Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
Grandpa Aerotart
When things turn profile ugly from 30, 40 , 60 miles out so begins a process of removing the aircraft's automation. It may start with the autopilot to maximise spoiler deflection, then the autothrust to prevent unwanted power up. Closer in, the flight directors info' won't correspond to the performance you are trying to extract to get the aircraft in. So off they come.
Core competencies are required in both areas, automation and handflying. But the AN* philosophy is now big C little t so they fail people for not being able to do what they have never been taught to do.
But back to the thread...so is the A340 so clever that it can be landed in the conditions that prevailed on the day by ANYONE let alone an FO.
This accident was not about your landing or my landing it was about landing period in conditions that warranted further consideration.
Hosing rain, contaminated runway, lightning destroyed wind reporting equipment, strong x wind that sounds like it gave a small tailwind component too, unstable approach...and, theoretically at least, the lesser qualified pilot flying. I would have been amazed had it not ended badly.
Sounded to me, when we looked at this accident at work, like the captain felt the conditions were beyond his abilities and handed his future career to an FO he felt might be able to land safely in conditions bordering on impossible. The last chance to really save the situation was on VERY short finals...look at the rain, look at the wind display on the EFIS...and then hit the GA switches...and they were hot and high as well.
Everyone is fond of quoting Prof Reason's swiss cheese model...well all the holes were lining up and the ONE person who is supposed to be the final filter, the captain, did not one fecking thing about it...in fact quite the opposite.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 2nd Apr 2007 at 13:44.
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CC gotta agree with you mate , I prefer to be a very big sook in situations like that and go somewhere nicer.
And the last thing I would worry about is commercials reaction to it.
Hey, its my licence on the line not the right seater(well maybe not) but mine is far more valuable to me!!
btw congrats on your move to the left seat
And the last thing I would worry about is commercials reaction to it.
Hey, its my licence on the line not the right seater(well maybe not) but mine is far more valuable to me!!
btw congrats on your move to the left seat
I believe that te Sil Air FO that Centauras was talking about was a Massey University cadet, on his 2nd week of line flying on the 737.
Back then Massey were running an aviation degree programme where in the 4th year, the students were placed with an airline for 6 months work experiance as a 737 FO.
That FO must have had gonads the sise of cocconuts to initiate a go around.
Back then Massey were running an aviation degree programme where in the 4th year, the students were placed with an airline for 6 months work experiance as a 737 FO.
That FO must have had gonads the sise of cocconuts to initiate a go around.
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That FO must have had gonads the sise of cocconuts to initiate a go around
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QUOTE..CC.......This accident was not about your landing or my landing it was about landing period in conditions that warranted further consideration.
.........SOMETIMES THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL......IT STARES YOU IN THE FACE AND YOU STILL CANT SEE IT!!!!
CC.....congrats mate....the whole thread summed up in one sentence!!!.....
the misses and my tui piss are yours....
.........SOMETIMES THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL......IT STARES YOU IN THE FACE AND YOU STILL CANT SEE IT!!!!
CC.....congrats mate....the whole thread summed up in one sentence!!!.....
the misses and my tui piss are yours....
Another pressure in conditions like this, is the sheep conditioning we humans have (no, not in a Kiwi trying to make a family way!!!). When you hear the WX is bad, but hear all the guys in the line in front of you still taking off or landing, it makes the decision to delay a lot harder. I have seen this quite a few time HKG when the typhoons are a commin or a leavin.
On arrival there on downwind the procession in front of us were taking the vectors and commencing the approach. The weather was shocking. On late downwind, I asked the controller if the aircraft in front were landing off the approaches. He replied that some were, but most were conducting missed approaches. I asked to hold, then the guy behind asked to hold, then another etc etc.
We get so use to being able to fly in all sorts of weather, that when it really does get bad it is hard to step back and say enough is enough. Add to this that all the other airlines are continuing, and the decision to join the hold or divert is made so much harder. Luckily we have SOPs, OPS MANs, and another flight deck crew member (its even better if you both understand the same language!) etc to help with this decision making.
Another good reason to call sick if the weather at departure or destination is anything but CAVOK.
Don
On arrival there on downwind the procession in front of us were taking the vectors and commencing the approach. The weather was shocking. On late downwind, I asked the controller if the aircraft in front were landing off the approaches. He replied that some were, but most were conducting missed approaches. I asked to hold, then the guy behind asked to hold, then another etc etc.
We get so use to being able to fly in all sorts of weather, that when it really does get bad it is hard to step back and say enough is enough. Add to this that all the other airlines are continuing, and the decision to join the hold or divert is made so much harder. Luckily we have SOPs, OPS MANs, and another flight deck crew member (its even better if you both understand the same language!) etc to help with this decision making.
Another good reason to call sick if the weather at departure or destination is anything but CAVOK.
Don
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Don....mate!!! ditto....
Please dont use the word "sheep" as it gits me really horny......
....the word you are looking for is ....PRUDENT!!!!.....old,bold,young stupid ugly thing...PB
Please dont use the word "sheep" as it gits me really horny......
....the word you are looking for is ....PRUDENT!!!!.....old,bold,young stupid ugly thing...PB
Sorry PB, didn't want to get you all excited. Mate, you should see some of the goats we have running around over here!!! If only the little baaaaastards could cook.
Don
Don
Rubbish....all this shows is a lack of basic automation competencies...or the aeroplane should never have been certified for pax carrying operations as several of my, very experienced, mates attest. If you have to turn stuff off that isn't broken then you don't know what you're doing...it is just that simple.
Congratulations on your new command but I would suggest a red flag there. By your own admission, you know nothing of Airbus, yet your convictions bulletproof. And I would prefer a discussion based on science and not " my very experienced mates".
In my experience with Airbus, unstable approaches and a number of fatal accidents ( Air India, Gulf Air, Armavia etc ) have one thing in common at the latter stages- degraded automation. In the case of the Air France A340 overrun, the Autothrust was simultaneoulsy disengaged with the Autopilot at 300 feet. Why? Well again Chimbu, you have all the answers.
Hosing rain, contaminated runway, lightning destroyed wind reporting equipment, strong x wind that sounds like it gave a small tailwind component too, unstable approach...and, theoretically at least, the lesser qualified pilot flying. I would have been amazed had it not ended badly.
Confidence and currency in a late GA from an unstable approach, regardless of position and configuration, probably the only way to counter the problem. Rembering that in most crashes in approach and in foul weather, aircraft have landed ahead- overshoot shear, turbulence increasing TWC due a gust front etc isn't linear nor predictable.
Two of the four Airbus outfits I have worked for practiced late GA from an unstable position. Not difficult and when versed and with curreny, takes away a bit of the committment psycology to a difficult approach.
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Quote,Gnads......Two of the four Airbus outfits I have worked for practiced late GA from an unstable position. Not difficult and when versed and with curreny, takes away a bit of the committment psycology to a difficult approach.
Gnads...CC has always taken potshots at the bus...he has a history of it,and most of it as a friendly jibe,,dont really have a beef with it as he means no harm.....some boeing blokes just dont want a better life
I agree with the intent of your comments,and your last paragraph is one by which most of us practice and more by rote than anything else....The problem with real life GA,s(as you well know) is that they are rarely practiced and are never initiated soon enough...the mindset that it has to be initiated at the GA point,when the ****e hits the fan or as the ultimate last resort......when one has realised they have no other choice as opposed to making a professional decision earlier on......
GA,s are a critical part of any flight....if we put as much emphasis on this procedure as we do when doing our normal flying duties,we would hear less of these events.....and I,m as guilty as the next...PB
Gnads...CC has always taken potshots at the bus...he has a history of it,and most of it as a friendly jibe,,dont really have a beef with it as he means no harm.....some boeing blokes just dont want a better life
I agree with the intent of your comments,and your last paragraph is one by which most of us practice and more by rote than anything else....The problem with real life GA,s(as you well know) is that they are rarely practiced and are never initiated soon enough...the mindset that it has to be initiated at the GA point,when the ****e hits the fan or as the ultimate last resort......when one has realised they have no other choice as opposed to making a professional decision earlier on......
GA,s are a critical part of any flight....if we put as much emphasis on this procedure as we do when doing our normal flying duties,we would hear less of these events.....and I,m as guilty as the next...PB
Grandpa Aerotart
Why would I be more worried about the next monsoon season than I have about the last 20. I have spent my entire career based in the tropics...heavy monsoonal rain and big TSs are as much a part of my day as putting my trousers on one leg at a time.
My only quibble about your last post was the, apparent, enthusiasm to turn automation off at the first sign that it was not doing what you expected rather than chosing a mode with more direct control...like going from Managed Descent to Open Descent or from Nav to Track or Heading Select.
Virtually all my long time mates are flying Airbus...some are checkers and trainers...I speak to them at length about the bus...very few if any are overly enthusiastic about the bus culture but it is pretty obvious that for the most part the various modes are more about what it is called than what it does...like Nav as opposed to LNAV or Open descent v FLCH and VNAV v Managed descent. Most don't like the A320 but recognise that the 330 and 340 are better aeroplanes to fly.
As to how/what extent automation is used/when or under what circumstances it is switched off is more a company culture thing in many respects. Overwhelming annecdotal evidence, confirmed in your post, is that the Ansett culture was 'turn it off' rather than use another mode...in the 767 if VNAV is not doing it for you then you change to something else...FLCH or VS. As soon as you are not conforming to a magenta line HDG SEL.
If I was to follow the practice outlined in your post I would be carpetted and, most assuredly, have remain an SFO until I changed my habits. .
In our normal daily operations we use the AFDS/MCP from first pitch change after takeoff to short finals, including circling approaches. It works very well and means both pilots are freed up to monitor flight path, traffic and ATC clearances using good CRM rather than PF hand flying and PNF doing everything else with a constrained ability for either pilot to satisfactorily monitor.
That doesn't mean we don't hand fly approaches when it is appropriate...I did so today at home port in nice weather and no traffic...but would not do so, unless forced to, at LHR or DXB in rush hour. It just loads up the PNF too much and degrades the team effort...its bad CRM.
I certainly don't have all the answers...but still none of you Bus officiandos have pointed out what the contaminated xwind limit is for the 340. This accident wasn't one where you could really say, hand on heart, "poor fellas, there but for the grace of God go I"....none of the parameters were just a little bit off and caught anyone unawares...it was just a giant clusterfeck in the same vien as GA200 at Jogya. many are quick to point out the Indonesian pilot's mistakes/cultural issues but you all seem less keen to comment on why someone would land in a situation that was AT LEAST as cut and dry as that of GA 200.
I have never shrunk from saying i don't like Airbus...I don't and have no desire to fly one. 99% of the stick I give them and the pilots that fly them is just good natured ribbing along the lines of OZ v Kiwi or Bne v Mexicans...but there is an underlaying Bus culture and lack of intuitiveness about Buses that I really think is bad. Airbuses pilots virtually invented, or certainly cornered the market on, 'the work around'.
I really, REALLY like the fact that, in my Boeing, Ground speed mini is never going to (try to) overspeed the flaps in managed descent because of a temp/wind change causing a signal to be blasted off to BS castle by the computer dobbing me in in less time than it takes to pull the thrust levers back.
My only quibble about your last post was the, apparent, enthusiasm to turn automation off at the first sign that it was not doing what you expected rather than chosing a mode with more direct control...like going from Managed Descent to Open Descent or from Nav to Track or Heading Select.
Virtually all my long time mates are flying Airbus...some are checkers and trainers...I speak to them at length about the bus...very few if any are overly enthusiastic about the bus culture but it is pretty obvious that for the most part the various modes are more about what it is called than what it does...like Nav as opposed to LNAV or Open descent v FLCH and VNAV v Managed descent. Most don't like the A320 but recognise that the 330 and 340 are better aeroplanes to fly.
As to how/what extent automation is used/when or under what circumstances it is switched off is more a company culture thing in many respects. Overwhelming annecdotal evidence, confirmed in your post, is that the Ansett culture was 'turn it off' rather than use another mode...in the 767 if VNAV is not doing it for you then you change to something else...FLCH or VS. As soon as you are not conforming to a magenta line HDG SEL.
If I was to follow the practice outlined in your post I would be carpetted and, most assuredly, have remain an SFO until I changed my habits. .
In our normal daily operations we use the AFDS/MCP from first pitch change after takeoff to short finals, including circling approaches. It works very well and means both pilots are freed up to monitor flight path, traffic and ATC clearances using good CRM rather than PF hand flying and PNF doing everything else with a constrained ability for either pilot to satisfactorily monitor.
That doesn't mean we don't hand fly approaches when it is appropriate...I did so today at home port in nice weather and no traffic...but would not do so, unless forced to, at LHR or DXB in rush hour. It just loads up the PNF too much and degrades the team effort...its bad CRM.
I certainly don't have all the answers...but still none of you Bus officiandos have pointed out what the contaminated xwind limit is for the 340. This accident wasn't one where you could really say, hand on heart, "poor fellas, there but for the grace of God go I"....none of the parameters were just a little bit off and caught anyone unawares...it was just a giant clusterfeck in the same vien as GA200 at Jogya. many are quick to point out the Indonesian pilot's mistakes/cultural issues but you all seem less keen to comment on why someone would land in a situation that was AT LEAST as cut and dry as that of GA 200.
I have never shrunk from saying i don't like Airbus...I don't and have no desire to fly one. 99% of the stick I give them and the pilots that fly them is just good natured ribbing along the lines of OZ v Kiwi or Bne v Mexicans...but there is an underlaying Bus culture and lack of intuitiveness about Buses that I really think is bad. Airbuses pilots virtually invented, or certainly cornered the market on, 'the work around'.
I really, REALLY like the fact that, in my Boeing, Ground speed mini is never going to (try to) overspeed the flaps in managed descent because of a temp/wind change causing a signal to be blasted off to BS castle by the computer dobbing me in in less time than it takes to pull the thrust levers back.
Thread Starter
Reminds me of the time in another life I was dobbed in by the F/O of a German airline I was contracted to, for hand flying SIDS in the 737 Classic. This was basic VOR radial/DME flying same as any GA IFR pilot in Australia. When I asked the F/O to fly a raw data ILS in perfect weather, he refused point blank. I insisted and his flying was so bad I was forced to take over.
Within days it was tea and bikkies in front of the chief pilot, a kindly gentleman in every sense, who explained gently that F/O's were not trained to monitor raw data - only the FMCS - and please would I stick to the automatics from lift off to landing. His train set etc...
Within days it was tea and bikkies in front of the chief pilot, a kindly gentleman in every sense, who explained gently that F/O's were not trained to monitor raw data - only the FMCS - and please would I stick to the automatics from lift off to landing. His train set etc...
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Truly amazing how pilots with absolutely no training on the bus are self-proclaimed experts by good advice from their mates! 
Chimbu, my bet is that no one gives a rat's ar$e whether or not you have a desire to fly the Airbus, your ramblings are meaningless without any real operational knowledge.
In the reported wx conditions, I would much rather be in the small bus than the big bus.
Chimbu, my bet is that no one gives a rat's ar$e whether or not you have a desire to fly the Airbus, your ramblings are meaningless without any real operational knowledge.In the reported wx conditions, I would much rather be in the small bus than the big bus.
Grandpa Aerotart
That's ok...doesn't mean I can't have a preference...I am not knocking yours
I have never driven a Skoda either...I know I don't want to....I wouldn't deny you your choice to do so however.
Still waiting for the A340 contaminated xwind limits
Centaurus know what you mean....you'd think there was a logical middle ground but apparently not
I have never driven a Skoda either...I know I don't want to....I wouldn't deny you your choice to do so however.
Still waiting for the A340 contaminated xwind limits
Centaurus know what you mean....you'd think there was a logical middle ground but apparently not
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 1st Apr 2007 at 17:20.
Chuck,
For the A343 the figures are:
27 knots on a dry runway.
27 knots wet.
15 knots on a runway covered with standing water or wet snow.
Don
For the A343 the figures are:
27 knots on a dry runway.
27 knots wet.
15 knots on a runway covered with standing water or wet snow.
Don
Why would I be more worried about the next monsoon season than I have about the last 20. I have spent my entire career based in the tropics...heavy monsoonal rain and big TSs are as much a part of my day as putting my trousers on one leg at a time.
My only quibble about your last post was the, apparent, enthusiasm to turn automation off at the first sign that it was not doing what you expected rather than chosing a mode with more direct control...like going from Managed Descent to Open Descent or from Nav to Track or Heading Select.
Airbus managed profiles are designed for STAR's. Bring in WX diversions or track shortening or high speed requirements and the managed modes may be corrected with more direct modes granted. However, extracting maximum performance, correcting mode confusion, can require autopilot, autothrust or flight director removal- this compounded in a situation where a transition can be made from a sporty approach on instruments to visual segment or GA. Accidents and Flight Data Analysis to support this. My common link so to speak.
Virtually all my long time mates are flying Airbus...some are checkers and trainers..
Overwhelming annecdotal evidence, confirmed in your post, is that the Ansett culture was 'turn it off' rather than use another mode..
If I was to follow the practice outlined in your post I would be carpetted
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 2nd Apr 2007 at 02:37.
Grandpa Aerotart
Agreed Gnads...the good old days were a ton of fun and we learned a lot of aircraft handling skills that stand us in good stead...arriving at 10 nm at 330kts in an F28 was a hoot and certainly 'enabled' an expanded green band in those of us so experienced.
Fact is the 'good old days' are over and finished...pilots who have entered the system in the last 10-15 yrs will never gain those skills because the system and aircraft design don't allow them. That being the case you're just gonna scare people witless doing it in aircraft that lack the flexibility to do it easily, even though an 'expanded green band' still makes it possible.
Worse still those not scared witless will try and emulate but without the skills to do so or the flexible aircraft type to do so easily and, invariably, cock it up.
So given that the current reality is STARs, SIDs, crowded airspace, larger aircraft with attendant handling and inertia issues, system redundancy up the waazoo and generally 'different' experience, perhaps it is long past time to recognise that the system requires the current levels of automation be used to best effect 100% of the time...and therefore train and check accordingly?
Whether you're flying a Fokker, Boeing or one of those silly French aeroplanes
Don thanks for that...I was beginning to think I wouldn't find out until I get to DXB on Wednesday and quiz an EK mate who just finished his command training on 330s after 4 years of MCC 330/340. As an aside he LOVES the 330...reckons it's a GREAT aeroplane when everything is working (and a crunt when it isn't)...I jus' tell im he's suffering Stockholm syndrome.
As I suspected...all within a few kts of my current mount...that being the case does anyone think the AF captain was displaying qualities in keeping with his job description by carrying out an approach under the prevailing conditions of a last reported crosswind > 30kts (double the AFM limitation)?
If you argue, and you could, that, yes, his decision to at least fly the approach was not completely stupid what about being high crossing the threshold and not going around at that point?
Even under perfect conditions a threshold wheel crossing height of 100' would mean touching down at least 3000' into the 9000' runway assuming they were on speed. They were clearly not on speed so touchdown only 1500' beyond the normal spot was a forlorn hope at best...and it was raining HARD. I can't remember off the top of my head whether the runway was grooved...lets assume it is. That doesn't mean you can land in heavy rain and expect acceptable braking action.
They touched down approaching 4500' (half way) down the runway...absolutely to be expected.
Why didn't the captain take control, apply max thrust and go around at this point...or even command the FO to do same?
Once they were down it was really a forgone conclusion. You might argue that they had some capability to get airborne again until thrust reverser activation but by the time 13 seconds ticked by (the apparent delay and an ENORMOUSLY long period of time) I think that hope was gone too. 13 seconds after touchdown, even with degraded braking action, they were probably sufficiently slow that the effects of reverse thrust was marginal....but still not slow enough to have any hope of stopping the aircraft in the remaining approximately 2000' (4500' + 13 seconds of, effective, innaction) of runway.
The pilot in the LHS of this aircraft on the day was not a captain he was a passenger.
It could be argued that the pilot in the RHS displayed zero command potential by not 'taking command' of the situation and doing his job to avert a near gauranteed outcome given the complete lack of effective input being received from the LHS.
The cabin crew are to be commended for getting everyone out...but recognise that pure unadulterated luck was the overriding factor in that miracle.
As airline pilots we are generally paid very well. AF pilots are paid very well indeed. We acknowledge that we earn our pay not merely because of the day to day humdrum of airline ops but on the rare occassions when circumstances are such that high levels of skill and decision making abilities are required to keep everyone in our charge safe.
Did this tech crew meet those expectations?
Fact is the 'good old days' are over and finished...pilots who have entered the system in the last 10-15 yrs will never gain those skills because the system and aircraft design don't allow them. That being the case you're just gonna scare people witless doing it in aircraft that lack the flexibility to do it easily, even though an 'expanded green band' still makes it possible.
Worse still those not scared witless will try and emulate but without the skills to do so or the flexible aircraft type to do so easily and, invariably, cock it up.
So given that the current reality is STARs, SIDs, crowded airspace, larger aircraft with attendant handling and inertia issues, system redundancy up the waazoo and generally 'different' experience, perhaps it is long past time to recognise that the system requires the current levels of automation be used to best effect 100% of the time...and therefore train and check accordingly?
Whether you're flying a Fokker, Boeing or one of those silly French aeroplanes
Don thanks for that...I was beginning to think I wouldn't find out until I get to DXB on Wednesday and quiz an EK mate who just finished his command training on 330s after 4 years of MCC 330/340. As an aside he LOVES the 330...reckons it's a GREAT aeroplane when everything is working (and a crunt when it isn't)...I jus' tell im he's suffering Stockholm syndrome.
As I suspected...all within a few kts of my current mount...that being the case does anyone think the AF captain was displaying qualities in keeping with his job description by carrying out an approach under the prevailing conditions of a last reported crosswind > 30kts (double the AFM limitation)?
If you argue, and you could, that, yes, his decision to at least fly the approach was not completely stupid what about being high crossing the threshold and not going around at that point?
Even under perfect conditions a threshold wheel crossing height of 100' would mean touching down at least 3000' into the 9000' runway assuming they were on speed. They were clearly not on speed so touchdown only 1500' beyond the normal spot was a forlorn hope at best...and it was raining HARD. I can't remember off the top of my head whether the runway was grooved...lets assume it is. That doesn't mean you can land in heavy rain and expect acceptable braking action.
They touched down approaching 4500' (half way) down the runway...absolutely to be expected.
Why didn't the captain take control, apply max thrust and go around at this point...or even command the FO to do same?
Once they were down it was really a forgone conclusion. You might argue that they had some capability to get airborne again until thrust reverser activation but by the time 13 seconds ticked by (the apparent delay and an ENORMOUSLY long period of time) I think that hope was gone too. 13 seconds after touchdown, even with degraded braking action, they were probably sufficiently slow that the effects of reverse thrust was marginal....but still not slow enough to have any hope of stopping the aircraft in the remaining approximately 2000' (4500' + 13 seconds of, effective, innaction) of runway.
The pilot in the LHS of this aircraft on the day was not a captain he was a passenger.
It could be argued that the pilot in the RHS displayed zero command potential by not 'taking command' of the situation and doing his job to avert a near gauranteed outcome given the complete lack of effective input being received from the LHS.
The cabin crew are to be commended for getting everyone out...but recognise that pure unadulterated luck was the overriding factor in that miracle.
As airline pilots we are generally paid very well. AF pilots are paid very well indeed. We acknowledge that we earn our pay not merely because of the day to day humdrum of airline ops but on the rare occassions when circumstances are such that high levels of skill and decision making abilities are required to keep everyone in our charge safe.
Did this tech crew meet those expectations?
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 2nd Apr 2007 at 06:23.
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CC
Seems you are not getting many replies, so for a low hour bugsmasher here goes.......
No.
Quite simply they were not on the job at all. Who knows why, nobody will know but them I guess if in fact they can recall.
As for the Captain being a passenger, not sure he was really there at all!
Must have been off with the pixies
.
And I am not meaning to be smart arsed about it, even if it sounds that way. But really there is no reason at all but to get to the threshold and not bugg off somewhere else. I would have chickened out long before.
J
Seems you are not getting many replies, so for a low hour bugsmasher here goes.......
Did this tech crew meet those expectations?
Quite simply they were not on the job at all. Who knows why, nobody will know but them I guess if in fact they can recall.
As for the Captain being a passenger, not sure he was really there at all!
Must have been off with the pixies .And I am not meaning to be smart arsed about it, even if it sounds that way. But really there is no reason at all but to get to the threshold and not bugg off somewhere else. I would have chickened out long before.
J
Grandpa Aerotart
It is also worth noting that even had there been no crosswind, or if the crosswind was negligable, the unfactored landing distance required was 6614' with a 5kt tailwind component. I am assuming non factored because I get a similar number from my 767 QRH (1000' more if I assume MLW and braking action 'poor')...and that is the only thing that comes out of QRHs be they Boeing or Airbus. I will further assume that the quoted distance includes 1000' of air distance.
Given that the aircraft was fully serviceable the crew had no relief from requiring fully factored landing distances.
If the crew applied 1.67 that is 11000' LDR.
And all they had was 9000'.
They simply had no legal means to begin the approach in the conditions that existed.
Given that the aircraft was fully serviceable the crew had no relief from requiring fully factored landing distances.
If the crew applied 1.67 that is 11000' LDR.
And all they had was 9000'.
They simply had no legal means to begin the approach in the conditions that existed.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 2nd Apr 2007 at 13:12.
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QUOTE CC....The pilot in the LHS of this aircraft on the day was not a captain he was a passenger.
It could be argued that the pilot in the RHS displayed zero command potential by not 'taking command' of the situation and doing his job to avert a near gauranteed outcome given the complete lack of effective input being received from the LHS.
,.........and there gentleman....in a nut shell.....is the answer and probably the final outcome and findings of this case!!!!
It could be argued that the pilot in the RHS displayed zero command potential by not 'taking command' of the situation and doing his job to avert a near gauranteed outcome given the complete lack of effective input being received from the LHS.
,.........and there gentleman....in a nut shell.....is the answer and probably the final outcome and findings of this case!!!!