ampan Maps
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I don't think I missed H'snort's point re a map. Yes, a map won't help if the sector whiteout prevents you seeing anything. But this wasn't the case. Although the crew couldn't see Erebus, they could see Beaufort Island. If you knew where you were in relation to Beaufort Island, then you would know where you were are in relation to Erebus - if you've got a decent map. If you haven't got a decent map, then that island down there in the sea is just an island down there in the sea.
Does anyone know what maps they had on the flightdeck?
AND READING A TOPOGRAPHICAL "CHART" (not map)
Reading a "CHART" is an "ART" a skill, one that is taught the basics of, and to varying levels to encompass a VFR "TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART" reading exercise with PPL and CPL training:
What you do with it from here after depends upon ones skill attained, and evolved from more and more use: and is directly proportional to the level they have attained up to the point they switch to Scheduled IFR operations.
Now having a "TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART" for IFR operations is not of the normally accepted:
To read a TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART you can never ever ever rely on matching just one visual outside observation, with a feature on a "CHART".
You need to have enough outside visual definition to do this:
If you are in "PARTIAL" (SECTOR) white out, and you are not trained to recognise this, then how are you going to use a "CHART".
The degree to which they ( the crew) could actually identify visually is unsure.
What was recorded to be, (thought to be) Beaufort Island is a matter of, from my memory (as I do not have my reference material handy) a matter of conjecture.
To have a TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART in POOR weather conditions, you are usually low to the ground and in no position to have your heads down!
Now in this case suppose they would have had to transition to a Topographical chart, at what stage of the Flt would you do it:?
They would have expected to pick up a intended track on a chart from there INS lead in track! yes?
But there in lies your problem, in a white out and not knowing they are in a white out, and the difference in the INS track and a track on a Topographical chart would have been seperated by 40 odd kilometers:
The crew would have been from their previous backgrounds pretty good at reading a topographical chart, certainly way above average.
But even the best would not have picked this in these circumstances, 40 km's?
They did not understand the relevence of white out, they did not understand the illusion created by nature, even an experianced mountaineer of Peter Mulgrews experiance, was fooled by this cruel twist of nature:
Yes I agree with a previous post : that the crew has to have some portion of the blame: IE the S.O.P. & FL 160/ 060 restriction:
BUT BUT BUT: the culture then, the old boy club etc etc, indeed the company its self, had advertised photographs as part of their publicity campaign showing photos from previous Flts well well below this "Paper restriction" it would have been unconceivable for the company to put the punters in the seats and truck on down to the ICE and stay above FL 160, would have been another disaster,< excuse the pun!
So the Q: The greater portion of blame is what?
Only my opinion, but Prospector and Desert Dingo are both correct: I guess and I say I guess! the Q will remain for along time yet, The greater portion of blame belongs to who?
Chr's
H/Snort
( Sorry! I don't wish for it to be thought that the below is mine, I got it from wikipedia and the net)
Read on:
Beginning in February 1977, Air New Zealand offered tourist overflights from Auckland to the Antarctic. These flights were quite popular--in 1979 four were offered. They flew the route shown at left (from the information brochure). The last of these scheduled flights, Flight TE 901, a DC-10 with 237 passengers and 20 crew, took off from Auckland at 0820 on 28 November, on what was supposed to be an 11-hour turnaround flight. But it crashed into the side of Mt. Erebus at 1249, killing all aboard.
The loss of radio contact was noted at McMurdo, and Air NZ was soon notified that communications had been lost. Soon after 2130, the itme when the DC-10 would have run out of fuel, two VXE-6 LC-130 aircraft returning from Pole and Byrd were diverted to search. Both LC-130's spotted the crash site and the wreckage at about 0100 on 29 November. Helicpter search parties reached the crash site at about 0900, and they quickly confirmed that the wreckage was from the ANZ aircraft, and that there were no survivors.
The recovery efforts were quite extensive--in part because of pressure from Japan due to the number of Japanese citizens who had been on board. The operation lasted until 9 December; at one time there were as many as 60 recovery workers at the crash site. Recovered bodies and fragments were flown directly back to Auckland, and eventually all but 44 of the victims were identified.
Several inquiries were held--after mechanical failures were quickly ruled out, the focus switched to the flight crew, who had never made this particular trip before. Initially they were blamed for flying below an approved altitude, and staying there while being unsure of their location. But a second inquiry determined that the coordinates in the navigation computer had been changed without telling the crew or the flight followers at Mac Center. At the time of the crash, TE 901 was flying in local whiteout conditions (in clear air under cloud cover, but with no surface definition), but most of the flight had been in clear air--if commentator Peter Mulgrew had been in his seat a minute or two earlier he would have recognized that the aircraft was off course. As it was, the flight crew was confident of their position and flight path until the collision alarms sounded just before the crash.
Aircraft Accident: DC. 10 ZK-NZP Flight 901
When: 28 November, 1979
Where: Mount Erebus, Antarctica
What happened:
At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, Flight 901 left Auckland Airport. On board were 237 passengers and 20 crew, looking forward to the 11-hour return flight to Antarctica.
These sightseeing flights had been operating since February, 1977, and took the passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound, returning to New Zealand on the same day.
Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not flown the Antarctic flight before, but the flight was considered to be straightforward and they were both experienced pilots.
19 days earlier the pilots had attended a briefing session where they were shown the printouts of a flight plan used by previous flights to the Antarctic.
The plan gave co-ordinates for the trip to Antarctica and across McMurdo Sound which when entered into the computerised navigation system, would be flown automatically by the plane.
On the morning of 28 November Collins and Cassin entered the series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer.
Unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning, and when entered into the computer, changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east.
At 12:30 pm Flight 901 was about 70 kilometres from McMurdo Station. Permission was given by the McMurdo radio communications centre to descend to 3050 metres and proceed visually.
Air safety regulations were against dropping lower than a height of no less than 1830 metres even under good weather conditions, but Collins believed the plane was flying over low, flat ground. Other pilots regularly flew low over the area to give their passengers a better view.
At 12.45 Collins advised McMurdo Centre he was dropping further to 610 metres. At this point he locked onto the computerised navigational system, but Flight 901 was not where either McMurdo Centre or the crew thought it was.
The change in the two co-ordinates had put Flight 901 on a path not across the flat ground of McMurdo Sound, but across Lewis Sound and towards the 3794 metre-high active volcano, Mount Erebus.
Because the air was clear and beneath the cloud layer, the white of the ice blended with the white of the mountain, with no contrast to show the sloping up of the land - a whiteout.
At 12:49 pm the deck altitude device began to blare a warning but there was no time for Collins to save the situation from disaster. Six seconds later Flight 901 hit the side of Mount Erebus and disintegrated.
From 12:50 pm McMurdo Centre kept trying to contact Flight 901, and finally informed Air New Zealand headquarters in Auckland that communication with the aircraft had been lost. US search and rescue aircraft were put on standby.
At 10:00 pm (New Zealand time), about thirty minutes after the DC-10 would have used the last of its fuel, the airline told reporters that it had to be assumed that the aircraft was lost. Searches were made over the usual flight path, but nothing was found.
Just before 1:00 am (New Zealand time) the crew of a United States Navy plane found some unidentified wreckage on the side of Mount Erebus. There were no signs of survivors.
20 hours after the crash, helicopter search parties were able to land at the site and confirm that the wreckage was the remains of Flight 901. All 257 people on board had died.
How many died: 257 (237 passengers and 20 crew)
Other events and outcomes:
The wreckage made a 600-metre trail across the lower slopes of Mount Erebus. As the fuel tanks exploded a fireball ripped through what was left of the fuselage. The force of the impact would have knocked the passengers out or killed them immediately.
The task of recovering and identifying the bodies of the passengers and crew (200 New Zealanders, 24 Japanese, 22 Americans, 6 British, 2 Canadians, 1 Australian, 1 French, 1 Swiss) was made more difficult because of the numbers involved.
Over 60 people worked on the accident site, most in body recovery. 213 victims were eventually identified.
On 22 February 1980 a burial service was held for the 44 unidentified victims.
Early in the investigation into the causes of the disaster, it became clear that there was no mechanical reason for the crash.
The information on the flight recorder tapes showed there had been no emergency in the cockpit of the aircraft.
Attention was then focussed on the possibility of pilot error, pointing to the inexperience of the two pilots in flying in the Antarctic.
A report by the chief inspector of aircraft accidents, Ron Chippindale, came out in May 1980. It stated that the decision of the captain in dropping to a height below the approved level, and continuing at that height when the crew was not sure of the plane's position, had been the main cause of the accident.
Only weeks before Chippindale's report came out, the government announced a one-man Royal Commission of Inquiry. On 27 April, 1981, Justice Peter Mahon, released his report.
This report placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
Mahon found that Captain Collins had been authorised by McMurdo to descend to 450 metres, and could not be said to have been guilty of unauthorised low flying.
Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $150,000.
The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
Debate on where the blame for the crash should be placed continued. The changed flight path was in line with Mount Erebus but would have been safe if there had been no drop in height below the recommended level.
Later court decisions questioned the way in which Mahon conducted his investigation.
Public opinion has remained divided on where the blame for the disaster should rest.
A wooden cross was erected above Scott Base to commemorate the disaster. It was replaced in 1986 with an aluminium cross after the original one was eroded by ice and snow.
The Mount Erebus disaster was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy, with one more death than in the 1931 Napier Earthquake.