like this
Company 100%
Crew 0%
or Crew 100%
Company 0%
Things just aren't that simple.
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: some dive
Posts: 448
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dream Land,
As usual, fu*kin idiots as yourself continue to run a muck according to your ego as 'supreme'.
Go and have a look at 'Flight to Erebus Part 6' on youtube and then after observing the ANZ management filth and scum of Capt C***by, still advise us all it was Capt Collins fault.
Do some research di**head, before posting!
As usual, fu*kin idiots as yourself continue to run a muck according to your ego as 'supreme'.
Go and have a look at 'Flight to Erebus Part 6' on youtube and then after observing the ANZ management filth and scum of Capt C***by, still advise us all it was Capt Collins fault.
Do some research di**head, before posting!
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 669
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
prospector,
Thank you. How did Justice Mahon apportion the blame? I could look it up for myself, but I suspect you could probably quote his finding exactly.
framer,
Thank you. I was just about to ask you that question.
ratpoison, 27/09, Dream Land, hoggsnortrupert, bbg, reubee, ampan, could you please give your opinions as to the blame apportionment.
I am curious as to whether anybody here thinks that any one party is 100% to blame.
Thanks.
Thank you. How did Justice Mahon apportion the blame? I could look it up for myself, but I suspect you could probably quote his finding exactly.
framer,
Thank you. I was just about to ask you that question.
ratpoison, 27/09, Dream Land, hoggsnortrupert, bbg, reubee, ampan, could you please give your opinions as to the blame apportionment.
I am curious as to whether anybody here thinks that any one party is 100% to blame.
Thanks.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Really? the only record appertaining to descent was that a VMC descent was requested, as you are no doubt aware that makes the crew responsible for their own terrain and traffic clearance during the descent requested.
I know Gordon Vette in his book Impact Erebus states that his (Collins) transponder was coding, but I find it very difficult to understand how this could be ascertained by anyone who was not in the cockpit at the time.
I know Gordon Vette in his book Impact Erebus states that his (Collins) transponder was coding, but I find it very difficult to understand how this could be ascertained by anyone who was not in the cockpit at the time.
One would think if they were indeed on the radar then their VHF and DME would also have been giving a reading.
The question of McMurdo Radar was very well covered by Judge Harold Greene's hearing in the US District Court in Washington who wrote in his ruling..."
Really? after requesting a VMC descent? naughty naughty.
Are you trying to say that McMurdo radar could see through Ross Island and Mt Erebus? That must have come from the Holmes account, from where else could it have come?? Not even Mahon came up with that proposition.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the ONLY LET/DOWN procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 Grid from McMurdo Field within 20nm of TACAN Ch29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 Grid from McMurdo Field within 20nm of TACAN Ch29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
This is the reason that I have a hard time finding the crew responsible in the legal sense - because of the presence of weather conditions on which they had never been briefed, they made the best possible decision they could with the information presented - that the information was erroneous because of such conditions at that particular time and in that particular place, there exists reasonable doubt that they could have known it was erroneous even if the nav track had not been altered, or if the track was down McMurdo and an INS error had misdirected them. They knew that the INS was accurate to more or less two miles on that route, so even if an INS error had taken them off-course they would still be over McMurdo Sound.
If this was a one-off flight planned with the military-like precision that Chippindale seems to have expected then I'd have more truck with his conclusions, but as it is, ANZ had been treating the flights as more-or-less routine and had infact been gradually removing more and more of the safeguards that were supposed to protect their flights.
In view of the mandatory descent requirements printed above, which were required to be complied with both by the company and CAA, and the lack of credence given these requirements by Mahon, I find that statement hard to digest.
Now - please don't be offended, but I want to ask you an honest question. How much of this do you really believe in your own heart, and how much of your vehemence is attached to a belief that to think otherwise is to automatically denigrate the work of Chippindale - a man who is no longer with us that you clearly respect?
I posted a few paragraphs in the AH&N thread on why I believe this to be a false dichotomy which I won't repeat here, but suffice it to say that I think that Chippindale honestly believed in what he was saying and I don't think he was intentionally out to deceive - I believe that this is why Mahon went out of his way to call him a model witness even though he clearly was not convinced by the conclusions he made. However I do believe that his employers at NZCA had a vested interest in an outcome of pilot error, because they had failed to update their regulations in accordance with ANZ starting to take on sightseeing flights - the regulations up until that point only really suitable for regular line flying (and the changes they did make were repeatedly flouted by ANZ over the two years between the start of the flights and the accident). I also believe that ANZ only presented the evidence to Chippindale that they wanted him to see (Ironically doing to Chippindale what the whiteout did to Collins) - going to some lengths (including B&E!) to conceal their own lowering of standards regarding Antarctic flights between 1977 and 1979. Chippindale himself admitted in 1987 that he believed ANZ pulled the wool over his eyes regarding how the Antarctic flights were operated, but at the same time said that did not alter his opinion.
Where I have a harder time explaining his actions relates to his editing of the CVR transcript, which in itself broke almost every known protocol relating to CVR handling in accident investigation, but in particular inviting Captain Gemmell - a known party with a vested interest in the conclusions of his report - to listen to the tapes with him. That, to my mind, was inexcusable - but I'm willing to accept that was down to naivete rather than malice.
Those that come down on Chippindale's "side" tend to have a belief that Captain Vette's research was largely to clear the name of his good friend Captain Collins, but he himself has never been that clear cut. What he said at the time of the Mahon report was actually that he believed that given the way ANZ were operating those flights at the time, presented with the same whiteout conditions and with the nav co-ordinates changed without their knowledge - any of ANZ's pilots, including him, would have ended up on the slopes of Erebus. That in itself is a pretty big admission to make, given that he was no slouch at navigation himself (having famously helped navigate a lost Cessna pilot some time previously).
For all my opinion is worth (which admittedly isn't much), if ANZ had not changed the co-ordinates and briefed the pilots correctly on whiteout, then I'd have been willing to accept some responsibility on the part of the crew. The corollary of that is that I believe that if whiteout had been briefed correctly and the co-ordinate change had been either notified or not made until after the Collins flight, the accident would never have happened.
Thus as far as I'm concerned (and given the deliberately destroyed evidence on the part of Mac Central and Air New Zealand), I have to apportion the responsibility as 15% NZCA for failing to update their regulations and failing to keep a regulatory eye on ANZ between 1977 and 1979 as far as Antarctic flights were concerned, 5% on Mac Central for destroying exculpatory evidence (which leads me to believe they were not paying attention to their radar), and 80% on Air New Zealand, for allowing standards to slip so spectacularly within the space of two years, having incredibly lax communication protocols between their nav section and operations and changing the INS co-ordinates without the crew's knowledge.
Furthermore, I believe that Prime Minister Muldoon deliberately engineered the political split and media manipulation that fostered an adversarial relationship between members of the NZ aviation community in an attempt at damage limitation on the reputation of his national carrier, which he knew would have been in considerable financial difficulty were it not for government subsidy.
@FGD135 :
The Mahon findings are right here:
http://www.erebus.co.nz/Portals/4/Do...f Disaster.pdf
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 2nd Dec 2011 at 17:02.
Guest
Posts: n/a
DozyWannabe.
" and how much of your vehemence is attached to a belief that to think otherwise is to automatically denigrate the work of Chippindale"
I hope my replies have not come across as vehement, my interest in this thread is to put forward my belief that Ron Chippendale's report was in fact correct
Lets just follw along on the points you bring up about the radar, that many people including holmes, have completely misinterpreted..
The transponder was interrogated and showed up as such for perhaps a minute or two. This was at the western most point of the first orbit, it was mentioned in the CVR as "Transpnder now responding" flollowed a minute or two later with "We've lost him again".
If you look at the track the flight took on the descent it is possible the radar may have got a return for a minute or two, it was certainly never identified, and certainly no radar controller would approve a descent if the flight was not identified. They requested and it was approved a VMC descent.
Now look at Ross Island and Mt Erebus, the position of the radar Tx and the position of the aeroplane during the descent. It is physically impossible for the radar, being line of sight, to ever pick them up again.
"As hard to digest as I find Chippindale's assertion that they were in cloud when that contradicts the contemporary weather report as well as the data later obtained by Vette."
Why was this unapproved descent commenced in the first place? because the weather conditions at McMurdo were below those required for the approved let down procedure, that had been practiced in the simulator prior to the flight.
"However I do believe that his employers at NZCA had a vested interest in an outcome of pilot error,"
Another of your beliefs that is erroneous.
From Maurice McGreal's publication. " The office was given administrative support from the Ministry of Transport but the Chief Inspector was independent and had no statutary responsiblity to the Civil Aviation Authority."
I do believe he reported directly to the Minister of Transport.
All this has been pounded to death many times on this site, as well as others, I would suggest you try and get hold of books, and reports penned by people who have many thousands of hours aviating behind them. All who disagree with Mahons findings.
A few I would recommend:
New Zealand Tragedies Aviation John King. Very good if you are interested in New Zealand aviation history,
A History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand Maurice M McGreal,
Chapter 20 Echoes of Erebus, has very good further references and reports.
" and how much of your vehemence is attached to a belief that to think otherwise is to automatically denigrate the work of Chippindale"
I hope my replies have not come across as vehement, my interest in this thread is to put forward my belief that Ron Chippendale's report was in fact correct
Lets just follw along on the points you bring up about the radar, that many people including holmes, have completely misinterpreted..
The transponder was interrogated and showed up as such for perhaps a minute or two. This was at the western most point of the first orbit, it was mentioned in the CVR as "Transpnder now responding" flollowed a minute or two later with "We've lost him again".
If you look at the track the flight took on the descent it is possible the radar may have got a return for a minute or two, it was certainly never identified, and certainly no radar controller would approve a descent if the flight was not identified. They requested and it was approved a VMC descent.
Now look at Ross Island and Mt Erebus, the position of the radar Tx and the position of the aeroplane during the descent. It is physically impossible for the radar, being line of sight, to ever pick them up again.
"As hard to digest as I find Chippindale's assertion that they were in cloud when that contradicts the contemporary weather report as well as the data later obtained by Vette."
Why was this unapproved descent commenced in the first place? because the weather conditions at McMurdo were below those required for the approved let down procedure, that had been practiced in the simulator prior to the flight.
"However I do believe that his employers at NZCA had a vested interest in an outcome of pilot error,"
Another of your beliefs that is erroneous.
From Maurice McGreal's publication. " The office was given administrative support from the Ministry of Transport but the Chief Inspector was independent and had no statutary responsiblity to the Civil Aviation Authority."
I do believe he reported directly to the Minister of Transport.
All this has been pounded to death many times on this site, as well as others, I would suggest you try and get hold of books, and reports penned by people who have many thousands of hours aviating behind them. All who disagree with Mahons findings.
A few I would recommend:
New Zealand Tragedies Aviation John King. Very good if you are interested in New Zealand aviation history,
A History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand Maurice M McGreal,
Chapter 20 Echoes of Erebus, has very good further references and reports.
Last edited by prospector; 3rd Dec 2011 at 00:50.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All this has been pounded to death many times on this site, as well as others, I would suggest you try and get hold of books, and reports penned by people who have many thousands of hours aviating behind them. All who disagree with Mahons findings.
I'll always think there was something fishy about the radar situation. What you say is correct about the positioning, however, given that the crew (I believe including the F/Es) had every reason to think they were over McMurdo Sound, they had a minute or less to work out why the radio had gone dead and if the transponder had stopped coding, why it had done so. They were in clear air according to the weather reports, they had not been briefed on that particular whiteout scenario, and they started an escape maneouvre almost as soon as anyone first raised any serious concern. I can't see any reason to conclude that they did anything less than the best they could with the information they had at the time.
Guest
Posts: n/a
" and a belief that his interpretation of the regs was too severe, especially given that every single prior flight either broke or skimmed very close to the limits of those same regs. "
Once again your belief would appear to be erroneous. How can an interpretation of a written order be to severe?
'they had a minute or less to work out why the radio had gone dead'
The only radio contact, at any time was by HF, and that never went dead
From Captain Mayne Hawkins:
" I was in no doubt at the briefing yhat the lower limit was 6,000ft", he says" The weather on my flight was perfect, with clear skies and 100 miles of visibility. Ice tower asked me for a low run, but I kept to 6,000ft."
Here we have again the request from Ice tower for a low run. Does a request from the controller in Ice Tower overide a standing order from both the Company and Civil Aviation? I think not.
One would get the impression from Mahons report that this crew were in fact the owners of the aircraft and could do as they wished, Bob Thomson covers this aspect very well when he wrote that" these people were taking a Sunday drive"
That taken from History of New Zealand AntArctic Research Programme 1965-88
We get back to the fact that a perfectly serviceable aircraft with the most up to date nav equipment was flown in to Ross Island, not Mt Erebus, remember it was only 1480ft that the impact occured, and that after a climb was initiated. And it would appear that you believe, along with many others, that the crew was blameless??
Once again your belief would appear to be erroneous. How can an interpretation of a written order be to severe?
'they had a minute or less to work out why the radio had gone dead'
The only radio contact, at any time was by HF, and that never went dead
From Captain Mayne Hawkins:
" I was in no doubt at the briefing yhat the lower limit was 6,000ft", he says" The weather on my flight was perfect, with clear skies and 100 miles of visibility. Ice tower asked me for a low run, but I kept to 6,000ft."
Here we have again the request from Ice tower for a low run. Does a request from the controller in Ice Tower overide a standing order from both the Company and Civil Aviation? I think not.
One would get the impression from Mahons report that this crew were in fact the owners of the aircraft and could do as they wished, Bob Thomson covers this aspect very well when he wrote that" these people were taking a Sunday drive"
That taken from History of New Zealand AntArctic Research Programme 1965-88
We get back to the fact that a perfectly serviceable aircraft with the most up to date nav equipment was flown in to Ross Island, not Mt Erebus, remember it was only 1480ft that the impact occured, and that after a climb was initiated. And it would appear that you believe, along with many others, that the crew was blameless??
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I believe they made an error, but that the error was understandable given a root cause of lackadaisical planning, poor procedural practice by the nav section and failure to correctly train crews on the conditions they could expect.
Was Capt. Hawkins a management pilot perchance? Their claims that they stuck to the regs was in such lockstep that they might as well have set them to the tune of "I Got Rhythm". ANZ themselves had to keep up appearances and chastise pilots who gave evidence saying that the regs were broken despite the fact that prior to the crash, promotional material was released making it clear to the public that flights as low as 2,000ft were taking place as a matter of course.
A transmission from the tower (I believe something along the lines of we can let you down to 1,500ft on radar vectors) indeed *could* override the regulations in a purely legal sense, otherwise Mahon would not have been permitted to take his conclusions as far as he did.
Thomson's "Sunday Drive" statement was based on Chippindale and Gemmell's erroneous CVR transcript - there's no evidence that he had seen the original "Washington Transcript" version, and I suspect that if he had, he'd have drawn different conclusions. The most notable in this instance being Chippindale's insertion of question marks to "where are we", "right about here now". With question marks it sounds like they're lost. Without (as in the original, agreed transcript) it sounds like they're following their expected course on a map, which picks a gigantic hole in Chippindale/NZCA/ANZ's argument - and indeed Thomson's assertion in the same statement that they weren't tracking progres on a map, at least as far as I'm concerned. Another example is Chippindale and Gemmell having Peter Mulgrew saying "The Taylor or Wright now or do yah?", and the agreed Washington version has him saying "Taylor on the right now", a clear indication that even the guide thought they were over McMurdo Sound.
I don't think, given the time between the call for go-around power and impact that there was any time for the aircraft to climb significantly. Incidentally another error made in the original report involved synchronisation of the CVR and FDR, due to the FDR tape being stretched around the capstan. What the report cited as last-ditch evasive maneouvres were just as, if not more likely to be, the reactions of the flight controls to impact.
Was Capt. Hawkins a management pilot perchance? Their claims that they stuck to the regs was in such lockstep that they might as well have set them to the tune of "I Got Rhythm". ANZ themselves had to keep up appearances and chastise pilots who gave evidence saying that the regs were broken despite the fact that prior to the crash, promotional material was released making it clear to the public that flights as low as 2,000ft were taking place as a matter of course.
A transmission from the tower (I believe something along the lines of we can let you down to 1,500ft on radar vectors) indeed *could* override the regulations in a purely legal sense, otherwise Mahon would not have been permitted to take his conclusions as far as he did.
Thomson's "Sunday Drive" statement was based on Chippindale and Gemmell's erroneous CVR transcript - there's no evidence that he had seen the original "Washington Transcript" version, and I suspect that if he had, he'd have drawn different conclusions. The most notable in this instance being Chippindale's insertion of question marks to "where are we", "right about here now". With question marks it sounds like they're lost. Without (as in the original, agreed transcript) it sounds like they're following their expected course on a map, which picks a gigantic hole in Chippindale/NZCA/ANZ's argument - and indeed Thomson's assertion in the same statement that they weren't tracking progres on a map, at least as far as I'm concerned. Another example is Chippindale and Gemmell having Peter Mulgrew saying "The Taylor or Wright now or do yah?", and the agreed Washington version has him saying "Taylor on the right now", a clear indication that even the guide thought they were over McMurdo Sound.
I don't think, given the time between the call for go-around power and impact that there was any time for the aircraft to climb significantly. Incidentally another error made in the original report involved synchronisation of the CVR and FDR, due to the FDR tape being stretched around the capstan. What the report cited as last-ditch evasive maneouvres were just as, if not more likely to be, the reactions of the flight controls to impact.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 3rd Dec 2011 at 02:13.
FGD 135
I've never sat down to think about how blame should be apportioned, except to say that there are several parties that contributed to this very sad event. Some of whom it would appear went to great lengths to distance themselves from any blame.
Here are the main contributing factors in my view, not in any order of significance.
1. Last minute change of co-ordinates which were not advised to the crew.
2. Lack of knowledge about sector white out.
3. A crew that was going to the South Pole for the first time.
4. Previous trips that had openly operated in contravention of the agreed rules, thus setting a precedent.
5. The decision of the crew to descend when/where they did.
6. Substandard regulatory oversight.
7. No comment to the crew from McMurdo Radar regarding the 25 mile lateral displacement from previous flights.
If we then allocate responsibility for each of the these factors (some factors may have more importance than others) then we can start to apportion blame.
Air New Zealand has to take the blame for items 1,2,3, and 4. Regarding items 2 and 3 I see them as being responsible for the training of the crew and ensuring the operating crew are well prepared for the trip.
The crew have to take responsibility for item 5,
NZCAA item 6
McMurdo radar for not being as vigilant as you might expect for item 7
I'm not sure what level of significance you should place on each item but for now I figure it as follows.
AirNZ 60%
Crew 25%
CAA 10%
McMurdo 5%
could you please give your opinions as to the blame apportionment.
Here are the main contributing factors in my view, not in any order of significance.
1. Last minute change of co-ordinates which were not advised to the crew.
2. Lack of knowledge about sector white out.
3. A crew that was going to the South Pole for the first time.
4. Previous trips that had openly operated in contravention of the agreed rules, thus setting a precedent.
5. The decision of the crew to descend when/where they did.
6. Substandard regulatory oversight.
7. No comment to the crew from McMurdo Radar regarding the 25 mile lateral displacement from previous flights.
If we then allocate responsibility for each of the these factors (some factors may have more importance than others) then we can start to apportion blame.
Air New Zealand has to take the blame for items 1,2,3, and 4. Regarding items 2 and 3 I see them as being responsible for the training of the crew and ensuring the operating crew are well prepared for the trip.
The crew have to take responsibility for item 5,
NZCAA item 6
McMurdo radar for not being as vigilant as you might expect for item 7
I'm not sure what level of significance you should place on each item but for now I figure it as follows.
AirNZ 60%
Crew 25%
CAA 10%
McMurdo 5%
Guest
Posts: n/a
" A transmission from the tower (I believe something along the lines of we can let you down to 1,500ft on radar vectors)"
Has it not been shown, and proven, that at no time were they in radar contact with McMurdo, please explain how this could be with a 13000ft mountain between them and the TX aerial, the only contact with McMurdo had been with the HF radio, not restricted to line of sight, and normally used for long range comms.
The tower was working VHF, at no time did they have VHF contact with the tower, once again there was a 1arge lump of land, Ross Island between them, and the same for the DME. If they were on the ball, and were where they believed themselves to be that alone should have sent warning bells to someone. No radar, no VHF, no DME, and only 40 odd miles from the station.
"Thomson's "Sunday Drive" statement was based on Chippindale and Gemmell's erroneous CVR transcript"\
RUBBISH. Use some more of the same statement
"The co pilot of Flt 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the Lar and Long readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never refesrred to it" .
Where in that statement can you read into anything about erroneous CVR transcripts. And it also answers your previous question of how they could establish their position, with a great degree of accuracy, put the lat and long from the INS on the chart, befor descent was commenced..
But that still leaves unanswered why this "home design" descent was even contemplated. The quite specific descent requirements were formulated because the powers that be were aware of the lack of AntArctic experience of the Air NZ crews. The only answer would appear to be that, I say AGAIN, that the WX conditions at McMurdo were below that required for tha approved descent procedure, so they invented their own with the end result that we have all seen.
Perhaps the word they is inappropriate here, that infers the whole crew invented the let down procedure, The other first officer. Mr lucas was for some reason down the back and had no say in this, it would appear that Mr Cassin did not question the Captain's decisions at all.
Has it not been shown, and proven, that at no time were they in radar contact with McMurdo, please explain how this could be with a 13000ft mountain between them and the TX aerial, the only contact with McMurdo had been with the HF radio, not restricted to line of sight, and normally used for long range comms.
The tower was working VHF, at no time did they have VHF contact with the tower, once again there was a 1arge lump of land, Ross Island between them, and the same for the DME. If they were on the ball, and were where they believed themselves to be that alone should have sent warning bells to someone. No radar, no VHF, no DME, and only 40 odd miles from the station.
"Thomson's "Sunday Drive" statement was based on Chippindale and Gemmell's erroneous CVR transcript"\
RUBBISH. Use some more of the same statement
"The co pilot of Flt 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the Lar and Long readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never refesrred to it" .
Where in that statement can you read into anything about erroneous CVR transcripts. And it also answers your previous question of how they could establish their position, with a great degree of accuracy, put the lat and long from the INS on the chart, befor descent was commenced..
But that still leaves unanswered why this "home design" descent was even contemplated. The quite specific descent requirements were formulated because the powers that be were aware of the lack of AntArctic experience of the Air NZ crews. The only answer would appear to be that, I say AGAIN, that the WX conditions at McMurdo were below that required for tha approved descent procedure, so they invented their own with the end result that we have all seen.
Perhaps the word they is inappropriate here, that infers the whole crew invented the let down procedure, The other first officer. Mr lucas was for some reason down the back and had no say in this, it would appear that Mr Cassin did not question the Captain's decisions at all.
Last edited by prospector; 3rd Dec 2011 at 04:01.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
please explain how this could be with a 13000ft mountain between them and the TX aerial, the only contact with McMurdo had been with the HF radio, not restricted to line of sight, and normally used for long range comms.
The tower was working VHF, at no time did they have VHF contact with the tower, once again there was a 1arge lump of land, Ross Island between them, and the same for the DME. If they were on the ball, and were where they believed themselves to be that alone should have sent warning bells to someone. No radar, no VHF, no DME, and only 40 odd miles from the station.
"The co pilot of Flt 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the Lar and Long readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never refesrred to it" .
Where in that statement can you read into anything about erroneous CVR transcripts. And it also answers your previous question of how they could establish their position, with a great degree of accuracy, put the lat and long from the INS on the chart, befor descent was commenced..
But that still leaves unanswered why this "home design" descent was even contemplated.
The quite specific descent requirements were formulated because the powers that be were aware of the lack of AntArctic experience of the Air NZ crews.
Perhaps the word they is inappropriate here, that infers the whole crew invented the let down procedure, The other first officer. Mr lucas was for some reason down the back and had no say in this, it would appear that Mr Cassin did not question the Captain's decisions at all.
Chippindale was a good pilot and an honest man, but he clearly was not prepared to deal with the level of corporate malfeasance that ANZ were willing to engage in to protect their public image.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 669
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SOPs ain't SOPs
Mods: Please leave this in "DG&P Reporting Points" as it relates to the thread "Paul Holmes and Erebus" that is already there.
This essay is titled after the "oils ain't oils" advertising campaign that was used to promote a motor oil in Australia about 30 years ago. The punchline "oils ain't oils" was to convey the message that some oils were better than others.
The subject is "SOPs" - "standard operating procedures". How they are regarded by pilots and how they can be viewed very differently by the law.
Some SOPs are better than others. Some will be recognised by the law as lawful requirements, while others aren't worth the paper they are written on.
The latest Erebus thread has once again revived the debate over which parties were culpable. There are many people that believe the pilots were partly to blame and their argument rests entirely on the existence of an "SOP" which the flight crew did not observe.
That "SOP" specified minimum altitudes around Mt Erebus and set out some other rules governing descent. If the pilots that day had observed the directives given in that "SOP", the aircraft would not have struck terrain.
Those that believe the crew partly responsible cite this "SOP" as the smoking gun evidence.
But did these descent directives really constitute an SOP?
The Mahon Royal Commission found that they did not, and that therefore, there was "no unauthorised flying at any time". Justice Mahon went on to find that the pilots bore no blame whatsoever.
Every commercial pilot is familiar with SOPs. But when pilots say "SOPs", what they are actually referring to are directives that have been published somewhere (typically the "Operations Manual").
But do the underlying directives sometimes undermine the lawfulness of the SOP?
Definitely, and the result is that the directive does NOT constitute an SOP. In other words, this means that despite the direction/instruction being published somewhere - and giving all the appearances of an SOP, the law may not later regard it as legally binding.
These directives can be:
1. Wrong. For example, imagine this statement in the Ops Manual: "Prior to the first flight of the day, all oil tanks must be drained and sampled for the presence of water". This was a typo. The word "oil" was used where "fuel" should have been.
2. Out of date. Operational circumstances may have changed over time and to now observe the directive may be illegal or unsafe.
3. Ambiguous. The directive may be open to numerous different interpretations.
4. Dishonoured. The directive is mostly, or fully, ignored by the company. The check and line pilots know the directive is there, but it has become routine to ignore it.
5. Unreasonable. The directive is almost impossible to comply with. For example: "Before landing at an ALA, the pilot must ensure that it meets the obstacle clearance and gradient requirements of CAAP 92."
Some pilots have strange ideas about written directives. They automatically regard them as SOPs, and will happily parrot the view that "if you break one, you will find yourself in court having to defend yourself".
I have known pilots to express views related to SOPs that are just plain stupid. For example, if somebody was to say "if the manual says I must drain the oil tanks - and not the fuel tanks - then I would be breaking the law if I did not drain the oil tank".
To ascertain whether a particular directive amounts to a lawful SOP may require a court judgement. And this is exactly what happened in the case of Erebus.
The descent "SOP" that the pilots did not observe was judged by the Royal Commission to be NOT an SOP afterall.
This was because nobody at Air New Zealand or the CAA were observing, or had ever, observed it.
SOPs ain't SOPs!
This essay is titled after the "oils ain't oils" advertising campaign that was used to promote a motor oil in Australia about 30 years ago. The punchline "oils ain't oils" was to convey the message that some oils were better than others.
The subject is "SOPs" - "standard operating procedures". How they are regarded by pilots and how they can be viewed very differently by the law.
Some SOPs are better than others. Some will be recognised by the law as lawful requirements, while others aren't worth the paper they are written on.
The latest Erebus thread has once again revived the debate over which parties were culpable. There are many people that believe the pilots were partly to blame and their argument rests entirely on the existence of an "SOP" which the flight crew did not observe.
That "SOP" specified minimum altitudes around Mt Erebus and set out some other rules governing descent. If the pilots that day had observed the directives given in that "SOP", the aircraft would not have struck terrain.
Those that believe the crew partly responsible cite this "SOP" as the smoking gun evidence.
But did these descent directives really constitute an SOP?
The Mahon Royal Commission found that they did not, and that therefore, there was "no unauthorised flying at any time". Justice Mahon went on to find that the pilots bore no blame whatsoever.
Every commercial pilot is familiar with SOPs. But when pilots say "SOPs", what they are actually referring to are directives that have been published somewhere (typically the "Operations Manual").
But do the underlying directives sometimes undermine the lawfulness of the SOP?
Definitely, and the result is that the directive does NOT constitute an SOP. In other words, this means that despite the direction/instruction being published somewhere - and giving all the appearances of an SOP, the law may not later regard it as legally binding.
These directives can be:
1. Wrong. For example, imagine this statement in the Ops Manual: "Prior to the first flight of the day, all oil tanks must be drained and sampled for the presence of water". This was a typo. The word "oil" was used where "fuel" should have been.
2. Out of date. Operational circumstances may have changed over time and to now observe the directive may be illegal or unsafe.
3. Ambiguous. The directive may be open to numerous different interpretations.
4. Dishonoured. The directive is mostly, or fully, ignored by the company. The check and line pilots know the directive is there, but it has become routine to ignore it.
5. Unreasonable. The directive is almost impossible to comply with. For example: "Before landing at an ALA, the pilot must ensure that it meets the obstacle clearance and gradient requirements of CAAP 92."
Some pilots have strange ideas about written directives. They automatically regard them as SOPs, and will happily parrot the view that "if you break one, you will find yourself in court having to defend yourself".
I have known pilots to express views related to SOPs that are just plain stupid. For example, if somebody was to say "if the manual says I must drain the oil tanks - and not the fuel tanks - then I would be breaking the law if I did not drain the oil tank".
To ascertain whether a particular directive amounts to a lawful SOP may require a court judgement. And this is exactly what happened in the case of Erebus.
The descent "SOP" that the pilots did not observe was judged by the Royal Commission to be NOT an SOP afterall.
This was because nobody at Air New Zealand or the CAA were observing, or had ever, observed it.
SOPs ain't SOPs!
Last edited by FGD135; 4th Dec 2011 at 01:58. Reason: Added the "Unreasonable" category of flawed SOPs