Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
I am not aware of any hull losses or loss of life where a captains innability to fly raw data, manual, non precision approaches was a contributory factor...let alone an FO's innability to do so.
Whether it be a lack of raw data ability that lead to disorientation and hull loss- Gulf Air and Armavia ( ex- Ansett HYB )- or the inability to look through the 'glass' and crosscheck what can be confusing presentation of data- Air Inter.
Grandpa Aerotart
I cannot present you with hard numbers Centaurus but that is what we are told by our training department.
I put a close mates son (50 hrs TT) in the LHS of my Bonanza the other day and took him for a fly...we spent most of the time doing steep turns, a much underated skill/scan builder, and with some instruction on scanning technique he went from +/- 500' to +/- 50' in a matter of minutes. Once I had him scanning outside-AH-outside-VSI-outside-AH-outside-VSI fast enough and making small corrections it all started to gell.
Much underated instrument is the old IVSI...even in a Boeing....but how do you put an old head on young shoulders?
Gnads...even in the Boeing I find myself, occasionally, looking 'through' the FD and flying it by basics.
I put a close mates son (50 hrs TT) in the LHS of my Bonanza the other day and took him for a fly...we spent most of the time doing steep turns, a much underated skill/scan builder, and with some instruction on scanning technique he went from +/- 500' to +/- 50' in a matter of minutes. Once I had him scanning outside-AH-outside-VSI-outside-AH-outside-VSI fast enough and making small corrections it all started to gell.
Much underated instrument is the old IVSI...even in a Boeing....but how do you put an old head on young shoulders?
Gnads...even in the Boeing I find myself, occasionally, looking 'through' the FD and flying it by basics.
Chimbu
You have some definitive but inaccurate opinions of Airbus Performance and I think that because of that, the 'good stuff' in this accident never gets the warranted discussion. Because you deflected the thread long ago with bold statements such as the approach was "never legal".
The Manual Landing requirements Don quotes are pre-dispatch requirements only. If he had published the next page and a half it would go on to explain that once airborne, in an abnormal scenario, a coefficient dependant upon the failure, must be applied to the Actual Landing Distance to determine the Required Landing Distance. There a few comments that follow, that consitute a hint in Franglais, that once airborne these pre-dispatch factors to ALD don't apply. Fair enough and subject to interpretation and as Don mentions, some operators apply these fully throughout the different flight stages- planning, airborne, diversion.
It was clear in the Airbus Instructors manual or Performance Engineering courses that the 1.67 dry, 1.92 wet and the contaminated 1.15 factor were pre-dispatch only as well. The trouble being, that many operators probably were not aware of the very dangerous limitations relying on absolute ALD's represented.
So, it evolved. The Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual went on to elaborate that once airborne these pre-flight factors need not apply. However, it took them a decade to realise the 'threat' of crews relying on ALD's airborne in a normal situation. So they now ask you to consider the Landing With Autobrake situation which factor ALD's in a normal scenario- about 40% from memory for dry, 10% wet. But well below those pre-flight requirements.
The further recent evolution has the following boldly labelled in the QRH- Airborne Refer To These Figures ( Autobrake ).PRE-FLT refer to FCOM ie: the regulatory figures you have confused the situation with.
I hope this clarifies Airbus procedures.
You have some definitive but inaccurate opinions of Airbus Performance and I think that because of that, the 'good stuff' in this accident never gets the warranted discussion. Because you deflected the thread long ago with bold statements such as the approach was "never legal".
The Manual Landing requirements Don quotes are pre-dispatch requirements only. If he had published the next page and a half it would go on to explain that once airborne, in an abnormal scenario, a coefficient dependant upon the failure, must be applied to the Actual Landing Distance to determine the Required Landing Distance. There a few comments that follow, that consitute a hint in Franglais, that once airborne these pre-dispatch factors to ALD don't apply. Fair enough and subject to interpretation and as Don mentions, some operators apply these fully throughout the different flight stages- planning, airborne, diversion.
It was clear in the Airbus Instructors manual or Performance Engineering courses that the 1.67 dry, 1.92 wet and the contaminated 1.15 factor were pre-dispatch only as well. The trouble being, that many operators probably were not aware of the very dangerous limitations relying on absolute ALD's represented.
So, it evolved. The Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual went on to elaborate that once airborne these pre-flight factors need not apply. However, it took them a decade to realise the 'threat' of crews relying on ALD's airborne in a normal situation. So they now ask you to consider the Landing With Autobrake situation which factor ALD's in a normal scenario- about 40% from memory for dry, 10% wet. But well below those pre-flight requirements.
The further recent evolution has the following boldly labelled in the QRH- Airborne Refer To These Figures ( Autobrake ).PRE-FLT refer to FCOM ie: the regulatory figures you have confused the situation with.
I hope this clarifies Airbus procedures.
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compliment to you blokes
well boys.....between Gnads,chuckles J430 and centaurus.........I think you blokes have covered a lot of good ground ...depending on your view....in and out of the cockpit....
Sort of hard for any of "us" to make comment as "you" have fairly well covered most of anything worth saying about this situation.....
...it has made great reading and not gone to the sewer.....PB
Sort of hard for any of "us" to make comment as "you" have fairly well covered most of anything worth saying about this situation.....
...it has made great reading and not gone to the sewer.....PB
Gnads...even in the Boeing I find myself, occasionally, looking 'through' the FD and flying it by basics.
However, something has gone awry with Airbus and CFIT.
The Flight Path Vector caused a hull loss - and some anxious moments in transition from an NPA in the old days to the GA. The FPV would be rotated toward 15 degrees of pitch before a rapidly decaying airspeed would have crews realising they were pitching to 15 degrees body angle!
Crews come on to the Airbus and learn how to performance fly the FPV on a raw data ILS- a year after transition take it away from them and many struggle with elemental IF technique. This elemental IF technique will be required of them in 3 QRH procedures however many Airbus crews are lured in to the false sense of security that the bird never flies away!
Airbus evolved and protected crews from disorientating GA's in raw data because of confusing PFD presentations. As soon as TOGA activated, simple & conventional Flight Directors reinstate. I suspect this due the Gulf Air accident where an inability to transition to a raw data GA had a crew submit to somato gravic gyral & pitch ilusions and fly into the sea.
Last year an Armavia A320 did similar- gear down flap full, failure to transition to GA and flies in to the ocean.
Anecdotal of close calls of a number of airlines- what happend to the AirNZ A320 thread?
It's of my opinion, that Airbus has had some big problems. Instead of elemental raw data proficiency, or a confidence to transition from automation to raw data and vice versa, it relies on technological upgrades that sadly are generally preceded by hull loss.
As a postscript, I suspect Armavia didn't have a software upgrade enabling the automatic reinstaion of FD's on GA. I suspect the crew were endorsed on a simulator that did. Dark night, TOGA thrust, 180 degree turn, no lateral or vertical guidance from the expected FD presentation and .......... no raw data proficiency.
Grandpa Aerotart
Interesting stuff Gnads.
The way I have always read this stuff is that normal ops are normal ops...and 'emergency' ops something else again when it comes to factored performance criteria.
I cannot fathom how any regulatory agency could possibly, knowingly, approve a system that says you will carry xyz factor at the planning stage and then once airborne pretty much anything goes.
The problem is that this stuff has a direct effect so rarely that we hardly ever give it a second thought...the average runway I operate off is 12000' long and some are more like 13000'. You just know you're covered and crank up the autobrake setting on the odd occassion when it is snowing/pissing down.
That doesn't remove the requirement for us to be extra carefull when things are more marginal.
We are not paid to fly around in a constant state of surprise.
Please go ahead!
As far as airbus v boeing...they are both certified to identical regulations...words may vary but the certification nuts and bolts are identical. I think the statement re regulatory factor (1.67) and normal ops I quoted earlier in the thread from the 767 QRH is fairly clear. It is inconceivable to me that the FAA would allow Airbus to meet less stringent requirements than Boeing.
Having said that it is pretty clear people read these statements and come up with different interpretations...sometimes I suspect because it can get 'inconveniant'.
The way I have always read this stuff is that normal ops are normal ops...and 'emergency' ops something else again when it comes to factored performance criteria.
I cannot fathom how any regulatory agency could possibly, knowingly, approve a system that says you will carry xyz factor at the planning stage and then once airborne pretty much anything goes.
The problem is that this stuff has a direct effect so rarely that we hardly ever give it a second thought...the average runway I operate off is 12000' long and some are more like 13000'. You just know you're covered and crank up the autobrake setting on the odd occassion when it is snowing/pissing down.
That doesn't remove the requirement for us to be extra carefull when things are more marginal.
We are not paid to fly around in a constant state of surprise.
'good stuff' in this accident never gets the warranted discussion.
As far as airbus v boeing...they are both certified to identical regulations...words may vary but the certification nuts and bolts are identical. I think the statement re regulatory factor (1.67) and normal ops I quoted earlier in the thread from the 767 QRH is fairly clear. It is inconceivable to me that the FAA would allow Airbus to meet less stringent requirements than Boeing.
Having said that it is pretty clear people read these statements and come up with different interpretations...sometimes I suspect because it can get 'inconveniant'.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 6th Apr 2007 at 13:20.
Grandpa Aerotart
I think I made a statement earlier in the thread that airbus' lack of intuitiveness was a worry to me...I have just heard too many horror stories that seem to be airbus specific. There is another that will come out soon that will make your skin crawl...but my lips are sealed.
That is one of the things I love about the 767...It is just a normal aeroplane that conforms to all my expectation/experience...plus a few neat gadgets...rather than a computer nerd's view of the world.
Just today I heard two stories of VERY experienced airbus pilots 'discovering' aspects of the computer programing they were never told about...one was simply embarrassing but resolved in cruise with no deviations...one resulted in serious retraining back in the sim when a manual go around went very badly askew.
That is one of the things I love about the 767...It is just a normal aeroplane that conforms to all my expectation/experience...plus a few neat gadgets...rather than a computer nerd's view of the world.
Just today I heard two stories of VERY experienced airbus pilots 'discovering' aspects of the computer programing they were never told about...one was simply embarrassing but resolved in cruise with no deviations...one resulted in serious retraining back in the sim when a manual go around went very badly askew.
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CC...mate...Ill read your posts as they are obviously entertaining,and informative.....Ive flown the F-27/F28(1000 and 4000 models/B-727 Q100 model.....but mate!!!! it gets old listening to you kick Airbus pukes in the balls ......Ive heard many a boeing "scary story"(been there done that).....and the 11 yrs Ive flown the bus....it,s been a breeze....and thats the 319/320/321...your mates who tell you these storys are ether...
(1) bull****ting
(2)dont fly the bus
(3)love to "tell" a story
(4)dont know "how" to fly the bus
(5)..if its not boeing.,I,m not going
(6)cannot adapt to a different theory
I,m more that happy to listen to a "different" view.....in fact I,m as pro active as any body.....love to hear the other side.....
What annoys me the most is the inability of "others" to accept that many of us have no problems with bus techology....we understand and comprehend the bus mentality/........please dont let it obscure your obvious talent....
PB
(1) bull****ting
(2)dont fly the bus
(3)love to "tell" a story
(4)dont know "how" to fly the bus
(5)..if its not boeing.,I,m not going
(6)cannot adapt to a different theory
I,m more that happy to listen to a "different" view.....in fact I,m as pro active as any body.....love to hear the other side.....
What annoys me the most is the inability of "others" to accept that many of us have no problems with bus techology....we understand and comprehend the bus mentality/........please dont let it obscure your obvious talent....
PB
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Though this thread has not followed its title, it's been partly useful in that some of us may find inspiration to review our methods of calculating landing distances in-flight.
As a contribution, may I suggest anyone who initially, like me, felt overwhelmed by all the science being thrown around, mostly by a certain writer who categorically does not understand a particular airplane type, then simply go to your operations manual and re-study landing distances required.
Though you might be tempted to invoke your own interpretation and apply 1.67 to QRH derived figures in-flight, perhaps due to the insistent badgering being done here, my suggestion would be to pause and take a breath.
Follow your own SOPs, not someone else's.
Thankfully, the pot of Gnadenburg and Chuckles has gone off the boil.
It was not helpful reading detracting and unqualified statements about Airbus for the sake of making an argument as it reduced the usefulness of the crucial subject at hand, which is perhaps more important than the title of the thread.
As a contribution, may I suggest anyone who initially, like me, felt overwhelmed by all the science being thrown around, mostly by a certain writer who categorically does not understand a particular airplane type, then simply go to your operations manual and re-study landing distances required.
Though you might be tempted to invoke your own interpretation and apply 1.67 to QRH derived figures in-flight, perhaps due to the insistent badgering being done here, my suggestion would be to pause and take a breath.
Follow your own SOPs, not someone else's.
Thankfully, the pot of Gnadenburg and Chuckles has gone off the boil.
It was not helpful reading detracting and unqualified statements about Airbus for the sake of making an argument as it reduced the usefulness of the crucial subject at hand, which is perhaps more important than the title of the thread.
It was not helpful reading detracting and unqualified statements about Airbus for the sake of making an argument as it reduced the usefulness of the crucial subject at hand, which is perhaps more important than the title of the thread.
QRH Landing Distance Without Autobrake
Note- The Above Distances Are Given For Use In Flight
Before Departure Refer FCOM
Note- The Above Distances Are Given For Use In Flight
Before Departure Refer FCOM
I would suggest people confused here read FCOM 2, FCTM Abnormals and have a look at the QRH.
I would go as far to say that these small details have been amended post-340 overrun.
Grandpa Aerotart
Thanks for taking the heat off me Ey777
4PW, how is it going mate?
I find it fascinating that people consider conducting an approach and landing in conditions which exceed limitations (seemingly) legal let alone acceptable.
I also find it fascinating that my opinion on a particular aircraft type, based on opinion expressed by close friends who have been flying them for up to 10 years, illicites such defensive and vitriolic responces.
Have we lost the ability to debate a topic rationally? It seems so when the opposing view is deemed to be unstateable as opposed to simply a different, but equally valuable opinion.
I have stated often enough in this thread that I don't view it as Airbus v Boeing...they are identical when it comes to performance certification. In other aspects of operation I have expressed a negative opinion on airbus, that is my democratic right...but lets leave it for another time.
Someone answer me these questions;
Why/how was the approach legal...was it safe?
Why/how was the landing legal, was it safe?
How do you justify not using regulatory factoring in normal ops post dispatch...is that safe?
Can we have a robust, open minded, professional, intellectually stimulating discussion where we accept the validity of opinions we may not agree with?
4PW, how is it going mate?
I find it fascinating that people consider conducting an approach and landing in conditions which exceed limitations (seemingly) legal let alone acceptable.
I also find it fascinating that my opinion on a particular aircraft type, based on opinion expressed by close friends who have been flying them for up to 10 years, illicites such defensive and vitriolic responces.
Have we lost the ability to debate a topic rationally? It seems so when the opposing view is deemed to be unstateable as opposed to simply a different, but equally valuable opinion.
I have stated often enough in this thread that I don't view it as Airbus v Boeing...they are identical when it comes to performance certification. In other aspects of operation I have expressed a negative opinion on airbus, that is my democratic right...but lets leave it for another time.
Someone answer me these questions;
Why/how was the approach legal...was it safe?
Why/how was the landing legal, was it safe?
How do you justify not using regulatory factoring in normal ops post dispatch...is that safe?
Can we have a robust, open minded, professional, intellectually stimulating discussion where we accept the validity of opinions we may not agree with?
The NTSB prelim' report is essential reading for those who wish to continue this discussion. Google A340 overrun wikpedia and there is a link to it.
It gives a good outline of WX and landing distances.
To me, it paints a pretty different picture of events to what many believe here.
Not condoning any mismanagement or poor decision making, but as per usual it's hardly an accident that can be dismissed as a black & white set of events- nor one where a strong command gradient would have saved the day.
For posterity, there is a lot of good sh&t in this accident. A brush up of Airbus performance and limitations may be warranted though.
It gives a good outline of WX and landing distances.
To me, it paints a pretty different picture of events to what many believe here.
Not condoning any mismanagement or poor decision making, but as per usual it's hardly an accident that can be dismissed as a black & white set of events- nor one where a strong command gradient would have saved the day.
For posterity, there is a lot of good sh&t in this accident. A brush up of Airbus performance and limitations may be warranted though.
Grandpa Aerotart
A METAR (weather observation) for the Pearson Airport was released almost exactly at the time of the accident. It stated that the weather at 20:04 UTC (16:04 EDT) consisted of winds from 340° true (north-northwest) at 24 knots (44 km/h) gusting to 33 knots (61 km/h), with 1 1/4 statute miles (2 km) visibility in heavy thunderstorms and rain. The ceiling was overcast at 4,500 feet (1,400 m) above ground level with towering cumulus cloud. The temperature was 23 °C (74 °F). According to the Canada Air Pilot, runway 24L has a heading of 227° true (237° magnetic),
There is mention of the wind instruments being knocked out by lightning prior to the approach and the pilots of two aircraft who landed immediately prior reported 'poor' ('poor' is defined in my QRH as equivalent of braking on wet ice) braking action and estimated crosswinds at 15 gusting 20kts.
The METAR, released at the time of the accident) indicates a 21kt average xwind component (Maximum closer to 30kts) and 5kt average tailwind component, maximum closer to 10kts. I accept that crew may not be in receipt of this METAR on approach but they were in receipt of previous pilot reports and they would have system derived wind vector (direction and magnitude) information available from on board systems as they flew the approach. Not to mention their weather radar showing multiple TS cells around the airport environs...reported lightning strikes etc.
I have seen no information (I might have missed it) that indicates they discussed holding or actually held prior to commencing the approach when they clearly had the fuel to do so.
Fuel on board indicates 3000kg available over and above the 4500kg required to divert to Ottawa. What holding time does that equate to in a A343? Met reports indicate weather improved markedly in less than 1 hour after the accident with wind backing around to the south and general improvement in vis, reduced rain etc. Ts are generally not long lived systems.
The decision making process, or lack thereof, post minima we have discussed to death. Once they touched down there was simply no possibility of stopping the aircraft on the runway.
I am interested in hearing how the rest of you think you would react given the known information available to the crew.
Would you be happy with the available runway length given the conditions?
Do you feel xwind limitations are limits or a helpfull guide?
The CBC reported that the crash occurred two hours after operations at the airport were grounded because of severe thunderstorms in the area ("red alert" status). Visibility at the time of the accident was reported to be very poor. There was lightning, strong gusty winds, and hail at the time and the rain just began as the plane was landing.....A severe thunderstorm warning was in effect since 11:30 a.m. and all outbound flights and ground servicing operations had been canceled but landings were still permitted.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 6th Apr 2007 at 11:00.
Grandpa Aerotart
I forgot to add in my last post that in the airline I work for, and those I have worked for in the past, operations are expressly forbidden in conditions of 'poor' reported braking action. That doesn't mean you might not be the first poor sap to report those conditions exist...but that doesn't apply in this case does it?
I have no idea what it states in relation to this in AF's Operations Manual....but I could take a guess.
Honest question.
If your company ops manual expressly forbids such are you 'breaking the law' by doing so or are you simply being a little silly?
How would it be interpreted in court?
In my opinion, as the ops manual forms part of the legally required documentation that defines how an airline exercises the priveledges of it's AOC, the act of ignoring such directives makes the operation illegal.
I am open to counterviews.
I have no idea what it states in relation to this in AF's Operations Manual....but I could take a guess.
Honest question.
If your company ops manual expressly forbids such are you 'breaking the law' by doing so or are you simply being a little silly?
How would it be interpreted in court?
In my opinion, as the ops manual forms part of the legally required documentation that defines how an airline exercises the priveledges of it's AOC, the act of ignoring such directives makes the operation illegal.
I am open to counterviews.
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CC.....I think you would be hard pressed to find anyone who would disagree with the logic.
CYYZ has 5 Rwys 2 @11000ft/3368m/3@ 9000ft/2770m....I fly into CYYR at least once a month and it is a very well run Airport, they are a little crazy about noise abatement procedures but other than that this is a top operation
The ground information (10-7) for arrival considerations,highlights the fact that..."Anticpate ldg 05/23 and 6R/24L in crosswinds up to 25kts @90 degrees"...also
"The climate of Toronto is influenced by its location with respect to Major Storm Tracks and the great lakes."...
I bring this up as these conditions are fairly routine operating conditions for those who fly into this airport
Based on what Ive read,and the condtions that existed at their time of arrival,your point CC , about company Ops Specs would have made it illegal for our company to even think of contemplating the approach .
Would be handy to know this companys SOP,s governing these conditions,and whether they were able to maintain the companys profile.
Certainly dont want to play the monday halfback.......but the decision to execute this app with the conditons that existed would raise eyebrows from most who are familiar with these conditions.....
CYYZ has 5 Rwys 2 @11000ft/3368m/3@ 9000ft/2770m....I fly into CYYR at least once a month and it is a very well run Airport, they are a little crazy about noise abatement procedures but other than that this is a top operation
The ground information (10-7) for arrival considerations,highlights the fact that..."Anticpate ldg 05/23 and 6R/24L in crosswinds up to 25kts @90 degrees"...also
"The climate of Toronto is influenced by its location with respect to Major Storm Tracks and the great lakes."...
I bring this up as these conditions are fairly routine operating conditions for those who fly into this airport
Based on what Ive read,and the condtions that existed at their time of arrival,your point CC , about company Ops Specs would have made it illegal for our company to even think of contemplating the approach .
Would be handy to know this companys SOP,s governing these conditions,and whether they were able to maintain the companys profile.
Certainly dont want to play the monday halfback.......but the decision to execute this app with the conditons that existed would raise eyebrows from most who are familiar with these conditions.....
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Very well thank you, Chuckles.
I'm pleased to report the hotel in Mumbai as perfectly adequate. It also has a connection, so here is my paltry reply. Must be brief though. Hark, the call to breakfast, and all that...
I, like many others, enjoy these threads because I always seem to learn something. You've brought more to this subject than any other contributor; don't doubt that.
No one is advocating a cessation of any sort of discussion, on any subject, but for attacks on worthless issues like Airbus vs Boeing, or one poster attacking the opinions of another.
My contribution is simply that LDR aloft is not 1.67 times the figure derived from the QRH in normal or non-normal conditions. More on that later perhaps, though if the Airplane Flight Manual figures are assessed (the figures where manual braking is used, not autobrakes...vague, perhaps, but I don't have the AFM with me, though I was reviewing it for this post when the need to divert arose) it can be seen the figure for LDR is very close to that of the QRH derived figure multiplied by a factor of 1.15.
Which is why the company manual advises factoring the QRH by 1.15 for LDR aloft.
I'm pleased to report the hotel in Mumbai as perfectly adequate. It also has a connection, so here is my paltry reply. Must be brief though. Hark, the call to breakfast, and all that...
I, like many others, enjoy these threads because I always seem to learn something. You've brought more to this subject than any other contributor; don't doubt that.
No one is advocating a cessation of any sort of discussion, on any subject, but for attacks on worthless issues like Airbus vs Boeing, or one poster attacking the opinions of another.
My contribution is simply that LDR aloft is not 1.67 times the figure derived from the QRH in normal or non-normal conditions. More on that later perhaps, though if the Airplane Flight Manual figures are assessed (the figures where manual braking is used, not autobrakes...vague, perhaps, but I don't have the AFM with me, though I was reviewing it for this post when the need to divert arose) it can be seen the figure for LDR is very close to that of the QRH derived figure multiplied by a factor of 1.15.
Which is why the company manual advises factoring the QRH by 1.15 for LDR aloft.