Erebus 25 years on

[prospector]

I can give the list of each flight and the height they descended to if you so wish

Righto, the flight captained by Captain Mayne Hawkins, the first company flight to the Antarctic, the first one's were for a travel agency.

What height did he go down to, and why did he go to that height?

[compressor stall]

Hypothetically,

If the cloud base was of the same horizontal extent but at 6500', and they had descended to not below 6000, it is my opinion that it's quite probable that the accident might have still occurred. That rock bank underneath Fang Peak, to which I made reference earlier, is roughly 6500' and above. It's all snow underneath; they might have ploughed in just the same.

[3 Holer]

The storytellers theories about this disaster compressor stall are mostly all hypothetical, so you need not apologise for that. You raise a very interesting point with your statement

......and they had descended to not below 6000, it is my opinion that it's quite probable that the accident might have still occurred.

. This is what this topic has lacked for sometime, someone with an understanding of polar flying and their valuable opinions.

[megan]

Stuart MacFarlane, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Aukland

Hawkins (B.639) was part of the airline’s executive, being flight manager training. He said he declined to descend below 6000 feet on 18 October 1977 because the minimum briefed altitude was 6000 feet. Captain Vette attended the same briefing and Vette’s view of the briefing conflicts with that of Hawkins. Hawkins’ co-pilot was A.A.E. Lawson. On Hawkins’ flight was Graeme Kennedy, a reporter who knew both pilots. Kennedy wrote an article in the 8 O’Clock (exhibit 83) that the flight descended to 200 metres, a misprint for 400 metres or about 1300 feet (T.816-817).

The instructions given to counsel for the passengers' consortium were that either Hawkins or Lawson told Kennedy thatwhen over McMurdo the aircraft was between 1200 feet and 1300 feet.

Lawson denied he told Kennedy the flight descended to between 1200 and 1300 feet and said that to the best of his recollection, Hawkins’ flight did not descend beneath 16,000 [sic] feet. (T.817-818). Hawkins said at (B.638): "I continued my descent visually to 6000 feet", at (T.1882): "I remained at 6000 feet. . . 6000 feet was my minimum altitude and that’s where I stayed." Hawkins said (T.1878) he knew Kennedy but he did not give Kennedy the information. Counsel said (T. 1879) a passenger stated he understood the flight descended to approximately 1000 feet. Hawkins answered that he was aware of the passenger who was the source of that information and it was totally incorrect, and it would be very difficult for a passenger to judge whether it was 6000 feet or 16,000 feet.

Grundy, flight operations manager, said the early flights had no discretion to descend beneath 16,000 feet. (T.4-32 D41) and that his flight on 22 February 1977 did not descend beneath that height. (T.432 D30)

Gemmell, chief pilot, who flew the first Antarctic flight on 15 February 1977, said that on that flight he did not descend beneath flight level 160 (16,000 feet) at any time. (T.462, T.463, T.490, T.505). His co-pilot, A.A.E. Lawson, is recorded as saying that to the best of his recollection the flight descended below 16,000 feet (T.817). Later he said: "If I could remember descending below 16,000 I am sure I would indicate it to this commission." (T.819). Bob Thomson of the DSIR Antarctic Division believed the flight descended to 9000 feet.

Evidence was not given by the pilots of 28 November 1978 and 1 November 1977.

We have it on oath from the Inspector that his office had discussions with most of the previous crews of the three years’ Antarctic flights but that only two "captains" expressed the view they were entitled to descend below 6000 feet. The fact is there were 13 Antarctic flights, three pilots on each flight i.e. 38 pilots (Lawson went twice). I believe that counsel when using the word "captain" meant "pilot."

The Inspector may instead have given a literal answer meaning that of the 38 pilots only two of those who held the rank of captain told his office they believed they were permitted to descend below 6000 feet while omitting to mention the views of the 20 first officers. Eighteen of the pilots were captains. Confirmation that the Inspector means pilots, not captains, is given in the following extract from his evidence. But he now says that he knew of only one pilot (not two captains) who did not share his interpretation of minimum flight altitudes.

Question: But we know, don’t we, that there are, and have been, numerous or a significant number of pilots who did not share your interpretation of that minimum flight altitude, don’t we?

Chippindale: I know specifically of one pilot and a sequence of reports of lower flights. (T.215)

Eight line pilots (i.e. not members of the administration) said in evidence they believed descent was permitted, one said he did not believe he was so permitted. The other five pilots who said descent was not permitted were all executive pilots or part of the airline administration. To recapitulate, of these five Lawson, formerly a briefing supervisor, knew of low level flying but did nothing about it, Johnson, a briefing officer, led briefing discussions on flights beneath 6000 feet but without criticising it, and descended below that height himself. Johnson’s co-pilots were Captain M. Buchanan and First Officer O. Faulls. Either here are two pilots who believed descent below 6000 was permitted, or they concurred in a breach, by their pilot in command, of briefing instructions. Likewise Captain A. Potts and First Officer Clapshaw either believed Captain Vette’s descent was authorised or in breach of briefing. McWilliams (B.518) descended to 2000 feet, so First Officers G. Roud and W. Woodhams believed descent was permitted or breached briefing instructions. The flight of First Officers M. White and P. Wilkins descended to 2500 feet. (B.510). First Officers Eaton and N. Pullin descended to about 4-000 feet (B.576). First Officer Woollaston descended to 2500 feet (B.536) and First Officer T. Shepherd to approximately 2000 feet (B.550). The Commissioner, Mr Justice Mahon (M.75) concluded that all Antarctic flights from 18 October 1977 descended considerably beneath 6000 feet, generally to between 1500 feet and 3000 feet.

The end result is that most Antarctic pilots believed descent beneath 6000 feet was permitted, or descended contrary to briefing. How is it that out of most of the Antarctic crews the Inspector’s office discovered only two captains (or one pilot) who believed such descent was permitted? He spoke to both Eaton (T. 189) who gave no evidence and Simpson (T.189 and T. 199); were those the two he refers to?

But Captain Vette tells me he was interviewed by the Inspector and that he made it clear that he did not believe there had ever been any prohibition on descent beneath 6000 feet, so evidently Captain Vette is the one pilot who told the Inspector there was no such prohibition.

......and they had descended to not below 6000, it is my opinion that it's quite probable that the accident might have still occurred.
. This is what this topic has lacked for sometime, someone with an understanding of polar flying and their valuable opinions

I made that very same point long, long ago. Thanks CS, BTW, that photo is something else, should be selling it in the shops as a poster, or even as a feature wallpaper.

[3 Holer]

Two outstanding threads megan & compressor stall. Both are factual and to the point. You are too modest megan, I didn't realise you were also experienced in polar ops.You both have rekindled my enthusiasm to participate in this debate. Hey prospector, bet you're glad you brought that challenge up to megan. Breath of fresh air!

[PapaHotel6]

Megan - there's one thing no witness ever said. And that is that they believed they were entitled to descend to 6000', or 2000', or whatever under any circumstances

[prospector]

megan,

My post 1101, got a reply yet.

Stuart McFarlane, Senior Lecturer in Law, has got a very low opinion of his superiors in the Appeal Court, and the Privy Council. Wonder why he has such a low opinion of his superiors?

Hey prospector, bet you're glad you brought that challenge up to megan. Breath of fresh air

The discussion is regarding clear air, not fresh air. .

Compressor stall,

Hypothetically, given the weather at McMurdo, which the crew had been given a very full briefing on, including the information that Ross Island was completely covered by cloud, would you consider it prudent to have carried out a descent in the same way, and continued that descent to 1,500ft without observing any identifiable feature, knowing full well that Ross Island with its mountains was very close, none of them sighted at all during the two racetrack patterns?

[megan]

My post 1101, got a reply yet.

The answer is embodied in the first sentence, though doesn't say why. So why did he go that low? Or are you so naïve as to believe management might not be economical with the truth?

Do you have an answer prospector to my,

How do you explain the ability of crews to descend to 1,000 AGL, if they deemed VMC conditions existed, if flying the alternate route to the Ninnis and Mertz Glaciers? (Brian Hewitt's memo 25 November 1976) AINS was the only means of navigation available - no TACAN, no NDB, no nothing, except AINS.

[ampan]

megan #1094:


Messrs Irvine, Gabriel & Simpson

“ [Quote]: They all left their respective briefings under the assumption that the waypoint was at McMUrdo Station. [Unquote] Well, tell me this, why then did the pilots give evidence to the contrary. They all said they thought the track went down the sound. Not one said they thought it went to the TACAN. From Brief of evidence before Royal Commission:


F/O Irvine, "When I left the briefing Ihad a clear understanding that we were flying into the McMurdo area up theMcMurdo Sound with Ross Island and Mt. Erebus well out to our left."


F/O Gabriel, said that during the briefing hecompared the TACAN co-ordinates with the co-ordinates of the"McMurdo" waypoint on the flight plan which he had in front of him.He realised the waypoint was to the west of the TACAN. He therefore believed the navigation track ran to the west of Ross Island though he did not know itsprecise location.


Captain Simpson, He said that he looked at the flight plan produced by Captain Wilson at the briefing and noticed that the "McMurdo" position on it wasfurther south west than the Byrd reporting point, being at the head of McMurdo Sound. Thus by inspecting the co-ordinates Captain Simpson was clear thecomputer flight path ran down McMurdo Sound and not across Mt. Erebus.”

F/O Irvine

For the umpteenth time, a belief that the track was down the Sound with Erebus to the left is not inconsistent with a belief that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station. I’ll have one more go at trying to explain why to megan, then I’m going to give up: A waypoint and a track to that waypoint are different things. The former is defined by a single set of co-ordinates. The latter is defined by two sets of co-ordinates, being those of the point one is going to and those of the point one is coming from. The only topographical map available at the briefing did not show Cape Hallett, being the point they were coming from, so the pilots could not picture the track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station and may well not have appreciated that it crossed Erebus.


What did F/O Irvine say about the waypoint? His evidence was contained in a written statement prepared for him by the union lawyers. As megan points out, that statement does not say where F/O Irvine believed the waypoint to be. Yes, he does not say that he believed the waypoint to be in the McMurdo Station area. But equally, he does not say he thought that the waypoint was 27 miles west of McMurdo Station. Fortunately, things did not end with F/O Irvine reading the words prepared for him by the union lawyers. After, he was cross-examined:

“Do I take it from that that so far as you were concerned yourself you did not know the geographical position of that waypoint? … I could not have walked straight to a map and indicate where the nav track finished. My understanding was that we would fly into the area of the McMurdo fields.” (Transcript page 1733)

The “McMurdo fields”? He could not have been referring to grassy pastures, but we know that there was an airfield near McMurdo Station, called Williams Field. I would venture to suggest that “McMurdo fields” was another typo by the stenographer and that F/O Irvine was referring to the McMurdo Station / Williams Field area – which, after all, was where the audio was telling him where the waypoint was located.


F/O Gabriel

The third sentence of megan’s paragraph was not in F/O Gabriel’s written statement, although it’s not overly important. At least the first two sentences are accurate: F/O Gabriel said he looked at a flight plan during the briefing and concluded that the waypoint was west of the TACAN. There were two flight plans at the briefing, both showing a waypoint to the west of the TACAN. There was Captain’s Wilson’s flight plan from a week before, showing a waypoint more than 28 miles west of the TACAN – and there was the 1977 flight plan used to program the simulator, showing a waypoint at the NDB at McMurdo Station, about 1-2miles west of the TACAN. So which one was it?


Once again,the truth emerges when the union lawyers are bypassed. F/O Gabriel said this in cross-examination: “… it was mentioned that the TACAN co-ordinates had been written on the briefing sheet and I think they were in ball point pen on one of the charts and I can recall at that stage just noticing that yes it’s off to one side – It is a bit east of theMcMurdo position.” (Transcipt page 1727) 1-2 miles is a “bit”. 28 miles is not. F/O Gabriel believed, from the briefing, that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station, just like the audio-tape was telling him.



Captain Simpson

Captain Simpson was seated next to F/O Gabriel at the briefing (MacFarlane p277), so it is probable that Captain Simpson looked at the same flight plan as F/O Gabriel, being the 1977 flight plan with the waypoint at McMurdo Station. Every single word in Captain Simpson’s two initial statements (MacFarlane pages 352 to 362)is consistent with a belief that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station. In neither statement is there any reference to a belief that the waypoint was 10 miles west of McMurdo Station, nor was there any reference to the Byrd Reporting Point. This is despite Captain Simpson making extensive reference to the waypoint in his second statement (MacFarlane p357).


All of this is backed up by the audio-tape, transcribed in Exhibit 12: “Enter 78S/167E being the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station.” So we have the audio-tape saying that the waypoint is at McMurdo Station and we have Captain Simpson hearing that and asking no question about the position of the waypoint,even though he is alleged to have believed it to be some miles out to the west.That alone is enough to raise questions about that part of Captain Simpson’s written statement prepared by the dodgy union lawyers. We then have Captain Simpson going into the simulator and observing it being repositioned. If Captain Simson believed the waypoint to be 10 miles out to the west of McMurdo Station, that’s where he would have expected the simulator to end up following the repositioning. Where did it end up? Overhead McMurdo Station. Did Captain Simpson ask any question about this? No, he did not.


We have Captain Simpson’s complaints in ‘Wings’ in 1986 that the union lawyers were constantly changing his statement and that the final version was presented to him on the morning he was to give his evidence (MacFarlane p661). We also have compelling evidence, which Captain Simpson himself would have known nothing about,that the union lawyers made subtle changes to the wording in order to lock Captain Simpson into a position that suited the union and which was not, in fact, the truth. When left to his own words, Captain Simpson described the flight plan he saw at the briefing as one from “previous years flights”(MacFarlane p354), which excluded the flight plan brought to the briefing by Captain Wilson from his flight the previous week, which had the waypoint well out to the west of McMurdo Station. By time the union lawyers had finished with things, the phrase “previous years flights” had morphed into “a previous flight”(MacFarlane p227), thereby including Captain Wilson’s flight of the previous week.


Finally, we have Captain Simpson’s assessment of the distance from McMurdo Station to the waypoint, as 10 nautical miles. The inset to NZMS135 had a scale, which made it very obvious that the distance from McMurdo Station to the “false McMurdo” / Dailey Islands waypoint was well over 20 nautical miles. The captain was cross-examined on this issue and was not able to provide any plausible explanation (MacFarlane p680 onwards).


The references to 10 miles west and to the Byrd Reporting Point did not come from Captain Simpson. They came from the union lawyers, who managed to slip them past the captain. Note that he knew nothing of the 1977 flight plan. No-one ever suggested to him that he might have been looking at that flight plan. Over time he would have come to believe that he must have been looking at Captain Wilson’s flight plan from the previous week. He was therefore a prime candidate to receive suggestions that might resolve his confusion. Why, then, didn’t the union lawyers simply have him say that he believed the waypoint was 27 miles west of McMurdo Station? Because of Captain Simpson’s first statement (MacFarlane p 353), which Air NZ had, and which said he was “somewhat surprised”to be 28 miles left of track when overhead the TACAN. If Captain Simpson believe the waypoint to be 27 miles west of McMurdo Station, there would be nothing to be surprised about. So the union lawyers needed a point that was west of McMurdo Station, but not too far west – and that’s when the references to 10 miles west and to the Byrd Reporting Point first appear. The problem was that it was patently obvious that the distance from McMurdo Station to the “false McMurdo” / Dailey Islands waypoint was not 10 miles. It was well over 20 miles, as would have been apparent to a sixth-former looking at the scale on the inset to NZMS135.

[prospector]

megan.

So why did he go that low? Or are you so naïve as to believe management might not be economical with the truth?

Why do you keep quoting legal people? You keep inferring that anybody who had anything to do with management were lying to the Commission of Enquiry. If they had of been lying, why is it that no one was ever charged with perjury???

I will continue to quote legal people, who were much more senior to Mahon, and certainly more qualified than a Law Lecturer

The Court of Appeal stated.
The Court of Appeal addressed several aspects that were brought to the commissioners notice during the inquiry but were ignored by him. The five judges unanimously quashed the $150,000 costs order, imposed as punishment for the alleged conspiracy.

Citing his own action when alleged to have been in the wrong, Morrie Davis called on Mahon to resign as a High Court judge, WHICH HE DID.

In their judgement, delivered on 20th October 1983, the five Law Lords dismissed the Commissioners appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, which set aside costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. The DEMOLISHED HIS CASE ITEM BY ITEM, INCLUDING EXHIBIT 164, which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended for the purpose of navigation"

Can we now get back to Mahon's statement that the crew committed no error.

Who then flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft, with the most up to date navigation equipment, into a mountain that everybody knew was there, disregarding all requirements laid down by the company and NZCAA regarding descent procedure, and even disregarding that portion of the briefing stating if weather was unsuitable, such as Ross Island being cloud covered, then the flight was to proceed to the South Magnetic Pole, weather permitting.

You will no doubt be aware of Gordon Vette's theory as to why they never sighted Mt Erebus, sector whiteout, that sector whiteout occurred all during the race track descent patterns? the people on the ground who stated that Ross Island, and Mt Bird and Mt Erebus were completely cloud covered with a base below 2,000ft did not know what they were observing?

How do you explain the ability of crews to descend to 1,000 AGL, if they deemed VMC conditions existed, if flying the alternate route to the Ninnis and Mertz Glaciers? (Brian Hewitt's memo 25 November 1976) AINS was the only means of navigation available - no TACAN, no NDB, no nothing, except AINS

.

Do I need an explanation? What has that to do with this disaster under discussion? If they deemed VMC conditions existed, if the weather was good the visibility extended to the horizon and further, in real VMC conditions Mt Erebus was visible for over 100 miles.

[3 Holer]

Here we go, prospector getting wreckless with the truth again.

Morrie Davis called on Mahon to resign as a High Court judge, WHICH HE DID.

This from NZ Timeline:

4 May 1981 Davis announced he was retiring. He explained that this was not an admission of guilt, but 'an attempt to remove a focus point from the current controversy and by doing so hasten the recovery of the company'.

So why would Justice Mahon accede to a request to resign as a High Court judge from a nobody? (Mahon never resigned until January 1983)

The Court of Appeal addressed several aspects that were brought to the commissioners notice during the inquiry but were ignored by him. The five judges unanimously quashed the $150,000 costs order, imposed as punishment for the alleged conspiracy. In their judgement, delivered on 20th October 1983, the five Law Lords dismissed the Commissioners appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, which set aside costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. The DEMOLISHED HIS CASE ITEM BY ITEM, INCLUDING EXHIBIT 164, which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended for the purpose of navigation"

That was the first part of the story and, as so often has happened in this saga, once the public smell "the stacked deck" there has been a backlash.

Despite his resignation Mahon decided to appeal to the Privy Council against the Court of Appeal's judgement and the government agreed to pay his costs. A four-week hearing was held in July 1983. In October the Privy Council 'very reluctantly' agreed with the Court of Appeal's judgements and dismissed Mahon's appeal. They also placed on record a tribute to the 'brilliant and painstaking investigative work done by the judge'. Justice Mahon's findings on the cause of the crash were not overturned by the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council. Their decisions relate only to his allegations against the airline of a conspiracy.

There is one sentence in your thread prospector that I do agree with.

Can we now get back to Mahon's statement that the crew committed no error.

Let the good times roll!

[megan]

Why do you keep quoting legal people? You keep inferring that anybody who had anything to do with management were lying to the Commission of Enquiry. If they had of been lying, why is it that no one was ever charged with perjury???

My, my, you really are naïve as to what goes on in a court room. I've been very close to a Royal Commission by way of long, long friendship with an individual who the company claimed was responsible for the deaths of a number of people, and injuries to others, including severe.

The company even claimed, at one stage, that he went to work that day with premeditated intent to cause the accident.

Witnesses that the company was to call were presented with a "song sheet" of the story the company wanted told. One witness had the balls to ring the guy in the dock and say, to the effect, "I've been told by the company what to say, I'm sorry I can't support you, I've got a young family to support, etc etc". When it comes to the crunch, you can't blame people taking a position to look after their self interest. To this day there are people who blame him for the accident, but to those who know, he was totally innocent.

And so the court found. The cause was found to be the usual mish mash. Poor plant design, poor design of computer control systems, lack of maintenance, failure to conduct required audits, lack of training, operating the plant continually in alarm mode (at all times there was an emergency being controlled - in this case an emergency had existed for two weeks due to no spares, and it finally got out of control).

in real VMC conditions Mt Erebus was visible for over 100 miles.

You don't know much about what constitutes VMC do you? You can answer by defining what REAL VMC conditions are.

[compressor stall]

Compressor Stall
Hypothetically, given the weather at McMurdo, which the crew had been given a very full briefing on, including the information that Ross Island was completely covered by cloud, would you consider it prudent to have carried out a descent in the same way, and continued that descent to 1,500ft without observing any identifiable feature, knowing full well that Ross Island with its mountains was very close, none of them sighted at all during the two racetrack patterns?

The way it was managed, I don't think it was prudent for any of the flights to leave the MSA of ~16000'.

[PapaHotel6]

The way it was managed, I don't think it was prudent for any of the flights to leave the MSA of ~16000'.

That's kind of sidestepping the question cs

My, my, you really are naïve as to what goes on in a court room. I've been very close to a Royal Commission by way of long, long friendship...........

Really - what are you saying here Megan? That the default response of a Royal Commission of Enquiry is to always ascribe the cause of an incident to evil forces within a company, and this in itself becomes a sort of self-fulfilling truth? That major incidents are always the result of a cummulation of institutional systems errors (please don't say "Swiss Cheese, I'll kill myself) and never banal individual mistakes?? Sorry, but I really don't see what point you're trying to make with your anecdote above.

In any case, we are not in a courtroom here - we have the luxury of being able to maintain integrity and have nothing but contempt for efforts to manipulate the truth, be them historical or present.

I came here with the simple intent of establishing that regardless of the errors or indeed, unethical behaviour of Air New Zealand, that the crew made serious errors in the conduct of this flight and that they could, even without the benefit of hindsight, still have been reasonably expected to have behaved differently on the day. I am happy that this point has now been made.

Prospector, ampan, Hempy and others clearly agree with me. Megan and cs do also; but to admit as much would be in violation of some principle or other. That's fine. There are others such as 3 Holer who cling to their dogma as though it had religious status and are therefore incapable of debating the issues with logic and reason. That's fine also; independent observers will see it for what it is and there'll be similar types on the "other" side of the argument too.

And with that, I'm returning to real life for a while. Thanks people, regardless of where your allegiances lie my faith in the professionalism and integrity of the aviation profession has been upheld.

[megan]

That's kind of sidestepping the question cs

Nothing of the sort. Have you ever flown in Antartica and experienced the conditions that prevail? CS has it nailed with his

I don't think it was prudent for any of the flights to leave the MSA of ~16000'.

[3 Holer]

You still don't get it do you PapaHotel6.

Even the last post by compressor stall when he stated:

The way it was managed,I don't think it was prudent for any of the flights to leave the MSA of ~16000'.

That statement actually contained some tragic wit, which was wasted on you, dismissing it as

....kind of sidestepping the question.....

[prospector]

My, my, you really are naïve as to what goes on in a court room

.

Yes I freely admit to that, I have never been in Court, I actually spent my working life in the sharp end of an aeroplane, there you have to contend with the law of physics, no appeal court if you get it wrong, but must admit living a life without having to resort to lawyers at any time has been a bonus. Probably because after forty years flying I have never hurt any Pax, or been caught breaking any rules or regulations.

Nothing of the sort. Have you ever flown in Antartica and experienced the conditions that prevail?

Have you??

3 Holer No reply, the answers to all your questions have been covered many times..

.

[megan]

Have you??

Sure have, and seen it at its best, and at its worse.

Seeing as you are a pro, you might go through the following list of McMurdo weather reports, and declare which ones you deem VMC exists, and why you so deem. I've made the assumption that each of the flights ran to the same schedule as the final flight.

TemperatureC,DewPointC,Humidity,SeaLevelPressurehPa,Visibili tyKm,WindDirection,WindSpeedKm/h,GustSpeedKm/h,Precipitationmm,Events,Conditions,FullMetar,WindDirDegrees

1977
(1) 15/2 ,-9999,-9999,N/A,993.6,72.4,SSE,25.9,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 150000Z 15014KT 45SM SCT/// BKN/// M08/M A//// RMK SLP936 T1078////,150
(2) 18/10 -9999,-9999,N/A,977.3,72.4,East,11.1,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 180000Z 10006KT 45SM BKN/// M15/M A//// RMK SLP773 T1150////,100
(3) 1/11 -9999,-9999,N/A,988.2,72.4,North,14.8,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 010000Z 35008KT 45SM SCT/// M12/M A//// RMK SLP882 T1117////,350
1978
(4) 7/11 -9999,-9999,N/A,982.2,72.4,NNW,31.5,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 070000Z 33017KT 45SM SCT/// BKN/// M13/M A//// RMK SLP822 T1128////,330
(5) 14/11 -9999,-9999,N/A,989.7,72.4,NW,18.5,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 140000Z 32010KT 45SM SCT/// SCT/// M12/M A//// RMK SLP897 T1122////,320
(6) 21/11 -9999,-9999,N/A,987.3,32.2,East,29.6,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 210000Z 08016KT 20SM -SN OVC/// M13/M A//// RMK SLP873 T1128////,80
(7) 28/11 -9999,-9999,N/A,987.8,64.4,ENE,33.3,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 280000Z 06018KT 40SM -SN OVC/// M08/M A//// RMK SLP878 T1078////,60
1979
(8) 7/11 -16.1,-17.8,87,993.7,8.8,ESE,20.4,-,N/A,Snow,Light Blowing Snow,METAR NZCM 070000Z 12011KT 11/2SM -BLSN OVC/// SCT/// OVC/// M16/M18 A//// RMK SLP937 T11611178,120
(9) 14/11 -12.2,-17.8,64,988.8,72.4,ESE,18.5,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 140000Z 12010KT 45SM SCT/// BKN/// OVC/// M12/M18 A//// RMK SLP888 T11221178,120
(10) 21/11 -5.0,-17.8,37,997.3,72.4,ENE,14.8,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 210000Z 06008KT 45SM SCT/// M05/M18 A//// RMK SLP973 T10501178,60
(11) 28/11 -2.2,-17.8,30,994.7,64.4,East,11.1,-,N/A,,Unknown,METAR NZCM 280000Z 08006KT 40SM OVC/// M02/M18 A//// RMK SLP947 T10221178,80

[3 Holer]

3 Holer No reply, the answers to all your questions have been covered many times..

No problems prospector, always available to help you out.

Don't hold your breath megan, I am still awaiting what the definition of REAL VMC are.

[prospector]

No. I am with PapaHotel6, I am tired of these statements that have nothing to do with Capt Collins and Flt901. There has been nothing really relevant for many posts.