Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
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"If you go off the far end and crash you'll sit there, if you survive, saying "what wouldn't I give to have the last 5 minutes of my life over again?".
"Well as you cross the threshold you have that time and if you're not totally happy go around"
"Well as you cross the threshold you have that time and if you're not totally happy go around"
Good thread Centaurus, even if not everyone agrees with you, it certainly gets you thinking.
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Agree
But as mentioned by Scottydoo, go around is an option up until the point of T/R deployment, may be a good practice to check braking PRIOR to deployment in severe conditions.
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More sectors, Less inertia, lower ground speeds, fewer runway considerations, more fuel, more alternates, less commercial pressure, smaller route structure, smaller operation, no cultural/ language issues, shorter duty times, no/few time zones. In other words you just flew a lot more, in a very familiar environment and with few variables. When the weather deteriorated a bit, a Captain could take an incremental approach to exposing a lesser experienced First Officer to the conditions. If a pilot showed an aptitude for x/winds, you might let him take on stonger conditions than perhaps someone else. If the individual was weaker, you were going to fly with him next week and he could be left to develop progressively as his and your confidence grew.
This is why I never want to work for an Oz airline.
Get a life.
Get a life.
Swingwing says
and then
If airliners were to pitch and break into the circuit area, you would see a lot more go arounds.
However, especially with the advent of a STAR tying a green line onto an ILS and a lesiurly transition from 250kts to Vapp, airline profiles have become very simple.
In the old glory days of 340kts to 15 miles in a 727,or even an A320, an unstable approach was more of a liklihood. Offsetting things being more adventurous stabilisation rules ( I recall 300' when I first joined Ansett ).
The go around is non-negotiable in most airline SOP's too. And remember that the military culture ( not so much RAAF ) was not often an easy one to adapt to airline environments and is still the cause of great problems today and abroad. CRM was partially brought in to play, to rid airliners of a Korean War single-seat culture that pervaded it's way through the airline game in the 60's & 70's. These days, it's more the problematic fast jet culture of second tier, non-Westernised air forces.
Although sadly, my chief pilot is ex-RAF, and his attitude to go arounds nothing short of abominable.
So my question is this - having grown up in the military system, the go-around was burned into our brains as a non-negotiable requirement under a whole range of circumstances.
But I do a lot of commercial flying (down the back) these days, and a go-around is so rare as to be very noteworthy. Indeed from what I've seen, the "go -around culture" isn't nearly so strongly emphasised in civil aviation - and I'm wondering why.
However, especially with the advent of a STAR tying a green line onto an ILS and a lesiurly transition from 250kts to Vapp, airline profiles have become very simple.
In the old glory days of 340kts to 15 miles in a 727,or even an A320, an unstable approach was more of a liklihood. Offsetting things being more adventurous stabilisation rules ( I recall 300' when I first joined Ansett ).
The go around is non-negotiable in most airline SOP's too. And remember that the military culture ( not so much RAAF ) was not often an easy one to adapt to airline environments and is still the cause of great problems today and abroad. CRM was partially brought in to play, to rid airliners of a Korean War single-seat culture that pervaded it's way through the airline game in the 60's & 70's. These days, it's more the problematic fast jet culture of second tier, non-Westernised air forces.
Although sadly, my chief pilot is ex-RAF, and his attitude to go arounds nothing short of abominable.
Centaurus's post has some good fundamentals.
However, bluntly, I feel it is too simple and leans toward outdated command practices that don't have an appreciation for the successful management of a modern glass airliner.
However, bluntly, I feel it is too simple and leans toward outdated command practices that don't have an appreciation for the successful management of a modern glass airliner.
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Scottydoo, I understand your faith statement, but I feel that most posters and all captains agree that this shouldn't have been an F/O landing.
And I fully agree it should've been a captain's landing, absolutely. But how is a pilot supposed to pre-judge the competence of his fellow in the cockpit? This seems to be the guard against complacency that Centaurus is advocating.
As for a mateship culture, in 12 years flying airliners, I personally have never seen mateship and the ensuing relaxed cockpit atmosphere lead to an alarming situation. If something unusual begins to develop, mateship goes out the window.
Thread Starter
So what is it? Is there a problem with go arounds that I'm missing?
I stress this is only with certain airlines; but it happens.
Under those circumstances it is not surprising that the captain is hell-bent on landing even though a go-around would be mandated if the aircraft was not stable by a certain point on the approach.
During a court case after the Silk Air B737 tragedy (the only way to describe those circumstances) evidence was presented that on one occasion specifically, the captain was hopelessly high during an approach and attempted to lose height by applying full alternating aileron on short final in order to use the spoilers to increase the rate of descent. The first officer urged the captain to go around but the captain refused. In desperation the F/O pushed open the throttles and forced the go-around. The captain then completed a split-arse circuit and landed. He told the F/O to keep quiet about the incident and not to put in a report as he (the captain) would put in a report. But the captain did not report the incident. Management were alerted later by passenger and cabin crew stories.
Why didn't the captain put in a report on the incident? Loss of face, maybe? Fear of management repercussions? (definately). Much depends on the culture in the airline and indeed of the particular individual in the cockpit.
Here we are talking not about a bad weather missed approach but more a cocked up approach gone wrong.
Thread Starter
Good thread Centaurus, even if not everyone agrees with you, it certainly gets you thinking.
I would hazard a guess and state there is not a pilot among us that has not occasionally quietly worried about having committed ourselves to giving the F/O a landing and as the ETA gets closer and the weather radar looks nasty over the airport, you think maybe I should be doing the landing - just in case, you know..
But being the good old bloke and crossing fingers the F/O doesn't stuff things, we let him fly the thing anyway. 99% of the time he does a good job and you congratulate yourself for being an astute judge of the man in the RH seat. It is the other one percent that used to worry me - just a little bit of course.
Grandpa Aerotart
Great thread Centaurus..
In the airline I work for that landing would have been so far outside FO limits as to be rediculous.
I don't get to decide whether I'll let the FO extend himself in such conditions...it is written VERY plainly in our SOPS...>15kts crosswind, <1200 m vis (<3000m vis with precip), runway anything more than 'wet', <300' cloudbase or < perfectly serviceable aircraft and it is MY LANDING.
No ifs, buts or maybes and I am not about to risk my command by breaking those rules irrespective of how experienced or talented the FO may be...the fact remains that an expensive aeroplane and 250 lives (not to mention mine) are my responsibility and that responsibility has been vested in me by the company for one reason and one reason only....because they are convinced that I can be trusted to operate their aircraft safely and conservatively.
If FOs have not got handling skills gained in more 'extreme' conditions single pilot/in command in smaller aircraft they can, and are, exposed to them, where I work at any rate, in the sim. Yes it isn't as good as the real thing and lacks that sphincter twitching quality, but a widebody jet is certainly not the place.
In the conditions that existed that day I find myself wondering why they were making an approach at all let alone one flown by the FO. 33 kts is right on the demonstrated limit (actually significantly in excess for a contaminated runway as Toronto was that day) for the 767 I fly and coupled with all the other factors in play that day I would have been holding for improved conditions and then once on approach going around for the slightest excuse and diverting to the alternate...and I am without any doubt that that would be the absolute expectation of my superiors in the corner office. In fact I suspect I would lose my command for landing in such circumstances even if it ended with me parked at the aerobridge and not a scratch on the airframe...I know of captains busted back for less.
I have no idea what the limits are under such circumstances in an A340...but I would be VERY surprised indeed if they were not reasonably similar to those of the 767.
If they were trying to land in 33 kts of crosswind on a contaminated runway they were entering a world of hurt one way or another. They don't seem to have been all that short of fuel so why push it?
In the airline I work for that landing would have been so far outside FO limits as to be rediculous.
I don't get to decide whether I'll let the FO extend himself in such conditions...it is written VERY plainly in our SOPS...>15kts crosswind, <1200 m vis (<3000m vis with precip), runway anything more than 'wet', <300' cloudbase or < perfectly serviceable aircraft and it is MY LANDING.
No ifs, buts or maybes and I am not about to risk my command by breaking those rules irrespective of how experienced or talented the FO may be...the fact remains that an expensive aeroplane and 250 lives (not to mention mine) are my responsibility and that responsibility has been vested in me by the company for one reason and one reason only....because they are convinced that I can be trusted to operate their aircraft safely and conservatively.
If FOs have not got handling skills gained in more 'extreme' conditions single pilot/in command in smaller aircraft they can, and are, exposed to them, where I work at any rate, in the sim. Yes it isn't as good as the real thing and lacks that sphincter twitching quality, but a widebody jet is certainly not the place.
In the conditions that existed that day I find myself wondering why they were making an approach at all let alone one flown by the FO. 33 kts is right on the demonstrated limit (actually significantly in excess for a contaminated runway as Toronto was that day) for the 767 I fly and coupled with all the other factors in play that day I would have been holding for improved conditions and then once on approach going around for the slightest excuse and diverting to the alternate...and I am without any doubt that that would be the absolute expectation of my superiors in the corner office. In fact I suspect I would lose my command for landing in such circumstances even if it ended with me parked at the aerobridge and not a scratch on the airframe...I know of captains busted back for less.
I have no idea what the limits are under such circumstances in an A340...but I would be VERY surprised indeed if they were not reasonably similar to those of the 767.
If they were trying to land in 33 kts of crosswind on a contaminated runway they were entering a world of hurt one way or another. They don't seem to have been all that short of fuel so why push it?
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 30th Mar 2007 at 15:19.
So Chimbu, that begs the question...
If you are close to the demonstrated limit/s - can you do the approach? Will you do the approach? If the limits are 'close' to the FOs limits, do you let him do the approach?
Swingwing
One of the criteria was 'if not satisfied with the approach'. I can't recall a single time that I saw that one being used and yet it is perhaps the most powerful and subjective reason to go-round. You would have to admit though, as a senior military QFI, who would ever question you on why you did a go-around? The FLTCDR? And a go-round in a Pig ain't cheap is it? Ergo, there is never any overt pressure in the training environment NOT to go-round. However I can think of times during my time where the pressure to 'get it in' was higher than normal e.g. one way strips in PNG, anywhere in Asia during thunderstorm season. The military also seldom have to contend with curfews (Canberra excepted) so the pressure is perhaps not the same as the airlines.
Personally I think there are perhaps two reasons why a Captain may end up in this situation - lack of supervisory 'training', that doesn't just mean four bars on the epaulette;
and you hit the nail on the head Swingwing when you asked
If you are close to the demonstrated limit/s - can you do the approach? Will you do the approach? If the limits are 'close' to the FOs limits, do you let him do the approach?
Swingwing
At 2FTS I think there were 9 defined criteria - ranging from "approach too steep or too shallow" through "S-turn required to line up on finals" etc. I failed one of the best ACM rides I did on intro fighter course - because I didn't go around when I should have back in the circuit. As a senior F-111 QFI I would still go around routinely from approaches.
Personally I think there are perhaps two reasons why a Captain may end up in this situation - lack of supervisory 'training', that doesn't just mean four bars on the epaulette;
and you hit the nail on the head Swingwing when you asked
Is it pride / cultural factors?
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So we've seen that in Australia, due to the introduction of CRM, STARs, updated SOPs, etc, etc, the unstabilised approach is now a relative rarity.
And that in Australian airlines an unstabilised approach calls for a mandated go-around.
But that in some "lesser" parts of the world, culture and loss-of-face issues might over-ride the imperative to go-around.
So why the lecture on D&G??? Instead of preaching to the converted, maybe this thread should've been posted in the South Asia or Middle East forum...
BTW, wasn't it ELEVEN go-around reasons???
And that in Australian airlines an unstabilised approach calls for a mandated go-around.
But that in some "lesser" parts of the world, culture and loss-of-face issues might over-ride the imperative to go-around.
So why the lecture on D&G??? Instead of preaching to the converted, maybe this thread should've been posted in the South Asia or Middle East forum...
BTW, wasn't it ELEVEN go-around reasons???
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Excellent Thread Centauras!! Having been a long time Prune reader, it is good to finally see a professional discussion between flight crew rather than the usual b**ch sessions that go on. Being a new CPL and wanting to end up in the pointy end of a jet it's interesting to read about the authority gradient on the flight deck.
A question for the jet captains out there; If it has been decided the FO will fly the approach and mid-way through the procedure the conditions nosedive, (Not the Aircraft I hope!!) do you assume control of the approach? Is there a discussion about it first? And for the FO's out there have you ever had a situation with the captain taking over?
Obviously both pilot are qualified to fly the aircraft but ultimately the Captain's a*se is on the line.
Keep the posts coming, an excellent read!!
A question for the jet captains out there; If it has been decided the FO will fly the approach and mid-way through the procedure the conditions nosedive, (Not the Aircraft I hope!!) do you assume control of the approach? Is there a discussion about it first? And for the FO's out there have you ever had a situation with the captain taking over?
Obviously both pilot are qualified to fly the aircraft but ultimately the Captain's a*se is on the line.
Keep the posts coming, an excellent read!!
If it has been decided the FO will fly the approach and mid-way through the procedure the conditions nosedive,
The grey area is if conditions haven't strictly fallen out parameters which are usually defined by x-wind, visibility & runway conditions. This could happen with a scenario involving windshear or turbulence.
It's a grey area. Like many. Compounded by a myriad of operational pressures.
Bottums Up
Bling,
No conversation, particularly late in the approach, there's no time for discussion.
We executed a missed approach the other day, new F/O flying, hot central Australia, thermal activity, float past the touchdown zone.
As Capt I called, "Go Around". F/O executed the manoeuvre well, the mains touching the runway briefly in the process, but we all lived to tell the tale, and no one claimed, we climbed vertically and I thort we wus gonna die"
No conversation, particularly late in the approach, there's no time for discussion.
We executed a missed approach the other day, new F/O flying, hot central Australia, thermal activity, float past the touchdown zone.
As Capt I called, "Go Around". F/O executed the manoeuvre well, the mains touching the runway briefly in the process, but we all lived to tell the tale, and no one claimed, we climbed vertically and I thort we wus gonna die"
Grandpa Aerotart
CS If I am close to the limits, but not exceeding them, I can of course commence an approach however my company also has approach bans (JAR-OPS) and a limit of two approaches and then bog off to alternate...so there is a judgement call to make.
We are also certified down to Cat 3b ND so if the problem is vis/cloud base rather than howling crosswind we can autoland at most of the destinations on our network. That would be a captains only landing too.
If things are close to FO cutoffs but I am reasonably comfortable that they won't be exceeded of course I would let the FO continue as PF but with the stabilised approach criteria very much in mind. Crossing the threshold at 100', as in the subject of this thread, is not stabilised.
There is of course the final arbiter of FO approach/landing cutoffs...'if for any other reason....'
Interesting that you mention 'one way' airstrips in PNG...almost always it was the case in PNG that if you attempted a go around at one way mountain airstrips once established on final approach, or sometimes beyond a certain point on finals, you would crash in the attempt...not maybe but would. That tends to concentrate the mind wonderfully and sloppy flying, if it was a feature of your flying before, dissappears.
When I progressed to the F28 after joining PX if you touched down beyond (or before) the aiming point, 800-1200' in, it was a big deal...if you touched down beyond the 1500' markers it was a VERY BIG DEAL and a go around was strongly encouraged.
To this day if it looks like we will touch down beyond that point, even on a 11000' runway, the hair on the back of my neck stands up...it is a most uncomfortable feeling...but my company touchdown zone is 'first 1/3rd' of runway which gives a little more leeway.
Of course weather conditions that exceed FO cut offs are quite rare so 99.9 times out of 100 there is no question that he/she will remain PF...I think the only times I had a landing taken off me in the past was for landings in fog etc that necesitated an autoland to Cat 2 or below minimas.
Someone mentioned CRM and 'letting the FO fly'. In my view the definition of CRM should be widened to Circumstantial Resource Management.
Often in complex non normals it is very beneficial to have the FO as PF so you can free up your mind and manage the resources at your disposal...but the captain would always be PF for the approach and landing.
We are also certified down to Cat 3b ND so if the problem is vis/cloud base rather than howling crosswind we can autoland at most of the destinations on our network. That would be a captains only landing too.
If things are close to FO cutoffs but I am reasonably comfortable that they won't be exceeded of course I would let the FO continue as PF but with the stabilised approach criteria very much in mind. Crossing the threshold at 100', as in the subject of this thread, is not stabilised.
There is of course the final arbiter of FO approach/landing cutoffs...'if for any other reason....'
Interesting that you mention 'one way' airstrips in PNG...almost always it was the case in PNG that if you attempted a go around at one way mountain airstrips once established on final approach, or sometimes beyond a certain point on finals, you would crash in the attempt...not maybe but would. That tends to concentrate the mind wonderfully and sloppy flying, if it was a feature of your flying before, dissappears.
When I progressed to the F28 after joining PX if you touched down beyond (or before) the aiming point, 800-1200' in, it was a big deal...if you touched down beyond the 1500' markers it was a VERY BIG DEAL and a go around was strongly encouraged.
To this day if it looks like we will touch down beyond that point, even on a 11000' runway, the hair on the back of my neck stands up...it is a most uncomfortable feeling...but my company touchdown zone is 'first 1/3rd' of runway which gives a little more leeway.
Of course weather conditions that exceed FO cut offs are quite rare so 99.9 times out of 100 there is no question that he/she will remain PF...I think the only times I had a landing taken off me in the past was for landings in fog etc that necesitated an autoland to Cat 2 or below minimas.
Someone mentioned CRM and 'letting the FO fly'. In my view the definition of CRM should be widened to Circumstantial Resource Management.
Often in complex non normals it is very beneficial to have the FO as PF so you can free up your mind and manage the resources at your disposal...but the captain would always be PF for the approach and landing.
Often in complex non normals it is very beneficial to have the FO as PF so you can free up your mind and manage the resources at your disposal...but the captain would always be PF for the approach and landing.
The F/O, if capable, is in a better position to fly the approach and landing than the Captain who would be relaint on standby instrumentation.
Who should fly the approach? If the approach is messed up you are now faced with the relatively difficult missed approach procedure with degraded systems.
Decision?
Grandpa Aerotart
Fair point....in the 767 it would take the failure of so many systems concurrently that the prospect of ending up in that circumstance is almost, but not completely, impossible...perhaps the A340 is different
It is rather like the current J* (ex AN) management pilots desire to test FOs by having them fly a manual thrust, handflown, raw data, single engine, non precision approach at limit crosswind in the A320 just in case all those things fail and there is not an ILS handy AND the captain is incapacitated as well.
It is one thing to have them do something like that in the sim for interest sake or in a no jeopardy training scenario...quite another to fail people based on something that is so far outside the certification basis of the aeroplane. Or maybe the A320 is different
No-one seems to be addressing the AF captain's decision to continue an approach in conditions of contaminated runway and crosswinds (up until the wind recorder was taken out by lightning, windshear anyone ) in excess of limits for those conditions...in the 767 the crosswind limits for contaminated are 10 kts...does the silence on this thread indicate that the limits for the A340 in this circumstance are in excess of 3 times those of the 767?
I just point blank refuse to believe that.
It is rather like the current J* (ex AN) management pilots desire to test FOs by having them fly a manual thrust, handflown, raw data, single engine, non precision approach at limit crosswind in the A320 just in case all those things fail and there is not an ILS handy AND the captain is incapacitated as well.
It is one thing to have them do something like that in the sim for interest sake or in a no jeopardy training scenario...quite another to fail people based on something that is so far outside the certification basis of the aeroplane. Or maybe the A320 is different
No-one seems to be addressing the AF captain's decision to continue an approach in conditions of contaminated runway and crosswinds (up until the wind recorder was taken out by lightning, windshear anyone
) in excess of limits for those conditions...in the 767 the crosswind limits for contaminated are 10 kts...does the silence on this thread indicate that the limits for the A340 in this circumstance are in excess of 3 times those of the 767?I just point blank refuse to believe that.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 31st Mar 2007 at 03:53.
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Non airline pilot comment.....Based on your comments, I think the silence says the AF guy F
ed Up big time, or he thought all them computers would sort it out for him.
J
Non airline pilot comment.....Based on your comments, I think the silence says the AF guy F
ed Up big time, or he thought all them computers would sort it out for him. J
FOs by having them fly a manual thrust, handflown, raw data, single engine, non precision approach at limit crosswind in the A320 just in case all those things fail and there is not an ILS handy AND the captain is incapacitated as well.
But your aversion for high standards of raw data ability under pressure is an inherent problem in Airbus aircraft. An inability or under confidence to fly a missed approach on raw data has led to a number of CFIT accidents on A320 aircraft including a former Ansett aircraft.It may have also been a factor in the Air France overrun.
Why?
When things turn profile ugly from 30, 40 , 60 miles out so begins a process of removing the aircraft's automation. It may start with the autopilot to maximise spoiler deflection, then the autothrust to prevent unwanted power up. Closer in, the flight director info' won't correspond to the performance you are trying to extract to get the aircraft in. So off they come. You are getting toward a scenario where your aircraft is hot n' high with Navajo like presentation.
This is no problem for those with very good raw data skills. Generally, pilots with such disciplines are quite adept in re-instating automatics once profile regained or if things botched, comfortable with a GA manoevre from any position, profile or configuration.
Airbus addressed the above problem of average piloting and raw data skills by having a GA Mode that reinstates the Flight Directors. However, this won't always be available and the recent A320 CFIT's due spatial disorientation ably demonstrates that Airbus, as of yet, cannot protect pilots from a lack of core skills including raw data piloting under pressure.
J* pilots should Harden The F*** Up frankly. Try circling off the completion of that profile at 500' like the mugs used to make us do a decade ago.
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 31st Mar 2007 at 06:27.