Erebus 25 years on
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Hempy and Pakehaboy (echo …echo.. with variation) put to Compressor Stall
a leading question.
a leading question.
It's very obvious you guys are scared of the answer, just as you are scared to admit that Collins did make some serious errors of judgment that can't all be explained away by poor airline management. Why, I have no idea. I'm not a psychologist. But I look forward to compressor stall's reply.
I have actually stated my position on this matter in previous threads on this and had been loathe to state it here as it would cloud (no pun intended) the only part of the discussion that I had the time and thus the inclination to be involved in.
The trouble in this debate is that there are two groups of people entering the blame game from two different angles. First is from the pilot’s perspective. From a pilot’s viewpoint, Collins was given a set of rules, rolled the dice, took a gamble and lost. Then you have those with experience in other affairs of business and courts where the actions of an individual are taken into the wider context of the training, modus operandi, information and instructional ambiguity etc. What this looks at is the framework and manner in which the individual was expected to operate and lays blame when there any procedures that are not watertight.
I have seen both sides in aviation. I have flown where I would be given a job to do ASAP, then expected to use all my PIC judgement and experience to get the job done, and inform operations when I couldn’t (and why). I have also been in another job where the task is set and as PIC I had to justify why I could do the job to a desk jockey via seemingly endless amounts of paperwork, meetings, safety plans etc. This reflects the differing awareness of corporate and managerial responsibility in the modern world for the actions of employees. In the latter case, if I stuffed up, the career of that desk jockey was in jeopardy. I vividly remember the stress of a tasker when it became apparent that I had flown through a "restricted" area unannounced on task - I hadn't even damaged anything. Her career was flashing before her eyes until I got to the bottom of it by finding out that it was never notammed, just announced via an advertisement in the local paper 2 months prior.
When I was working in the mines (not flying) an employee fell asleep and crashed his car on the way home after an overtime shift. The courts found the mine guilty for not foreseeing this and not providing transport home.
It is the way of the modern world. For better or for worse.
Speaking with my pilot’s hat (beanie?) on, as I said ~5 years ago on here, I think Collins was rather gung ho with his descent and should wear some of the blame for poor judgement. But as someone who also spends time working behind the scenes, I also accept how modern courts accept the same situation as the entirely fault of the airline / CAA.
I do accept the theory of normalisation of deviance - in fact normalisation of deviance was nearly the end of me many, many years ago in a C210. That was a lesson that still gives me goose bumps as I type about it, and a feeling of anger for letting myself be railroaded into that situation.
That this thread has gone on for some 1200 posts, and there are a few thousand more in the previous threads I believe is down to the approach one takes to the issue.
A pilot’s view, or the legal/corporate view. Never the twain shall meet.
The trouble in this debate is that there are two groups of people entering the blame game from two different angles. First is from the pilot’s perspective. From a pilot’s viewpoint, Collins was given a set of rules, rolled the dice, took a gamble and lost. Then you have those with experience in other affairs of business and courts where the actions of an individual are taken into the wider context of the training, modus operandi, information and instructional ambiguity etc. What this looks at is the framework and manner in which the individual was expected to operate and lays blame when there any procedures that are not watertight.
I have seen both sides in aviation. I have flown where I would be given a job to do ASAP, then expected to use all my PIC judgement and experience to get the job done, and inform operations when I couldn’t (and why). I have also been in another job where the task is set and as PIC I had to justify why I could do the job to a desk jockey via seemingly endless amounts of paperwork, meetings, safety plans etc. This reflects the differing awareness of corporate and managerial responsibility in the modern world for the actions of employees. In the latter case, if I stuffed up, the career of that desk jockey was in jeopardy. I vividly remember the stress of a tasker when it became apparent that I had flown through a "restricted" area unannounced on task - I hadn't even damaged anything. Her career was flashing before her eyes until I got to the bottom of it by finding out that it was never notammed, just announced via an advertisement in the local paper 2 months prior.
When I was working in the mines (not flying) an employee fell asleep and crashed his car on the way home after an overtime shift. The courts found the mine guilty for not foreseeing this and not providing transport home.
It is the way of the modern world. For better or for worse.
Speaking with my pilot’s hat (beanie?) on, as I said ~5 years ago on here, I think Collins was rather gung ho with his descent and should wear some of the blame for poor judgement. But as someone who also spends time working behind the scenes, I also accept how modern courts accept the same situation as the entirely fault of the airline / CAA.
I do accept the theory of normalisation of deviance - in fact normalisation of deviance was nearly the end of me many, many years ago in a C210. That was a lesson that still gives me goose bumps as I type about it, and a feeling of anger for letting myself be railroaded into that situation.
That this thread has gone on for some 1200 posts, and there are a few thousand more in the previous threads I believe is down to the approach one takes to the issue.
A pilot’s view, or the legal/corporate view. Never the twain shall meet.
Last edited by compressor stall; 14th Jul 2016 at 01:08.
Whispering "T" Jet
Chippindale’s findings were the catalyst for this impasse. For Air New Zealand and the government, the cause had to be pilot error, no compromise and clear cut. This was because of inevitable litigation and the cheaper option was to blame the crew. The foundation was laid. The public saw this as a miscarriage of justice and so did NZALPA. Air NZ & Muldoon realised, too late, that this would have political repercussions down the line so arranged for a Royal Commission of Inquiry. There was anticipation that Justice Peter Mahon would find the legal evidence during this inquiry to support Chippindale’s finding. It never happened, for reasons already discussed for the past thirty seven years. IMHO, had there been more transparency at the Inquiry by testimonial witnesses of Air NZ’s flight department, Mahon may have found evidence of crew error. That he had to investigate so hard to find the truth, eventually all evidence pointed the cause squarely at the feet of the incompetent administrative airline procedures.
Peter Mahon got it right. There was an appeal and the Privy Council upheld his findings. As prospector said “There is no higher court in the land”. Air NZ has apologised, the NZ government has apologised and both parties have requested that we all move on.
Whether Collins and his crew should have shared blame is now irrelevant. It will make no difference to the Mahon finding and has no bearing on any litigation, due to the statutes of limitations law.
It only fuels the egos of those fly by night authors, sanctimonious journalists and part time “aviation experts” with their new theories, “what about” scenarios, presumption, assumption and innuendo, with schadenfreude hysteria.
Hindsight wisdom is of no use.
Thank you Fantome. I was referring to the Cathay Pacific ‘49’s (I should have done my homework) There has been the odd caustic comment made about NZALPA and I thought it was a cheap shot at unions.
Peter Mahon got it right. There was an appeal and the Privy Council upheld his findings. As prospector said “There is no higher court in the land”. Air NZ has apologised, the NZ government has apologised and both parties have requested that we all move on.
Whether Collins and his crew should have shared blame is now irrelevant. It will make no difference to the Mahon finding and has no bearing on any litigation, due to the statutes of limitations law.
It only fuels the egos of those fly by night authors, sanctimonious journalists and part time “aviation experts” with their new theories, “what about” scenarios, presumption, assumption and innuendo, with schadenfreude hysteria.
Hindsight wisdom is of no use.
Thank you Fantome. I was referring to the Cathay Pacific ‘49’s (I should have done my homework) There has been the odd caustic comment made about NZALPA and I thought it was a cheap shot at unions.
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Thanks compressor stall for your #1162. You may well be correct - perhaps the fundamental problem with some people accepting that Collins was at least partially to blame is their need to replicate some sort of quasi-legal "innocent until proven guilty" scenario; hence their efforts to manipulate truths, muddy the waters etc. - all things that would likely happen in a court of law.
As I have said, I'm now more than happy that on this forum the rational argument - ie. that the blame for this tragedy must be shared between the crew, Air New Zealand, and CAA - was won some time ago.
Then I (stupidly) read 3-Holer's post above, and feel compelled to respond.
If you had any integrity at all, you'd preface that statement with the words "in my opinion". Because there have been plenty of credible viewpoints expressed over the last 40 years to the effect that Mahon anything but "got it right".
For someone who is so quick to cry "perjury!" (as laughable as the term is here; this is not even a Kangaroo-court) - that statement really is verging on offensive. The appeal court did not "uphold Mahon's findings". They did not comment in any meaningful way on the causes of the accident at all, because that wasn't in their brief. They did, however, state that Mahon had breached the terms of natural justice. For a member of the judiciary, there can almost be no higher criticism. Whether this detracts from Mahon's credibility in an overall sense is up to the observer.
They have apologised about how things were handled in the aftermath of the disaster. They have not accepted responsibility for the disaster.
No, it isn't irrelevant, because the families of the other 256 people who perished deserve to know what really happened to their loved ones and why, and not be dismissed with some ALPA-approved, whitewashed version of what went on the cockpit. Also, every time some..... moron, for want of a better word writes "Mahon got it 100% right" a knife is stuck into the families of Chippindale, Gemmell etc.
That's your opinion. I myself on the other hand think important lessons can be learned from the mistakes of others, therefore "hindsight wisdom" is most definitely of use.
As I have said, I'm now more than happy that on this forum the rational argument - ie. that the blame for this tragedy must be shared between the crew, Air New Zealand, and CAA - was won some time ago.
Then I (stupidly) read 3-Holer's post above, and feel compelled to respond.
Peter Mahon got it right.
There was an appeal and the Privy Council upheld his findings.
Air NZ has apologised, the NZ government has apologised
Whether Collins and his crew should have shared blame is now irrelevant
Hindsight wisdom is of no use
Last edited by PapaHotel6; 14th Jul 2016 at 15:54.
Whispering "T" Jet
Thanks compressor stall for your #1162. You may well be correct
I will retract one thing I said earlier. I don't think you are here collecting information for a thesis. You need to have a calm, collective temperament to write and be academically savvy. At this point in time, you don't appear have either of those qualities.
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Very good post PapaHotel6, like the Commission of Enquiry, 3 holer is stating but his opinion, it would appear proven fact is not utilised at all in forming that opinion.
The Royal Commission of Enquiry itself was but a legal opinion and not a statement of fact, and could not be appealed in legal terms. Ron Chippindale's report, collated in a fraction of the time, was open for challenge, but has never been officially challenged, and remains for many who have experience in the world of aviation the more acceptable version of the events that occurred on that flight.
Again I must ask are you for real?, on a professional pilots rumour network and you have to do homework re what is meant by the "89"ers, and to confuse that with the "49ers"??
Where exactly were you referring to that event, and how could it be relevant to this forum?
Take your own advice re comprehending contents
.
Post 1157, that is also 100% correct.
The Royal Commission of Enquiry itself was but a legal opinion and not a statement of fact, and could not be appealed in legal terms. Ron Chippindale's report, collated in a fraction of the time, was open for challenge, but has never been officially challenged, and remains for many who have experience in the world of aviation the more acceptable version of the events that occurred on that flight.
I was referring to the Cathay Pacific ‘49’s (I should have done my homework) There has been the odd caustic comment made about NZALPA and I thought it was a cheap shot at unions.
I was referring to the Cathay Pacific ‘49’s
PapaHotel6 compressor stall is 100% correct. Re-read his post and comprehend it's contents
I think Collins was rather gung ho with his descent and should wear some of the blame for poor judgement
.
My comment re 1500 meant that they should never have left 16000'.
Last edited by prospector; 14th Jul 2016 at 23:04.
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ALTITUDE AWARENESS 101.
"The MSA is the MORA/MSA for that instant in time whenever NOT under positive radar control OR at night.If every pilot followed this cardinal rule CFIT would cease.Under this rule TE901 would never have descended below 16000 feet unless totally VMC which it was not.All other factors are not relevant.
"The MSA is the MORA/MSA for that instant in time whenever NOT under positive radar control OR at night.If every pilot followed this cardinal rule CFIT would cease.Under this rule TE901 would never have descended below 16000 feet unless totally VMC which it was not.All other factors are not relevant.
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Good one Pete !!!gimme a break!!! I flew in Alaska for 10 years,flying glaciers,mountains,Denali fixed and rotary!..etc etc,If we had adhered to your programme,we would have gone bust and never flown ,cardinal rules ..Really... The real world doesn't live by them.....The term .."**** happens "applies to all operations ...wrong or right ... Erebus is and has become a little more than that,Pilots in these types of operations are not "molds"or "moulds"to be manufactured,you cannot replicate previous flights,you cannot replicate previous pilots,the day arrives ,and you fly the "day"...the rules in this case were never adhered too,by either by Collins ( buy assumption )and /or ANZ.( by more than assumption)... To suggest a hard line rule in light of the argument(s) that are currently being presented is ............. Bullpoo!!!!...and BULL-****e
Last edited by Pakehaboy; 15th Jul 2016 at 04:10.
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This is yet another of those CFIT accidents where the line between VMC and IMC was allowed to become blurred. In times of old this was a complete no-no, so much so that many instructors would cover up the windows when teaching trainee pilots how to operate in IMC.
Getting back to the assertion that they were VMC when they hit the mountain, because they could see various black rocky outcrops well over eight miles ahead. That argument might get some traction under the strange ICAO definition of 'visibility' but not the New Zealand definition, which defines it as the ability to see “prominent unlighted objects”, not “a prominent unlighted object”. So under the New Zealand definition, if there are two prominent unlighted objects, such as a big black rock and a big white mountain, you have to be able to see both, not just one.
Getting back to the assertion that they were VMC when they hit the mountain, because they could see various black rocky outcrops well over eight miles ahead. That argument might get some traction under the strange ICAO definition of 'visibility' but not the New Zealand definition, which defines it as the ability to see “prominent unlighted objects”, not “a prominent unlighted object”. So under the New Zealand definition, if there are two prominent unlighted objects, such as a big black rock and a big white mountain, you have to be able to see both, not just one.
Last edited by ampan; 15th Jul 2016 at 03:10.
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You know what ampan,.Im a kiwi who has flown in many countries,I couldn't give a rats arse about what the definition of VFR was (until I was is the **** or authorities hands)... All I did was open my eyes and look out the fricken window..... We have all been there,anyone who has really flown.and acknowledged the fact of there own limitations...,.from an H 500/300/ Taylarcraft to an A330.. VFR is by definition,a rule, that one has as a measuring stick.,nothing else,determined by whom....
Fantome....please Excuse my head popping here....the debate is not only intriguing but educational.One can only admire the expertise in linguistics and vocation
Fantome....please Excuse my head popping here....the debate is not only intriguing but educational.One can only admire the expertise in linguistics and vocation
Last edited by Pakehaboy; 15th Jul 2016 at 04:06.
Getting back to the assertion that they were VMC when they hit the mountain, because they could see various black rocky outcrops well over eight miles ahead. That argument might get some traction under the strange ICAO definition of 'visibility' but not the New Zealand definition, which defines it as the ability to see “prominent unlighted objects”, not “a prominent unlighted object”. So under the New Zealand definition, if there are two prominent unlighted objects, such as a big black rock and a big white mountain, you have to be able to see both, not just one.
THE []POLAR WHITEOUT? - Fritz - 2012 - Weather - Wiley Online Library
TE901 would never have descended below 16000 feet unless totally VMC which it was not.All other factors are not relevant.
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Originally Posted by megan
My God, you're one ignorant sod ampan
ignorant
ˈɪɡn(ə)r(ə)nt/
adjective
lacking knowledge or awareness in general; uneducated or unsophisticated.
"he was told constantly that he was ignorant and stupid"
ˈɪɡn(ə)r(ə)nt/
adjective
lacking knowledge or awareness in general; uneducated or unsophisticated.
"he was told constantly that he was ignorant and stupid"
'Thinking' (or hoping) that you are in VMC does NOT mean that VMC conditions exist. As stated, the defined VMC conditions for that flight were, amongst other minima, 20km horizontal visibility. That means 20km in 360 degrees, not just 'in that direction'.
Surely you aren't claiming that they could actually see 20km in their 12 o'clock? Right up until bitching betty started wailing?
Try this out and see how you go. Your cars speedometer reads 30 km/h under the actual speed. You get pulled over by a policeman for traveling 110km/h in an 80 zone. "I'm sorry officer, I thought I was doing 80".
Good luck with that.
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megan, You post
compressor stall, your expert on things Antarctic, and I certainly do not doubt that, states.
and also
So in actual fact what the visual conditions were at 1,500ft is well after the decision that created this disaster was taken.
We have managed to keep this thread going for a long time now, mainly through no one using language like
Keep that up and one would begin to suspect you are a plant from an unnamed ALPA to get the thread shut down.
Could you please explain exactly why you think the descent procedure as required by the Company and CAA was "physically impossible"?
I have heard an explanation of weather decisions as relates to flying helicopters in Antarctica, by a pilot who has spent many years doing this job ., the weather is either very good or very bad, so decision making is not a problem.
The only weird theories have come from yourself and PapaHotel6. The very fact that both of you still display complete ignorance of whiteout, and the ability to be in VMC until impact, despite advice telling you so from an expert (compressor stall) in Antarctic operations. Somebody who has never been there and done the job, telling the guy who has, he doesn't know what he's talking about? Give me a break.
Speaking with my pilot’s hat (beanie?) on, as I said ~5 years ago on here, I think Collins was rather gung ho with his descent and should wear some of the blame for poor judgement.
My comment re 1500 meant that they should never have left 16000'.
We have managed to keep this thread going for a long time now, mainly through no one using language like
My God, you're one ignorant sod ampan.
Could you please explain exactly why you think the descent procedure as required by the Company and CAA was "physically impossible"?
I have heard an explanation of weather decisions as relates to flying helicopters in Antarctica, by a pilot who has spent many years doing this job ., the weather is either very good or very bad, so decision making is not a problem.
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At the start of this VMC debate I sought to draw a line between fact and belief, and my understanding of the “they were VMC when they hit the mountain” claim was that it concerned the former – ie, as a matter of fact, they were VMC when they hit. What the captain might have believed the situation to be was, I thought, a different issue. It now appears that the claim concerns the captain’s belief, given the appearance of the word “believe”in the final paragraph of megan’s #1171. So can the believers and the storytellers now agree that, as a matter offact, they were not VMC when they hit the mountain? That will allow the debate to move on to what appears to be the real difference between the factions, being whether the captain genuinely, but wrongly, believed he was VMC and, if so, whose fault that was.
Whispering "T" Jet
We have managed to keep this thread going for a long time now, mainly through no one using language like
Quote:
My God, you're one ignorant sod ampan.
Quote:
My God, you're one ignorant sod ampan.
The more I read that Honourable gentleman's writings, the more convinced I am as to what a stupid blinkered old twit he really was....
I can see where all this has come from: These dummies have only focused on part......
Two examples of what a dope Mahon was: (1) Of the most significant line..........
.........&" Ian Gemmell was right: Mahon was an idiot.
I don't see any point in 3 Holer trotting out quotes from Mahon, because Mahon was an idiot.....
?
I can see where all this has come from: These dummies have only focused on part......
Two examples of what a dope Mahon was: (1) Of the most significant line..........
.........&" Ian Gemmell was right: Mahon was an idiot.
I don't see any point in 3 Holer trotting out quotes from Mahon, because Mahon was an idiot.....
?
You raised the issue of '89s & '49's, that got me thinking about references you made about NZALPA during this debate. You reference also an ALPA plant. Why so anti-union? Again, some of your quotes:
This was the airlines fault? nothing to do with NZALPA insisting that their senior pilots all have a turn at this perk flight?
Why did they not stick to one or two crews that had the experience required by other operators? could it be because NZALPA wanted their senior pilots to have a turn at this perk flight?.
Those on the other side of this argument, NZALPA in particular, remind me of that mad ovine rabble whose mass hysteria led........
The issue is what Captain Simpson said, before the union lawyers got their hooks into him
Captain Simpson received the worst treatment and ended up getting it in the neck from both sides. The process that led to that was begun by NZALPA.
Apart from the union and its lawyers, the various authors who wrote books in support were nearly as slimey.........
Why did they not stick to one or two crews that had the experience required by other operators? could it be because NZALPA wanted their senior pilots to have a turn at this perk flight?.
Those on the other side of this argument, NZALPA in particular, remind me of that mad ovine rabble whose mass hysteria led........
The issue is what Captain Simpson said, before the union lawyers got their hooks into him
Captain Simpson received the worst treatment and ended up getting it in the neck from both sides. The process that led to that was begun by NZALPA.
Apart from the union and its lawyers, the various authors who wrote books in support were nearly as slimey.........
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Thanks for that, 3 holer. Some super stuff there by me, and I'm in complete agreement with everything I say. There's one matter that's not covered in the passages you have selected, which is that Mahon was idiot.
But putting the idiot to one side (which is where he was from the outset): Were they VMC when they hit the mountain:
(a) As a matter of fact, or, if not:
(b) According to the captain's genuine belief ?
But putting the idiot to one side (which is where he was from the outset): Were they VMC when they hit the mountain:
(a) As a matter of fact, or, if not:
(b) According to the captain's genuine belief ?
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Not anti anyone, in fact NZALPA did me a good turn once many years ago.
When one states a fact, that is relevant to the discussion it is not being "anti". Why I used that
It was not anti, it was a fact in answer to all you Mahon disciples stating that the crews were not properly trained in Antarctic operations. Although I think you were all being unkind to very experienced pilots when you state they had no training in Antarctic ops and therefor no knowledge of whiteout. I have never been to the ice, but through reading and comments made by people who have been down, I would be well aware to be ever alert not to caught in the conditions that favour whiteout. Especially I would have swatted when I was assigned a flight to the ice. And this crew apparently did, they presented themselves to DeepFreeze Christchurch for assuredly more that a cup of tea.
Captain Gordon Vette on his one flight to the ice was so confident in his knowledge that he even descended to 1,500ft or so, at the request of the Air Traffic Controller for a low run. And when he got back from that one flight he was "expert enough to advise Mahon on sector whiteout? Admitted he did a lot of research, but an expert after one flight to the ice?
Yes I raised 89'ers, and got a good response from Hempy, very good in fact, but "49ers" have never been mentioned in this thread till your
If you wish to use compressor stall as your expert on things Antarctic why do you not use
Quote:
Then I would certainly agree with you, the argument about sector whiteout is a result of another statement that compressor stall explained in an earlier thread the reason why he got involved in it.
From Fantome
.
From 3 holer:
.Well done. Fantome post was informative??
When one states a fact, that is relevant to the discussion it is not being "anti". Why I used that
"This was the airlines fault? nothing to do with NZALPA insisting that their senior pilots all have a turn at this perk flight?
Why did they not stick to one or two crews that had the experience required by other operators? could it be because NZALPA wanted their senior pilots to have a turn at this perk flight?.
Why did they not stick to one or two crews that had the experience required by other operators? could it be because NZALPA wanted their senior pilots to have a turn at this perk flight?.
Captain Gordon Vette on his one flight to the ice was so confident in his knowledge that he even descended to 1,500ft or so, at the request of the Air Traffic Controller for a low run. And when he got back from that one flight he was "expert enough to advise Mahon on sector whiteout? Admitted he did a lot of research, but an expert after one flight to the ice?
You raised the issue of '89s & '49's,
I was referring to the Cathay Pacific ‘49’s (I should have done my homework)
Speaking with my pilot’s hat (beanie?) on, as I said ~5 years ago on here, I think Collins was rather gung ho with his descent and should wear some of the blame for poor judgement.
and also
and also
My comment re 1500 meant that they should never have left 16000'.
PapaHotel6 compressor stall is 100% correct.
From Fantome
OFF TOPIC . . . . you do not 'get banned' for mentioning'89. Every ten years it gets a good airing. Only those who become vituperative face the axe.
From 3 holer:
It's the Moderators who shut threads down, not ALPA plants?
Last edited by prospector; 16th Jul 2016 at 04:21.
Whispering "T" Jet
Were they VMC when they hit the mountain:
(a) As a matter of fact, or, if not:
(b) According to the captain's genuine belief ?
(a) As a matter of fact, or, if not:
(b) According to the captain's genuine belief ?
Air NZ and the flight department had their day in court and they blew it! My old man once told me, if you tell lies you have to have a good memory. As was demonstrated during Mahon's Royal Commission of Inquiry, a number of the witnesses had very poor memories.
Fantome post was informative??