Erebus 25 years on
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skol wrote
This sounds like an SOP to me ?
Prospector is right in the respect that pilots were in error, but unlike Prospector I don't believe that you need to dump it all on the crew. The company screwed up in several ways aswell and then attempted a cover up.
KIWIGUY
I was on the DC10 in those days-there were no SOP's.
I was on the DC10 in those days-there were no SOP's.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area
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Kiwiguy,
I have stated on this forum and in this thread that my main concern with the findings of Justice Mahon are that many people appear to agree with this statement posted earlier in the thread.
"The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged."
I have stated that I believe that the blame should be shared between everybody involved, Company, CAA and the crew. To take the crew out of the loop gives a completely wrong interpretation of the events of that day.
I have stated on this forum and in this thread that my main concern with the findings of Justice Mahon are that many people appear to agree with this statement posted earlier in the thread.
"The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged."
I have stated that I believe that the blame should be shared between everybody involved, Company, CAA and the crew. To take the crew out of the loop gives a completely wrong interpretation of the events of that day.
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1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
2. No snow showers in area.
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I don't have any problem with the following comment:
I do think the airline created a culture that allowed descent criteria to be ignored not just on the flight which crashed but probably on earlier ones aswell.
I have always since the crash concluded for myself that lack of line of sight VHF contact was a glaring clue to the pilots that something was not right.
I have stated that I believe that the blame should be shared between everybody involved, Company, CAA and the crew. To take the crew out of the loop gives a completely wrong interpretation of the events of that day.
I have always since the crash concluded for myself that lack of line of sight VHF contact was a glaring clue to the pilots that something was not right.
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And that was the reason for making the descent requirements as they were.
If they had of been complied with there was no way the flight could have impacted on to Erebus
If they had of been complied with there was no way the flight could have impacted on to Erebus
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...........has it really been that long?......CFIT...............new then to some degree & still being performed now ! Sadly as long as humans are at the controls of machines we shall have events such as this.
Was a sad day for all who love aviation & the adventurous spirit it produces! I hope the loss to all those touched by this event are now at piece.
CW
Was a sad day for all who love aviation & the adventurous spirit it produces! I hope the loss to all those touched by this event are now at piece.
CW
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Brian Abraham,
Please read post 156 this thread.
Note that this was the only descent procedure approved, it was formulated to allow these flights to be carried out knowing full well the lack of Antarctic experience that existed amongst ANZ crews. Whether they were VMC, VFR or whatever is irrelevant.
Please read post 156 this thread.
Note that this was the only descent procedure approved, it was formulated to allow these flights to be carried out knowing full well the lack of Antarctic experience that existed amongst ANZ crews. Whether they were VMC, VFR or whatever is irrelevant.
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KIWIGUY
There was instructions relating to that specific duty the same as there is now but there were NO SOP's relating to general operating procedures.
SOPs became part of the Route Guide about 15 years ago but is now a manual on its own.
There was instructions relating to that specific duty the same as there is now but there were NO SOP's relating to general operating procedures.
SOPs became part of the Route Guide about 15 years ago but is now a manual on its own.
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Wrong again
Prospector says;
and
No - it was not the requirement for descent on that flight.
Justice Mahon’s report 40 (b) (my emphasis)
This was the requirement for descent on that flight,
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area
Note that this was the only descent procedure approved, it was formulated to allow these flights to be carried out knowing full well the lack of Antarctic experience that existed amongst ANZ crews. Whether they were VMC, VFR or whatever is irrelevant.
Justice Mahon’s report 40 (b) (my emphasis)
(b) The low altitude of the aircraft:
As stated already, it is beyond dispute that there is no danger in flying at 1500 feet over any flat terrain in clear weather. That altitude is in fact far higher than the minimum safe altitude prescribed for aircraft flights by regulation 38 of the Civil Aviation Regulations.. But it happened that when the Civil Aviation Division of the New Zealand Ministry of Transport had approved these antarctic flights early in 1977, they had prescribed special minimum safe altitudes.. The minimum safe altitude on the approach to Ross Island had been set at 16000 feet and there was a permitted descent of 6000 feet to the south of Ross Island so as to permit sightseeing. This 6000 permission was confined to a special limited sector over the Ross ice shelf to the south of Ross Island.
But as inquiries eventually established, these limits, which may or may not have been observed by the airline for the initial two flights .in February 1977, had not been observed at any time thereafter. In truth, the minimum safe altitude so prescribed by the Civil Aviation Division may have been quite satisfactory as part of an initial flight plan to be used for planning purposes on the first flight. But such minimum safe altitudes of 16 000 feet and 6000 feet, insofar as they were supposed to apply to all Antarctica flights, were misconceived. They had no relation whatever to the realities of sightseeing flights in Antarctica. They continued to be the officially approved levels as between the Civil Aviation Division and the airline from February 1977 right through to the date of the disaster. But in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes, and in my opinion were justified in doing so.
Captains of antarctic flights were specifically briefed in 1978 and in 1979 that they were authorised to descend in the McMurdo area to any flight level authorised and approved by the United States air traffic controller. When Captain Collins accepted the invitation from the United States air traffic controller to descend to 1500 feet where he would find himself in clear air, and with unlimited visibility, he was acting in compliance with authority directly given to him by the airline's briefing officer and under conditions approved by the United States' air traffic controller. The proposed over-flight of McMurdo Sound in the areas specified by the air traffic controller was at a perfectly safe altitude. Contrary to what I think has been a public misconception over this altitude question, there was at no time on 28 November 1979 any unauthorised "low flying" by the crew of TE 901.
As stated already, it is beyond dispute that there is no danger in flying at 1500 feet over any flat terrain in clear weather. That altitude is in fact far higher than the minimum safe altitude prescribed for aircraft flights by regulation 38 of the Civil Aviation Regulations.. But it happened that when the Civil Aviation Division of the New Zealand Ministry of Transport had approved these antarctic flights early in 1977, they had prescribed special minimum safe altitudes.. The minimum safe altitude on the approach to Ross Island had been set at 16000 feet and there was a permitted descent of 6000 feet to the south of Ross Island so as to permit sightseeing. This 6000 permission was confined to a special limited sector over the Ross ice shelf to the south of Ross Island.
But as inquiries eventually established, these limits, which may or may not have been observed by the airline for the initial two flights .in February 1977, had not been observed at any time thereafter. In truth, the minimum safe altitude so prescribed by the Civil Aviation Division may have been quite satisfactory as part of an initial flight plan to be used for planning purposes on the first flight. But such minimum safe altitudes of 16 000 feet and 6000 feet, insofar as they were supposed to apply to all Antarctica flights, were misconceived. They had no relation whatever to the realities of sightseeing flights in Antarctica. They continued to be the officially approved levels as between the Civil Aviation Division and the airline from February 1977 right through to the date of the disaster. But in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes, and in my opinion were justified in doing so.
Captains of antarctic flights were specifically briefed in 1978 and in 1979 that they were authorised to descend in the McMurdo area to any flight level authorised and approved by the United States air traffic controller. When Captain Collins accepted the invitation from the United States air traffic controller to descend to 1500 feet where he would find himself in clear air, and with unlimited visibility, he was acting in compliance with authority directly given to him by the airline's briefing officer and under conditions approved by the United States' air traffic controller. The proposed over-flight of McMurdo Sound in the areas specified by the air traffic controller was at a perfectly safe altitude. Contrary to what I think has been a public misconception over this altitude question, there was at no time on 28 November 1979 any unauthorised "low flying" by the crew of TE 901.
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" No - it was not the requirement for descent on that flight."
From where do you get that statement, and how would you justify it??
It was certainly part of the briefing for the flight, a copy was found in the cockpit after the accident, so the crew certainly were aware of it.
"But in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes, and in my opinion were justified in doing so."
Are you suggesting that an OPINION held by Justice Mahon is of more importance than the requirements of both the Company and the CAA??
"Contrary to what I think has been a public misconception over this altitude question, there was at no time on 28 November 1979 any unauthorised "low flying" by the crew of TE 901."
Once again, are you suggesting that the opinion of Justice Mahon, which incidentally could not be appealed, it was not a law court he was presiding over, is of more importance then the already mentioned many times,MANDATORY requirements for descent??
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
As the flight was never identified on the radar, then this requirement obviously could not be complied with. As the controller did not know their position how could he advise them of anything?? This question of the responsibilities of McMurdo radar were very well covered in the court of US judge Harold Greene. None of his findings agreed with Mahons theories or opinions.
From that court.
" It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing, he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and the terrain, and he was on his own."
Considerably different from your rendition of Mahons opinion that he was invited down by the controller.
"When Captain Collins accepted the invitation from the United States air traffic controller to descend to 1500 feet where he would find himself in clear air, and with unlimited visibility"
From where do you get that statement, and how would you justify it??
It was certainly part of the briefing for the flight, a copy was found in the cockpit after the accident, so the crew certainly were aware of it.
"But in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes, and in my opinion were justified in doing so."
Are you suggesting that an OPINION held by Justice Mahon is of more importance than the requirements of both the Company and the CAA??
"Contrary to what I think has been a public misconception over this altitude question, there was at no time on 28 November 1979 any unauthorised "low flying" by the crew of TE 901."
Once again, are you suggesting that the opinion of Justice Mahon, which incidentally could not be appealed, it was not a law court he was presiding over, is of more importance then the already mentioned many times,MANDATORY requirements for descent??
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
As the flight was never identified on the radar, then this requirement obviously could not be complied with. As the controller did not know their position how could he advise them of anything?? This question of the responsibilities of McMurdo radar were very well covered in the court of US judge Harold Greene. None of his findings agreed with Mahons theories or opinions.
From that court.
" It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing, he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and the terrain, and he was on his own."
Considerably different from your rendition of Mahons opinion that he was invited down by the controller.
"When Captain Collins accepted the invitation from the United States air traffic controller to descend to 1500 feet where he would find himself in clear air, and with unlimited visibility"
Last edited by prospector; 27th Jan 2008 at 08:12.
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On topic but as an aside....some of these posts are getting quoted in the local papers (NZ). Last few days have included articles siting PPRuNe, the thread, and quoting posts. Also stated is that ALPA are to set up a website to give the details of Erebus, as a result.
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Also stated is that ALPA are to set up a website to give the details of Erebus, as a result.
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Prospector writes:
I get it from the Royal Commission Report and justify it because it was given in evidence (somewhat reluctantly, it would appear) by company management.
No - it was not the requirement for descent on that flight."
From where do you get that statement, and how would you justify it??
From where do you get that statement, and how would you justify it??
k) It was alleged that the crew descended below the officially approved minimum safe altitude either of 16000 feet or 6000 feet and that this was the predominant cause of the accident. Although the chief inspector referred from time to time in his report that descent to 1500 feet, even though suggested and authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control. was in breach of the MSA rules officially in force, nevertheless the chief inspector recognised that there were pilots who evidently had misinterpreted the conditions surrounding descent to 6000 feet as if they referred only to a cloud break procedure, and did not prevent descent to any lower altitude consistent with air safety.
The Civil Aviation Division. not unnaturally, placed the breach of its MSA conditions in the forefront of its case. The airline witnesses also, for a considerable period of time, were inclined to rely strongly upon descent below 6000 feet as being in breach of the airline's rules and consequently as amounting to a decisive cause of the disaster. However, after the Commission had been sitting for many weeks it was for the first time revealed by the evidence of Captain Wilson that when briefing air crews for Antarctica flights in 1978 and 1979 he had told them that the practice on antarctic flights was to descend to whatever level was authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control, and he said in his brief of evidence that he did not indicate any criticism of this course.
This new aspect of the RCU; briefing was a most surprising revelation. I noticed that it occurred at the very end of Captain Wilson's prepared brief. Without wishing to appear too pedantic, I also observed that this significant concession appeared to have been added to the end of the brief with a different typewriter, so that the decision to reveal this information was not only very late in the day but also seemed to have the hallmarks of a last-minute decision. It also appeared that the chief inspector had not been appraised of this unwritten feature of the antarctic briefings. I have already referred briefly to this disclosure in paragraph 168 above, and that it had not been previously mentioned to the chief inspector. So here there had been, up until this point, a sedulous reliance by the airline and by Civil Aviation Division upon a breach by Captain Collins of the prevailing MSA rules. that breach being treated as if it obliterated each and every error that might have previously been made by the airline or by Civil Aviation Division. But as from the time of Captain Wilson's admission, the MSA defence, if I may call it that, could not prevail against Captain Collins.
In the final submissions for the airline it was admitted that there were a number of pilots who testified that in VMC conditions they considered it permissible to descend below 6000 feet outside the specified safety sector. It was submitted that Captain Wilson had been under a misconception when he appeared to share the same opinion. Captain Wilson had said:
"In a visual strictly visual VMC letdown providing the weather was clear, very good weather, ceiling and visibility unlimited and provided that the Captain received permission of McMurdo, he could have descended outside that particular segment." (T 1224) The submissions for the airline went on to assert (at para. 7.85) that Captain Collins had carried out his descent outside the specified sector and below 6000 feet "which, on the face of it, constituted a breach of the briefing instructions". This latter submission is plainly wrong. When Captain Collins decided to descend to 1500 feet in VMC conditions with the specific authority of McMurdo Air Traffic Control, he was in fact acting in accordance with the authority given to him at his RCU briefing.
The final submissions for Civil Aviation Division proceeded upon the simple and unqualified basis that the MSA conditions laid down by the division had been contravened, not only in the present case but in previous cases. That of course may be a material factor as between the division and the airline, although I have already expressed my reservations as to the division's alleged lack of knowledge of the levels at which pilots flew in 1978 and in 1979 in the McMurdo area. But I am concerned here, of course, with the position as between the airline and its pilots and there can be no doubt, upon all the evidence, that the pilots were in fact authorised at the RCU briefings in 1978 and 1979 to descend below 6000 feet in VMC conditions to any altitude authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control. This allegation of pilot error must accordingly fail.
The Civil Aviation Division. not unnaturally, placed the breach of its MSA conditions in the forefront of its case. The airline witnesses also, for a considerable period of time, were inclined to rely strongly upon descent below 6000 feet as being in breach of the airline's rules and consequently as amounting to a decisive cause of the disaster. However, after the Commission had been sitting for many weeks it was for the first time revealed by the evidence of Captain Wilson that when briefing air crews for Antarctica flights in 1978 and 1979 he had told them that the practice on antarctic flights was to descend to whatever level was authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control, and he said in his brief of evidence that he did not indicate any criticism of this course.
This new aspect of the RCU; briefing was a most surprising revelation. I noticed that it occurred at the very end of Captain Wilson's prepared brief. Without wishing to appear too pedantic, I also observed that this significant concession appeared to have been added to the end of the brief with a different typewriter, so that the decision to reveal this information was not only very late in the day but also seemed to have the hallmarks of a last-minute decision. It also appeared that the chief inspector had not been appraised of this unwritten feature of the antarctic briefings. I have already referred briefly to this disclosure in paragraph 168 above, and that it had not been previously mentioned to the chief inspector. So here there had been, up until this point, a sedulous reliance by the airline and by Civil Aviation Division upon a breach by Captain Collins of the prevailing MSA rules. that breach being treated as if it obliterated each and every error that might have previously been made by the airline or by Civil Aviation Division. But as from the time of Captain Wilson's admission, the MSA defence, if I may call it that, could not prevail against Captain Collins.
In the final submissions for the airline it was admitted that there were a number of pilots who testified that in VMC conditions they considered it permissible to descend below 6000 feet outside the specified safety sector. It was submitted that Captain Wilson had been under a misconception when he appeared to share the same opinion. Captain Wilson had said:
"In a visual strictly visual VMC letdown providing the weather was clear, very good weather, ceiling and visibility unlimited and provided that the Captain received permission of McMurdo, he could have descended outside that particular segment." (T 1224) The submissions for the airline went on to assert (at para. 7.85) that Captain Collins had carried out his descent outside the specified sector and below 6000 feet "which, on the face of it, constituted a breach of the briefing instructions". This latter submission is plainly wrong. When Captain Collins decided to descend to 1500 feet in VMC conditions with the specific authority of McMurdo Air Traffic Control, he was in fact acting in accordance with the authority given to him at his RCU briefing.
The final submissions for Civil Aviation Division proceeded upon the simple and unqualified basis that the MSA conditions laid down by the division had been contravened, not only in the present case but in previous cases. That of course may be a material factor as between the division and the airline, although I have already expressed my reservations as to the division's alleged lack of knowledge of the levels at which pilots flew in 1978 and in 1979 in the McMurdo area. But I am concerned here, of course, with the position as between the airline and its pilots and there can be no doubt, upon all the evidence, that the pilots were in fact authorised at the RCU briefings in 1978 and 1979 to descend below 6000 feet in VMC conditions to any altitude authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control. This allegation of pilot error must accordingly fail.
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Kiwi, I think the full quote is "History is old, and repeats itself". Could add infinitum I guess.
If anyone has an "in" with the ALPA, and they set up the web site, could you see that they include Chippendales report which seems to have disappeared off the face of the earth.
If anyone has an "in" with the ALPA, and they set up the web site, could you see that they include Chippendales report which seems to have disappeared off the face of the earth.
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Prospector again about the MSA requirements:
No. It was not found in the cockpit after the accident.
Strange that. If you like a conspiracy theory you could also wonder why FO Cassin’s briefing notes were collected by the company from his house and never seen again, why all the pages were missing from Captain Collin’s notebook, why the company became so enthusiastic about shredding documents, and who was behind the alleged burglaries at Captain Collins and Justice Mahon’s houses.
Prospector:
It was the Airline that disregarded the CAA minimum altitude requirement in their briefing to pilots. Justice Mahon then had an opinion that they were justified in doing so. The importance or otherwise of his opinion does not change the fact that “in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes”. He suggests in his report that the CAA should take it up with the airline and not try to blame the pilots.
Prospector:
It was not mandatory. The company had specifically authorised descent below 6000 feet in VMC.
"there can be no doubt, upon all the evidence, that the pilots were in fact authorised at the RCU briefings in 1978 and 1979 to descend below 6000 feet in VMC conditions to any altitude authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control."
It was certainly part of the briefing for the flight, a copy was found in the cockpit after the accident, so the crew certainly were aware of it.
342. This instruction by the chief executive for the collection of all Antarctica documents had some unfortunate repercussions. Captain Gemmell. the chief pilot had gone to Antarctica with the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents, and with other officials, at about midday on 29 November 1979. It was alleged by counsel for ALPA that while Captain Gemmell was at Antarctica he had collected a quantity of documents from the crash site and brought them back to Auckland.
It was pointed out that of the documents collected at the wreckage site and produced to the Commission, there were only three which had been part of the flight documents carried by Captain Collins.
These three documents were:
(a) The RNC chart which set out track and distance diagrams for QANTAS and for Air Force flights but not for Air New Zealand. and which conveyed information as to various radio frequencies.
(b) A sample flight plan printed in October 1977 which contained among the list of co-ordinates the latitude and longitude of the NDB at McMurdo.
(c) The piece of paper containing Captain Johnson's notification on 8 November 1979 that the NDB facility was withdrawn and including a notification that the minimum safe altitude in the McMurdo area was 6000 feet.
343. It was suggested by counsel for ALP A that it was curious to find that the only flight documents recovered from the ice were each in favour of. the case which the airline was now attempting to advance. The RNC chart gave information about radio frequencies. The 2-year-old sample flight plan gave the co-ordinates of the McMurdo NDB. Captain Johnson's memorandum contained a reminder that the minimum safe altitude was 6000 feet.
344. It was pointed out that the following documents, which clearly had been carried in the flight bag of Captain Collins, along with the three just specified, had not been recovered:
(a) A map or maps upon which he had been working with plotting instruments the night before the fatal flight.
{b) The thick and heavy atlas upon which he had been working with plotting instruments the night before the fatal flight.
{c) The large topographical map issued to him by Flight Despatch on the morning of the .flight.
(d) The briefing documents handed to Captain Collins on 9 November 1979, which would have contained his own notations.
(e) The notebook which he almost certainly brought with him to the briefing of 9 November 1979 along with his atlas.
{f) The track and distance diagram showing the flight path to be down McMurdo Sound (Annex G to the chief inspector's report).
{g) Another track and distance diagram also showing the flight path to be down McMurdo Sound (AnnexH to the chief inspector's report).
(h) The Antarctica Strip Chart showing the military track down the centre of McMurdo Sound (Annex I to the chief inspector's report).
It was suggested that each of the documents just listed, but not located, would have tended to support the proposition that Captain Collins had relied upon the incorrect co-ordinates.
It was pointed out that of the documents collected at the wreckage site and produced to the Commission, there were only three which had been part of the flight documents carried by Captain Collins.
These three documents were:
(a) The RNC chart which set out track and distance diagrams for QANTAS and for Air Force flights but not for Air New Zealand. and which conveyed information as to various radio frequencies.
(b) A sample flight plan printed in October 1977 which contained among the list of co-ordinates the latitude and longitude of the NDB at McMurdo.
(c) The piece of paper containing Captain Johnson's notification on 8 November 1979 that the NDB facility was withdrawn and including a notification that the minimum safe altitude in the McMurdo area was 6000 feet.
343. It was suggested by counsel for ALP A that it was curious to find that the only flight documents recovered from the ice were each in favour of. the case which the airline was now attempting to advance. The RNC chart gave information about radio frequencies. The 2-year-old sample flight plan gave the co-ordinates of the McMurdo NDB. Captain Johnson's memorandum contained a reminder that the minimum safe altitude was 6000 feet.
344. It was pointed out that the following documents, which clearly had been carried in the flight bag of Captain Collins, along with the three just specified, had not been recovered:
(a) A map or maps upon which he had been working with plotting instruments the night before the fatal flight.
{b) The thick and heavy atlas upon which he had been working with plotting instruments the night before the fatal flight.
{c) The large topographical map issued to him by Flight Despatch on the morning of the .flight.
(d) The briefing documents handed to Captain Collins on 9 November 1979, which would have contained his own notations.
(e) The notebook which he almost certainly brought with him to the briefing of 9 November 1979 along with his atlas.
{f) The track and distance diagram showing the flight path to be down McMurdo Sound (Annex G to the chief inspector's report).
{g) Another track and distance diagram also showing the flight path to be down McMurdo Sound (AnnexH to the chief inspector's report).
(h) The Antarctica Strip Chart showing the military track down the centre of McMurdo Sound (Annex I to the chief inspector's report).
It was suggested that each of the documents just listed, but not located, would have tended to support the proposition that Captain Collins had relied upon the incorrect co-ordinates.
Prospector:
"But in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes, and in my opinion were justified in doing so."
Are you suggesting that an OPINION held by Justice Mahon is of more importance than the requirements of both the Company and the CAA??
Are you suggesting that an OPINION held by Justice Mahon is of more importance than the requirements of both the Company and the CAA??
Prospector:
Once again, are you suggesting that the opinion of Justice Mahon, which incidentally could not be appealed, it was not a law court he was presiding over, is of more importance then the already mentioned many times, MANDATORY requirements for descent??
"there can be no doubt, upon all the evidence, that the pilots were in fact authorised at the RCU briefings in 1978 and 1979 to descend below 6000 feet in VMC conditions to any altitude authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control."
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Desert Dingo,
You are doing nothing but quoting from Mahons book, in which he tries to justify his many opinions.
Try reading the reports compiled by very experienced aviation and administration personnel in the wake of the findings of the Commission being made public.
You could start with the Bolt/Kennedy report that was compiled by to look into the allegations of failure by the CAA made by Mahon.
Or the "Analysis of the Royal Commission report", compiled by C.H.N. L'Estrange. It is entitled "The Erebus enquiry: A tragic miscarriage of Justice".
Or the article by Captain Derek Ellis in the British Airline Pilots Association magazine the log of Aug 1985 in which he states "The effect of reading Gordon Vettes book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the commissioner, has in fact been to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of Air Accident Investigation are infinitely more realistic".
You are doing nothing but quoting from Mahons book, in which he tries to justify his many opinions.
Try reading the reports compiled by very experienced aviation and administration personnel in the wake of the findings of the Commission being made public.
You could start with the Bolt/Kennedy report that was compiled by to look into the allegations of failure by the CAA made by Mahon.
Or the "Analysis of the Royal Commission report", compiled by C.H.N. L'Estrange. It is entitled "The Erebus enquiry: A tragic miscarriage of Justice".
Or the article by Captain Derek Ellis in the British Airline Pilots Association magazine the log of Aug 1985 in which he states "The effect of reading Gordon Vettes book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the commissioner, has in fact been to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of Air Accident Investigation are infinitely more realistic".
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Thanks, Prospector. I'll try and read those books you mention.
I have been quoting from the Report of the Royal Commission, not "from Mahons book, in which he tries to justify his many opinions."
I have always thought Royal Commissions were to establish facts, not opinions.
Do you have any facts that disprove those found by the Royal Commission that completely demolish your argument that the pilots were not permitted "to descend below 6000 feet in VMC conditions to any altitude authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control." Are you suggesting that Captain Wilson's own evidence was wrong?
I have been quoting from the Report of the Royal Commission, not "from Mahons book, in which he tries to justify his many opinions."
I have always thought Royal Commissions were to establish facts, not opinions.
Do you have any facts that disprove those found by the Royal Commission that completely demolish your argument that the pilots were not permitted "to descend below 6000 feet in VMC conditions to any altitude authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control." Are you suggesting that Captain Wilson's own evidence was wrong?
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Yes I do, the requirements for descent that have been quoted ad infinitum.
It was only Mahons opinion that they did not apply. They were a legal requirement arrived at by CAA before approval for these flights was given, and for obvious reasons.
Why do you not also quote from Capt M. Hawkins, who stated "I was in no doubt at the briefing that the lower limit was 6000Ft, the weather on my flight was perfect, with clear skies and 100 miles visibility. Ice tower asked me for a low run, but I kept to 6000 feet".
Because the flight levels of 16000ft and 6000ft and the flight path over Mt Erebus still remained as part of the official approval of Civil Aviation Division as at 29 November 1979 Mahon wrote;
"This was the principal basis of the case for CAA and, as will be found from what I have already written, it was in my VIEW a basis without any justification whatever".
Once again Mahon believes his view overrides mandatory requirements from CAA. And remember, these views are from a man who had no intimate knowledge of aviation procedures.
It was only Mahons opinion that they did not apply. They were a legal requirement arrived at by CAA before approval for these flights was given, and for obvious reasons.
Why do you not also quote from Capt M. Hawkins, who stated "I was in no doubt at the briefing that the lower limit was 6000Ft, the weather on my flight was perfect, with clear skies and 100 miles visibility. Ice tower asked me for a low run, but I kept to 6000 feet".
Because the flight levels of 16000ft and 6000ft and the flight path over Mt Erebus still remained as part of the official approval of Civil Aviation Division as at 29 November 1979 Mahon wrote;
"This was the principal basis of the case for CAA and, as will be found from what I have already written, it was in my VIEW a basis without any justification whatever".
Once again Mahon believes his view overrides mandatory requirements from CAA. And remember, these views are from a man who had no intimate knowledge of aviation procedures.
Last edited by prospector; 27th Jan 2008 at 22:43.
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It was only Mahons opinion that they did not apply.
- Captain Wilson testified that he briefed the pilots that it was OK to descend in VMC.
- McMurdo ATC issued descent clearances contrary to those requirements because the company never advised them of those restrictions.
Justice Mahon established the fact that the company subsequently disregarded those restrictions on later flights.
You make some good points, but you can't get past the fact that the company briefed the pilots that they had approval to descend below 6000 feet VMC with ATC clearance.