Originally Posted by prospector
The question is then why did they do this. My argument has been, and always will be, that the descent was carried out in complete contradiction to their standing orders.
are you saying that the 5 crew aboard the DC-10 were fully aware of those standing orders and made a unanimous conscious decision to blatantly disregard them?, that the crews of earlier flights made similar unanimous conscious decisions to disregard the same standing orders.
Originally Posted by prospector
But, if the flight had not descended in contradiction to the special requirements of descent for that area, those requirements necessitated by the crews known lack of experience in Antarctic operations, then it would not have hit the mountain.
There are several other IF's that would've led to the plane not hitting the mountain. IF 164'48" instead of 166'48" had been typed into the navigation computer years earlier, IF correct procedure had been followed in adjusting the way-point in the days prior, IF Mulgrew had got to the cockpit earlier and seen Beaufort Is for what it was, IF the crew or ATC had interpreted the difficulties with the radio and radar to be due to line of sight, etc etc etc
About the only way you could put in down to 1 IF that could be attributed to the crew is if they had mistyped the co-ordinates into the computer at the beginning of the flight, or if Collins had plotted the path onto his map incorrectly (if they were following a line he had drawn on a map, had anyone else checked that the line he had drawn was in the correct place)
Originally Posted by prospector
Beaufort Island.
This was obviously sighted, in clear conditions as shown by the photographs salvaged from the wreckage, how could someone who had, as Mahon spent so much time pointing out, spent hours pooring over a "map" not realized, if they were on the track they thought they were on, was on the wrong side???
look at pages 68/69 of Impact Erebus for possible explanations. The only person who would've recognised the shape was Mulgrew and he wasn't on the flight deck at the appropriate time, and the photos at the bottom of those pages show the difficulties in interpreting what is a hole in the sea ice and what is a rocky island, something that could be due to the lack of training and experience for flying in the Antarctic region.
Originally Posted by ampan
Gentlemen, Who really gives a toss about what the lawyers think, whether it be Justice Mahon, or Stuart McFarlane, or Judge Greene, or the NZ Court of Appeal, or the Privy Council? I just want to be able to see the information that these lawyers saw, so that I can make up my own mind.
You raise a good point because in interpreting Chippendale, Mahon, the Court of Appeal, the Privy Council, Justice Greene, it has to be remembered that they all had different levels of information that was presented to them differently. For instance Greene's information was presented to them such that the plantiff was trying to paint the view that the US Navy was negligent, whilst the defence was trying to come up with ways that showed the US Navy was not negligent, or less negligent than others. The Court of Appeal and then the Privy Council heard information relevant to the narrow points of law that were being debated. The Court of Appeal only sat for six days. The Royal Commission sat for much longer and had access to the greatest depth and width of information and it was quality information in terms of being presented, challenged and recorded. Chippendale was let down by references to 'off the record' conversations, unnamed experts who could not later be found, and what he added to the CVR transcript.
Originally Posted by Desert Dingo
Can you give me some more details about this case? I have tracked down a Judge Harold H. Greene of the US District Court in Washington DC but can’t find the case you mention.
Can you give me any info on the case number, date plaintiffs/respondents etc.?
Did this judge conduct a separate accident investigation, or did he rely on Chippindale’s report?
look for Beattie v USA
Originally Posted by ampan
(Some criticism had been made of the slight delay in attempting to climb out after the GPWS sounded, but it should be noted that the first officer had just recommended climbing out to the right, which the captain was starting to have doubts about. The GPWS sounded and then the captain had to decide between the left and the right, which he does in a remarkably short time, and manages to get it right.)
With regards to the turn left or right, consider where the crew were in the cockpit. Collins can see better to his left than his right, Cassin can see better to his right than his left. The positioning also explains why the engineers were the first to express concern, they could not see the terrain that the pilot and co-pilot could see out there side windows.
Originally Posted by prospector
The following statement from Ron Chippendale would be what I find sums up the situation best, but it would appear I am in a minority with this belief, but hopefully it has made people rethink Mahons findings.
"The errors in the briefing were serious but not an absolute excuse for the accident when the means were readily available for the pilot in command to make certain he knew where he was."
The pilot in command was certain he knew where he was. At any point up to impact if you'd asked him where he was he would've confidently pointed to a point on the line on his map. He didn't have a lot of evidence to back him up if you'd covered the distance to run indicator on the panel before asking the question, but equally he was undone by not having any negative fixes that caused him to doubt his position.