Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
Grandpa Aerotart
I recognise the fact he had 3000kg of fuel over and above diversion fuel so holding and then making a approach based on having min divert fuel at the minima was a possible alternative course of action...particularly if an improvement was likely/forecaste.
I find it very difficult to believe the 6600 figure from the accident report is factored for contaminated given that the runway is marginal just for wet. If you work back from that figure removing factors the raw data figures would be small indeed. It seems unlikely to be the case if Gnads figures are for a representative landing weight.
I have edited my previous post for transposition error.
I find it very difficult to believe the 6600 figure from the accident report is factored for contaminated given that the runway is marginal just for wet. If you work back from that figure removing factors the raw data figures would be small indeed. It seems unlikely to be the case if Gnads figures are for a representative landing weight.
I have edited my previous post for transposition error.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 2nd Apr 2007 at 17:40.
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This accident falls firmly into the category of "poor decision making" compounded by a complete lack of situational awareness from both seats when it came to commencing the approach in the face of deteriorating wx and runway conditions.
Have been there done that and nearly worn the T-Shirt...(into St Johns of all places).
Have been there done that and nearly worn the T-Shirt...(into St Johns of all places).
Gnads,
Above I have pasted a bit from the Airbus VOL 2 re how to change a actual landing distance to the required landing distance. JAR states you need a required landing distance, except in the case of non-normal.
Above I have pasted a bit from the Airbus VOL 2 re how to change a actual landing distance to the required landing distance. JAR states you need a required landing distance, except in the case of non-normal.
Which would help explain the common interpretation that airborne your RLD is your ALD with abnormal factors. Or pragmatically, that some French Test Pilot without system failures, slammed the a/c onto the piano keys to determine your ALD figure- which you conservatively address.
Grandpa Aerotart
Gnads as I too operate to JAR-OPS that is a paradox that has bemused me also...so I just took the pragmatic view that I will never land with < than normal factored LDR + a buffer for broken bits of the aeroplane and sundry family members.
It gets real interesting in say, a double hydraulic failure. On the one hand that is definately an emergency and the good book says "Plan to land at the nearest suitable". Defining suitable with an aeroplane that is handling like a bucket of jello exercises my mind somewhat...especially if all you're left with is one thrust reverser and brake accumulator presure
It gets real interesting in say, a double hydraulic failure. On the one hand that is definately an emergency and the good book says "Plan to land at the nearest suitable". Defining suitable with an aeroplane that is handling like a bucket of jello exercises my mind somewhat...especially if all you're left with is one thrust reverser and brake accumulator presure
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 2nd Apr 2007 at 18:17.
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All of this stuff above, and the x-wind was.....30+ knots
Memories of Microburst and a QFB737 in BrisVegas come to mind also. GA executed!
Might be my simplistic view of the world but even if the text book says you will scrape it it, you have to hit the Piano keys, and in that kind of storm you must be pretty lucky to pull it off every time.
Divert is what I would want as a pax. Better to have my luggage in a hotel somewhere else than have it crisped, along with me
J
Memories of Microburst and a QFB737 in BrisVegas come to mind also. GA executed!
Might be my simplistic view of the world but even if the text book says you will scrape it it, you have to hit the Piano keys, and in that kind of storm you must be pretty lucky to pull it off every time.
Divert is what I would want as a pax. Better to have my luggage in a hotel somewhere else than have it crisped, along with me
J
Grandpa Aerotart
J430 much of this stuff is, or should be, ingrained habit in any airline pilot that has been airline flying for a while...it should be bordering in subconcious in a captain such that when the information is needed it is just there...by that I don't mean he pulls numbers from his ar$e but he knows where to look to get the basic numbers and knows what to do with them to make them meaningfull. Having said that I do store away a few numbers in the grey matter that (hopefully) will gell with information received in an ATIS, Notams or when looking at the 10-9 chart (aerodrome diagram) or just looking out the window, and if it seems a little tight cause me to seek further refinement of those numbers.
In large aircraft we can't just thump it down 'on the piano keys' and stand on the brakes to give us 'a bit for mum' when the runway is wet or contaminated. Because of the geometry (height of eye vs wheels and how far they are behind you ) if you did the likely outcome would be stuffing the wheels into the dirt before the threshold and then ripping them off the aeroplane when they met the beginning of the runway.
As a result our aiming point is fairly well set in concrete at 1000' in from the threshold which, all things being normal, gives a main wheel crossing height of 50' at the threshold...hence the markings you see on runways at the 500', 1000' and 1500'.
The 1000' markers are where the glidesope beam portion of the ILS 'intersects' the runway. On a nice day when you are desirous of a flattering landing you actually land a little beyond that point because you, of course, round out and flare...you might touchdown around the 1500' markers. In bad conditions you don't flare you just drive the aircraft on and get the wheels spun up so the autobrakes and, a few seconds later, the thrust reversers can do their job. In strong crosswinds on wet runways you might not, and need not, even kick the aeroplane straight but rather let the aircraft geometry sort it out for you. The CofG is a fair way ahead of the main wheel boggies in big aircraft so if you touchdown with drift allowance on the aircraft's inertia means it won't dart off but actually just shudder and straighten up. The main boggies are designed for this...good airmanship, if not a little mechanical sympathy, dictates you don't do it on dry runways but you can...and the odd person does
We have all sorts of aids to help us with all of this...from diagrams and narrative in manuals to talking radio altimeters that (should) say "50 feet" a fraction of a second after the threshold dissappears from view right up to autoland and auto rollout if conditions dictate. We have SOPs that dictate, with absolutely no room for interpretation, how a crew will react under certain stimuli...as an example if you are out of tolerance the ILS display flashes and changes colour...under certain well defined circumstances that requires a go around...under others it dictates a go around might be a bloody good idea.
'Stabilised approach' criteria, in well founded airline SOPs, dictate a whole raft of requirements that absolutely must be met by a minimum altitude or a Go Around is required. These criteria include IAS, ROD, configuration and spacial positioning all to be within narrow margins and checklists completed by 1000' in IMC or 500' in VMC. Of course these are limits not targets...you usually have all that in place earlier. Things can go pear shaped later in the approach and may well require a go around if, in the captain's judgement, the situation demands...most airlines would not question that decision unless it became a regular feature of that captains operation...go arounds are rare because of stabilised approach criteria...if an individual is doing them 'regularly' clearly there is an issue that needs addressing with some retraining in the sim.
Mention has been made in this thread to handflying core skills...sometimes heated mention. They are essential and the VAST majority of pilots do maintain appropriate skills whether by practice in the real aircraft when circumstances dictate it is appropriate or in the sim every 6 mths. As an aside my company has it's own sim and we are encouraged to go in our own time and practice and that practice is free. I would never contemplate fronting up to my 6 mthly recurrent without doing a couple of practice sessions in the weeks prior and before my recent command sim training my course mates and I all spent many hours in the sim getting our eye and muscle memory in in the LHS by practicing lots of engine failures and fires on takeoff and flying assymetric circuits in foul weather and with strong crosswinds. Sim training/practice is a helluva lot of fun actually.
That doesn't mean that core handflying skills remain a fixed skill set down through the ages. In my early airline career I was flying F28s in the tropics and the combination of a level of automation akin to that in my Bonanza and near universal non precision approaches only on our route network, with circling a regular feature in darkness/bad weather, meant our handflying skills were high indeed...it was a crapload of fun, but is also well recognised within the industry as relatively high risk.
In the 767 I fly these days that eventuality is so rare as to be vanishingly small and combined with incredible automation and system redundancy the requirement to actually handfly such an approach borders on non existant. We do practice them in the sim and we do fly them if required (virtually never) but we fly them via the A/P. It works just incredibly well and both pilots are freed up to monitor flightpath and a myriad of other things such that the risk is reduced enormously.
Some check pilots still demand levels of handflying skill along the lines of what Gnadenberg is suggesting. Certainly such exercises in the sim are beneficial but they should not be fail items on brand new FOs. Teach them how, release them to line, let them build skills over time, refresher training each 6 mths in the sim and when they are approaching command seniority levels/experience make it a scoreable event...but not before...and even then not at totally unrealistic levels of aircraft system degradation.
Automation is my best friend...turning it off for macho reasons is just stupid. When the weather is crap or ATC is bringing us in behind someone with minimal spacing is the time to leave it in. A handflown Go around in a widebody jet is a VERY busy event. One pilot is just flying and the other is doing EVERYTHING else..selecting modes, adjusting heading bugs, winding in altitude clearances, talking to ATC and trying to monitor the flying pilots performance to ensure tracking and climb performance is all optimal...and the likelyhood is high that your Go around will throw the ATC system into slight dissarray as you charge into areas where other aircraft are transitioning the terminal airspace to arrive or departing off adjacent runways...or at places like Dubai and London departing and arriving at adjacent airports.
Flown on the automagics it is a calm and straightforward exercise with both pilots freed up to monitor flight path and aircraft system performance and the division of duties far more evenly spread across the two pilots.
The days of the F27, F28, 727 etc are over for the most part...mainline training and skill sets should, and in most airlines do, reflect that. If a young pilot ends up flying old technology in a 'time warp' operation he should rejoice because he will learn some excellent skills...but if a young pilot never flies anything other than current generation aircraft thise skills are essentially not required so relax and challenge yourself to be good at the technology you're flying.
In large aircraft we can't just thump it down 'on the piano keys' and stand on the brakes to give us 'a bit for mum' when the runway is wet or contaminated. Because of the geometry (height of eye vs wheels and how far they are behind you ) if you did the likely outcome would be stuffing the wheels into the dirt before the threshold and then ripping them off the aeroplane when they met the beginning of the runway.
As a result our aiming point is fairly well set in concrete at 1000' in from the threshold which, all things being normal, gives a main wheel crossing height of 50' at the threshold...hence the markings you see on runways at the 500', 1000' and 1500'.
The 1000' markers are where the glidesope beam portion of the ILS 'intersects' the runway. On a nice day when you are desirous of a flattering landing you actually land a little beyond that point because you, of course, round out and flare...you might touchdown around the 1500' markers. In bad conditions you don't flare you just drive the aircraft on and get the wheels spun up so the autobrakes and, a few seconds later, the thrust reversers can do their job. In strong crosswinds on wet runways you might not, and need not, even kick the aeroplane straight but rather let the aircraft geometry sort it out for you. The CofG is a fair way ahead of the main wheel boggies in big aircraft so if you touchdown with drift allowance on the aircraft's inertia means it won't dart off but actually just shudder and straighten up. The main boggies are designed for this...good airmanship, if not a little mechanical sympathy, dictates you don't do it on dry runways but you can...and the odd person does
We have all sorts of aids to help us with all of this...from diagrams and narrative in manuals to talking radio altimeters that (should) say "50 feet" a fraction of a second after the threshold dissappears from view right up to autoland and auto rollout if conditions dictate. We have SOPs that dictate, with absolutely no room for interpretation, how a crew will react under certain stimuli...as an example if you are out of tolerance the ILS display flashes and changes colour...under certain well defined circumstances that requires a go around...under others it dictates a go around might be a bloody good idea.
'Stabilised approach' criteria, in well founded airline SOPs, dictate a whole raft of requirements that absolutely must be met by a minimum altitude or a Go Around is required. These criteria include IAS, ROD, configuration and spacial positioning all to be within narrow margins and checklists completed by 1000' in IMC or 500' in VMC. Of course these are limits not targets...you usually have all that in place earlier. Things can go pear shaped later in the approach and may well require a go around if, in the captain's judgement, the situation demands...most airlines would not question that decision unless it became a regular feature of that captains operation...go arounds are rare because of stabilised approach criteria...if an individual is doing them 'regularly' clearly there is an issue that needs addressing with some retraining in the sim.
Mention has been made in this thread to handflying core skills...sometimes heated mention. They are essential and the VAST majority of pilots do maintain appropriate skills whether by practice in the real aircraft when circumstances dictate it is appropriate or in the sim every 6 mths. As an aside my company has it's own sim and we are encouraged to go in our own time and practice and that practice is free. I would never contemplate fronting up to my 6 mthly recurrent without doing a couple of practice sessions in the weeks prior and before my recent command sim training my course mates and I all spent many hours in the sim getting our eye and muscle memory in in the LHS by practicing lots of engine failures and fires on takeoff and flying assymetric circuits in foul weather and with strong crosswinds. Sim training/practice is a helluva lot of fun actually.
That doesn't mean that core handflying skills remain a fixed skill set down through the ages. In my early airline career I was flying F28s in the tropics and the combination of a level of automation akin to that in my Bonanza and near universal non precision approaches only on our route network, with circling a regular feature in darkness/bad weather, meant our handflying skills were high indeed...it was a crapload of fun, but is also well recognised within the industry as relatively high risk.
In the 767 I fly these days that eventuality is so rare as to be vanishingly small and combined with incredible automation and system redundancy the requirement to actually handfly such an approach borders on non existant. We do practice them in the sim and we do fly them if required (virtually never) but we fly them via the A/P. It works just incredibly well and both pilots are freed up to monitor flightpath and a myriad of other things such that the risk is reduced enormously.
Some check pilots still demand levels of handflying skill along the lines of what Gnadenberg is suggesting. Certainly such exercises in the sim are beneficial but they should not be fail items on brand new FOs. Teach them how, release them to line, let them build skills over time, refresher training each 6 mths in the sim and when they are approaching command seniority levels/experience make it a scoreable event...but not before...and even then not at totally unrealistic levels of aircraft system degradation.
Automation is my best friend...turning it off for macho reasons is just stupid. When the weather is crap or ATC is bringing us in behind someone with minimal spacing is the time to leave it in. A handflown Go around in a widebody jet is a VERY busy event. One pilot is just flying and the other is doing EVERYTHING else..selecting modes, adjusting heading bugs, winding in altitude clearances, talking to ATC and trying to monitor the flying pilots performance to ensure tracking and climb performance is all optimal...and the likelyhood is high that your Go around will throw the ATC system into slight dissarray as you charge into areas where other aircraft are transitioning the terminal airspace to arrive or departing off adjacent runways...or at places like Dubai and London departing and arriving at adjacent airports.
Flown on the automagics it is a calm and straightforward exercise with both pilots freed up to monitor flight path and aircraft system performance and the division of duties far more evenly spread across the two pilots.
The days of the F27, F28, 727 etc are over for the most part...mainline training and skill sets should, and in most airlines do, reflect that. If a young pilot ends up flying old technology in a 'time warp' operation he should rejoice because he will learn some excellent skills...but if a young pilot never flies anything other than current generation aircraft thise skills are essentially not required so relax and challenge yourself to be good at the technology you're flying.
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CC
Your educational material is great reading yet again. Thank you.
I do think you might have missed my simplistic view though. With all the talk above about the landing distance available etc, and a wet/ contamintaed runway etc etc, my point was that when the book says you will sneek it in by say 1000' to 2000', that does not afford you the luxury of touch down at 1000-1500' feet, and in very trying conditions you may not get every thing you hoped for from the theoretical figures. So why risk it like they did in Toronto. Seems ok if the runway was wet and a slight tail wind component but when it was considerably worse, you dont have any margin up your sleeve. Hence my comment you can not rely on spot landing it in such conditions.
better to bug off somewhere nice for a cup of tea and try later perhaps.
J
Your educational material is great reading yet again. Thank you.
I do think you might have missed my simplistic view though. With all the talk above about the landing distance available etc, and a wet/ contamintaed runway etc etc, my point was that when the book says you will sneek it in by say 1000' to 2000', that does not afford you the luxury of touch down at 1000-1500' feet, and in very trying conditions you may not get every thing you hoped for from the theoretical figures. So why risk it like they did in Toronto. Seems ok if the runway was wet and a slight tail wind component but when it was considerably worse, you dont have any margin up your sleeve. Hence my comment you can not rely on spot landing it in such conditions.
better to bug off somewhere nice for a cup of tea and try later perhaps.
J
< than normal factored LDR + a buffer for broken bits of the aeroplane and sundry family members.
So, in a dual HYD failure in an Airbus, with an abnormal multiple pushing or exceeding 2.5 to 3 depending on the model you have the following
4-5 X ALD X comfort%. The A340 ALD at the weight in the accident was 1155 nil TWC.
Airborne, you are now looking for a 4000-5000m strip? Without even adding your comfort factor! Edwards Air Force Base anybody??????
The actual landing distance is measured from 50ft above the runway surface until the aircraft comes tp the completestop.
This distance is measured during flight testing and represents the maximum aircraft performance. It is called LANDING DISTANCE WITHOUTAUTOBRAKE in the QRH. Should a failure occur inflight which requires the actual landing distancetobe multiplied by a factor, then the factor should be applied to the"LANDING DISTANCE WITHOUT AUTO BRAKE" configurationfull. Conversely, the AUTOLAND LANDING DISTANCE WITH AUTOBRAKE table available in the QRH gives a realistic indication of the aircraft performance during normal operations. Therefore, if a new-route diversion is required, and no landing distance factor is to be applied, the crew should refer tothistable.
This distance is measured during flight testing and represents the maximum aircraft performance. It is called LANDING DISTANCE WITHOUTAUTOBRAKE in the QRH. Should a failure occur inflight which requires the actual landing distancetobe multiplied by a factor, then the factor should be applied to the"LANDING DISTANCE WITHOUT AUTO BRAKE" configurationfull. Conversely, the AUTOLAND LANDING DISTANCE WITH AUTOBRAKE table available in the QRH gives a realistic indication of the aircraft performance during normal operations. Therefore, if a new-route diversion is required, and no landing distance factor is to be applied, the crew should refer tothistable.
Grandpa Aerotart
The book figures include 1000' of air distance from overhead the threshold at 50' to touchdown at the 1000' point....so the ground braking portion doesn't start until then. Those figures for normal ops are then factored heavily as discussed above so if you do everything nearly right you actually do it quite easily even in foul conditions. Clearly as the starting point is fixed then any extreme variation in braking effect caused by a contaminated runway is taken care of to some extent by varying autobrake settings or if that doesn't do it you just need to be lighter when you touch down...hence you might hold and burn off fuel.
The autobrake has multiple settings with 1 being hardly noticeable and max auto being VERY noticeable and in reality just a little less than max manual. Max manual braking is quite literally BOTH pilots standing on the anchors as hard as they can. The antiskid system protects the wheels from aquaplanning or lockup...so braking is always optimal and this is dne by comparing wheel spin up/speed with IRS derived ground speed. The RTO (rejected takeoff) autobrake setting is akin to park brake with antiskid
Landing/RTO performance figures are certified without reverse thrust being used...so reverse thrust is a bonus. At lower/mid autobrake settings the autobrakes seek to achieve a rate of deceleration so applying reverse actually causes the brakes to release somewhat to achieve the same rate of deceleration thus saving the brakes...this is important on a quick turn around where brake energy doesn't have time to dissipate and can effect the next departure in terms of being able to meet rejected takeoff criteria.
When you do it nearly right the margins are quite large in transport category operations...where it gets scary is if you don't react to variations that effect the validity of the landing calculations.
In the case of the subject of this thread the crew can not have been aware of how marginal was there performance had become because of the contaminated runway...when they didn't react appropriately to the circumstances they found themselves in (unstable approach) on short finals those slim margins and a whole lot more besides went out the window and the overrrun was a forgone conclusion.
It is sorta understandable, but not excusable, because we all spend 99% of our arrivals in reasonable weather and really long runways..like 11000' plus.
In this case a contaminated 9000' runway didn't raise a red flag in the captains mind...it should have.
Had the approach been flown coupled (on A/P) with both pilots fully briefed and raised awareness of company SOPs stabilised approach requirements with the captain as the PF they almost assuredly would have arrived at 100' stabilised. If not hit the GA switches and fly a fully automatic GA and hold for better weather or divert. If everything is nicely within tolerances disconnect and land (or autoland if within autoland xwind limits) and the regulatory buffer easily takes care of any less than optimum handling on the part of the pilots...non of us are test pilots.
If you give the system half a chance it is actually pretty easy.
The autobrake has multiple settings with 1 being hardly noticeable and max auto being VERY noticeable and in reality just a little less than max manual. Max manual braking is quite literally BOTH pilots standing on the anchors as hard as they can. The antiskid system protects the wheels from aquaplanning or lockup...so braking is always optimal and this is dne by comparing wheel spin up/speed with IRS derived ground speed. The RTO (rejected takeoff) autobrake setting is akin to park brake with antiskid
Landing/RTO performance figures are certified without reverse thrust being used...so reverse thrust is a bonus. At lower/mid autobrake settings the autobrakes seek to achieve a rate of deceleration so applying reverse actually causes the brakes to release somewhat to achieve the same rate of deceleration thus saving the brakes...this is important on a quick turn around where brake energy doesn't have time to dissipate and can effect the next departure in terms of being able to meet rejected takeoff criteria.
When you do it nearly right the margins are quite large in transport category operations...where it gets scary is if you don't react to variations that effect the validity of the landing calculations.
In the case of the subject of this thread the crew can not have been aware of how marginal was there performance had become because of the contaminated runway...when they didn't react appropriately to the circumstances they found themselves in (unstable approach) on short finals those slim margins and a whole lot more besides went out the window and the overrrun was a forgone conclusion.
It is sorta understandable, but not excusable, because we all spend 99% of our arrivals in reasonable weather and really long runways..like 11000' plus.
In this case a contaminated 9000' runway didn't raise a red flag in the captains mind...it should have.
Had the approach been flown coupled (on A/P) with both pilots fully briefed and raised awareness of company SOPs stabilised approach requirements with the captain as the PF they almost assuredly would have arrived at 100' stabilised. If not hit the GA switches and fly a fully automatic GA and hold for better weather or divert. If everything is nicely within tolerances disconnect and land (or autoland if within autoland xwind limits) and the regulatory buffer easily takes care of any less than optimum handling on the part of the pilots...non of us are test pilots.
If you give the system half a chance it is actually pretty easy.
Grandpa Aerotart
No Gnads i am not....all I am saying is that depending on the level of aircraft degradation 'suitable' gets a little interesting.
But lets look at it. A double hydraulic failure will leave you with only one thrust reverser and may leave you with degraded wheel brakes/antiskid...perhaps only accumulator pressure with paired wheels rather than all wheel antiskid protection.
If you have just taken off at MTOW in really foul weather (departure alternate required) how much runway do you think will GAURANTEE a safe landing? What if your departure alternate is 8- 9000' long (no problems most of the time) and wet?
It is absolutely abundantly clear that 'the good book' says "Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport" and that this must occurr as soon as possible.
I am not diverting to Edwards AF base or anything like it but in such a circumstance would you prefer your family was behind someone factoring effectively or just racing in and putting the aircraft down in circumstances that require test pilot performance levels?
In this situation I go into the QRH non normal landing graphs (for the specific non normal I have) and it gives me a reference distance plus additions and subtractions for all manner of things like wind, slope, weight above/below the reference weight, IAS above Vref etc.
That is great...but it doesn't have factors for a rough runway, rubber deposits that haven't been removed in living memory, pooling water and the fact that I might be having a bad day...or be at the end of a 14 hr duty period.
67% factoring may be appropriate on the day and I would argue a great starting point. 10% or 20% most often would not be.
Airline certification is all about gauranteed performance...I cannot just hope it will be ok I must be able to gaurantee, within reason, that it will be.
But lets look at it. A double hydraulic failure will leave you with only one thrust reverser and may leave you with degraded wheel brakes/antiskid...perhaps only accumulator pressure with paired wheels rather than all wheel antiskid protection.
If you have just taken off at MTOW in really foul weather (departure alternate required) how much runway do you think will GAURANTEE a safe landing? What if your departure alternate is 8- 9000' long (no problems most of the time) and wet?
It is absolutely abundantly clear that 'the good book' says "Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport" and that this must occurr as soon as possible.
I am not diverting to Edwards AF base or anything like it but in such a circumstance would you prefer your family was behind someone factoring effectively or just racing in and putting the aircraft down in circumstances that require test pilot performance levels?
In this situation I go into the QRH non normal landing graphs (for the specific non normal I have) and it gives me a reference distance plus additions and subtractions for all manner of things like wind, slope, weight above/below the reference weight, IAS above Vref etc.
That is great...but it doesn't have factors for a rough runway, rubber deposits that haven't been removed in living memory, pooling water and the fact that I might be having a bad day...or be at the end of a 14 hr duty period.
67% factoring may be appropriate on the day and I would argue a great starting point. 10% or 20% most often would not be.
Airline certification is all about gauranteed performance...I cannot just hope it will be ok I must be able to gaurantee, within reason, that it will be.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 3rd Apr 2007 at 07:19.
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As an aside my company has it's own sim and we are encouraged to go in our own time and practice and that practice is free. I would never contemplate fronting up to my 6 mthly recurrent without doing a couple of practice sessions in the weeks prior and before my recent command sim training my course mates and I all spent many hours in the sim getting our eye and muscle memory in in the LHS by practicing lots of engine failures and fires on takeoff and flying assymetric circuits in foul weather and with strong crosswinds. Sim training/practice is a helluva lot of fun actually.
We sold our 757/767 and A320 sim's back to Alteon
Every 6 months its full on from the word go
Thread Starter
Certainly such exercises in the sim are beneficial but they should not be fail items on brand new FOs
I am sure you will agree that those pilots legally qualified to be second in command of a passenger jet must be certified competent not only at monitoring the automatic pilot but also to demonstrate excellent handling skills. There must be no place on the flight deck for a second in command that is unable to hand fly the aircraft.
Granted, most flying in todays sophisticated jets is on automatic pilot from a few seconds after lift off, to a few seconds before touch down. Company policy in many airlines is that hand flying or even raw data flying is to be avoided unless absolutely necessary for the safety of the operation. The theory being the "dangerous" stuff such as hand flying is best left to recurrent simulator sessions.
The trouble is most simulator flying is taken up on just about everything else but raw data navigation and/or hand flying with no automatics. Even the autothrottle is left engaged. Accent in the simulator is on labour intensive LOFT or whatever is the latest fancy name, and instrument rating renewals are nothing more than full automation. Not much skill needed there.
It is rare to see circuits and landings, unusual attitude recovery practice, dark hole approach practice, strong crosswinds, short wet runways. Even a high altitude stall recovery is only for the endorsement and not practiced after that. The very skills needed to keep a second in command up to scratch with basic handling is simply disregarded. Most of the time recurrent simulator training is little more than a rehash of normal daily flying - perhaps with an engine failure thrown in to tick a box.
It is incumbent on the testing officer, whether he be a check captain or simulator instructor, not to lower the standards just because the newby is just a bum in the RH seat. Either the chap is qualified and certified competent to act as second in command of his big passenger jet or not. You cannot be just a little bit pregnant. You cannot have a second in command that is good at automatics but lacking at manual handling skills - and we all know that is an umcomfortable truth in many well known airlines.
The handling and automatics competency required of the crew should not be restricted to the bloke with the flashy hat and four gold bars. It follows in my book that failure to attain command standard competency in hand flying is enough to take the fellow from the RH seat (or the left seat) and either give him more training - or take a tough decision on his career.
Passengers and cabin crew are entitled to have a fully qualified and competent pair of pilots up front - one is the captain; the other ready to take over if the captain becomes impaired. If the second in command cannot demonstrate that he has the full gambit of skills required to hold a command endorsement - or a copilot endorsement, then flight safety is compromised.
Last edited by Centaurus; 3rd Apr 2007 at 09:57.
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The trouble is most simulator flying is taken up on just about everything else but raw data navigation and/or hand flying with no automatics. Even the autothrottle is left engaged. Accent in the simulator is on labour intensive LOFT or whatever is the latest fancy name, and instrument rating renewals are nothing more than full automation. Not much skill needed there.
Everything other than a non-precision approach must be hand flown, raw data, FD's off.
There is a component of showing competency with the automatics ala SOP adherence, but the vast majority of jeopardy items are hand flown in manual thrust.
(the same in the 2 airlines I've worked for)
Thread Starter
Last year I observed assessment tests of 12 pilots of different nationalities who were gathered together to see if they could get direct entry commands into a Japanese 737 operator. The sim checks were dead easy. CAVOK, wind calm - Take off, circuit and land. Then another take off, engine failure at V2, radar vector for ILS and land. Weather 500 ft cloud base, 3000 metres vis.
The catch? The assessing officers required raw data, and 75% of the flight hand flown. With two notable exceptions, the standard of flying accuracy of these experienced pilots was dismal. Without the availibility of the flight director and autothrottle, and autopilot these chaps were quite unable to fly within instrument rating tolerances most of the time in what was the easiest tests I have seen. All except one were given jobs, though.
No small wonder that airlines demand full use of automatics to keep the pilots from making fools of themselves.
So what is to be done about it? A big fat nothing, that's what. It's the way of the aviation world judging by many of the posts on Pprune.
The catch? The assessing officers required raw data, and 75% of the flight hand flown. With two notable exceptions, the standard of flying accuracy of these experienced pilots was dismal. Without the availibility of the flight director and autothrottle, and autopilot these chaps were quite unable to fly within instrument rating tolerances most of the time in what was the easiest tests I have seen. All except one were given jobs, though.
No small wonder that airlines demand full use of automatics to keep the pilots from making fools of themselves.
So what is to be done about it? A big fat nothing, that's what. It's the way of the aviation world judging by many of the posts on Pprune.
A lot of good stuff has been missed in this thread reference the A340 overrun. If Chimbu's creation of the Airbus Industrie 767 confused you, don't despair, you aren't alone.
Lets go back- the approach WAS legal. Lets look at some of the information presented to the crew of the A340 and decide if you too would be lured into the approach. Then let's look at reactive procedures to the scenario- notably a late GA option or sound contaminated runway landing technique ( reversors are king etc ).
I believe, and will outline below, that the crew may not have been aware of a contaminated runway. But even so here are the actual landing distance ( ALD )figures- runway length is 2743, dry actual landing distance 1155, wet 1502, contaminated 1987.
Airbus ( company procedures may differ ) post-dispatch have NO requirement to apply the 1.67 dry, 1.92 wet, and 1.15 factors to dry ,wet and contaminated runways.The FAA recomendation stands that you x by 1.15 any airborne derived ALD's- this incidently a post-accident Airbus requirement and may address the confusion crews have with these concepts. But still, the approach is well within the bounds of legality.
The actual conditions and how they are presented to the crew important. An hour before touchdown, TS activity in the area and nothing untoward in terms of windspeed nor viz. Heavy rain but enough to deem the RWY contaminated???
The wind direction indicator is now knocked out- would you divert? Or rely on pilot reports or ATC estimates of W/V?
Running down the timeline, prior to approach commencement. Two preceding aircraft have landed and report the wind to be 15 knots gusting twenty. Braking action poor. A definitive indication of a contaminated runway? But as yet, no reports of TWC.
When the 340 landed, a possible gust front significantly changed the W/V, and in the flare a rain squall. The wind has increased significantly to 20 plus knots with gusts over 30- very late in the approach ( flare or short final by the looks of the report ) with heavy rain.
Think of time compression and the information presented. At this late stage, a GA could have saved the day. I feel that if the the wind rapidly backing to an increasing quartering TWC made things very tough- compounded by overshoot ( perhaps inevitable ) of the touchdown zone and late selction of reversors ( a decelaration not dependant on runway friction ).
There is a lot that can be taken from this incident.
Lets go back- the approach WAS legal. Lets look at some of the information presented to the crew of the A340 and decide if you too would be lured into the approach. Then let's look at reactive procedures to the scenario- notably a late GA option or sound contaminated runway landing technique ( reversors are king etc ).
I believe, and will outline below, that the crew may not have been aware of a contaminated runway. But even so here are the actual landing distance ( ALD )figures- runway length is 2743, dry actual landing distance 1155, wet 1502, contaminated 1987.
Airbus ( company procedures may differ ) post-dispatch have NO requirement to apply the 1.67 dry, 1.92 wet, and 1.15 factors to dry ,wet and contaminated runways.The FAA recomendation stands that you x by 1.15 any airborne derived ALD's- this incidently a post-accident Airbus requirement and may address the confusion crews have with these concepts. But still, the approach is well within the bounds of legality.
The actual conditions and how they are presented to the crew important. An hour before touchdown, TS activity in the area and nothing untoward in terms of windspeed nor viz. Heavy rain but enough to deem the RWY contaminated???
The wind direction indicator is now knocked out- would you divert? Or rely on pilot reports or ATC estimates of W/V?
Running down the timeline, prior to approach commencement. Two preceding aircraft have landed and report the wind to be 15 knots gusting twenty. Braking action poor. A definitive indication of a contaminated runway? But as yet, no reports of TWC.
When the 340 landed, a possible gust front significantly changed the W/V, and in the flare a rain squall. The wind has increased significantly to 20 plus knots with gusts over 30- very late in the approach ( flare or short final by the looks of the report ) with heavy rain.
Think of time compression and the information presented. At this late stage, a GA could have saved the day. I feel that if the the wind rapidly backing to an increasing quartering TWC made things very tough- compounded by overshoot ( perhaps inevitable ) of the touchdown zone and late selction of reversors ( a decelaration not dependant on runway friction ).
There is a lot that can be taken from this incident.
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accuracy of these experienced pilots was dismal
Grandpa Aerotart
Centaurus I would not attempt to argue that tradition skills are not degrading but is that a significant cause for concern?
I am not aware of any hull losses or loss of life where a captains innability to fly raw data, manual, non precision approaches was a contributory factor...let alone an FO's innability to do so.
There have been many cases where mode confusion/lack of core skills with automation did contribute to hull/life losses. The A320 at BAH, A320 in Germany, 757 in Cali etc.
As to your example of recent sim assessments...well I think the world has long since reached the point where (cheap) bums on seats is the major consideration...keeping aircraft in the air earning beans for the beancounters...sadly.
Don't get me wrong...I am a firm believer in core handling skills and feel blessed that the first 11000+ hrs of my career were in low technology aircraft, including jets, and that has left me with good core handling skills...not always been seen as a 'positive' by everyone with an influence on my career progression
My company places lots of emphasis on automatics on the line and in the sim...but we also do a fair bit of handflying in the sim...including NPAs in crap weather with degraded aircraft handling/systems.
Given the system redundancy and route network I don't think I can fault their training emphasis. There has just NEVER been a real life example of a B767 being reduced to the technological equivalent of a 1975 C402.
The training budget at any airline is constrained by available resources...why emphasize the 100 million to 1 chance at the expense of not infrequent reality?
We get back to the beancounter 'real world' where if you fail every candidate for innability to cope with scenarios that are statistically insignificant then you soon run out of bums for your seats.
Personally I would LOVE to see that happen...the pilot shortage would all of a sudden become accute to the point of industry collapse but by god those pilots with solid, all round skills would be making a **** of a lot of money.
I am not aware of any hull losses or loss of life where a captains innability to fly raw data, manual, non precision approaches was a contributory factor...let alone an FO's innability to do so.
There have been many cases where mode confusion/lack of core skills with automation did contribute to hull/life losses. The A320 at BAH, A320 in Germany, 757 in Cali etc.
As to your example of recent sim assessments...well I think the world has long since reached the point where (cheap) bums on seats is the major consideration...keeping aircraft in the air earning beans for the beancounters...sadly.
Don't get me wrong...I am a firm believer in core handling skills and feel blessed that the first 11000+ hrs of my career were in low technology aircraft, including jets, and that has left me with good core handling skills...not always been seen as a 'positive' by everyone with an influence on my career progression
My company places lots of emphasis on automatics on the line and in the sim...but we also do a fair bit of handflying in the sim...including NPAs in crap weather with degraded aircraft handling/systems.
Given the system redundancy and route network I don't think I can fault their training emphasis. There has just NEVER been a real life example of a B767 being reduced to the technological equivalent of a 1975 C402.
The training budget at any airline is constrained by available resources...why emphasize the 100 million to 1 chance at the expense of not infrequent reality?
We get back to the beancounter 'real world' where if you fail every candidate for innability to cope with scenarios that are statistically insignificant then you soon run out of bums for your seats.
Personally I would LOVE to see that happen...the pilot shortage would all of a sudden become accute to the point of industry collapse but by god those pilots with solid, all round skills would be making a **** of a lot of money.
Grandpa Aerotart
REQUIRED LANDING DISTANCE
MANUAL LANDING
Regulation defines the required landing distance as the actual landing distance divided by 0.6, assuming the surface is dry.
If the surface is wet, the required landing distance must be at least 115 % of that for a dry surface.
For JAR-OPS operators, if the surface is contaminated, the required landing distance must be at least the greater of the required landing distance on wet runway (see previous paragraph) and 115 % of the landing distance determined in accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data.
Gnadenberg the above is from one of donpizmeoff's earlier (Airbus) posts.
That would give, based on your 1155m dry or 1987m contaminated figures a RLD of 2285m...the greater of (1155/.6 x 1.15) or (1987 x 1.15)..at first glance seemingly acceptable.
The information available to the crew before commencing approach was;
9000 LDA- no overly long.
TS in area- possible Windshear?
Heavy rain- possible contaminated runway?
'Poor' reported braking action- Definately contaminated runway.
X wind component in excess of contaminated xwind limits (15 gusting 20 - aircraft limit 15kts)
We are all aware of the difference between legal and safe and that what is legal is not always safe and visa versa.
So with a mere 450m in reserve this crew commenced an approach to a runway they could reasonably expect was contaminated with a xwind component they knew was in excess of the aircraft limitations.
Legal? Safe?
I don't think so.
They then experienced significant deterioration on short finals...xwind now more like twice limit, windshear (reasonably predictable) and much heavier rain (not likely to make 'poor' reported braking action any better
).
Things just got very illegal and terribly unsafe.
But they landed anyway and ran off the runway end at 79kts.
I think you're wrong to believe runway performance doesn't need full regulatory factors after dispatch in normal operations..and those regulatory factors are the absolute minimum...it is the captains right and absolute LEGAL responsibility to increase them as he deems fit given additional circumstances such as existed at Toronto.
Sorry...most of the circumstances they found themselves in could be reasonably predicted to be factors possibly affecting their landing before they even commenced the approach. We get paid to think about these possibilites before they happen and react appropriately.
Absolutely...the defination of contaminated is 'significant areas of standing water, depth 3mm or greater' (paraphrase).
One of the numbers I keep stored in my head is 23000kg. That is the 'contaminated' RTOW reduction (3mm...its closer to 40000kg at 12mm) if I walk out of the crew room at my home port and a thunderstorm is dumping water all over our 11000' runway. If it starts pi$$ing down after I 'dispatch' (aircraft first moves under its own power) does my accelerate/stop performance magically no longer suffer on that rain contaminated runway?
If, as I did last night, I taxied out about 7000kg under MTOW (about 10000kg under performance limited RTOW) and it started pi$$ing down as I reached the holding point (happens from time to time) and I ignore it...and suffer a catastrophic failure 1 second before V1, reject, and charge off the end of the runway at 79kts would my performance be deemed legal? Would it be deemed safe? Would I remain in the employ of my company?
I, theoretically, took off at least 13000kg in excess of book figures for the conditions. If I killed people I would end up in jail.
To think the same does not apply landing at your destination is pure fantasy.
We get paid to take into account all factors that may effect our operation...not to be so lacking in foresight that one set of numbers override, or are immune from, mutitudinous other factors.
MANUAL LANDING
Regulation defines the required landing distance as the actual landing distance divided by 0.6, assuming the surface is dry.
If the surface is wet, the required landing distance must be at least 115 % of that for a dry surface.
For JAR-OPS operators, if the surface is contaminated, the required landing distance must be at least the greater of the required landing distance on wet runway (see previous paragraph) and 115 % of the landing distance determined in accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data.
Gnadenberg the above is from one of donpizmeoff's earlier (Airbus) posts.
That would give, based on your 1155m dry or 1987m contaminated figures a RLD of 2285m...the greater of (1155/.6 x 1.15) or (1987 x 1.15)..at first glance seemingly acceptable.
The information available to the crew before commencing approach was;
9000 LDA- no overly long.
TS in area- possible Windshear?
Heavy rain- possible contaminated runway?
'Poor' reported braking action- Definately contaminated runway.
X wind component in excess of contaminated xwind limits (15 gusting 20 - aircraft limit 15kts)
We are all aware of the difference between legal and safe and that what is legal is not always safe and visa versa.
So with a mere 450m in reserve this crew commenced an approach to a runway they could reasonably expect was contaminated with a xwind component they knew was in excess of the aircraft limitations.
Legal? Safe?
I don't think so.
They then experienced significant deterioration on short finals...xwind now more like twice limit, windshear (reasonably predictable) and much heavier rain (not likely to make 'poor' reported braking action any better
).Things just got very illegal and terribly unsafe.
But they landed anyway and ran off the runway end at 79kts.
I think you're wrong to believe runway performance doesn't need full regulatory factors after dispatch in normal operations..and those regulatory factors are the absolute minimum...it is the captains right and absolute LEGAL responsibility to increase them as he deems fit given additional circumstances such as existed at Toronto.
Think of time compression and the information presented.
Heavy rain but enough to deem the RWY contaminated???
One of the numbers I keep stored in my head is 23000kg. That is the 'contaminated' RTOW reduction (3mm...its closer to 40000kg at 12mm) if I walk out of the crew room at my home port and a thunderstorm is dumping water all over our 11000' runway. If it starts pi$$ing down after I 'dispatch' (aircraft first moves under its own power) does my accelerate/stop performance magically no longer suffer on that rain contaminated runway?
If, as I did last night, I taxied out about 7000kg under MTOW (about 10000kg under performance limited RTOW) and it started pi$$ing down as I reached the holding point (happens from time to time) and I ignore it...and suffer a catastrophic failure 1 second before V1, reject, and charge off the end of the runway at 79kts would my performance be deemed legal? Would it be deemed safe? Would I remain in the employ of my company?
I, theoretically, took off at least 13000kg in excess of book figures for the conditions. If I killed people I would end up in jail.
To think the same does not apply landing at your destination is pure fantasy.
We get paid to take into account all factors that may effect our operation...not to be so lacking in foresight that one set of numbers override, or are immune from, mutitudinous other factors.
Thread Starter
I am not aware of any hull losses or loss of life where a captains innability to fly raw data, manual, non precision approaches was a contributory factor...let alone an FO's innability to do so.
So the statement you make that: "not aware of any hull losses..where a captain's inability....was a contributory factor" is quite understandable. Your memory is like everyone else's on Pprune forums - fallible.
Few of us can waste time poring through the internet, trawling accident reports from magazines and libraries just to argue the point between poor hand flying and poor automatics management. But there is no doubt in my mind that pilot incompetence on hand flying ranks well up the scale in accident causes. Take it or leave it..