Erebus 25 years on
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Fair enough today - but the skip didn't have 30 years to think about it.
I can't see anything wrong with staying at 18000 feet for the next 40 miles to the final waypoint, getting a radar positional fix, and good comms, being cleared of local traffic, and then breaking the cloud cover over McMurdo Station.
Can't help wondering if that second memo might have had something to do with this.
I can't see anything wrong with staying at 18000 feet for the next 40 miles to the final waypoint, getting a radar positional fix, and good comms, being cleared of local traffic, and then breaking the cloud cover over McMurdo Station.
Can't help wondering if that second memo might have had something to do with this.
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Nothing at all wrong with that, we certainly would not be having this debate if that sequence of events had of happened. The bug in the ointment was the conditions at McMurdo, completely overcast at 3500ft, and cloud layers above.
Mountain tops in the area were covered in cloud. other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud, and the crew of a helicopter which landed at Cape Bird hut, 35 kilometres from the crash site and only an hour later, said it was overcast at 1500ft with light snow.
Certainly very bloodshot VMC, 260kts plus at 1467ft. The next aircraft in a USAF C-141 only 45 minutes behind said no terrain was visible and he made a long gradual descent over the water, navigating entirely by INS and maintaining 16,000ft until being picked up by McMurdo radar about 38 nautical miles out.
The only other flight that had bad weather diverted and went to the South magnetic pole, this was touched on earlier in the thread, all the rest had CAVOK with unlimited visibility.
Mountain tops in the area were covered in cloud. other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud, and the crew of a helicopter which landed at Cape Bird hut, 35 kilometres from the crash site and only an hour later, said it was overcast at 1500ft with light snow.
Certainly very bloodshot VMC, 260kts plus at 1467ft. The next aircraft in a USAF C-141 only 45 minutes behind said no terrain was visible and he made a long gradual descent over the water, navigating entirely by INS and maintaining 16,000ft until being picked up by McMurdo radar about 38 nautical miles out.
The only other flight that had bad weather diverted and went to the South magnetic pole, this was touched on earlier in the thread, all the rest had CAVOK with unlimited visibility.
Last edited by prospector; 21st Feb 2008 at 03:09. Reason: addition
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Recovery of the memo at the crash site.
How very convenient for the company’s case to find that memo at the crash site.
How very convenient also that Captain Collin’s big black covered atlas was never recovered, although lots of little white colored things were found in the snow.
How very strange that the two policemen who found Collin’s notebook said that they were astonished when seeing a TV documentary (some months after Mahon’s enquiry had finished) that there were no pages in the notebook. When they recovered the notebook it was undamaged, contained about 30 pages of which the first 6 or 7 pages were notes and flight data which they could easily read. Realising its significance, they placed it in a plastic evidence bag and made sure it was sent back to the recovered evidence store at McMurdo base. ( I wonder if it might just by chance have contained the final waypoint co-ordinates and written notes regarding the “oral” descent approval?)
Also very strange was that of all the many photographs taken by the passengers during the descending orbits, not one was ever produced that showed a view to the south ie directly towards Mt Erebus.
I’ve read somewhere that a good way to analyse some things is to “follow the money”.
In this case if the sole cause of the disaster was “pilot error” the Civil Aviation Division and the Ministry of Transport are completely exonerated, and the airline’s liability is limited by the Warsaw convention to only $42,000 per passenger; if it was not solely “pilot error” then the sky is the limit on damage claims on all parties.
I wonder if there is a motive in there for “not finding” some things?
How very convenient also that Captain Collin’s big black covered atlas was never recovered, although lots of little white colored things were found in the snow.
How very strange that the two policemen who found Collin’s notebook said that they were astonished when seeing a TV documentary (some months after Mahon’s enquiry had finished) that there were no pages in the notebook. When they recovered the notebook it was undamaged, contained about 30 pages of which the first 6 or 7 pages were notes and flight data which they could easily read. Realising its significance, they placed it in a plastic evidence bag and made sure it was sent back to the recovered evidence store at McMurdo base. ( I wonder if it might just by chance have contained the final waypoint co-ordinates and written notes regarding the “oral” descent approval?)
Also very strange was that of all the many photographs taken by the passengers during the descending orbits, not one was ever produced that showed a view to the south ie directly towards Mt Erebus.
I’ve read somewhere that a good way to analyse some things is to “follow the money”.
In this case if the sole cause of the disaster was “pilot error” the Civil Aviation Division and the Ministry of Transport are completely exonerated, and the airline’s liability is limited by the Warsaw convention to only $42,000 per passenger; if it was not solely “pilot error” then the sky is the limit on damage claims on all parties.
I wonder if there is a motive in there for “not finding” some things?
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Desert Dingo,
"In this case if the sole cause of the disaster was “pilot error” "
I was under the impression the debate was about Mahon stating that NO BLAME could be attributed to the crew.
"other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud,"
Also very strange was that of all the many photographs taken by the passengers during the descending orbits, not one was ever produced that showed a view to the south ie directly towards Mt Erebus.
Who wants to take photo's of clouds????,
"In this case if the sole cause of the disaster was “pilot error” "
I was under the impression the debate was about Mahon stating that NO BLAME could be attributed to the crew.
"other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud,"
Also very strange was that of all the many photographs taken by the passengers during the descending orbits, not one was ever produced that showed a view to the south ie directly towards Mt Erebus.
Who wants to take photo's of clouds????,
Last edited by prospector; 21st Feb 2008 at 04:43.
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Following the Money
But if you're going to follow the money, D. Dingo, and if you work out what was in the airline's best financial interests, you then have to ask what financial leverage the airline might have had over the exec pilots. My understanding is that there was very little financial advantage to being an exec pilot. So maybe it was just stand-over tactics by Morrie Davis, or one of his henchmen? The problem there is that even Mahon would be unlikely to agree, given that in his book he gives lengthy descriptions of his impressions of the top two exec pilots. If Mahon's descriptions are accurate, the Chief Pilot would have had no difficultly in telling Morrie to f*ck off, and the No.2 likewise (except that he would have done so in a charming fashion).
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Exec Pilots
MacFarlane's book (p106) contains an organisation diagram. Captain DR Eden is shown as "Director of Flight Operations". Below him is Captain PA Grundy, who is shown as "Flight Operations Manager". Captain IH Gemmell is below Capt. Grundy, listed at "Flight Manager - Technical".
My understanding is that the Director of Flight Operations job was 100% office, while the rest of the exec jobs were part flying / part office.
The "Chief Pilot" title might have had more to do with seniority: It looks as if Capt. Gemmell had been with AirNZ since the 1940s.
The two execs that Mahon describes in his book are Capts. Gemmell and Grundy.
My understanding is that the Director of Flight Operations job was 100% office, while the rest of the exec jobs were part flying / part office.
The "Chief Pilot" title might have had more to do with seniority: It looks as if Capt. Gemmell had been with AirNZ since the 1940s.
The two execs that Mahon describes in his book are Capts. Gemmell and Grundy.
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Burglary at Pilot's Home
This has nothing to do with the cause of the crash but I'd be very grateful if ANYONE was able to advise me just why the pilots' homes were broken into and certain items removed. I really have a problem with that. Just WHO or what had the most to gain by such action?
If you've seen the video of Captain Collins' widow, Maria, testifying about this at the Royal Commission, it is quite heartbreaking. She describes how only documents are stolen, yet valuables, such as "a ruby ring surrounded with diamonds" were not taken. "They would be quite distictive" she says, after asked by the lawyer (who is not shown, but I assume it is either Baragwanath or Collins' lawyer). Whilst those of us suspicious about Air NZ's possible conspiracy had our own ideas, Mahon mentions this incident in his book, but explains (rather diplomatically I thought) it as what he considered to be a relative of one the deceased passengers breaking-in, so that they could read an advanced copy of one of the reports that had been handed to Maria.
There was no breakin at the Cassin household (that I am aware of). However, documents relating to the crash were passed to an Air NZ employee by Anne Cassin's brother-in-law, without her being present nor aware of this. Her testimony relating to this I also have on video. Captain Crosby's was identified as being the employee who took the documents.
Captain Crosby's evidence is quite bizarre, as his later evidence at the Royal Commission relates to the missing papers from Captain Collins' black ring binder. He mentions that he doesn't recall removin them, but then when asked if Air NZ were to send an employee to the Cassin house to take documents, who that would have been, he replies "that would be myself I presume".
I have seen it mentioned here that Mahon's house was broken into during the Commission. I hadn't heard of this before - it isn't mentioned in his book - and I am intrigued as to what the motive was behind this.
Nevertheless, all of these sinister acts that were committed after the crash and during the Commission by "persons unknown" have added to the weight of disapproval and anger against the airline at the time (whether that is fair or not is another question).
Last edited by malcolmyoung90; 21st Feb 2008 at 23:21. Reason: Watched Flight 901 Video Last Night
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ampan
"Fair enough today - but the skip didn't have 30 years to think about it."
Given that these people were very well qualified airline pilots flying international routes, how long would they need to think about it. They were well aware they were operating in a new, very challenging environment, of which they had no experience whatsoever, which puts them back to the basics, you dont go down a sucker hole. especially when the actual weather at your destination is below minimums for the approved descent procedure.
How difficult is that to accept???
Who said what and where, and who pinched what allegedly months later has absolutely nothing to do with what caused the accident.
Why is a captain a captain? the buck has to stop somewhere, if as Mahon claims, the aircraft was programmed to fly into Mt Erebus, and the crew in the sharp end could not prevent this, then why bother having them there???
"Fair enough today - but the skip didn't have 30 years to think about it."
Given that these people were very well qualified airline pilots flying international routes, how long would they need to think about it. They were well aware they were operating in a new, very challenging environment, of which they had no experience whatsoever, which puts them back to the basics, you dont go down a sucker hole. especially when the actual weather at your destination is below minimums for the approved descent procedure.
How difficult is that to accept???
Who said what and where, and who pinched what allegedly months later has absolutely nothing to do with what caused the accident.
Why is a captain a captain? the buck has to stop somewhere, if as Mahon claims, the aircraft was programmed to fly into Mt Erebus, and the crew in the sharp end could not prevent this, then why bother having them there???
Last edited by prospector; 21st Feb 2008 at 05:51.
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Prospector:
"Sucker hole" is exactly the right expression. It was a nest of vipers down there, which is why it's difficult to identify an error. All there is is the Beaufort Island issue, and although Mahon's Dunlop Island theory and MacFarland's 'gap in the sea ice' theory are both nonsense, you still have the mindset and the time pressure.
Which is why I have tried to look at the situation before they descended down the hole. It looked quite straightforward: Crew failed to verify position before going below height of known hazard. But it looks as if they intended to verify their position before going down, and then changed the plan and descended through the hole. The only explanation for that that I can come up with is that second memo.
So it's starting to become a bit of a viper's nest above the cloud, as well as below.
"Sucker hole" is exactly the right expression. It was a nest of vipers down there, which is why it's difficult to identify an error. All there is is the Beaufort Island issue, and although Mahon's Dunlop Island theory and MacFarland's 'gap in the sea ice' theory are both nonsense, you still have the mindset and the time pressure.
Which is why I have tried to look at the situation before they descended down the hole. It looked quite straightforward: Crew failed to verify position before going below height of known hazard. But it looks as if they intended to verify their position before going down, and then changed the plan and descended through the hole. The only explanation for that that I can come up with is that second memo.
So it's starting to become a bit of a viper's nest above the cloud, as well as below.
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ampan,
" Crew failed to verify position before going below height of known hazard. But it looks as if they intended to verify their position before going down, and then changed the plan"
And now you are getting to the conclusion that Chippendale, Ellis, Bolt, L'Estrange, Sir G Roberts, and many others, who between them have many thousands of hours of air time, as well as admin in the highest level in the aviation world, arrived at. As against a judge, who may well have been a very good judge, but had never parked his arse in the drivers seat of an aeroplane.
" Crew failed to verify position before going below height of known hazard. But it looks as if they intended to verify their position before going down, and then changed the plan"
And now you are getting to the conclusion that Chippendale, Ellis, Bolt, L'Estrange, Sir G Roberts, and many others, who between them have many thousands of hours of air time, as well as admin in the highest level in the aviation world, arrived at. As against a judge, who may well have been a very good judge, but had never parked his arse in the drivers seat of an aeroplane.
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Ross Island obscured by cloud
Sure “Ross Island was obscured by cloud.” What prospector omits to mention is that it was clear below the cloud.
One report was from the C141 flying at 16,000 feet and above the cloud layer. Of course Ross Island was obscured by cloud for them.
Find the complete C141 report and it says
Another report was from the C130 inbound from the west northwest.
There were photographs taken by the passengers only second before impact which showed the “wing rock” event and the eastern shoreline of Cape Bird and the eastern and northwestern shoreline of Lewis Bay. These also showed a cloud layer with a base around 2,000 feet above unbroken snow.
Visibility to the sides was not a problem – it was the sector whiteout dead ahead that was the fatal trap.
It was conclusively proved at Mahon’s inquiry that the aircraft was flying in clear air right up to impact.
Some more points to ponder;
The airline claimed that Collins had been briefed that the track was over Mt Erebus.
Ignore for a moment the evidence of the other pilots at Collins’ briefing who said in effect “ That’s BS”, and the evidence about Collins drawing a track on his atlas down the middle of McMurdo sound .
The peak of Mt Erebus is about 20 nm from Mc Murdo. Collins locked the aircraft onto the NAV track after completing his orbits and descent. They were still engaged on the NAV track when Collins said “Were 26 miles north, we’ll have to climb out of this.”
If Collins (or anyone else on the flight deck) believed the NAV track was taking them over Mt Erebus, and here they were at 1500 feet with less than 10 miles to run pointing straight at a 12,450 foot mountain they would have to be bloody suicidal.
When questions at the enquiry about why Collins put the aircraft in this position of danger, Chippindale replied that he had given the matter careful consideration, and Collins must have been suddenly afflicted by some medical or psychological malady which made him oblivious to the mortal danger looming in front of him. When it was pointed out that this must have simultaneously happened to everyone else present on the flight deck, and was patently an absurd proposition his credibility suffered badly.
Once again the only conclusion to make is that the crew believed they were flying down the middle of McMurdo sound and never saw Mt Erebus.
One report was from the C141 flying at 16,000 feet and above the cloud layer. Of course Ross Island was obscured by cloud for them.
Find the complete C141 report and it says
” …….. We began descent and entered cloud immediately. The cloud cover appeared to be cumulus or stratocumulus and we encountered only light rime icing and light turbulence. Between 12,500 feet and 11,000 feet we passed between cloud layers. We broke out of the cloud base at about 5,000 feet; visibility beneath the ceiling was good. We landed at McMurdo at 2.52pm.
“there was a continuous stratiform layer covering Ross Island with cloud “domes” over Mt Erebus and Mt Terror concealing them from view. A lenticular cap cloud lay over Mt Erebus above the main cloud layer. Visibility was good below the main cloud base, but surface definition was poor.
Visibility to the sides was not a problem – it was the sector whiteout dead ahead that was the fatal trap.
It was conclusively proved at Mahon’s inquiry that the aircraft was flying in clear air right up to impact.
Some more points to ponder;
The airline claimed that Collins had been briefed that the track was over Mt Erebus.
Ignore for a moment the evidence of the other pilots at Collins’ briefing who said in effect “ That’s BS”, and the evidence about Collins drawing a track on his atlas down the middle of McMurdo sound .
The peak of Mt Erebus is about 20 nm from Mc Murdo. Collins locked the aircraft onto the NAV track after completing his orbits and descent. They were still engaged on the NAV track when Collins said “Were 26 miles north, we’ll have to climb out of this.”
If Collins (or anyone else on the flight deck) believed the NAV track was taking them over Mt Erebus, and here they were at 1500 feet with less than 10 miles to run pointing straight at a 12,450 foot mountain they would have to be bloody suicidal.
When questions at the enquiry about why Collins put the aircraft in this position of danger, Chippindale replied that he had given the matter careful consideration, and Collins must have been suddenly afflicted by some medical or psychological malady which made him oblivious to the mortal danger looming in front of him. When it was pointed out that this must have simultaneously happened to everyone else present on the flight deck, and was patently an absurd proposition his credibility suffered badly.
Once again the only conclusion to make is that the crew believed they were flying down the middle of McMurdo sound and never saw Mt Erebus.
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Desert Dingo,
Ok. it was clear below the cloud, below being 1467ft which was the point of impact height. from memory. If you consider flying a DC10, or even an MD11, at 1500ft, not below 260 kts over country you have never been over before, in conditions that were very marginal VMC to say the least, is reasonable behaviour then not much more is to be gained from this hair splitting contest.
"never saw Mt Erebus."
Patently obvious, but one would have thought, knowing how close they were to it, even if they were on the track they thought they were on, not sighting it would have been a major concern.
"some medical or psychological malady "
He may well have been correct, did Mahon prove otherwise??? Did he consult with his crew before he decided to commence this descent??
Ok. it was clear below the cloud, below being 1467ft which was the point of impact height. from memory. If you consider flying a DC10, or even an MD11, at 1500ft, not below 260 kts over country you have never been over before, in conditions that were very marginal VMC to say the least, is reasonable behaviour then not much more is to be gained from this hair splitting contest.
"never saw Mt Erebus."
Patently obvious, but one would have thought, knowing how close they were to it, even if they were on the track they thought they were on, not sighting it would have been a major concern.
"some medical or psychological malady "
He may well have been correct, did Mahon prove otherwise??? Did he consult with his crew before he decided to commence this descent??
Last edited by prospector; 21st Feb 2008 at 08:14.
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Not necessarily, Desert Dingo:
Yes, the crew could not have believed that the nav track went over Erebus. They must have believed that it went down McMurdo Sound.
But it still possible that they were briefed that the nav track went over Erebus.
Note that the briefing was over two weeks before the flight. And floating around at the briefing were photocopies of a flightplan with the McMurdo Sound nav track coordinates. I as recall, Capt. Wilson's evidence was that these were samples which were not intended to be taken away, but that one of the photocopies was not returned.
Let's assume that Captain Collins decided to retain one of the photocopies. More than two weeks later, he uses it to plot the nav track. I'm not suggesting that he forgot what was said at the briefing, but he may have disregarded it, because what's on paper tends to overide what is said, especially after two weeks.
Going back to Capt. Wilson, it was his evidence that shot the legs off the minimum altitude argument, as you have pointed out. So it's difficult to go through his evidence picking cherries, saying I'll have bit, but I don't want that other bit. He swore under oath that he told the crew that the nav track went over Erebus, and was then set upon by a tag team of lawyers - and he maintained that he told the crew the track went over Erebus.
Yes, the crew could not have believed that the nav track went over Erebus. They must have believed that it went down McMurdo Sound.
But it still possible that they were briefed that the nav track went over Erebus.
Note that the briefing was over two weeks before the flight. And floating around at the briefing were photocopies of a flightplan with the McMurdo Sound nav track coordinates. I as recall, Capt. Wilson's evidence was that these were samples which were not intended to be taken away, but that one of the photocopies was not returned.
Let's assume that Captain Collins decided to retain one of the photocopies. More than two weeks later, he uses it to plot the nav track. I'm not suggesting that he forgot what was said at the briefing, but he may have disregarded it, because what's on paper tends to overide what is said, especially after two weeks.
Going back to Capt. Wilson, it was his evidence that shot the legs off the minimum altitude argument, as you have pointed out. So it's difficult to go through his evidence picking cherries, saying I'll have bit, but I don't want that other bit. He swore under oath that he told the crew that the nav track went over Erebus, and was then set upon by a tag team of lawyers - and he maintained that he told the crew the track went over Erebus.
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One point I wish to bring up is that the strip map issued to the crew on the morning of the flight showed the track going down the middle of the sound ie on the track that Collins had plotted and expected. Don't you begin to get the idea that the whole operation from top to bottom was cluster f**k?
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MacFarlane's book (p106) contains an organisation diagram. Captain DR Eden is shown as "Director of Flight Operations". Below him is Captain PA Grundy, who is shown as "Flight Operations Manager". Captain IH Gemmell is below Capt. Grundy, listed at "Flight Manager - Technical".
My understanding is that the Director of Flight Operations job was 100% office, while the rest of the exec jobs were part flying / part office.
The "Chief Pilot" title might have had more to do with seniority: It looks as if Capt. Gemmell had been with AirNZ since the 1940s.
The two execs that Mahon describes in his book are Capts. Gemmell and Grundy.
My understanding is that the Director of Flight Operations job was 100% office, while the rest of the exec jobs were part flying / part office.
The "Chief Pilot" title might have had more to do with seniority: It looks as if Capt. Gemmell had been with AirNZ since the 1940s.
The two execs that Mahon describes in his book are Capts. Gemmell and Grundy.
Initilally I thought that you were joking with your 1940's date. But in the Royal Commission video, Captain Gemmell appears as if he's in his mid-late 50's. If he started flying in his early 20's or late teens, then he would have commenced his flying career in the 1940's as you suggested. I also note that there is a reference to him as General Manager Airline Operations for Polynesian Airlines as recent as Sep 2003, which would hve made him probably in his mid-late 70's when still at that airline.
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Cluster F**k
Don't you begin to get the idea that the whole operation from top to bottom was cluster f**k?
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SNAFU
No arguments here. (But maybe the same applies to the Royal Commission hearing.)
The strip chart is on page 101 of MacFarland's book. Although it shows two tracks going to the Byrd Reporting Point, those tracks don't run from Cape Hallett. So I don't think the strip chart would have influenced the pilots.
The strip chart is on page 101 of MacFarland's book. Although it shows two tracks going to the Byrd Reporting Point, those tracks don't run from Cape Hallett. So I don't think the strip chart would have influenced the pilots.
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SR71,
Post #242
"The Erebus Papers" will set you back £86 on Amazon.co.uk!
and
Ampan,
Post #243
I'm not sure what the difficulty is in obtaining all of the books and reports that have been written about the Erebus disaster. 
All of the books and reports that I mentioned (with the exception of the Readers Digest article) in my post #353 are redily available from second hand bookstores, particularly those in NZ. And there's no point paying 95 or 86 pounds for the books that you mentioned. I picked these up in the past few years for about A$15 (Verdict on Erebus) and The Erebus Papers was a little more expensive (but then it's 736 pages), probably around A$25 but $10 of that was on postage.
The internet is your friend, use it to its full capabilities.
The best website that I've come across is abebooks.com. It lists all books available and you can search by location or by ascending order of cost, etc. I know for a fact that the Royal Commission Report is readily available on this website, it's just a matter of checking which country the bookstore is located, so you can balance out the cost of book and postage to determine what is cheaper.
In addition to the books and reports listed in my post #353, there are also another 2 books that I'm aware of (which I also have). These are "White Out" by Michael Guy (which describes the recovery operation and was published in 1980 prior to the Royal Commission); and "Flight 901 to Erebus" by Ken Hickson.
I picked up my last piece of the puzzle (in terms of published material) the other day, the Aircraft Accident Report No. 79-139 (ie the Chippendale Report), from a secondhand bookstore in NZ, for US$10 + postage. An added little unexpected bonus with this was an original letter, written and signed by Ron Chippendale (c/o Office of Air Accidents Investigation), addressed to the Officer in Charge of US Navy Detachment, Operation Deep Freeze at Chrsitchurch International Airport. A quick check on abebooks has just shown that there are 5 of this report for sale, for between US$24 and U$40, and I think all are from NZ bookstores.
For me, I'd rather always have the original material where it is availalble, rather than wait for an organisation to possibly put in on a (yet uncreated) website in a few months time.
But Ampan, there were over 3000 pages of evidence - would you honestly think ALPA would scan all of that? (if it's even available to them).
Post #242
"Impact Erebus" will set you back £95 on Amazon.co.uk!
"The Erebus Papers" will set you back £86 on Amazon.co.uk!
Ampan,
Post #243
Mahon's report is probably out of print by now, but there are several copies available at the Auckland Public Library. They also have the transcript of the evidence given at the hearing (but not the documents).
There is also a useful book called "The Erebus Papers" (Stuart Macfarlane - Avon Press - 1991). It has decent photographic reproductions of many of the documents and also has extracts from the transcript of evidence. Unfortunately, the book also has the opinions of the lawyer who wrote it. Bit if those are ignored, it is very helpful.
Incidentally, if ALPA are going to do are proper job on the proposed website, why don't they dig up everything, scan it, and put it on the site so that everyone has all the information?
There is also a useful book called "The Erebus Papers" (Stuart Macfarlane - Avon Press - 1991). It has decent photographic reproductions of many of the documents and also has extracts from the transcript of evidence. Unfortunately, the book also has the opinions of the lawyer who wrote it. Bit if those are ignored, it is very helpful.
Incidentally, if ALPA are going to do are proper job on the proposed website, why don't they dig up everything, scan it, and put it on the site so that everyone has all the information?
All of the books and reports that I mentioned (with the exception of the Readers Digest article) in my post #353 are redily available from second hand bookstores, particularly those in NZ. And there's no point paying 95 or 86 pounds for the books that you mentioned. I picked these up in the past few years for about A$15 (Verdict on Erebus) and The Erebus Papers was a little more expensive (but then it's 736 pages), probably around A$25 but $10 of that was on postage.The internet is your friend, use it to its full capabilities.
The best website that I've come across is abebooks.com. It lists all books available and you can search by location or by ascending order of cost, etc. I know for a fact that the Royal Commission Report is readily available on this website, it's just a matter of checking which country the bookstore is located, so you can balance out the cost of book and postage to determine what is cheaper.In addition to the books and reports listed in my post #353, there are also another 2 books that I'm aware of (which I also have). These are "White Out" by Michael Guy (which describes the recovery operation and was published in 1980 prior to the Royal Commission); and "Flight 901 to Erebus" by Ken Hickson.
I picked up my last piece of the puzzle (in terms of published material) the other day, the Aircraft Accident Report No. 79-139 (ie the Chippendale Report), from a secondhand bookstore in NZ, for US$10 + postage. An added little unexpected bonus with this was an original letter, written and signed by Ron Chippendale (c/o Office of Air Accidents Investigation), addressed to the Officer in Charge of US Navy Detachment, Operation Deep Freeze at Chrsitchurch International Airport. A quick check on abebooks has just shown that there are 5 of this report for sale, for between US$24 and U$40, and I think all are from NZ bookstores.
For me, I'd rather always have the original material where it is availalble, rather than wait for an organisation to possibly put in on a (yet uncreated) website in a few months time.
But Ampan, there were over 3000 pages of evidence - would you honestly think ALPA would scan all of that? (if it's even available to them).
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Evidence
Some great information there.
To make the project worthwhile, I think that all the evidence has to made available, including the documents (eg, maps, memos, photos). Otherwise, all we have are the extracts from the evidence that Macfarlane chose to put in his book and the copies of documents that MacFarlane chose to put in his book.
One thing ALPA obviously cannot do is attempt to include every book/article/opinion that has been written about this accident. This would make the task a never-ending one. So the best approach might be to leave all that out, and concentrate on the primary material. As I understand things, it's held by Archives NZ at Wellington, and they might be prepared to assist. (I'm sure that there would be many librarians around NZ who would be very pleased, as it would save them dragging a supermarket-trolley's worth of big volumes up from the basement everytime someone gets interested in Erebus.)
To make the project worthwhile, I think that all the evidence has to made available, including the documents (eg, maps, memos, photos). Otherwise, all we have are the extracts from the evidence that Macfarlane chose to put in his book and the copies of documents that MacFarlane chose to put in his book.
One thing ALPA obviously cannot do is attempt to include every book/article/opinion that has been written about this accident. This would make the task a never-ending one. So the best approach might be to leave all that out, and concentrate on the primary material. As I understand things, it's held by Archives NZ at Wellington, and they might be prepared to assist. (I'm sure that there would be many librarians around NZ who would be very pleased, as it would save them dragging a supermarket-trolley's worth of big volumes up from the basement everytime someone gets interested in Erebus.)