Qf LAME EBA Negotiations Begin
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Look, by all means, have a go at us AJ - but lets look at a few other things first:
Management making decisions that are just plain stupid, that end up costing tens of millions -
The Dallas flights - 2 diversions in the last week due low fuel
The Cargo cartel fines
Paying $150 million to fight a $10 million payrise
The Vietnam execs ransom
etc etc etc
SO much for engaging the workforce. All they have done is make them angry and bitter
Add to this a management structure built on empire building - we all got the recent statement that we have just had a new "Manager people communication" appointed who will report to the "Manager people advisor" or some such nonsense
Our particular section has 5 managers.
10 years ago we had 1
I hope you are reading this AJ, cause heres a simple tip, free of charge, guaranteed to save a few million in one hit
GET RID OF THE USELESS LAYERS OF MANAGEMENT
Management making decisions that are just plain stupid, that end up costing tens of millions -
The Dallas flights - 2 diversions in the last week due low fuel
The Cargo cartel fines
Paying $150 million to fight a $10 million payrise
The Vietnam execs ransom
etc etc etc
SO much for engaging the workforce. All they have done is make them angry and bitter
Add to this a management structure built on empire building - we all got the recent statement that we have just had a new "Manager people communication" appointed who will report to the "Manager people advisor" or some such nonsense
Our particular section has 5 managers.
10 years ago we had 1
I hope you are reading this AJ, cause heres a simple tip, free of charge, guaranteed to save a few million in one hit
GET RID OF THE USELESS LAYERS OF MANAGEMENT
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Cant wait to hear the board say SORRY to the investors when their plan comes out in public
No, the reality is, if they screw it up, they'll just spend more of Q's money defending themselves in Court. If they stopped paying the bl00dy lawyers, they could afford to give us some job security.
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My oleo is extended
YOU ARE THE MAN!!!!
tell it like it is!
what the hell is worlds best practice anyway?
Sounds like a statement management make to cover their
Own bad decisions like, our outsourced engine overhaul is
Worlds best practice!
is That is why they blow up Joycey?
tell it like it is!
what the hell is worlds best practice anyway?
Sounds like a statement management make to cover their
Own bad decisions like, our outsourced engine overhaul is
Worlds best practice!
is That is why they blow up Joycey?
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Worlds best practice
give me strengh....this crock of bull****e has been rolled out for years,when are we going to just face the facts that fixing and flying aircraft cost money,and if you want the best people to do the best then you have to pay them more than the others....so AJ has told us now thats what he wants,and its not the best,well get on with it and lets move onto the next phase,down size your workforce bring in unskilled workers to look after the new gen aircraft...whooa did I say new gen,what about the old clunkers we have now,looking at a ZX the other night it felt like looking at a PanAm aircraft 30 years ago....the rim
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If world's best practice for an engine shop is measured in hours on wing, then surely QF was world's best practice. When managers use the term "world's best practice", they actually mean "world's cheapest practice" because that's all they look at, the bottom line.
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A great piece from Garry Norris, ALAEA to Ben Sandilands.
Some great stuff here and these words from Ben struck me;
Says it all really.
Some other parts of the Qantas story
July 21, 2011 – 9:37 pm, by Ben Sandilands
One of the unusual things about the long drawn out dispute between Qantas management and its international pilot and licensed engineers unions is the difference in the narratives chosen by the company and its employees.
The company does much of its talking about costs. The unions do almost all their talking about the management actions that they see as destroying the standards that are the strength of the brand. Neither side is responding to the narrative of the other.
And the management controls the general media coverage to the extent that its voice is heard the loudest, with the contrary voices either unreported or given a few token lines. This writer doesn’t accept everything that either side says, but in fairness, thinks the union voices should be heard, whether they are right or wrong, because unless they are heard, how can anyone come to informed conclusions?
Gary Norris is the Senior Industrial Officer in the Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association or ALAEA.
He sent me this briefing note on engine outsourcing problems.
Qantas Engines Outsourcing Debacles! Other Parts may be Next?
It is well known in internal Qantas engineering circles that its experience with outsource engine maintenance providers has not been a good one, even in Australia let alone overseas. Qantas shut down its internal B737 engine shop at Tullamarine and outsourced it to a Patrick Corp (Virgin) Qantas Joint Venture for the overhaul and maintenance of CFM56 GE engines used on Qantas 737-400s & 800s and Virgin 737-800s. The joint venture failed with Patrick Corp (Virgin) pulling out which was due mainly to costly reworks due to quality problems with the product. This led to not enough engines being available within the normal manufacturer’s requirement for hours in service. It’s rumored that Virgin were livid about the engine delivery delays and drop in hours on wing stats.
Qantas also had to source engines from overseas to make up the shortfall, therefore negating any efficiencies it may have gained through the joint venture. Qantas were left with the bag and had to find another partner or effectively drop the corporate veil and wholly own it leaving them back where they started. Eventually Lufthansa Technik became the other joint venture partner (LTQ), but its reported quality assurance and delivery issues still remain with the joint venture product. LTQ also repair GE CF6-80C2 Engines (767 & 747) and GE CF680E1 Engines (A330) for Qantas. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery was taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management. The Tullamarine APU (Auxilliary Power Unit) overhaul repair and maintenance was also shut down and outsourced. Since then and recently, there has been approximately 13 unscheduled replacements of APUs within 3 months, such an amount of replacements when the work was done by Qantas usually happened over a time span of 2 to 3 years. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery was taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
Then there is the well publicised closure in July 2009, of the Sydney Rolls Royce RB211 Centre of Excellence the world’s best practice Rolls Royce engine maintenance and overhaul facility. For 18 years this facility turned out a product that was the most reliable and had the longest on wing in service for any Rolls Royce RB211 and derivative engines in the world. Since the closure there has been 10 major blade failures some of them having spectacular effect and widely publicised in the media. In outsourcing these engines Qantas handed over the control of its engine quality and safety to maintenance organisations controlled by Singapore Airlines Engineering Company SIAEC. Ironic seeing that Singapore Airlines is Qantas main rival on its international routes and in the expanding Asian market. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery was taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
Since 2006, Qantas have systematically closed down maintenance facilities including Sydney B747 Heavy maintenance, Tullamarine Engine Shop, Tullamarine APU overhaul shop, Tullamarine and Sydney parts and components repair shops, and the Rolls Royce line. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery is taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
More recently Qantas Supply Chain started outsourcing its own QF parts and components logistics to external agencies such as Airinmar, Spareline and Air France.
When Qantas used to do all this work in house its own computer tracking systems for parts and components recorded the usage, servicing, repair and maintenance history for every part or component, therefore enabling Qantas engineering to programme servicing, repairs and overhaul of parts and components on a systematic and controlled basis. This had the control of reliability firmly in Qantas’ Engineering’s hands, enabling LAMEs to Certify with confidence; hence the long history of Qantas airworthy, safe, reliable aircraft which has taken a battering since all this restructuring started. The parts and components will now be from a “pool” managed by Qantas Supply chain but sourced through Airinmar, Spareline or Air France. The problem is Qantas Engineering now has to rely on parts and component history only verified by an external supplier and not controlled within the Qantas system of maintenance by Qantas Engineering.
Effectively Qantas has decided to take the “risk” that all will be well with a supplier who has a vested interest in selling a part or component to get the revenue. Who knows what risks they are prepared to take to supply so they get the money? Well watch this space………..the problem now is that parts and component failures (as exampled by the RB211 incidents) may become more prevalent for other areas of the aircraft as Qantas managers continue on their faulty strategy of outsourcing the control of quality, reliability and on time delivery from the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
The problem for our LAME members is can you be assured that the parts and components you will Certify for once fitted on an aircraft, now sourced externally including their “bought history”, has actually the appropriate accurate history with it? That is, is the part/component represented to you genuine??
While this writer doesn’t accept an inference that a Singaporean facility would deliberately impair a job for a Qantas jet, there has in general been some persuasive evidence that not all overseas facilities are uniformly excellent, or been effectively monitored by Qantas, or may not have been set up to deal with some notably older jets than you might find in fleets of Singapore Airlines or Emirates for example.
What worries in the analysis that Gary Norris has written is the way it compliments the management narrative on how costly and inefficient its engineering and maintenance processes had become.
There has not been a word from management about the excellence of the processes it is putting to the sword in favor of these lower but globally compliant standards that Qantas clearly sees as saving its money.
Qantas and its standards are inseparable in the public mind. They also appear to be unaffordable or unnecessary in the management mind.
So, when they are gone, won’t the reasons for flying Qantas have also gone?
Qantas engineers raise doubts about maintenance integrity | Plane Talking
July 21, 2011 – 9:37 pm, by Ben Sandilands
One of the unusual things about the long drawn out dispute between Qantas management and its international pilot and licensed engineers unions is the difference in the narratives chosen by the company and its employees.
The company does much of its talking about costs. The unions do almost all their talking about the management actions that they see as destroying the standards that are the strength of the brand. Neither side is responding to the narrative of the other.
And the management controls the general media coverage to the extent that its voice is heard the loudest, with the contrary voices either unreported or given a few token lines. This writer doesn’t accept everything that either side says, but in fairness, thinks the union voices should be heard, whether they are right or wrong, because unless they are heard, how can anyone come to informed conclusions?
Gary Norris is the Senior Industrial Officer in the Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association or ALAEA.
He sent me this briefing note on engine outsourcing problems.
Qantas Engines Outsourcing Debacles! Other Parts may be Next?
It is well known in internal Qantas engineering circles that its experience with outsource engine maintenance providers has not been a good one, even in Australia let alone overseas. Qantas shut down its internal B737 engine shop at Tullamarine and outsourced it to a Patrick Corp (Virgin) Qantas Joint Venture for the overhaul and maintenance of CFM56 GE engines used on Qantas 737-400s & 800s and Virgin 737-800s. The joint venture failed with Patrick Corp (Virgin) pulling out which was due mainly to costly reworks due to quality problems with the product. This led to not enough engines being available within the normal manufacturer’s requirement for hours in service. It’s rumored that Virgin were livid about the engine delivery delays and drop in hours on wing stats.
Qantas also had to source engines from overseas to make up the shortfall, therefore negating any efficiencies it may have gained through the joint venture. Qantas were left with the bag and had to find another partner or effectively drop the corporate veil and wholly own it leaving them back where they started. Eventually Lufthansa Technik became the other joint venture partner (LTQ), but its reported quality assurance and delivery issues still remain with the joint venture product. LTQ also repair GE CF6-80C2 Engines (767 & 747) and GE CF680E1 Engines (A330) for Qantas. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery was taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management. The Tullamarine APU (Auxilliary Power Unit) overhaul repair and maintenance was also shut down and outsourced. Since then and recently, there has been approximately 13 unscheduled replacements of APUs within 3 months, such an amount of replacements when the work was done by Qantas usually happened over a time span of 2 to 3 years. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery was taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
Then there is the well publicised closure in July 2009, of the Sydney Rolls Royce RB211 Centre of Excellence the world’s best practice Rolls Royce engine maintenance and overhaul facility. For 18 years this facility turned out a product that was the most reliable and had the longest on wing in service for any Rolls Royce RB211 and derivative engines in the world. Since the closure there has been 10 major blade failures some of them having spectacular effect and widely publicised in the media. In outsourcing these engines Qantas handed over the control of its engine quality and safety to maintenance organisations controlled by Singapore Airlines Engineering Company SIAEC. Ironic seeing that Singapore Airlines is Qantas main rival on its international routes and in the expanding Asian market. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery was taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
Since 2006, Qantas have systematically closed down maintenance facilities including Sydney B747 Heavy maintenance, Tullamarine Engine Shop, Tullamarine APU overhaul shop, Tullamarine and Sydney parts and components repair shops, and the Rolls Royce line. Effectively the control of quality and on time delivery is taken out of the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
More recently Qantas Supply Chain started outsourcing its own QF parts and components logistics to external agencies such as Airinmar, Spareline and Air France.
When Qantas used to do all this work in house its own computer tracking systems for parts and components recorded the usage, servicing, repair and maintenance history for every part or component, therefore enabling Qantas engineering to programme servicing, repairs and overhaul of parts and components on a systematic and controlled basis. This had the control of reliability firmly in Qantas’ Engineering’s hands, enabling LAMEs to Certify with confidence; hence the long history of Qantas airworthy, safe, reliable aircraft which has taken a battering since all this restructuring started. The parts and components will now be from a “pool” managed by Qantas Supply chain but sourced through Airinmar, Spareline or Air France. The problem is Qantas Engineering now has to rely on parts and component history only verified by an external supplier and not controlled within the Qantas system of maintenance by Qantas Engineering.
Effectively Qantas has decided to take the “risk” that all will be well with a supplier who has a vested interest in selling a part or component to get the revenue. Who knows what risks they are prepared to take to supply so they get the money? Well watch this space………..the problem now is that parts and component failures (as exampled by the RB211 incidents) may become more prevalent for other areas of the aircraft as Qantas managers continue on their faulty strategy of outsourcing the control of quality, reliability and on time delivery from the proven reliable Qantas Engineering hands and handed over to Qantas Supply Chain management.
The problem for our LAME members is can you be assured that the parts and components you will Certify for once fitted on an aircraft, now sourced externally including their “bought history”, has actually the appropriate accurate history with it? That is, is the part/component represented to you genuine??
While this writer doesn’t accept an inference that a Singaporean facility would deliberately impair a job for a Qantas jet, there has in general been some persuasive evidence that not all overseas facilities are uniformly excellent, or been effectively monitored by Qantas, or may not have been set up to deal with some notably older jets than you might find in fleets of Singapore Airlines or Emirates for example.
What worries in the analysis that Gary Norris has written is the way it compliments the management narrative on how costly and inefficient its engineering and maintenance processes had become.
There has not been a word from management about the excellence of the processes it is putting to the sword in favor of these lower but globally compliant standards that Qantas clearly sees as saving its money.
Qantas and its standards are inseparable in the public mind. They also appear to be unaffordable or unnecessary in the management mind.
So, when they are gone, won’t the reasons for flying Qantas have also gone?
Qantas engineers raise doubts about maintenance integrity | Plane Talking
And the management controls the general media coverage to the extent that its voice is heard the loudest, with the contrary voices either unreported or given a few token lines.
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In light of AJ's recent comments re the no-LAME transit on new gen domestic aircraft.
Is this really something we are able to stop? Considering Virgin and Jet* have been doing it for so long, with no perceived problems. We know it's better to have a LAME check every aircraft prior to every departure but, when you also consider all the unmanned stations that already operate in our domestic operation, do we have a leg to stand on?
The way I see it, no-LAME pre-flight inspections on 737 NG non-ETOPS sectors, or "LAME-on-demand" as they're now calling it, is something that is inevitable. Knowing full well that the reduction in LAME numbers would be minimal considering there will be just as much work at night and permanent nightshift is a thing of the past.
Is this something being negotiated Steve? Is this something that we can agree to, to get a reasonable offer on the table?
Is this really something we are able to stop? Considering Virgin and Jet* have been doing it for so long, with no perceived problems. We know it's better to have a LAME check every aircraft prior to every departure but, when you also consider all the unmanned stations that already operate in our domestic operation, do we have a leg to stand on?
The way I see it, no-LAME pre-flight inspections on 737 NG non-ETOPS sectors, or "LAME-on-demand" as they're now calling it, is something that is inevitable. Knowing full well that the reduction in LAME numbers would be minimal considering there will be just as much work at night and permanent nightshift is a thing of the past.
Is this something being negotiated Steve? Is this something that we can agree to, to get a reasonable offer on the table?
Watch for a massive drop in despatch reliability due to engineering issues - and this will be after the negotiation of the EBA.
QF is about to learn the difference between how management "thinks" maintenance and overhaul is done and the actual "reality" of how its done.
If QF is lucky, it will only cost them about Two engineering managers and millions in consulting costs before they realise that they have lost control of one of the core competencies of an airline - producing an aircraft on time at a gate ready to take passengers to the scheduled destination.
The nice consulting euphemism for describing the difference between what management thinks happens and what actually happens in maintenance and many other activities is usually dressed up as "changes to business rules".
"Changes to business rules" means that the systems and practices management forced on don't work because:
(a) They were improperly described and understood when the new systems were dreamed up Two or Three years ago by a consultant who was selling stuff.
(b) The systems and practices can't change as fast as the business does, in other words they can't keep up with changes. The people on the floor of course, who have the best understanding of what works, what doesn't and what might work, are not allowed to have any input into this process.
Consultants make a great deal of money out of modifications and upgrades to systems and practices to cope with "changes to business rules".
For example, I'll bet that the guys who built the troubled "Myki" public transport ticketing system are going to make millions making it Android and iPhone friendly - those disruptive technologies weren't around when the system was specified were they?
How is Qantas going to use the iPad? How does giving one to every LAME with a complete set of automatically updating manuals and IPC's sound?
By the way, what is Qantas going to do with control surfaces and flaps as well as actuators? If they are "pooled" how is mod status going to be managed?
QF is about to learn the difference between how management "thinks" maintenance and overhaul is done and the actual "reality" of how its done.
If QF is lucky, it will only cost them about Two engineering managers and millions in consulting costs before they realise that they have lost control of one of the core competencies of an airline - producing an aircraft on time at a gate ready to take passengers to the scheduled destination.
The nice consulting euphemism for describing the difference between what management thinks happens and what actually happens in maintenance and many other activities is usually dressed up as "changes to business rules".
"Changes to business rules" means that the systems and practices management forced on don't work because:
(a) They were improperly described and understood when the new systems were dreamed up Two or Three years ago by a consultant who was selling stuff.
(b) The systems and practices can't change as fast as the business does, in other words they can't keep up with changes. The people on the floor of course, who have the best understanding of what works, what doesn't and what might work, are not allowed to have any input into this process.
Consultants make a great deal of money out of modifications and upgrades to systems and practices to cope with "changes to business rules".
For example, I'll bet that the guys who built the troubled "Myki" public transport ticketing system are going to make millions making it Android and iPhone friendly - those disruptive technologies weren't around when the system was specified were they?
How is Qantas going to use the iPad? How does giving one to every LAME with a complete set of automatically updating manuals and IPC's sound?
By the way, what is Qantas going to do with control surfaces and flaps as well as actuators? If they are "pooled" how is mod status going to be managed?
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How is Qantas going to use the iPad? How does giving one to every LAME with a complete set of automatically updating manuals and IPC's sound?
The writing was on the wall a long time ago when KTA was starting and the old exec ignored the warnings from PER lames.
Not trying to stir up the pilots - butwhat exactly are there criteria/training requirements for a "walk around" - do they actually get any engineering training? Can they actually name the parts they are looking at?
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aveng -
just to put your mind at rest, generally knowing how things work and particularly which bits do what, is kind of a must have for the pilot gig whether you're GA or on a Jumbo. (certain cadet schemes excluded)
Having a look during a pre-flight walkaround is also a lot more than something to fill in 10 to 15 mins and sometimes yields an issue requiring the expert advice/repair of the (experienced, expert) Eng.
I think that your pitch really needs to be more about the importance of the partnership between the Eng & Pilot and how by short-cutting the process on a purely economic whim is actually making a choice of either:
a) safe, (or in the case of some 'safe-ish')
b) safer
c) or safest outcomes.
Pls note that contrary to Joyce and Co., the latter is my preference.
Also note that the faux "success" of the Joyce positions on these matters is largely predicated on the "I don't want to know" factor - from which it is perfectly reasonable to assume that it all works and saves a few dollars - until something really sh*ts itself or the unthinkable happens - wherein it then becomes someone else's fault.
We're on the same side mate - let's not fragment the debate.
AT
just to put your mind at rest, generally knowing how things work and particularly which bits do what, is kind of a must have for the pilot gig whether you're GA or on a Jumbo. (certain cadet schemes excluded)
Having a look during a pre-flight walkaround is also a lot more than something to fill in 10 to 15 mins and sometimes yields an issue requiring the expert advice/repair of the (experienced, expert) Eng.
I think that your pitch really needs to be more about the importance of the partnership between the Eng & Pilot and how by short-cutting the process on a purely economic whim is actually making a choice of either:
a) safe, (or in the case of some 'safe-ish')
b) safer
c) or safest outcomes.
Pls note that contrary to Joyce and Co., the latter is my preference.
Also note that the faux "success" of the Joyce positions on these matters is largely predicated on the "I don't want to know" factor - from which it is perfectly reasonable to assume that it all works and saves a few dollars - until something really sh*ts itself or the unthinkable happens - wherein it then becomes someone else's fault.
We're on the same side mate - let's not fragment the debate.
AT
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Jet-A-One said;
Yes, IMHO it's inevitable, however, if the pilot finds something on his walk around he's not happy with, or a bit unsure about………….
The tarmac will only be as LAME-less as the pilots want it to be so QF will drop numbers at their peril…..horrible delays could ensue…..especially if parts are needed
!
"LAME-on-demand" as they're now calling it, is something that is inevitable.
The tarmac will only be as LAME-less as the pilots want it to be so QF will drop numbers at their peril…..horrible delays could ensue…..especially if parts are needed
!
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As far as pilots being "forced" to do the pre-flights, I hold no grudge whatsoever towards them, we've all got a job to do / mortgages to pay / wife(s) to support / kids to feed .................
And I'm equally confident that if it comes to the no-LAME tarmac that the pilots would recognise that their mechanical skills are not on a par with a LAME.
I'm sure that if they saw some 'wet Skydrol"they would recognise that they wouldn't know the difference between a potential hydraulic leak and a seep that can be deferred with a "rag spanner" for further evaluation, between allowable "chevron cuts" and a potential blow-out in a tyre, between tread reinforcing and the structural components of a tyre, how many screws are permitted to be missing in a leading edge panel, between oil weeping in the tail-pipe and a potential bearing failure and oil fire................
I'm confident that if they came across any "issues" like these they would call for a LAME, no-LAME tarmac or not
!!!
And if there are no available LAMEs around 'cos they've all been made redundant of shifted to night-shift .........
Oh...BTW, I not at all sure that they can FORCE us to permanent night-shift, but I do KNOW that even if they can, they can only make us do eight-hour night-shifts
Anyone else here remember just how little work actually used to get done on the eight-hour night-shifts ??
Start // hand-over // get the tools organised // often the plane wasn't even in the hangar yet // smoko // first-work (3 hours if they are lucky) // tea // second-work (2 hours max) // smoko // tow aircraft to bay // handover // go home !!
And we didn't even have "Take-Five" then .........
ST
And I'm equally confident that if it comes to the no-LAME tarmac that the pilots would recognise that their mechanical skills are not on a par with a LAME.
I'm sure that if they saw some 'wet Skydrol"they would recognise that they wouldn't know the difference between a potential hydraulic leak and a seep that can be deferred with a "rag spanner" for further evaluation, between allowable "chevron cuts" and a potential blow-out in a tyre, between tread reinforcing and the structural components of a tyre, how many screws are permitted to be missing in a leading edge panel, between oil weeping in the tail-pipe and a potential bearing failure and oil fire................
I'm confident that if they came across any "issues" like these they would call for a LAME, no-LAME tarmac or not
!!!And if there are no available LAMEs around 'cos they've all been made redundant of shifted to night-shift .........
Oh...BTW, I not at all sure that they can FORCE us to permanent night-shift, but I do KNOW that even if they can, they can only make us do eight-hour night-shifts
Anyone else here remember just how little work actually used to get done on the eight-hour night-shifts ??
Start // hand-over // get the tools organised // often the plane wasn't even in the hangar yet // smoko // first-work (3 hours if they are lucky) // tea // second-work (2 hours max) // smoko // tow aircraft to bay // handover // go home !!
And we didn't even have "Take-Five" then .........
ST
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Yes, IMHO it's inevitable, however, if the pilot finds something on his walk around he's not happy with, or a bit unsure about………….
What do you think is going to happen if LAME-less workplaces become a reality? Do you think management will say "Ok, we've cut engineering to the bone, lets look elsewhere where we can cut costs" ???
A/ Of course not. In reality, QF enigneering has been continuously changing and evolving the last 10+ years in order to satisfy the whims of these bean counters, regardless of what AJ says. They will keep pressuring us to save a buck so the next manager can get his bonus.
If LAME-less tarmacs come in, and if something gets picked up on a walk-around, then the pilot may point it out to a (most likely) less qualified and less-experienced mechanic. He will more than likely fail to deal with it because he is inexperienced and under a degree of pressure to minimise a delay (or to put schedule ahead of safety). He may not know what he is looking at and decide to take a chance and tell the skipper "it's alright, she's in limits" or just turn a blind eye.
This is what will eventuate, make no mistakes about it.
Last edited by Ngineer; 22nd Jul 2011 at 12:20.
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This is what will eventuate, make no mistakes about it.
If LAME-less tarmacs come in, and if something gets picked up on a walk-around, then the pilot may point it out to a (most likely) less qualified and less-experienced mechanic. He will more than likely fail to deal with it because he is inexperienced and under a degree of pressure to minimise a delay (or to put schedule ahead of safety). He may not know what he is looking at and decide to take a chance and tell the skipper "it's alright, she's in limits" or just turn a blind eye.
If LAME-less tarmacs come in, and if something gets picked up on a walk-around, then the pilot may point it out to a (most likely) less qualified and less-experienced mechanic. He will more than likely fail to deal with it because he is inexperienced and under a degree of pressure to minimise a delay (or to put schedule ahead of safety). He may not know what he is looking at and decide to take a chance and tell the skipper "it's alright, she's in limits" or just turn a blind eye.ngineer seems to sum it up nicely, this 'worlds best practice' scenario is
what Fred Bruggeman, from aircraft engineers international, described
occuring throughout europe with another problem of overconfident and/or
undertrained CAT A people doing the lames job unsupervised.
He does not paint such a rosy picture of the EASA regs that Joyce does.
what Fred Bruggeman, from aircraft engineers international, described
occuring throughout europe with another problem of overconfident and/or
undertrained CAT A people doing the lames job unsupervised.
He does not paint such a rosy picture of the EASA regs that Joyce does.
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All defects must be entered into the tech log then actioned by a the type rated LAME using a maintenance manual reference. There is no "she'll be right mate"
100% LAME, 100% safe.
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We're on the same side mate - let's not fragment the debate.
