Erebus 25 years on
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SR71:
Cape Hallett – Clear weather. The passengers took photos of it. I haven’t seen these photos, but I’ve seen other photos of Cape Hallett. It’s a very impressive sight and would have been one of the highlights of the flights.
Drift in the AINS – The actual impact position was about 3nm off the nav track position, ie, not much. But I’m not suggesting that drift was the primary potential problem with the AINS. The primary problem was the human input.
Communication problems – Agreed: The crew can’t be blamed for that penny not dropping. To do so would be to engage in “Monday Morning Quarterbacking”, as Pakeha Boy calls it.
“Know” and “Sure” – This is more of lawyer’s issue, but I would say that you can be sure that the world is flat, but you can’t know that the world is flat, cos it isn’t. Putting the semantics to one side, isn’t the real issue the independent verification? Even if the crew had obtained the radar fix, they still wouldn’t know their position to the level of 100% certainty, because the radar operator might have made a mistake. But the chance of two independent navigation aids both being wrong at the same time is so remote that it can be discounted. I still can’t accept that you have sufficient knowledge of your position by simply locking on to the nav track, because you are relying on the AINS alone. That’s fine at 30,000 feet over the Pacific, but not at 10,000 feet near Ross Island.
Brian Abraham:
If the alleged error is the decision to go down, then doesn’t that remove the whiteout issue? There was no sector whiteout at 18000 feet. Whiteout only became an issue once under the cloudbase. So the decision to go down would have been an error in any area, polar or tropical, with 13000 feet worth of high ground around.
So I’d be “tooling around” with Prospector at 18000 feet.
I’ve had another read through the whole 30 minutes of the transcript. There is a definite impression that the captain was anxious to get the radar fix. Note that he gets on the blower himself at about 40 miles out, which was the radar range he had been given by ATC.
Cape Hallett – Clear weather. The passengers took photos of it. I haven’t seen these photos, but I’ve seen other photos of Cape Hallett. It’s a very impressive sight and would have been one of the highlights of the flights.
Drift in the AINS – The actual impact position was about 3nm off the nav track position, ie, not much. But I’m not suggesting that drift was the primary potential problem with the AINS. The primary problem was the human input.
Communication problems – Agreed: The crew can’t be blamed for that penny not dropping. To do so would be to engage in “Monday Morning Quarterbacking”, as Pakeha Boy calls it.
“Know” and “Sure” – This is more of lawyer’s issue, but I would say that you can be sure that the world is flat, but you can’t know that the world is flat, cos it isn’t. Putting the semantics to one side, isn’t the real issue the independent verification? Even if the crew had obtained the radar fix, they still wouldn’t know their position to the level of 100% certainty, because the radar operator might have made a mistake. But the chance of two independent navigation aids both being wrong at the same time is so remote that it can be discounted. I still can’t accept that you have sufficient knowledge of your position by simply locking on to the nav track, because you are relying on the AINS alone. That’s fine at 30,000 feet over the Pacific, but not at 10,000 feet near Ross Island.
Brian Abraham:
If the alleged error is the decision to go down, then doesn’t that remove the whiteout issue? There was no sector whiteout at 18000 feet. Whiteout only became an issue once under the cloudbase. So the decision to go down would have been an error in any area, polar or tropical, with 13000 feet worth of high ground around.
So I’d be “tooling around” with Prospector at 18000 feet.
I’ve had another read through the whole 30 minutes of the transcript. There is a definite impression that the captain was anxious to get the radar fix. Note that he gets on the blower himself at about 40 miles out, which was the radar range he had been given by ATC.
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Brian Abraham: I offer this comment on your digression about the BA 747.
Not long after that event I was chatting with a Qantas pilot who was scheduled the fly the same route shortly after the BA flight.
He told me that volcanic dustcloud was notamed, but BA continued on the planned route anyway.
The Qantas pilot said they took on extra fuel and routed round the notamed area.
So, on the assumption my acqaintance was not telling porkies, I would say that the BA captain, would have justifiably copped a fair measure of blame if the flight had ended in tragedy.
Not long after that event I was chatting with a Qantas pilot who was scheduled the fly the same route shortly after the BA flight.
He told me that volcanic dustcloud was notamed, but BA continued on the planned route anyway.
The Qantas pilot said they took on extra fuel and routed round the notamed area.
So, on the assumption my acqaintance was not telling porkies, I would say that the BA captain, would have justifiably copped a fair measure of blame if the flight had ended in tragedy.
Last edited by gsf; 19th Feb 2008 at 02:00.
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Casper:
As you would know, the CVR transcript has been the subject of years of argument. But there is one aspect of it about which there is no argument: When Gordon Brooks said "I don't like this", he wasn't talking about the coffee.
As you would know, the CVR transcript has been the subject of years of argument. But there is one aspect of it about which there is no argument: When Gordon Brooks said "I don't like this", he wasn't talking about the coffee.
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A PS to my last comment re the CVR transcript: The two "black boxes" (actually orange), were located at the crash site reasonably quickly. They were taken back to Auckland around a week later and then sent off to the US for transcription. The union, quite rightly, insisted on being represented at the transcription. So a three man team was sent off with the CVR tape. One was a union man. One was a company man. And the other was the senior F/O, who you could call "exec", but maybe he was sent because he knew the voices of the F/Os on the flight. But it doesn't really matter about the 2-1 thing, because they all had to agree - and all agreed that when F/O Brooks said that he didn't like it, he was worried.
It should be noted that F/O Brooks had an excellent reputation amongst pilots.
It should be noted that F/O Brooks had an excellent reputation amongst pilots.
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Prospector , ampan & pakeha boy
I think you all need to appreciate that there is a difference between cause and blame .
Taildragger67 made the point perfectly clear back in # 224 with reference to the AA191 crash. You can say that crew in that instance caused the crash by reducing speed. You can’t blame them for the crash, as they did precisely what they had been trained to do.
There are striking similarities to this Erebus disaster.
You can say the crew caused the accident. They flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the side of a mountain. Nobody disputes that fact.
However you can’t blame them for hitting something they could not see. Every step along the way the crew performed in an impeccably professional and competent manner.
( OK . Minor exaggeration. If it was a check flight and I wanted to be nitpicky – “you were a bit late setting the QNH on descent – discussed. Overall session VG apart from the very last bit where you hit the mountain.”
)
Circular reasoning.
If they recognized they were over Beaufort Island they would have realized they were on a track to Mt Erebus, but they could only have recognize Beaufort Island if they knew they were on a track to Mt Erebus.
Mahon explains this better than I can
He goes on to analyse the movements of Peter Mulgrew, the commentator who had been there several times previously and could have been expected to identify Beaufort island. Unfortunately, he was never in a position to see Beaufort Island and break a link in the chain of events leading to the tragedy.
One point seems to be arising in this discussion. Mess with Peter Mahon’s intellect and his analysis of events and you will come off second best.
Prospector
Do you actually bother to read any replies to your postings?
You say
Go back to # 267
a)On 8 November 1979, Captain RT Johnson issued a revised descent restrictions memo removing the requirement for ASR to be available and used for descent below FL160 (item 3 of the original memo exhibit 1/8). There was now no company requirement for radar monitoring if the descent was VMC.
And also where you say
Having a bit of a tunnel vision problem here are we?
Just go up 5 lines in that memo and you will find “Delete all reference in briefing 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL 160 …. etc.
However the whole descent memo became totally irrelevant when the company briefing specifically authorized the crew to descend to any altitude approved by the United States Navy Air Traffic Controller.
When you say
Jeez, first you say they have the sole responsibility for terrain and traffic separation (#245), now you require them to be radar identified so ATC can separate them from traffic. Make up your mind!
Note for future reference:
1.They did not require radar identification
2.They did not require a position fix before making a VMC descent You keep flogging the proposition that they made an unauthorized descent. Full marks for persistence, but that argument is patently wrong, and you get shot down every time. They did not make an unauthorized descent. Period.
You have been asked before to brush up on how to reach a valid conclusion via a logical argument
Please do so. Read SR71’s posts for some good examples.
Yes, I know ad hominem attacks are not good debating tactics, and I’ll lose points, but bugger it.
(edited once again for crap spelling and grammar which I only notice after posting)
I think you all need to appreciate that there is a difference between cause and blame .
Taildragger67 made the point perfectly clear back in # 224 with reference to the AA191 crash. You can say that crew in that instance caused the crash by reducing speed. You can’t blame them for the crash, as they did precisely what they had been trained to do.
There are striking similarities to this Erebus disaster.
You can say the crew caused the accident. They flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the side of a mountain. Nobody disputes that fact.
However you can’t blame them for hitting something they could not see. Every step along the way the crew performed in an impeccably professional and competent manner.
( OK . Minor exaggeration. If it was a check flight and I wanted to be nitpicky – “you were a bit late setting the QNH on descent – discussed. Overall session VG apart from the very last bit where you hit the mountain.”
)- It was entirely reasonable for them to descend as they did
- It complied with their briefing
- They had ATC approval, although as Brian Abraham points out (#268) not legally required, but good airmanship and part of their briefed requirement.
- They did not require a position fix before descending VMC
- (As Brian Abraham points out in (#279 ) the very nature of a VMC descent is that it does not require prior position fixing.) It seems you have already concluded that unless you can invalidate that fact – your argument is screwed.
They should have IDed Beaufort Island,
If they recognized they were over Beaufort Island they would have realized they were on a track to Mt Erebus, but they could only have recognize Beaufort Island if they knew they were on a track to Mt Erebus.
Mahon explains this better than I can
One of the criticisms levelled at the aircrew of Flight TE901 had been their failure to identify Beaufort Island. During the orbiting sequences it had been plainly visible and it showed up very clearly in the passengers' photographs. It was certainly many miles to the west of the flight track plotted on the map, when it should have been many miles to the east. The island was clearly marked on Captain Collins' atlas and also, no doubt, on the map which he had procured on his own initiative for the purposes of the flight.
Before I went to Antarctica I must admit that I could see no answer to the allegation that the aircrew should have seen that they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island. Of all the criticisms advanced so assiduously by the management against the aircrew, this alone had seemed valid. But, as so often happens, there is nothing like visiting the scene and making your own observations.
It was when I first saw Beaufort Island from the air on our approach to Lewis Bay that I realised why it had not occurred to the aircrew of the DC10 that they were looking at Beaufort Island. There it was, about twelve miles to our right. But then I looked further away to the right, towards the mountains of Victoria Land, and I knew that the flight track on Collins' map showed a flight path which would be nearly thirty miles to the right of the flight path of our Hercules. I visualised Collins flying in what he thought was the centre of McMurdo Sound, and looking at an island which he would have seen was unmarked on his map. From his point of view the island he was looking at was therefore nearly thirty miles to the west of Beaufort Island. The display on the HSI panel verified that his aircraft was flying exactly on course, therefore Beaufort Island was far away to his left. It could not be anywhere else. What Collins and Cassin were looking at, in their minds, was an anonymous island lying some distance off the coast of Victoria Land.
I could see now why there had been no fault on the part of the aircrew in failing to detect the identity of Beaufort Island.
On the atlas and on the maps, Beaufort Island is marked as a distinctive black dot on a green background. But there are no green areas in Antarctica. What we actually saw from the Hercules, as I have said, was a rock outcrop protruding through the ice, the outcrop being almost totally covered by snow. It was quite a different visual situation, as I could see, from an aircraft flying over blue sea with every island, covered with bush or trees, easily discernible at long range. Those who had criticised the failure of the aircrew to identify Beaufort Island seemed to me to be people who did not understand the vast white immensity of the terrain. But, in particular, they clearly had not mentally placed themselves in the centre of McMurdo Sound and then asked themselves what they would think if they saw this snowy outcrop over to their right and knew, by reference to their map, that Beaufort Island was miles away to their left, and was probably another snowy mound in the bleak white landscape. Neither pilot had mentioned the island, either before, during or after the orbiting sequences, and when I surveyed this white landscape myself l could see why.
So much for the Beaufort Island theory and the simple unimaginative attribution of fault to the aircrew for not identifying that feature
Before I went to Antarctica I must admit that I could see no answer to the allegation that the aircrew should have seen that they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island. Of all the criticisms advanced so assiduously by the management against the aircrew, this alone had seemed valid. But, as so often happens, there is nothing like visiting the scene and making your own observations.
It was when I first saw Beaufort Island from the air on our approach to Lewis Bay that I realised why it had not occurred to the aircrew of the DC10 that they were looking at Beaufort Island. There it was, about twelve miles to our right. But then I looked further away to the right, towards the mountains of Victoria Land, and I knew that the flight track on Collins' map showed a flight path which would be nearly thirty miles to the right of the flight path of our Hercules. I visualised Collins flying in what he thought was the centre of McMurdo Sound, and looking at an island which he would have seen was unmarked on his map. From his point of view the island he was looking at was therefore nearly thirty miles to the west of Beaufort Island. The display on the HSI panel verified that his aircraft was flying exactly on course, therefore Beaufort Island was far away to his left. It could not be anywhere else. What Collins and Cassin were looking at, in their minds, was an anonymous island lying some distance off the coast of Victoria Land.
I could see now why there had been no fault on the part of the aircrew in failing to detect the identity of Beaufort Island.
On the atlas and on the maps, Beaufort Island is marked as a distinctive black dot on a green background. But there are no green areas in Antarctica. What we actually saw from the Hercules, as I have said, was a rock outcrop protruding through the ice, the outcrop being almost totally covered by snow. It was quite a different visual situation, as I could see, from an aircraft flying over blue sea with every island, covered with bush or trees, easily discernible at long range. Those who had criticised the failure of the aircrew to identify Beaufort Island seemed to me to be people who did not understand the vast white immensity of the terrain. But, in particular, they clearly had not mentally placed themselves in the centre of McMurdo Sound and then asked themselves what they would think if they saw this snowy outcrop over to their right and knew, by reference to their map, that Beaufort Island was miles away to their left, and was probably another snowy mound in the bleak white landscape. Neither pilot had mentioned the island, either before, during or after the orbiting sequences, and when I surveyed this white landscape myself l could see why.
So much for the Beaufort Island theory and the simple unimaginative attribution of fault to the aircrew for not identifying that feature
One point seems to be arising in this discussion. Mess with Peter Mahon’s intellect and his analysis of events and you will come off second best.
Prospector
Do you actually bother to read any replies to your postings?
You say
As for the VMC descent, nowhere in the company or CAA requirements for descent is VMC descent an option, it is clearly understood that any descent was to be inside the parameters as laid down and printed many times on this thread, not one of these requirements were met.
a)On 8 November 1979, Captain RT Johnson issued a revised descent restrictions memo removing the requirement for ASR to be available and used for descent below FL160 (item 3 of the original memo exhibit 1/8). There was now no company requirement for radar monitoring if the descent was VMC.
And also where you say
Requirement 4. was
Descent to be coordinated with local radar as they may have other traffic in the area.
Descent to be coordinated with local radar as they may have other traffic in the area.
Just go up 5 lines in that memo and you will find “Delete all reference in briefing 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL 160 …. etc.
However the whole descent memo became totally irrelevant when the company briefing specifically authorized the crew to descend to any altitude approved by the United States Navy Air Traffic Controller.
When you say
My interpretation of this requirement would be first of all the flight would have had to have been identified on radar, and position clearly established, before McMurdo radar could maintain separation between them and any other traffic.
Note for future reference:
1.They did not require radar identification
2.They did not require a position fix before making a VMC descent You keep flogging the proposition that they made an unauthorized descent. Full marks for persistence, but that argument is patently wrong, and you get shot down every time. They did not make an unauthorized descent. Period.
You have been asked before to brush up on how to reach a valid conclusion via a logical argument
Please do so. Read SR71’s posts for some good examples.
Yes, I know ad hominem attacks are not good debating tactics, and I’ll lose points, but bugger it.
(edited once again for crap spelling and grammar which I only notice after posting)
Last edited by Desert Dingo; 19th Feb 2008 at 23:58.
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New Zealand Airline Pilots Association president Mark Rammell said there was no division among pilots.
"Justice Mahon's finding, that was the official finding of the Royal Commission and that was accepted in Parliament," Rammell said.
"Our pilots are completely happy with that finding, that it was not pilot error."
That was the piece in the article that started this thread again.
I think it has been proven, even to Desert Dingo, that there is a great deal of division among pilots as to Mahons findings.
And I have no doubt "our pilots are very happy with that finding" would be the only correct thing in the article.
Desert Dingo,
.They did not require a position fix before making a VMC descent You keep flogging the proposition that they made an unauthorized decent. Full marks for persistence, but that argument is patently wrong, and you get shot down every time. They did not make an unauthorized descent. Period.
With a comment like that I hope you are a legal man and not an aeroplane driver, I do believe you may have fond illusions about shooting people down, but in this game you have to be right the first time, we do not rely on Appeal Courts and Privy Councils, and these blokes plain got it wrong.
The responsibility to get those Pax home again safely was far more important than missing a bit of sightseeing, as I am sure they would have agreed.
"Justice Mahon's finding, that was the official finding of the Royal Commission and that was accepted in Parliament," Rammell said.
"Our pilots are completely happy with that finding, that it was not pilot error."
That was the piece in the article that started this thread again.
I think it has been proven, even to Desert Dingo, that there is a great deal of division among pilots as to Mahons findings.
And I have no doubt "our pilots are very happy with that finding" would be the only correct thing in the article.
Desert Dingo,
.They did not require a position fix before making a VMC descent You keep flogging the proposition that they made an unauthorized decent. Full marks for persistence, but that argument is patently wrong, and you get shot down every time. They did not make an unauthorized descent. Period.
With a comment like that I hope you are a legal man and not an aeroplane driver, I do believe you may have fond illusions about shooting people down, but in this game you have to be right the first time, we do not rely on Appeal Courts and Privy Councils, and these blokes plain got it wrong.
The responsibility to get those Pax home again safely was far more important than missing a bit of sightseeing, as I am sure they would have agreed.
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Can't believe that you quoted Mahon's book re Beaufort Island, D. Dingo. If there are still any undecided voters out there who can be bothered comparing Mahon's report with Mahon's book, they will realise that the relevant part of the honourable mister justice's book is nothing more than a fabricated concoction. I'm tempted to call it an orchestrated litany of lies, but I'm satisfied that that Mahon decided to tell this load of cr*p all by himself.
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Prospector , ampan & pakeha boy
I think you all need to appreciate that there is a difference between cause and blame
mate,youve read me wrong......Im,looking at responsibility....nothing else.....I fly the same seats as these jokers did...Ive never blamed this crew,,,...other than knowing ,that they were at the end of the chain......I certainly appreciate the difference....I live it everyday.....my input in this debate is nothing more than to learn something and be educated.......I appreciate your input
I think you all need to appreciate that there is a difference between cause and blame
mate,youve read me wrong......Im,looking at responsibility....nothing else.....I fly the same seats as these jokers did...Ive never blamed this crew,,,...other than knowing ,that they were at the end of the chain......I certainly appreciate the difference....I live it everyday.....my input in this debate is nothing more than to learn something and be educated.......I appreciate your input
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Prospector
No, I am not a legal man, but 40 years flying finishing with the MD11 (a kinda super DC10) gives me some insight into what it would have been like on Air New Zealand flight 901. Not that it makes the slightest difference to any of the arguments I put forward. They stand or fall on the strength of the facts and logic presented.
Backing up your arguments with facts is something you have conspicuously avoided. Perhaps for me to write “you get shot down” is a bit insensitive, but repeating “wrong” and “incorrect” to you gets a bit repetitive and boring.
You say
OK . Prove it.
Show us the facts and how you reach that conclusion.
Please.
Pakeha boy
Sorry. Withdawn.
ampan
So show us where he went wrong.
That's pretty strong.
Care to elaborate?
As per my comment to Prospector:
Prove it.
Show us the facts and how you reach that conclusion.
With a comment like that I hope you are a legal man and not an aeroplane driver, I do believe you may have fond illusions about shooting people down, but in this game you have to be right the first time, we do not rely on Appeal Courts and Privy Councils, and these blokes plain got it wrong.
Backing up your arguments with facts is something you have conspicuously avoided. Perhaps for me to write “you get shot down” is a bit insensitive, but repeating “wrong” and “incorrect” to you gets a bit repetitive and boring.
You say
and these blokes plain got it wrong.
Show us the facts and how you reach that conclusion.
Please.
Pakeha boy
Sorry. Withdawn.
ampan
Can't believe that you quoted Mahon's book re Beaufort Island, D. Dingo.
the relevant part of the honourable mister justice's book is nothing more than a fabricated concoction.
Care to elaborate?
As per my comment to Prospector:
Prove it.
Show us the facts and how you reach that conclusion.
Last edited by Desert Dingo; 19th Feb 2008 at 04:04.
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Desert Dingo,
Their task was to take Flt901 to the Antarctic for a sightseeing trip,
They did the first half OK, but they stuffed up badly on the rest.
The proof, the aeroplane is still down there.
You say you stand and fall on facts, you accept that by going VMC they accepted responsibility for their own terrain clearance, they did not clear that terrain, they impacted it. You can come up with all the arguments about who did what and why, but the fact is they accepted responsibility to clear terrain and they did not.
Do you consider thats not proving they got it wrong with clear unequivocal fact?
Their task was to take Flt901 to the Antarctic for a sightseeing trip,
They did the first half OK, but they stuffed up badly on the rest.
The proof, the aeroplane is still down there.
You say you stand and fall on facts, you accept that by going VMC they accepted responsibility for their own terrain clearance, they did not clear that terrain, they impacted it. You can come up with all the arguments about who did what and why, but the fact is they accepted responsibility to clear terrain and they did not.
Do you consider thats not proving they got it wrong with clear unequivocal fact?
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No.
C’mon. Call me for not providing any facts to support my conclusion.Like I demand from you. Then I can refer you to a hundred previous posts.
C’mon. Call me for not providing any facts to support my conclusion.Like I demand from you. Then I can refer you to a hundred previous posts.
Last edited by Desert Dingo; 19th Feb 2008 at 06:19.
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100% of the reponsibility lies with Air New Zealand Limited, which was the employer of everyone involved (putting the Mac Centre issue to one side).
The debate is about the apportionment of blame between different groups of employees. If it's Crew/The Rest, I would be prepared to accept Sir Rochford Hughes' 10%/90%. Prospector might even be prepared to do the same - but I can't stomach 0%/100%, because as he said, the plane is still down there.
Here's a question: What would Jim Collins say?
The debate is about the apportionment of blame between different groups of employees. If it's Crew/The Rest, I would be prepared to accept Sir Rochford Hughes' 10%/90%. Prospector might even be prepared to do the same - but I can't stomach 0%/100%, because as he said, the plane is still down there.
Here's a question: What would Jim Collins say?
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This has nothing to do with the cause of the crash but I'd be very grateful if ANYONE was able to advise me just why the pilots' homes were broken into and certain items removed. I really have a problem with that. Just WHO or what had the most to gain by such action?
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ampan,
I would put it slightly different to that. I would put CAA in there with 10% for not carrying out there statutory duties and overseeing this operation more closely. 25% to the crew for failing to carry out the responsibilities they took on as far as terrain clearance, and the remainder to the company for letting such a slack operation take place. And also for pandering to NZALPA and treating these flights as perks rather than as other operator's such as RNZAF,USN, and USAF and requiring a certain experience level in Antarctic operations. before going down there as captain.
I would put it slightly different to that. I would put CAA in there with 10% for not carrying out there statutory duties and overseeing this operation more closely. 25% to the crew for failing to carry out the responsibilities they took on as far as terrain clearance, and the remainder to the company for letting such a slack operation take place. And also for pandering to NZALPA and treating these flights as perks rather than as other operator's such as RNZAF,USN, and USAF and requiring a certain experience level in Antarctic operations. before going down there as captain.
Last edited by prospector; 19th Feb 2008 at 06:01.
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Casper:
This gets back to what I said yesterday about the AirNZ staff who bore the brunt of Mahon's report. There were all sorts of allegations tossed around, apart from that of organised perjury. The exec pilot who went down to the ice was alleged to have disposed of relevant documents. Another exec pilot (who was an ALPA rep at the time) was alleged to have collected documents from the F/O's house and then destroyed them. Morrie Davies was alleged to have ordered the shredding of incriminating documents. And there was also the burglary allegation to which you refer.
None of these allegations were established before the Royal Commission. The Police investigated them. No-one was prosecuted.
So the allegations were either unfounded, or AirNZ, in the spece of 24 hours, managed to transform itself from a pack of bunglers into a superbly-organised criminal machine.
This gets back to what I said yesterday about the AirNZ staff who bore the brunt of Mahon's report. There were all sorts of allegations tossed around, apart from that of organised perjury. The exec pilot who went down to the ice was alleged to have disposed of relevant documents. Another exec pilot (who was an ALPA rep at the time) was alleged to have collected documents from the F/O's house and then destroyed them. Morrie Davies was alleged to have ordered the shredding of incriminating documents. And there was also the burglary allegation to which you refer.
None of these allegations were established before the Royal Commission. The Police investigated them. No-one was prosecuted.
So the allegations were either unfounded, or AirNZ, in the spece of 24 hours, managed to transform itself from a pack of bunglers into a superbly-organised criminal machine.
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Prospector:
I thought I was pushing it with my question at the end of #311, but lets not fan the flames any further by suggesting that NZALPA might be eligible for 1% or so.
I thought I was pushing it with my question at the end of #311, but lets not fan the flames any further by suggesting that NZALPA might be eligible for 1% or so.
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OK, I'll give another 3 examples from my everyday life as a pilot which demonstrate the blurred lines of responsibility in our business....
Dekker implies system safety is an organizational responsibility. I alluded to this previously with reference to other accidents.
1) With clearance to pushback off stand, my tug team push me back and the tail of the a/c crashes into another "unseen" obstacle. APU catches fire. My responsibility? What am I? An owl?
2) Taxiing my a/c with wingspan 45m along one of airfield XXX's taxiways, the tip crashes into a pier and spills 45T of fuel onto the taxiway. Aerad chart says taxiway is available for use for a/c up to wingspan 60m. My responsibility? (Happened to colleage of mine - albeit with no fuel leakage.)
3) Cleared for intersection departure. Performance manuals suggest TORA/TODA/ASDA is legal but airfield has promulgated incorrect figures and aircraft never gets airborne. My responsibility? (Happened to colleage of mine - figures had been wrong for years. Rotated over piano keys.)
Seems to me, if you want to make the PIC ultimately and exclusively responsible in these circumstances, you've got a job on your hands.
I don't expect to have to have a mirror and tape-measure onboard.
Anyway, associated with ultimate responsibility must be the concept of ultimate discretion, surely? (Although in our industry, it is normally only invoked in an emergency situation....)
And if that is the case, then regardless of what procedures there were for descent, PIC retained the right to deviate from these.
I'd agree, that being down at 1500ft on anything other than the NAV track, he'd be in the s**t. So obviously did the crew...which is why they locked on again...twice.
I can see both sides of the coin but until someone convinces me, as a professional pilot who knows the difference between what the manual(s) say and what really goes on in the commercial world we live in, that it was most unreasonable to do what the crew did, I reserve judgement.
Dekker implies system safety is an organizational responsibility. I alluded to this previously with reference to other accidents.
1) With clearance to pushback off stand, my tug team push me back and the tail of the a/c crashes into another "unseen" obstacle. APU catches fire. My responsibility? What am I? An owl?
2) Taxiing my a/c with wingspan 45m along one of airfield XXX's taxiways, the tip crashes into a pier and spills 45T of fuel onto the taxiway. Aerad chart says taxiway is available for use for a/c up to wingspan 60m. My responsibility? (Happened to colleage of mine - albeit with no fuel leakage.)
3) Cleared for intersection departure. Performance manuals suggest TORA/TODA/ASDA is legal but airfield has promulgated incorrect figures and aircraft never gets airborne. My responsibility? (Happened to colleage of mine - figures had been wrong for years. Rotated over piano keys.)
Seems to me, if you want to make the PIC ultimately and exclusively responsible in these circumstances, you've got a job on your hands.
I don't expect to have to have a mirror and tape-measure onboard.
Anyway, associated with ultimate responsibility must be the concept of ultimate discretion, surely? (Although in our industry, it is normally only invoked in an emergency situation....)
And if that is the case, then regardless of what procedures there were for descent, PIC retained the right to deviate from these.
I'd agree, that being down at 1500ft on anything other than the NAV track, he'd be in the s**t. So obviously did the crew...which is why they locked on again...twice.
I can see both sides of the coin but until someone convinces me, as a professional pilot who knows the difference between what the manual(s) say and what really goes on in the commercial world we live in, that it was most unreasonable to do what the crew did, I reserve judgement.