Erebus 25 years on
Whispering "T" Jet
After being cleared for descent to FL180, "He levelled out at that altitude and a few minutes later, knowing from McMurdo that the weather was well below the minima required for the company approved let down procedure and so he would have to improvise his own, he saw a break in the clouds which extended to sea level. Collins stated his intention to circle to get below cloud"
.. .you completely ignoring the written company requirements for descent? There is no doubt they were well aware of these, a copy was recovered from the wreckage of the cockpit.
so it is no surprise that if a document is found on the flight deck that may be helpful to the pilot error hypothesis then a cynic might allege foul play.
From the burglary of homes to the CVR transcript doctored by Chippindale,
a Shakespearean scholar might well say 'something is rotten in the state of Denmark'.
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Fantome said:
Fantome, if you respect the views of Peter Garrison, you might be interested in his take on the Erebus disaster, which can be found here:
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=n...erebus&f=false
They may. But as been pointed out many times before on this thread, failure of one party does not exonerate another.
"Again and again, pilots are found to show little sympathy for their colleagues who are hurt or die, some simplifying explanation is immediately hit upon to reassure the others that the same fate will not be theirs".
At his best Peter Garrison ..............
At his best Peter Garrison ..............
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=n...erebus&f=false
a Shakespearean scholar might well say 'something is rotten in the state of Denmark'.
No, but are you completely ignoring the written company requirements for descent?
and it could be explained by " Normalisation of Deviation" and many other weird theories
From Macarthur 'Mac' Job Editor, Aviation Safety Digest - a highly respected gentleman in the Australian aviation industry.
Notwithstanding the airline’s lamentable role in the many factors that contributed to the accident, and the enormous integrity with which the Royal Commissioner went about his searching Inquiry, did his findings go too far?
Did they overlook fundamental principles of air navigation? The basic terrain-clearance philosophy of IFR flight; and the concept, inherited from generations of seafaring experience, of command responsibility? Will they pose problems of precedent that could one day have far- reaching implications?
For example, how valid can be an opinion, no matter how eminent, whose entire basis and background is essentially legal, on operational judgements made in a highly technical environment? What are we to make of a situation where a professionally qualified government authority, with statutory powers for the safe ordering of air navigation, can have its rulings overturned by legal but technically "lay" arbiters who do not carry that statutory responsibility?
Minimum Safe Altitudes are prescribed for air routes throughout the world to ensure aircraft are not put at risk by descent into areas of high terrain. Both Air New Zealand and the NZ Civil Aviation Division agreed that the MSA for the last 33nm of the route to McMurdo was 16,000 feet.
With terminal conditions at McMurdo poor, the sound navigational procedure would have been to remain at this height until within range of the McMurdo radar, checking over the last portion of the flight that the distance to run on the AINS was of the same order as the DME distance from the McMurdo TACAN.
But, the captain, having spotted a break in the cloud, decided to descend from FL180 when still some 43nm out and not yet identified on McMurdo radar. At this stage the aircraft was only some seven minutes’ flying time from the destination waypoint, when the McMurdo aids could have been relied upon for a safe letdown.
The crew thus contravened the MSA requirement by undertaking a descent without corroboration of position from ground based aids. The fact that no VHF transmissions of any sort were being received from McMurdo also did not assume the relevance it might have.
Airline flight crews are constrained by regulatory requirements. If a crew member transgresses those regulations, he can expect to be disciplined. It was thus surprising that the Royal Commissioner condoned the breaking of MSA requirements on the basis of the conduct of previous Antarctic flights, and the perceived need to provide sightseeing passengers with "their money’s worth".
Even so, it was the Royal Commissioner who succeeded in uncovering the unpalatable facts about the airline’s internal deficiencies and conduct, evidently missed by the technical investigation, which progressively and inexorably painted this unfortunate crew into a corner.
A major, technically complex investigation of this sort, where much hangs on the exact establishment of cause (and, inevitably, the apportioning of blame) is demanding in the extreme. Because of all that is at stake, it can also be subject to subtle but real commercial influences from various "interested parties". Political motives and media pressures for "instant answers" are also brought to bear.
For all these reasons it is plain that such an investigation requires both unfettered technical expertise and highly ethical "outside" objectivity — of the standard provided by Mr Justice Mahon’s Inquiry — if it is to arrive at the unbiased truth.
But could the Royal Commissioner’s findings in this particular case mean that the airline industry might eventually come to the point where the whole basis of command responsibility, as it has been traditionally understood, becomes outmoded? If so, who will then hold the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of an airline flight?
In an age when increasingly computerised operational technology is being imposed on the world airline industry — not without serious reservations in some cases — these questions still await answers.
Last edited by megan; 12th Jul 2016 at 12:55. Reason: Mac Job
The only weird theories have come from yourself and PapaHotel6. The very fact that both of you still display complete ignorance of whiteout, and the ability to be in VMC until impact, despite advice telling you so from an expert (compressor stall) in Antarctic operations. Somebody who has never been there and done the job, telling the guy who has, he doesn't know what he's talking about? Give me a break.
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Megan said:
Would you please point out where I have displayed "complete ignorance of whiteout"?
Putting the whiteout (and Vette's "false horizon" hypothesis) into context is not the same as displaying ignorance. Or maybe in your own blinkered view of the world, it is. At least I have the ability to be concise.
Okay Megan - you've made this inflammatory request several times, so I'll play your silly game and answer it on prospector's behalf. Whenever there's any cloud around, VMC conditions can disappear in an instant, so it isn't possible to to deduce who might, or might not have had VMC conditions on whatever previous flight, especially without relating the flight path of the previous flights to the weather. As a pilot, I would have thought you'd be aware of this.
But looking at the METARs of TE 901, in conjunction with the descent pattern, what was said on the CVR and the fact they made a 15000' descent from MSA; I consider it extremely unlikely they were VMC the whole way down. And if other pilots breached VFR, then I find that abhorrent also and it in no way excuses Collins if he did the same.
I completely concede we'll never know for sure. So should Collins just be given the benefit of the doubt? Perhaps. But even in that case, there are several other reasons why Collins must share some of the blame for this accident, which have all been covered before.
Yet Megan you seem to completely condone everything Collins did on the basis that the same or worse might have been done before.
The only weird theories have come from yourself and PapaHotel6. The very fact that both of you still display complete ignorance of whiteout, and the ability to be in VMC until impact,
Putting the whiteout (and Vette's "false horizon" hypothesis) into context is not the same as displaying ignorance. Or maybe in your own blinkered view of the world, it is. At least I have the ability to be concise.
Everyone ignored the company requirements for descent prospector. I invited you to examine the METARs to pick which ones permitted a VMC descent. You've been strangely ignoring the request.
But looking at the METARs of TE 901, in conjunction with the descent pattern, what was said on the CVR and the fact they made a 15000' descent from MSA; I consider it extremely unlikely they were VMC the whole way down. And if other pilots breached VFR, then I find that abhorrent also and it in no way excuses Collins if he did the same.
I completely concede we'll never know for sure. So should Collins just be given the benefit of the doubt? Perhaps. But even in that case, there are several other reasons why Collins must share some of the blame for this accident, which have all been covered before.
Airline flight crews are constrained by regulatory requirements. If a crew member transgresses those regulations, he can expect to be disciplined. It was thus surprising that the Royal Commissioner condoned the breaking of MSA requirements on the basis of the conduct of previous Antarctic flights
Last edited by PapaHotel6; 12th Jul 2016 at 21:23.
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Re weather at McMurdo, this from a previous post by Henry Crun way back in the discussion.
.
Are you for real??
This from compressor stall
Have to request more, does he mean not down at 1,500ft, or not down at the ice?
megan,
Did not answer your question about the metars, obviously everyone else who went down must have been able to maintain VMC or they likely would have ended up like Collins.
PapaHotel6, Thanks for answering that on my behalf, better response than I would have made, and more polite.
Perhaps your story equating the truck going through the red light a few posts back could be relevant? Collins got the red light.
PapaHotel6,
Good find re Peter Garrison
Further to the points under discussion, an article in todays Dominion Post about the accident quotes the conversation that a Ted Robinson (deputy leader, Scott Base) had with Jim Collins.
Robinson, was at the time, sitting in the radio room doing routine checks with field parties when Collins called for a chat and a weather report.
Quote "Collins made contact and I informed him of the weather conditions, how it was a complete whiteout". He, Robinson, told Collins that it would be unwise to come to McMurdo as passengers wouldn't see anything.
He suggested that Collins fly over the Dry Valleys where the weather was clear.
Robinson also told Collins that a work party on the sea ice some 64 kms from Scott base and at Vanda Station had clear conditions.
Shortly after Collins accepted that information he changed frequency to McMurdo station and Robinson did not speak with him again.
Robinson was never called to give evidence at the enquiry.
Robinson, was at the time, sitting in the radio room doing routine checks with field parties when Collins called for a chat and a weather report.
Quote "Collins made contact and I informed him of the weather conditions, how it was a complete whiteout". He, Robinson, told Collins that it would be unwise to come to McMurdo as passengers wouldn't see anything.
He suggested that Collins fly over the Dry Valleys where the weather was clear.
Robinson also told Collins that a work party on the sea ice some 64 kms from Scott base and at Vanda Station had clear conditions.
Shortly after Collins accepted that information he changed frequency to McMurdo station and Robinson did not speak with him again.
Robinson was never called to give evidence at the enquiry.
A typical theoretical prognostication of events from the storytellers in this sad saga. Those comments are based neither on facts of evidence nor actual events. If that was a sworn statement in a court of law, the witness would be cited for perjury.
Are you for real??
From Macarthur 'Mac' Job Editor, Aviation Safety Digest - a highly respected gentleman in the Australian aviation industry.
Minimum Safe Altitudes are prescribed for air routes throughout the world to ensure aircraft are not put at risk by descent into areas of high terrain. Both Air New Zealand and the NZ Civil Aviation Division agreed that the MSA for the last 33nm of the route to McMurdo was 16,000 feet.
With terminal conditions at McMurdo poor, the sound navigational procedure would have been to remain at this height until within range of the McMurdo radar, checking over the last portion of the flight that the distance to run on the AINS was of the same order as the DME distance from the McMurdo TACAN.
But, the captain, having spotted a break in the cloud, decided to descend from FL180 when still some 43nm out and not yet identified on McMurdo radar. At this stage the aircraft was only some seven minutes’ flying time from the destination waypoint, when the McMurdo aids could have been relied upon for a safe letdown.
With terminal conditions at McMurdo poor, the sound navigational procedure would have been to remain at this height until within range of the McMurdo radar, checking over the last portion of the flight that the distance to run on the AINS was of the same order as the DME distance from the McMurdo TACAN.
But, the captain, having spotted a break in the cloud, decided to descend from FL180 when still some 43nm out and not yet identified on McMurdo radar. At this stage the aircraft was only some seven minutes’ flying time from the destination waypoint, when the McMurdo aids could have been relied upon for a safe letdown.
he should not have been down there (Prospector statement)
Exactly. A point I have made to you and others during my sporadic attention to this thread and its predecessors over the past 7 or so years.
Exactly. A point I have made to you and others during my sporadic attention to this thread and its predecessors over the past 7 or so years.
megan,
Did not answer your question about the metars, obviously everyone else who went down must have been able to maintain VMC or they likely would have ended up like Collins.
PapaHotel6, Thanks for answering that on my behalf, better response than I would have made, and more polite.
Perhaps your story equating the truck going through the red light a few posts back could be relevant? Collins got the red light.
PapaHotel6,
Good find re Peter Garrison
Last edited by prospector; 12th Jul 2016 at 23:55.
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I have dug up the definitions from the 1974 reprint of the Civil Aviation regulations, which applied in 1979. They are virtually the same as those in the current Civil Aviation Rules:
" 'Visibility' means the ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of measurement, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day ... "
" 'Visual meteorological conditions' means meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling equal to or better than specified minima:"
Assuming the specified minima for visibility to be 8km (but feel free to make if 5km if you want) could one of the believers trying fitting "they were VMC until they hit the mountain" into the above definitions?
" 'Visibility' means the ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of measurement, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day ... "
" 'Visual meteorological conditions' means meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling equal to or better than specified minima:"
Assuming the specified minima for visibility to be 8km (but feel free to make if 5km if you want) could one of the believers trying fitting "they were VMC until they hit the mountain" into the above definitions?
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I think I can see where all this has come from: These dummies have only focused on part of the definition of VMC, being "distance from cloud" and "ceiling", and have thought "ah ha! - those requirements are met" (they reckon) but in their boyish enthusiasm, they have overlooked the fact that the definition contains the word "visibility", that Mount Erebus was a very prominent unlighted object, and that they never saw it before hitting it- so the captain's visibility "expressed in units of measurement" was zero millimetres.
Whispering "T" Jet
prospector, Mate.
Of course prospector, more assumptions, presumptions and just stabbing in the dark. We do know however, that the facts brought in evidence, are Air New Zealand had a very poor safety culture re: Antarctic sightseeing flights and ..........the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew. That mistake is directly attributable, not so much to the persons who made it, but to the incompetent administrative airline procedures which made the mistake possible.
Absolutely. Guaranteed in any court in the land.
Did not answer your question about the metars, obviously everyone else who went down must have been able to maintain VMC or they likely would have ended up like Collins.
Are you for real??
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Those comments are based neither on facts of evidence nor actual events. If that was a sworn statement in a court of law, the witness would be cited for perjury.
Absolutely. Guaranteed in any court in the land.
Do you ever read any of these posts? How many times has the descent procedure of this flight been published.
From Macarthur 'Mac' Job Editor, Aviation Safety Digest - a highly respected gentleman in the Australian aviation industry.
But, the captain, having spotted a break in the cloud, decided to descend from FL180 when still some 43nm out and not yet identified on McMurdo radar. At this stage the aircraft was only some seven minutes’ flying time from the destination waypoint, when the McMurdo aids could have been relied upon for a safe letdown.
The crew thus contravened the MSA requirement by undertaking a descent without corroboration of position from ground based aids. The fact that no VHF transmissions of any sort were being received from McMurdo also did not assume the relevance it might have.
The crew thus contravened the MSA requirement by undertaking a descent without corroboration of position from ground based aids. The fact that no VHF transmissions of any sort were being received from McMurdo also did not assume the relevance it might have.
Personally myself I would think it not possible, but from your opinion, who knows.
by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew.
.He suggested that Collins fly over the Dry Valleys where the weather was clear.
Robinson also told Collins that a work party on the sea ice some 64 kms from Scott base and at Vanda Station had clear conditions
Robinson also told Collins that a work party on the sea ice some 64 kms from Scott base and at Vanda Station had clear conditions
I would refer you to Gordon Vette book, "Impact Erebus" pages 46,47 and 48. There are some very good diagrams of the descent path, or perhaps you will also state that Gordon Vette was guilty of perjury?
Just as an aside, are you an 89'er?
Last edited by prospector; 13th Jul 2016 at 09:31.
Amman, those lumps of rock that were around 20km away either side of track were easily identified (sadly geographically misidentified) so clearly the visibility was 20km.
Those features would have likely still been visible at the moment of impact. I've never sat in a DC10 cockpit, you likely have, but they would have been visible about 40° to the rear on each side if you draw a line back from the accident site which I believe was only about 1-2 nm in from the coast.
Those features would have likely still been visible at the moment of impact. I've never sat in a DC10 cockpit, you likely have, but they would have been visible about 40° to the rear on each side if you draw a line back from the accident site which I believe was only about 1-2 nm in from the coast.
Whispering "T" Jet
Would the editor of Australian Safety Digest also be guilty of perjury?
He levelled out at that altitude and a few minutes later, knowing from McMurdo that the weather was well below the minima required for the company approved let down procedure
he saw a break in the clouds which extended to sea level.
stated his intention to circle to get below cloud
There are some very good diagrams of the descent path
I'll give you the credit prospector of not giving me the public service answer of NO, because they didn’t crash! Save it for PapaHotel6 or ampan, they'll accommodate you, trust me.
You get banned on pprune for mentioning '89. Do your homework! Make your own assumptions - you're good at that.
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compressor stall,
he should not have been down there (Prospector statement)
Have to request more, .do you mean not down at 1,500ft, or not down at the ice?
I must admit I have had no experience down on the ice, but surely the definition of VMC as quoted by ampan
means not only out to the sides, but more importantly in the direction you are travelling? Would not the black rock around the coastline, as seen out to the sides also be in the line they took before impact?
The question of sector whiteout may or may not be correct, who will ever know.
he should not have been down there (Prospector statement)
Exactly. A point I have made to you and others during my sporadic attention to this thread and its predecessors over the past 7 or so years.
I must admit I have had no experience down on the ice, but surely the definition of VMC as quoted by ampan
" 'Visibility' means the ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of measurement, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day ...
The question of sector whiteout may or may not be correct, who will ever know.
Sorry missed that in your reply.
My comment re 1500 meant that they should never have left 16000'. I am familiar with the issues of the then airline and the CAA, but have not delved into the minutae deeply enough to be comfortable defending a statement that they should never have left NZ.
There may not have been black rock under the coastline as the track crossed the coast. Often on slopes of this kind, the ice sort of spills over and falls into the water / ice. As for looking forward, they likely had still the ability to see any prominent rock outcrop at 1500'. As an aside here, it's interesting to note NZ's definitions of visibility differ from ICAO and many other member states.
Your last comment is spot on. We will never know. There are plenty of other failures to criticise here raised by yourself and others with which I have not disagreed in our intermittent jousting over this during the past 7 or 8 years.
My comment re 1500 meant that they should never have left 16000'. I am familiar with the issues of the then airline and the CAA, but have not delved into the minutae deeply enough to be comfortable defending a statement that they should never have left NZ.
There may not have been black rock under the coastline as the track crossed the coast. Often on slopes of this kind, the ice sort of spills over and falls into the water / ice. As for looking forward, they likely had still the ability to see any prominent rock outcrop at 1500'. As an aside here, it's interesting to note NZ's definitions of visibility differ from ICAO and many other member states.
Your last comment is spot on. We will never know. There are plenty of other failures to criticise here raised by yourself and others with which I have not disagreed in our intermittent jousting over this during the past 7 or 8 years.
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compressor stall,
Brush aside those making an argument simply for arguments sake based on personal 'shoulder chips', and give us your honest opinion...'white-out', 'VMC' etc notwithstanding.
There are two simple sides to the original argument.
1. Collins and his crew played a significant (but not sole) role in the events that took place on 28 Nov, 1979 (Chippindale) or;
2. Collins and his crew played little to no role whatsoever in the events that took place on 28 Nov, 1979 (Mahon).
So, based on your experience, which is it?
Brush aside those making an argument simply for arguments sake based on personal 'shoulder chips', and give us your honest opinion...'white-out', 'VMC' etc notwithstanding.
There are two simple sides to the original argument.
1. Collins and his crew played a significant (but not sole) role in the events that took place on 28 Nov, 1979 (Chippindale) or;
2. Collins and his crew played little to no role whatsoever in the events that took place on 28 Nov, 1979 (Mahon).
So, based on your experience, which is it?
Hempy and Pakehaboy (echo …echo.. with variation) put to Compressor Stall
a leading question. Presumably, Pakehaboy has since popping his head up thought better of this engagement,
in that he has pulled out of the running.
So let me take issue with Hempy . To pick a hole or two starting with assumptions -
1. the 'original argument ' is not clearly defined. To imply in the first place that there are arguments reducible to the 'simple' and that the 'correct' answers to the resolving of two alternative view points somehow holds the key to grasping a final and absolute understanding of the key sins of commission and omission
attributable to those responsible will not wash.
2. to invoke the concept of 'fairness' to the posing and the answering of the two alternative viewpoints is again to lead. (The 'role' of Jim Collins and his crew has been discussed as we know ad nauseam . What he might have said in reply to his critics is forever pure conjecture.)
OFF TOPIC . . . . you do not 'get banned' for mentioning'89. Every ten years it gets a good airing. Only those who become vituperative face the axe. Only pariahs are unmentionable.. No sin or shame showing your colours.
a leading question. Presumably, Pakehaboy has since popping his head up thought better of this engagement,
in that he has pulled out of the running.
So let me take issue with Hempy . To pick a hole or two starting with assumptions -
1. the 'original argument ' is not clearly defined. To imply in the first place that there are arguments reducible to the 'simple' and that the 'correct' answers to the resolving of two alternative view points somehow holds the key to grasping a final and absolute understanding of the key sins of commission and omission
attributable to those responsible will not wash.
2. to invoke the concept of 'fairness' to the posing and the answering of the two alternative viewpoints is again to lead. (The 'role' of Jim Collins and his crew has been discussed as we know ad nauseam . What he might have said in reply to his critics is forever pure conjecture.)
OFF TOPIC . . . . you do not 'get banned' for mentioning'89. Every ten years it gets a good airing. Only those who become vituperative face the axe. Only pariahs are unmentionable.. No sin or shame showing your colours.
Last edited by Fantome; 13th Jul 2016 at 14:48.
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I've finally got the believer's argument. From the photos taken out the side, we can see black rocky outcrops nearly 20 miles away. Assuming a similar view out the front, where we know there were similar black rocky outcrops, we can assume that the pilots could see them as well, so they had the requisite visibility. Is that it?