AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

[gulliBell]

...I am surprised to learn the Aberdeen Simulator(s) are not working nearly 24 hours each and every day. I would think every pilot, but especially newer pilots would be encouraged to make use of the Sim(s) anytime they were not scheduled for Required Training..

I've been flying IFR helicopters for over 20 years including offshore for almost 10 years and have never once sat in a sim let alone done any training in one.....I'd like to have a go in a sim at least once in my career but alas it looks unlikely. So far the employers or oil companies/clients never wanted to pay for it, perhaps they never considered it worth the expense or time.

[PRO_FANE]

Long time reader first time poster... don't bite my head off :uhoh:

Along with a lot of others lets wait to we see all the data before drawing conclusions.

My worry is that if human error is a factor the operators, eurocopter, oil companies and other interested parties will throw the kitchen sink at the pilots. So as to deflect from previous incidents and get the fleet flying.

I fly the 332 and have struggled with what I see as unfair criticism of the Puma family.

I do though worry that we may miss valuable safety lessons if the human factor is blamed in its entirety.

Surely with more investment in the Shetland oil fields we NEED airports with better infastructure (why no ILS for 09?, Scatsa ILS?).

What about flight time and fatigue given the latest boom in the North Sea? I certainly know my own capabilities after 5 days of early starts and 6 hours in the chair being asked to fly the 16 ILS into EGPD at minima.

Just some thoughts.....

[26500lbs]

if the Pilots are smart and BALPA members....they will already have Lawyers and have made any statement only after being advised by those Lawyers.

They can count upon being sued by the families of the four passengers that were killed and also by the survivors too.....thus they need to be very judicious about what they say to the AAIB and everyone else.

I can assure you when it comes to going to Court....the Lawyers representing CHC are not representing the Pilots.

Unfortunately this is bang on the money. If any here are ever in the unfortunate position of being involved in a accident/incident, it would be most prudent to ensure that the very first person you speak to after getting your voice back is the union representative and then an appointed lawyer after that. Only after those two have been consulted should one engage in the rest of the chat. As has been mentioned already, memory is an unreliable tool and very malleable when folks are looking for someone to blame. If I were in their shoes right now, with all the uncertainty, confusion and stress of the aftermath, I would not be saying a huge amount until the CVR/FDR are examined. A few vague memories from the heat of the very stressful moment without the full picture can really only be inaccurate at best and will do little to help build an accurate picture of events. The AAIB will expect as much and probably not expect too much from the crew at this point anyway, hence the wording of the release. It neither conforms nor denies any rumors or theories and so far in no way implicates CFIT or technical failure. Do not try to read between the lines on this one. Yes the wording is carefully chosen, but does not implicate. They just don’t know yet, and until the recovery of the FDR, probably wont be able to release any more info either. All in time.

[HeliComparator]

Personally I think its unlikely to be vortex ring.
To get VRS you have to be going very slowly in both axes, at a stable air speed less than 10 kts, and then it takes a little while to develop. SPs are pretty resistant to VRS. The hypothetical scenario proposed doesn't require VRS to cause the heli to hit the sea.

Yes, I am aware of at least one other event where this happened, not on this continent. They got away with it by the skin of their teeth.

[Brom]

Agree with HC. My recollection of VRS from my Mil training days is that the ROD is very high/scary. I doubt if the L2 would have stayed in one piece or that any of the pax would have got away with no injuries had that been the case.

[SASless]

The AAIB did not mention what the Airspeed was....what the ROD was...what the Aircraft Heading or Track was....Folks....Quit Speculating....it is a waste of time to do so.

Until there are some definitive facts and data to be chewed on and digested....you are only arm waving and making silly noises at this point.

[ACW599]

CVFDR found:

Air Accidents Investigation: AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter G-WNSB ? News Release (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/as332_l2_super_puma_helicopter_g_wnsb___news_release.cfm)

[SASless]

Now....in time we shall get some very useful information and data.....then we can all speculate with great abandon as some are already doing.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, I don't see anything wrong with speculation as long as its made clear its just that. It passes the time pending real information, and allows the airing of things that COULD go wrong, even if they didn't this time. Anyway, looks like there might be some solid info soon.

[CharlieOneSix]

Having been retired from the NS for nearly 15 years I have refrained from commenting here as I'm too long out of touch, however the information contained in the third paragraph of the initial AAIB press release regarding airspeed reduction and increased rate of descent could well be the result of analysis of the Sumburgh radar tapes and nothing to do with statements from the crew or passengers.

[mary meagher]

The captain of the BA777 that landed a tad short at LHR was told by BA to go into seclusion and on no account talk to the media.

No doubt the crew of the Super Puma have also received the same caution.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

The Norway CHC L2s are flying today. CHC is the Operator of the accident aircraft.

The AAIB report expressly omits any mention of technical problems despite 4 days access to both pilots.

BALPA press release reaffirms its members confidence in the Super Puma family and has access to the crews.

Lets hope the HSSG recognise the significance off these statements and CHC actions and we all get flying again soon.

DB

[Mechta]

Its very good news that the cockpit voice and flight data recorder has been recovered, and the likelihood is the true cause(s) of the ditching can now be determined from hard facts. Not withstanding that, it would be sad if the opportunity was lost to use this accident and the attention currently focused upon it to improve the already high standards throughout the offshore helicopter industry.

As Diginagain said:

I believe it was Mechta who suggested the use of a confidential reporting system for raising concerns. Of course, air- and ground crew as well as maintainers can do-so using CHIRP. The oil industry have been offered a similar confidential occurrence reporting system but this offer has been rebuffed. It seems that while OGUK/Step Change In Safety would like greater workforce engagement, there are limits as to how much engagement is warranted, it appears. The difference between CHIRP and my proposal, is that CHIRP is started by an individual being sufficiently concerned that they initiate the process of a report. What I proposed was a confidential survey or interviews of all those working (and could include retired from) the industry to pick up incidents which had previously gone unreported. There must be plenty of close-call incidents which, although alarming at the time, did not get reported due to distractions of pressing day to day tasks. They then become distant memories until someone gets badly bitten by much the same thing.

My other proposal (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/522069-as332l2-ditching-off-shetland-23rd-august-2013-a-25.html#post8015062), of, as Grenville Fortescue (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/522069-as332l2-ditching-off-shetland-23rd-august-2013-a-25.html#post8015128) described it,

A North Sea Helicopter Operations Task Force comprised of retired pilots and engineers, supported in their mission by offshore workersto observe and compare, over a period of weeks or months, the differences between the operators' styles of operations, planning, maintenance etc. with the sole objective to bring industry standards up to the level of the best, would be a valid way to reassure the users of North Sea helicopters that the four lost did not die in vain.

As a footnote, if you were a 'bear' wouldn't you at least like your pilot to be aware of the cause of the recent accident, whether it was mechanical or not, before you climbed into EC332L2?

[b.borg]

From the CHC website:
Update: CHC Statement on Sumburgh Aircraft Accident (http://www.chc.ca/AboutCHC/News/Pages/CHC-statement-on-Sumburgh-Aircraft-Incident.aspx)
From what we know so far about the Sumburgh incident, as well as tens of thousands of hours of experience with this aircraft, there is no reason to believe that a fundamental problem with AS332L2 aircraft led to this accident. So we returned AS332L2 aircraft to service beginning Thursday.

Inside the U.K., we are continuing to honor a request by the Helicopter Safety Steering Group and are not presently flying passengers with AS332L, As332L1, AS332L2 or EC225 aircraft (except for life-saving SAR and medevac missions).



So the SP family is OK to resume flight operations as soon as the HSSG say so

[SASless]

So very fine Tap Dancing in the CHC Press Release.

No statement as to the suspected cause....but a statement that the Type (in their view) has no "fundamental flaw".

You speculators out there.....if there was a mechanical problem would they have mentioned something vaguely or not? If it was CFIT...would they have obliquely mentioned that to enhance the public image of the SP family?

[satsuma]

Vortex ring? Don't think so.

If their airspeed was low enough for vortex ring, say 20kts and they travelled a mile after the start of the event (with the wind from about the half past one I think) then to travel that mile it's going to take them about 4 minutes. At the same time they dropped about 400' in that hypothetical 4 minutes ie 100'/minute. Hardly vortex ring territory.

[SASless]

I bet BHL wishes they had a Hangar full of old S-61's that could be given a good wash, a quick inspection and run-up....a few base checks and put the old girls back into the air for a while.

Remember those days....when surplus helicopters tended to get pushed back out of the way but kept somewhat ready to go if a quick need showed itself?

But....that was when Helicopter folks and not business tycoons ran things.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Hardly vortex ring territory.

I tend to agree with you but ..

Could that indicate vortex ring state?

.. and

A manually flown approach, wx on minima, decide to slow down so reduce collective, nose up a bit, get distracted, next time you look the aircraft is doing 20kts with high ROD that you can't manage to arrest before the surface.

[satsuma]

They wouldn't have travelled a mile though.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

I bet BHL wishes they had a Hangar full of old S-61's that could be given a good wash, a quick inspection and run-up....a few base checks and put the old girls back into the air for a while.

Ha ha! Was going to suggest that with the resulting problem of men stranded at sea (http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/naturalresources/article3853818.ece) they should recruit a few RAF and Navy Sea Kings to make day time VFR runs out to the platforms to help get 'em orf!

Satsuma, totally agree.

[SASless]

What is this all about? AAIB investigated the accident did they not?

What could this kind of inquiry accomplish that the AAIB Investigation did not?

Delayed Super Puma inquiry ?could have saved four lives? | The Times (http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/scotland/article3853095.ece)

[HeliComparator]

A typical lawyer speculating for dramatic effect!

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Exactly, which non-happening accident enquiry? Which delay?

Any reviews etc. which are going to be done (as per suggestions made on this thread) should include some sort of collaboration between the oilcos, operators, RMT and the regulator about blinkin' releases to the media.

This issue has been addressed numerous times on PPRuNe and I think the tendency is to see fouled-up news reports as something of an irritation but the reality is that poor media management can end up damaging the industry for all the wrong reasons.

[Lenticular]

Without specific reference to this current accident case, as a general question (which I am sure you will tell me is a naive one but here goes anyway!), are the crew of an aircraft involved in an accident not covered by their employers indemnity insurance from any potential lawsuit? I thought that was the whole purpose of liability insurance for AOC operators.

Surely any lawsuit would be against the company and not the individuals??
I realise there are nominated post holders as part of an AOC requirement but again, there would be liability insurance would there not? A member of the crew is not a nominated post holder.

I would be interested to hear of your experience of this.

My thoughts and prayers are for those left behind who have lost loved ones, friends, and work colleagues in this regrettable accident

[HeliComparator]

AS - its about the fatal accident inquiry on the 2009 L2 accident - a Scottish thing, see here:

Fatal Accident Inquiries - Judgments & Sentences - Judiciary of Scotland (http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/10/0/Fatal-Accident-Inquiries)

Not really related to an aaib report, but supplemental to it.

Lenticular, I suspect that a multi-million pound company with lots of insurance is a better bet for sueing (in terms of likely wealth pot from which to get money) that an individual, hence its normally the company they go after, not the pilot.

[HeliComparator]

HSSG has just announced they are allowing all Super Puma variants back into the air for oil and gas support in the UK.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

So what do the HSSG know that changed their minds?

[HeliComparator]

Fairly obvious I would have thought!

[Bravo73]

HSSG has just announced they are allowing all Super Puma variants back into the air for oil and gas support in the UK.

BBC News - Super Puma helicopter flights resume after Shetland crash (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23874304)

A meeting of industry representatives has recommended that Super Puma helicopters should be cleared to fly.
All offshore flights by the Super Puma had been suspended following the crash off Shetland last week which killed four oil workers.
The Helicopter Safety Steering Group (HSSG) said a campaign would be started to engage with the offshore workforce.
Earlier the missing flight data recorder the crashed helicopter was recovered.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said the combined voice and flight data recorder would be taken to its Farnborough headquarters for analysis.
The AAIB said the Super Puma had appeared to show a "reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent".
The AAIB said it appeared the helicopter had been intact and upright when it entered the water.
However, it was too early to identify a cause of the crash.

The AAIB update reported: "Preliminary information indicates that the approach proceeded normally until approximately three miles from the runway when there was a reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent.
"The helicopter struck the sea approximately two miles west of the runway threshold.
"The evidence currently available suggests that the helicopter was intact and upright when it entered the water.
"It then rapidly inverted and drifted northwards. The helicopter was largely broken up by repeated contact with the rocky shoreline.
"The investigation is ongoing and at this early stage it is not possible to identify the causal factors leading to the accident."
Heavy swell Much of the wreckage of the Super Puma has been brought ashore.

Key parts arrived at Lerwick at 04:30 on the support vessel Bibby Polaris.
Divers had known the rough location of the flight data recorder, but heavy swell hampered efforts to retrieve it.
Marine engineering company Ocean Kinetics, which is carrying out the recovery operation, had already recovered the helicopter's gearbox and rotor head.
Four people died when the Super Puma AS332 L2 went down close to shore on a flight to Shetland's Sumburgh Airport from the Borgsten Dolphin rig.
They were Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland, Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin, Gary McCrossan, 59, from Inverness, and George Allison, 57, from Winchester.
The crash was the fifth incident involving Super Pumas in the North Sea since 2009.
Inquiry Aberdeen North MP Frank Doran has called for a public inquiry.
The Super Puma is said to make up about half of the UK offshore industry's 75-strong helicopter fleet.
Different aircraft models and alternative methods of transport, such as boats, are being used or looked at to transport people on and off North Sea platforms.
Aberdeen City Council has established a facility for people affected by the crash.

It said experienced staff at the Balgownie Lodge Support Centre will offer assistance to bereaved family members, survivors, friends and work colleagues.
Aberdeen Lord Provost George Adam said: "The tragedy which occurred last Friday was deeply shocking and has affected very many people, not just those directly associated with the energy industry but the people of Aberdeen, the wider north east and indeed across the UK.
"Our thoughts are with the families of those who have lost loved ones, with the survivors and their families, and with their friends and work colleagues too, who will all be trying to come to terms with what has happened."
The centre will remain open for three weeks.

[212man]

Fairly obvious I would have thought!

Quite! I think some posters need to practice their 'reading between the lines' skills (ref the press release)

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

I know it's fairly obvious! I forgot the tongue-in-cheek smiley! 😉

[jimf671]

There is always major confusion about FAI. This is partly because there are only 5 million of us, and of course mainly because most people learn most of what little they know about law from watching second rate TV.

FAI are held for specific reasons. In many cases of sudden death, if the Procurator Fiscal can readily establish why the deceased person died then there will often be no reason for an FAI. For instance, that is why FAI are rarely held for mountain accidents.

Principally, they are held if someone dies at work or in custody. Also, if the death is suspicious or unexplained. There may be public interest reasons.

In the case of a North Sea helicopter accident, UKCS Scotland, if anyone dies as a result, we can expect an FAI because all POB are there in the course of their work.

Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976,
Section 6, (1), specifies the form of the resulting determination.
(a) where and when the death and any accident resulting in the death took place;
(b) the cause or causes of such death and any accident resulting in the death;
(c) the reasonable precautions, if any, whereby the death and any accident resulting in the death might have been avoided;
(d) the defects, if any, in any system of working which contributed to the death or any accident resulting in the death; and
(e) any other facts which are relevant to the circumstances of the death.

It's a presentation and examination of a detailed investigation by a PF so that the state can establish important facts about a death. It's not a race to a finish line and it's not going to be hijacked.

Although often interesting in the way that every nuance of the situation is laid out for examination, in the end they result in a set of dry and often unremarkable facts.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Les Linklater from the HSSG:

Audioboo / Les Linklater from the Helicopter Safety Steering Group on Superpumas return to flight. (http://audioboo.fm/boos/1573113-les-linklater-from-the-helicopter-safety-steering-group-on-superpumas-return-to-flight)

[tistisnot]

Listen to the offshore worker who refuses to go on a SP presently - used to only having 13 / 14 on board but now chokkablok with 19 and he fears for an easy egress. L2 windows and seating arrangement ....... just an observation.

[high spirits]

Just a question....hypothetical and all that
If it turns out to be CFIT, no petrol, pilot error etc (rather than technical) , where does it leave Bob Crowe and his union? Would his union file suit against the pilots who might belong to another union (BALPA for example).

Or would he still deem it the fault of 'The Management'....?

[SASless]

Listening to the audio....I understand all is safe now as the Oil Company, the Helicopter Operators, and the Authority have all reviewed their processes and procedures and have concluded the folks offshore working over due to the Super Puma groundings....need to get home.

There...done...finished....and whenever the AAIB gets around to it...all will deal with that report as all the earlier reports have been dealt with.

So ya'll just get back to work....put your irrational fears and concerns behind you and move along....there is nothing to see here.

Did I summarize that correctly?

[heliski22]

Did I summarize that correctly?

It would seem so...

[HeliHenri]

.
No you didn't.

The two last sentences of the HSSG :

"However it suggests that given the sensitivities around the accident, the L2 fleet should only initially return to non-revenue operations.

Additionally it mandates an independent review into offshore helicopter transportation."

Safety group lifts Super Puma flight ban (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/safety-group-lifts-super-puma-flight-ban-389997/)
.

[SASless]

It also notes no reaction from either EASA or the UK Civil Aviation Authority "which positively affirms that there are no safety reasons that support a suspension of flying".


Knowing how quickly the UK CAA is to arrive at a decision...and its reluctance to assume responsibility however indirectly on issues that could come back to bite its corporate butt....the lack of a response by the CAA comes at no great surprise does it?

Assuming the lack of response is a response seems a bit dodgy in my mind.


However it suggests that given the sensitivities around the accident, the L2 fleet should only initially return to non-revenue operations.


So they are saying no Revenue flying for the SP series?

How does that get the Work Overs home in a timely manner?

[HeliHenri]

.
Sorry but you're slow tonight/today SASless,

Only for the L2 serie !
.

[SASless]

I stand corrected.....perhaps my Cold Medicine is stronger than advertised. It warned against operating machinery and driving automobiles. but not a word on thinking ability.

[HeliComparator]

But the good news is that they are mandating an independant review of offshore helicopter transportation.

Mind you, it doesn't say what sort of review, maybe a review of why the oil companies have to pay so much for those darn helis, and how to do it cheaper?

[SASless]

A number I have heard thrown around about the Oil Companies is their total Transportation budget....Tankers, Trucks, Gulfstream jets, Helicopters, limo's....is 2% of their total operating costs. If we consider the helicopter costs out of that 2% budget....knowing how small that amount is compared to all the other Transportation modes....we are not really talking about a huge amount of budget. Assume just a 10% increase in "helicopter" costs....that remains a small up tick in the total transportation cost.

Rex Tillerson, Head Wallah at EXXON, last year pulled down a cool 35 Million Dollars in Compensation......so that should put things into perspective a bit.

The EXXON Annual Report for 2012 reported an After Tax Earnings of 44.88 Billion Dollars.

I suggest there is some room for spending a bit more on helicopter safety if they really cared to do so.

That is just one Oil Company mind you.

2013 may not be as good as 2012.....


http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/BigOilTable.png

[Hummingfrog]

HC

Do you think my point about overuse of the autopilot functions, in benign conditions, versus making sure that stick skills are maintained may have perhaps been reaffirmed by this latest accident? (assuming a/c was f/s as it entered water)

HF

[HeliComparator]

No, not at all (although of course we don't know the circumstances yet). We don't know if the approach was being flown manually, coupled, partially coupled, and why the pilots may not have noticed the loss of speed and descent. Lets have the discussion once we know more.

But basically, I suspect that the primary missing skill was a failure to monitor. Are you suggesting that they saw the sea coming up but were too de-skilled to know they should pull up the collective and restore some speed?

[Hummingfrog]

HC

I agree let's wait til we know the full details - however I believe that monitoring/flying are the same thing if you can't interpret what the instruments are telling you because you believe the autopilot is doing the right thing then you can reach a state where the a/c momentum can't be overcome in the height available.

HF

[Geoffersincornwall]

Thompsons experienced a couple of serious incidents during 'go arounds' and decided to investigate further. They found that by using 'eye-tracking' technology during their sim training and testing over a period of months they were able to understand that many of their pilots had little or no structure or discipline to their instrument scan.

I see on a regular basis the impact that the change from dials to flat screen PFD/MFD has on pilot performance. In some cases, especially at the beginning the pilots literally cannot see (find) the data they are looking for and they are swamped by a plethora of information to the extent that it's no wonder that they have not developed a disciplined scan - unless they are taught to do so and shown how during their training. Were you taught what to look at when when you did your last training course ? or were you left to teach yourself?

The L2 may not have flat screens but the Thompson experience may be pointing a finger at a deficiency that is widespread amongst all pilots whether they be fixed or rotary wing.

G.

[SASless]

Geoffers,

I know my first good look at an all digital flat screen Cockpit made me understand what a Dog watching Television feels like.

[maf]

The experience of changing from good ol`steam gauges to smaller crt`s and onwards to large flatscreens can be difficult for anyone. My local flying club has seen issues/incidents with the G1000 C172 repeated over and over by pilots coming from the classic version, escpesially hard landings (by experienced pilots as well as rookies!).

Even in the train operator world has this been an issue, where lcd screens are taking over a majority of the information being displayed (like the new Stadler Flirt), scanning them correctly requires more training then the steam gauge Bm69.

The human brain can go quite numb if presented with too much info at once without knowing how to prioritize.

For the pilots sake, I hope they did everything correctly.

[Overdrive]

The unfavourable comments about glass cockpits in general are very valid. What a retrograde step. Mostly mixed, random, messy and counterintuitive, totally at odds with how a human seeks and isolates information. If users need training in how to glean/extract vital information from a "Display" (further to regular IFR scanning), then what does that say?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

It's interesting the pilots have kept a low profile since the event.

[GipsyMagpie]

Hey, don't bash the glass screens. When well done they are awesome. It's just some manufac turers have got it dead wrong. They should be taking the best from analogue and putting it on glass (reconfigurable, small IF scan, integrated information). My biggest gripe is the use of moving strip gauges with a fixed needle (such as rad alt, bar alt and ASI on MFD 255) ! My eyes need to see the numbers, I need to comprehend them THEN make a decision. A fixed scale with a moving needle is much better. That means either a rotary gauge for hugely spread numbers (bar alt) and a fixed strip or rotary gauge for rad alt and ASI. I have seen a lot of variation and flown lofts them and that is all that works for me. If you find glass hard, it's probably crap gauges on the glass. If any of you get involved in designing the next glass cockpit then please listen

[pilot and apprentice]

It's interesting the pilots have kept a low profile since the event.

Not if you think about what they have been and are about to go through.

Don't bash glass

I'll agree with the statement, but not the rest. I have found many of the strips to be just as intuitive or better.

Sticking with round 'gauges' on a screen just because that's how guys have been flying for decades seems right in the short term, but defeats so many advantages of no longer using a mechanical gauge.

Clean sheet of paper thinking should not be discouraged.

The unfavourable comments about glass cockpits in general are very valid. What a retrograde step. Mostly mixed, random, messy and counterintuitive, totally at odds with how a human seeks and isolates information. If users need training in how to glean/extract vital information from a "Display" (further to regular IFR scanning), then what does that say?

Often, not always but often, it means the human doesn't want to or is having difficulty changing the way they do things.

[HeliComparator]

Geoffers, your comments ring a bell with me, but only for the first 25 hrs or so, then one becomes acclimatised. The L2 does by the way have flat screen displays, unless you are referring to a difference between the slight curve of a CRT screen (L2) vs the completely flat LCD screen (eg 225)?

The L2 has 2 screens, one with attitude, speed, pressure alt etc, the other with heading, Nav, power and radalt. The hardest thing I found was getting a hang of looking at the right screen for pressure alt vs radalt. Also, the mechanical standby altimeter was the same size, and next to, the mechanical clock. So many's the time I thought it was 2 o'clock, just because we were at 2000' (or vice versa, which was worse!).

When I moved to the 225 with all info needed to fly the aircraft on 1 screen, it was so much easier, and when converting people from the 332L it never seemed to be an issue. Therefore I think the detail of the MMI is what matters, not whether its separate mechanical instruments, round dial EFIS or strip gauge EFIS.

With the grounding of the 225, a lot of our chaps went back onto the 332L and there were a number of reports with difficulty keeping a good scan.

[TipCap]

Interesting. When I had a look at Plane Finder reporting the AIS, the only trace I could find was Bond 88K an S92 (LN-OED) SQ 7052 of Air Bosna heading East at 3000'. I really wanted to see whether the SP fleet was flying again after the HSSG ruling yesterday. For you techies out there, don't the regular helo flights display on AIS?

[HeliComparator]

TC, I think you may be confusing AIS with something else. AIS is a marine transponder system. What you see on Planefinder is aeronautical mode S transponder extended squitter. This tends to be fitted only to large fixed wing, although recently it has been fitted to some Ec225 and some S92. Its not fitted to any L2 or L as far as I know, at least not in UK waters.

Edited to add, looks like its fitted to recent S76C and Aw139 as well. Lets say "most helis delivered in the last couple of years"

[c53204]

Is air travel (fixed or rotary) safe - yes, compared to most other forms of transport.

Are cost cutting measures being implemented by operators - Oh yes. Has the standard of maintenance reduced - yes.

Do passengers on aircraft consider pilots to be less well trained - yes. But the same can be said for bus drivers, truck drivers and the general standard of driving on our roads.

Can we improve all these standards, maintenance and safety - of course. Are the companies involved and Government willing to open their chequebooks? It appears not.

[jimf671]

The only NS helo stuff I have seen are the MCA SAR aircraft on the marine AIS and some Bond stuff on the aero ADS-B.

Bond 87R (LN-OEC) is heading east from Dyce at a fair lick right now. I guess their must be a good westerly.


------------

No, BHL too. G-CFDV, S-76 (?) enroute.

[Beaucoup Movement]

C53204,

The following statement which you said;

"do passengers on aircraft consider pilots to be less well trained - yes".

Where did you get this info from? I find it hard to believe & certainly worrying

[Brom]

c53204

Passengers may think pilots are less well trained, but are they? I don't think so. In my 35yrs flying helicopters I have seen aircraft become more complex and sophisticated, however, with the increasing use of simulators pilots have been able to keep pace with the advances in technology. Ground school courses are much better in content and structure than when started my career.

Can't agree with you on the standard of maintenance, in my experience it's always been good and hopefully will continue the trend of continual improvement. We can improve on the standards we see today and we must strive to do so.

As for the companies and Government(?) getting their chequebooks out...well, maybe these latest incidents will force them to do so, but I wouldn't hold your breath on that one.

[jimf671]

On the matter of displays and human perception, many many years ago when I was a student, the class were test subjects for an undergraduate psychology project on spatial ability.

Most of the tests took the form of timed exposures of patterns of marks or letters in an array. Tests were done faster and faster to find the limit of the subjects ability.

The fastest of all the tests was ludicrously fast. I was surprised that human perception operated at these levels. A marker was in an array of boxes and we had to nominate its position. The speeds at which the group were able to do this ranged from 20ms down to 2ms. Yes, milliseconds.

These tests left me in no doubt that displays showing a simple position are far more easily perceived than anything with writing. You might have a preference for a different approach when the sun is shining and all is good with the world but when the pressure is on your brain knows differently.

[TipCap]

Thanks HC and jimf61 for the input on AIS.

I often watch L-o-S SAR where I was once based in the old days but didn't fully realise that it was only a surface vessel facility. Thought it was awfully quiet out of EGPD - not like in my day ;)

TC

[HeliComparator]

Pilots in Bristow certainly spend more time training than they did say 20 years ago, although as has been said, the helis are perhaps more complex.

It would be interesting to know the ratio of licensed engineers per airframe now vs 20 years ago. I suspect there are fewer now, but that is just a guess. And thanks to EASA, they seem to spend most of their time on paperwork!

[b.borg]

Like Tipcap I occasionally follow offshore activity, but on Flightradar 24.
I have just had a look at Planefinder and to put it mildly it is a farce.

G-FTOM has just departed from Dyce. It is equpped with "2 turboprop engines" :uhoh: and the operator is "Gulf International Airlines" and not as one would hope CHC Scotia :ugh:

G-LLOV (also CHC Scotia) is inbound to Dyce - operated by "Air Gemini" :sad:

Edited for sp.

Edited to add: THe symbols on Planefinder mostly show helicopters with a fixed wing symbol :suspect:

Bond seem to be shown correctly, with a helicopter symbol & correct operator information. :D

[HeliComparator]

B.borg, in part its due to the pilots setting Flight ID on the transponder controller correctly. Looks like Bond (as do Bristow) are setting their callsign / flight number, whereas CHC are just leaving the registration, which is incorrect I think.

Currently I don't think Aberdeen ATC have Mode S desks yet, but when they do these things will get picked up.

[HeliComparator]

Before I get a roasting from someone at CHC I should mention that the correct procedure for Flight ID is to set the callsign if a flight plan has been filed, if not then the reg. Its a moot point as to whether a flight plan has been filed since we are very unusual in Abz in not filing flight plans ourselves - ATC do it direct via the "mayfly" system. So I suppose it could be argued that as we don't file flight plans, the reg should be entered.

However, after discussion with ATC it was pointed out that it would be much more helpful if the callsign appeared on their screens (when they get them) than having the reg twice. That's why BHL and Bond set the callsign, and the likes of Inverness, who have mode S, can then see it.

Just another example of the widely differing operational ideas between the different operators, albeit a fairly trivial one.

[rotorspeed]

c53204

Your comments are so sweeping and negative that they either come over as being chippy, or requiring qualification. Assuming the latter, for which operator are you saying the standard of maintenance has reduced? On what basis - are you involved in maintenance? And similarly for which operator are you saying the standard of training has reduced? How, specifically?

Are you surprised that cost cutting measures are being implemented by operators? Providing safety standards are not being compromised, don't you think that is the nature of good business? In most businesses there are areas where costs inevitably rise and others where costs can be reduced, and optimising the balance is crucial to economic survival. And without that there are no jobs for you.

[EESDL]

C53204
That's one of the more useful purposes for this forum.
For someone to come out with such a statement is commendable.
2-way comms and all that - it is only a perception after so:
Do companies spend money on pr to convince our pax that our licences and extensive training are valid, or,
Do we dismiss the sweeping comment as another ignorant statement from a Facebook Ranter (if you get my drift?)

We would all like more training but there comes a point when increased training loses out v experience and flying the line.

We've recently recruited some low-time pilots and I have been very impressed with the hours our training department have thrown at the co-jocks, both in the aircraft and down at the sim. Myself included as my mil & civ experience had not included sufficient time in a credible sim and not just a box with lights! I have witnessed remarkably different levels of what is acceptable with other jaa/easa companies so perhaps the passengers are more astute than the drivers think?

It amazes me what some national caa departments pass as credible training levels.
Thanks again c53204 for mentioning this but please try to use a narrower brush next time as I'm kind of proud of our training department but understand your perception in a atmosphere where everything seems to suffer due to Mr Accountant.

[pumaboy]

Audioboo / Eurocopter CEO Guillaume Faury speaks to Rebecca Curran, following the decision to lift the suspension of all Super Puma flights in the UK North Sea (http://audioboo.fm/boos/1573297-eurocopter-ceo-guillaume-faury-speaks-to-rebecca-curran-following-the-decision-to-lift-the-suspension-of-all-super-puma-flights-in-the-uk-north-sea?playlist_direction=forward)

[c53204]

Guys. Stop trying to kid yourself. The exact figures may be debatable, but if anyone thinks the standard of pilots, drivers, maintenance has not declined - you are reacting exactly as I expected.

NSTB "For Scheduled air transport, pilot error typically accounts for just over half of worldwide accidents with a known cause'. (Wiki). This rises to 78% for GA accidents.

So what amount is caused by poor design (say Main Gearboxes) or bad maintenance (say main gearboxes).........

Add in known maintenance issues that have cause fatal/non fatal accidents and for good effect add the internet (787 fiasco). Is it any wonder passengers have less faith in air transport these days.

I'm a lapsed PPL (A+H) (last flight circa 1995) and used to think nothing of commercial flying. A little different these days.

[C195]

As far as incident/ accident causes are concerned, human error will increase as technology becomes more complex and more reliable. Better training can of course help to offset this to some extent. I only fly fixed wing but have clearly seen a reduction in pilot skills as the technology has become better. More reliance on automation etc. Especially with new guys.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Someone was asking about the L2's flight deck whether it is analogue etc.

knQD-zd_FSo

[diginagain]

Mechta, apologies for not responding. In my defence I've just got home after a rather convoluted journey from the Borgsten. Your proposal is clearly the way forward, and gets my full support.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

It's obvious where Eurocopter is pointing fingers.
Helicopter bosses say all the indications show the helicopter crash off Shetland was not the result of a mechanical failure.
Four people died after the L2 aircraft went down in the water a few miles from Sumburgh airport.
Helicopter Manufacturer Eurocopter say the accident could be as a result of a number of factors - including environment, maintenence or human error.
It comes as the suspension on Super Puma flights to and from the UK North Sea is lifted.
But the Air Accident Investigaton Branch say it's too early to know the cause, and only recovered the black box recorder this evening.
Eurocopter is helping the AAIB with the investigation.

[Hummingfrog]

I wonder if now is the time to have a survey of all the NS pilots to see what they want to see on each flat screen, what autopilot functions they need and how easy it is to activate them and avoid secondary problems if the function is used/activated in an in appropriate way.

It seems from what I hear that the S92 system is not as user friendly as the 225. Why?

I have, unfortunately, not flown glass cockpit so may be a luddite:confused: but I have flown with several types of GPS systems - some of which were impossible to use without deep understanding of the manual and constant practice and others which seem to work as the human mind does so are intuitive to use.

I had the opportunity to fly a RAF Jaguar, (in the sim) a head up display ILS - it was very simple - you had a circle on the screen and so long as the dot (ILS beam) was kept in the centre of the circle you were on localiser and glideslope, the circle calculated drift for you. DME, height and speed were on the side of the display with the ability to set DH as an alarm. I was told approach and threshold speed and it was very easy to fly a good stabilised approach - and a good landing:ok:

So I can see how correct development of new ways of displaying can make the pilot's work load less.

HF

[satsuma]

A reminder of where the CAA stood on automation couple of years ago

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SafetyNotice2011017.pdf

[Anthony Supplebottom]

A reminder of where the CAA stood on automation couple of years ago

Satsuma thanks for this.

in May 2011 an AS 332L2 under instrument flight rules unexpectedly pitched up and lost airspeed to capture and maintain the demanded rate of climb

The above incident has no doubt been discussed already but could someone remind me how an L2 losses airspeed in this situation. The driver punches in a desired ROC (is that normal, why wouldn't he simply select altitude) and the system doesn't mind how much airspeed is traded-off? Doesn't the AP have a parameter which prevents airspeed from dropping below a certain minimum irrespective of the ROC selected?

[HeliComparator]

AS the L2 doesn't have the flight envelope protection of the 225. I can't remember what, if anything, it does have in this respect, but I do know that when you use Altitude Aquire, it doesn't command the aircraft to climb or descend. So you have to arm Alt.A first, then use VS mode to actually initiate the climb or descent.

And to think, I used to think the L2 was quite good - then I flew the 225!

[African Eagle]

Interesting to note in that same CAA doc that two other Eurocopters simply dropped out of the sky at night just because the AFCS was deselected and the aircraft was transferred back into manual! :eek:

[Colibri49]

"survey of all the NS pilots" After decades of flying with "steam driven" round instruments, I converted to the EC225 many years ago. The conversion training we got from HC was thorough, to say the least. He and the other trainers/line trainers didn't unleash us to fly as line crew until they and we were comfortable.

Having said the above and after comparing impressions with several colleagues, I can safely say that it took most of us some months of having to concentrate on the EFIS presentations before they became second nature. As HC has mentioned, it was a bit of a challenge going back from EFIS in the EC225 to round dials in the AS332L/L1.

Now I must assure all doubters that the way Eurocopter (Airbus) presents the information on the screens is nothing short of brilliant. The concept of having most of the essential information arranged along a horizontal lubber line seems to me like "why isn't this made compulsory for all aircraft?"

For reasons best known to themselves, Sikorsky chose to spurn the opportunity presented by new technology and "wasted" their S92 flat screens by reproducing essential flight information in the old round analogue dials format. Why bother with screens at all, in that case?

If any of our passengers are still following this thread, the most safety you're likely to get for years to come is in the EC225 with its VERY sophisticated autopilot which caters for almost all pilot errors and the biggest escape windows of all 19 seat helicopters.

[batboy1970]

If that 'is' the SP fleet flying the next thing of course will be that every time there is the slightest tech fault with any of them, it's going to be reported through the media like wildfire causing more panic and unsettled pax.

[Non-Driver]

Guys. Stop trying to kid yourself. The exact figures may be debatable, but if anyone thinks the standard of pilots, drivers, maintenance has not declined - you are reacting exactly as I expected.


This is a subjective opinion based on different eras which can't be compared eg footballers, racing drivers etc. What is important is the overall safety of the system (ie transport A to B in safety) and operating subsystems (piloting, maintenance, design, manufacturing).

Add in known maintenance issues that have cause fatal/non fatal accidents and for good effect add the internet (787 fiasco).

Think you'll find none of the 787's problems are maintenance problems, they are design & manufacturing. The pace of communications is a game shifter for perception. I suspect 20 years ago we would have had the CVFDR found and downloaded in this case before there was enough momentum for a grounding campaign.

Suspect your view is primarily driven by two well documented human traits: rose tinted hindsight and fear increasing with age. Anyone that is more afraid of commercial transport now than in the 60's or 70's has not seen the rate of hull losses and fatalities plotted over those 40 years. GA accidents - well that's a whole different kettle of fish where the technology can't compensate for the singular points of failure and compromises made at the price point.

[nowherespecial]

I've never bveen a NS pilot but I am a RW pilot elsewhere.

A question though, do you think that the automation of systems and new technology is making people go flying when they otherwise wouldn't. For me I think the answer is yes - all instrument and procedural flying spring to mind.

Do these enhancements in pilot/ ac capability mean that people think they can fly safely when they should otherwise say no and thus put themselves into situations where a crash is a very reasonable possibility. If the industry regularly puts itself into a position where a crash is a reasonable possibility, statistically you will get accidents.

Keen to hear the thoughts of my bewinged and more experienced brethern?

Edited to add, please don't take this as me saying I think we should scrap PF and IF, merely that flying without visual references is inherently more risky than being able to see all the time.

[derek_j_spence]

Hi all,

I must say there is a lot of good discussion on here and not so much bickering as on certain FB pages i have been following.
Been on PPRuNe for years but haven't posted in over 10, felt compelled to do so today.
I am now an offshore worker (gave up my pilot dreams in 2001) and currently sitting out on the WilHunter.
What comes across as knee jerk from a lot of posts on FB is a lack of understanding and transparency about the incident last friday.
Any time we get a minute on the rig, all that is being discussed is the SP situation and a lot of varied opinions on the subject. What I must say is that most (but not all) guys/girls are saying they dont want to fly SP. Some say "ever again", some say "unless we hear the report", some just nod heads.
For me, I have never had an issue with the SP but have started to question my position on this.
The Eurocopter spokesman was very vague in his statement but, at the same time, very confident that it wasn't mechanical.
I am writing here to see what you, the guys in the driving seats, the guys in the hangers, think to the statement.
Obviously, the data recorders need to be analysed before a lot of the investigation can be done so not asking for hypothesis but what are the facts on this.
Thank you in advance for any/all replies.

PS. I read this back and dont think I wrote anything that would cause offense. If you disagree, please accept my apologies as none has been intended.

[Brom]

just found this snippet on the BBC News webpage...

Bristow said passenger sensitivities played a part in its decision but it intended to resume services using Super Puma AS332 L2s - the type which crashed - very soon.

Didn't think Bristow had any L2's, especially not in ABZ.

[HeliComparator]

DJS - For both you guys and us, its very hard to know anything for sure until a preliminary report is released into the public domain. However, those guys at the HSSG, Eurocopter and the senior management at the helicopter operators will know a lot more than we do at this stage.

As I said, we can't be sure, but the indications, taking into account the press statements, lack of technical action from CAA or EASA or EC, all point to the fact that the accident occured when there was nothing wrong with the helicopter. From that you can infer some sort of pilot error, but please lets not jump the gun on that one until the report comes out.

What is termed "pilot error" can arise from sheer stupidity, incompetance, negligence and general daftness of the pilots. However it is very rarely like that. More often it is a result of a series of relatively minor events coming together, with the saviour of last resort (the pilots) for some reason failing to act just as they should. There can often be systemic faults in procedures, SOPs, training and company culture that are contributory factors, not to mention the pilot being sub-optimal on that day due to a row with the wife or a colleague, some minor ailment etc etc.

If I was given the opportunity to fly tommorow, I wouldn't hesitate, although I would much rather fly in an EC225 than a 332L or L2, since the former is so much more technologically advanced and pilot friendly.

For you, it is your choice, but there is no logical nor technological reason why you shouldn't be just as safe as always in a helicopter. That is, you can never be totally safe in anything you do from lying in bed, crossing the road etc, but the probability of anything happening on your flight is extremely small. You are going to die sometime, its highly, highly unlikely that it will be in a helicopter.

[HeliComparator]

Brom, we have a couple of L2s in Nigeria. Which is part of the global oil industry "family" even if far far away!

[bondu]

Derek,

The main problem with any incident/accident these days is the ease of 'communication' via 'social media'. News is almost immediately being broadcast, usually without any facts being available. The 'Facebook' thread is a prime example of an idea being generated and spread without any hard evidence. As pilots, we tend to want hard facts before we make decisions - not always, but usually.
A lot of emphasis in the media reporting was based on second-hand 'eye witness' reports. Ask any policeman or lawyer about the accuracy of eye witnesses! Any delay in producing hard facts will inevitably result in a vacuum which will be filled by uncertainty and apprehension. That's the world we live in today.
Logically, waiting for the interim report from the AAIB is the only sensible thing to do, but that does leave that vacuum and people will jump in to fill it.
I've been flying the AS3322L/EC225 for 21 of the past 26 years - over 10,000 hours. I am confident in the aircraft. The EC225 is perhaps the best machine to have flown on the North Sea, closely followed by the S92. The next types - AW189, EC175 - will no doubt be even better.
As aircrew we all have wives/husbands/children etc that we want to go home to - we would not knowingly climb into an aircraft we thought was not fit for purpose. There is a very old saying, "there are old pilots and there are bold pilots, but very few old bold pilots". I and I'm sure all my colleagues want to be old pilots, drawing our pensions and looking back on our safe careers.
I hope this might go some way to allay your fears and apprehensions, but feel free to ask any other questions, either on this thread or by private message.

bondu

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

DJS the Eurocopter Spokesman is the CEO of Eurocopter. He is a Flight Test Engineer and was head of the EC225 Design Team. I cannot think of a better CV for a man to lead Eurocopter right now.

[Bladestrike]

"Do these enhancements in pilot/ ac capability mean that people think they can fly safely when they should otherwise say no and thus put themselves into situations where a crash is a very reasonable possibility. If the industry regularly puts itself into a position where a crash is a reasonable possibility, statistically you will get accidents."

No. The weather I launched in 3 and 4 axis AP SPs and 139s for years is no worse than the weather I launched in non-ap equipped S61s for nearly a decade. Canada East Coast/North Atlantic 4 hour sorties with no APs was a challenge and automation has only improved safety significantly.

[JohnDixson]

Colibri,

When the basic display format came up for debate on the 92, SA had been delivering S-76 aircraft with Sperry/Honeywell EFIS, which incorporated tape displays for airspeed and altitude. Fleet pilot response to those displays, along with our test pilot community group, was anything but polarized, either for or against, but the strong majority was in favor of the hybrid display which was certified and delivered. The discussions were long and spirited.

[Grenville Fortescue]

.. but the strong majority was in favor of the hybrid display which was certified and delivered. The discussions were long and spirited.

To be perfectly sincere, and given the exponential nature of technological development - most especially in the area of MFD design and information processing, it should be but an option available at the press of a button as to which type of display a pilot prefers to use and not just one standard layout.

[dmsims]

And would it not be an idea to have a mandatory standard display across all types (as an option)

[nbl]

HC - Why should the HSSG, Eurocopter and the Operator bosses know more than the rest of us? HSSG is all about keeping the workforce informed is it not?

[RVDT]

exponential nature of technological development

If only it was that easy in aviation. Working with a few "glass machines" over the years it is far from easy even to get something minor changed and released.

e.g. EC135P2 - new config file to change ALT BARO from in/hg to hPa.

7K Euro! As the avionics installed were slightly different than standard and the file had to be written, tested and released.

My experience from "tapes" and "round dials" is that "round dials" don't require you to read the numbers. The angle of the needle is enough.

[HeliComparator]

nbl - you would have to ask them! But consider the sensitivities IF IF IF the cause is "pilot error". That will completely devastate the lives of the two pilots, even if there are plenty of ameliorating factors. Before publicly announcing that, there has to be a degree of certainty that can only be had once a proper investigation, including looking at the CVFDR, has taken place and all the factors (because there will be a number) are identified. So they don't announce it, but by not announcing any technical faults everyone in the industry gets the general idea.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I wonder if we are looking at another Flight 401 scenario.

(The flight crew becoming preoccupied with a burnt-out landing gear indicator light and failed to notice the autopilot had inadvertently been disconnected. As a result, the flight gradually lost altitude and eventually crashed while the crew was distracted with the indicator problem.)

My experience from "tapes" and "round dials" is that "round dials" don't require you to read the numbers. The angle of the needle is enough.
With you 100% on that one RVDT.

[Geoffersincornwall]

My overall impression is that most TRI's have not had the benefit of a course that helps them to help the candidate learn to instrument fly properly and to a certain extent we lack the tools to do that as well. The fact that it's necessary to resort to 'Post-It' notes stuck on bits of the PFD in order to teach students how to prioritise the data collection at different stages of flight and in different manoeuvres reinforces that notion.

When I learnt to fly as a newbie in the sixties - the LATE sixties I hasten to add - the teaching techniques were so rough and ready it was tantamount to being given an aircraft and a safety pilot whilst you taught yourself how to do it.

Things then became more scientific and we all benefitted from a more structured approach with patches of duct tape used instead of the post it notes of today.

If the TRI's are going to be in the front line of those tutoring newbies when they first encounter flat screen technology then we need to equip the TRIs with some skills beforehand - Ah! what's that you say? Not required in the regs!! Bugger! another hole in the Swiss cheese. It can join the fact that sim instructors are not required to learn how to teach in a sim, just to know what the buttons do and how to climb down the escape ladder. Looking more like a lump of stale Emmental every day.

I retire next month but will make myself available to anyone interested in making our instructor corps as good as they are able, rather than just (barely) good enough.**

**This comment is directed at the extensive population of TRIs that have been elbowed into running sim training sessions for their company but never given the tuition or practice or mentoring to get them up to a standard whereby they are fluent, confident and above all competent. Every time I climb in the box and find it in a mess after a 'dry' training session I really do wonder what had gone on in there and whether any real value was achieved from the time and money spent.

G. :ugh:

[SASless]

Geoffers......an evaluation tool I used in the aircraft and sim when doing IF training, was to announce "Unusual Attitude Recovery".....and set up the exercise with the usual...."Right...Head down...eyes closed....I'll fly....you keep yer eyes closed till I tell you to take the controls...then you take control and recover from whatever attitude you are given. (...or words to that effect)

Once the Stude got his head down and eyes closed....I reached across and adjusted his Attitude Indicator to show a Ten degree Bank when actually level.

Then....do the old whoopsy doodle bit for a minute moving all the controls around and wiggling the pedals.....then in a fairly benign aircraft attitude....give control to the Stude....and watch the next few minutes of fun.

What I found.....those that knew how to actually fly the instruments....tweaked to the attitude indicator roll problem in very short order.....and those....usually the great majority would never figure it out. We flopped from one side to the other as they fought heading problems over and over and over.....all the while ignoring the Standby and Co-Pilots Attitude Indicators that were both showing something different than the one he was using.

What that showed was whether the guy was flying instruments (plural usage on purpose) or the Attitude Indicator.

In just a couple of words....."Cross Check".

Remember my complaint about Check Airman from a Company Checking their Check Airman Buddy....rather than having a third party do the checks and the risk that poses?

[beamender99]

BBC News - Super Puma crash not due to technical problems, says CAA (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23896479)

[UKpaxman]

Another survivor describes how quickly the helicopter seemed to lose power and end up in the sea.

?I was on my last breaths when a flash of my family got me through?, says survivor | ShetlandTimes.co.uk (http://www.shetlandtimes.co.uk/2013/08/30/i-was-on-my-last-breaths-when-a-flash-of-my-family-got-me-through-says-survivor)

[Grenville Fortescue]

If only it was that easy in aviation. Working with a few "glass machines" over the years it is far from easy even to get something minor changed and released.

e.g. EC135P2 - new config file to change ALT BARO from in/hg to hPa.

7K Euro! As the avionics installed were slightly different than standard and the file had to be written, tested and released.

My experience from "tapes" and "round dials" is that "round dials" don't require you to read the numbers. The angle of the needle is enough.

The processes involved in what amounts to relatively minor modifications (by today's standards) in current MFD technology are sometimes used by manufacturers to drain their client's bank accounts when in fact such systems could be designed from the outset to offer greater flexibility.

Your comments regarding the convenience of circular readouts demonstrates the benefit of offering pilots personalised choices in the style and display of information and I would go further and say that additional options relating to the positioning of specific indicators as well as their relative size should also be optional. In fact, pilots should be able to customise screens specifically to their preferences.

For aircraft regularly flown by different pilots a personal code could be entered into the system to activate an individual's preferences and if large fleet operators wish to standardise all their displays they should be able to "lock" screen options to a specific setting or simply indicate the company's preferred screen arrangement in their SOP's.

Either way we are at a place (technologically) where these kind of options should be available. Moreover, and in my understanding, information displayed in a way which is tailored towards a pilot's personal preferences has the potential to contribute towards the enhancement of safety.

[HeliComparator]

GF - normally you make sense, but that is the most horrendous suggestion ever! What about standardisation? What about the fact that, in my experience quite often, the pilot is not well placed to make such decisions and will typically follow the easiest path for when things are run of the mill, and not consider the best overall solution under a variety of circumstances? Pilots are not MMI designers.

No, lock it down I say. Even the 225's ability to display various navaids on any screen, and the ability to select sector, HSI, rose, hover displays is getting close to 1 too many degrees of freedom, and has to be locked down by rigorous SOPs.

If you want what you suggest, I suggest you but a PC flight sim!

[Anthony Supplebottom]

A CAA spokesman said: "Based on all the information currently available, we do not believe that the accident was caused by an airworthiness or technical problem."

Oh well there we have it. Am a little surprised but there we are.

I wonder if all the talk of finger trouble with the AFCS in the past couple of pages will bear any relation to what is discovered? If so then NS operators will need to review their pilot training regimes, again!

[HeliComparator]

... and/or, standardising the use of automation!

[Grenville Fortescue]

HC, some contextualisation required and, significantly, I am not suggesting an information "free for all" in respect of which information should be in and which should not but primary indicators such as airspeed, vertical speed, attitude and heading may connect with different people in different ways - in fact the evidence is already there as Sikorsky found out (see John Dixon's post (http://www.pprune.org/8021358-post853.html)).

Rigorous standardisation may well be easier to administer but real safety might just be found in higher levels of customisation.

Ideally it is something to be researched.

[Brom]

With regard to display settings, there has to be standardisation, end of debate. I would not wish to fly with another pilot/co-pilot who has a different screen set up than me. It would be a nightmare on the line and during training (Sim debriefs would be interesting for sure). Anyway I doubt the authority would allow it.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HC and BROM I strongly agree with your posts re standardisation. In my experience HC is correct that even multiple options of needle displays can lead to confusion.

However, I also feel we should embrace multiple SOPs for differing scenarios especially with the situational awareness tools available on modern displays.

Grenville. You may have a point in the SPH environment but I think most MPH crews on this forum rely on standardisation as a key component of CRM and inherent safety. Not to say we should not tailor anything for a specific set of circumstances but this would always be briefed out as "non standard" to ensure our stick buddy remains in the loop to watch our your back.

I believe, in the MPH environment, two pilots doing their own thing is far worse than one pilot on his own.

DB

[dsc810]

I recall reading some analysis on electronic instruments presented as either dials or as numbers many years ago.
It was said that is is much easier to spot an indicator out of its normal place on a dial type display than a number.
As stated above the point was that you did not have to read the numbers to determine if there was a problem - merely scan the dials to see something was wrong.
This effect is even more noticeable on a complex bank of say multiple engine dials where a single errorous indicator in the dial format will be spotted far quicker than a bank of numbers.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Dsc810, I hear you but we are much more advanced than you think. When a system is out of parameter in EC225 we get a warning light plus the numbers on the affect system gauge appear for the first time. We do not need to monitor numbers anymore (in general).

On the EC175 we have gone one step further. In this type, a parameter out of trend is notified to the crew long before it exceeds a limit.

Some of this philosophy is on the L2 but not all.

We are heading in the right direction.

Round gauges or tapes. May well be a personal preference but I have not met an EC225 or EC175 pilot who does not like the EC display.

Is there anyone who can prove me wrong on this one.

DB

[HeliComparator]

dsc810 - its interesting that the S92 goes for strip gauges for the engine and system instruments, and clock dials for some of the primary flight instruments, whereas with the 225 and L2 its the exact opposite, clock dials for all system and engine gauges and strips for primary flight instruments.

Both sets of pilots of course get used to what is presented to them, but it would be interesting to trial, with brand-new-to-both-types pilots, both the S92 and EC225 layouts. My feeling is that the clock vs strip is not the primary consideration, its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.

[heliski22]

Both sets of pilots of course get used to what is presented to them,

Key point, methinks...

[Hummingfrog]

HC

its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.

This is exactly what is required and it has to be designed for the NS Helicopter environment not a FW system modified, to save money, to try and apply to NS ops. It also has to have functions that are Murphy proof so a that it is impossible for a mode to cause the a/c to enter a flight regime in which helicopters weren't designed to operate safely.


HF

[Grenville Fortescue]

.. its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.

Agreed.

However, human nature being what it is, this rationale might not be interpreted in exactly the same way by everyone - thus resulting in variations in preferences.

I am sure however that for fleet requirements (and therefore in line with this discussion) standardisation is desirable but it would be an interesting study to examine (most especially under critical circumstances) whether enhanced crew responses could be stimulated by different information display styles.

[SASless]

My feeling is that the clock vs strip is not the primary consideration, its the overall layout in terms of logicality, intuitiveness and absence of clutter that is the more important factor.

My feeling is HC is exactly right.

[HeliComparator]

DB yes I agree on your point about different setups according to the task in hand. For fixed wing, they tend to land at an airfield, all of which are pretty much the same. For oil and gas RW we have offshore ops (flat earth, no need for EGPWS map), ARA where the primary navaid is the radar, onshore ops where EGPWS map can be useful, onshore instrument approaches, and of course visual approaches including night offshore ones. Then there are the different types of departures. But the SOPs should be defined for each of these scenarios so everyone is on the same page - literally!

[HeliComparator]

Hey, I just had an idea! Lets find out all the offshore workers who signed the ridiculous Facebook page. Then BHL, CHC and Bond can put out a joint statement that sorry, anyone who signed may be a liability in flight due to predisposition to hysteria and will have to go by boat for a month. That would liven things up a bit!






OK it's Friday night and I may have had a G&T!

[Fareastdriver]

In my experience the position of needles on an instrument doesn't really matter. I operated on a fleet that had a mixture of imperial and metric flight instrumentation. The instruments had different numbers of needles and different Zero positions and rattled through the numbers faster or slower depending on the data. We would fly a metric aircraft in kilometres at metric flight levels and cross seamlessly to a different authority using ICAO flight levels and then fly an imperial aircraft the same route with the same variations.

It doesn't happen now but in the past one could operate different types on a daily basis. I was operating three at one time. There was no problem even though the performances at different stages of flight were markedly different.

Apart from having six base checks in a year.

[diginagain]

Yes, thanks for that, HC. The Loke Viking was very nice, the crew kind and considerate to those of us who'd just lost a friend or four, and they even tried to avoid us coming alongside in Lerwick at the same time as the Bibby Polaris was, with her cargo of AS332L2.

Enjoy your drink.

An observation; the plate that I have seen for LOC DME for 09 at Sumburgh includes the word "Recommended". Does that mean that a pilot may choose to deviate from the approach to descend below the profile?

[Anthony Supplebottom]

OK it's Friday night and I may have had a G&T!

As long as its Plymouth gin and served with a splash of Angostura bitters, no problem! :ok:

It doesn't happen now but in the past one could operate different types on a daily basis. I was operating three at one time. There was no problem even though the performances at different stages of flight were markedly different.

Back then we used to fly. Now they manage systems. :ooh: ;)

[jimf671]

... to go by boat for a month ...

You may be onto something HC, in spite of the G&T. The only problem is that, although anyone on a boat trip during the next couple of days may end up getting thrown about a bit, it's due to be far too calm a September for your scheme to be very effective.

[SASless]

OK it's Friday night and I may have had a G&T

If you have had your Morning Tea.....these days... it is most probable you have had a G&T.....admit it!;)



As it appears now.....the main question is why did the Crew fail to keep the aircraft out of the water while on the approach?

2-3 miles out....the aircraft should have been at a fair height above the water.

They were trained, checked, and fully capable, qualified, and experienced Pilots in a very well equipped aircraft and were in weather conditions that were not extreme in any way.

This is the usual question that arises during any CFIT event usually.

If it had been an Inadvertent IMC event at night....or in rugged terrain....we could begin to understand it easier. This happened over the Sea...in daylight....while on a published approach to an airfield they were familiar with, and at the end of a routine flight from offshore.

This one needs to be studied intensely from the Human Factors perspective to determine what actions can be taken to prevent another situation like this one from occurring again. Was it training, SOP's, cockpit distractions, failure of the Autopilot that went un-noticed.....as despite it being apparently CFIT....there are still "Technical" issues that could be at play.

[Special 25]

I think I saw this mentioned before. How about another ILS at Sumburgh?

It is becoming an O&G base again, SAR base, an alternate for Scatsta, and an enroute refuel stop for the East Shetland Basin. I would have thought there would be a lot of interest in getting a second glideslope, particularly given the weather in Shetland and the amount of activity both east and west of shetland.

Are we talking huge amounts of money and lots of calibration hassles??

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I'm sorry to say it appears this accident is down to the crew and whatever confused them on the approach.

Read between the lines here;
The fatal Super Puma helicopter crash off Shetland was not caused by airworthiness or technical problems, based on current information, the Civil Aviation Authority has said.

Helicopter operators are making arrangements to return their fleets to service after the suspension of flights was lifted.

The CAA said it considered the decision to resume flights as "appropriate".

The flight data recorder is being analysed by investigators.

A CAA spokesman said: "As the UK's aviation safety regulator, protecting the public is our fundamental purpose.
"It was right that Super Puma operations were suspended in the immediate aftermath of the accident on 23 August, until further information was available.

"We have reviewed and assessed the evidence available, including the information already published by the Air Accident Investigation Branch and detailed information provided to us by the operators.

"Our team of specialists includes pilots who are experienced in flying the Super Puma AS332 L2 in the North Sea environment."

The spokesman added: "Based on all the information currently available, we do not believe that the accident was caused by an airworthiness or technical problem, and consider that the decision by the operators to resume Super Puma flights is appropriate.

"We would not allow a return to service unless we were satisfied that it was safe to do so. We will review the position if any new evidence comes to light."

None of the three North Sea helicopter operators had Super Puma passenger flights on Friday.

The Helicopter Safety Steering Group (HSSG) said a campaign to engage with the offshore workforce was under way.

Les Linklater of HSSG said: "Four people tragically lost their lives on Friday. However there are almost 16,000 people offshore currently, with over 12,000 in the most affected areas (central and northern North Sea).

"Today, there are over 250 people who have spent more than 21 days offshore, this is increasing daily and they and their families are wondering when they are going to get home.

"We have a duty of care to all offshore workers both in terms of their safety and their well-being; we must consider the cumulative risk of the 'time out'. We must avoid a further tragedy through the introduction of human factor-based risk such as fatigue, stress and other well-being concerns that increase the likelihood of a high consequence - low frequency event."


Four people died after last Friday evening's tragedy off Shetland
He added: "The individual helicopter operating companies will now work with their customers, to ensure the correct information and confidence-building communication is available, sensitive to the individual needs of the offshore workforce, before returning to full commercial passenger service."

Bob Crow, general secretary of the RMT transport union, told BBC Scotland's Good Morning Scotland programme that he backed the decision to return the Super Pumas to service, in light of the evidence currently available.

He said: "You've got to weigh up, at the end of the day, the pressures on individuals who are stranded on rigs and want to get back, or who've been away from work for two to three weeks.

"Also, at the end of the day, we've got to look at the evidence that was put in front of us and at this moment in time there's no reason why the crash was mechanical."
One offshore worker told BBC Scotland: "I am slightly concerned about how fast they are back out."

Another said: "Obviously there is a bit of concern because of what's been happening over the last couple of years, but basically (I will) try and put it to the back of my mind and just do what we are here to do."

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said the Super Puma had appeared to show a "reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent".

The AAIB said it appeared the helicopter had been intact and upright when it entered the water.

Four people died when the Super Puma AS332 L2 went down close to shore on a flight to Shetland's Sumburgh Airport from the Borgsten Dolphin rig.

They were Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland, Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin, Gary McCrossan, 59, from Inverness, and George Allison, 57, from Winchester.

The crash was the fifth incident involving Super Pumas in the North Sea since 2009.

[212man]

.No, lock it down I say. Even the 225's ability to display various navaids on any screen, and the ability to select sector, HSI, rose, hover displays is getting close to 1 too many degrees of freedom, and has to be locked down by rigorous SOPs.

I have referred to the desire to turn a glass cockpit into an S-61 or AS332L look alike as the "comfort blanket" approach, and is truly a catch 22. SA is alive and well and living in an MFD -sadly, not everyone knows that!

[HeliComparator]

I think Scatsta should probably get 1st shout. They would be delighted with a localiser approach!

Digininagain, its a non-precision approach. Provided you don't go below the MDA and any other intermediate "not below" heights, the descent profile is advisory. Since you are approaching over water, in this case there aren't any intermediate "not below"s for this one -ie no high ground etc.

Did I hear someone whisper "CDFA"?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

In previous major incidents the flight crew are quick to explain how the accident occurred.

We have not heard a peep in this case even though four passengers lost their lives.

Perhaps some on here discussing minor technical details might like to think how they would feel losing a loved one in such an accident:(

[Non-Driver]

I find this comment more than slightly alarming:

A CAA spokesman said:...."It was right that Super Puma operations were suspended in the immediate aftermath of the accident on 23 August, until further information was available.

So the way I read that, any type with 10+ years of mature & safe (by any reasonable data measure) operation should be grounded in the event of any accident where the root cause is not immediately apparent (ie most of them) ???

This does seem to be a pretty seismic shift in CAA policy.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Read this bit;
Bob Crow, general secretary of the RMT transport union, told BBC Scotland's Good Morning Scotland programme that he backed the decision to return the Super Pumas to service, in light of the evidence currently available.

In other words this accident was not caused by technical problems.

[IFR Piglet]

Just seen the latest BBC report on this accident and feel totally gutted for the crew. To me, they may have simply proved the world that they’re human beings and as a result fallible. Sadly our work can be very very unforgiving. The AAIB will continue to do what they do best and produce a report that shall in time allow our industry learn.
This accident will test the companies flight safety principles and I hope it adheres to the corner stone of any effective SMS….the “just culture”. Far to many of our peers are flight safety stupid or perhaps ignorant is a better word. To much focus is placed on the processes of flight safety, corporate image and not the benefits of the just culture……but that’s another argument for another day.

Any pilot who believes this type of accident can’t happen to them is an idiot and a fool.

With regards to displays; dials illustrate a rate of change better than tapes, hence why the eurocopter products have a trend bar next to the airspeed/altitude tapes in attempt to overcome this inherent shortcoming.

Finally I hope the crew get all the support they need now and into the future.

[diginagain]

Thank you, HC. Since I am aware of the difference between the the two, am I safe in my assumption that it is entirely possible for the crew to say "Screw this, let's drop below this clag and drive in underneath."? If it helps, I've already been there.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

It's alright to be defensive for the crew but four people lost their lives.

Passengers trust and put their lives in the operators of offshore helicopter
operators and the management.

In this case it went wrong for reasons we have yet to establish.

In the meantime the funerals are taking place.

Perhaps better to have sympathy for families that lost loved ones instead of
worrying about the flight deck crew who have not had the decency to emerge
with their lives intact but concerned about careers.

No spirit of Sully here.

[jimf671]

This one needs to be studied intensely from the Human Factors perspective ... ...


Yes, and in the back as well.

Windows, doors, seat plan, ...

The accounts of the survivors can have immense value to every one of us who is ever likely to sit back there.

[Hummingfrog]

diginagain

"Screw this, let's drop below this clag and drive in underneath."?

Why would they do this - how do they know how low the "clag" goes - is it to sea level? What happens when they find at say 300ft they are still in the clag? It would be lunacy to think that was a safe and appropriate way to approach an airfield:ugh:

Far better to calculate the ROD to arrive at MDH just short of the MAP and, if the actual is correct, break cloud with the lights and runway directly in front of you. Modern runway lights are very powerful and the pattern of lead in lights naturally leads you towards the runway.

HF

[212man]

YEO, harsh! Post Cormorant I had the life changing experience of spending an evening in IH's house and hearing his daughter having a nightmare. I also saw JS become a changed man. We don't fly into the water on purpose. Give us a f***ing break on the Sully thing - good outcome from zero choice!

[MoodyMan]

This one needs to be studied intensely from the Human Factors perspective Yes, and in the back as well.

Windows, doors, seat plan, ...

The accounts of the survivors can have immense value to every one of us who is ever likely to sit back there.

Agreed. Flying in the back of an L2 is a horrible claustrophobic experience. It's just about tolerable if the flight isn't very full, however when every seat is taken it's a very uncomfortable experience, physically and mentally. Not withstanding the spate of recent incidents this is the main reason why it is so unpopular.

[diginagain]

I am in agreement with your argument, HF. The maths is already done, it's on the plate, and you can match your profile as you drive down the approach. So what is it that compels us to to divert from the published procedure? It's not as if it hasn't happen before.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Far better to calculate the ROD to arrive at MDH just short of the MAP and, if the actual is correct, break cloud with the lights and runway directly in front of you. Modern runway lights are very powerful and the pattern of lead in lights naturally leads you towards the runway.


Not rocket science Hummingfrog. Lots of private fixed wing pilots can do that without the luxury of another pilot in the r/h seat instead of a complaining wife.

[212man]

Moody man,
I do sympathise. I don't even like bouncing around in clear air turbulence over the Bay of Bengal in SIA business class. We all develop our own sense of mortality! I think it's easy to be blasé from the front. It's not the same. I even question the use of jump seats.....

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Yes, and in the back as well.

Windows, doors, seat plan, ...

LARGE push-out windows all the way down the fuselage might be a good start.

[bondu]

AS, you mean like the EC225?

Bondu

[rotorspeed]

Diginagain

I don't think so. For the crew to have consciously tried to duck under they would have probably been pretty aware and focused on basic parameters like height and airspeed, which they would have maintained at a sensible speed. From the Met it is reasonable to presume the cloud base was not less than 200ft. High enough for a mega focused crew to pull up before hitting the sea. Still seems more like, as ? HC has posted, to be letting the AS reduce critically under low power setting on reaching MDA and losing lift. And being, bizarrely, slow to appreciate that.

IF the cause is from such a reason, despite all the chat about methods of presentation of basic info on flat screens, it would seem pretty inexcusable for a two crew operation to miss such basic info. Hard to believe it is as simple as that unless the crew were very negligent.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Bondu, yes as well as other new a/c but not (sadly) on the 332.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Rotorspeed;
Please read this....
Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Air_Lines_Flight_401)
Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 was a Lockheed L-1011-1 Tristar jet that crashed into the Florida Everglades at 11:42pm December 29, 1972, causing 101 fatalities (99 initial crash fatalities, two died shortly afterward). There were 75 survivors. The crash occurred as a result of the entire flight crew becoming preoccupied with a burnt-out landing gear indicator light and failing to notice the autopilot had inadvertently been disconnected. As a result, the flight gradually lost altitude and eventually crashed while the flight crew was distracted with the indicator problem. It was the first crash of a wide-body aircraft and at the time, the second deadliest single-aircraft disaster in the United States.[1][2]

[Colibri49]

Ye Olde Pilot "the flight deck crew who have not had the decency to emerge with their lives intact but concerned about careers".

I take great exception to this statement. It is no better than all those who jumped to the conclusion that the Super Pumas should be destroyed, without a shred of evidence that there was a technical cause of the accident.

One of the crew lies in hospital with a broken back and the other was at home, initially in no fit state to speak. Furthermore they would have been well advised not to say anything initially in the aftermath, without having legal representation.

Where do you think that all the agencies involved got the clear idea from, only a few days after the tragedy, that it could have been human error? Only one possibility exists vis. that at least one of them has now elected to talk probably at almost the earliest opportunity, given the inevitable delays due to weather and investigators arriving, etc. Not to mention having to wait for properly appointed legal representatives to arrive.

Even though they won't yet have had an opportunity to comment on the evidence contained in the CVFDR, at least one of them has almost certainly spoken in spite of knowing that their North Sea helicopter careers are probably over.

On behalf of my colleagues in all three helicopter companies who are deeply cognisant of the grief being experienced by the bereaved, I ask you to retract your unfounded accusation.

[diginagain]

Rotorspeed, I concur; it would be inexcusable for a professional crew to do such a thing. But presumption has tripped us up in he past.

[Non-Driver]

Whilst I have worked in aviation all my working life and get defensive when (to my mind) irrational responses take flight, it is still fundamentally a prerequisite of our industry that we care passionately about each and every casualty however statistically "small" they are.

I had the pleasure of working with HC and others on this forum in a 7-year stint in rotary and watch back with affection from the big jet game I returned to. I value the professionalism and varied opinions of each of the disciplines. I do believe Bill Chiles truly was impacted by loss of life in his pre-aviation career as much as he is a driven businessman.

I count myself fortunate that the fam flight I was due to do on an S76 out of Norwich on the 17th of July 2002 was postponed for the most tragic of reasons. I count myself fortunate that I climbed the Northern Line escalator at Kings Cross on the 18th of November 1987 at 15:00 rather than 19:30. I am not religious nor particularly believe in "fate"

In this sad case it is not about (caveated by my prior post) breathing a sigh of relief that the type is (probably) exonerated on the altar of a couple of fallible sacrificial lambs. It is about trying to prevent it happening again.

[dmsims]

G-BEON makes interesting reading:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/8-1984%20G-BEON.pdf

[212man]

YEO, the Everglades L1011 report is less than helpfull! I suggest you consider the recent posts .....

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Colibri49

I take your point but the grief of the families who have lost their loved ones must exceed those lucky enough to have survived.

Are you suggesting one of the pilots has 'talked' to the agencies at the expense of the other?

[rotorspeed]

Ye Olde Pilot

Thanks, and interesting indeed. A major distraction certainly looks likely. I wonder what it was if so?

[212man]

G-BEON makes interesting reading:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...4%20G-BEON.pdf

I find it hard to imagine that any NS pilot would be anything less than familiar with most, if not all, of the CFIT accidents in the last 30 years.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

If you read this quote from a survivor of G-BEON
Langley-Williams told The Times (20 July 1983, p. 28 & 18 July 1983, p. 26): "It was very quick. I bumped forwards and hit my head on the seat in front." She asked Smith, "'What the hell is going on?'" The response was one word, by which time the passengers were chest-deep in seawater. "I closed my mouth and took a deep breath and by then I was under water." The seat had twisted on impact, tightening the seatbelt. "I realised I had not got an awful lot of breath left." She released the belt, opened the door and floated to the surface.

And the survivors of the AS332L2 statements they are similar.

Cause:
A report investigating the incident was concluded twenty months later, in February 1985, finding the cause to be 'pilot error'. The official report concluded that the accident was caused by the pilot not observing and correcting an unintentional descent before the helicopter collided with the sea during an attempt to fly at 250 feet using visual clues in poor and deceptive visibility over a calm sea.
The report also added that the following were contributory factors:
inadequate flight instrument monitoring due to flying in visibility conditions unsuited to visual flight.
lack of audio height warning equipment.
Safety recommendations
The Accident Investigation Branch made eight recommendations:
The weather minima for helicopter flight in visual flight rules and the related crew instrument monitoring procedures should be removed.
Radio Altimeters, with both audio and visual decision height warning, would be fitted to all helicopters operating offshore as a matter of urgency.
Consideration should be given to the development of a ground proximity warning system for helicopters.
The moving of the radio altimeter indicators to within the pilot's field of head-up vision should be examined.
Helicopters used for public transport should be fitted with an automatically deployable survival radio beacon.
Consideration should be given to pilots of helicopters used for public transport to wear lifejackets with dual frequency personal locator beacons.
The use of QFE by the company on low level approaches to St Mary's aerodrome and the minimum RVR should be reviewed.
The requirements concerning the strength of helicopter passenger and cabin attendant seats be reviewed.

[dickmct]

The threshold of 09 at Sumburgh is on the beach; no lead in lights or other early visual aids. As it is an over the sea, localiser only approach with no obstacles in the undershoot my preference is to get near MDA early, level on the AP and bleep down. There is not a standard lighting system so normal procedures are not the best.

FWIW, 25yrs on SP, 225 the best yet; it's a real pilots a/c with a brilliant AP.

Re. EFIS. My scan was poor on an analogue cockpit, my instrument flying improved wonderfully when I converted to L2 in '99.

[Colibri49]

Ye Olde Pilot

No I'm not suggesting that at all. They might both have made preliminary statements with their legal representatives present, after both agreeing a common position for the sake of enabling investigative processes to proceed.

There but for fortune go all of us and I very much doubt that most of us would be obstructive if we found ourselves in a similar position. There would be no point, because the truth always comes out in cases like this.

No, neither does my last sentence imply that they or any of us would seek to hide the truth if we thought that we could get away with it. Lives were lost and I'm confident that their instinct would be to help the survivors and bereaved to understand.

I have a very high regard for the personal integrity of our colleagues.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

YEO and others. I know the Commander of this flight well and he is honest as the day is long. Straight down the middle and a very good pilot.

We do not yet know what happened only that the Authority has stated it is not technical.

Whatever happened it was certainly not deliberate.that is called "An accident" knowing the man and the standards of that Company I doubt they would have deliberately flown an unauthorised approach.

Wait fr the report.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Of course none of us would have made a mistake with 20/20 hindsight but it's a sobering thought that what we think is routine can often bite when we least expect it.

The next day or two will reveal the truth.

There has to be a corporate role in this accident.

[Ray Joe Czech]

Can someone tell me what the rad alt setting policy is for precision and non-precision approaches in CHC?
I believe that Bond bug NHP to zero on precision approaches. Is this correct? What is their policy for non-precision approach?
And offshore ARA too, please.

[HeliComparator]

RJC your question is aimed at CHC so I can't answer it, but I can say this:

Depending on the variant and the operator, there are differences in the way the pilot and copilot radalt bugs work regarding the AVAD callout. On the L2, for everyone, the "check height" occurs on descending below the 1st bug, so the setting of the second bug is superfluous in this respect. For the 225, those for Bond and CHC are likewise. For Bristow, we requested a similar setup to the 332L, where you get the "soft" warning light /caption on descending below the 1st bug, and the harder "check height" on descending below the second.

[SASless]

Agreed. Flying in the back of an L2 is a horrible claustrophobic experience. It's just about tolerable if the flight isn't very full, however when every seat is taken it's a very uncomfortable experience, physically and mentally. Not withstanding the spate of recent incidents this is the main reason why it is so unpopular.

The Achilles Heel of the SP Family.

[Overdrive]

Of course none of us would have made a mistake with 20/20 hindsight but it's a sobering thought that what we think is routine can often bite when we least expect it.
Well that's more balanced now. No-one errs on purpose and all incidents & accidents bite quickly and are unexpected.

The bereaved, the survivors, the pilots, the company and all directly involved should be treated at this stage with the sympathy and understanding befitting their horrible loss and shock. There's no place for mud slinging.

The next day or two will reveal the truth.The next day or two may well allude but not fully reveal or explain.

There has to be a corporate role in this accident. Everyone that needs to be involved will be involved.

The report(s) will be cool, thorough and factual. Whatever the findings, it would serve all best to view them as resolution and opportunity to improve rather than to blame.

[IFR Piglet]

The report(s) will be cool, thorough and factual. Whatever the findings, it would serve all best to view them as resolution and opportunity to improve rather than to blame.

Amen brother!

[HeliComparator]

JD your PM box is full!

[The Ancient Geek]

Why are peope blaming the pilots before the preliminary report is out ?.
"No technical failure" leaves several other possibilities open including lack of fuel, bird strikes, incapacitation, etc etc.

Please stop jumping to conclusions - they are almost always wrong and there is seldom a simple single cause.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Does anyone know if the AAIB, or any other similar organisation, makes use of the investigation tool known as the 'Zotov Error Map'?

The ZEM plots the contributions made by other (and all, hopefully) agencies to a particular accident using a graphic based on a non-liner time-line.

Thus it is possible to include a decision made some considerable time before the accident by authorities, companies or individuals and include them in the overall assessment of causal factors.

David Beaty in his book 'The Naked Pilot' pointed us away from the simplistic diagnostic 'Pilot Error' and the ZEM can take that one step further. I am familiar with at least one (UK) fatal accident in which the ZEM would have implicated powerful groups but who in reality escaped inclusion in the post-accident narrative in a way that reflected their true contribution to events.

For those looking for simplistic solutions to this SP L2 incident they will be there for the taking but if we are to fully understand the nature of the holes that appeared in the Swiss cheese on this occasion we need a more mature and sophisticated approach. An approach that can hold powerful groups to task about any contribution to an accident they may have made, no matter how small, no matter how embarrassing.

Time will tell.

G.

PS - Emil Zotov is a Russian born New Zealand based accident investigator. His ZEM has been included in several safety conferences I have been privileged to attend but I have not encountered it in mainstream conversations about accident investigation.

[pilot and apprentice]

Ye Olde Pilot:It's alright to be defensive for the crew but four people lost their lives.

Passengers trust and put their lives in the operators of offshore helicopter
operators and the management.

In this case it went wrong for reasons we have yet to establish.

In the meantime the funerals are taking place.

Perhaps better to have sympathy for families that lost loved ones instead of
worrying about the flight deck crew who have not had the decency to emerge
with their lives intact but concerned about careers.

No spirit of Sully here.

This is not a condolences thread. That is elsewhere.

I, and others, will continue to discuss the technical aspects of our work and how they may or may not relate to this particular accident as we see fit.

I, for one, speak about my own accident, and the ones where I have lost close personal friends, just as I do this one.

HC: As much as I agree with the sentiment, and especially the soothing effects of a good G&T, I have refrained as much as possible from saying similar things. For all that we have been trying to have a rational debate about the accident, potential causes, and ways to improve what we do, there has been a witch-hunt going on here as well. Now that the 332 family has been burned at the stake and proven not a witch, the villagers are looking for new targets. We need to show we are better than that.

YOP:There has to be a corporate role in this accident.

Every preconception you make confirms why the real investigators need to do their jobs.


The report(s) will be cool, thorough and factual. Whatever the findings, it would serve all best to view them as resolution and opportunity to improve rather than to blame.
Amen brother!And I second that!

[Brian Abraham]

Does anyone know if the AAIB, or any other similar organisation, makes use of the investigation tool known as the 'Zotov Error Map'?Have not heard of the ZEM previously, and wonder, if he now being a New Zealander, developed it as a result of the DC-10/Erebus accident. Nevertheless, what he proposes is exactly the model introduced by James Reason.

Any accident report worthy of the name will look into ALL the factors that may have contributed - whether they be corporate governance, training, maintenance etc etc.

Why are peope blaming the pilots before the preliminary report is out ?

As the following article says "Of course, finding fault with pilots is easy, as they are the last persons to have possession of an aircraft and are the first to arrive at the scene. But it’s not that simple."

Emphasis mine. Like the crash crew arriving at the scene and asking the pilot "what happened?", and receiving the reply "no idea, I just got here myself."

The Domino Effect - Helicopters Magazine (http://www.helicoptersmagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2106&Itemid=145)

[oleary]

Many years ago during Canadian Arctic operations we did a lot of night flying so we got pretty good at recognizing the dangers of the "both pilots looking out the window, nobody minding AS/VSI/RADALT" scenario.

But I especially remember a particular night approach (rare on the East Coast) to the Rowan Gorilla off Sable Island with 214ST CF-VZO. We got too low on the approach and despite SOP calls the flying pilot (not me) did not correct. The AS decayed, VSI pegged down and we almost went into the water. In hindsight, I still find it difficult to believe that 2 very experienced IFR captains could screw it up that badly.

My condolences to all involved in this tragedy.

[Geoffersincornwall]

James Reason - Yes he certainly expounded on that subject but I don't recall him presenting it in graphical format. If I was able to draw one for you you would immediately see how powerful the ZEM is in bringing the whole thing together in one digestible format.

Dr Steve Walters was the man who sold me on it and he has written a few papers on the subject. He made a powerful case using a fixed wing accident in NZ that involved, I believe, a DH6.

G.

[satsuma]

Now that the 332 family has been burned at the stake and proven not a witch

Are you sure about this? The lack of confidence in the Super Puma's ability to remain in the sky may have reduced with recent announcements but the discomfort felt by passengers is still clearly evident. Read the following two quotes, the second of which is in one of today's broadsheets.

Flying in the back of an L2 is a horrible claustrophobic experience. It's just about tolerable if the flight isn't very full, however when every seat is taken it's a very uncomfortable experience, physically and mentally.


The nervousness among oil workers about flying and speaking openly about their concerns was highlighted in some of the media interviews during the aftermath of last week's accident.

"The EC225 is a flying death trap," one oil worker with 20 years' experience told the BBC. "The internal layout means [passengers] in the back … are so close that your knees are interlocked with the passenger sitting opposite you."

As we know, there will always be a risk that the helicopter will end up in the ocean somehow. Irrespective of the cause, the passengers should be able to escape unhindered when conditions and circumstances are less benign than the two EC225 ditchings. If they can't it is not a safe situation. The second quote is a combination of the rational and irrational. Of course it's not a flying death trap. Yet remove the emotion from his voice and study the evident fact - there are too many passengers crammed in to North Sea helicopters. 19 on a Super Puma is enough to make your eyes water. If change is needed, this may be somewhere to start. Cost will undoubtedly increase if fewer are carried but costs will increase further if the workforce refuse to travel on the predominant North Sea helicopter. Reduce the numbers.

[oleary]

.... and then there was the 61 ;)

[roundwego]

For Bristow, we requested a similar setup to the 332L, where you get the "soft" warning light /caption on descending below the 1st bug, and the harder "check height" on descending below the second.

Did you get it HC?

[Hummingfrog]

My memories of flying both in the front and back of the 332L are a a little dimmed by time now but I do seem to recall that some oil companies had a policy of restricting the number of pax on board.

I certainly remember that one company would not let pax sit in the middle seat of the back row - limiting the payload to 18 pax.

Perhaps this is the way for the more safety aware companies to go:ok:! I know I always felt a little hemmed in if I was in the "wrong" seat in the back - though the seats were far chunkier and in a different configuration to that used now and the windows are now bigger especially on the 225.

HF

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SEATS ON SP FAMILY

This is a serious issued currently being discussed seriously by some very influential people. The movers and shakers in our industry are listening to the most important people in our industry - OUR PASSENGERS.

I know this forum protects the anonymity of posters but could I please ask, for the sake of those of us who care deeply for the welfare of our PAX (and I naturally include every OFFSHORE pilot in this group) ask those of you who keep taking sideswipes at our customers (our passengers) please please please stop doing it as it gives our passengers the impression that you work in our Industry.....and we, the real crews, know by your poor opinion of our passengers, that you clearly do not.

Please continue to contribute and offer us your ideas as no stone should be left unturned but know this...every time you say something unpleasant or patronising about our passengers, every single offshore pilot is disgusted.

To an offshore crew, the safety of their PAX is priority number one.

DB

[Anthony Supplebottom]

"The EC225 is a flying death trap" one oil worker with 20 years experience told the BBC. "The internal layout means that passengers in the back are so close that your knees are interlocked with the passenger sitting opposite you."

North Sea oil culture needs to change, says union leader after helicopter crash | Business | The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/30/north-sea-oil-culture-helicopter-crash-bob-crow)

[jonseagull]

Admirable post DB. I think it's fair to say, if the safety of your passengers isn't your priority and you are a commercial pilot, of any persuasion, you're in the wrong job.

After years away from the North Sea I renewed my IRH. Having briefed for a CDFA NDB, because of current FW training,I was told in no uncertain terms to fly a dive and drive.

Aware that this could have absolutely no bearing on the current investigation, does the CDFA principle have any place in NS non-precision ops?

JS

[Savoia]

If I was able to draw one for you you would immediately see how powerful the ZEM is in bringing the whole thing together in one digestible format.


There is, what appears to be, a (somewhat small) Zotov Error Map on page one of this (http://asasi.org/papers/2008/Accident%20Data%20and%20the%20Helicopter%20Offshore%20Safety %20Case%20Presented%20by%20Steve%20Walters.pdf) report.

[Fareastdriver]

Don't blame the aircraft for being stuffy and claustrophobic in the back; blame the kit you have to wear. In countries were the sea is always above 25 degrees tee shirts and trainers are the rig and there are no complaints.
As the suits and rebreathers are compulsory then the room for them must be allowed for. Passenger weight has been progressively increased over the years from 170 lbs so now is the time to allow for the extra bulk and increase the seat pitch.
Should passengers numbers be reduced then so be it.

[bigglesbutler]

Pax numbers in the aircraft is controlled by the oil companies to get maximum bang for their buck. EC and operators are merely supplying for the demand of the client. Those of you wanting more room in the back (passengers) go talk to the oil companies as we can rearrange the seats as required, within reason so no lazyboys I'm afraid.

After years away from the North Sea I renewed my IRH. Having briefed for a CDFA NDB, because of current FW training,I was told in no uncertain terms to fly a dive and drive.


As I understand it and apply we generally fly a CDFA to be at MDH shortly before decision point, giving best chance of getting in combined with controlled and safe descent to that point.

Lastly but not least:

Quote:
For Bristow, we requested a similar setup to the 332L, where you get the "soft" warning light /caption on descending below the 1st bug, and the harder "check height" on descending below the second.
Did you get it HC?

yes we did, we get a large "DH" come up in the centre of the artificial horizon before the second bug sets off the "CHECK HEIGHT".

Almost forgot to say, thank heavens for the edit function, spot on DB I have friends who work offshore and disparaging them has been getting my back up too.

Si

[keithl]

Aware that this could have absolutely no bearing on the current investigation, does the CDFA principle have any place in NS non-precision?

JS. Not at present, no. CDFA was mandated for FW in 2011, but not for helos.

There is a compromise between "Dive & Drive" and CDFA, which is to require NPAs to be flown using a "notional glidepath" (i.e. a continuous descent following the altitude vs DME table) to the MDA and then "drive" to the MAPt. True, there is a "drive" element to that, but it does prevent "ducking under".

[212man]

Aware that this could have absolutely no bearing on the current investigation, does the CDFA principle have any place in NS non-precision ops?

Jon, not yet but I hope it will do. I introduced it as SOP in my previous organisation and it's a topic dear to my heart!

[MoodyMan]

Don't blame the aircraft for being stuffy and claustrophobic in the back; blame the kit you have to wear. In countries were the sea is always above 25 degrees tee shirts and trainers are the rig and there are no complaints.
As the suits and rebreathers are compulsory then the room for them must be allowed for. Passenger weight has been progressively increased over the years from 170 lbs so now is the time to allow for the extra bulk and increase the seat pitch.
Should passengers numbers be reduced then so be it. There's a reason we wear re-breathers and survival suits. People (including pilots) paid with their lives to discover it.

Even with shorts and t-shirts on it's going to be stuffy and claustrophobic unless you have 19 vertically challenged PAX in the back. Most people of average stature have to almost bend double to get out the back. Try it.

A poster earlier in the thread alluded to the fact that one of the original design criteria for the SP was that it could be carried by rail ie. it was designed to be cramped.

I've only flown on an EC225 once (I crew change on an S92) it was a very empty flight, still a bit cramped headroom wise but the seat layout was a little better and the large push out windows soothed the fears of my "inner chimp" to paraphrase another earlier poster.

[Ray Joe Czech]

It may be that the oil companies will have to look at leaving the centre seats unfilled on all types to pacify their workforce, except maybe those seats that are beside a jettisonable door.

That would make for 14? pax max on all Superpuma variants.

On the 225 at least, this would also massively reduce exposure problems on rig arrival and departure and maybe prevent the next accident likely to happen in the current paradigm.

[African Eagle]

On the 225 at least, this would also massively reduce exposure problems on rig arrival and departure and maybe prevent the next accident likely to happen in the current paradigm.

.. and increase available power margins and increase annual helico revenues.

But very unlikely to happen.

[Ray Joe Czech]

I agree, but until 18 or 19 bears squeeze into the back of a Superpuma type we will not know if the current paradigm has survived this incident. And they are not back in them yet, and I have heard of no plans for the first flights.

Edited to add: I would imagine the extra revenue would be marginal, and certainly not 18/14 x current revenue. Not all flights are full, and not all fourth rotation flights are used -- most of the money comes from the standing charge not the flight time, if I understand the contract model correctly.

[HeliComparator]

Si, I believe your description of CDFA is not quite right. You describe a notional glide path approach. With CDFA there is no MDA, its a DA so no level sector and you go around on reaching DA ( if not visual). Someone who has actually done these will correct me if I'm wrong!

The technology for flying this as an overlay approach ( ie controlled by the FMS in vertical profile ) has been around for a while but currently, the EC225 doesn't do it, although I believe it may be on the list for future development (EC take note!). Not sure if the S92 does it in a way acceptable to the CAA?

[Colibri49]

Super Puma AS332L/L1s have a shorter cabin than the L2s and EC225s. Furthermore they never carry more than 18 pax and for this reason the centre rear seat is never occupied.

The EC225 seating configuration is staggered in the Bristow version to obviate the discomfort of shoulders pressed against each other. The worst position in the cabin for interlocking knees is at the rear, so if fewer than 19 pax are being carried, I try to ensure that one of the rear seats remains unoccupied.

It also helps in the EC225 that the considerably larger windows allow more scope for passenger upper arms and shoulders be accommodated in the window recesses.

Overall in the EC225 there is a little more legroom in the longer cabin and a bit more shoulder room than found in the AS332L/L1.

[pohm1]

Super Puma AS332L/L1s have a shorter cabin than the L2s and EC225s. Furthermore they never carry more than 18 pax and for this reason the centre rear seat is never occupied.

When we carry 18 pax in an L/L1 the centre rear seat is always occupied, there are only 18 seats in the cabin.

P1

[Ray Joe Czech]

The Ls I flew had six rows of three seats and when 18 were carried there was a passenger in the rear middle seat.

As to your other comments, it may be more comfortable in the 225, but if I was a centre row pax I would not like to have to wait for someone else to egress before going out myself, and likely getting kicked in the face on the way...

[imsafe]

I agree it is cramped in the SP, but i believe that a roll over in the 225 is more survivable than in a L/L2 or the S92. Large windows and 2 jettisonable sliding doors. There is no doubt the S92 has more space in the cabin but how much does that really help when there are limited emergency exits. Are the windows large enough that the average passenger with a survival suit can escape without a problem? There are too many feelings involved and people judge the all SPs without a trial. Yes, the 225 had MGB problems and ended up on the water, so did the S92.

Just sayin'

[Colibri49]

I can only speak for my company's version used on North Sea operations. That's my little world.

Perhaps I'll go and count seats again on Monday. These days we seldom carry a full load of pax, so the spare lifejackets get tied to the centre rear seat to discourage its use.

HC Far more likely that I've got it wrong. I'll crawl back into my hole.

[HeliComparator]

Colibri, when I left the 332L some years ago, I'm sure it only had 18 seats? Maybe we currently have a 332L or two in Abz that has been imported from somewhere where the pax are smaller, and still has the original 19? Or am I remembering wrong?

[HeliComparator]

RJC - however, you can also be in a middle seat on an S92 with its much smaller windows - in fact there are more middle seats on an S92 I think. If this doesn't worry you, it is only because you perceive you are less likely to have to evacuate from an S92?

[keithl]

HC, you are right re #943. Si also uses the terms DH and Decision Pt. I was going to let it go, but he isn't describing CDFA. CDFAs with designated vertical profile have no MAPt, those with nominal vertical profiles do have a MAPt.

If there are any technical questions on CDFA, I have TGL 44 right here with me at home. Guess why I'm brushing up CDFAs...

[bigglesbutler]

Si, I believe your description of CDFA is not quite right. You describe a notional glide path approach. With CDFA there is no MDA, its a DA so no level sector and you go around on reaching DA ( if not visual). Someone who has actually done these will correct me if I'm wrong!

I was just thinking about that and was wondering if I had got it wrong, DOH need to do more studying then. My intention was a nominal glide slope to get down to MDA just before the decision point and then settle prior to someone shouting "DECIDE".

Si

P.S. I used MDH instead of MDA but not DH XD, nit picking I know cuz I fluffed it anyway :E

[jimf671]

An important point about the shorts and t-shirts territories is that many of these places are populated by smaller people.

Northern Europe is the home of some of the largest people on the planet (cf. L L Cavolli-Sforza, J Geipel). Stats for the size of the average human being can be unhelpful in the design of expensive hardware used mainly by large rich people. It would be nice to think that AS had the sense to design the SP to accomodate frenchmen rather than chinese but my Highland back and shoulders say other wise.

I have also sat in the design seat when dealing with very similar issues for land vehicles and it is close to impossible to justify extra space to the bean-counters when there is a large pile of statistics from reputable institutions backing the case for the smaller option.

[Jimmy 16]

@HC
The most used acronym for constant angle approaches is CANPA, Constant Angle Non Precision Approach. (good for googling purposes anyway)
There is some good reading here from the Flight Safety Foundation:

http://flightsafety.org/files/alar_bn7-2-nonprecision.pdf

I am a little surpised that no-one here has mentioned the tremendous work that the FSF has done with its excellent ALAR-toolkit (Approach and Landing Accident Reduction). If your companies are FSF members or have attended their seminars, your FSO's should have copies of the CD.

More here from Skybrary:
SKYbrary - Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Toolkit (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Flight_Safety_Foundation_ALAR_Toolkit)

Here's another one:
http://www.google.com.vn/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&ved=0CEsQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.atac.ca%2Fweb%2Fimages%2FDocuments%2FSC DA%2520Approach%2520Briefing%2520.ppt&ei=BNMhUomGKOTqiAfa64DwBA&usg=AFQjCNGyJbQ30z3JxQjljFiulpOta8ElTA&sig2=-_icv-i_KegV0R8pDnz0kQ&bvm=bv.51495398,d.aGc

[Ray Joe Czech]

Not at all, my post said ALL types.

Edited to add: to expand on this a bit, if the pax are worried about full loads and underwater emergency egress the way you solve that is by giving them their own jettisonable window or sitting them beside a large jettisonable door. This would need to apply to all types. And I don't know why I am even bothering to type this because money will always trump marginal safety improvements and it will never happen.

[terminus mos]

Our passengers hate being in the back of an EC225. The EC175 has much more shoulder room. When you look at the EC225 and the EC175 side by side, the 225 looks very old and its cabin looks dark and cramped (perception?)

But, our pax don't hate the back of the S-92, maybe for the reason HC says. They "feel" safer.

[SASless]

We can argue about bigger/smaller people, Tee's and Runners vs Survival Kit and rebreathers, Fat vs Skinny, but the issue is the cabin on the SP series is small and cramped for the passengers being carried on the North Sea. The situations is such that it causes at the very least, the perception of being dangerous and is causing a problem amongst the passengers.

This is a drop the Shield issue.

Either the Passengers are wrong....or they are right.....which is it?

In studies of this and previous fatal accidents that were "Survivable" and Passengers died....we should study those accidents to determine who survived, what seats they were in, what the passenger loading was, and any other factor that contributed to successful and unsuccessful exits from the aircraft.

This is a Safety Issue....not a mere "Comfort" Issue.

Why the passenger size has grown over time is immaterial....the fact is the passengers are larger than 30 years ago.....but then that is the situation all over the World. As we eat better....over generations...we get taller and broader. Ever been to a really old Pub with the original doorways? Wonder why you have to stoop down to get through....People were not as big then as we are now.

Listen to the Passengers folks....they are telling you they "fear" being in cramped conditions. As the size of the helicopter is not going to change....something else must to alleviate that cramped seating situation.

What is it to be?



CDFA Approaches have merit for Offshore Use.....a drastic change from decades of practice thus the change is not going to be welcomed with open arms.

The single most valuable aspect to the CDFA concept in my view is once the Descent is initiated....it is maintained until a unique Decision Point at which time the Descent is terminated and a CLIMB is initiated. No more cruising along at a very low height above the sea....with all the risks that creates. We have a habit of flying too low and plunking perfectly good helicopters into the water. At least with a CDFA approach there is but one defined point at which you are "close" to the water without having the Rig in sight.

DB has done good work improving Night Approaches.....and perhaps he might consider how to incorporate CDFA Approaches into his model.

That would be combining the best of both techniques.

[jemax]

I am not familiar with the limitations of the L2's auto pilot.

What I cannot understand it why there would be a need to decouple the automatics in a non precision approach.

In the S92 as you are approaching MAP you will call "I have control" if you have sufficient visual cues whilst the PM monitors. At this point in 3Q, as it's called in the S92 (I believe 4 axis in EC products) you have IAS, NAV/Heading and ALT coupled. You simply beep trim the IAS to the minimum 55 knots and beep down on the collective in Alt. You remain fully coupled whilst the aircraft descends.

Yes you may land longer than if you decouple decelerate and descend manually, but so what.

I have seen many times pilots decoupling at MDH, then decoupling and in my opinion, descending and decelerating too aggressively. In marginal conditions is not a position you want to be in.

With the 92 in 09 Sumburgh you would be able to remain coupled at 55kts, the minimum for the Autopilot (IAS), coupled to the localiser (NAV/HDG) and beep trim the aircraft onto the runway using the coupled collective (ALT) if you wished.

Is it not possible to do something similar in the L2, if not why is it not SOP?

[Jimmy 16]

There is no need to disengage the upper modes in an L2 to fly a non-precision approach.
You can do this in a 4-axis configuration using APP/LOC-IAS-VS with ALT Acquire set. You can fly it down to the runway with this setup, of course you have to be visual after MAPt to be legal. If you need to go around, just press the button on the collective and the lady flies away nice and easy..
A fairly low intensity workload setting if you ask me.

[dakarman]

Hello, I would like to take this chance to add my thoughts and ideas to this already substantial discussion regarding North Sea helicopters.

As a quick explanation I am one of the SLF (great phrase). I claim no in depth knowledge of piloting techniques or politics etc although I would like to point out I do have a low hours fixed wing PPL (no sniggers please) and a lifelong interest in aviation so do have a reasonably good technical understanding of the discussions. I would like to make my comments as a regular passenger in these aircraft as invited by previous replies earlier in the discussion.

My primary reaction is to complement the recent suggestions for lower number of passengers per flight and would like to highly recommend to anyone with influence reading this that this is in my opinion a potential major point in influencing those offshore to return to flight on the SP class of aircraft.

There is obviously the as yet undetermined issue of the 332L2 ditching and the concerns over reliability etc. and I would not like to make any decision in my own mind on this airframe until the proper investigations have been completed or more conclusive explanations released.

Having said that I personally dislike the 332 (all variants) as a frequent passenger as simply they are cramped and uncomfortable and more importantly seem old simply based on condition (fixtures and fittings, noise and vibration levels etc.) and with the mechanical stresses that helicopters undergo - an old helicopter feels unsafe. I am well aware that these machines undergo some of the best maintenance possible (I sincerely hope) and cannot fly except in perfect condition but with so many parts subject to high stress then the airframe apparent age goes strongly against them.

Ignoring technical issues I would like to return to my previous comment of passenger comfort. There are 2 issues here, one of which is the day to day being jammed in like a sardine for hours on end (This is a very widespread opinion of travelling on this class of helicopter - and why the S92 is liked much more with its larger cabin and better seats) and the other of which is escape in the event of emergency.

Just as a thought, imagine what the HSE would say if you were to set up a replica of a 332 in the full environment dunker and put 18 people in it in normal offshore survival suits then even with safety divers run a night time storm dunking simulation. Would you sit on that chopper even in the pool?

My suggestion is (assuming proper human factor analysis) remove seats making the 332 a 14 seat helicopter.
From the laymans view this would help by
1. Better chance of escape - i.e. more room to move.
2. Better comfort during flight - any room to move is better than none.
3. More baggage capacity - not previously mentioned this is a bugbear amongst some offshore workers - particularly third party persons who travel between different rigs and have to carry more gear. There are still too many examples of having to leave a bag behind.
4. A lowering of the loading of the machine which would surely reduce stress and associated failures. If your horse was 15 years old would you still load it up with a weight and run it hard over jumps?

A few months ago I was informed that the client I was working for at a time had a 14 persons limit on the flights which seemed like an extremely good idea so why not formalise it by some means and take the other seats out.

I have not mentioned 225's here but would like to suggest they also have seats removed as despite being newer and if the comments on here are true, much better, they still suffer from nearly the same cramped positions. I suspect its quite possible that acceptance among the majority of passengers could be influenced by making it seem more safe while improving comfort.

I do appreciate in most cases this issue is one determined by the client as opposed to the operator but with the 'workforce getting larger' (as reported repeatedly over the years) is this possibly a regulatory issue now?

I apologies in advance if I have stepped on anyone's toes or caused upset in this post. I am just attempting to get across a different point of view - from someone sat offshore just now.

As a final comment, I imagine being asked how I would travel offshore and would probably respond as follows
1. Boat or chopper? - Boat definitely.
2. S92? Yes if necessary.
3. EC225? Maybe.
4. EC332? Nope thanks.

[jimf671]

... the issue is the cabin on the SP series is small and cramped for the passengers being carried on the North Sea. ... ...the perception of being dangerous and is causing a problem amongst the passengers.

I hear you SASless. We might wonder if AirbusH/EC will make EC225 Mk2 with a taller cabin. Not entirely straightforward. For all the tales of Pumas in the back of Transalls, it's the SP that has the normal cabin height and not the S-92.

The AW189 will be the same, as will the EC175, though both will be blessed with monster escape windows.

Add to that the stability on floats that is inevitably better with a lower aircraft.

What is it to be?

Let me see now. Do I want a perception of space and comfort or do I want monster windows and stability on floats? I'll take the latter.

EC175 window: see page 9.
http://www.eurocopter.com/site/docs_wsw/medias/Oil&Gas112011.pdf



Once you get beyond about a dozen pax, I think the escape situation is inevitably more complex and the space required for each person may need to rise. Headroom certainly has some value in that regard but I suggest it is not as valuable as floor-space.

I would be delighted if we could see a detailed study of what happens in the back. A bunch of fresh-thinking PhD types getting together with accident survivors and established aviation evacuation specialists might bring us substantial value.

[keithl]

Jimmy 16, rest assured FSF ALAR Briefing Note 7.2 formed part of my initial study of CDFA for helos and is now part of this weekend's revision homework.

SAS, while CDFAs may have merit offshore, (a) the derivation and presentation of a "nominal vertical profile" to decks at unique elevations may not be straightforward (I'm not saying impossible) and (b) it is an extension of the present NPA Onshore discussion and has the potential to muddy the waters.

... although this IS pPrune, of course.

[SASless]

Recently Sikorsky and the FAA reported certification of automated approaches in the S-92.

FAA Approves Sikorsky Aircraft?s New Platform Approach System for S-92® Helicopters ? Feature Offers Enhanced Safety Through Reduced Pilot Workload (http://www.sikorsky.com/About+Sikorsky/News/Press+Details?pressvcmid=01ae2e1536a7e310VgnVCM1000004f62529 fRCRD)


At that time.....I suggested it was time for the CAA and North Sea Operators to consider that technique.

I find it interesting it was a Gulf of Mexico Operator, PHI, that was instrumental in the initiative....as we all know how backwards the GOM is....right?

HC as I recall said the 225 has the same capability although it is not used currently.

Should this be an area of operations that needs to be implemented on the North Sea?

How much more of a safety bonus would such approaches provide compared to existing techniques?

It would seem in the Localizer Approach being done by the crew in this latest crash.....had the "Automated Approach" technique been used.....an S-92 or EC-225 (or aircraft with comparable capability) could have used the technique to arrive at the Thresh Hold fully controlled by the Autopilot system with the pilots only having to monitor the autopilot.

The Technology is here.....when will the Authority acknowledge that by allowing the use of it in daily operations?

This is another Shield that needs dropping.....thus providing for timely acceptance of new but proven technology.

[Fareastdriver]

jimf671
An important point about the shorts and t-shirts territories is that many of these places are populated by smaller people.

You've obviously never flown out of Karratha, or Broome, or Truscott; and 85kgs Asians are getting quite common now.

[Ray Joe Czech]

Still a long way to go; a recent UK CNS pax of mine was 330lbs.

[Outwest]

and 85kgs Asians are getting quite common now

since McDonalds, Burger King and KFC showed up ;)

[212man]

Jimmy 16, rest assured FSF ALAR Briefing Note 7.2 formed part of my initial study of CDFA for helos and is now part of this weekend's revision homework

Gad to hear that. Maybe the P-ILS function in the BHL 92 sim will be put to good use after all:ok:

[Jimmy 16]

This discussion about approaches offshore is interesting in itself, but this thread is about an accident that happened on an approach to an landbase airport with "standard" approach aids, published procedures, a runway, reliable wx reports etc .

IMHO this should be considered as any other Approach / Landing Accident, fixed or rotary wing, unless of course there was a major technical issue.
(and I am not in the blame business, should anyone think so...)

[HeliComparator]

Not being familiar with the S92, is the P-ILS constrained by the database only to use approaches already in the database, or can the pilot make the P-ILS to anywhere? If the latter, I suspect the CAA won't like it.

SAS, there is currently no auto-rig approach for the 225 but it is in development I believe. However, the obstacle nature of the offshore environment, and the fact that the landing point may not be in a fixed location (FPSOs swinging at anchor etc) makes me nervous about any move away from using radar. Plus, the hard bit is not the instrument approach itself, its the visual segment from the Mapt to the deck that is tricky, especially at night in marginal weather.

[SASless]

HC,

What is to preclude the use of Radar in conjunction with the "Automated Approach" to ensure obstacle clearance exactly as is done now?

How many Platforms or Semi's "swing about"?

Do we not have to be concerned about mobile obstacles today....which is no different than it would be for an Automated Approach.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, if the radar shows that the obstacles (and thinking in particular about the structure of the destination) is still going to be sufficiently far away at MAPt, no problem.

However for example if it transpires during the approach that the "fly by" is going to be too close, the crew have to notice, then decide whether or not to break off from the procedure and fly a manual go-around, continue manually but adjust the heading a bit, or to press on coupled and hope for the best. All a bit messy! If the world of offshore installations was a straightforward one it would be fine, but as we know it isn't. And we don't want to have 1 sort of approach for most installations and a different sort for a few.

I am not totally against the idea, its just not a universal panacea and would need to be introduced carefully and thoughtfully.

Databases for airfield approaches are fine because they tend not to move, and obstacles are controlled by safeguarding. Not so offshore, where the database reflects the notional situation extant when the database was created, but not necessarily the current situation

[SASless]

If you read up on the PHI/FAA concept....it is not one size fits all.

Also...why fly a manual go around?

At DA....nothing seen....tell the AP to do the Missed Approach....and if need be fly around and repeat the Approach. Why....revert to Hands On....when you have the Auto Pilot available and capable of doing anything you tell it to do?

Instead of looking for generic ways to argue against the concept....try to figure out how to make it work....as surely there are ample place/situations it can be used.

After all....we have advanced from the Whirlwind days haven't we?

[HeliComparator]

I don't know about the SK idea, but IIRC the EC / CAA idea is to make the coupled go-around straight ahead. Hence if there is an obstacle detected late, clearance becomes dependant on the RoC and its height.

I am not being obstructive, but new ideas and technologies need to be carefully considered in the real world, as well as the design office and flight test world. One problem is that the designers and testers often have little idea about the nature of the end user's world.

[SASless]

Why does the approach point have to be down wind of the deck.....and not offset as it is now?

Also, with the average winds on the North Sea....what would the GS be for an Approach flown at Vy?

Could Wind Speed be one of the factors used to calculate Approach Minima?

Some days....with 30-45 knots of wind....GS would be very slow thus granting a much larger margin for the Missed Approach.

[pumaboy]

About the the size of the cabins in SP familiy

I don't see the logic in reducing the number of seats in the EC225 or the L2 what is the point.

First of all the Operators/ Oil companies would not enterain it would be too expensive to operate a helicopter certified to fly with 19 seats but only fly with 14 it the operating cost's would be suicidle.:ugh:
Then it would just as easy to operate a fleet of AW139's instead and the cabin size in these sardine cans is even smaller,

With regards to the difference with the S92 and SP familiy I would rather much in an emergency escape from a SP because of the emergency exits you have a large jettison door either side larger escape windows

What do you have in a 92?

The argument is we as human beings are larger then how can you escape from the windows from the 92? :eek:

[HeliComparator]

Yes I suppose there could be an argument for including wind speed as a modifying factor for the MAPtt, however the more complicated you make it, the more you create the possibility for error and or loss of SA.

Personally I think the (coupled) approach should be orientated so the the MAPt is directly downwind of the helideck, thus the last bit is flown into wind, not slightly out of wind as at present. In the old days without MFDs having everything overlayed, it could be hard to see what the ground track was relative to radar obstacles, but these days its easy.

[Jimmy 16]

I have been in the North Sea helicopter business for a few years, including safety management. The saying in Norway then was that the British way of looking at safety was to protect people post accident.
The Norwegian approach was to not get the aircraft get wet in the first place.
Comments?

[albatross]

This thread has certainly opened a lot of doors which need to be looked behind.
Perhaps as some have said we do need to look at our processes as a whole.

On an Offshore approach I prefer to descend and drive as I like to be stable at my DA before the offset. No descent to stop just a climb and turn to initiate in the event of a miss.

Onshore I like to be at DA slightly before the MAP.


If you are going to use a constant rate of descent to arrive exactly at your Missed Approach Point you will have to initiate your overshoot above your DA because you can't dip below a DA as you can a DH on an ILS.

Just my two cents.

Congratulations to all for efforts towards keeping this thread civil.
Some good concepts are being discussed.

212man check your PMs.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

What happened to airwave45?

He hasn't been on here for a couple of days, he added some good value to the thread.

[SASless]

Pumaboy....without meaning to be condescending to your "youth".....there was a time on the North Sea that despite having 12-14 seats.....we oft times could only legally offer 1-2 seats on some runs due to the fuel requirements imposed by the CAA.

That occurred primarily because some feckwit bid the contract with the exact wrong aircraft for the length of run required.

Flying at reduced seating was not an uncommon thing in the old days due to aircraft payload limitations caused by Power limitations.

What does matter in this conversation is the Safety issues "over crowded" cabins and the lack of room for Passengers to quickly, safely, and easily gain exit from the cabin during an emergency particularly ditchings and crashes that do not afford an orderly, paced, evacuation of an up right aircraft devoid of sea water.

The Passengers have raised legitimate issues that must be addressed.

Some Pilots have also noted some issues with the Emergency exits/Door Operation on the SP family. I am sure the S-92 has some issues in the minds of the passengers.

Again, if we are to improve Safety....we have to be prepared to critically review the existing situation from every point of view.

[dakarman]

With regards the removal of seats from my point of view, I see it fairly simply as the amount of volume in a space. If you remove a number of seats from any void, you not only remove the space taken up by the people but the volume and shape of the seats as well, thereby making considerably more room for those remaining to manoeuvre particularly in the event of an emergency.

In the unfortunate event of an inverted ditching - as can be witnessed in the dunker, people will move in all axes in the space available. More space (i.e. S92 cabin vs SP cabin) you would think ought to make it easier to manoeuvre therefore escape. It would be most interesting to see scientific proving of this.

I do definitely agree on window size assisting with escape particularly with the larger waistline and the doors on the SP's assisting in this although there is still the issue of the doors being opened normally and blocking the forward exits as discussed earlier in the thread despite posted warnings.

With regards the cost to operators and oil companies this would clearly be an issue however we then bring the debate back to cost vs safety - assuming of course that less seats would be safer. I was also recently informed (and I could easily be wrong here - as a bear at the back of the bus) that many contracts are based on flights not passenger numbers which would minimise the cost impact of less seats. There is also the fact that many current flights are not full - even in cases with oil companies already limiting POB to 14 in some cases.

A further 'feeling of safety' I would like to mention is access / egress with the current seating. It quite simply feels much safer (i.e. quicker and easier - therefore probably quicker to escape) to walk on and off standing nearly upright (S92) vs the bend in half and twist sideways around required in the SP class - just try getting into the forward seat of a SP in offshore gear with others already seated.

My final comment returns to comfort. Why should we have to put up with extremely uncomfortable positions getting to and from work? Why should I have to be jammed in a small space with my knees wedged against another person for a couple of hours? Are we so bad now that human comfort and dignity is ruled out to save pennies?

These are my opinions on the preference for S92 and dislike of all SP's despite potential technical benefits (EC225)

[HeliComparator]

True, although given the choice I would rather put my efforts into stopping the aircraft arriving in the water in the first place, than making evacuation easier afterwards. Yes you can do both, but in reality resources are finite.

[jimf671]

... I would rather put my efforts into stopping the aircraft arriving in the water in the first place ...

So would I. However, if nobody is willing to get in the back there is not much point.

[SASless]

Jim....Shame! Confusing the issue with facts.....grossly unfair!

[Ray Joe Czech]

I don't think it is unfair. I can't see any way of empirically working out if it is less safe having 19 in the back of a 225 than 14 when it is upside down at night in cold NE seas. There aren't enough data sets out there. Even if there were and the data said no (which, frankly, I seriously doubt it would) you still may not be able to sell that to the offshore workforce.

Finally, as we are talking about emergency egress from upside down helicopters, how did we ever arrive at a position in our industry where our passengers have rebreather equipment and the pilots don't? Oh yes, I forgot how the industry works: we'll need a couple of drowned pilots first before we can get that one approved.

[pumaboy]

SAS I here what you say and you were right in the old days there was less in the back due to power restrictions.

If escape window's are an issue with the AS332L2 could EC not be approached and re-design the L2 cabin windows and make them as the EC225 cabin window's and doors thus making feel more safer for the guy's in the back, just a thought !!

Another point that needs to be addressed since you bring up safety is the HUET training :

In this thread there has been points raised when an a/c enters the water at speed a number of offshore workers would be unprepaired for a quick evacuation and there has been points raised at when the HUET enters the water it is at a slower speed but then makes it unrealistic for the people in the back, but still find it difficult to escape the HUET.

Do you not think then stricter rules need to be applied so when the HUET does enters the water it enters at a speed a little more aggresive so when it does happen in real life the people in the back would be more prepaired, after all in real life you only get one chance but in training there chances to get it right and divers to help you get out.

This maybe why offshore workers don't have the faithe in the transport that is provided to them to get them to work and nothing to do with the equipment that is being used to transport the offshore workers but are using the equipment as an argument.

I would like to hear others opinion's on this topic it is an important issue I think needs to be addressed so the guy's in the back are more comfortable travelling to work and feel safeafter all 4 people did not make it out safe in the last accident.

SAS you are 100% right safety is an issue then it needs to be addressed so everybody feels safer.l

[Dma]

I agree with reducing pax load; but not with reducing available seats.

What happens when a platform has to be evacuated? Max seats available would be preferable, no?

[Bravo73]

re HUET - the only realistic training, IMHO, would be to carry out evacuations with 19 pax.

I'm aware, however, that most HUET training rigs can't accommodate so many 'trainees' at the same time.

[SASless]

Pilots do not have Escape Breathing Devices?:ugh:

What enlightened thinking lead to that decision?

Sounds to me like some Management folk need to ride the Dunker in ice cold water, in the dark, after someone knocks them silly while having to deal with an absolutely chock a block cabin to deal with.....perhaps there would be a change in heart over some of these policies!

Just like flying with NVG's at night.....once you use them you would not fly nights again without them......works the same with Bailout Bottles too! Those breathes the bottle provides makes all the difference in the world.

But...what the heck we once flew with White Shirts, black trousers, and Jumpers for survival kit too didn't we.

[thelearner]

I have been watching this thread over the last week, and felt no need to post as airwave45 and diginagain have been doing an excellent job along with some others.

I don't want the discomfort in the back to take any focus away from finding out what happened, and what can be done to make sure this accident is never repeated in future - I would rather the effort went into keeping the helicopters out of the water.
The effort also needs to concentrate on why we have put 5 aircraft in the water in the last 4 years with loss of 20 life's.

I have been on helicopters in the back for around 21 out of the last 30 years, shore based now, last flight at start of this year, but around 14 years recently in the mk1, mk2 and latterly EC225 prior to grounding. Average flight time in the 225 on a good day 1 hr 50, so in the back for a while, and it is not very comfortable, and I have grown also over the years.

I don't think as many as you think are unwilling to get on the puma again, well certainly not the EC225 from speaking to some of my colleagues, although I'm not offshore so cannot gauge the full feelings of the workforce.

You would be surprised though how many people fly who are really scared of flying in a helicopter, and I have always admired these guys - don't know how they do it.
Personally, I have always accepted that when flying in a helicopter for a long time over water there is a risk, albeit small you will end up in it. I also think that sometimes you may not easily get out, but if a controlled ditching on a calm day you have a good chance. I accepted that risk, I chose where to work because it is a good job with good rewards, although the helicopter is not the only risk we accept.

HUET training - again you underestimate how difficult many already find the existing training - which is not fully realistic, some people dread doing that training, some struggle and don't like the rebreather and some simply are frightened of water and being disorientated. I find it OK luckily, and think rebreather has made it easier.

I agree you guys should also have one, but remember you have a door that looks quite appealing to me if we land on the water.

Also I hope when the report comes out, if it finds pilot error there is no witchhunt, there is no way they deliberately did this, and there will quite likely be other factos to take into account - I note you guys get quite busy at this time?

[jimf671]

... I can't see any way of empirically working out if it is less safe having 19 in the back of a 225 than 14 when it is upside down at night in cold NE seas. There aren't enough data sets out there.

These are just a first few thoughts about this.

I think you would start by using the available sets of real data, then add to that with work in the pool, and use all of that to set up the parameters of a computer simulation. Once you have run enough computer simulations and identified some possible good and bad practices, go back to the pool and test these wet. Use the results of the further pool work to refine the computer simulation and then you are probably starting to produce something useful.

The real data will not all be from inversion survivors. The relationship between seat position, injury and outcome in the likes of Cougar91 would be relevant. The decision-making of survivors of ditchings who didn't even get their feet wet would be too.

--------------------

Somebody else said 14. My thoughts are that a reduction of one or two, if sufficiently well thought through, could make a major difference if done along with changes in layout and other factors that prove relevant.

At the moment, I am not sure we even have a grasp of what is relevant.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I wonder if reducing the pax to 16 would have improved the survival chances of the fatalities in this accident.

The oil companies might not like the extra costs but they can afford it.

[check]

I believe that we have a situation where the tail is wagging the dog. The SLF are attacking the wrong thing, they should be attacking their employers not the aircraft.
The Oil Companies put out a tender document which sets out the requirements and the operators submit their bids utilising their existing fleet or if there is an age limit, a new type. In most cases the cheapest bid wins. The range, payload etc. Are all taken into consideration, so if a helicopter bid using say 14 seats against 18/19 seats he will go out of business. Everything is driven by the Oil Companies and while over the years they have raised standards they still watch the pennies.
I have served on a number of committies in my time and most were constructive, but there were times when it felt we were trying to get blood out of a stone.
Any changes have to come from the customer not the operator. It has been mentioned in previous posts that the budget for helicopter transport is miniscule within the big picture, but for the individual who controls it it is large and any chages have to be justified from higher up.
If enough pressure from the workforce or if some posts are to be believed lack of workforce may contribut to changes.
What I don't think will change in the near future are the helicopter types already in service.

[pohm1]

Ye Olde Pilot


I wonder if reducing the pax to 16 would have improved the survival chances of the fatalities in this accident.


Unlikely, there were only 16 pax on board.

P1

[pumaboy]

I don't see the oil companies paying the extra costs operating a EC225 with 16 seats instead of 19 and said by P1 I don't think it would make a difference 16 guy's in the back in the L2 incident 12 survived.

I think it is more the training and the funding for HUET training that needs to be addressed as mentioned in my previous posts.

Maybe change the seating arrangements instead of having rear facing seats, have all seats front facing in all SP helicopters just like the S92.

But I see one problem getting to and from the seats would be more diificult.

Just a suggestion but not an easy solution.

Maybe the guys in the back would feel more comfortable.

But someone has to pay for these mods and rightly so the oil companies do have money enough and maybe they should contribute more to safety.

[OffshoreSLF]

Just a few thoughts on the SP from someone who has been retired from flying offshore for a few years now.

When I started, most flights were by S61, although I did have a couple of flights in a S58. (Definitely giving my age away now!) At one time when B Cal were in operation, we flew in Bell 214ST's.

Helicopter flying is not the most comfortable way to travel at the best of times, but that's just inherent in the way they are. I always thought that the S61 was as comfortable as it could be, and never had any problems. I also liked the 214ST, as it was just one big cabin, and it knocked quite a bit of time off the flight to Forties.

When the SP came along, I never really took to them because I found them very cramped and uncomfortable. If you were in a window seat, and got a big guy sitting next to you, there was no room to move, so gawd knows what would have happened if we'd had to evacuate. It was just as bad if the big guy was in the window seat. I remember one flight where I just managed to get one bum-cheek on the seat as that was all the room that was left. I was a bit sore by the time we reached Aberdeen!

If there is a move to reduce the number of pax, then can I suggest that a new design of seat, a bit more comfortable, and more room between them be installed.

As for the HUET, I think that you can take realism too far. I did the RGIT one quite a few times, and also the Australian one in Fremantle, and can say that I never had any bother with doing it. I would say that it's probably about the right level as it is.

I'll never be on another helicopter, but if I did have to go offshore for some obscure reason, I'd have no qualms whatsoever about getting on one of whatever flavour. Irrespective of the recent incidents/accidents, I still have great faith in the professionalism of you guys who take us to/from or place of work.

[keithl]

I've posted here, so far, as an instrument procedures specialist and well within my "comfort zone". This post is outside that zone as I'm taking a somewhat wider view, but I want to summarise what I've read (and heard) so far.

When Frank Doran, MP, called for a general "Piper Alpha" type enquiry, my instinctive response was that he was capitalising on this accident for personal publicity. Sorry, I'm just suspicious of politicians. And posturing trade union leaders, come to that.

However, this thread has revealed a whole range of topics that need to be addressed. Cabin crowding, instrument approach techniques, Norwegian-style workforce involvement in offshore practices, HUET training quality, crew training and aircraft capability have all been raised.

I think this breadth of issues does justify a wider inquiry. These seem to be areas capable of improvement and perhaps Mr Doran is right about the way to tackle it.

I don't normally do polemic. I'm a bit nervous now about your responses...

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Check and pumaboy just beat me to it. Virtually anything is possible:

You want fewer pax per flight, or lower Tq settings, or more in depth maintenance between flights? No problem.

New helicopters every 5 years? No problem.

More training for crews? No problem.

More training for pax? No problem.

However, the Big But: all that costs money.

And if the oil companies aren't willing to pay, then you still have a problem.

[pumaboy]

Then oil companies have to be made aware of these issues after all they should also take some responceabilty away from the operators they are with the ones the cash the ones that tender the contracts.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

The Norwegian strategy has emerged in most of the radio and tv interviews.

[Grenville Fortescue]

The Norwegian strategy has emerged in most of the radio and tv interviews.

Norwegian strategy relating to what specifically?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

The fact they have a better safety record than the UK in terms of fatalities.

[HeliComparator]

On the subject of pax numbers and evacuation, and putting a side for a moment any perceptual as opposed to factual considerations, firstly, the last N Sea accident where escape was a factor was the N Cormorant in 1992. I can't think of an survivable ditchings / crashes where people died from not being able to get out, in the interim? 21 years ago.

This latest could be in that category, but so far we don't know why most got out but some didn't. With the injuries reported, it was clearly a fairly hard impact and perhaps those unfortune ones who didn't make it were incapacitated. Or maybe they froze, gasped water or maybe something else went wrong such as they couldn't unbuckle or inflated their jackets inside. Or maybe the thrust of this debate is correct, they were all in middle seats and their exits were blocked by those at the window seats. We just don't know yet, if we ever will. Therefore I think its far too soon to be talking about reducing pax numbers as a safety initiative.

If we did, we would have to accept that the increased flying rate would require new pilots etc, and would inevitably reduce the time before the next accident. Would it be worth it for 1 accident in 21 years?

We also have to bear in mind that there are not just survivable arrivals in the water, and unsurvivable ones. Its a sliding scale. So you can put a lot of effort into making a copycat of this accident survivable, only to have the next one just a bit worse and hence partially unsurvivable again. You can't win that one.

Alternatively, we could reduce pax numbers, good for PR, keep them happy, and never mind that the logic and science doesn't add up. In other words, con them. Even though I have been a little disparaging about the Facebook pax, I think we owe them more than that. If we are going to reduce pax numbers, its only for comfort.

[Special 25]

Many thanks to DakarMan and TheLearner for posting some straight forward and honest feelings from the offshore world. Makes a nice change after some of the comments made in the media and on this and other forums.

SP cabin cramped - agreed.

EC225 I would think would give the best evacuation options for any offshore helicopters with two jettison-able main cabin doors and each window physically big enough for someone of my size to get through.

I've never been a fan of the S92 cabin from an evacuation point of view, but accept that it is a much more passenger friendly environment. Not quite as good as the S61 however!

Bearing in mind a Boeing 737 has 130 passengers and 8 exits (sometimes 6).

All aircraft are tested to ensure that their evacuation procedures meet the minimum requirements, although these tests are impossible to simulate accurately with volunteers in lab conditions. The best test I ever saw was where they offered diminishing cash incentives for the first passengers getting out.

Also, worked in Norway and the UK. Not familiar with that many differences. Both sides of the North Sea operate very professionally in my opinion.

[Grenville Fortescue]

The fact they have a better safety record than the UK in terms of fatalities.

Hmm .. I fell into this 'trap' near the beginning of the thread. BALPA and others also seem to have picked-up on this agenda but - is there (as yet) a clearly defined strategy associated with this lower rate of fatality?

I am in support of an independent North Sea Operations Review as per suggestions made by Mechta and others and which looks at all aspects of offshore operations in order to determine those factors which clearly reveal examples of best practice.

[VP-F__]

this might have been covered already and I missed it, apologies if I have.

Returning to the thoughts on flotation options the current method is sponson mounted inflatable floats as standard and they seem perfectly adequate providing the ditching is relatively textbook along with kind seas.

I think I saw someone mention high floats on a wasp meaning that you would be underwater with potentially a still spinning disc to emerge into....!

As I say this may have been mentioned already but would it not be logical to have a float mounted somewhere high up on the side of the main door? My thinking being that if the ditching is a good one it would not be needed, however if you have a ditching like this one, or the sea state is not at all helpful then it will at least keep one side up, preferably the one with the big door allowing more time for escape and a reduced chance of drowning in the process.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

I think I saw someone mention high floats on a wasp meaning that you would be underwater with potentially a still spinning disc to emerge into....!

I also wondered about this but assumed they must have resolved this before fitting them to the Wasp. I'm sure the rotors stop fairly quickly and if they contact the water, even more quickly!

The best suggestion so far was the one from SASless to go back to amphibious helicopters! :ok: