Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Away
Posts: 300
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chuckles, I'm no legal specialist so I've little to offer.
Notwithstanding my lack of legal training, it seems to me you're making a very big call saying these guys acted illegally.
In effect, to say this is to infer they wilfully committed a violation, that is to say they did not err, but wilfully violated a law, in this case their SOPs for landing on a contaminated runway.
Do you know this for sure?
On the subject of AFM vs QRH landing distances required, the airline I'm fortunate enough to work for is a world leader in many respects. The safety department is significant, as is the company's performance department.
I'll ask for further guidance in due course, but our Ops Manual is very clear on what to do with QRH figures when assessing a landing, any landing, be it normal or non-normal. Nowhere is it suggested we factor the QRH by 1.67 and to suggest one does so is to go outside the company recommendations, which is in itself questionable.
A review of the e-manuals on my laptop shows:
1) AFM LDR using max manual braking at sea level, 0' PA, nil wind, dry runway @ 300000kg LW = 7300'. This is factored by 1.67, so Boeing's unfactored landing was 4380'.
2) QRH LDR using autobrakes 4 at sea level, 0' PA, nil wind, dry runway @ 300000kg LW = 6350'. Conversely, this is unfactored. If factored by 1.15 the figure is 7303'.
Not the differences, specifically the max manual braking versus autobraking, and when the numbers are factored or unfactored.
Hope this helps others to find a reason to read their own Company Operations Manuals, compare their own AFM derived figures to their own QRH Performance Inflight figures, marry the lot against SOPs and determine which runways and under what conditions you may or may not attempt a landing.
Notwithstanding my lack of legal training, it seems to me you're making a very big call saying these guys acted illegally.
In effect, to say this is to infer they wilfully committed a violation, that is to say they did not err, but wilfully violated a law, in this case their SOPs for landing on a contaminated runway.
Do you know this for sure?
On the subject of AFM vs QRH landing distances required, the airline I'm fortunate enough to work for is a world leader in many respects. The safety department is significant, as is the company's performance department.
I'll ask for further guidance in due course, but our Ops Manual is very clear on what to do with QRH figures when assessing a landing, any landing, be it normal or non-normal. Nowhere is it suggested we factor the QRH by 1.67 and to suggest one does so is to go outside the company recommendations, which is in itself questionable.
A review of the e-manuals on my laptop shows:
1) AFM LDR using max manual braking at sea level, 0' PA, nil wind, dry runway @ 300000kg LW = 7300'. This is factored by 1.67, so Boeing's unfactored landing was 4380'.
2) QRH LDR using autobrakes 4 at sea level, 0' PA, nil wind, dry runway @ 300000kg LW = 6350'. Conversely, this is unfactored. If factored by 1.15 the figure is 7303'.
Not the differences, specifically the max manual braking versus autobraking, and when the numbers are factored or unfactored.
Hope this helps others to find a reason to read their own Company Operations Manuals, compare their own AFM derived figures to their own QRH Performance Inflight figures, marry the lot against SOPs and determine which runways and under what conditions you may or may not attempt a landing.
4PW
If your company has the Airbus FCTM this may be valid for you-
The reason I mention this is the tables above a have higher than a 15% factor that you may be applying to LDG Dist Without Auotbrake ( despite SOP's ).
If your company has the Airbus FCTM this may be valid for you-
Conversely, the AUTOLAND LANDING DISTANCE WITH AUTOBRAKE table available in the QRH gives a realistic indication of the aircraft performance during normal operations. Therefore, if an en-route diversion is required, and no landing distance factor is to be applied, the crew should refer to this table.
People are quoting the METAR at the time of the crash!
I have been trying to make the following point- what information was presented to the crew at the time of the accident?
WX: W/V 50 degrees off the RWY at 15KTS gusting 20KTS. This is well within limits. Now, two preceding aircraft landed ahead and reported POOR braking action. PLEASE lets stick to Airbus here- as per FCOM 2 POOR braking is used to restrict X-W operational limits. This needs to now be considered. For Boeing drivers, POOR Braking is not an ice runway equivalent- it is dry snow or standing water on an Airbus and is predominantly ( possibly entirely but don't have manuals ) used to reduce XW limits
So, you have the legally required ALD 1987m contaminated unfactored versus 2743m available. Now Airbus tells you to use the Autoland With Autobrake to derive realistic factored ALD figures and from memory these figures are padded by around 15% for a contaminated runway.
XW Limitation at approach commencement would appear to be in limits even when you reduce it by the mandatory factor because of reported POOR Braking.
You have no W/W indication from the Tower so are reliant on the pilot reports and your IRS derived readout on approach.
But......................... the NTSB Prelim report says
So it wasn't until the last stages of the approach and possibly the flare that the conditions become 1) possibly illegal 2) extremely perilous.
The fact the aircraft overshot the touchdown zone could even suggest overshoot sheer on short finals and the flare.
Which returns me to my original point that a low level GA may have been the only way to save the day.
And a footnote. In clutter, heavy rain and in a terminal area close to the ground I personally find Airbus radars to be overly sensitive. Point being the radar picture may not have been clear.
I have been trying to make the following point- what information was presented to the crew at the time of the accident?
WX: W/V 50 degrees off the RWY at 15KTS gusting 20KTS. This is well within limits. Now, two preceding aircraft landed ahead and reported POOR braking action. PLEASE lets stick to Airbus here- as per FCOM 2 POOR braking is used to restrict X-W operational limits. This needs to now be considered. For Boeing drivers, POOR Braking is not an ice runway equivalent- it is dry snow or standing water on an Airbus and is predominantly ( possibly entirely but don't have manuals ) used to reduce XW limits
So, you have the legally required ALD 1987m contaminated unfactored versus 2743m available. Now Airbus tells you to use the Autoland With Autobrake to derive realistic factored ALD figures and from memory these figures are padded by around 15% for a contaminated runway.
XW Limitation at approach commencement would appear to be in limits even when you reduce it by the mandatory factor because of reported POOR Braking.
You have no W/W indication from the Tower so are reliant on the pilot reports and your IRS derived readout on approach.
But......................... the NTSB Prelim report says
At about the time the aircraft landed a sharp boundary of rain with a moving TS associated wind changes and gusts
The fact the aircraft overshot the touchdown zone could even suggest overshoot sheer on short finals and the flare.
Which returns me to my original point that a low level GA may have been the only way to save the day.
And a footnote. In clutter, heavy rain and in a terminal area close to the ground I personally find Airbus radars to be overly sensitive. Point being the radar picture may not have been clear.
Grandpa Aerotart
4PWs...Mumbai? Mate you have all the luck
My Boeing QRH is specific in the Performance in Flight preamble where it states that the landing distance figures are not factored and cannot be used for dispatch purposes. It is also specific when it refers to "poor" braking performance...and I quote 'The performance level used to calculate "poor" data reflects runways covered with wet ice'...further on..'Use of the autobrake system commands the airplane to a constant deceleration rate. In some conditions, such as a runway with "poor" braking action, the airplane may not be able to achieve these deceleration rates.'
My bolding.
We are all well aware that in the normal course of events our takeoff and landing distances are factored. We are simply not allowed to use runways that don't meet certain factored performance criteria. In normal operations what changes once we are airborne?...I have never seen any guidance EVER that suggests that regulatory requirement changes airborne unless in an emergency situation...where it becomes very much more nebulus.
Typically, in non normal ops, you get a different version of 'reasonable' from every trainer...anything from 20% to "just double the numbers..after all we need 67% in normal ops".
The AF crew were not experiencing any non normals that would give them relief from regulatory factors which are defined, as posted by Donpizzmeoff, as /.6 for dry, /.6 and x 1.15 wet and contaminated x 1.15.
Interestingly the dry and wet factoring is actually slightly more restrictive than the Boeing equivalent 1.67. Also very interesting that Gnads suggests
Airbus might have already revisited these factors, as a result of this accident, and their use...I think the factoring of contaminated by only 15% is something less than conservative....bordering on wishfull thinking in fact.
As far as landing in "poor" braking conditions I am yet to read an Ops manual which allows it...ever...I accept that ops manuals do exist that don't give specific direction on this matter but I would be very surprised if a company like AF has such an ops manual. "Poor" reported braking is rolling a dice...might be ok most of the time but often it won't be and that is just not the way Transport Cat works. The aircraft system redundancy and our training reflect circumstances in the 'millions to 1' category...why do that then just toss a coin when it comes to landing?
Boeing are being quite up front with the use of may not from the QRH quote above...they just don't know. How do you factor that?
Hence Ops manuals that expressly forbid ops in "poor".
Of course a pilot report of "poor" is a very subjective thing...but the word has still been used...my feeling is ignore it at your peril.
I see nothing in the circumstances surrounding this accident that would allow me to leave the holding pattern.
My Boeing QRH is specific in the Performance in Flight preamble where it states that the landing distance figures are not factored and cannot be used for dispatch purposes. It is also specific when it refers to "poor" braking performance...and I quote 'The performance level used to calculate "poor" data reflects runways covered with wet ice'...further on..'Use of the autobrake system commands the airplane to a constant deceleration rate. In some conditions, such as a runway with "poor" braking action, the airplane may not be able to achieve these deceleration rates.'
My bolding.
We are all well aware that in the normal course of events our takeoff and landing distances are factored. We are simply not allowed to use runways that don't meet certain factored performance criteria. In normal operations what changes once we are airborne?...I have never seen any guidance EVER that suggests that regulatory requirement changes airborne unless in an emergency situation...where it becomes very much more nebulus.
Typically, in non normal ops, you get a different version of 'reasonable' from every trainer...anything from 20% to "just double the numbers..after all we need 67% in normal ops".
The AF crew were not experiencing any non normals that would give them relief from regulatory factors which are defined, as posted by Donpizzmeoff, as /.6 for dry, /.6 and x 1.15 wet and contaminated x 1.15.
Interestingly the dry and wet factoring is actually slightly more restrictive than the Boeing equivalent 1.67. Also very interesting that Gnads suggests
Airbus might have already revisited these factors, as a result of this accident, and their use...I think the factoring of contaminated by only 15% is something less than conservative....bordering on wishfull thinking in fact.
As far as landing in "poor" braking conditions I am yet to read an Ops manual which allows it...ever...I accept that ops manuals do exist that don't give specific direction on this matter but I would be very surprised if a company like AF has such an ops manual. "Poor" reported braking is rolling a dice...might be ok most of the time but often it won't be and that is just not the way Transport Cat works. The aircraft system redundancy and our training reflect circumstances in the 'millions to 1' category...why do that then just toss a coin when it comes to landing?
Boeing are being quite up front with the use of may not from the QRH quote above...they just don't know. How do you factor that?
Hence Ops manuals that expressly forbid ops in "poor".
Of course a pilot report of "poor" is a very subjective thing...but the word has still been used...my feeling is ignore it at your peril.
I see nothing in the circumstances surrounding this accident that would allow me to leave the holding pattern.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 7th Apr 2007 at 07:00.
Chimbu
Nobody gives a stuff about the Boeing performance figures. They are very different and your continued regurgitation of them here has done a great disservice to this discussion.
I have repeatedly told you how it is; quoting from the FCOM, QRH & FCTM. I have also politely pointed out too, that Don's Airbus quotes that you use as credence for your arguments, are in fact, only half of the info provided. Then it was explained that their is a different classification of POOR braking by Airbus and Boeing due certification differences.
You have stated on occassions that what I am saying is rubbish which is gross arrogance.
I can not help that you can't get it around your head that Airbus & Boeing are different. In certification and performance.
Why is it so? Post FAR 42? Airbus defined hard and fluid contaminants? The allowance for Airbus because as a FBW aircraft it's lowest selectable speed is less than Boeing? Airbus uses temperature for ALD's on contaminated runway and has inherent conservatism?
I don't know.
You have stated you would never have left the Holding Pattern in your Boeing. So what are you learning here?
Nobody gives a stuff about the Boeing performance figures. They are very different and your continued regurgitation of them here has done a great disservice to this discussion.
I have repeatedly told you how it is; quoting from the FCOM, QRH & FCTM. I have also politely pointed out too, that Don's Airbus quotes that you use as credence for your arguments, are in fact, only half of the info provided. Then it was explained that their is a different classification of POOR braking by Airbus and Boeing due certification differences.
You have stated on occassions that what I am saying is rubbish which is gross arrogance.
I can not help that you can't get it around your head that Airbus & Boeing are different. In certification and performance.
Why is it so? Post FAR 42? Airbus defined hard and fluid contaminants? The allowance for Airbus because as a FBW aircraft it's lowest selectable speed is less than Boeing? Airbus uses temperature for ALD's on contaminated runway and has inherent conservatism?
I don't know.
You have stated you would never have left the Holding Pattern in your Boeing. So what are you learning here?
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 7th Apr 2007 at 11:13.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: ...
Posts: 341
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Wasn't this thread originally a tale about what happens if you leave an FO to do the landing in ratsh!t conditions???
Not that we would, in the civilised world, but it was a nice tale anyway.
So what's with all the willy-waving here about regs and performance? Is it worth me reading the last dozen pages or so? Am I missing anything?
Is centaurus still in the game here? I see he started a new thread on the same topic... maybe he got tired of all the above macho muchachos...
Not that we would, in the civilised world, but it was a nice tale anyway.
So what's with all the willy-waving here about regs and performance? Is it worth me reading the last dozen pages or so? Am I missing anything?
Is centaurus still in the game here? I see he started a new thread on the same topic... maybe he got tired of all the above macho muchachos...
Grandpa Aerotart
Name of thread: Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility.
Airbus mentioned nowhere in name of thread.
Airbus crash used as thread starting point...average intellect would suggest a starting point is just that.
Lots of the huggy fluffy CRM brigade suggest accidents have many contributing factors and would suggest this one is no different...suggestion even that the report has/will find no one person at fault...not even the captain who's vocabulary seems to lack the phrases "I think we will hold a while" or "Go around"
Some accidents are the PIC's fault and there are pilots flying that shouldn't be in command of a kite.
I Was discussing this accident, and thread, with a Airbus 330/340 captain mate here in DXB today, yes amos2 I am on a long haul.
His reaction to the LDA at Toronto was "**** that is short" given the conditions that existed.
His view of the airbus statutory factoring situation is pretty much as reported in this thread...but "You'd be crazy if that was all you ever used" ...an airbus captain who wouldn't have left the holding pattern under the circumstances that prevailed, let alone landed half way down the runway
Ego amos2...or basic airmanship?
Scotty what part of performance and command responsibilities can be described as macho willy waving?
Airbus mentioned nowhere in name of thread.
Airbus crash used as thread starting point...average intellect would suggest a starting point is just that.
Lots of the huggy fluffy CRM brigade suggest accidents have many contributing factors and would suggest this one is no different...suggestion even that the report has/will find no one person at fault...not even the captain who's vocabulary seems to lack the phrases "I think we will hold a while" or "Go around"
Some accidents are the PIC's fault and there are pilots flying that shouldn't be in command of a kite.
I Was discussing this accident, and thread, with a Airbus 330/340 captain mate here in DXB today, yes amos2 I am on a long haul.
His reaction to the LDA at Toronto was "**** that is short" given the conditions that existed.
His view of the airbus statutory factoring situation is pretty much as reported in this thread...but "You'd be crazy if that was all you ever used" ...an airbus captain who wouldn't have left the holding pattern under the circumstances that prevailed, let alone landed half way down the runway
Ego amos2...or basic airmanship?
Scotty what part of performance and command responsibilities can be described as macho willy waving?
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 8th Apr 2007 at 12:54.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: Brisbane
Posts: 626
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You have stated you would never have left the Holding Pattern in your Boeing. So what are you learning here?
J
I know what I learnt here, if its that bad, never leave the holding pattern, divert or in the least go around and divert. They bent a perfectly servicable A340 instead.
Doesn't this tell you something? A point I have been trying to make the whole thread. The actual weather conditions didn't deteriorate until very late in the approach. They had HWC and acceptable XWC right to the late final position- and then it looks like all hell broke loose with a huge backing of the wind, overshoot sheer and a sharp boundary of rain.
Iif some here have the foresight to never leave the pattern than further discussion unneccessary.
Despite Chimbu's endless sources of Airbus "mates" telling contributors here they are talking rubbish, he has found one in Dubai that points out that oils ain't oils in Boeing versus Airbus performance.
But of course, the new Airbus mate gives total credence to Chimbu's line of argument, discussion or willy waving.
My mate Neil Armstrong said he probably would have left the holding pattern with the conditions as presented. He said that he wouldn't want to explain to the Mission Controller, that despite all performance criteria being met and factored as per realistic operational Airbus requirements- Autoland with Medium Autobrake on a contaminated surface, he didn't want to commence the approach because if you factor as per a Boeing and with your personal comfort factor it looks awfully uncomfortable.
Neil said he would have taken over the approach- " I have control". Poor autothrust lag would have been his first clue that conditions deteriorating. Backing wind, overshooting the glideslope and an increaesing Vapp Neil reckoned he was out of there- " GA Flaps......"
If actual winshear conditions, Neil would have maintained his configuration and politely slapped the co-pilot's hand as he reached for the flap lever. Like Chimbu, he feels CRM fluffy and duffy.
The bloody great cell on the missed approach path was another story....
I won't contribute further here. With mates like Neil Armstrong, you people know nothing.
But of course, the new Airbus mate gives total credence to Chimbu's line of argument, discussion or willy waving.
My mate Neil Armstrong said he probably would have left the holding pattern with the conditions as presented. He said that he wouldn't want to explain to the Mission Controller, that despite all performance criteria being met and factored as per realistic operational Airbus requirements- Autoland with Medium Autobrake on a contaminated surface, he didn't want to commence the approach because if you factor as per a Boeing and with your personal comfort factor it looks awfully uncomfortable.
Neil said he would have taken over the approach- " I have control". Poor autothrust lag would have been his first clue that conditions deteriorating. Backing wind, overshooting the glideslope and an increaesing Vapp Neil reckoned he was out of there- " GA Flaps......"
If actual winshear conditions, Neil would have maintained his configuration and politely slapped the co-pilot's hand as he reached for the flap lever. Like Chimbu, he feels CRM fluffy and duffy.
The bloody great cell on the missed approach path was another story....
I won't contribute further here. With mates like Neil Armstrong, you people know nothing.
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 9th Apr 2007 at 03:42.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: Brisbane
Posts: 626
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
They had HWC and acceptable XWC right to the late final position- and then it looks like all hell broke loose
in the least go around and divert.
J
Grandpa Aerotart
There is no moderator participating in this thread as far as I can see...what posts have been moderated?
Gnads ok if it makes you feel better I will endevour to live my life in a vacuum and not ask mates flying other equipment anything at all...in fact I will insist that when we get together over beers we do not discuss our work in any way shape or form...as to learning from others different experience I will stop hence forth.
That meet with your approval?
Clearly in your view airbus are different, better and, apparently, immune from the laws of physics.
amos 2 do you have anything to add to this subject besides 'pithy' one liners?
Gnads ok if it makes you feel better I will endevour to live my life in a vacuum and not ask mates flying other equipment anything at all...in fact I will insist that when we get together over beers we do not discuss our work in any way shape or form...as to learning from others different experience I will stop hence forth.
That meet with your approval?
Clearly in your view airbus are different, better and, apparently, immune from the laws of physics.
amos 2 do you have anything to add to this subject besides 'pithy' one liners?
