AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SAS, sorry buddy, there are no shortcomings in the EC225/175/155 autopilot. (Provided it is used properly). They are the only systems with full flight envelope protection.

Only a matter of time until AW and Sikorsky catch up.

Anybody know if the AW189 has protections??

DB

[HeliComparator]

DB I seem to recall there was a fairly prolonged period last year (or two) when the glideslope at Aberdeen 16(?) was inop (antenna damaged by a snowplough IIRC). This was after your time on the N Sea I suspect, but means that most Abz pilots did quite a few localiser only approaches.

[FC80]

DB, it may be a rare event to fly a LOC/DME approach into Aberdeen but it's something that will be done plenty by anyone operating out of Sumburgh on a regular basis.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HC & FC80 thanks for the corrections. My EGPB based operations were before the ILSs were installed.

DB

[victor papa]

Thelearner, tks for incl me in a elite group BUT really I dont belong there. Worked 8 weeks along time ago only in the NS and worked for 1 of the operators remotely for a few years but not part of the big players at the moment.

Advantage of a smaller new offshore company, I took our proposals to change SOP's direct to top management ignoring Quality abd Safety and their audit checklists. CEO and Ops manager asked for updates from this thread and what the big boys are saying as well as started asking casual questions to our crews. Result, we snagged a aircraft for auto pilot uncommanded yaw inputs and asked different crews to do test flight without knowing situation and report status of aircraft. We identified the "I dont need the FLM or AMM checklist to decide", "dont really need it so dont know difference", "dont know how to interpret FLM instruction", "know the system and followed the correct FLM check and accordingly certified aircraft as serviceable" crews. We even got to identify a Commander who knew the system and FLM but got side tracked by his co-plt ego! We now have loads off additional sim sessions and prev sim training under investigation, aircraft hours allocated, auto pilot ground school being booked with manufacturer and human factors-in addition to CRM-training for all pilots and engineers.

Not so easy in a big organisation, but I think the process followed by the company using a nonexistant defect and test flights by different crew taught us how many variables a known can have! Aircraft was fully serviceable during the exercise.

[SASless]

Advantage of a smaller new offshore company, I took our proposals to change SOP's direct to top management ignoring Quality abd Safety and their audit checklists. CEO and Ops manager asked for updates from this thread and what the big boys are saying as well as started asking casual questions to our crews.

Try that in a large, old, organization with well entrenched constituencies and see how far you get?

We have lots of very senior people who on the one hand want to push their agenda but very likely have defended their own Rice Bowl against similar challenges in the past as they worked their way up that greasy pole of management and training.

Turf Protection can be a sinister evil thing especially when done behind closed doors by a group of folks who share a secret handshake or membership in a society closed but to themselves and those they invite to participate.

Please note....I am not referring to the Free Masons, Knights of Columbus, or Salvation Army here.

But....I bet you can recognize the generic sorts of folks to whom I refer....by type, character, and ego size.

[keithl]

thelearner

No-one's answered yr question re Localiser Approaches.
It's simply that with an ILS, you get an instrument display of the approach profile in two dimensions, Horizontal = LOCALISER; Vertical = GLIDESLOPE.

If a GLIDESLOPE (G/S) is not provided (as Sumburgh 09) or if it fails (e.g. HC's Aberdeen example) the approach is flown by following the LOCALISER, but descending according to tabulated guidance about what altitude you should be at for your distance out. So it's called a LOCALISER approach

For your purposes, will this do? I'm assuming you want to understand the general idea, not the technicalities.

[thelearner]

keithl - yes thanks for answering- explains it perfectly. I had searched and found a caa localiser approach chart for sumburgh r/w 09 (http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-93DDC10D6CF61153011DF052AA76671F/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/AD/NON_AIRAC/EG_AD_2_EGPB_8-1_en_2012-05-31.pdf) - I think - but I won't pretend I could understand the chart fully - although I can see the glideslope heights which it was on at 3 miles out before things started to go wrong according to aaib report.

Edited to add - when I have had the best seat in the house (for watching and learning - not escaping!) and the curtain has been open I have watched ILS landing in Aberdeen and can see how easy it is to monitor progress against glideslope.

[212man]

Some people have also asked if this accident would have been prevented if Sumburgh had a full ILS system. This question has never really been answered

Flying an ILS is the same as flying a CDFA NPA approach but with the latter having higher minima. There is vast inertia within the RW community -partly shown within this thread - about the merits of the concept. In simple terms - "people need to get out more!"

[S76Heavy]

212Man, it is not; an ILS gives guidance in the vertical which makes a world of difference.
Like others I am far from convinced that the CDFA NPA is as good as some think it is. I was taught the dive and drive and to me it still has its place and merit.
But I'll take an ILS everytime.

[M609]

Quick question from an ATCO: Has any form of RNAV approach with APV Baro or APV SBAS been introduced offshore or onshore for helos?

[212man]

S76H, to clarify, I meant in a modern machine with FMS guidance to the FD/AP. not using V/S or using DME/distance calculations. I too was taught dive and drive.

M609, certainly onshore. My last operation introduced RNP0.3 LNAV/VNAV Aproaches to what had been a day VFR only heliport, just before I left.

Here's a picture on final approach - looks remarkably like an ILS :ok:
http://i202.photobucket.com/albums/aa50/S92ctc/null_zps6d5439ed.jpg

[Lonewolf_50]

From the Canadian investigation ...
On 23 July 2011, a Cougar Helicopters’ Sikorsky S-92A. After engaging the go-around mode of the automatic flight control system during the departure, the helicopter’s pitch attitude increased to approximately 23° nose-up while in instrument meteorological conditions. A rapid loss of airspeed occurred.
I'll ask this same question again, with a rhetorical sense.

Are you flying the aircraft, or is the aircraft flying you? I've had vertigo a few times over water, in the dark, IMC/night. It's no fun at all.

Consider your habit patterns, and see if you can place what you usually do, and where things go wrong, to get to where that crew ended up.

What are you doing, what are you looking at, and where are your hands and feet .. as the aircraft's pitch attitude goes up?
Once there, it's probably not productive to ask "Why did you let it go up when you know that pitch attitude isn't the one you wanted" but "How do you get this nose attitude back to the proper one, now?" (UA training, here we come ... )

For those gents, the question to answer was: how did that pitch attitude get there?

Some of the symptoms (pitch and airspeed loss) look similar to the accident under discussion in this thread. The weather was poor ... were they in the process of a GA? Hopefully, we'll find out when the report goes final. (Granted, different aircraft models and different avionics systems).

[albatross]

212man
Very nice approaches both of them!
I enjoyed using them during our visitations last year from down the road.
Cheers and all the best.
Albatross.

[keithl]

M609, certainly onshore. My last operation introduced RNP0.3 LNAV/VNAV Aproaches to what had been a day VFR only heliport, just before I left.

I think, 212man, that it should be made clear to M609 that that "last operation" was not in Europe.

I also think your enthusiasm for CDFA doesn't take account of helicopters (or aircraft generally) which can't generate a pseudo glidepath. As you know, CDFA provides for "nominal vertical guidance", which can be no more than the standard ALT vs DME table - and therefore wouldn't have provided any extra protection to the accident we're discussing.

[JulieAndrews]

Recent......extract from Skybary:

"The term monitoring actually comes from the Latin root ‘Monere’ to warn and in the context of flight operations it is defined as:
The observation and interpretation of the flight path data, configuration status, automation modes and on-board systems appropriate to the phase of flight. It involves a cognitive comparison against the expected values, modes and procedures. It also includes observation of the other crew member and timely intervention in the event of deviation."


No hard and fast rules for when to intervene - common sense I guess - and please don't mention that there was a CCG in these modern times of self-awareness?

There go by the grace of God go I (?)

[HeliComparator]

As you know, CDFA provides for "nominal vertical guidance", which can be no more than the standard ALT vs DME table - and therefore wouldn't have provided any extra protection to the accident we're discussing.

Probably true since the heli ran out of steam whilst still descending on the approach. But with dive and drive, the heli will have to level out at MDA, thus if coupled in 3 axis on VS and then ALT, a collective increase must be made on level off to prevent speed decay, whereas with CDFA there is no level sector.

Of course, not being coupled in 3 axes and especially not with VS / ALT is a good way to stay safe, but CDFA seems to be another string to that bow.

One has to wonder if, flying a pretty straightforward NPA is beyond some pilots's capabilities (thinking of the accident stats posted earlier, not this specific one), then how would they cope with the harder bit - getting in to the runway when suddenly becoming visual near the MAPt of, say, a VOR half way up the runway whilst still at the MDA and doing say 100kts.

I don't really see the argument against CDFA?

[keithl]

I'm not totally against CDFA, HC, I believe it is one of those things that does no harm, but I think doesn't necessarily do any good. Particularly for helicopters as opposed to FW.

I'm off now, but if people are still interested in 2 weeks, I will elaborate then.

The argument was 30 - 40% of CFIT accidents were from NPAs. This is true for FW but, while I'm away, let everyone find a helicopter CFIT from NPA to discuss. This one, yes, but that's not 30%. Be careful not to include visual manoeuvring following an NPA.

[SASless]

One has to wonder if, flying a pretty straightforward NPA is beyond some pilots's capabilities (thinking of the accident stats posted earlier, not this specific one), then how would they cope with the harder bit - getting in to the runway when suddenly becoming visual near the MAPt of, say, a VOR half way up the runway whilst still at the MDA and doing say 100kts.


Why not use Vy or the minimum IMC airspeed for an approach and slow down well out on the final approach segment?

You are flying a helicopter remember.

[HeliComparator]

Why not use Vy or the minimum IMC airspeed for an approach and slow down well out on the final approach segment?

You are flying a helicopter remember.

Slowing below Vy seems a bad idea to me - on the back of the drag curve its very easy to lose too much speed. Then the regulatos will want to know what you will do if an engine fails in IMC below Vy, etc etc.

Personally I think even slowing to Vy can be too much if there is a significant crosswind, since the drift angle can become significant, resulting in pilots looking in the wrong place for the lights and possibly rendering one pilot unsighted at the moment its decided to go visual.

Yes, a helicopter can do both these things but the primary aim should be a safe landing somewhere, not a landing at the nominated destination but with reduced safety margin.

Aggressive visual manoeuvring at low speed in marginal weather (big flare to slow down) just seems a recipe for disaster, and for what benefit?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

212 - that PFD screen is the worst ergonomic display I have ever seen. What aircraft is it from??? Or it is from a computer game.

It took me a full half hour to figure out where the everything was and still not clear where the RADALT and bug settings are on the display???

Why is the VSI not in the PFD scan area or can it be moved??

[Special 25]

Is a Night Approach considered a NPA?? Certainly, when you look at CFIT in the offshore world, Night Approach, ARA and now an onshore Non Precision Approach are all incidents with similar hallmarks.

[212man]

212 - that PFD screen is the worst ergonomic display I have ever seen. What aircraft is it from??? Or it is from a computer game.

I assume you are joking when expressing your apparent ignorance about the type?

Regardless, I cannot but agree with you about the ergonomics and I have had many heated discussions with the OEM about them, that go back 7 years!:ugh::ugh:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

212 Man no honestly I have no idea, is it the S92??

Apologies if I sound a bit I'm but I do not gt out much!!

[212man]

DB - yes, it is.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Holy Molly I have heard some negatives about it before but never realised how bad it was. Looks like a Kid has gone nuts with a box of crayons!!

One technical Q though. The P. R. C. Indication on the AFCS annunciation strip, is shoung "Collective" in the RH AFCS Annunciator?? Which seems illogical.


DB

[212man]

The P. R. C. Indication on the AFCS annunciation strip, is shoung "Collective" in the RH AFCS Annunciator?? Which seems illogical.
Depends what logic process you apply, I guess. EC seem to use the logic that the collective is physically on the left, but on the PFD you could equally argue that the functions to which it pertains - ALT, V/S and G/S - are all on the right.

the AFCS annunciation strip

One thing I introduced a while back, and tried to get the OEM to adopt too, is the use of the expression FMA - Flight Mode Annunciator. It is absolutely the standard expression used accross all the FW manufacturers, operators and other bodies (just look at the guidance on level busts, or NPAs). Every RW manufacturer has a different term for it (SAC call it the PFD header strip!) and consequently operators have no standard term too.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

212 yes I agree. The FMA is a better term. Airbus usethis too. Try saying "AFCS Annuciation Strip" intheheat of battle or 100 times a day.

I am intrigued though about the Collective Mode logics.

In EC the logic. C. YR. P. are the VERTICAL. LATERAL. LONGITUDINAL. axis and the MODES are assigned to the relevant axis making it clear which flight control is doing what.

However, during AFCS systems based training, quality time spent demonstrating these logics and display presentations I think lies at the heart of understanding fully the operation of the AFCS.

I have an open mind but when the "C" is on the right my small swede is confused.

DB

[Fareastdriver]

then how would they cope with the harder bit - getting in to the runway when suddenly becoming visual near the MAPt of, say, a VOR half way up the runway whilst still at the MDA and doing say 100kts.

Thousands of fixed wing pilots seem to manage this without coming to the hover, You may well be flying a helicopter but the approach is designed and certified for a fixed wing aircraft. Why make things difficult at Vy when there are thousands of metres of concrete at the end to stop it in.

[Kakpipe Cosmonaut]

FW drivers add 400m to the RVR/CMV when using the 'dive and drive' method. Except for circling approaches.

[GJM]

'What we do know is that a helicopter ended up in the drink with both engines operative'

Does that categorically mean the Heli still had enough fuel?

I mean you can run off the road on a car with fuel in the lines still pulling you until impact but that doesn't mean it can take you another 10 miles.

How accurate are the gauges, does inaccurate weights have much of an impact.

From my time offshore in the past, the truth is figures passed on weights are rarely accurate

[Bravo73]

Does that categorically mean the Heli still had enough fuel?


If there had been an issue with fuel quantities, there would have been a PAN and then a MAYDAY declared (depending on planned and actual fuel loads).

It has already been reported (on day one), that there was not even a MAYDAY call.

[HeliComparator]

when there are thousands of metres of concrete at the end to stop it in.

If only there were!

[HeliComparator]

'What we do know is that a helicopter ended up in the drink with both engines operative'

Does that categorically mean the Heli still had enough fuel?

I mean you can run off the road on a car with fuel in the lines still pulling you until impact but that doesn't mean it can take you another 10 miles.

How accurate are the gauges, does inaccurate weights have much of an impact.

From my time offshore in the past, the truth is figures passed on weights are rarely accurate

Have you actually read the interim AAIB report? Clearly it hadn't run out of fuel. Anyway, we know that Sumburgh was the destination and they were carrying fuel for an alternate.

[OMONEZ]

GJM ,Shut up.
JA. last line is so true.
Etap was not CFIT(W) not with the high ROD and high Q.
Fly into a hill when you think you are somewhere else is CFIT.
Did the crew start to recover too late! Level in pitch right wing low. Nose down dump the pole.
Lets not forget it's a crash not a ditching ( not CFIT(w) ) A Crash!
How do we move on and try to reduce the risk?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

OMONEZ - reading the other 90 pages before you post might help.

DB

[OMONEZ]

So what do we do?

[OMONEZ]

I will not rise to your cheap bait. Check my posts on this thread. How do we move on? What have we done wrong in training, assumptions!.

[pilot and apprentice]

Slowing below Vy seems a bad idea to me - on the back of the drag curve its very easy to lose too much speed. Then the regulatos will want to know what you will do if an engine fails in IMC below Vy, etc etc.

Personally I think even slowing to Vy can be too much if there is a significant crosswind, since the drift angle can become significant, resulting in pilots looking in the wrong place for the lights and possibly rendering one pilot unsighted at the moment its decided to go visual.

Yes, a helicopter can do both these things but the primary aim should be a safe landing somewhere, not a landing at the nominated destination but with reduced safety margin.

Aggressive visual manoeuvring at low speed in marginal weather (big flare to slow down) just seems a recipe for disaster, and for what benefit?

HC, I have not flown in the NS, so it may be different there, but on the Canadian East Coast there are weeks where approaches to minimums (ie. you consistently need the second approach to get in, or you just don't) are the norm. You, DB, and others have advocated several things that make me leery.

1) everyone keeps stating the 225 autopilot, or EC standard autopilot, is perfect. Bull$hit. It was designed by people, there are places it will not be adequate. Forgot this at your own risk! You may not have seen them yet, but eventually someone will!

2) when at true minimums on the approach, one pilot is on the dials and the other is looking out. If the weather was good enough for both to be looking for visual references (outside) then it wouldn't be an approach to minimums! One pilot decides. The other maintains a back-up on instruments. There is no aggressive manouevering (sp?, i don't care really). There is a whole runway, or rig, in front of you.

And CDFA/dive-and-drive (what a crap term!), is it really that hard to see the differences? Or are all the endless questions on here from people who fly neither helicopters or IFR?

If you are actually planning to successfully land an approach in minimum weather, these are things you should have thought about long ago!

[albatross]

I am afraid, Pilot and Apprentice, that there are many on this forum who have never flown an ARA, Localizer or any non precision approach nor for that matter a helicopter in an offshore environment.
Many who critize the PUMA, 225 and / or the 92 have never even been in one.
Still this is a rumour network so you have to seperate the wheat from the chaff.

Notice for example that many seem to think that an ARA is a straight in and completely ignore the offset which is going to put the rig at either the 1030 or 1330 position at mimima. Excepting of course where a visual has been attained earlier and a 'visual continue' call made with perhaps a heading change made from the offset back towards the rig.

I too dispise the term "Dive and Drive."

Don't worry about the spelling. On some threads the rule seems to be "if you can not argue against the logic -attack the grammar, spelling or syntax even when the person's first language is not english."

Having stated that there are some here who are very experienced and knowledgeable.
We will not change the world on this forum but some folks have some very good ideas and it is worth waiting for some gem of wisdom to heave over the horizon.

[rotorspeed]

Anyone know if there will be another interim AAIB report on this, and if so about when? Or is that it for official info now until the full report comes out in presumably a year or so?

[The Ancient Geek]

Another interrim will usually only happen if they find something that needs action.
This generally implies that a hazard has been identified which should be addressed before the full report is complete.

[GJM]

Yes I read the report and know what it says but just because any engine is running upon impact that doesn't categorically mean there was sufficient fuel

[HeliComparator]

Yes I read the report and know what it says but just because any engine is running upon impact that doesn't categorically mean there was sufficient fuel

Yes it does. Maybe you have no experience of gas turbine engines (in which case I wonder why you are trying to push an agenda of running out of fuel), but with such an engine, there is either fuel being pumped in, or once the fuel level gets too low, air gets entrained with the fuel and a pocket of air in the fuel line results in a momentary fuel interruption which puts the flame out and the engines ceases to function.

In any case, if the engine was "running but with insufficient fuel" aka losing power, there would be a report of low rotor rpm which there wasn't. The scenario does in no way fit running out of fuel. Why not make another post suggesting that the pilots were beamed out of the cockpit by aliens? After all, they survived when some passengers didn't. Maybe they weren't aboard when the heli hit the sea?

[SASless]

Now.....Now HC.....the wee callow fellow does have a point.....not much...but a point.

They could have arrived with out their planned reserve fuel....or something akin to that.....but even then both engines would be happy as Clams as they would not know it until they did in fact get a sudden and complete injection of either air or sea water.

Is he reluctant to state he thinks they were short of fuel and thus were doing something in extremis to ensure they made visual contact with the surface so they would not have to do a Missed Approach?

If that is what he is saying....he should either say that or keep his musing to himself I would suggest.

How he would arrive at that view is a topic that I would dearly love to hear him explain.

That would beat CSI and Criminal Minds best episodes combined into one wouldn't it?

[[email protected]]

I am sure that eventually the engines did get an injection of seawater but the report states engines running normally and producing power on impact - if there was a fuel starvation/interruption issue they wouldn't have written that phrase and we wouldn't be speculating how the crew managed to fly a serviceable helicopter into the water.

[rotorspeed]

SAS

That (remote) scenario wouldn't make sense. Apart from anything else, if they knew they were low on fuel they would surely have gone for best glide range speed (? 80kts ish) on the approach, not got behind the drag curve. And if they didn't know, the approach would have been with normal speed and profile until a sudden departure from both as it ran out.

[Bravo73]

They could have arrived with out their planned reserve fuel....or something akin to that.....

Like I've already said a few posts above, if they had been in that position, then the crew would have already declared a PAN and/or a MAYDAY due to their fuel state. ATC never even received a MAYDAY call.

I understand that the 'run out of fuel scenario' is still a popular rumour amongst some of the offshore community. This might be the reasoning behind GJM's ill informed posts.

[FrustratedFormerFlie]

Seems to me we've pretty much exhausted this discussion. The answers are on the CVR

Either they were aware of their situation, in which case it'll be on the CVR, or they weren't aware, so an equally significant absence of infromation on the CVR.

Either way, it's likely to be a long time before any such evidence sees the light of day. M'learned friend will see to that.

[Hummingfrog]

Having read and taken part in this thread it seems to me that the autopilot/coupler/FMS fitted to modern helicopters has become too complicated!
The talk of which control does what function at a particular time - upper and lower modes seems to to over complicate what should be simple evolutions.

What do we want the coupler to do in the simple IFR environment of NS offshore flying?

We want it to fly:-

1. A coupled ILS down to DH where if not countermanded it will carry out a missed approach.

2. A LOC/DME approach horizontal profile where it will level at the set MDH and when commanded carry out a missed approach.

3. A VOR/DME approach horizontal profile where it will level at the set MDH and when commanded carry out a missed approach.

4. A Rig Radar approach horizontal profile where it will offset at 5deg at 1.5nm, 10deg at 1nm and if commanded at 0.75nm a 45deg turn away from the rig and climb to SA or preselected altitude.

6. A visual night approach as prescribed in the company Ops Manual

5. A system for maintaining altitude and navigating along a pre-programmed route with easy access to how much fuel there will be at each way-point and destination/diversion.

Certain safety features can also be programmed into the coupler - such as min speed for a certain type of approach.

These simple functions should be easy to program and activate from one control panel and it should be obvious what approach has been selected.

I am sure that a simpler coupler would be welcomed by NS crews but I am afraid it will never happen as the "geeks" who design these systems always want to add more and more capabilites - a bit like buying a laptop - it always has far more capabilities than you require!!

It was quite telling that DB found the S92 display confusing even though he is one of the pilots pushing more and more automation.

My view is that the coupler is there to help you fly the a/c - more accurately if required - not to take over the flying of the a/c!

HF

[OMONEZ]

Hit on the nail! Maybe 2 years before we see the final report.
All types in the North Sea have problems!
Bitching about types doesn't help.
How can all that experience be better put to use?

[serf]

And a suitable alternate?

[serf]

I'm asking a question.

[Hummingfrog]

Serf

Of course he would have had a suitable alternate such as Kirkwall, Wick or Bergen depending on the forecasts. With the following TAFs, if you are a pilot, which alternate would you have chosen?

TAF AMD EGPB 231452Z 2315/2324 14020G30KT 6000 FEW002 BKN005
PROB30 2318/2324 4000 BR BKN006=

TAF COR EGPB 231700Z 2318/2403 14020G30KT 2500 BR BKN003
TEMPO 2321/2403 6000 SHRA SCT005
PROB30 TEMPO 2322/2403 +SHRA=

TAF EGPC 231355Z 2315/2324 15015KT 5000 HZ FEW003
PROB30 TEMPO 2315/2324 9999 NSW=

TAF ENBR 231400Z 2315/2415 15008KT 9999 FEW040 BKN080=

TAF EGPA 231355Z 2315/2324 18018KT 2000 BR BKN001
TEMPO 2315/2321 6000 NSW SCT002=

HF

[serf]

Yes Hummingfrog I do fly and was responding to a posting which has now been deleted.

[HeliComparator]

Serf

Of course he would have had a suitable alternate such as Kirkwall, Wick or Bergen depending on the forecasts. With the following TAFs, if you are a pilot, which alternate would you have chosen?

HF

I'd have chosen Aberdeen if it was OK.

[FrustratedFormerFlie]

I believe Aberdeen - Dunbar platform (Borgsten barge) - Sumburgh (refuel) - Aberdeen is a regular Total milk run.

[serf]

So fuel required at Sumburgh to make it back to Aberdeen?

[Hummingfrog]

HC

In my day we could only dream of using Aberdeen as an alternate from Sumburgh coming in from the Shetland basin - it would have meant we couldn't have carried many pax!! I often used Wick which meant I could carry a full load and once actually used it (VOR/DME approach!) - in my day we got a free pen if we fuelled at Wick - they were a very friendly bunch and turn rounds were very quick. I was the only 332L who brought a full load back that day!!

HF

[Bravo73]

And a suitable alternate?

I'm asking a question.

Yes Hummingfrog I do fly and was responding to a posting which has now been deleted.

So fuel required at Sumburgh to make it back to Aberdeen?

What exactly are you angling for, serf? Do you want someone to say that they were suffering from 'press-on-itis' and they had to land at Sumburgh because they weren't holding fuel for an alternate? :suspect:

Given the forecast at Sumburgh, the crew would not have departed the Borgsten if they weren't holding sufficient fuel to fly to Sumburgh and then on to a suitable alternate. That alternate would probably have been closer than Aberdeen so, yes, they might have needed a top up at Sumburgh in order to make it to Aberdeen.

[bigglesbutler]

in my day we got a free pen if we fuelled at Wick - they were a very friendly bunch and turn rounds were very quick

Yup Andrew was still there last time I was in Wick, a year or so ago and dishing out the kit-kat chunkys and pens when required.

[Irish Steve]

I've been watching this thread since it started, and at the risk again of getting something hard thrown my way, some thoughts, observations and questions.

First, an observation, which may be based on wrong information, the TV reports at the time of the accident showed an approach profile that was in no way a direct approach to the airfield, if there had been any hint of fuel shortage, which I would have expected the crew to have been aware of a long time before it became critical, then a direct routing would presumably have been sought and given. On that basis, I suspect the fuel shortage is a red herring.

So, there are significant discussions about ILS/DME, or VOR/DME approached, and even NDB/DME.

In the FW world, for which all of these very old technologies were originally produced, we regularly see aircraft the size of an A380 making approaches to land in CAT3C condition, where the only visual contact is after touchdown, at 140 Kts, and needing a long strip of unobstructed runway in front of the aircraft. It happens on a regular basis, all round the world, and the number of accidents that can be attributed to autoland is very low. It was developed originally for the Trident, and they've been out of service now for a long time.

I find it hard to understand why the RW arena does not at this stage have things like GPS/DME approaches, with Radalt coupled for the landing phase, that would be capable of approaching in zero visibility, and then making an appropriate descent and flare to landing. GPS accuracy is way more precise than a localiser, or glideslope, so why has it not become a fundamental part of NS operations, with suitable equipment fitted on the rigs to provide the wide area augmentation.

If that is not accurate enough, what happened to MLS, which was supposed to be capable of more accurate resolution than ILS.
A long time ago, I got the impression that ILS was going to be phased out to free up the frequency spectrum for other broadcasting use, and replaced by a combination of MLS and GPS/DME approaches, but things seem to have gone very quiet in that area for some reason.

Last weekend, I was at a model show in Kent, and one of the things shown was a model quadcopter no more than 500mm rotorspan, it took off from a fixed point, marked by a balloon on a stick, was then flown around the area, under radio control, and then flown away from the start point, and to conclude the demonstration, the transmitter was switched off. The quad then climbed to 20 Mtrs, positioned back towards the departure point, then descended from the overhead, and landed less than 1 metre from the departure point, using electronics that are the size of a matchbox.
This was in gusty winds, so the "black box" had to work to keep things accurate, which it did.

I was already aware of this technology, and I find it slightly strange that the manufacturers and operators of commercial helicopters have not pushed very hard to get this level of technology on board, even if only in research at this stage,

So, I guess the questions I am posing are pretty simple in some respects.

Why is the NS forced to still use technology that was never designed or intended for RW operation?

Why have the capabilities that are in daily use on FW operations not finding their way down into helicopter operations. If an A380 is deemed safe to regularly land in zero visibility conditions at 140Kts, and it does not have the ability to hover, why can't a helicopter be set up to land safely in zero zero conditions using similar technologies, or better, given that MLS and GPS, along with Radalt should be capable of determining exactly where the helicopter is, laterally and vertically, and determining automatically how to get to the required point.

There will be issues with keeping the crew in the loop. and it certainly appears that there are problems already in this area, the comment about geek systems is well understood, I've worked with some of them, and if they don't have real experience at the sharp end, some of the more esoteric things that get done only serve to confuse things, so maybe some of the retired or senior NS pilots should be working with the manufacturers to develop systems that meet the needs of the task.

I don't think I'm taking an over simplistic view of things, and clearly some change would be a benefit to safety and reliability, which all involved should be happy to see.

[SASless]

IS,

Did you catch the reaction by the North Sea folks to the mere mention of a Sikorksky/PHI Automated Approach Procedure that has been Certified by the FAA?

The immediate reaction was "won't work".

That is your short answer to your long question.

Landing a Jet weighing several hundred thousand pounds carrying several hundred passengers, moving at 130-140 knots onto a narrow strip of concrete without seeing the ground is seen as far simpler than developing procedures to bring a helicopter to a stabilized airspeed and height at a particular point over open water or over a runway ashore.

The Helicopter Industry is too short sighted and handicapped by a mindset that starts off finding ways "not" to be able do do something that is so innovative.

The technology exists.....making it happen is the impossible bit.


The old Sperry Helipilot system with Flight Director and a RadAlt would do an ILS Approach down to a minimum height of 50 feet AGL.....level the aircraft and track the Localizer. Yet we were limited to 200 feet DH. No effort was ever made to gain certification for lower than that by any Operator I ever flew for.

The Helicopter Industry operates to limitations imposed by their Purse....not the aircraft equipment.

[HeliComparator]

SAS first of all, to get it out of the way! Both SKY and EC / CAA have been working on automated rig approaches. All credit to SKY for getting there first, although I don't know how good it is in practice. Both systems will get the helicopter to the missed approach point which will probably remain at 0.75 in EASA land, or maybe squeeze down to 0.5 miles. But that is the easy bit especially with the likes of the 225's superb autopilot operation.

The tricky bit comes when the pilot has to take control and get the helicopter from the MAPt to the deck, maybe starting from only 50' above the deck (so no sight picture until the last moment).

As I think has been mentioned before, there have been no accidents during the IFR part of a rig approach, so these developments, whilst welcome, are not going to make a step change in safety since they are addressing a risk that has yet to ever become an accident.

Where SKY lag is in their minimum coupled speeds for the bit from MAPt to the deck. 50 (or is it 55, can't remember) into a typical 15 kt headwind gives 35-40 kts minimum coupled ground speed.

By contrast the 225 can be coupled to IAS down to 30 kts, say 15 kts ground speed, and ALT hold works perfectly down to zero speed. So currently I would say the 225 is by far the safer heli to make a rig approach in marginal conditions. Yes the automated approach sounds great and no doubt comes with a glossy sales brochure, but its contribution to flight safety is limited because it doesn't address the most challenging bit.

[HeliComparator]

IS I think the current situation arises due to various factors. Firstly, fancy GPS approaches are only possible with SBAS and of course its only a couple of years since EGNOS went live n Europe.

Secondly, I think we all felt that the offshore ARA was the risky bit. Onshore non-precision approaches are pretty easy by comparison, and so what could possibly go wrong?

Finally I do think EC made a mistake by not having vertical guidance built in to the FMS / Autopilot in the same way as the 92 does (even though no-one seems to use it!). Also as far as I am aware, the GPS installation is not currently certified to use SBAS (I may be out of date there, but our's certainly aren't), and I believe the standard oil and gas GPS installation is still TSO 129 and not TSO 145. Hopefully EC are progressing this now, and after this accident there will hopefully be more pressure to move to vertical guidance on an NPA.

The 225 does have fantastically precise auto hover, based on Inertial /GPS hybrid (with the emphasis on inertial) but the operational use of that has to be such that a public transport heli doesn't enter a flight regime from which recovery would be difficult in the event of a malfunction.

Edited to add the the emphasis should be on adding to safety margins, not on letting the heli "get in" on a day when it otherwise might not. We only fly to CAT 1 ILS minima, in part because if you look at how often we don't get in to Aberdeen, it is a very rare event. To go to CAT 2 requires a significant amount of additional training for a 50' reduction in DA and its just not worth it. That is presuming the destination and alternate airports even have CAT 2.

Our flight programmes are disrupted due to being unable to get in offshore, or there being no suitable alternates, or due to weather such as lightning. They are very rarely disruptions due to being unable to get in to Aberdeen because of poor vis/low cloud.

[HeliComparator]

So fuel required at Sumburgh to make it back to Aberdeen?

Rumour has it that the wx at Aberdeen meant that, as a destination, an alternate was required. An L2 could probably fly back from that rig with a reasonable payload, and no strong headwind (as was the case that day, direct to Aberdeen. But since an alternate was required, it could only probably do that with a fairly low payload,if at all (depending on where the alternate was). To pop into Sumburgh, nearly on the way, to gain a few extra passengers-worth of payload is obviously the sensible thing to do, and common practice.

[Hummingfrog]

HC

To go to CAT 2 requires a significant amount of additional training for a 50' reduction in DA and its just not worth it.

Interesting that you need extra training to reduce the DH from 200ft to 150ft. If my brain is working today the RAF Seaking had a DH of 150ft for an ILS and PAR - this was due to the calculation of DH for various a/c which included an Aircraft Approach limitation (AAL) which was used in conjunction with the Obstacle clearance limit (OCL). This produced a DH for the Seaking of 150ft - we had no extra training for this - you just flew to that limit.

Crab may be able to confirm if this is still the case - the ILS was also manually flown as we had no coupler for approaches to airfields.

HF

[SASless]

HC,

If one sets the RadAlt but to 150/100/50 feet....pick your choice....does the helicopter know the difference between CAT 1, 2, 3 etc?

I should think that fancy 225 Autopilot you slavishly praise to us constantly would quite happily drive the machine to whatever height you selected.....would it not?

Would it not hold the Airspeed you select as well?

We know it would magically track the localizer to a gnats reared as well.

[rotorspeed]

Interesting though discussion about potential AFCS performance to enable approaches to below Cat 1 ILS limits is, it is surely not particularly relevant to this accident's cause. Just 3 mins after the accident time, the wx at Sumburgh was not that bad - 2800m vis, scattered 200 and broken 300ft. The acft crashed 1.5miles away - almost certainly where wx was similar. Getting visual safely should not have been hard. We still come back to the progressively reducing airspeed and height below profile. There is no logic to a deliberate action of chosing this profile, surely? Why try and descend early when the airfield is pretty much at sea level anyway, and that's where you've been told the wx is ok?

Incidentally, would the approach just have been monitored horizontally on the localiser/DME, or would the crew have been monitoring an AD GPS waypoint too as back up?

[SASless]

If as HC suggests....the 225 is capable of doing an auto hover....why not pick a point along the runway and do such a procedure for that point? Not talking about legality here.....just capability and feasibility.

[Hummingfrog]

SASLESS

I think it all boils down to money - the 365N2 had a coupled ILS which in theory would take you down to 50ft but nobody would pay for it to be certified. If the companies can see no commercial advantage they won't pay. As HC says a 200ft DH at Aberdeen seems to be enough for 99% of Oil related flights so no need to pay for a lower DH!!

HF

[SASless]

How would an approved 50" IlS minimum/reduced vis limits figure into Alternate Planning? Are there financial savings to be had there?

[industry insider]

HC

The Sikorsky automated Rig Approach is not so much about bad weather as about getting the aircraft to the appropriate relative position in relation to the rig / platform every time, good, bad weather day or night.

If the pilot doesn't like what he sees, just leave it alone and the aircraft will perform a safe GA. As you know, it's the GA in bad weather or at night in good weather and the transition from visual to instrument that can and has (BLUN) go wrong.

I would have thought that an automated system which delivered you stable to the same (allowing for W/V) place each time would have met with your approval, even if the box didn't say made in France by Eurocopter.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

In my day we could only dream of using Aberdeen as an alternate from Sumburgh coming in from the Shetland basin

Aberdeen-Magnus-Aberdeen direct both ways loses its appeal very quickly!

[HeliComparator]

II if you read my posts you will see that I do approve, its to that I shall not be jumping up and down shouting that its the best thing since... whatever. Yes as I said it does help, but it helps with the bit that is already quite easy these days with very precise pilot driven upper modes such as HDG, IAS and ALT and a GA button which flies the heli up and away regardless. The step from your day on the S76A, to the automatic approach systems we are talking about, would be massive. But very much less for a modern heli.

[Sailor Vee]

I can recall a 234 driver coming back to Aberdeen when the weather was a tad 'iffy'. As most of Scotland was the same, he declared his diversion was Paris!

[HeliComparator]

HC,

If one sets the RadAlt but to 150/100/50 feet....pick your choice....does the helicopter know the difference between CAT 1, 2, 3 etc?

I should think that fancy 225 Autopilot you slavishly praise to us constantly would quite happily drive the machine to whatever height you selected.....would it not?

Would it not hold the Airspeed you select as well?

We know it would magically track the localizer to a gnats reared as well.

The 225 ILS system is quite capable of delivering the heli to 80' at 30 kts IAS, from which it can be beeped down to 30'. However the rules don't allow it to be used below the system minimum of 200'. To get down to 150' would be CAT 2, requires an operational approval from CAA and recurrent training every 6 months. And not even sure that Aberdeen is approved for CAT 2? Certainly other minor airports aren't.

So (and this directed to HF as well) it is not just about what tricks the heli can perform, it is what is allowed under the operational regulations and what has been certified. To certify such a system would have to take account of failure modes - ie if the heli was entering an auto-hover over the runway in IMC what would the pilots do if it stopped working - how would they even know if it stopped working until there was a crunch. So in all probability it is less about the money for certification, and more about whether such use is certifiable at all.

When flying an ILS in the 225, for Bristow it is SOP to leave the ILS coupled at DA if visual. The ILS system then takes the heli down to level flight at 80' on the localiser and the pilot beeps the speed well down. The aircraft handles this perfectly every time, and it eases workload in the sometimes tricky transition to visual flight with substantial speed reduction. BUT this can only be done if the pilots have the required visual references at and below DA. Thus they can monitor against visual references and take manual control if necessary (though it never is!).

[SASless]

HC.....so we in the helicopter industry are still playing by Rules put in place for Fixed Wing Aircraft are we not?

When I suggested a "Shields Down" review of how we have gotten to where we are.....a process of evolution in reality.....the amazing capability of modern technology is still limited by 1950's regulations.

Should the Authorities take a fresh view of the Rules and Regulations that pertain to Helicopters that evolved from those created for fixed wing aircraft?

How about Point in Space IFR Approaches.....could there not be a place for them and even Helicopter Only Low Level IFR airway routes?

A dear friend and colleague of yours has been advocating that for many years and laid out such a system to the FAA which like most authorities gave the concept scant attention.

Helicopters are very different in their handling abilities than are Airplanes. Why should there not be a separate set of Regulations and Infrastructure for us rather than trying to replicate fixed wing concepts?

[Fareastdriver]

Ideally we would have separate routes and separate approach patterns for helicopters. They then could use their attributes and their unique equipment. However at the moment we use fixed wing certified approach aids and runways and we have to share them with our fixed wing brethren.

You cannot come down an approach at Vy and come to the hover at the threshold with a radar controller feeding fixed wing into the approach at two minute intervals behind you. You have to go with the flow. That's why we did 140 knot approaches at Hong Kong. (In a S76)

[SASless]

AT West Palm Beach one evening....Approach asked a 727 to increase speed on final as he had a Helicopter overtaking him.

The Airline Pilot said he would add ten knots......two minutes later he was asked if he could speed up a bit more.....and when the Controller again said it was because a Helicopter was overtaking him......he asked "What the hell kind of a helicopter is it?"

I chimed in and said ....." A very fast one!"

We were smoking down the chute at Vne.

Flying brand new 76's at the factory had its perks!

[OffshoreSLF]

Aberdeen-Magnus-Aberdeen direct both ways loses its appeal very quickly!

Used to do Aberdeen-Bruce and Bruce-Aberdeen regularly, so I can tell you that being stuck in the back of a SP for nearly 2 hours dressed up like the Michelin man is not much fun either. I would hate to do the round trip in one go, so you have my sympathies.

We sometimes used to call in at Longside on the way out for a top up of fuel, but that seemed to have stopped before I left. Is Longside still used as a fuel top-up or diversion airfield?

On the visibility issue, I worked in the North Sea for about 30 years, and it was a rare occasion that we were delayed due to weather.

[Brom]

Aberdeen-Magnus-Aberdeen direct both ways loses its appeal very quickly!

You're not wrong there! So does Aberdeen-Brent-Aberdeen followed by Aberdeen-Fulmar-Aberdeen. Used to do them in the BV234LR, not much fun at all.

And yes it was possible to use Paris as an alt from the basin, with full fuel, few or no pax, a strong following wind and flying at altitude nose bleed to keep the fuel flow down.

Anyway,enough reminiscing, back on topic you lot this is a very good informative thread with some excellent input.

[[email protected]]

Interesting that you need extra training to reduce the DH from 200ft to 150ft. If my brain is working today the RAF Seaking had a DH of 150ft for an ILS and PAR - this was due to the calculation of DH for various a/c which included an Aircraft Approach limitation (AAL) which was used in conjunction with the Obstacle clearance limit (OCL). This produced a DH for the Seaking of 150ft - we had no extra training for this - you just flew to that limit.

Crab may be able to confirm if this is still the case - the ILS was also manually flown as we had no coupler for approaches to airfields.


HF, as HC mentions above, we are limited to 200' on an ILS due to the system limitations not the helis. We can still subtract 50' from a FW precision approach minima but not below 200' for ILS and 150' for PAR.

Unfortunately, after many many, years of safe operation of the SK, someone allowed a piece of work by a Navy TP to surface and we now have a variable HTA between 30' and 50' to add on:ugh: Oh and the same genius imposed a 100 kt GS limit on ILS as well - not very helpful when you have poorly people in the back and you are in a hurry!

I believe that the S61s in Ireland (which had the SN 500 series autopilot like the SK 3A) were allowed, in extremis, to use the trans down SAR modes to runway which would get you to 40' fully coupled.

[micraman]

We flew the army gazelle down to 150 feet single pilot and no stick feel or autopilot just hands on.must admit when I started flying civvy flying I did question why with all the help and full autopilot and 2 crew we could only go down to 200 feet ?

[bigglesbutler]

I believe that the S61s in Ireland (which had the SN 500 series autopilot like the SK 3A) were allowed, in extremis, to use the trans down SAR modes to runway which would get you to 40' fully coupled.

We used the LN450 to transition down running into Sumburgh @ 40ft when the 40 Mile an hour fog was about, using the localiser as a backup indication of the correct track to runway 27/09. It was a well established procedure by the time I arrived in 2004.

Si

[Fareastdriver]

We flew the army gazelle down to 150 feet single pilot

We did the same with Pumas, everywhere, anytime.

[Hummingfrog]

Fareastdriver

We flew the army gazelle down to 150 feet single pilot

We did the same with Pumas, everywhere, anytime.

We flew the Wessex at 50ft agl on low level transits on Ex in Germany - there again the Pumas always were big P====ys:E

Just before my time on the Seaking somebody tried to demonstrate a trans down at RAF Chetwynd ( a grass airfield) - unfortunately I believe the rad alt unlocked over the waving long grass so the system thought it was higher than 50ft and planted the Seaking firmly!! onto the ground.

HF

Sorry about slight thread drift!!

[Ray Joe Czech]

Gossip I heard this week was that the PM -- who was the co-pilot-- said "airspeed" more than once. Please note that this is second or third hand gossip, but, if true, will put us in a run of incidents/accidents where quite inexperienced co-pilots are sitting watching experienced pilots crash aircraft.
I've got my doubts about the veracity of this as I would expect the commander to be PM given the poor weather there was at the time. Is this standard practice across all the companies?

[industry insider]

I've got my doubts about the veracity of this as I would expect the commander to be PM given the poor weather there was at the time. Is this standard practice across all the companies?

Don't doubt yourself Ray.

[Fareastdriver]

We flew the Wessex at 50ft agl on low level transits on Ex in Germany
I know; we used to undertake you.

[HeliComparator]

I know; we used to undertake you.

Wow, you should be careful. With such enormous balls dangling, they might hit the ground and that WOULD be painful.

[HeliComparator]

... I would expect the commander to be PM given the poor weather there was at the time. Is this standard practice across all the companies?

It is in Bristow, but not set in stone. If the copilot never plays the PM role in such circumstances, how can he prepare for command? But if he was pretty new, putting him as PF would seem the sensible thing to do.

[SASless]

Is it company policy where you work for the Captains to mentor Co-Pilots and give them as much hands on experience as possible....or are Line Captains seen to be the Hands on guy and the Co-Pilot there to assist the Captain by doing all the grunt work?

I always saw it to be my responsibility to teach and mentor as well as be the PIC of the Helicopter.

By doing that.....do you not work to break down the psychological barrier between the two pilots so that in times of stress the subordinate is willing to speak up and communicate and for the Captain to "Listen" to the Co-Pilot?


HC....we know you would never have that problem of banging yer balls....but if you did it would be a very small problem.

[Ray Joe Czech]

Is it company policy where you work for the Captains to mentor Co-Pilots and give them as much hands on experience as possible....or are Line Captains seen to be the Hands on guy and the Co-Pilot there to assist the Captain by doing all the grunt work?

I think you are reading waaaay too much into my comment about the PIC taking control for the DA decision in marginal weather, but here goes anyway...
In my company generally one pilot flies out and the other flies back. I may offer the other pilot the other sector as well from time to time if they are relatively new on line so they can get the take-off and landing practice: regrettably, I won't improve, maybe they will.
As to mentoring, no, I don't think there is any policy about that although I fail to see how you can sit there and not learn anything from watching the other guy regardless of the experience you have.

I always saw it to be my responsibility to teach and mentor as well as be the PIC of the Helicopter.
By doing that.....do you not work to break down the psychological barrier between the two pilots so that in times of stress the subordinate is willing to speak up and communicate and for the Captain to "Listen" to the Co-Pilot?

No, you don't. I think you set yourself up as 'teacher' if you do that and force them into the roll of 'student' and probably considerably steepen any cockpit gradient. Probably better to treat them as as much of an equal as you can and ask as many open questions as you can about the decisions you need to make. Unfortunately, I probably trample all over this ideal the moment I say, 'Well, I'd rather get back to base with more/less fuel than that because of the weather/exposure coming off the deck.'
It probably also helps to tell them before you go flying, that if they see anything they don't like or understand to spit it out sooner rather than later.

[SASless]

RJC,

Seems you confuse "Mentoring" with "Instruction"....and I take it from your comments you think a new copilot should silently admire your Monkey Skills and somehow soak up that ability vicariously.

Monkey skills come from hands on flying....or doing.....the other important part of the learning process is as you say....including the lesser experienced pilot in all phases of the business at hand.....in other words....being a Mentor.

Is not the old Master/Apprentice relationship what we are talking about here?

The skilled craftsman passing that skill down to a younger person?

How that gets done is the question.

I maintain Captains have an inherent responsibility to do so.......do you disagree?

Do you know Gann......I begin to think not?


Great Aviation Quotes: Piloting (http://www.skygod.com/quotes/piloting.html)

[Ray Joe Czech]

Perhaps you should read what I have said rather than what you think I have said.
As to your Master/Apprentice comment, that just leads me to think that you have no conception of what cockpit gradient means.

Edited to add: the OECD definition of mentor: advise, or train.

[[email protected]]

There is no real difference between mentoring and instruction - both are means to pass on knowledge and skills and both require mutual respect to be effective.

It is only those that insist on the more formal methods of instruction that become ineffective and rely on status to ensure the 'gradient' rather than it being self-evident from both the quality and quantity of the knowledge being passed along.

[SASless]

Apprentice defined:

one who is learning by practical experience under skilled workers a trade, art, or calling

Master defined:


A journeyman has also the responsibility of supervising lesser experienced workers and training them. He must be qualified to work unsupervised himself.

[[email protected]]

UL - that was my point, formal instruction without the mutual respect is not usually very effective and it is easy to hide behind the instructor/student gradient rather than establish a real rapport with the student.

Mentoring is certainly not effective without that same rapport/respect.

[mary meagher]

How fortunate we are in aviation that our class sizes in the hands on part of tuition/mentoring/intructing are generally limited to one other person!

[SASless]

I found by practice that removing my chain drive wallet from my hip pocket made the gradient less biased. Is that the gradient to which you refer?

[Fareastdriver]

Even more interesting when your co-pilot does not understand English and you have an interpreter in the jump seat. One of the principles of training is that when he is projecting you all to certain destruction you have to let him carry on so far to see whether he is going to correct himself. Should that not happen then you have to initiate command responsibility.

There are three ways.

1. Take over control and tell him where he has gone wrong. The interpreter will not understand the technical reasons so your co-pilot will suffer a massive loss of face because you have overruled him.

2 Tell the interpreter to tell the co-pilot what actions to take to correct the situation. This will end up in an argument between the interpreter and the pilot as to what I was talking about.

3 The final and best way. Convey to the pilot by means of the interpreter suggestions in such a way that the pilot thinks that they are his idea, in which case he will implement them. Face is saved all round and everybody comes home and Gam Beis at a big company dinner.

The world can be so different elsewhere.

[SASless]

Like having a Libyan Air Force Major who spoke no English being told by a young Libyan Lieutenant who almost spoke English relaying what you said. As Far said....it is complicated sometimes. Along with the Language issues, loss of face issues, and then Rank got thrown into the mix. Caring about the outcome of a Chinook conversion course under those circumstances was more than a bit difficult. Bottom line the money was very good and living in northern Italy at the foot of the Alps was not bad duty.

[industry insider]

Like having a Libyan Air Force Major who spoke no English being told by a young Libyan Lieutenant who almost spoke English relaying what you said. As Far said....it is complicated sometimes. Along with the Language issues, loss of face issues, and then Rank got thrown into the mix. Caring about the outcome of a Chinook conversion course under those circumstances was more than a bit difficult. Bottom line the money was very good and living in northern Italy at the foot of the Alps was not bad duty.


Relevance check SAS. This occurrence was in Sumburgh with two qualified and current English speaking pilots. Retirement is in danger of mixing your cogent posts with rambling ones.

[thelearner]

Originally posted by RJC
Gossip I heard this week was that the PM -- who was the co-pilot-- said "airspeed" more than once. Please note that this is second or third hand gossip, but, if true, will put us in a run of incidents/accidents where quite inexperienced co-pilots are sitting watching experienced pilots crash aircraft.
I've got my doubts about the veracity of this as I would expect the commander to be PM given the poor weather there was at the time. Is this standard practice across all the companies?
Only 2 possible sources? AAIB from CVR and would be highly unprofessional so unlikely? Or CP himself, speaking to colleagues, more likely, but even if true the real question is did the Pilot hear him?
We should wait on the facts from CVR and AAIB - hopefully we will get another interim report.

Co-Pilots - although they may be inexperienced, they are highly trained professionals who have the skills and ability to do everything the A/C commander can do - I would expect.
The real question, which has been posed earlier in this thread, is what sort of culture exists in the cockpit in the N/S, which has been partly answered but not fully?

It's a very British trait where there is a reluctance to point out mistakes to senior personnel, or question their decisions for fear of being wrong and looking stupid. Is this a problem in the companies in Aberdeen? The Co-pilot has a duty to take control if he thinks something is wrong, or his colleague has become temporarily incapacitated, and from what I have read, having no visual references can cause problems for even the most experienced?

Also nobody has mentioned fatigue as a possible factor? I know you guys are strictly limited on flying hours, but crash occurred at end of week and late on a Friday?

As an aside I have read some interesting articles form the AF447 crash in July 2009, which mystify me, as I thought all singing all dancing Airbus planes could not get outside their safe flight envelope? The crew were certainly able to get this one in an unsafe trim.
Also here there were 3 crew, although the most experienced was in bed when the chain of events was triggered by the least experienced crew member, when the auto pilot was disengaged when the pitot tube a/s sensor failed.

[industry insider]

Only 2 possible sources? AAIB from CVR and would be highly unprofessional so unlikely? Or CP himself, speaking to colleagues, more likely, but even if true the real question is did the Pilot hear him?
We should wait on the facts from CVR and AAIB - hopefully we will get another interim report.


The existence of the call(s) is fact.

Also nobody has mentioned fatigue as a possible factor? I know you guys are strictly limited on flying hours, but crash occurred at end of week and late on a Friday?


It was this crew's only flight of the day so fatigue would have to be cumulative and affect both crew. The same aircraft had flown an almost identical flight earlier in the day.

[Screw Driver]

"Also nobody has mentioned fatigue as a possible factor?"

It was thrown into the mix in post no. 1598 in response to a comment by Wirbelsturm.

[thelearner]

Screw Driver - thanks - I have read your post 1598 which must not have registered in my mind - I have read every post. Interesting post from you.


A significant number of our pilots are frequently close to the FTL limits (the limits are of course regarded as a target by the commercial department) and there are regular complaints about being fatigued. I wonder how many pilots come to work on their 5th day thinking that the automation will help them get through the 7 hours of flying and that 3rd ILS following the 4 ARAs? Another hole in the cheese is lining up as mistakes in setting up the AP are creeping in, even for those experienced on type! Would you have turned up for work if you knew you had to fly it all manually?

I agree with those who advocate more training, as opposed to testing, combined with manual flying. The latter has served me well on more than one occasion.

Industry Insider The existence of the call(s) is fact.

The poster stated it was gossip and unsubstantiated?

[Harry the Hun]

There is no real difference between mentoring and instruction - both are means to pass on knowledge and skills and both require mutual respect to be effective.

It is only those that insist on the more formal methods of instruction that become ineffective and rely on status to ensure the 'gradient' rather than it being self-evident from both the quality and quantity of the knowledge being passed along.


The best post I have read here in a long time!
Instructing is a form of art, or gift, that should not be squeezed into standardised procedures. Different students learn best in different ways and it up to the instructor to find this best way. The old military style might work in operational training, but for basic tuition there are better ways.

[Ray Joe Czech]

To answer an earlier point, no, I am not sure it is a line captain's job to mentor/train/instruct new pilots. Our line trainers have to do a CRM facilitators course, ground instructional training course and a fair amount of flying instructional training to do that: you think it's fine for me to do this without any of that?
The practical outcome of this approach is what tends to happen a little anyway, although less and less as all the dinosaurs die out. Line captains showing pilots fresh out of their line check "better" or "other" ways to do things. Having been on the receiving end of this type of thing I can report it is just a pain in the ar$e. You are just trying to get on with what you have been instructed to do when you are shown another way to do it along with an unwanted and sometimes plain wrong lecture. These guys are not idiots; they can see how you think and what you do and say; they will pick it up by osmosis. And if they don't, it's because the way I do isn't that great, or they don't get it, in which case they will have it beaten into them on recurrent line training.

My point about the gradient thing is that the more you adopt a mentor/instructor role and they a student/apprentice one, the steeper the cockpit gradient becomes between them and you, and, I believe, the more inhibited they will be in making a verbal or physical intervention if required. And if the gossip I reported is true then these matters are key because it looks like the Cougar, ETAP and this one all had this as a contributory factor.

[satsuma]

Both Cougar ones, the crash and the near crash.

[Fareastdriver]

Years ago I was sent off to a platform under construction to change over the evening shift. The wind was northerly and the accommodation barge was on the eastern side which made it a LHS landing. The helideck on the main structure was on the north side of the derricks was a RHS landing apart from another barge moored alongside with its cranes up against the western side of the helideck.

I recced both deck as I arrived and as the western crane was too close to the platforms helideck I told my co-pilot that he was going to be busy doing all the landings. He landed on the accommodation barge and I did the take off. I handed over control for the landing on the platform and as expected the deck went out of my sight on the final stages of the approach.

There then followed a long period of hovering and general confusion. I queried this and he stated that he could not manage the landing. I then took over control and pulled in power to clear the installation.

Conversation established that his entire offshore night experience had been four landings on a semisub parked in Aberdeen harbour. On the basis of this he had been line checked and cleared for all night operations. I had not flown with him before and there was no intimation to me as to his lack of experience. In a different circumstance if I had fouled it up he would have no way of knowing as to when we would have passed the point of no return.

Sometimes you're lucky, sometimes you're not.

[SASless]

Harry said it right too....not one single method of teaching works as we all have different motivators. The key to being a good instructor is being able to figure out how to motivate the one being taught. Any one that has Principles of Instruction should be aware of that.


It's a very British trait where there is a reluctance to point out mistakes to senior personnel, or question their decisions for fear of being wrong and looking stupid.

It has been my experience with the British (for the Ex-British Army anyway)....it was the other way around.....the Seniors did not like being shown to be stupid and wrong. The RN and RAF guys all seemed quite reasonable and decent Chaps. The Dark Blue crowd seemed to be far more fun in the Mess after duty was done.

[Nigerian Expat Outlaw]

Now now Sas, please don't tar all ex British Army with the same brush......:=

NEO

[Hummingfrog]

The introduction of CRM courses made a big difference in helping inexperienced co-pilots challenge any odd decisions made by the captain. It gave them confidence because they knew the system would back them up and also demonstrated to the "crusty" older captains that they could and would be challenged if they "did their own thing".

SASless

The Dark Blue crowd seemed to be far more fun in the Mess after duty was done

Are yes the Rum, baccy and....... Service:eek::E

HF

[SASless]

NEO,

Thank you for reminding me.....I will have to admit the Sgt Pilots were all a good lot....to the Man!:ok:

[HeliComparator]

FED - for the benefit of our non-pilot readers I think I should point out that a key part of your post are the first words "years ago". These days a lot more thought and training goes into releasing a copilot onto the line for night landings offshore. Yes, when I was a baby pilot (many, many years ago) I could have been your copilot, but these days they will have done plenty of Sim training, the non-rev real deck landings (11 IIRC) and an additional course of night Line Training, before being released to fly with non-training captains for night offshore ops.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SAS - naughty little soldier!!

For us Army Officer pilots we were trained that in the absence of understanding a total disregard for the facts would see us through!! Baaaaa!! Watch Blackadder!

To be fair and balanced:

BLACKPOOL - Army
ETAP - Navy
SUMBURGH - Civvy

This phenomenon is not discretionary. It can affect any one of us.

DB

[SASless]

Actually....I was thinking more about Management styles and collegial temperament when downing a few dozen Pints after work.

Did Army Officers even buy their own drink?

[HLCPTR]

RLOs buy their own drinks?

Let's not even ask about them buying a round.

Heavens NO! They were always occupied in the latrine washing up after pissing on their hands!

;)

[SASless]

Sounds like a member of the WOPA speaking!:ok:

[HLCPTR]

SAS,

Nearly a charter member. :ok:

(67-7)

[SASless]

Charter Member 205th Geronimo's Chapter '68!:E

[Ray Joe Czech]

The introduction of CRM courses made a big difference in helping inexperienced co-pilots challenge any odd decisions made by the captain. It gave them confidence because they knew the system would back them up and also demonstrated to the "crusty" older captains that they could and would be challenged if they "did their own thing".


Doesn't seem to working that way. I'm sure the vast majority of co-pilots may say something, but the numbers that remain insistent and who will physically intervene probably drop off exponentially as the amount of effort required increases. Sim instructors feel free to chip in here: do you see a lot of cases of the PM verbally intervening initially when things are going sideways, but who subsequently desist?

[Fareastdriver]

Did Army Officers even buy their own drink?

No; it was signed for.

[Hummingfrog]

Ray Joe Czech

Doesn't seem to working that way..

Do you work for one of the big 3 in Aberdeen? Are you a co-pilot.

The co-pilots I worked with were never cowed by the captain - or at least when they flew with me I always encouraged them to question any "odd" decisions I made.

If the co-pilots in the company you work for aren't capable of intervening if things start to go wrong then the CRM training is insufficient or the type of co-pilot the company is recruiting is may be of the wrong type! I know the RAF tried to recruit stable extroverts! During my CRM training I was surprised how few stable extroverts there were in the company pilot pool!

HF

[SASless]

Humm,

Don't some of the North Sea Operators do Psychological Testing during the Hiring process?

What personality types are they primarily looking for and are there some personality types they routinely bin?

[Savoia]

BBC News - Super Puma EC 225 helicopter seating could be changed (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-24207744)

[SASless]

A spokesman said the main aim was to improve comfort.

We see where "Safety" ranks in the priorities.:D

[rotorspeed]

Come on SASless, the manufacturer can hardly say any change is to improve safety can they? In these super-litigious days, commercial Rule No 1 is do not admit the reason for changing something is for safety - ie, it was not safe before!

[bondu]

Why only the EC225? The seats in Bristow 225s are different to those in CHCs - don't know how Bond configure theirs.
So, will they also look at the seating in the L2s? And the 332L 'classics'?

bondu

[vaibronco]

If the co-pilots in the company you work for aren't capable of intervening if things start to go wrong then the CRM training is insufficient or the type of co-pilot the company is recruiting is may be of the wrong type!

Interesting: you assume that the captain is never wrong.
one co-pilot with minimum legal requirements, CRM and no experience will not act as an experienced co-pilot.
Call it as you like, on-job training or experience, the co-pilot willl be the product of the captains he flies with. CRM should work on both pilots. Crew Resource management Course continues in the cockpit. The captain himself will lead a new co-pilot to higher standards.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

95 pages now...no suggestion there was any technical malfunction..the same helicopters are still flying so what is the conclusion?

Not a word from the crew on how the accident happened despite the fatalities.

The elephant is still in the room but being ignored.:ok:

[SASless]

As there were four Fatalities....there are two places the Pilots are going to speak....with the AAIB and in Court....ably assisted by Legal Counsel at both places I should think.

That Elephant shall remain in the Tent until the Tent is taken down and packed away till its next use....which the way things are going shall not be all that long.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I think by now all of us can guess the AAIB report.

The helicopter type was cleared to fly again very soon following the accident.

Which points the finger one way.

CFIT. Pilot Error as the tabloids would put it.

[Hummingfrog]

vaibronco

Interesting: you assume that the captain is never wrong.

Where did I say this? Don't put words into my "mouth" Read a post properly before making wild assumptions:ugh:

I did say

or at least when they flew with me I always encouraged them to question any "odd" decisions I made.

Which tends to put forward the theory that Captains aren't always right.

the co-pilot will be the product of the captains he flies with.

Wrong - the co-pilot is a product of the company recruitment policy as well as the training departments CRM philosophy. An indiviual Captain should have no bearing on this.

I see from your profile that you are not a current NS pilot so your inaccuracies about NS ops may be excused but if you can't post accurately then don't bother posting:ok:

HF

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

YOP. You are at it again!!

We do not use the term "Pilot Error" anymore as it allows systemic failures to be ignored. The pilots are the last link in a very long chain of events that eventually lead to an incident or accident.

Headlining an event as "Pilot Error" neatly gets all the backsliding, penny pinching, ignorant management failings of the hook and allows them to lie dormant until the next poor sap comes along to complete the same chain.

YOP, "Yeh One-dimensional Pilot" methinks!

Hopefully the AAIB, CAA and maybe the Operator will not be as blinkered as you.

DB

[iamthetroll]

Why only the EC225? The seats in Bristow 225s are different to those in CHCs - don't know how Bond configure theirs.
So, will they also look at the seating in the L2s? And the 332L 'classics'?

bondu

I think they refer more to newly built aircraft from now on, rather than refitting the aircraft already flying.

[vaibronco]

the co-pilot is a product of the company recruitment policy as well as the training departments CRM philosophy

I agree but:

An individual Captain should have no bearing on this.
I totally disagree, but would like to hear more opinions.



I see from your profile that you are not a current NS pilot so your inaccuracies about NS ops may be excused but if you can't post accurately then don't bother posting
I'm not talking about NS ops. Environments can be different, concepts are the same.

[SuperF]

Funny how it's pilot error when some American slams a cheap and nasty 350 or 206 into a hill on EMS, or in the GOM, but as soon as an Englishman runs a twin ifr capable helicopter into a building, or two pilots manage to run a perfectly capable twin, ifr, no expense spared helicopter into the drink, it becomes systemic failure....

Someone has their blinkers on.

And no I don't fly in America, in the GOM, or EMS, just looking in from the outside.

[Keke Napep]

It's strange how in the aviation community, people (and especially managers with no knowledge of aviation, only financing it or supposedly managing the 'sharp end personnel :ugh:) have only in fairly recent years come to realise what human factors engineers have known for years.

As far back as 1947 Fitts and Jones studied the behavious of pilots in the cockpit and showed how systematic failures in interpreting instruments and operating controls produced misassessments and actions not as intended.


The implicit assumption was that the person closest to the failure was the cause. Investigators saw that the aircraft was in principle flyable and that other pilots were able to fly such aircraft successfully. They could show how the necessary data were available for the pilot to correctly identify the actual situation and act in an appropriate way. Since the pilot was the human closest to the accident who could have acted differently, it seemed obvious to conclude that the pilot was the cause of the failure.

Fitts and his colleague empirically looked for factors that could have influenced the performance of the pilots. They found that, given the design of the displays and layout of the controls, people relatively often misread instruments or operated the wrong control, especially when task demands were high. The misreadings and misoperations were design-induced in the sense that researchers could link properties of interface design to these erroneous actions and assessments. In other words, the “errors” were not random events, rather they resulted from understandable, regular, and predictable aspects of the design of the tools practitioners used.

The researchers found that misreadings and misoperations occurred, but did not always lead to accidents due to two factors. First, pilots often detected these errors before negative consequences occurred. Second, the misreadings and misoperations alone did not lead directly to an accident . Disaster or near misses usually occurred only when these errors occurred in combination with other factors or other circumstances.

In the end, the constructive solution was not to conclude that pilots err, but rather to nderstand principles and techniques for the design of visual displays and control layout. Changing the artifacts used by pilots changed the demands




There's a lot of interesting in this paper published a few years ago by Ohio State University:

http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/woods/error/app_cog_hand_chap.pdf

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SuperF thanks for your totally pointless post.

I stand by my post however, regardless of creed, colour or Country.

What exactly is your position.......or are you too busy gobbling off to actually have one!!

DB

[SuperF]

Touchy. Did I hit a nerve?

[Hummingfrog]

SuperF

Funny how it's pilot error when some American slams a cheap and nasty 350 or 206 into a hill on EMS, or in the GOM,

Surely that is an American problem - if you want to call it pilot error then it is up to you. If those accidents happened in the UK then the AIB would investigate and look at the chain of events that led to the accident - just because the pilot is at the end of the chain doesn't mean it is the pilot's fault.

HF

[212man]

There's a lot of interesting in this paper published a few years ago by Ohio State University:

http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/woods..._hand_chap.pdf


Early Episodes of “Human Error”
Consider these episodes where some stakeholders reacted to failure by
attributing the cause to “human error,” but where more careful examination
showed how a combnation of factors created the conditions for failure.1

Obviously "careful examination" didn't spot the human error in the title ;)

[brar1776]

DB
Well said . I personally feel this terminology of so called pilot error should be done away with. Why we don't we use terms like management error or company error. Why should the pilot be the only one to face the hangmans noose . In classrooms we all talk of flight safety as a chain with many links . Yet , when an accident takes place our vocabularies get limited to pilot error or technical error.:=

[Matari]

If those accidents happened in the UK then the AIB would investigate and look at the chain of events that led to the accident - just because the pilot is at the end of the chain doesn't mean it is the pilot's fault.

Shields down, please. It's not just the AIB that looks at a chain of events. Rest assured that the NTSB evaluates both causal and contributory factors as well. In fact, a sister thread here has posters banging on about how texting caused an accident, when the NTSB clearly stated the probable cause (fuel management and inability to perform an EOL) as well as contributing factors (one of which could have been texting).

[SuperF]

Humming frog

That is just the attitude that I'm talking about, "Surely that is an American problem"...

Doesn't seem to stop anyone else around the world having the same accidents, it's just as soon as it happens in the UK, you guys all go on the defense and personally attack anyone that disagrees with you.

Nothing is an individual country or industry segment problem. Every accident affects every one of us that is in, or wants to be in this industry. A single engine accident in the USA ripples through the entire helicopter community, like it or not, what they do affects us, what you do affects us, and what we do affects you.

Sorry, but everyone makes errors every single day, the idea is to ensure that those errors don't do harm or kill someone, and where possible minimize or eliminate those errors. We see that with two pilot, twin, ifr machines flying in the NS, as that is how they can reduce the risk, but the guy that made the error at the end of the day, put the machine in the drink, into the hill, or upside down in the trees.

To call it Pilot Error, certainly focuses the pilots mind, and he has a great influence on safety in this industry, calling it system failure or management failure lets it get washed over, and not hurt anyone's feelings....

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SuperF - nice post and I agree with you. We should not ignore errors made by the crew of course as long as we are determined to understand how these errors have happened.

In the worst case it may be that a pilot is just not skilful enough, or deliberatley transgressed from the rules, but we tend to assume that in CAT, a trained and checked pilot has demonstrated sufficient skills and discipline to do the tasks he is doing.

Deconstructing complex events is our best way of trying to identify why a crew made a particular error. This can only happen in a "No Blame" culture and this should be the default status of such investigations as we assume the crew did not want the event to occur to them.

With this approach it allows the investigators, even when a Pilot has maybe been transgressing rules deliberately, to widen the net and look at "culture" that has allowed him to believe what he is doing is acceptable. The internal military inquiry into the Australian Army Blackhawks crashes is a good example of this approach.

In my experience as a pilot, instructor/examiner and regulator, we can change the rules, we can change procedure, we can even change the pilot. However, the hardest thing to change is culture!!

I am not sure Hummingfrog meant to isolate our US brethren with his comments but I agree with you SuperF, they are not appropriate.

DB

[Hummingfrog]

SuperF


To call it Pilot Error, certainly focuses the pilots mind, and he has a great influence on safety in this industry, calling it system failure or management failure lets it get washed over, and not hurt anyone's feelings....


The reason why "pilot error" is not used as a catch all reason for an accident in the UK is to get to the bottom of the reasons for the accident.

Yes sometimes the reason is pilot error and it won't be washed over but as you must know there are nearly always other reasons for the accident - they may be minor but we can all learn from them.

Calling the accident cause as purely pilot error can let off those in the management chain who could be contributing to the accident.

An example of this is the CAA - they mandate absolute limits for flying hours over defined periods - be it day, week, month or year. This is to try and prevent fatigue. The companies however look at these MAXIMUM hours limits as targets. What does the CAA do about this - nothing. Does it audit and look closely at which companies always fly their crews to 95%+ of the maximum - I doubt it. Why do the companies fly their crews to the maximum - money - profit!! Could this lead to accidents - maybe - will the CAA be criticised? I doubt it but they are in the chain!!

The examples you chose could be pure pilot error.

but the guy that made the error at the end of the day, put the machine in the drink, into the hill, or upside down in the trees.


Could also have a strong management cause. For instance if the guy who put the a/c into the hill or upside down into the trees was an EMS pilot on a day VFR contract who didn't have an IR yet felt pressured by the company to get the job done. If he gave in to those pressures, then yes he was at fault for flying in weather not suitable for his qualifications, but if he feared for his job because the management expected him to get the job done then management has to accept a fair amount of blame for the accident.

The Swiss Cheese theory is nearly always present in every accident.

HF

As DB said I didn't mean to isolate the US - it was just a comment that if the US tries to blame pilots rather than look at the whole picture then that is wrong - the UK has moved away from that but if the pilot was to blame then it will come out in the investigation.

[Keke Napep]

Actually the most common form of safety culture in international companies these days is the Just Culture model. SKYbrary has a good definition:

One key to the successful implementation of safety regulation is to attain a “just culture” reporting environment within aviation organisations, regulators and investigation authorities. This effective reporting culture depends on how those organisations handle blame and punishment.
Only a very small proportion of human actions that are unsafe are deliberate (e.g. criminal activity, substance abuse, use of controlled substances, reckless noncompliance, sabotage, etc.) and as such deserve sanctions of appropriate severity. A blanket amnesty on all unsafe acts would lack credibility in the eyes of employees and could be seen to oppose natural justice. A “no-blame” culture per se is therefore neither feasible nor desirable.
What is needed is a “just culture”, an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, even rewarded, for providing essential safety-related information - but in which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.
There is a need to learn from accidents (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Accident) and incidents (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Serious_Incident) through safety investigation so as to take appropriate action to prevent the repetition of such events. In addition, it is important that even apparently minor occurrences are investigated, in order to prevent catalysts for major accidents. Safety analysis and investigation is a necessary and effective means of improving safety, by learning the appropriate lessons from safety occurrences and adopting preventative actions. It is therefore important that an environment exists where occurrences are reported, the necessary processes are in place for investigation and for the development of necessary preventative actions such as re-training, improved supervision etc.


There is a rumour that the Managing Director of one large company operating in the NS is trying to scrap the just culture in favour of a blame culture :ugh:

[Ray Joe Czech]

Don't be a tease, which one?

[Colibri49]

Well, I can completely assure you that it isn't Bristow and if anyone says it is, then it is unsubstantiated rumour. We have enough pilots high enough up the greasy pole, who would let we mushrooms know p.d.q. if this were true.

So who's going to eliminate one of the remaining two and satisfy our curiosity?

[SASless]

it is unsubstantiated rumour

Are not all rumours unsubstantiated?:oh:

[jimf671]

BBC News - Survivor tells of Super Puma crash ahead of CAA Norway talks (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-24427601)

Mr Nugent told BBC Scotland: "There was a hell of a noise and twisting in the fuselage.

"We realised there was something really wrong with the helicopter.

"About four seconds later we were hitting the surface of the water hard. Water was rushing into the fuselage. We had crashed."

He said he managed to escape after trying to help colleagues, but was now struggling to go near helicopters.

[HeliComparator]

New AAIB bulletin out with FDR plot. As we suspected, unfortunately. It is amazing how long they went without noticing the airspeed decay. The report doesn't mention any particular distractions so its a bit hard to get away from pilot error, but of course the foundations were laid earlier with decisions to:

Have the captain as PF
Fly the approach 3 axis
Intentionally destabilise the approach by reducing to 80kts late in the approach.

I wonder if any of those choices were contrary to their Ops Manual?

Also, not using ALT.A seems odd, but not contributory.

[212man]

Special Bulletin S7/2013 out now: http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/S7-2013%20AS332%20L2%20G-WNSB.pdf

[SASless]

Did neither Pilot raise the Collective upon realizing there was an airspeed problem as they approached the Minimum Altitude?

Were there any comments, declarations, or calls reporting taking such action or having taken such action?

Why were they so blind in failing to monitor the Airspeed and ROD as they were in the portion of the approach where they would have been either about to or were in the process of leveling off from the descent to Minimum Altitude?

There is far more to this than is being reported by the AAIB at this time in my view.

Again, they are begging more questions than they are answering.

Why not hold off and make a much more detailed report of their findings?

[HeliComparator]

SAS, did you read the report? Yes there were calls, yes the collective was raised but too little too late, until right at the end when it was fully raised.

Unfortunately I don't think there is that much more to it than meets the eye. My supposition is that Copilot was looking out. Captain was looking out too because he wanted to get in and was aware of the lack of copilot's experience, and no-one was looking at the instruments properly (they were looking at the altitude, but not the airspeed).

The only thing that doesn't meet the eye is the company training and operational culture that got them there - to what extent that is a factor is unknown at this time and will probably remain so.

[rotorspeed]

The torque set on the approach seems surprisingly low to me - is the 24% that it was increased to at 80kts, having previously been just 18%, anywhere near what the crew might have expected would maintain an 80kt 500ft/min approach profile?

Very sadly for the crew, there seems to be no information coming from either this report, or any reported comments from them on the accident, that looks like this was anything other than simple (two) pilot error from a bizzarely very poorly monitored approach. For their sakes I had hoped there might at least been distraction from dealing with some warning captions or other cockpit distraction.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

It's the same old sad story of pilots flying routine boring legs missing the big picture when it all goes wrong. The Air France accident is classic.

If I may just point to Vertical Freedoms postings on here he is flying at the margins of the helicopters ability and extreme altitude and weather as a single pilot he must be waiting for an challenge every flight.

How two well qualified North Sea pilots lost the plot here poses major questions.
BBC News - Shetland helicopter crash: Pilots 'failed to spot reduced airspeed' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-24586824)

Four people lost their lives here.

[26500lbs]

The only thing that doesn't meet the eye is the company training and operational culture that got them there - to what extent that is a factor is unknown at this time and will probably remain so.


Ouuuchh and meowwww - you old bitch you…..:=. Are you really telling me this could never happen in Bristow????? Careful how you answer;)

[HeliComparator]

Im sure it could, but if it did it would contravene some Ops Man SOPs. My point was not to hit CHC in particular, rather to desperately look for some alleviation from just blaming the pilots. Just because I suggest there might be some corporate fault in CHC in no way means that I think no corporate fault exists in Bristow! I am not that stupid!

[GJM]

Autopilot should never be used n a ship in close quarters, narrow channels, entering and exiting port..

Is it common practice to relay on automation when coming into land or is that classed as being lazy getting complacent.

'further enhanced the guidance to support the full use of automation as the default'

Why would they state this, surely there is no substitute for being in full manual control?

[HeliComparator]

surely there is no substitute for being in full manual control?

Yes, if you are a caveman used to flying by weight shift and burning coal to stay aloft.

I appreciate that the word "autopilot" is the same for a ship and a helicopter, but thereafter there is no similarity.

[HeliComparator]

So it was VRS all along. Interesting reading

That is what the report says, however....

VRS requires very low airspeed whereas they seemed to have 20-30kts, and VRS results in a rate of descent of maybe 6000'/min not responding to collective, whereas they had 1800.

Perhaps they were on the cusp of developing VRS but I think it was mostly low airspeed and high rate of descent with insufficient power to arrest it in time. Although it doesn't really matter either way.

Anyway "it" wasn't caused by any of the above, "it" was caused by prolonged inattention to the airspeed having previously intentionally destabilised the approach by substantially reducing power to slow down.

[HeliComparator]

Just noticed the Nr - they had Nr-ILS selected which takes the Nr down a bit (97%) but results in significantly less "bite" to a yank of collective.

[GipsyMagpie]

VRS is a symptom not the cause. It is dangerous 3 axis autopilot modes. You could have the same accident tomorrow in an A109. If you lower the lever and ddon't pay attention to the speed with alt or vs engaged you will lose control. You need height to recover. The AFCS is dangerous if you don't know about this. If they had had the apm2010 afcs we have it would not have happened. Speed would have fallen to 40kts and stopped. The vertical would have then increased until the ground protection in the system had levelled them out. Crap afcs is your cause. Pilots complain

[HeliComparator]

If they had had the ec225 afcs it would not have happened. Speed would have fallen to 40kts and stopped. The vertical would have then increased until the ground protection in the system had levelled them out. Crap afcs is your cause. Pilots complain!

Well not quite, had it been a 225 the IAS mode would have engaged at ~65 kts and raised the collective to maintain 65 kts and the preset Rod, then levelled at 150' still maintaining 65kts.

[212man]

Great to see VRS appearing in a report - that'll help. How about simple exponential V/S development as a function of a non-linear power demand? :ugh:

[HeliComparator]

Great to see VRS appearing in a report - that'll help. How about simple exponential V/S development as a function of a non-linear power demand? :ugh:

Yes, although note its in a section entitled "manufacturers review of recorded data" so once AAIB realise its wrong, they will be able to blame the French!

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

That is what the report says, however....

VRS requires very low airspeed whereas they seemed to have 20-30kts, and VRS results in a rate of descent of maybe 6000'/min not responding to collective, whereas they had 1800.

Fully developed Vortex Ring will give you 6000', the report does state "...vortex-ring state entry condition..." so 1000' to 1800'/Min is entirely reasonable. It also says that the ac went from 240' / 24%Tq / 1000' per min to 1800' per min by 100' even though he now had 115% Tq on. Sounds like pulling power made it worse, which could also indicate the onset of VRS.

Anyway "it" wasn't caused by any of the above, "it" was caused by prolonged inattention to the airspeed having previously intentionally destabilised the approach by substantially reducing power to slow down.

No arguments from me there though!

Anyway, as said, doesn't really matter as the real cause of the accident was failure to monitor the basics and perhaps an over reliance of AP.

Or perhaps an under reliance? Use of the 4th axis, IAS hold, would have prevented this. The L2 cannot match a 225 in the quality of its 4 axis ability, but it usually manages pretty well and there has to be a good reason not to use it in a scenario such as this.

[Colibri49]

The "grapevine" informs me that the captain had fairly recently come back onto the L2 after being on the EC225.

I leave it to HC to derive the various possibilities and potential for this to exacerbate the risk of human error.

If my information is wrong, I apologise now.

[SASless]

HC,

The second time I went to the linked report some additional pages showed up.....which answers most of my questions which came after the first go.

Perhaps part of it did not load or something.

[industry insider]

Colibri

The "grapevine" informs me that the captain had fairly recently come back onto the L2 after being on the EC225.

I leave it to HC to derive the various possibilities and potential for this to exacerbate the risk of human error.

If my information is wrong, I apologise now.

When asked in an oil and gas forum both EC and CHC said that this was not the case.

[satsuma]

The exact rate of descent at impact is not known, but the impact was survivable

followed by a "100 FEET" automated call two seconds before impact with the surface of the sea

With apologies to Isaac Newton for the shoddy rate of change calculation, but 100 feet in two seconds sounds like 3000 feet per minute to me.

[GipsyMagpie]

failure to monitor the basics and perhaps an over reliance of AP.

Should aircraft have an AFCS mode which will kill you if you don't pay attention? Yes it is fundamental to being a pilot to monitor your instruments but this issue should be pushed out to mitigate the risk a bit. Basic 3-axis vertical modes (ALT, VS) are just plain dangerous if you don't know the risks at low collective settings. Want to scare yourself next time you're up? Just engage ALT at height and put the lever down. Watch the airspeed wash off and the aircraft fall out of the sky. Horrific.

[rotorspeed]

GipsyMagpie

I can't believe I'm reading your last post - maybe it's time you reconsidered your career. You're not really going to tell me that an ATPL/CPL needs to be warned that low collective settings can result in excessive rates of descent when the AFCS is coupled to VS are you?? If so you just should not be flying - your understanding of basic physics, let alone absorption of training, is simply inadequate.

With regard to the hazards of AFCSs, just how much nannying do you want? So you want 4 axis? And who or what is going to ensure you put the correct parameters into the system? The frequency for the ILS even? Maybe you'd like the whole lot automated so you can sit there all day doing nothing?

The more automation you have the more scope for boredom, over-reliance and degradation of monitoring and even hand flying skills. Of course there is a balance - no one is going to advocate SP hand flown ILSs. But given the number of instrument approaches that are flown quite acceptably with 3 axis AFCS systems, the current balance is well within the scope of two well trained pilots, concentrating on the job.

Maybe in this incident use of AS hold rather than VS would have been better - at least then the consequence of inadequate power set would have been a higher ROD from the outset and when the radalt warning sounded, assuming neither crew picked up the ROD cue, pitching up into a climb with the heave of collective would have avoided the VRS that took them into the sea.

[212man]

There wasn't much automation in the S61 that BAH flew into the water in 1983! I don't believe this is an automation issue - it's a monitoring and awareness issue.

Just engage ALT at height and put the lever down. Watch the airspeed wash off and the aircraft fall out of the sky. Horrific.

Try switching off the cylic trim then letting go of the cyclic - that's pretty horric too.........:rolleyes::rolleyes:

[Grenville Fortescue]

A HELICOPTER boss urged people not to jump to conclusions about pilots involved in a fatal crash after investigators revealed they found no technical fault with the aircraft.

Vice-president of quality and safety for CHC Helicopters Duncan Trapp urged people to realise that the report was not conclusive and defended the training of the pilots.

He said: “It is important to remember that the investigation is ongoing and nothing has been concluded as to why this accident happened.”

Evening Express - Article - Helicopter boss urges restraint as crash investigators release findings (http://www.eveningexpress.co.uk/Article.aspx/3438053)

[SASless]

Maybe in this incident use of AS hold rather than VS would have been better - at least then the consequence of inadequate power set would have been a higher ROD from the outset and when the radalt warning sounded, assuming neither crew picked up the ROD cue, pitching up into a climb with the heave of collective would have avoided the VRS that took them into the sea.

Absolutely Spot On!

Ask yourself which Flight Control was most crucial in this whole thing....and which parameter is the one that is required to change to carry out the maneuver?

In this case....altitude change was the primary focus and airspeed could have been left alone from the start.

I know it sounds a bit elementary to suggest a well trained crew can not adjust two parameters simultaneously.....and that is not what I am saying.

If an Approach Airspeed had been set first.....then the descent initiated.....then an incorrect power setting would have been the very first thing to show up and be corrected as the Collective would have been an "Active" control. One Pilot would have had his grubby mitt busy working the Lever to maintain the ROD while the AFCS was maintaining the Airspeed.

Be the Approach Speed been 110 Kts or 80 Kts......it would have made very slight difference. It is not like the aircraft were lined up by the dozens to land at Sumbrugh that day.

[HeliComparator]

Unfortunately for Duncan, people are going to jump to conclusions. An outsider, reviewing CHC's strategy of selling off their training assets and outsourcing a good chunk of their training for no reason other than increasing capital and profit, would conclude that they were not really interested in quality of training, merely ticking a box to satisfy the minimum standard.

Personally, having done my L2 conversion at CHC I am aware that the standard was similar to Bristow at the time (10 years ago), although I do wonder if that is still the case, despite the best efforts of the folk at the sharp end. Not many outside observers are in my position though.

[26500lbs]

HC - you need to clear some space on your PM box!

[bondu]

I don't know about the L2 training, but having completed a 332L conversion with CAE in Stavanger, I can only comment on my experiences. The standard of simulator training was outstanding! The pre-session briefings were the best I have every had in 35 years of military and civil flying. Once in the sim, the pace and content were again spot on, perfectly tailored to the crew's experience levels. Having spent 11 years at Bristow, I can honestly say that the CAE training was as good if not better.
I don't think the standard of training per se is the reason this tragic accident occurred. It was, as always, a combination of human errors, from the design of the AFCS system, through company management culture to the pilots themselves. And not forgetting the oversight, or lack of, by the CAA?

bondu

[HeliComparator]

26500-done

Bondu - not saying CAE training is bad necessarily, just that outsourcing your training as a policy looks bad for a large/mainstream operator. Although I think there will be an element of pot luck as to whether you get an instructor with any experience on type or in role.

The other issue is the flexibility that being in control of your own simulator brings. Not an issue when things go to plan, but when you have a candidate who is marginal and really needs more training, there is a strong temptation to just pass them because you know that there is no more sim time available at short notice, and anything else is too difficult. This is something I found a problem at Helisim, but not once we got our own ones.

Of course its not "required" to have your own sim, but when you do, to sell it is a big backwards step that says a lot to an outsider about your attitudes.

[Bladestrike]

I agree with Bondu. Having been a sim instructor (on the 332s in fact), I know the guys who instruct full time provide better instruction than pulling guys off the line to instruct part time, which was my role. My experience with CAE instructors has been first rate.

[HeliComparator]

However is it also not true that you can get a job with CAE, do a type rating course in the Sim, and then instruct on it having never flown it, and maybe never even flown offshore? This doesn't mean that your instructional technique will be poor, but I suggest you will lack an insight into the real world of operating that type in that role.

[JohnDixson]

The time-history included in the report raises a few questions.

A 40 degree heading change at the end, yet the pedal position isn't on the trace.

The derived radio altitude rate does not square with the rate one derives by taking the slope of the proportional traces of baro and radio altitude at the end. Radio altititude rate signals have been suspect in other applications.

VRS, at least in the SA models I've been exposed to, typically results in a significant increase in cockpit N/rev excitation. Would be good to see the accelerometer traces along the same timeline as the Figure 1 data. On the same plot, would be ideal.

Seems a rush to judgement and perhaps a too convenient action to just hang it all on VRS, at least based on that one Figure as presented.

Would be helpful to see the AFCS/Autopilot commands and actuator out puts along the same time base.

[HeliComparator]

Hi john

Yes, I noticed a bit of a "disconnect" between the radalt and the derived vertical speed at the end. You have to remember that the L2 was designed in the late 80s and certified in the early 90s and as such, has limited "extra" parameters on the FDR and mostly at the minimum sample rates. I think the lat and long accelerations are only at 4Hz and might even be 2 Hz, therefore well below the Nyquist frequency for 1-per-rev vibration. Also I'm pretty sure that only the pilot's control positions are in the data frame, not the AFCS series actuator outputs. The low sample rate might also explain the radalt / vertical speed disconnect - maybe they hybridised their VS parameter with some integrated normal acceleration data - that parameter being the one with the highest sample rate.

[JohnDixson]

Thanks, HC.

I was referring to the 4/rev excitation, not the 1/rev, but as you wrote, perhaps the sample rate didn't support that range ( I didn't work it out, but am sure its 16-21 Hz or so ).

Is it possible that the AFCS/Autopilot Computer has some memory built in? If so, I'd bet that it would have the frequency range to assist.

Think they didn't put up the directional control trace because there is none? Most surprising if true.

All in all, one would hope that there is a lot more applicable data to review than that published in the single figure. I have to believe that the pilots office at EC is into this 100% and can assist. Just guessing, but would not be surprised if they took the VRS sedative with some skepticism as well.

[Bladestrike]

I'm not sure. I may have been lucky, as the instructors I've had are generally guys who have a significant amount of experience, and in Norway at least, most were guys who had lost their medicals. I have had instructors not familiar with offshore flying, but all have been very receptive to input from guys with extensive experience in the field. As a rule, someone fresh from the sim, new to offshore, for instance, will still be subjected to extensive indoctrination training on the line prior to flying with regular Captains.

[HeliComparator]

Hi john

If 4-per, then definitely way out of the sample rate. You have to sample at twice the maximum frequency you want to recover, that would be at least an order of magnitude faster than the actual FDR sample rate.

I'm sure there is yaw pedal position on the FDR, it comes (as for all the control axes) from the parallel trim actuator so is pilot's control position, ie without the effect of the series actuators or even collective mixing. On the 225 there is also the total control position (ie pilot + series actuator) but iirc this is not on the L2.

The AFCS is digital and does had some memory, but I think its limited to fault codes etc rather than a real-time data stream.

[Variable Load]

HC - CAE have not delivered ANY recurrent training to CHC Scotia pilots.

[HeliComparator]

HC - CAE have not delivered ANY recurrent training to CHC Scotia pilots.

I know, my point was about how it looks from the outside and what is says about the company top brass's priorities, not the actual reality for recurrent training. Plus I would say the loss of control of the Aberdeen L2 sim is relevant for the reasons I mentioned.

[turboshaft]

So are they going to be renaming that Facebook (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/522069-as332l2-ditching-off-shetland-23rd-august-2013-a-21.html#post8014091) page to "Destroy the pilot's"?

[HeliComparator]

So are they going to be renaming that Facebook (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/522069-as332l2-ditching-off-shetland-23rd-august-2013-a-21.html#post8014091) page to "Destroy the pilot's"?


Possibly, but no point because the poor guys will already be destroyed.

[turboshaft]

Indeed. And, let me emphasize, no disrespect intended.

[tistisnot]

HC - your post #1945

' Of course its not "required" to have your own sim, but when you do, to sell it is a big backwards step that says a lot to an outsider about your attitudes. '

I think your statement reflects more on your attitude as an old school pilot trying to manage a global company and not a new broom manager trying to move the industry on from old habits?!

[industry insider]

I don't agree tis tis, the problem with the industry these days is that its all run by bean counters. There needs to be a few more "helicopter" people in management, not just those intent on cutting costs.

You won't achieve safety from a spreadsheet of calculations, sometimes, you have to have been there and done it.

[thelearner]

Helicomparitor
Unfortunately I don't think there is that much more to it than meets the eye. My supposition is that Copilot was looking out. Captain was looking out too because he wanted to get in and was aware of the lack of copilot's experience, and no-one was looking at the instruments properly (they were looking at the altitude, but not the airspeed).

If this turns out to be true, then the Captain should never have left the ground. If a Captain does not have 100% faith in the co-pilots ability to do his job there is no point in flying with him? Is this the root cause - lack of experienced pilots?

I agree the 2 crew will be destroyed - they did not deliberately or wilfully crash this helicopter, and it is vital we get to the root causes. I don't think the offshore workforce will be blaming the pilots, unless like everything else in life a tiny minority may. It was a minority who started the other page as well, and most of the posters had probably never been in a helicopter.

However, this report will do nothing but increase the anxiety of those who are nervous helicopter travellers. All that seems to have changed so far is change of procedures (which hopefully will be a big step forward? - although you don't all seem to agree) and Sumburgh have to improve sea rescue capability.

[GipsyMagpie]

I can't believe I'm reading your last post - maybe it's time you reconsidered your career. You're not really going to tell me that an ATPL/CPL needs to be warned that low collective settings can result in excessive rates of descent when the AFCS is coupled to VS are you?? If so you just should not be flying - your understanding of basic physics, let alone absorption of training, is simply inadequate.

Sorry rotorspeed I didn't say that. I said an ATPL/CPL needs to be warned that a basic 3-axis AP in ALT/VS with depart controlled flight due to loss of AIRSPEED if the collective is lowered (and held too long). Not as intuitive. Let me guess - you have never tried it - it is extremely subtle until it suddenly goes. And no, I haven't just mucked about while flying, it was done under controlled conditions to see what happened. Let's be honest flying with collective for speed is not intuitive.

I do think dumb 3-axis autopilots (not latest EC in EC135 for example) are more dangerous than they are worth - I'll say it again, an AP shouldn't be able to take the aircraft into a dangerous flight condition, certainly not on Public Transport. GM

[Jimmy 16]

@GipsyMagpie
I have some experience on the Bombardier CRJ-900 (as well as a few thousand hrs on the L2). Our CRJs do not have auto-throttles, so the approach is 3-axis. The crew have to mind the airspeed.

Do you think this is dangerous?

[26500lbs]

If a Captain does not have 100% faith in the co-pilots ability to do his job there is no point in flying with him? Is this the root cause - lack of experienced pilots?

I am afraid then when you are recruiting pilots with 200hrs TT this is inevitable to a degree. The knock on effect lasts for years. You end up with silent deviations in SOPs because for whatever reason the captain does not fully trust the copilot until he has been in the company for several years. This in itself is no bad thing, but the recurrent training and SOPs ought to reflect this. Complacency as we know is always one of our biggest enemies, but close behind him is lack of confidence in our peers and SOPs. Perhaps the discussion on Captains monitored approaches should be looked at again in certain conditions?

[212man]

I have to believe that the pilots office at EC is into this 100% and can assist. Just guessing, but would not be surprised if they took the VRS sedative with some skepticism as well

Exactly, and I think even referring to it is unhelpful. A fixed power with an exponetially increasing power demand results in an exponetial increase in rate of descent.

HC, I can't see on the FDR trace the key for the discrete that runs accross the top of the plot - any idea what it is? Also, I'm puzled by the DME trace shape - is it a function of low sampling rate? Surely it would otherwise be a straight line?

I see, also, that the selected V/S trace drops off at about 40 KIAS, is that the AFCS being decoupled automatically? (The S92 does at 50 KIAS and below, for non-radalt modes)

[HeliComparator]

212, good spot but I too can't see what that discrete is. I don't think its worth trying to guess.

The DME is only recorded to the mile, not decimals of a mile, hence it changing in steps of 1 mile. So its a resolution issue rather than a sample rate issue.

On the VS trace, I can only guess you are right and (not having been involved in the L2 for 7 years) I can't remember how the AFCS behaves once you go below the min speed for a mode. On the L, it remains engaged. On the 225 it drops out (though the vertical modes all work down to zero kts). Not sure about the L2.

[tistisnot]

industry_insider post #1959

I understand from where you are coming ...... but surely beancounters have not stifled our policy or procedures on how to maintain control of the aircraft?

[GipsyMagpie]

I have some experience on the Bombardier CRJ-900 (as well as a few thousand hrs on the L2). Our CRJs do not have auto-throttles, so the approach is 3-axis. The crew have to mind the airspeed.

Do you think this is dangerous?

Throttles = speed, so no I don't. It's dangerous when you are swapping axes (collective = speed) and an engaged mode will fly you into danger. If you haven't got autothrottles it cannot. You now there is no AFCS controlling speed so you are active hands on controlling it. In the case I mention, you have a mode engaged which is controlling what is normally the collective's job and if you put the collective in the wrong place, you reach a point where you lose control. In your CRJ, you leave the throttles at the back and:

a. You get a stall warner - pretty sure there isn't a vortex ring warner!

b. You are used to firewalling the throttle if it goes wrong and hopefully it drags you out. In a helicopter you pull in power, it makes it worse.

So no, in a CRJ, not dangerous.

[HeliComparator]

GM you raise a valid point about stall warners etc. I have previously said to EC that despite the wonders of the 225 autopilot, there are only visual clues when a failure occurs that causes a mode to drop out or otherwise require pilot intervention. For a visual warning to work, you have to be looking at it. IMO there should be an aural warning of some sort (not too "in your face") when a mode degrades, drops out or when the heli goes out of the flight conditions within which the mode is allowed, just to make you look in the right place. It wouldn't seem too hard to implement even as a retrofit.

It's the very fact that such failures virtually never occur on the 225 that makes it all the more necessary.

[212man]

The S92 shouts "Decouple" whenever a mode is deselected - intentionally or otherwise.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

You can argue until the cows come home but the buck stops with the two guys up front.

It appears no one wants to point the finger of blame but in my book they were paid to transport workers off an oil rig to home and messed up badly.

They have not had the decency to speak about this disaster in public because in my opinion they only care about the outcome.

I would have a lot more respect if they had faced the public from day one.

As for defending them by saying they'll never fly again what about the four passengers who lost their lives. I'd rather be alive sans career than dead in the icy waters off Shetland.

I sometimes despair when I read reams of rubbish defending pilots who make big mistakes.

The Air France threads are a classic example.

Four people who depended on this company,helicopter and crew lost their
lives but the families are having to cope with the grief of the loved ones they will never see again.

[Torquetalk]

Too much Ye Old Pilot. Do come back on frequency.

The pilots were almost certainly not authorised to speak about the accident and will have had to reconstruct what went wrong both for themselves and the AAIB.

That comments reflect a colleagial empathy is absolutely understandable. That shouldn't be confused with making excuses or giving a higher priority to the pilots' needs than of those who lost their lives. It is a tragedy for many people in many ways.

If you really think blame is what is needed here then you are part of the problem, not the solution.

TT

[Colibri49]

Ye Olde Pilot.

There aren't sufficient printable words in the language to describe how despicable you seem and the contempt with which most of us regard you. You insist on making your reprehensible analyses repeatedly, with no attempt to see the wider situatuon.

In Dickensian times you would have been best suited as a hanging judge, of the kind who ordered transportation to the colonies for minor crimes, using the flimsiest of evidence.

I very much doubt that you've ever been part of a multi-engined North Sea helicopter crew, or if you have then you're likely one of those for whom CRM was invented to root out your pernicious brand of unpleasantness.

How glad we are to have seen the back of your ilk on the North Sea!

[TeeS]

It is far too simplistic for anyone to say – “The solution is…….”. In reality, as humans make autopilot systems more reliable, then the human monitoring of those systems will become more frail.

If your autopilot fails to perform as you expect it to perform once every flight, then you monitor it as if your life depends on it; however, if your autopilot fails to perform as you expect it to perform once in a lifetime, then you monitor it as if you depend on it!

I don’t for a second suggest that advanced autopilots are not the way of the future but I do suggest that we still ask the wrong questions and we still don’t have the right answers.

TeeS

[he1iaviator]

On 5 November 2006 an AS332L2 operating offshore Malaysia crashed into the sea during an ARA, with one fatality (the captain). At the time there was information to suggest that the crew were not aware that some AP modes had disengaged due to the reducing airspeed.
What a terrible shame it is that the full findings of the accident report were not made public. If the Malaysian DCA published accident reports in the interest of aviation safety, as the AAIB do, lives could quite possibly have been saved.

http://malaysiaflyingherald.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/choppersdgdikeluarkandrair.jpg

[rotorspeed]

Gypsie Magpie - not getting any better I'm afraid. I remain staggered that you think there are ATPLs/CPLs out there that really do not know that if you reduce the collective sufficiently when coupled on ALT or VS on a 3 axis AFCS that the set ALT or VS may not be maintained. Seriously scary. And obviously that did include you. If that's the case then pilots either need better training to cover this right now - or perhaps just be brighter. As I said before, this is basic physics, and there will be umpteen other flight scenarios that require a fundamental understanding of what keeps the things in the air, and the right way up. And yes, I have tried it.

The fact is 3 axis AFCSs are considered safe systems by the the regulators for coupled IMC approaches with one pilot, let alone two, and I can't see that changing for a long time, so any vulnerability must be addressed by pilot training and competency.

Ye Olde Pilot may have put it harshly, but I think our industry would look better from the outside if there was a greater willingness from some to accept basic responsibility when mistakes are made - in this case surely by the pilots. It's understandable that in the close knit pilot community people feel defensive of their colleagues - but are those seeking to attribute responsibility to corporate approach/training/aircraft systems going to be as ready to do so when a relative of theirs gets killed by a coach driver on the public roads that loses concentration? I suspect not.

YOP I think however you're wrong to slam the pilots for not talking so far. I bet in some ways they'd love to, to help them share their angst and try and move on. But the legal implications just mean they can't. The situation is obviously very serious for them. When the time is right I suspect they will provide very candid views.

I am quite sure that following this accident a lot of us doing IMC approaches are focussed that bit more on proper scans and parameter monitoring, and that flying will be the safer for it. As has been said before, Pprune does a great job publicising incidents and sparking debate about causes, and definitely benefits flight safety. And He1aviator - quite right, disclosure of mistakes by others is the best learning tool.

[GJM]

Being a shipping man and now being reliably informed that Autopilot is not Autopilot other than a meaningless word...

Again correct me if I'm wrong but as ye old pilot says the buck stops.

Vortex Ring Helicopter Training with Tom Rigg - YouTube

'It is actually very easy to get out of vortex ring… at least in the incipient stage when the juddering and yawing starts'

If the above is not a meaningless statement then why did this pair not follow what would appear to be very basic steps to recover.

You would expect a Fireman to know the fire triangle...

Or is that unfair as that is the opinion that will be cast by many non pilots

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

If the above is not a meaningless statement then why did this pair not follow what would appear to be very basic steps to recover

Notice how everything under the helicopter in the video is very small.
That's because it's "far away".
Or what we in aviation call "high up".

See how they started the exercise at 2500'.
See how the little Robinson lost 500', even though this was expected and pre-planned.

Now go and read the report again and tell us all how the crew of the 9 ton helicopter would recover from the unexpected onset of VRS (if that's what it was) from under 300'.

[FrustratedFormerFlie]

For my money, VRS was not causal here, it was part of the 'ultimate effect'.

Nose-up cyclic progressively robbed the aircraft of airspeed and, at c 300', VRS developed and the aircraft entered what was, at that height, an unrecoverable uncontrolled descent.

VRS and the (probably associated) sudden yaw/hdg changes are an interesting discussion point, no more

Or at least that's my tuppence worth

[Lonewolf_50]

Anyway "it" wasn't caused by any of the above, "it" was caused by prolonged inattention to the airspeed having previously intentionally destabilised the approach by substantially reducing power to slow down.
Sounds eerily similar to a 777 at SFO. In this case, there is no training captain to blame.

HC, the term "overreliance on automation" is not to be countered with "you are a cavemen for so asserting" if one wishes to prevent accidents in the future. ;)

For GypsieMagpie: It's dangerous when you are swapping axes (collective = speed) and an engaged mode will fly you into danger.
It was noted some pages back that collective controlling airspeed is counterintuitive to the basics of helicopter flying. So in part you raise a salient point.
What is also true is that when one knows one's aircraft and one's systems, what may have been counterintuitive can become understood and applied to a given mission. People who have flown multiple models of aircraft have to do that all the time, as do people who fly more than one type for a fleet that has multiple types. If you are used to flying a given machine, you may find the next machine "counterintuitive" until one is used to it ... or trained to it. A test pilot friend of mine experienced that when flying a few Aerospatiale (and Mi) helicopters after some years as a U.S. Helicopter pilot.

(See the old vertigo demonstrations under the bag, for one).

[Brian Abraham]

heliaviator makes a good point referencing the lack of a report on the Malaysian accident, more recently Bristow had a Puma go into the water in an apparent CFIT in Nigeria, and not an ounce of information forth coming. Perhaps lessons available and not being learnt through lack of willingness to confront and advertise shortcomings.

Autopilot modes certainly can cause trouble, Asiana has been mentioned, there was also a DC-10 climbing in VS and stalled when performance available was unable to meet the demand. Bits were shaken off the air frame due stall buffet.

[Offshore Addict]

Been following this thread with interest as I work offshore and have done for over a decade. I read the recent report of the incident, not a pilot but have a background in military air traffic and flight ops, and there was no mention of warnings being given to the crew that their speed was decreasing. It mentions height warnings but nothing about speed which was a critical factor in this incident. Just curious about that.

As there has been some comments about blame recently perhaps a bit of feedback from a passengers may be useful. There has been a lot of discussion offshore obviously about this accident and the previous events. But the vast majority of people I have spoken with, and the conversations I have been party to, show that you guys have the confidence of the workforce offshore. We are not stupid and by the very nature of the work we do know that there is a) risk and b) people can and do make mistakes. It happens. We dont have all the facts as yet but all indications are that there was a human error at work here. But from this thread it is clear that the crews are looking at every possibility and trying to learn from what happened. Cant see what else can be done. People are naturally defensive and I understand that, nothing more natural than standing up for your colleagues, but to me its more important that every avenue is investigated and I am happy that is being done. I have always taken the view that if the pilot is happy to sign for it I am happy to sit in the back. Still am.

The bottom line is that the only people strapping into these aircraft are the crews and passengers, yet we seem to have almost zero interaction with each other. We just get in, sit behind you for a bit, and get off at at the other end. I want to see the CAA led investigation and the individual inquiries the helicopter companies being pilot led. Will they be ??, just how much input will you guys have ??, As a passenger I cringe when I hear the suited man from the HSSG going on in fluent managment speak about "opening up a dialogue" with us and I dont really put much store in PR blurb from the operators and Eurocopter. When the EC225 returned with the gearbox fix the first place I looked was here. I wanted to know what the people driving the thing had to say. The industry is missing a trick here, some guys I have talked to about the helicopter situation have openly commented that the very people whose views they want to hear, the pilots, seem to be the only ones we are not hearing from directly. Now that isnt a crticism as you are employees like us and your bosses want to manage the message that goes out. But I cannot help but feel that a meeing with current pilots would go a long way to put to rest the concerns that a small number working offshore still have. The offshore industry as a whole seems to have lost the human touch in many respects and I feel the current situation would benefit from it.

[Lordfindon]

I agree addict but what really doesnt help the dialogue is when you get marxists nut jobs opening up facebook pages or pretending to speak on behalf of the workforce through "Union" nutjobs asking for the world of helicopters and pilots to be grounded after an incident!
I have always had a fantastic dialogue with pilots and many time they have handed me a headset and we have joked and chatted on the flight when they werent at their busiest.
What we need is respect for these guys. They land on our decks without asking each and everyone of us if we have done our job and made it safe for them to do so! Some of those retards posting on facebook and such places would do well to remember that.

[jimf671]

... ... ... I cannot help but feel that a mee(t)ing with current pilots would go a long way to put to rest the concerns that a small number working offshore still have. The offshore industry as a whole seems to have lost the human touch in many respects ...

So more like Bond ABZ?

[P3 Bellows]

So more like Bond ABZ?

No - I don't think preflight is the time to get stuck into the deep and meaningful about helicopter travel. It is not the time or place.

Perhaps some suitably qualified pilots could go offshore for a few days for small group meetings or one-to-one discussions.

[Variable Load]

So more like Bond ABZ?

Jim - what makes you think other operators have not been doing the same?

The process works well until the pilot is confronted by a passenger(s) with less common sense and social skills than those demonstrated by Offshore Addict above (I'm choosing my words very carefully here!). End result is a pilot who is now potentially shook up or angry having been confronted by his passengers, then having to climb into a cockpit and focus on his real task of completing the flight safely. He will not be in the right frame of mind no matter how calm he appears.

The above is not supposition on my part :ugh:

[Bladestrike]

Interesting idea Offshore Addict. Some warning that speed has reduced below Vy, somehow only activated when IFR (imagine slinging with a warning like that?)?

Not sure how they'd implement it, but as an instructor for years for offshore guys, I know that being unaware of slowing below Vy has put many in a world of hurt. I don't know how many times I've said "watch your speed" and how much stress we'd put on being aware of dropping below Vy. "Fly the aircraft" is the most common debrief item. It's a very common mistake that generates interesting recoveries in the sim.

[iamthetroll]

Bladestrike:

You refer to the warning of airspeed dropping below Vy and suppose there's a way to do it when IFR. Completely agree with the idea, always have.
An immediate fix would be when 3-axis (alt, and hdg/app engaged) that annunciators show IAS below Vy and 40kts.

This is where the 225 would have had an effect on this incident (not a 225 buff, an L2 driver myself). With the V/S and APP engaged the autopilot would have engaged the IAS below 40kts? (Anyone please correct me if I am wrong). Thus -arguably- preventing VRS.

[rotorspeed]

What, if any, new policy or advice has CHC introduced for flight crews following this accident, regarding use of upper modes on aircraft with 3 axis AFCSs during IMC non-precision approaches?

Or other operators, come to that?

[HeliComparator]

Iamthetroll - its 65 kts not 40. 40 is getting pretty slow! Had his been a 225 the heli would not have slowed below 65 kts had the pilots done nothing. But then, since the 225 is flown 4 axis pretty much all the time (in BHL anyway) it seems highly unlikely that a 3 axis approach would have been contemplated in the first place.

Rotorspeed - wrong question? Should read ...4-axis...if you want to relate it to this accident and the L2.

[rotorspeed]

Sorry HC - getting confused, though admittedly rushing! I thought the accident acft here only had a 3 axis hence speed decay with low collective on VS couple. Are you saying it was 4 axis? If so was it only being used in 3 axis mode here? Perhaps I better try to find time to go through reports again!

[HeliComparator]

Rotorspeed - yes, it was a 4 axis heli being flown in 3 axis, presumably the choice of the pilots.

Perhaps worth expanding on the differences between the L2 and the 225 that could help understand that choice.

The L2 has a torque limit of 82%(?) above Vy. There is no transient allowed, so any excursion above the limit above Vy generates a HUMS overtorque warning and maintenance action. The autopilot is a digital representation of an analogue system and as such suffers from overshoots especially when stimulated by turbulence. The autopilot is unaware of the torque limit and is quite happy to raise the collective above the torque limit. Therefore one has to be very careful of power limits when using 4 axis.

This means that during high power regimes -climb, cruise - 4 axis is inappropriate. During descent the tendency is also to use 3 axis with fixed collective and vertical speed on the cyclic. The L2 likes to cruise fairly high, and likes a long descent at say 300'/min. Long periods at high speed descent in 4 axis tends to result in a fair amount of collective hunting since the AP is foolishly trying to control airspeed with cyclic and vertical mode with collective, a technique that works less well the faster you go.

However, once you get to final approach speeds (say 120 or less) 4- axis becomes appropriate as we normally want to maintain a fixed speed for an instrument approach. But you can see from the above that use of 4 axis on the L2 is used very much less than 3 axis.

By contrast on the 225 its a digital autopilot with sensor data hybridised with inertial data thus resulting in no overshoots, and minimal control hunting. It fully aware of the current power limit and will maintain a margin from the limit when coupled 4 axis. Additionally the limits have generous transient limits that can be used without maintenance penalty.

The autopilot handles high speed 4 axis cruise very well since it knows not to try to control height with collective (unlike some pilots!) and in fact the whole flight regime from hover to hover can be handled 4 axis, although the reality is that its best to use 4 axis from committal point on takeoff until 80' / 30 kts or so on an ILS.

So you can see that "normal" for an L2 is 3 axis, whereas "normal" for a 225 is 4 axis.

[SASless]

The S92 shouts "Decouple" whenever a mode is deselected - intentionally or otherwise.

Do set the Cat amongst the Pidgeons will you!:uhoh:

I will quiz Mr. Lappos about this tonight.

[212man]

Do set the Cat amongst the Pidgeons will you

I'm not sure I get the point? It was an aural alert that EASA required as part of the SAR AFCS certification. It makes sens in that context and is not out of place in a non-SAR context too. It doesn't differentiate between modes deselcted by button pushing or those that have been forced out for other reasons - low IAS, system faults etc.

[HeliComparator]

It doesn't differentiate between modes deselcted by button pushing or those that have been forced out for other reasons - low IAS, system faults etc.

Although it would be better if it did. A pilot should know when he presses a button to decouple a mode, as should his colleague if there are even baseline SOPs for automation use. A warning that is routinely heard is one that is no longer heard.

Yes there is the possibility of a double-press by accident but again baseline SOPs should require mode engagement to be checked at the time of engagement.

What is difficult to cover by SOPs is the unexpected decouple without pilot action, and IMO that is the only time a "decouple" warning should be heard.

[Woolf]

HC:

I think you have given a pretty good summary of autopilot differences however I would make the following corrections:

The L2 autopilot is aware of the TQ limit (or at least of the First Limit Indicator limit) and will NOT pull above the maximum continuous torque limit. There is anecdotal evidence of transient overshoots in turbulent conditions (which is maybe what you are alluding to) however I have not actually spoken to anyone who has had a torque exceedance due to this (maybe someone will correct me).

However what you say with regards to using the autopilot at high power settings still remains true. It’s uncomfortable in this configuration, leads to an unstable aircraft and should be avoided.

Having said all that the 4 axis autopilot does actually perform very well on IFR approaches and especially if used in conjunction with an altitude acquire (and the availability of a go-around mode) makes for a stable, controlled and safe approach.

My main point here is that your last statement is certainly not true when it comes to IFR approaches and as far as I am concerned (and the company I fly for):

A 4-axis approach (in conjunction with an altitude acquire for non-precision approaches) is very much the norm on the L2!

[HeliComparator]

Woolf, thanks for the corrections, its 7 years since I flew an L2! I recall that the L2 didn't like being 4 axis in the cruise or climb near a power limit and had it in mind that it didn't cope with this. So how does it cope with climbing with power demands (IAS and vertical speed say) being set to higher values than achievable within the power limit? Or cruising at Vh in 4 axis (I know this is not routinely done in oil and gas, but it was done in SAR (3-axis) for a genuine emergency callouts)

As to my last para, it was my intention to show that the L2 is "normally" flown in 3 axis. By "normally" I mean for the vast majority of the overall flight time. I fully agree that everyone normally flies an instrument approach in an L2 coupled 4 axis, but the point is that, in the overall context of the flight regime, this is a pretty short period and is therefore "not normal" overall, even though it is "normal" for an IFR approach. If you get my drift!

Whereas for a 225 its "normal" to be 4 axis virtually all the time.

[cyclic]

The L2 with airspeed engaged is fine if treated gently when making changes to either altitude or speed (ARAs require a little more care than the 225). It doesn't like high speeds though and it will quite happily pull above max continuous if airspeed is beeped up to higher speeds. This is often catches out ex 225 drivers when ATC ask for an acceleration from say a holding speed of 110 with IAS engaged up to say 140 - it will generally then pull above max continuous to attain the speed if, only briefly, which is why it isn't used for faster precision approaches. We fly all our NPAs four axis though using the method described above i.e. with an Alt Aquire and adjust VS for the profile.

[MightyGem]

Some warning that speed has reduced below Vy, somehow only activated when IFR (imagine slinging with a warning like that?)?

Not sure how they'd implement it,
It shouldn't be difficult to give the ability to set "bug" speed and then have some sort of warning. Fixed wings can do it.

[[email protected]]

As regards decoupling alerts, the Sea King 3A has annunciators just under the cockpit coaming (at eye-line) that flash either P, R or C when the cyclic or collective channels are decoupled (either intentionally or through failure). The same PRC legends are on steady when the mode is engaged.

Seems to work very well without the need for additional audio warnings.

[HeliComparator]

As regards decoupling alerts, the Sea King 3A has annunciators just under the cockpit coaming (at eye-line) that flash either P, R or C when the cyclic or collective channels are decoupled (either intentionally or through failure). The same PRC legends are on steady when the mode is engaged.

Seems to work very well without the need for additional audio warnings.

So do the Super Puma L2 and 225 (and 92 ) - at the top of the primary flight display anyway. However as I said, you have to be looking at them to see them.

Whilst you are hunting for the next group of brown people to gun down, your state of arousal is probably fairly high and you are paying attention.

Whilst we are droning along in an endless straight line over the ocean eating and reading the paper, our state of arousal is pretty low and how can we be expected to notice an ickle lightly somewhere on a screen?

[GipsyMagpie]

EH101 has a "bong" when collective mode taken out (which is just enough to let you know without being annoying). Really miss it on the APM2010 on Puma models.

[cyclic]

Now, now HC, I think you will find Crab is a lover not a fighter:ok:

[HeliComparator]

Now, now HC, I think you will find Crab is a lover not a fighter:ok:

Outrageous - why then are we the taxpayer paying him a huge amount of money as a member of the armed forces if its not to kill people? Is he there under false pretences?

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

He's been SAR that long that even "armed forces" is pushing it a bit...

[HeliComparator]

He's been SAR that long that even "armed forces" is pushing it a bit...

Well that's ridiculous. Why are we the taxpayer paying the armed forces to do SAR? It should be privatised immediately!







Oh sorry, wrong thread...

[Lonewolf_50]

Whilst you are hunting for the next group of brown people to gun down, your state of arousal is probably fairly high and you are paying attention.
What incited this load of bollocks, HC? :confused: The usual appeal to "play the ball not the man" is made herewith.

*Return to lurking and learning about auto-pilot modes in helicopters I don't fly.*

[diginagain]

Perhaps HC had been at the gin again?

[Variable Load]

Well, HC's last comment made me smile, so for that ....... :ok:

[HeliComparator]

Well I suppose I have to explain for those too dull witted to get it.

My point was that a visual indication of a critical situation with the autopilot requiring immediate pilot intervention may not be sufficient, and an audio attention getter is required.

Crab refuted this by saying he found a visual indication just fine.

I pointed out in a somewhat tongue in cheek way that there is a fundamental difference between military and civil flying which makes his opinion not relevant, namely that military flying tends to be of relatively short duration (at least in terms of annual hours) but requiring a high degree of attention. Whereas routine oil and gas civil flying tends to be long, boring and routine requiring little attention for most of the time.

In the latter case its foolish to presume that the pilots will spend an 8 hour flight (or series of flights), day after day, looking at the autopilot status indications, the more so on a type which hardly ever goes wrong. Hence the need for an aural attention getter, such as exists for the "red" master caution on the 225.

Do you get it now? Although I thought my first attempt at making the point was the more entertaining!

[diginagain]

Incidently, if anyone's in the centre of Aberdeen tomorrow afternoon with a little time to spare;

The UK Oil and Gas Industry will hold it's annual service of remembrance in the Kirk of St Nicholas, Union St, Aberdeen at 2.00pm on the 26th of October. This service allows the industry to gather to remember those who have died offshore during the previous 12 months and also through the years. A candle is lit for each of those who have died in the last year and a minute’s silence is observed allowing family, friends and colleagues to remember.