Erebus 25 years on
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Prospector, while on the one hand you seem to agree that there are two points of view on this accident you don’t seem so willing to accept an entitlement to hold the other point of view. Worse, you seem to be to be quite selective, if not cavalier, in your presentation of information. For example, in one of your first posts you say:
Quote:
You would appear to belong to the school that supports Mahons statement that the aircraft "was programmed to fly into the mountain from the time it left (NZ)".
I believe that this is a subtly pejorative representation of what was said. There is no hope of anything other than endless pointless argument if you don’t do your best to present such comments in as accurate and balanced a fashion as possible. Here are the actual words from Mr Justice Mahon’s report:
Quote:
393. In my opinion therefore, the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt. Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew. That mistake is directly attributable, not so much to the persons who made it, but to the incompetent administrative airline procedures which made the mistake possible.
It is a matter of fact that the key elements of this finding – the change of waypoint co-ordinates and the failure to tell the aircrew – are correct (for the unfamiliar, the waypoints were not loaded one by one by the crew). Of course the argument moves on from there to why the crew were where they were, etc. etc. … and it goes on and on and on thereafter with supporters of each side of the argument selecting bits of information to support their point of view.
May I also make the point that your reference to the “Orchestrated litany of lies” is also misleading? It was subsequently found that the evidence did not support the use of the word “orchestrated” (and I have no argument with this finding). However, what you seem to miss is that Mr. Justice Mahon was fully entitled to conclude that some witnesses had been less than truthful and that this finding was not overturned. The evidence for this finding in his report is (tellingly) supplemented by the account in his book “Verdict on Erebus” where he lays out exactly why and how he slowly turned from one point of view to another. Working from memory, a key reason for that change was the behaviour and evidence of certain witnesses.
I am familiar enough with the two points of view in this accident to know that any argument will go on endlessly, so I’ll let it go with an appeal for less strident approach towards those of us who disagree with you.
Quote:
You would appear to belong to the school that supports Mahons statement that the aircraft "was programmed to fly into the mountain from the time it left (NZ)".
I believe that this is a subtly pejorative representation of what was said. There is no hope of anything other than endless pointless argument if you don’t do your best to present such comments in as accurate and balanced a fashion as possible. Here are the actual words from Mr Justice Mahon’s report:
Quote:
393. In my opinion therefore, the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt. Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew. That mistake is directly attributable, not so much to the persons who made it, but to the incompetent administrative airline procedures which made the mistake possible.
It is a matter of fact that the key elements of this finding – the change of waypoint co-ordinates and the failure to tell the aircrew – are correct (for the unfamiliar, the waypoints were not loaded one by one by the crew). Of course the argument moves on from there to why the crew were where they were, etc. etc. … and it goes on and on and on thereafter with supporters of each side of the argument selecting bits of information to support their point of view.
May I also make the point that your reference to the “Orchestrated litany of lies” is also misleading? It was subsequently found that the evidence did not support the use of the word “orchestrated” (and I have no argument with this finding). However, what you seem to miss is that Mr. Justice Mahon was fully entitled to conclude that some witnesses had been less than truthful and that this finding was not overturned. The evidence for this finding in his report is (tellingly) supplemented by the account in his book “Verdict on Erebus” where he lays out exactly why and how he slowly turned from one point of view to another. Working from memory, a key reason for that change was the behaviour and evidence of certain witnesses.
I am familiar enough with the two points of view in this accident to know that any argument will go on endlessly, so I’ll let it go with an appeal for less strident approach towards those of us who disagree with you.
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"for the unfamiliar, the waypoints were not loaded by one of the crew" For the unfamiliar, jack red in particular, the waypoints were definitely loaded by one of the crew.
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The evidence for this finding in his report is (tellingly) supplemented by the account in his book “Verdict on Erebus” where he lays out exactly why and how he slowly turned from one point of view to another. Working from memory, a key reason for that change was the behaviour and evidence of certain witnesses.
Re the courts findings.
The Court of appeal addressed several aspects that were brought to the commissioners notice during the enquiry but ignored by him. The five judges unanimously quashed the $150,000 costs order imposed as punishment for the alleged conspiracy
Bitter controversy and renewed public debate followed the judgements. Citing his own action when alleged to be in the wrong, Morrie Davis called on Mahon to resign as a High Court judge, which he did.
In their judgement, delivered on 20th Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioners appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, which set aside the costs against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company's chief executive had ever existed.
However, what you seem to miss is that Mr. Justice Mahon was fully entitled to conclude that some witnesses had been less than truthful and that this finding was not overturned
For a High Court Judge to be admonished by his superiors for "Clear breaches of natural justice" was surely not a good thing.
My belief is that the Nav section was sloppy with their handling of the Flight Plan, but nothing in that plan was for any part of the flight below MSA. That was the decision of the Captain after considering the weather conditions prevailing at the time. The weather at the time has been posted many times, it was well below that required for the approved descent, it was well below that required for any sightseeing around Scott Base.
Nothing to strident I hope?
Last edited by prospector; 19th Jul 2016 at 02:08.
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Not strident enough: Mahon was one of those special brands of idiot, being one who thought he was clever. Given that Jack Red has referred to it, I'll cite an example from 'Verdict on Erebus'. At pages 258 and 259, the honourable gentleman refers to the lack of passenger photos facing south towards Mount Erebus. This most clever of jurists points out that during the racecourse descent manoeuvre the aircraft made two 180 degree turns during which Mount Erebus would have been abeam. From this, he goes on to construct Stupid Conspiracy Theory Number 58, suggesting the photos were destroyed. What the silly old twit overlooked was the fact that the aircraft would have been banked during both turns, and given that it was travelling at speed with flaps retracted, the banking would have been steep.
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Civil aviation has an enviable record for safety, transparency and critical self-examination. Where an aircraft is lost the various accident investigation boards around the world leave no stone unturned until the key causal factors are uncovered and a remedy identified and implemented.
Historically following an aviation incident of accident the cause is exhaustively investigated, blame apportioned where necessary followed by implementation of solutions aimed at prevention of further accidents of like nature.
So it was with Erebus; The fear of God (litigation) was put through the worlds airline operations sections such that flight planning and navigation errors were extremely significantly reduced or eliminated; conduct of operations in non-normal day to day airline operations throughout the world including crew training for these was significantly reviewed and improved; management including crew training in the use of continuously improving flight management and navigation systems continued to be vastly improved.
Past hurts and old injustices have a way of keeping us stuck in our tracks, unable to move forward or experience joy. It can take a radical reboot to get past yesterday
It's an axiom of psychology that we are some recombination of all of our yesterdays. To move forward wisely, we are therefore often urged to look back. But there's a point where appreciation and analysis of the past become gum on your psychological shoe. It sticks you in place, impedes forward motion, and, like gum, it doesn't just disappear on its own. You need to do some scraping.
The power to get past the past does not lie primarily with the nature of events themselves. They count a lot, sure. But so do the steps forward a person is willing to take and how much effort he or she is willing to expend to push some emotional rock up, up, and out of the way.
Getting unstuck involves remembering an injury, but reconsidering it from a different, more empathetic perspective. Moving forward may mean reconfiguring so that you are less giving, more realistic.
Is there anything you can't get over? Yes and no. You don't get over it, but you might find a different place to put it. You don't forget it, but the thought no longer intrudes. You don't pretend it wasn't bad, but you have a sense that you can heal. We don't get over the past. We get past it.
Getting past yesterday demands both thinking and doing. Its things we do as well as things we think that hold us unwittingly in a painful place. Arguably, it's easy to shift behaviours—that is, once you pause to consider them. More intricately, getting beyond yesterday is a psychological high-wire act of letting go, of re-evaluating experience and relinquishing old perspectives, of discarding cherished but mistaken beliefs, of delicately but deeply recalibrating thoughts and feelings.
Letting go means something has to open in your head and in your heart, but that shift, that easing, comes up against our own invisible, often implacable resistance. A great deal of that resistance comes from nothing more pedestrian than the great human reluctance to change. Even change for the better is still change, often initially dreaded and avoided. We are creatures of habit and of inertia.
Industry now recognises Psychological problems among pilots are an insidious threat to safety because of impairments to task performance. Crew licensing authorities worldwide specify the minimum medical requirements crew must meet to be able to fly, and psychologists have an increasingly important role in pre-training psychological screening, assessing licensed crew, preparing reports for crew licensing authorities and in supporting aviation personnel who work in safety critical roles in order to prevent mental health problems from arising in the first place.
The risk can never be managed or taken away entirely, but a combined policy, best practice and technology-enabled approach may give a viable route into managing the level of risk faced as a consequence of aircrew mental health issues, and a balanced approach to mitigating that risk which meets the need of all the key stakeholder groups.
Historically following an aviation incident of accident the cause is exhaustively investigated, blame apportioned where necessary followed by implementation of solutions aimed at prevention of further accidents of like nature.
So it was with Erebus; The fear of God (litigation) was put through the worlds airline operations sections such that flight planning and navigation errors were extremely significantly reduced or eliminated; conduct of operations in non-normal day to day airline operations throughout the world including crew training for these was significantly reviewed and improved; management including crew training in the use of continuously improving flight management and navigation systems continued to be vastly improved.
That is the aviation industry, as is their want, learnt and moved on.
Past hurts and old injustices have a way of keeping us stuck in our tracks, unable to move forward or experience joy. It can take a radical reboot to get past yesterday
It's an axiom of psychology that we are some recombination of all of our yesterdays. To move forward wisely, we are therefore often urged to look back. But there's a point where appreciation and analysis of the past become gum on your psychological shoe. It sticks you in place, impedes forward motion, and, like gum, it doesn't just disappear on its own. You need to do some scraping.
The power to get past the past does not lie primarily with the nature of events themselves. They count a lot, sure. But so do the steps forward a person is willing to take and how much effort he or she is willing to expend to push some emotional rock up, up, and out of the way.
Getting unstuck involves remembering an injury, but reconsidering it from a different, more empathetic perspective. Moving forward may mean reconfiguring so that you are less giving, more realistic.
Is there anything you can't get over? Yes and no. You don't get over it, but you might find a different place to put it. You don't forget it, but the thought no longer intrudes. You don't pretend it wasn't bad, but you have a sense that you can heal. We don't get over the past. We get past it.
Getting past yesterday demands both thinking and doing. Its things we do as well as things we think that hold us unwittingly in a painful place. Arguably, it's easy to shift behaviours—that is, once you pause to consider them. More intricately, getting beyond yesterday is a psychological high-wire act of letting go, of re-evaluating experience and relinquishing old perspectives, of discarding cherished but mistaken beliefs, of delicately but deeply recalibrating thoughts and feelings.
Letting go means something has to open in your head and in your heart, but that shift, that easing, comes up against our own invisible, often implacable resistance. A great deal of that resistance comes from nothing more pedestrian than the great human reluctance to change. Even change for the better is still change, often initially dreaded and avoided. We are creatures of habit and of inertia.
A great deal of psychological research attests to resistance even to positive change. It is one of the great marvels of clinical observation how much discomfort people can tolerate before they acknowledge the need for change. And change is always uncomfortable, at least at first.
Industry now recognises Psychological problems among pilots are an insidious threat to safety because of impairments to task performance. Crew licensing authorities worldwide specify the minimum medical requirements crew must meet to be able to fly, and psychologists have an increasingly important role in pre-training psychological screening, assessing licensed crew, preparing reports for crew licensing authorities and in supporting aviation personnel who work in safety critical roles in order to prevent mental health problems from arising in the first place.
In essence an inability to move on, absorb and learn from previous events is indicative of perhaps an inherent or impending psychological problem which has no place in the modern flight deck; a problem requiring recognition, assessment, management and treatment. It is certainly more than an impending risk to sound psychological health in retirement.
The risk can never be managed or taken away entirely, but a combined policy, best practice and technology-enabled approach may give a viable route into managing the level of risk faced as a consequence of aircrew mental health issues, and a balanced approach to mitigating that risk which meets the need of all the key stakeholder groups.
Put the pebble in your pocket as a cherished reminder, and leave room in your heart for something new.
Whispering "T" Jet
More assumptions from ampan (who else?) right to the end of debate
you have no idea of the configuration at that time.
Anyway, I'm off now and may see you all back here again in another couple of years when, no doubt, the amateur book writers and a newly graduated journo will put pen to paper about another theory on the crash.
Before leaving, I'll leave the storytellers,especially ampan, prospector and PapaHotel6 with the comforting and warming fact that:
The Honourable Justice Peter Mahon's Royal Commission of Inquiry's conclusion and findings have been tabled, unabridged and original, in the New Zealand Parliament. This means the cause of the accident remains, now(again)official, as found during the inquiry and that Mahon got it 100% correct.It makes outstanding reading from the Hansard.
Air New Zealand and the Government have apologised to the Hewitt, Gemmell,Chippindale,Collins,Cassin, the Honourable Justice Peter Mahon's wife and family and to all the family members of the victims.
Most informed commentators close to the disaster, request that we all move on.
I respectfully accede to their request now. Hooroo!
aircraft would have been banked during both turns, and given that it was travelling at speed with flaps retracted, the banking would have been steep.
Anyway, I'm off now and may see you all back here again in another couple of years when, no doubt, the amateur book writers and a newly graduated journo will put pen to paper about another theory on the crash.
Before leaving, I'll leave the storytellers,especially ampan, prospector and PapaHotel6 with the comforting and warming fact that:
The Honourable Justice Peter Mahon's Royal Commission of Inquiry's conclusion and findings have been tabled, unabridged and original, in the New Zealand Parliament. This means the cause of the accident remains, now(again)official, as found during the inquiry and that Mahon got it 100% correct.It makes outstanding reading from the Hansard.
Air New Zealand and the Government have apologised to the Hewitt, Gemmell,Chippindale,Collins,Cassin, the Honourable Justice Peter Mahon's wife and family and to all the family members of the victims.
Most informed commentators close to the disaster, request that we all move on.
I respectfully accede to their request now. Hooroo!
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I recognise Dark Knight's "Put the pebble in your pocket as a cherished reminder, and leave room in your heart for something new." It's from the first draft of the following scene from Pulp Fiction. As you will see, the line was modified in the editing process:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFtHjV4c4uw
As for 3 Holer's latest and, allegedly, final contribution, the aircraft definitely had the flaps retracted. It was an express requirement, the reason for which was that if they were extended they might get stuck, when would mean that the aircraft would not make it back to NZ.
I'm going to re-read 'Verdict on Erebus' in search of some more mid-priced shots at the late Royal Commissioner, safe in the knowledge that the believers have all now disentangled themselves from their swiss cheese and will, next week, be returning to school.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFtHjV4c4uw
As for 3 Holer's latest and, allegedly, final contribution, the aircraft definitely had the flaps retracted. It was an express requirement, the reason for which was that if they were extended they might get stuck, when would mean that the aircraft would not make it back to NZ.
I'm going to re-read 'Verdict on Erebus' in search of some more mid-priced shots at the late Royal Commissioner, safe in the knowledge that the believers have all now disentangled themselves from their swiss cheese and will, next week, be returning to school.
you have no idea of the configuration at that time.
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Yes, me too Dora. I have been a silent observer of this discussion for some time and I am wondering if Mr Holer slipped that one in as a subtle final clip.
The crews going down there appeared non-compliant with most other areas such as MSA and low flying, why wouldn't they consider slowing things down for a good look. How do we know other crews didn't do it and thought it was a good idea? Would lowering flaps be as bad as hitting a mountain? I don't know, the whole discussion is going around in circles. Too many theories and not enough fact for my liking.
The crews going down there appeared non-compliant with most other areas such as MSA and low flying, why wouldn't they consider slowing things down for a good look. How do we know other crews didn't do it and thought it was a good idea? Would lowering flaps be as bad as hitting a mountain? I don't know, the whole discussion is going around in circles. Too many theories and not enough fact for my liking.
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I am wondering if Mr Holer slipped that one in as a subtle final clip.
would lowering flaps be as bad as hitting a mountain?.
Last edited by prospector; 19th Jul 2016 at 23:19.