AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

[The Ancient Geek]

A quick analogy for those not familiar with statistics and the laws of chance.
There are 52 variables in a standard pack of cards - what are the chances of getting the same shuffle twice ?

If each shuffle takes 30 seconds there will be one identical repeat somewhere within about 5 billion years. The two identical shuffles could be 5 billion years apart or only a few minutes apart, we has no way of knowing this but we know that it will only happen once.

Aviation accidents are rare and the causes are diverse, each accident can involve multiple factors. We will never be able to predict them, we can only investigate causes and mitigate known risks. If two similar accidents occur in the same area this is essentially meaningless unless we can determine a precise common cause, anything else is just random chance.

[industry insider]

Bristow 332L and CHC 332L, L1 and EC225 are flying in Australia as normal today (Monday)

Bristow 332L and L1 and EC225s will be flying in Norway on Monday.

[airwave45]

I'll drag you back to the point I made earlier.
UK helicopter ops have shown, beyond all reasonable doubt, that we can't do it as well as the Noggies.
Looking at the stats online, we have the same crash frequency as the Americans.
That is appalling.
(Given that the Americans use some single engine, single pilot configurations and almost exclusively in the UK it is heavy / medium twins with 2 crew)

The "average" bear these days will do 24 to 26 flights a year.
Back in the day we used to shuttle to work once offshore.
That would ramp it up to 3-400 flights a year.

Some of the crusty old guys in the back have spent more time in helicopters than the guys driving the bus.
Trying to explain to the bears that there are a myriad of different faults which could cause an incident just doesn't wash. They neither know nor care about gyroscopic presecion / or the new offshore QNH setting procedure.

The guys _Know_ the UK incident rate is terrible, they are yet to be convinced that UK helicopter operators know what they are doing.
All they see is a drive to get the Puma back online.
What they also see is a slew of them killing their buddies.

You can intelectually pontificate as to the cause of this latest prang all you like, but the bears are very, very, very unhappy.
If they feel that (and it looks like you are) rushing them back into SLF mode, you are likely to get their backs up further.

As to the HUET training, back in the day (again, I'm old, it happens if you are lucky) we used to routinely kill people in the pool doing their HUET training.
I'm impressed the Newfies are making it more realistic, but they'll end up killing people in the pool too.
Hence the reason the windows are huge in the huet trainers, the wave and wind machines have been switched off.
As to rebreathers . . . has anyone actually tried to get through a standard window wearing all that gear ? throw in a slightly larger framed bear possibly one who has a sedentary job offshore.
You are in a place where all the safety gear might be preventing the pax actually getting out of the aircraft.

[satsuma]

If two similar accidents occur in the same area this is essentially meaningless unless we can determine a precise common cause, anything else is just random chance.

Common themes have been alluded to:

there are commercial pressures to "trim" towards the basic regulations rather than build the "gold plated" standard

a culture of not bothering too much

OEM briefings identified that torque settings were higher in the North Sea than in other areas of the world, so stress loads were higher

[letmein]

Non-UK Offshore pilot here, 1000's hours on the L's..

I have to say that I am surprised to see such an extreme level of anger, fear, despair and distrust expressed by the workforce,
particularly on the FB 'destroy the Super Puma' page and online petition.

At some point, the authorities will need to step back and look at the big picture.
Engaging the end user in a meaningful dialogue would be a start.

[high spirits]

How does offshore helicopter ops in uk stack up when it comes to 'deaths per 10,000 flying hours'? That's the statistic that was used to assess risk in military flying. It would probably make it look safe relative to airline travel, or using the roads etc

[HeliComparator]

HS - much safer than road travel, not as safe as airline travel.

[HeliComparator]

Witnesses reporting a sudden loss of power - whilst this should be taken with a pinch of salt in the short term, I was pondering possible causes.

In the DECU there are some bits of software whose sole purpose is to make the engine run down to idle under certain fault conditions. This came about following the Norwegian Norne accident mentioned earlier in this thread. I'm trying to remember (since I've been away from the L2 since 2006) what the triggers are:
Double Nf sensor failure
Faulty PPNg signal
Major DECU hardware failure

Anything else? I think there is, but can't remember. Anyone out there with their L2 groundschool notes?

Obviously it would need to happen to both engines simultaneously, so a common trigger would have to be involved which at first sight seems unlikely.

On the other hand, when one engine runs down, the other is put under the sort of stress it never normally sees, especially after CHC's policy of not conducting OEI training in the aircraft due to freewheel concerns.

As an aside, this is the sort of area where technological progress helps. On the 225, any of a double N1 sensor failure, double N2 sensor failure and pretty much any double failure you can think of, has no major impact on power. Even a complete governing failure (which has never happened) results in a fuel flow freeze, a much more benign failure than the engine running down to idle.

[heli1]

Over 800 Super Pumas built....more than 4.5 million flying hours.....operating in North Sea UK sector for more than 30 years....lead aircraft with more than 40,000 hours....and flying with 100 operators world wide.
Lets get real, ignore the crap, and put this in perspective.

[Nf stable]

HC..... (pauses, taking deep breath)... Honestly???

[HeliComparator]

I see Tim Ripley is spouting absolute rubbish in the P&J this morning. "There is a slim possibility that the pilot may have pressed the wrong buttons which would have led to the engine cutting out" is just one of his daft ideas!

Is he related to Jim by any chance?

[DMackie]

Over 800 Super Pumas built....more than 4.5 million flying hours.....operating in North Sea UK sector for more than 30 years....lead aircraft with more than 40,000 hours....and flying with 100 operators world wide.
Lets get real, ignore the crap, and put this in perspective.

The problem is in a little over 4 years 5 ( FIVE ) super pumas have ended up in the UK North Sea with 20 dead.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Over 800 Super Pumas built....more than 4.5 million flying hours.....operating in North Sea UK sector for more than 30 years....lead aircraft with more than 40,000 hours....and flying with 100 operators world wide.
Lets get real, ignore the crap, and put this in perspective.

Well said.

Sudden loss of power?

We simply don't know what happened yet and pilot error may well be a factor but in my gut I don't think this is a pilot error accident. Very untechnical I know and I may well be proved wrong but that's my inclination at the moment.

Does anyone know when the AAIB are likely to make any kind of initial statement?

[HeliComparator]

I imagine it will be quite soon, next few days. A brief look at the FDR data should be able to show mechanical failure vs pilot error, and the approximate nature of any mechanical failure (engines, transmission etc) and with the pressure on the nation's oil industry I'm sure they will give us a clue as soon as they can.

[bondu]

DMackie

Come on, lets get the facts right, shall we!
Of the five incidents you refer to, one was CFIT, two were precautionary landings/ditchings and one was a catastrophic failure of the gearbox. The fifth, we don't know yet!
The BBC News website is still referring to the EC225 ditchings last year as 'crashes'. If we follow that analogy, the BA Airbus that lost it's engine cowlings a few months ago, should be designated as a 'crash' not a precautionary landing! Just because the Airbus crew could fly around to reduce fuel before returning to Heathrow, does that make it really any different to the EC225 crews carrying their landings?
Four fatalities are four too many. But as HC has posted earlier, more than four people are killed on Aberdeenshire roads every week and no one really cares, except the relatives.
As a pilot currently flying the AS332L, I am affected by this tragic accident, as I'm sure are all the North Sea pilots. I want to know what happened just as much as anyone else. But let the AAIB do their job and publish an interim report before people start making ill informed decisions.

Bondu

[mary meagher]

Seems to me as a "plank driver" that the only things holding up a heli are the rotating wings, so if the nut holding that assembly together fails, it doesn't make a very good glider.....

I also think that as even the best assembly may develop problems, if I were required to sit in one of those busses to go to my work, I would be a lot happier if the flotation gear was improved.

[dmanton300]

"Unfortunately, in order not too scare the living daylights out of the work force, the dunker is a very gentle affair in a warm swimming pool. I can assure you the military version is much more realistic but half the workforce wouldn't pass the course. Where do you draw the line of realism against risk? "

A question if I may? In 1988 I did the dunker course at Yeovilton when I was an apprentice with Normalair Garrett. It was a "fun day out" as part of the activities of the apprentice and students association. I distinctly remember there being two north sea workers who did the course with us, and two trainee Jungly pilots as well. Now, assuming they were there "for real" and we were just filling empty seats in the dunker, is there any reason to suppose I didn't undergo the dunkings just as they did? No allowances could be made for a bunch of civvies having a bit of fun when their were real trainees taking part could they?

I remember it being tremendous fun (because my life wasn't on the line!) and remember doing the dunking upright with lights on, inverted with lights on and inverted in darkness. I also remember with some pride being given a thumbs up by a safety diver when one of our managers panicked in the inverted scenario and pushed past me to get out, when I paused to allow him to egress in front of me.

I only ask out of interest at the comment about how much more realistic the military one is over the civilian one, has something changed since my fun day out? I don't remember it being particularly onerous as long as you kept your head. . . all allowances made for the fact that I may have only participated in a part of the course and not the full monty of course.

[HeliComparator]

But Mary, a helicopter can glide and land safely at virtually zero touchdown speed - a definite advantage over a FW especially one with 1 engine! And no, there isn't a nut holding the rotors on, that is a popular myth. They are actually held on by Araldite.

[African Eagle]

Seems to me as a "plank driver" that the only things holding up a heli are the rotating wings, so if the nut holding that assembly together fails, it doesn't make a very good glider.....


That's why the nut holding the rotor on is called the "Jesus Nut", named so for the benefit of Rotoronin and the Darwin crowd.

Regarding gliding, have you ever seen these?

SsBhE20Y1sY

[African Eagle]

And no, there isn't a nut holding the rotors on, that is a popular myth. They are actually held on by Araldite.

Mary, that's not quite true as many (but not all) helicopters do have a nut which holds it all together:

http://static.ddmcdn.com/gif/helicopter-rotor.gif

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/79/Jesus_nut.jpg/481px-Jesus_nut.jpg

Jesus nut - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesus_nut)

[Little cloud]

Bibby Polaris, dive support/heavy lift ship still on site but has moved to a location south of Grut Ness which suggests they are possibly now recovering the tail section and searching for any other parts on the seabed. Makes sense to do everything in one visit with a ship of that capability, I'm assuming sidescan, multibeam, ROV's and possibly divers onboard.

Live Ships Map - AIS - Vessel Traffic and Positions (http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/default.aspx?mmsi=232585000&centerx=-1.346983&centery=59.88055&zoom=10&type_color=9)

For anyone getting a compressed map and big adverts on that link, 'refresh' or F5 expands the map and pushes down the ads.

[HeliComparator]

AE yes, OK some small helicopters do have such a nut, but not the sort we are talking about. Glad you are not disagreeing about the araldite though!

[TipCap]

Well said Bondu.

Lets wait until the AAIB come up with some ideas. With luck the CVR, IHUMS and FDR with the 2 pilots will show exactly what happened. There is so much speculation going on and I know we are a "Rumo(u)r" network but come on guys lets be sensible and not take cheap shots at each other

It was nice to see someone from the industry :ok: albeit with another hat on talking some sense on TV. I even saw it in Wales!!

TC

[bondu]

Cheers TC!!

Hope you are enjoying your well earned retirement!

bondu

[Tractor_Driver]

HC.

That only applies to European helicopters. American ones use Gluit.

[Valkyrie1500]

With servicing and weather problems it's quite normal to fall behind normal scheduling and then there will be catch up for the next few days, so it can be quite normal for flights to be leaving at that time of the night to various offshore problems. The metar was fine but I for one disliked going out at night particularly in the winter. 0 degree isotherm low, rough seas, strong winds, heavy rain, reduced vis due to snow. As for summer all the above less 0 degree and snow but factor in fog, the North Sea crews earn their pay. Well done to you all and take care.

[mary meagher]

Right, guys, I've already placed my order for Araldite Super Strong Epoxy Adhesive with Amazon....
And we glider pilots fasten our wings on with electrician's tape. I just wish when they put the gliders away they wouldn't leave the tape wadded up on the grass for somebody else to tidy up....

Back to my earlier post; it would be a comfort to the pax to improve the inflatable flotation devices so more likely to keep the fus right side up in the water.

[bondu]

Hi SAS,

An extract from an article I wrote earlier this year:

"The Safety Regulation Group (SRG) of the UK CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) published a paper in December 2005 entitled “Summary Report on Helicopter Ditching and Crashworthiness Research”, (CAA Paper 2005/06). In this report, the SRG used a number of other reports from 1984 to 2003, which had been commissioned by the CAA. The main conclusions of the 2005 report were that:-
• the testing done so far was inadequate as the waves tanks produced ‘regular’ rather than ‘irregular’ waves;
• float scoops fitted to emergency floats would enhance stability ‘at minimal costs’;
• additional high-level flotation devices to prevent total inversion should be fitted;
• the upper practical capsize limit for helicopters lies in the region of SS5 or SS6, but there is a significant risk of ditching in seas greater than SS6 in some areas of the operation (e.g. the northern North Sea);
• sea conditions should be defined in terms of a significant wave height, zero crossing wave period and wave spectrum shape;
• sea state steepness should be more rigorously defined.

Of the six findings of the CAA 2005 report listed above, five of them have not been acted upon:
• testing hasn’t been done using ‘irregular’ waves;
• float scoops haven’t been added;
• high-level floats haven’t been fitted;
• sea conditions are still not being defined as the report advised;
• wave ‘steepness’ hasn’t been addressed at all."

I fully agree with your point. But, alas, we have a 'regulator' in the UK which does nothing to enhance 'real' safety, only, as HC and others have posted, 'paper' safety. Just tick the boxes and rake in the money - who cares if people die.

bondu :ugh: :ugh: :ugh:

[Grenville Fortescue]

But, alas, we have a 'regulator' in the UK which does nothing to enhance 'real' safety, only, as HC and others have posted, 'paper' safety. Just tick the boxes and rake in the money - who cares if people die.

Then it's time for operators and clients to get together and address these issues comprehensively.

I suggest that one begins with the outstanding five recommendations of Bondu's report as well as implementing any valid recommendations made in the Sintef report (http://www.sintef.no/upload/Teknologi_og_samfunn/Sikkerhet%20og%20p%C3%A5litelighet/Rapporter/SINTEF%20A15753%20Helicopter%20Safety%20Study%203%20_HSS-3_%20Main%20Report.pdf).

[HeliComparator]

I seem to recall that UK CAA started a research project on high level floats, but it was taken over by EASA and is still lurking in their corridors of power.

There is a lengthy report here:
https://www.easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/research/EASAfinalreport.pdf

It also gets a brief mention here:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/iacs/oiac/hlg/090112/pjanoiac1201.pdf


Whether anything will even happen though...

[TwoStep]

Bird strike cannot be discounted, if you remember the PHi S-76.

Press Release [November 24, 2010] - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2010/101124.html)

[AAKEE]

Didn't see anything in this thread about any elec failure, but according to svenska dagbladet website ( svd.se ) a Jim Nicholson, coordinator at RNLI did say something about total electrical failure ?
Might be only a wild guess or did he know facts before that statement ?


[Edit] Disregard. Found the same statement in English on another site, seems like Svenska Dagbladet took 'Loss of power' as loss of elec. guess they didn't do their homework.

[heliski22]

During my short time working out of Denes into the SNS, where night shuttles, with their additional inherent dangers are common, one the pilots there, a long serving and experienced hand as well as a senior training Captain, observed that "if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they'd stop night shuttling!"

The reality is that if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they would be doing the research on this (higher level floats) and anything else that warranted it to further reduce the dangers of offshore travel themselves and implementing their findings without waiting for the regulators to impose it upon them.

Instead, costs are cut to the bone in the interests of maintaining profits (and, by extension, investor dividend) and, where the regulatory imperative to do so is weak or non-existent, the interest in change simply isn't there. It's very hard not to have the feeling that a certain amount of loss of life, like "collateral damage" can be tolerated.

Union officials who are quick to criticise perceived shortcomings in the existing levels and quality of service might more profitably (for the welfare of their members) address their concerns to those who pay for the service and who, ultimately by the amount they spend on it, control the quality of that service.

22

[HeliComparator]

Its been brought to my attention that I made an uncalledfor sideswipe at CHC in an earlier post about OEI training. This was not my intention at all. My point was that, whereas previously we all conducted OEI training in the aircraft, we have all pretty much stopped doing that due to the increased use of Simulators. Its true that CHC stopped it completely whereas we didn't, but that differenc is trivial in the context of increased Sim usage. Some people should be less sensitive! Anyway, hopefully that entire point is a red herring.

[HeliComparator]

Mitchaa, I think the point about the birdstrike was that it moved both engine control switches to idle. So a possibility, but unlikely on an L2 because:

The windscreen on the S76 was a plastic replacement non-bird-strike-proof one (for weight saving), the L2 windscreen is a plastic/glass laminate that is pretty tough, plus the aircraft was probably not going very fast.

The engine control switches on the S76 were not guarded or locked. On the L2 the levers are locked in a gate that requires sideways movement to unlock.

[HeliStudent]

http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7284/8744002783_d383c196cf_b.jpg

[Flap 5]

I have a sneaky suspicion that this one is down to pilot error as there was certainly no catastrophic failure of the gearbox. Double engine failure just does not happen (Unless it ran out of fuel) so kind of rules that one out too. It never lost its tail, passengers would have reported a spin, main blade failure would have been violent. Leaves a flight control restriction I guess.



Strange deductions.

Gearbox failures can be of many types. It doesn't necessarily mean the aircraft instantly becomes a flying brick. The pilot may well have sufficient time to ditch.

Double engine failure could well happen with fuel starvation to both engines. Unlikely, but can not be ruled out with possible fuel supply problem to both engines.

Loss of tail rotor at speed does not result in a spin until the aircraft slows to below around 40 knots. A Bristow Tiger had just such a loss of tail rotor in the 80's and only lost control on final approach at Aberdeen when the speed came below around 40 knots.

So there are still many possibilities.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

The engine control switches on the S76 were not guarded or locked. On the L2 the levers are locked in a gate that requires sideways movement to unlock.

True, but the red fuel shut off levers aren't.

Still agree its very unlikely though. Plus, if it was a birdstrike, I'm sure the pilots might have mentioned it by now (!) and we'd have heard from EC declaring loudly that this was not a technical failure.

[aergid]

Bird Strike i think is a bit hard to swallow:= due the debris guards that are fitted to these Aircraft.

Until the AAIB give a verdict we can only guess.

RIP to the lads who lost their lives and thoughts with the family.:(

[fenland787]

RIP to the lads who lost their lives and thoughts with the family.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/sowee.gif
And the lass

[jimf671]

Loss of tail rotor at speed does not result in a spin until the aircraft slows to below around 40 knots. A Bristow Tiger had just such a loss of tail rotor in the 80's and only lost control on final approach at Aberdeen when the speed came below around 40 knots.

So, thinking about the tail rotor scenario, somebody talk us through this for a Super Puma on approach to Sumburgh at a few hundred feet with 150' rocky obstacles in the vicinity.

[LTNABZ]

a senior training Captain, observed that "if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they'd stop night shuttling!"

The reality is that if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they would be doing the research on this (higher level floats) and anything else that warranted it to further reduce the dangers of offshore travel themselves and implementing their findings without waiting for the regulators to impose it upon them.

Instead, costs are cut to the bone in the interests of maintaining profits (and, by extension, investor dividend) and, where the regulatory imperative to do so is weak or non-existent, the interest in change simply isn't there. It's very hard not to have the feeling that a certain amount of loss of life, like "collateral damage" can be tolerated.Absolutely. I don't work in aviation, but do work in the oil industry (and have made a few chopper flights over the years), in a specialisation similar to aviation inasmuch as we try to prevent future events and loss of life. This is a complex subject and the reality is that there comes a point where you have to stop spending money to make something safer, even in this sort of "zero-tolerance" scenario. The issue is, where is that point? It's just not possible to say "scrap the Puma", or "move to the S-92" without the evidence to prove that that is the solution.

What can be done is to have some deep(er!) conversation about where the risks are, what can be done to prevent or mitigate, what the impacts of those are, and who pays. There are and will always be grey areas. At the end of these analyses, you're absolutely right, there is usually an "acceptable" residual risk, in deaths per 10,000 years (or whatever criterion). Who decides this, and are the guys in the seats behind the bulkhead involved?

There are also issues to me around the contracting of the flight service; the typical method in the industry generally is competitive tender around a specification; if that is the model for chopper service, then presumably that specification has a certain element of minimum safety requirements as perceived by the oilco. I feel that the oilcos and chopper operators all genuinely desire safer operations, but by definition they are operating in the grey area at a point of diminishing safety returns for each extra buck spent, and until a certain "acceptable" level of protection (whatever protective system or monitoring etc) is mandated by law, it is unlikely to happen.

The regulatory authorities have to impose these requirements (be interesting to know from anyone whether Norway has a tighter regulatory regime, regardless of which aircraft they use*), and the oil cos have to knuckle under and put their money where their mouth is. In Aberdeen we daily live with edicts such as holding the handrail, lids on cups of hot coffee, reverse parking etc, but whilst they have their place, these are cheap measures. Someone has to mandate the expensive ones, imho.


(* btw, on my one trip offshore Norway, the life jackets were under our seats ! This unsettled me totally.)

[Flap 5]

So, thinking about the tail rotor scenario, somebody talk us through this for a Super Puma on approach to Sumburgh at a few hundred feet with 150' rocky obstacles in the vicinity.

You would only be at 40 knots or less when over the runway at Sumburgh. Not two miles offshore where this was reported to have happened.

[jimf671]

(* btw, on my one trip offshore Norway, the life jackets were under our seats ! This unsettled me totally.)

Which aircraft type? How big were the windows?

[fenland787]

Talking of regulators and their timely response to issues, did anyone hear the EASA chap on the Radio4 'Today' program being interviewed by John Humphrys this morning?

Was it just me or would anyone listening (who didn't know better of course) assume that EASA were a bit dithery, and out-of-the-loop on the whole business of Super Pumas and the North Sea?

Not sure anything about that interview would encourage me back on-board if I was feeling reluctant. Mr Humphrys was even in 'be nice' mode too!

[chcoffshore]

Lifejackets under your seats!!! What century was that? What complete :mad:

[thechopper]

Why is it that the same international O&G companies demand different operating standards depending on which country they operate in?
Like CAT A offshore above certain wave heights or at night; built in buoyancy
in passenger survival suits, etc.
Minimum experience levels for pilots, TCAS, EGWPS, all things off the shelf, but safety recommendations are not pushed for with any urgency.
Do they evaluate the cultural differences of different nationalities and see what they can get away with?
But maybe that's just too cynical.

[HeliComparator]

Surely its not unreasonable to have different standards according to global location, for example operations over hostile vs non-hostile terrain? Areas known for good weather, vs bad weather? Availability or not of all-weather SAR etc.

[SASless]

HC....I find your submission there is good reason to allow different standards in different locations around the World.

To the point most Days one can get by without Exposure Suits in the Gulf of Mexico or that one does not have to haul Fish in the baggage compartment on the North Sea.....I will agree with you on those kinds of issues.

However, when it comes to serious matters....Aircraft Performance, Survival Training, Simulator Training, Emergency Flotation, Engineering Practices, Flight Following, SAR.....I would suggest the Industry adopt an Industry Best Practices model and stick to it no matter where the Aircraft are being operated.

Just because one finds himself in Nigeria or Ghana....or Venezuela or any other place that does not require the same standards of safety....then the Operators and Oil Companies should import the higher standards.

It isn't about costs or sophistication....it is all about human lives.

Right now we sell ourselves too cheaply in that regard.

[heliski22]

It isn't about costs or sophistication....it is all about human lives.



What are the odds, I wonder, that somebody in a boardroom somewhere (or maybe several different boardrooms) hasn't already asked the question "How is the stock price holding up...?"

[Grenville Fortescue]

I would suggest the Industry adopt an Industry Best Practices model and stick to it no matter where the Aircraft are being operated.


This generally does happen to some extent and in some cases happens quite effectively. Most reputable oil companies require that the selected air service provider conform to OGP's Aircraft Management Guidelines (http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/390.pdf), even in the far flung corners of the earth.

There are, as always, exceptions however.

[nomorehelosforme]

What machines are going to be used to fill the considerable gaps left after the grounding of the Super Puma's?

[Anthony Supplebottom]

They are going to round-up herds of Bell 412's. :ok: ;)

[SASless]

So...I guess the Oil Company always goes for the newer and more expensive option.....and not one Oil Company executive has ever worried about the Share Price and what the Wall Street Analysts have to say?

How many of the "Non-Responsive" Bids get chunked into the Trash Can as a way of forcing the Operator to conform to the Tender Requirements?

[Brom]

I don't wish to speculate on the cause of this accident, but would like to add to a post someone made earlier on the thread concerning tail rotors. I believe the person who posted was referring to a tail rotor control failure where the helicopter (depending on many factors) could possibly begin to rotate below 40(ish)kts.
The other failure, tail rotor drive failure, as all Puma pilots know, requires an immediate entry into full auto and engines to idle or shutdown before landing. At low level that's not a nice position to be in. I suppose drive failure is a possibility, however, I'd rather wait for the outcome of the investigation than attribute the accident to any speculative cause.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Industry Insider, I feel your grief, I really do.

As I stated earlier, this tragedy can be turned to some good if it will be used by operators and clients to regroup and form a better understanding of what improvements can be made to helicopter operations overall.

However, regarding your comments, what I don't understand is - if your contracts are stipulating a maximum age on equipment, why are operators submitting proposals which incorporate the use of older ones? Wouldn't this invalidate their tender?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Publicity such as this, from a UK newspaper today, must be a concern for operators and oil companies.

How many more need to die? Anger of oil workers after latest Super Puma crash raises death toll to 20 in just four years
http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/08/26/article-2402115-1B77F8D7000005DC-375_636x391.jpg

Union chiefs said there was a ‘groundswell of anger’ against the helicopters, pictured centre, following the crash on Friday near Sumburgh, Shetland, which killed four, with many oil workers vowing never to fly in one again. The worst incident was in 2009 when all 16 aboard were killed. Now the latest tragedy brings the total number of people killed while flying aboard the Super Puma helicopter to 20. Clockwise from top left, Stuart Wood, Richard Menzies, James Edwards, Alex Dallas, Leslie Taylor, Nolan Carl, Paul Burnham, George Allison, Gary McCrossan, Nairn Ferrier, David Rae, Gareth Hughes, Warren Mitchell, Raymond Doyle, Brian Barkley, Vernon Elrick, James Costello, Sarah Darnley and Duncan Munro, as well as Mihails Zuravskis, have all perished due to incidents involving the craft.

[Brom]

And how many times has the decision date been extended and an operator asked if they would like to resubmit their tender as another company has a lower bid?

[industry insider]

SAS, 3 out of 5 chunked (commercials returned unopened) of course our CEOs look st stock price but try having an accident to see how much it costs and what Wall St thinks.

Grenville, we usually allow non conforming sections in addition to conforming sections as a way of encouraging innovation. The trouble is that iinnovation comes as cheap older aircraft. It maybe commercially innovative but its not what we really mean by innovation.

Brom, I would be fired for that. Our whole process has oversight from the tender board and venture partners.

[jimf671]

They are going to round-up herds of Bell 412's.

Is that the same Bell 412 that has an almost identical length of service, accident total and fatalities total to the 332/532 but is much smaller and would require many more miles/hours?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Yes, most tenders make provision for "alternative" proposals however, one would not expect a vendor to propose something which completely contradicts a fundamental criterion of the tender itself!

[mazdadriver]

(* btw, on my one trip offshore Norway, the life jackets were under our seats ! This unsettled me totally.)

I haven't been offshore in Norway for a very long time, but it used to be the case that the suits used there were themselves buoyant, so the life jackets under seats were probably there for additional back-up only. What type of suit were you wearing on that flight, LTNABZ?

[HeliComparator]

II not sure about your neck of the woods, but around here the major players all comply with the minimum standard set by OGP etc. However that compliance is demonstrated in a mostly tickbox way. You get no extra ticks for having a better culture or for exceeding the minimum standard in most cases. So then it just becomes a race to the bottom. Are the operators blameless? No, of course not, but neither are the Oil Cos, and it is the latter who control who gets the contract, so the power rests with them.

Also, I find the drive for brand new aircraft slightly worrying, its not like buying a new car! Just like all its predecessors, no doubt the AW189 will have something horribly wrong with it, we just don't know what it is yet!

[roundwego]

Loss of tail rotor at speed does not result in a spin until the aircraft slows to below around 40 knots. A Bristow Tiger had just such a loss of tail rotor in the 80's and only lost control on final approach at Aberdeen when the speed came below around 40 knots.

STOP STOP STOP MISINFORMATION ALARM

The Bristow Tiger did NOT have a tail rotor failure.

The tailrotor drive shaft cover came open as the aircraft slowed below 40 kts and severely damaged the tail rotor. Tail rotor control was normal up to that point.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Are the operators blameless? No, of course not, but neither are the Oil Cos, and it is the latter who control who gets the contract, so the power rests with them.

I shall say it again - let the tragedy of 23rd August become a catalyst for increased cooperation between operators and their clients to reach a new understanding for the overall improvement of helicopter operations.

Maybe this needs to be driven from "the bottom" with pilots, engineers and bears pushing for round table talks between all parties to identify where improvements can be made and to agree to those measures capable of seeing them implemented.

One thing is certain though. If the CAA were simply to legislate in favour of best practice in safety and operations, oil companies and operators would have no alternative but to conform.

[SASless]

There! We have it!

Oil Company points finger at the Operators.......Operators point fingers at Oil Company. Pilots point finger at Company.....Company points finger at Pilots. Everyone points finger at Authority.....Passengers Union points fingers at everyone else......and the Authority eats the pies and collects a nice Pension.

Is that a simple summary of the situation?

What has to happen to change this?

[cyclic]

Publicity such as this, from a UK newspaper today, must be a concern for operators and oil companies.


Let us not forget that two of the people pictured were pilots. Sometimes, it gets forgotten that wherever the pax go, the crew goes as well. This is why we still don't have STASS:ugh:

[heliski22]

Helicopter operating companies need to be run by real helicopter people, take a long term view and show some leadership.

I never worked with Bristow but, when doing my IR in Norwich in 2002, the dominant sentiment around the company even then was...

"Back in old man Bristow's day, this was a helicopter company that made a profit. Now it's profit-making company that just happens to operate helicopters!"

Alan Bristow, love him or hate him, had his feet on both sides of the table and acted accordingly. But it doesn-t work like that now. The big helicopter companies now have owners/investors and their own boardrooms too. "Leadership" will only surface or show its face if the deal is a sure thing and profits/dividends can be enhanced.

One of the great difficulties in the helicopter world, certainly at the level where large operators are owned by larger corporations which are in turn controlled by even larger investors, is the regulatory "cultural conflict".

On the one hand, everything about the operation of aircraft, from the initial design and certification to the flying and maintenance, is governed by regulations that have been developed over many years and which owe their origins, in very large measure, to the findings of the investigations into accidents and incidents that have claimed many, many lives.

On the other hand, such regulations as govern the running of businesses and accounting practices in general and anything to do with money in the broad sense are basically there to keep order in the books, to ensure that things are done correctly and, where they have been developed or tightened at all, it has been as a result of some impropriety or other.

So, while we wander about the skies according to regulations written in the blood of those who have lost their lives, we are being managed/controlled by others who are operating to regulations designed to stop them from being thieves.

Or is that just too much cynicism....?

[c53204]

Throw everything 'aircraft/contract/reliability issues' out of the window. I believe the oil workers who travel on the aircraft involved will guarantee it's demise.

[Hummingfrog]

I insider

I sympathise with your predicament but you can understand why there is a reluctance to up grade a/c - cost and the "A" model always comes with unforseen problems which are solved with the "B" model - so best practice is to wait for the "B"!

As an old and bold ex NS capt who started on Whirlwinds and finished up on the 365N2 via Wessex, Seaking and 332L I have seen the improvements in both design and autopilot function. I wonder now if we have gone too far with the autopilot and taken away the newer pilots ability to actually fly the a/c. Although I have retired now I still keep in touch and hear stories like "on take off Vy is reached then autopilot engaged!" How do pilots maintain their manual flying skills. The autopilots and Flight management systems, while very capable, are not user friendly and have upper and lower modes with differences that catch people out!

Operations in the NS are simple - move people to/from rigs in most weathers. The a/c has to be able to safely do that - it doesn't need an autopilot/FMS that is not user friendly!

I remember going from the 365N to the 365N2 which had RNAV 2 along with track superimopsed on the radar. With RNAV 2 you could toggle between 2 pages to get most of the info you needed, the line on the radar confirmed you were going to the rig -simple. A later Garmin GPS you needed a degree to operate:ugh:

Keeping the avionics simpler, but as safe, would reduce costs.

I was lucky enough to work/live offshore working with a particular unmanned rig crew so learned alot about their fears and was able to explain how we operated. I was surprised at how many were afraid of flying but suffered in silence so they could get offshore to earn money!

To all those rig crews who are reading this thread please be aware that we as pilots and groundcrew will operate as safely as we can. I understand the worry about this cluster of accidents but they are not the same a/c. The 225 is a different machine though it looks similar.

We will have to wait for the cause of this tragedy but as all the critical "witnesses", crew,a/c and black boxes are available it should take too long.

RIP to the 4 who died and safe flying to everybody else.

HF

[SASless]

I worked for Bristow in the "good ol' days" when the "Old Man" owned it.

He got his Pound of Flesh....but he understood what Loyalty was all about....that it was a two way street.

In those days....the company's moral compass was internalized in one Man, a real Helicopter Pilot in every essence of the definition, and as such Management understood what the business was all about.

Today....at best....that "moral compass" is absent. The Owners and Board of Directors at best might sometimes "ride" in a helicopter as part of their perks and privileges but know absolutely nothing about helicopters per se.

Loyalty in today's business world is to the the Quarterly Report....and nothing that negatively impacts the contents of that Report is going to be allowed.

[HeliComparator]

C53204 - if that becomes the case, it will out of ignorance. Yes the Super Puma family has borne the brunt of recent accidents, but also it is the type that has flown by far the most hours out of Aberdeen. If you remove the SP, without addressing any underlying causes of these accidents such as cultural issues, all you will do is move the problem onto another fleet and repeat the process all over again. That would be rather daft!

As I posted earlier, none of the recent 5 events are fundamentally the fault of the aircraft, all were the fault of the operating and maintenance culture (latest one aside for the time being of course).

If the industry is driven by ill informed mass hysteria that would be very unfortunate, though not totally unexpected. Lets try not to encourage them.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Or is that just too much cynicism....?

No it isn't.

In fact it was what I was eluding to when I wrote:


Most public companies require large numbers of people to be on board before any meaningful changes can take place and whenever one or two individuals come up with proposals, even if they are sound, there are invariably others who are eagre to challenge them, to emphasise the bottom line (which shareholders love) and find justifications for maintaining the status quo.


With a privately owned company you don't need to have "large numbers of people to be on board before any meaningful changes can take place" in fact all you need is someone who understands the business and possesses a management style which can effectively manage the needs of both staff and customers.

But, as it is unlikely that we shall see a return to large privately owned helicopter companies, some other system needs to be developed and I don't see that happening without the national aviation authorities becoming more involved.

[mary meagher]

It would seem appropriate that on the first flight after the Super Puma has been returned to service, the owners, board of directors, and those in the oil company responsible for awarding the contract are the very first passengers to ride on the first Aberdeen to rig North Sea voyage, preferably on a lively day, returning at night....

It might influence their priorities.

[UKpaxman]

Mary, here's what they did only a matter of weeks ago when the puma's that were grounded returned to service.


BBC News - Super Puma EC 225 returns to service after ditchings (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23530274)


I think it flew to Alwyn North.

[nomorehelosforme]

Influence their priorities? Could you clarify this please? If you are making any reference to cost cutting and H&S I'm sure we would all like to hear your comments. In this day and age the majority of industries are unable to compromise H&S, and plough many thousands into making sure that things are done correctly.

I do appreciate that many of these procedures are arse covering exercises for company Directors etc but I'm convinced that there is no corner cutting when it comes to the aviation industry in offshore operations.

[SASless]

Lots of questions begged by this accident....and in time they will be answered as due to the fatalities and it having happened in the UK and not Nigeria.....the AAIB shall investigate it fully and report their finding to the Public.

Did Bristow ever report what happened in Nigeria to their SP that went for a swim?

[TipCap]

Do you know what, SAS? I don't necessarily agree with some of your posts but you hit the nail on the head when you talked about your days in Bristow in post #344.

I gave BHL 40 years of service and saw a huge transformation of ethics and management practices - most of them not too clever for the Company personnel but perceived good for the share holders

Mike, thanks for the good wishes. I am still missing flying tho........

TC

[nomorehelosforme]

Were there fatalities in Bristow's Nigeria incident? And I understand it is 3rd world country, but surely there is a minimum standard required for investigations worldwide following any aviation accident?

[Agaricus bisporus]

Lots of questions begged by this accident....

Eek! Never come across that variant before!

Beg The Question // Get it right. (http://begthequestion.info/)

[SASless]

No Fatalities in the Nigeria Accident.....but one does wonder how a well trained crew in a very capable helicopter fails to succeed in a Takeoff from an offshore Rig in benign weather. It is not like it is a "secret" that it happened. But, it does seem to be a "Secret" as to why it happened.

A video taken by one of the passengers onboard at the time showing the pax and crew in life rafts was on Youtube for a very short while before it was yanked.

In it could be heard the Co-Pilot making some comments about what happened.

Perhaps i will have to buy some shares in Bristow and attend the Annual Meeting to get my answer as then I would have vested interest and of course Childs et al would want to ensure I was happy with my investment.....right!

[HeliComparator]

No fatalities in the Bristow Nigeria 332L ditching. I seem to recall seeing a Nigerian AAIB report some time ago, but can't find it on the internet. There were no technical factors in the ditching (apart from needing bigger engines!)

SAS - they were contemplating landing, not taking off, and the weather was a big factor.

[SASless]

One of those tried and true Nigerian Rig Radar approaches in the Monsoon downpours was it?

The kind where the Radar goes bright Red from Attenuation and one reverts to GPS and the Mk I eyeball whilst scooting along just above the Oggin trying to maintain visual with the surface and looking for something man-made to appear between the wind shield Wiper blade?

"Contemplation" meaning giving it a go....rather than just pissing off home for a cup of Tea and waiting for better weather.

[TipCap]

sounds like you "been there and done it" SAS :ooh:

[HeliComparator]

SAS, yes something along those lines, although I wouldn't have put it so harshly!

[SASless]

I too am not immune from pressure....either self inflicted or by those from up above.:(

After a couple of the times "contemplating".....I started opting for the Tea instead. The pay check was the same either way!

[Lonewolf_50]

I think that trying to turn HUMS from a monitoring system into a warning system may be too difficult. It was always designed to try and pick up trends in component's characteristics and then as experience was built up look for trigger points to replace that component.
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/522069-as332l2-ditching-off-shetland-23rd-august-2013-a-10.html#post8011027
In essence HUMS moves maintenance away from reactive based maintenance to pro-active maintenance. So in the end the HUMS software is designed to maintain the 'health' of a harmonic signature...not the imminent failure of the component.
FWIW, the US Navy has been working with HUMS in their SH-60/S-70 fleet for some years (I think about two decades). One of the frustrations I have heard from maintenance departments is the number of false positives they encounter. (And some of this may be software driven ... ). Better safe than sorry, but their experience is why the above quotes need to be understood. It's not quite a "caution" or "warning" light generating system, to date.
UKpax Are there any helicopters that have a system to slow descent in the event of a gearbox or rotor failure?
All do, it's called "pilots" for a gear box failure. Use the flight controls to get the craft down to earth in a controlled manner. When the tail rotors fail, one can usuall auto down or do a power reduction and ditch ... when the main rotors fail or brake (leave the aircraft while at flight RPM) in flight, you are likely dead at that point. (Massive CG shift and uncontrollable rotor disk).
Given the air industry builds redundancy into their critical systems, its always struck me that the helicopter gearbox/drive shaft is a system where redundancy seems to have been deliberately ignored - I presume there's no practical solution, is there?
The design engineers increase/beef up safety factors for such components. Design has to be for "infinite fatigue life" on many more components than fixed wing. Failures are uncommon for that reason. Also, helicopter maintenance is very inspection intensive. (Recalling preflights of the dozens of torque striped nuts on various helicopters over the years ... )
UKpaxman
I guess the point I'm making is that I can't think of another form of civilian transport that places 100% reliance on something as complex as a gearbox with no redundancy in the event of a catastrophic failure.That's why safety factors in gbx designs are significant. (Generous)

I think you will also find, in most cases, that in a reasonably well maintained aircraft, that failures which will cause a gear box to go completely TU typically give off warning signs before all goes south. (Vibration, noise, oil temp/pressure rise, lights flashing ... ) You get a chance to land/ditch before it all turns into horribly deformed metal.
I also think that as even the best assembly may develop problems, if I were required to sit in one of those busses to go to my work, I would be a lot happier if the flotation gear was improved.
colibri: liked your post. On that point ... someone a few pages back noted that SOP's where he works called for floats armed anytime flying over water. Seems a wise SOP to me, particularly when carrying passengers.

colobri
Now to my final point; an anology. You're driving your Mondeo along a road and come upon a serious accident involving another Mondeo. Or maybe it wasn't even you, but a family member of yours who told you about the accident. Either way, does it make sense to immediately get rid your Mondeo and join a clamour for all Mondeos to be recalled, before anyone knows the cause?
No, it makes no sense, but one must never forget that group IQ tends to be inversely proportional to group size.

cyclic
Unfortunately, in order not too scare the living daylights out of the work force, the dunker is a very gentle affair in a warm swimming pool. I can assure you the military version is much more realistic but half the workforce wouldn't pass the course. Where do you draw the line of realism against risk?
:D Well said.
Mitchaa
Double engine failure just does not happen (Unless it ran out of fuel) so kind of rules that one out too.
Consider the possibility of fuel contamination ... no idea on this one. ... though usually when the lines get clogged you see a few lights and bypass indications before all goes south, in the heilcopters I am personally familiar with. Not sure how the 332's systems approach that.

HC:

You made a point about a model of helicopter where engines fail toward Idle, which I presume is a feature of the ECU/DECU. (If I guessed that wrongly, please correct me). That seems to me a very odd design feature.

If an ECU / DECU fails toward high power, you can control NR with incr pitch and then (with a good crew) your non-flyer can cut the DECU / ECU out via cockpit switches or engine control options ... depends on model, I suppost. (I am most familiar with S-70 class and its engine controls). This would hopefully leave one some version of manual fuel control, and you always have some NR in flying range going for you.

If it fails to low power, or both do, you droop. That can be bad three ways:
lift loss
controllability change
typically generators may kick off making for more trouble.

From what you posted, and being not familiar with the aircraft in question, I don't understand this design decision.
What's the upside of that approach?
(Failures that are "graceful degradations" being preferred to "suddenly it's all gone" from a design point of view)
Oil Company points finger at the Operators.......Operators point fingers at Oil Company. Pilots point finger at Company.....Company points finger at Pilots. Everyone points finger at Authority.....Passengers Union points fingers at everyone else......and the Authority eats the pies and collects a nice Pension.
Thank you, SASless. :ok: Just waiting for Benny Hill to run by, pursued by a few scantily clad lovelies ...

[JohnDixson]

Unfamiliar with the UK investigatory process, so am asking if anyone has a guess as to when preliminary data from the recorders will be made public?

[MoodyMan]

As I posted earlier, none of the recent 5 events are fundamentally the fault of the aircraft, all were the fault of the operating and maintenance culture (latest one aside for the time being of course).I'd challenge this assertion. The two EC225 ditchings last year were indirectly the result of design flaw in that the pilots were given false indication that the emlub system wasn't working (when in fact it was) after the failure of the rotor shaft.

Had the emlub system been correctly designed (and more importantly tested!!) it's likely both aircraft would have been put down on dry land. The fact there was no loss of life in either of these incidents was primarily down to the fact that sea state was favourable for egress from a ditched aircraft (ie. luck).

Unfamiliar with the UK investigatory process, so am asking if anyone has a guess as to when preliminary data from the recorders will be made public? The flight recorders have not yet been located.

[nomorehelosforme]

John the last news I saw was about the machine been recovered on to a salvage ship today, so might be a day or two before the recorders are released for investigation

[helimo]

Oh dear, whatever caused the catastrophic loss of power also caused a catastrophic loss of confidence in the Super Puma family.

Offshore Oil workers start campaign against Super Puma helicopters.

Massive online support for Destroy The Super Pumas Facebook page | Scotland | News | STV (http://news.stv.tv/scotland/237315-massive-online-support-for-destroy-the-super-pumas-facebook-page/)
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Destroy-the-Super-Pumas/649173595095243

[HeliComparator]

Lonewolf, you need to be familiar with the Norwegian Norne accident some years ago (that has been mentioned earlier in this thread) but basically, some damage was acruing in the high speed shaft caused by a loose nut (IIRC), this took out all N2 signals the engine ran up, then the damaged shaft failed and the turbine suffered a massive overspeed that caused fragments of the disc to sever the flight controls, take out the other engine, and kill some passengers before they hit the water.

As a result, the failure mode of the engine was made more benign - ie running to idle is better than an uncontained N2 overspeed especially in a twin.

The 332L and L2 have a manual emergency throttle so that, following such a run-down, the crew can advance the throttle to restore some (ungoverened) power on that engine.

I should add that its a pretty unlikely set of conditions that have to be met to make the engine run down, and its not something that happens often, if at all.

[NST1990]

Seems the pilots on here who have referred to the workers as 'Bears' and questioning their intelligence might get a few dirty looks at the hell-ports.

Most of them probably earn more than us and are highly skilled. Think you should watch how you refer to them in future, the link is public on their forums.

[NST1990]

https://www.facebook.com/TheNorthSeaTigers

[jimf671]

Shockingly inaccurate.

I was sure there were more than 31,548 idiots in the English-speaking world.

[SASless]

A Default setting to Max Power in the event of a Engine Control system failure is fraught with peril.....especially if the aircraft has very strong engines.

I had one in an empty Chinook that was also low on Fuel.....it was amazing the Rotor Blades stayed with us! Sadly....when you raise the Lever to control the Nr.....the good engine followed and that gave us way...way....way too much Ooomph going to the Rotor System.

Shutting down the bad engine was the only answer in the failure I had.....and deciding which engine was the bad one was complicated by the screaming of the Gearboxes and Crew.

The giveaway was one Engine was way above Topping N-1.....and the other was at Topping N-1. Torques were close with the bad engine being higher than the good engine.

For you Wokka drivers....it was an N-2 Overspeed Drive Shaft Failure....before it was in the Checklist or Flight Manual.

[mary meagher]

Thank you, UKPaxman, for your post 349, and the item that only three weeks ago, the Super Puma EC225, after "months of investigating, testing" flew again in service after the two previous ditchings. On this flight, which you say likely flew to Alwin North, the Chief Pilot and Senior Managers of the company did indeed fly as passengers. Respect.

Helicomparator mentions in post 301 that high level floats are still under consideration by EASA, more than a year ago. The performance of the floats saved everyone on board in the two previous ditchings, the surface of the sea did not seem so friendly this time.

[Sevarg]

Nomorehelosforme, The CVFDR is in the tail cone, or is on the 332L, so unless they have picked that up and it (the CVFDR) hasn't detached itself they haven't yet got there hands on it.
With the currents around there it could travel some distance but there's a 30 day pinger on it so they still should find it.

[Little cloud]

Reported on Radio Shetland that the search continues for the tail section 'containing the black box'. Certainly looks from the Marinetraffic plot that the Bibby Polaris is conducting a slow and thorough search close to the extended centreline of 09/27 and south of Garths Ness.

[HeliComparator]

Mary, the effectiveness of the floats this time was more to do with the rapidity of arrival on the sea rather than the sea state. No flotation system can reasonably be designed to work following an unlimited energy arrival. So you could beef them up a bit such that they worked in a "minor crash" but at some point, the crash severity is going to be such that they don't remain intact. They are designed for ditching, not for crashing.

[JohnDixson]

Thanks, LC. Am I correct in thinking that the pilot statements will be kept private until the CVR/FDR data is examined?

[nessboy]

The Bibby Polaris is south of Garths Ness and not Grutness. That is where the Ferry leaves for Fair Isle.

[SASless]

HC,

Are the SP floats Pilot inflated or Pilot armed and auto inflate using "water" switches?

[HeliComparator]

Moodyman, sorry missed your post.

You are correct that there was a flaw (or several!) in the backup to the backup lubrication system. Bearing in mind that this system gives you 30 mins at 80kts (40nm), I think at least one of those events was more than 40 nm from shore, so the outcome would have been the same. However most of us think that the best option, regardless of the EMLUBE indications, is to put down in the sea if the sea state is reasonably benign, especially following transmission indications that are not "textbook". So I question whether the outcome would have been different had the EMLUBE captions not come on. In any case, the system was designed to cope following total oil loss, not a broken shaft.

But the key point with those ditchings is that they resulted from the shafts developing a fault. All helicopters develop faults, its just the nature of the complex beast. What is important is to have means to detect the developing faults before they become critical, and for that we have various tools including HUMS.

The existing HUMS tools was quite capable of detecting the fault before it became critical, but unfortunately the tool was not used optimally and so the fault went undetected until the shaft broke.

[Sevarg]

Sasless, Pilot armed auto inflated, 4(?) float switches.
.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, the floats have to be armed before anything can happen. Then, optimally they are inflated by the pilots at low speed before alighting on the water. If the pilots forget or don't have time, they are fired by float switches but only if they have been armed. There are airspeed limits for float inflation (the max speed that the test pilots dared to fly at with the floats inflated) and you can't have a system that could malfunction and inflate the floats when above that speed (which is 150 for a 225, 80 for a 92, and can't remember for an L2 but maybe 130?). That is why the pilots must slow down to below that speed prior to arming the floats.

[SASless]

Those speeds are for fully inflated floats I assume.....and I wonder what effect "speed" would have on the float bags as they inflate as there would be quite a bit of flapping around in the wind stream until they were pressurized and "solid".

When the testing was being done on the High Side Floats.....was there any consideration given to using fewer low bags or smaller low bags to compensate for the extra flotation provided by the High Side Bags?



Also...forgot to ask....."Saltwater Immersion Switches" or will they activate automatically in fresh water as well?

[HeliComparator]

SAS, I think the criteria will be the ablity to inflate at high speed without damaging the aircraft's ability to continue flight, rather than necessarily no damage to the float bags themselves. But they do inflate pretty quickly, more of an explosion that an inflate.

Although there has been some debate about this, my opinion is that the high level floats should only come into play if the heli rolls over, therefore the normal floats should be unchanged. Experience (too much of it!) has shown that following a controlled ditching, the heli will stay upright in some surprisingly poor sea states. Personally I'd rather evacuate with my clothes dry if possible!

Float switches, that will work in any type of water.

[bille1319]

In the early 80's we used to fly North Sea as pax on S-61s and on long night flights the stewardesses would serve drinks all round. Like a fixed wing a/c there were no survival suits worn. How this has changed.

The last time in 2012 I did the BOSIET refresher helicopter evacuation course I found the re-breather apparatus a great help and should allow you about 20 or so usable breaths under water.
It will interesting to see as to whether the survivors were able to prepare and don theirs before the rotors stopped rotating and the hull inverted and of course the evacuate command issued.

I just wonder if more could have been done to retrieve the poor trapped soul which didn't make it out. But judging by the frame photos, the hull didn't appear to suffer much damage so a descent rate of less 500'/m would seem likely which makes you wonder about press reports by pax of the craft 'falling rapidly'.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

HC,

The existing HUMS tools was quite capable of detecting the fault before it became critical, but unfortunately the tool was not used optimally and so the fault went undetected until the shaft broke.

Maybe on the second 225 ditching, but the Bond G-REDW AAIB report quite clearly says that Bond picked up a trend on the day before the ditching, and again after first flight on the day itself, carried out the AMM actions in both cases, and put the ac on close monitoring, all completely in accordance with the AMM. Could they have looked more closely, maybe, I'm sure you'll tell us Bristow would have done, but to say they did not detect it because they were not using HUMS properly is untrue.

Page 7 if you're interested:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/AAIB%20S3-2012%20G-REDW.pdf

[Harry O]

If it hasn't been posted. Some CHC news.
Some CHC Helicopters Back in Air Following ?Super Puma? Crash Off Shetland| Offshore Energy Today (http://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/some-chc-helicopters-back-in-air-following-super-puma-crash-off-shetland/)

"After CHC on Saturday announced it would ground all of its helicopters within the UK, as a response to the AS332-L2 Super Puma helicopter crash which occurred Friday, off Shetland, the company last night revealed that some of its helicopters might start flying Monday after all.

“We believe that engineering and operating differences associated with AS332L/L1 and EC225 aircraft warrant continuing flights with those aircraft. Nonetheless, we canceled all of our Sunday (Aug. 25) flights on those aircraft types (except for those involved in life-saving search-and-rescue and medevac missions) in order to give us time to take stock of any implications associated with Friday’s accident, which involved an AS332L2 aircraft,” said CHC last night in a press release.
The company’s AS332L/L1 and EC225 helicopters are expected to start flying today.
“We will continue to hold all flights worldwide involving AS332L2 aircraft, except for those involved in life-saving SAR and medevac missions. In the U.K., consistent with a request by the Helicopter Safety Steering Group and until further notice, we will not fly AS332Ls/L1s/L2s and EC225s, except for life-saving SAR and medevac missions,” the company concluded.

[Hummingfrog]

The floats are remarkabley robust. I had a set blow (365N2) on rotation from the Piper B. There was a "bang" and there they were. I flew to the Tharos our base alongside and landed on for advice from the company! I kept running as the nose bag kept the nosewheel clear of the deck and I didn't want to risk ground resonance on the helideck. It was decided to fly back to Aberdeen below 90kts which was our max arm float speed. All went well - if noisy! Arrived back in Aberdeen to Be met by most of the hangar watching and being cleared to taxi in by ATC. That would have ruined the floats. On carefully shutting down it was found that the floats were as hard as ever!

HF

[excrement]

This is my first contribution this site, but having read all of the postings, some of which are well informed and make valid observations backed up with facts, otherssadly are ill informed and ridiculous.

Pilots and engineers are the same on BOTH sides of the North Sea and if comparisons are to be made to determine “WHO IS THE SAFEST” then the following should be taken into account.

Regarding the recent CRASHES/DITCHINGS/INCIDENTS, not including the most recent as cause has still to be released;

The initial EC225 incident was due to pilot error and possibly conditions but NOT THEOPERATOR or sector of operation.

The L2 crash was attributed to debris in the main xmsn. The operator and its procedures were closely scrutinised by the relevant bodies and determined not to be negligent.

The EC225 DITCHINGS were performed by their Pilots who each made a decision based on their ability, experience and the situation they encountered including passenger safety.

None of the above can be attributed to area of operation, and the fact that these events did not occur in the Norwegian sector was purely by chance.

PLEASE no more talk of EXPLODING ROTOR BLADES, PARACHUTES, ILL-INFORMED IMPROVEMENTS TO IHUMS OR MARMS and MOUNTING THE FLOATS above the windows.


As for survival training, when the DUNKING is carried out in the pool Divers are always at hand and should someone panic and fail to evacuate the operation is repeated. Unfortunately in a real event there are no second chances.



I have worked with all variants of Super Puma as well as other types for 30 years and can assure any apprehensive passenger I do not take their safety lightly. I am also saddened by nonsense media reporting and subsequent rhetoric.
If a Kneejerk reaction to these events results in the removal of the Super Puma then should it’s alternative (S92) have a problem – WHAT THEN !

[HeliComparator]

O F yes, I think that is fair comment in some respects, but I didn't say whose fault it was that HUMS tool was not used optimally. Two things I am aware of:

Our engineers told me they would have done things differently and looked at the shaft, since its relatively easy to do that. You could say "they would say that, with 20:20 hindsight" and maybe that is true, we can't know.

There is however I suspect a cultural difference in that Bristow is a developer of HUMS, whereas Bond is a user of it.

Secondly the amount of effort that has gone into refining the HUMS thresholds over the last 25 years or so of its existence is pretty minimal, ditto for improving reliability. That is not the operator's fault, not the manufacturers fault (well maybe) it is a cultural fault of our "system" resting on the laurels of HUMS developed in the 1980s. My point is that HUMS was quite capable of detecting the fault, and in fact did, but the warning was treated as "cry wolf" because the reliability rate of the sensors is not very good, and because the possible failure modes (of the transmission) had not been fully examined.

I did have it in mind that Bond had not downloaded the HUMS data after each flight, but if I am wrong in that respect then I apologise.

[jayteeto]

One of my north sea mates has just posted that article from the Scotsman on facebook. The S92s amazing ability to run for 30 minutes after it has run out of fuel is Herculean!

[Tractor_Driver]

Mitchaa:

"For CHC to release such a statement so soon where they believe it is not related to the other aircraft types tells you what you need to know about the incident."

or about CHC?

[airwave45]

Missing the point gents.
Pax think the aircraft is junk.
Pontificating on irrelevant technical details is not changing the minds of the pax.
If they don't fly, you don't get paid. (However smart you are)

As sassles said, sheilds down and look at the issues.

Of which there are 2.

Slf confidendce gone (and going further)

Aircraft capability, sort of ok, but not trusted by pax.
(Sort of ok meaning worse then GoM averages, which are not "good" )

You are heads up against pax who would gleefully burn these aircraft, whilst you are arguing that "it's what we have, what more do you want?"

What the SLF want is to get to work and get home with the same risk profile they have with flying to Londinium in a plank.

If you can't deliver what they want, they'll find a new company who can.

Poo poo what is going on now at your peril.

[nomorehelosforme]

I did ask early in this thread, how many North Sea flights are there, daily/ weekly merely asking, you seem like someone in the know?

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

If you can't deliver what they want, they'll find a new company who can.

Unfortunately for them, what they want doesn't exist.

I am unaware of fleets of underused S-92s sitting in hangars around the world, ready to decamp to the NS.

If they really are going to refuse to fly on any Superpuma, of whatever variant, then I hope they like sailing and cranes.

[HeliStudent]

I did ask early in this thread, how many North Sea flights are there, daily/ weekly merely asking, you seem like someone in the know?

And since I saw your question I've been trying to find out.

What I've been able to see is that Aberdeen has about 100 helicopter movements per day (some sources say 200), Norwich has 40 departures per day (not sure how many movements that equates to, maybe double if they come back) and I've read there's a similar amount (around 50 movements or more from Holland).

Haven't been able to find Dansish helicopter movements and I think Norwegian movements are at least 150 or 200 per day and I can't find what the movements are for Sumburgh.

But, a very rough estimate would put it at somewhere between 300 and 500 movements per day throughout the North Sea (I think)?

It would be nice if someone could help please.

[HeliComparator]

aiwave, I think you have been reading the press and watching too much TV. Yes there certainly is a loud and ill informed movement to "destroy the Super Puma's" (sic) but that is just hysterical froth whipped up by fools. Of the few SLFs that I know personally, all take the pragmatic view that there is nothing particularly wrong with the SP family, after all they have spent many years flying in them - although of course they would prefer not to have to fly in a rather cramped and uncomfortable helicopter at all!

If the ignorant masses get to decide by mob rule what helicopters are operated, we are all doomed (well, they are doomed anyway) but, depending on the cause of this latest accident, hopefully that won't happen.

[nomorehelosforme]

Percentage wish, if 200 - 400 movements per day in the North Sea is correct, how does the accident percentage, per day, compare to all UK helicopter flights, commercial and private? At a guess North Sea movements would win hands down on safety per movement?

[airwave45]

Obnoxio f*kwit (great name btw :-) )
The slf are genuinely beyond a short game here and _will_ put up with boats.
Boats don't kill them.
Unpleasant nast and smelly as they are. They don't suffer "falling into the sea"

You, have to get your house in order.
Currently you are tit for tat with single engined single pilot ops.
Which, is not good.
Given you run twin engine twin pilot ops.

Now, aside from telling me you are my only option.
What are you actually doing to make me belive you are getting better at what you do for a day job ?

As sadly, you as an NS pilot, I think you should be doing much better.

[fenland787]

"destroy the Super Puma's" (sic) but that is just hysterical froth whipped up by fools.

The Beeb are gleefully reporting how many 'likes' the Facebook page has got (whatever a 'like' is) over 34,000 it would seem. I have to say I may have to revise my opinion of Facebook as a means of running everything - I had assumed it was some sort of flash mob social chit-chat thing, I had no idea they had anything like that many experts in aviation and the safety aspects of operating aircraft in the North Sea on their books! Still, we live and learn....don't we...?

[Lorimer]

It was in the late 80s I flew the Chinook helicopter out to the rigs for Shell & British Airways Helicopters - there was a fleet of 6 of them.
It was really handy having an endurance of 4 hours, 140kt cruise carrying 45 pax with refreshments,
cabin crew and a loo!
I still have my certificate from Boeing
for 1000 hours on the aircraft.
It sounds as if the Chinook is required once again.

[airwave45]

HC, read your point.
I'm not a fan of the press, too much power, too little responsibility.

Just a bear.

Have a bit of p1 time, but way more slf time, so have a wee bit of insight to both sides (currently non grafting)
No p1 on anything H (or p2 on anything H)

But what I'm trying to get across to the boys n girls up front is that the pax are genuinely, seriously, scared to get into any of the 330 variants.

If you don't seriously address those concerns, an alternate will be found.
I refer you back to sassles, proper ground up introspection is required.

Not on here (too public)
But really, when your frequency of unplanned arrivals on heavy / medium twins is equal to the GoM with singles/single pilot ops....(i've done the research, it is)
You really, really should be looking closely at what you do.

[SASless]

They Chinooks are not available.....all of them are out Logging and doing Fire Fighting in the USA and other parts of the World and making far more money than they would flying offshore probably. I would come out of retirement if they were to be re-introduced....well one can dream anyway.

Now if a Safety Auditor Gig would be offered.....I would put on my Tweed Jacket, Cords, and Brogans and jump on the next US Air flight to LWR (so long as it was a Boeing and not an Airbus).

This video showed up a little while ago.....not very dramatic but gives a good view of a successful water landing in benign seas.

Sorry HC....but you would get soaked no matter how you were dressed on this occasion. Lacking Rain falling....it appears SP Pilots need to imitate Alaska Bush Pilots and wear Knee Waders if they are to keep their feet dry.

Puma ditching Nigeria - YouTube

[HeliComparator]

Mitchaa, regarding your comments on the REDL HUMS shenanigans, there was fault on the Bond side according to the report -they did not use the correct EDR forms that should make for clear and recorded dialogue with EC. The primary communication was by telephone calls - there were emails as well, but the emails did not fully back up the phone conversations and consequently, some discrepancies arose. They misidentified the "chip" material as being silver or cadmium, when in fact it was steel. Silver and cadmium are non-ferrous and therefore non-magnetic, so it would seem, even to a simple pilot like me, unlikely to be found on a magnetic detector.

Most importantly, they didn't remove the epicyclic as was required by the AMM. Although we don't know what they would have found, there is a fair chance that there would have been a good few more metallic particles.

Therefore I think its unfair of you to blame the inappropriate maintenance actions on EC.

[Pittsextra]

Question. At what point is a Super Puma seen as a family of helicopters or individual models??

Recent events seem to blur things where I think it would be fair to say many seem to like to quote X number of flight hours of the Super Puma fleet as a whole when looking for statistics to promote a positive view on the model (s) and then instantly wish to differentiate individual models when one or another goes in. Just an observation.

There has also been comments around if the UK side of the North Sea is as safe or are individual operators / industry as a whole doing all it can safety wise. Given the community isn't that big in the grand scheme what are the pilots that complain doing about it? Maybe they are putting their hands up for huge change and its being ignored? (although that doesn't seem to be reflected here).

HC suggests that poor exploitation of HUMS is to blame for the crash of G-REDL and the two recent 225's that ditched, yet in order for the 225 to fly in the interim we have further reliance on HUMS...even more incredible is that there has been a complete change of view from Eurocopter regarding onboard HUMS data from the AAIB recommendations from the G-REDL crash to recent events with the 225.

The point is its all very well moaning about a faceless "industry" but thats just made up of individuals whom for the most part seemed to just rely on the fact that Eurocopter has a bunch of clever people and the rest should but out.

[airwave45]

Lorrimer,
I sailed on the Bar Protecter when we went to find the 3rd of the ditched chinooks.
I saw the rov footage.
You have 1000 hours on those indescribably awful aircraft.
Good effort.
They averaged a little over 9000 hours between ditchings ( in the n sea )
You are a lucky man.

This is 2013,
That level of attrition is just not acceptable now.

I am lost, as a group you want the bears to accept that the current level of attrition is ok.
As a bear, i'm letting you know, we disagree.

[Pittsextra]

Mitchaa, regarding your comments on the REDL HUMS shenanigans, there was fault on the Bond side according to the report -they did not use the correct EDR forms that should make for clear and recorded dialogue with EC. The primary communication was by telephone calls - there were emails as well, but the emails did not fully back up the phone conversations and consequently, some discrepancies arose. They misidentified the "chip" material as being silver or cadmium, when in fact it was steel. Silver and cadmium are non-ferrous and therefore non-magnetic, so it would seem, even to a simple pilot like me, unlikely to be found on a magnetic detector.

Most importantly, they didn't remove the epicyclic as was required by the AMM. Although we don't know what they would have found, there is a fair chance that there would have been a good few more metallic particles.

Therefore I think its unfair of you to blame the inappropriate maintenance actions on EC.

And how has that process changed since and with whom does the buck stop to make sure that the right form / conversation takes place?

[HeliComparator]

airwave, I can't disagree that the rate of arriving unexpectedly into the sea is way too high at the moment. What I do disagree about is that its the fault of the SP. Although changed since the groundings, before that virtually the entire Aberdeen fleet was SP. Therefore any unexpected arrivals into the sea was bound to be in an SP. But, for example, the S92 has had some pretty close calls and one major fatal. If the fleet had been all S92 for that past 5 years, I suspect it would be "destroy the S92" on facebook.

As I have alluded to earlier, there does need to be some radical change in culture, but that doesn't mean replacing the normally safe and reliable SPs

[HeliComparator]

Pitts - read the report and find out!

[airwave45]

HC, understood.
But really what is lacking is any desire to express to the slf that there are issues being worked by the rotary wing community to "up the game".
All I'm seeing is "the slf are stupid and we know all."
When the stats say, you don't
(N Sea only)

Your pax may not all be graduates with type rating loans outstanding, but they are not dumb.
They can read online crash stats, and if you haven't looked, yours are not good.

Now, what will pour oil on troubled waters is a bit of reality on both sides.
If you behave like people doing the best you can possibly do, we'll belive you (you have epaulettes, how could we disagree?)
However, if you disparage the slf, and continue to kill them, the slf will move for alternates

[SASless]

HC,

Without kicking off the old argument about the S-92.....I submit that if the Crew had complied with their Checklist, and done what the Co-Pilot recommended twice to the Captain, that event would not have been what it was. We don't know how a controlled ditching in the sea state and weather (air and water Temps, sea state) would have turned out but it seem on the face of it....there would have been far less loss of life if any.

Just as in the recent North Sea events....that Crash uncovered some very serious issues in many different areas.

You are correct that if only S-92's had been the aircraft operating on the North Sea and all these things (or similar but different) had happened then it would the S-92 that would be in trouble.

The facts are it is not the 92....but is the SP family that is in the spotlight.

It is also the UK Operators that are in the spot light

The Oil Companies are in the Spotlight.

It is the UK CAA that is in the Spotlight.

It is EC that is in the spot light.

There is going to be a lot of squirming....finger pointing.....spinning....weaseling....and dropped shoulders before all this is over and done with. Not just on this latest tragedy....but on the entire situation.

You folks over there have gotten yourself into a pickle. I dare say, if a really intensive investigation were to be undertaken by a truly independent body....there would be plenty of mud stuck to all sorts of faces. I doubt there are "dirty hands" but I am certain there have been plenty of bad decisions made, lots of bad policies implemented, and now it is time to sort out the tangle.

The way the Chinook got killed by the Media and some of those involved in the Oil Patch was wrongheaded, misguided, and because it was allowed to happen....without anyone having the courage to tell it like it was.....now you get to see how it works on the SP family. Killing the SP Family of Aircraft will be just as wrong as it was for the Chinook.

Knowing the background of that debacle.....all I can say is "Karma is a real Bitch!" sometimes.

[maxwelg2]

It sounds as if the Chinook is required once again.

Lorimer

I have to say that I am deeply disappointed that a former pilot would even suggest using the BV 234 for today`s offshore personnel transfer requirements. I can still recall the uproar and the workforce response that got them banned in the first place. For me the sheer number of potential loss of life in a non-military environment would be too great a risk, I`m pretty sure the oil companies and operators would end up at the same conclusion.

Out of curiosity I did a quick Google on the type and found this story...

Peru Helicopter Crash Leaves 5 Americans, 2 Others Dead (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/peru-helicopter-crash_n_2431943.html)

The point I`m making is that it`s not just the aircraft type that can be the issue, from a 30,000 feet point of view it`s always down to how procedures are created, followed, and how lessons are learned from experience. The common denominator in all these factors is the human factor, where wrong decisions, unknown or otherwise, determine the final outcome.

IMHO to move forward from where we currently are as both PAX and pilots, indeed the whole aviation industry, we need to do a cold eye review of our current operating mode and determine a logical way forward that is mutually beneficial to all parties. The current high spirits on the public media outlets is not helping matters.

Safe flying

Max

[HeliComparator]

airwave, surely the "industry" has been going to great lengths to improve things, with the Step Change, and the other industry organisations (whose name currently escapes me at this time of night!) not only trying to up the game, but including the SLF in the dialogue. If you are expecting all that on here, this is a professional pilot forum and you should be grateful we even allow you to look in! We are not on this forum to mollycoddle the SLF into wanting to get back into a SP - that is someone else's job. This forum exists so that we can discuss matter of importance to aviation, such as which offshore installation does the best breakfast!

[NST1990]

Guys,

Guys I am new to this site as you can see, but hold ATPL (A) and work closely with these 'Bears' through a service company I own.

Be on no uncertain terms, there is a lot of anger in the work force, and it's being fuelled by the assumption by the pilots that they are that 'little bit slower'.

This thread is in the public domain now, and spreading fast, there are a few furious groups angered even more by being called 'bears' and questioning their intelligence.

These guys can be very switched on, some very intelligent guys and girls, who are only getting more and more despondent and drawing a line between them and you. (pilots, engineers and heli companies)

This will all have a snowballing effect on us as oil service companies. Ultimately if they don't fly, then the oil companies cut back on crews, if they do that all service companies business suffers, including yours.

Treat them with a bit more respect, before you awaken a sleeping giant. They took some talking round to trust the EC225, this could not have come at a worse time.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, yes you can reasonably blame the Newfie accident on failure to follow cockpit procedures, just as I can blame REDL on a failure to follow maintenance procedures. In both cases, things were perhaps not that simple (in the case of the S92, we are still not quite sure what effect the misinformation put out by SK regarding 30 mins run time had on the psyche of the captain).

So I am not trying to dis the S92 (for a change) and in fact, I think we are both in agreement!

[airwave45]

HC,
i am indebted by your indulgence of my presence
Brae Bravo circa 1992, the bacon butties were sublime.

Your grasp on the cyclic and your grasp on the realite of pprune may differ.
This is a public fora, there are people who thrash eggwhisks in a day job capacity on here.
There are people who are thrashed by eggwhisks on here.

Our perception of acceptable risk differs.

Whilst I may be dissmissed as slf, i urge you (n sea community) to listen.
You can do better ( the stats say so)
5 sp's getting wet and 20 dead, in 4 years is not acceptable to the slf.
What are you doing to change that?

Trying to change the slf perception of risk is a steep hill to climb.

[Agaricus bisporus]

maxwelg, I don't think there were many Chinook pilots who wouldn't go right back on it now if the opportunity offered. I know I would. It was a superb machine and inherently far safer than anything else on the N Sea.

At the time of the Sumburgh accident (entirely mod not type or inherent design related) there had already been a number of Puma accidents/incidents involving gearboxes and I can recall the incredulity when the P & J ran the Chinook out of town with it's campaign of misinformation and hysteria - and the Pumas were still landing with white-hot gearboxes and no one seemed to bat an eyelid. It seems incredible to me that 25 years later the damn things are still falling out of the sky and only now people seem to be wondering why...

I can see that argument that 44 people is a lot to risk in one package - tho it is one that doesn't seem to affect the rest of aviation (viz 747/A380) - but a Chinook with pop out windows would have been an unbeatable solution for decks large enough to take it. The lack of mid-cabin exits was a mistake in retrospect, but no one had even considered their psychological importance at the time as the 234 was rightly regarded as being completely amphibious and almost impossible to capsize.

Sad, a missed opportunity.

I do find it irritating that so many non-aviation people seem to have decided that an aircraft is unsafe when the crews who are exposed to 50 times the hours in it don't, and that everyone seems to have decided with no evidence whatsoever that this accident is tech-related.

Still, if the media did for one type on the N Sea, it can do it again for another. But this time there aren't lots of spare S61s sitting around to take up the slack. It's not going to be easy to do that this time if the grounding stays for a while.

[SASless]

HC,

We agree....and you are correct in that the ambiguity certainly played a role.....but.....an emphatic "but".....the Checklist, the current edition, the approved one, clearly stated "Land Immediately!" The Co-Pilot on two occasions reminded the Captain of that....and sadly did not assert himself as he should have. Why that Crew did follow the Checklist is subject to debate....that they should have is not.

That being said, Sikorsky made effective changes and also instituted an effective Public Relations effort at mending the reputation of the 92. They were effective both in the fixes and the PR effort and the 92 seems to be over its early troubles.

Now that EC is Air Bus.....perhaps the Air Bus PR Department will get stuck in and do what they do best.....sell their products despite their own problems such as the Air France Crash.

If Air Bus does not put on a sustained, effective PR Effort......the Super Puma Family is dead....extinct as the Dodo Bird. Despite the SP Family being similar but different aircraft....the distinction is lost on most of those who ride as Passengers. Most of them can not tell the difference and in reality until this recent spate of ditchings and crashes could care less as they were dependable and reasonably safe rides to work.

The same Mob mentality killed the Chinook.....unless Air Bus gets its head out of its hind end.....that is going to be the fate of the SP. They might find a job in the USA and Australia fighting fires or perhaps logging but who ever owns them now is going to take a real hosing when they try to sell them. Perhaps the RAF might buy them.... as the MAA seems very loosely run from what we are hearing in the Military Aircrew Forum.

[HeliComparator]

airwave, we both agree on the fact that 5 SPs getting wet and 20 dead is not acceptable. What I won't accept is a need to temper what I post, or change it, just because some SLF are listening, nor to pander to ill informed mass hysteria. I am interested in the real issues, not in some social media campaign to demonise the SP. I'll leave the PC brigade to try to talk the SLF down!

[SASless]

HC,

Can you imagine if Face Book had existed when the Chinook was being proposed for the North Sea.....it could have saved Bristow a lot of money! Then when the one did crash.....and although some folks survived it.....the frenzied mob could have really run amok by means of Face Book.

[Freewheel]

Airwave45, sounds like your mind is made up and no amount of logical analysis will convince you otherwise.

The answer is obvious, get your boat licence and fire up your tinny.

[Colibri49]

As I said in my previous posting, I sympathise with those who are obliged to ride in the back of any helicopter to and from work. But I also despair at the irrational hostility which has been whipped up. I/we drivers have known for years that most of you are afraid to a greater or lesser extent.

On Monday morning dozens of my fellow pilots attended a briefing by our management and plenty of well-thought-out views were expressed. But none of them were against the Super Puma family, nor against EC and other agencies. The greatest concern was at the sheer lies and rumours which have been spread without a shred of evidence.

All of us want to feel as safe as humanly possible and we work diligently each day to bring ourselves and you home to our - and your families. We were asked by management if any of us have any qualms and, please believe me, we're completely unafraid to tell them if we think that anyone or anything is wrong.

Not one of the attending pilots of Super Pumas, S92s, EC225s, S76s or AW139s expressed any doubts about our operational or engineering standards, or any reservations about other agencies. You say that we're above-averagely intelligent (I'd like to think so, but nobody will tell me to my face) and I've already said that some of my colleagues would call our management tw_ts to their faces.

Please give us credit for knowing what we're doing and you should only start to get militant against a helicopter type when you learn that we have "concerns". We're not gung-ho "ace" types of pilots. We don't have death wishes. We are chosen from a segment of the pilot world which generally doesn't include "chancers". Historically there were a couple, but they're gone.

[airwave45]

Freewheel, I'd fly with a Noggy eggwhisk outfit.
Would I fly with a Scottish one ?

No.

And therin lies your problem.
No bums on seats.
No revenue.

I have asked nicely, politely even.
Bums on seats pay salaries, no bums on seats, no salary.

You tell me what you are doing is good enough, I say, BS.
What I also say is.
If you are not making it better, I'm not flying in it.

Which I think HC will agree is somewhat vital to a PP service . .

[John Eacott]

Lorrimer,
I sailed on the Bar Protecter when we went to find the 3rd of the ditched chinooks.

I thought that there was only the one Chinook fatal ditching?

Some of the hysteria being whipped up in the UK media is borderline reprehensible, especially the perceived use of 'bears' as denigrating the offshore workers. They have referred to themselves as such since the 1970's, for goodness sake, yet the fluffy kitten loving PC marketing types now see it as us denigrating our passengers!

I fear that this will run unchecked until either someone gets out with simple one line messages that the average 21st Century journalist can understand or until the Puma family is removed from North Sea ops. Essentially, no one but us helicopter pilots and engineers is the slightest bit interested in the technicalities that we discuss here. The modern media world lives on short, sharp messages regardless of the truth behind what is actually said..

Look at the constant reference to the Sumburgh 332L2 'falling out of the sky', all based on a third hand telephone call from (supposedly) a passenger's relative. It has now been reported so often that as far as the UK population is concerned it is fact, and nothing has come from CHC nor from Airbus Helicopters to refute the claim.

That's how the modern media works, and if it is on Twit-ter or Facebook then it must be true to the younger generation :sad:

[KiwiNedNZ]

On Facebook there is a page called Destroy The Pumas. It has over 34,000 likes so far. Here is something I just posted on there - maybe a little bit of it will get through to some of them, who knows, but was worth a try.. If I am inaccurate on some of it then apologies.


Interesting page here however I think there are a few misconceptions. I own and publish two helicopter industry magazines, and one of them HeliOps covers the global civil helicopter industry which includes offshore oil & gas operations. I spend 10 months of the year travelling shooting and flying in helicopters all over the world INCLUDING the AS332L1/L2 and EC225. The Super Puma family has been flying around the world for decades and will continue to do so - carrying hundreds of thousands of people to and from work, oil workers included and clocking hundreds of thousands of trouble free flying hours with no incidents. The men and women who FLY these helicopters are just like every oil worker reading this page - they want to come home EVERY NIGHT and see their wife and children. They have no intention of wanting to not make it back. They didnt spend hundreds of thousands of dollars going through all the training to get their licences just to fly something that wasnt going to bring them home safely.

They are the same as an airline pilot - they have a responsibility to those in the seats behind them to get home safe and sound - the only difference is they are flying a helicopter and not a Boeing 777 etc. EVERY pilot I know around the world WILL NOT fly a helicopter that is not 100% safe - its ludicrous to think they would. And NO they do not get paid ONLY if they fly - these guys flying in the North Sea for companies like Bristow, CHC, Bond etc are paid an annual salary like you men and women so there is NO incentive for them to fly a bad machine for ANY reason and I personally know many who fly in the north sea including some who have refused to take off because of a maintenance issue with their aircraft. Once the issue is fixed then they departed - keeping in mind its their lives at risk as well as those in the back. Pilots don't want to have an accident - its not in their nature.

Saying companies like CHC, Bristow, Bond, ERA etc are only in it for the money and don't care about pax safety is also incorrect. These companies know the repercussions of ANY accident so do everything they can to avoid one but sometimes in this industry accidents do happen despite all the best efforts to prevent them. Some are from human errors, some related to weather, some related to mechanical issues. Some we have control over, some we dont. I have personally lost many friends in this industry over the time I have been involved and hate it every time it happens but do I call for one type of helo to be banned because of it - No I dont. I feel gutted for the friends and families of all those lost on ANY accident but to call for the banning of that helo type because of it I think is unwarranted.

In regards to the latest accident it has nothing to do with the same cause as the EC225 accidents - they are a different model of the Puma family so in my opinion its unfair to ban the whole Puma family because of two unrelated accidents. It would be best to wait until the actual cause of this latest accident is known before making blanket statements to destroy what is a great helicopter. I personally have done many flights and shoots on the L1/L2 and also EC225 and would get on one again tomorrow. In fact I did a shoot with ERA Helicopters 225 in Houma, LA in March which the UK ones were still grounded, thats how confident I am in the product and I value my life just as much as everyone here values theirs.

Keep in mind helicopters are complicated pieces of aviation machinery and from time to time accidents happen - its not nice and the results are not usually survivable but they do happen. Its not through lack of maintenance or the skilled crews who fly them. Sometimes things are just not seen in time for them to become catastrophic as they happen so quick. Like pilots the mechanics who work on the Puma family KNOW that peoples lives rest on their work and they do everything to the best of their abilities to ensure that any aircraft that is pushed out of the hangar door is 100% airworthy. Who do you think the first person accident investigators will look at if its a mechanical issue that brings a helicopter down - yep the engineers who were the last ones working on it. Its not a good situation to put yourself in so they dont.

Human error happens in all parts of the world we live in whether it be driving the car down the road and we decide to answer our cell phone instead of concentrating on the road and we run off it, the women driver who pulls out into cross traffic while putting her make up on etc etc. Unfortunately it happens in aviation as well, except the consequences are magnified because of where and what we are operating.

This post is no way taking away the losses and heartache felt by those on here who knew someone that died on any of these accidents, in fact I knew the co-pilot on the Cougar S92 who died in that accident. If anything use your collective might to push for bigger escape windows, better training to get out of a ditched helicopter etc. I mention the ditching training for a reason - and that is in my opinion the training of oil workers in getting out of an upside down helicopter is unrealistic. Your training is done in a dunker in a swimming pool, usually nice and warm and with divers all around. Yet look at the accidents that have happened - they are out in the North Sea one of the most hostile environments out there. Under the water you are getting thrown around by waves and its normally dark and gloomy - to me thats what you should be trained for. Push for realistic training that will stand you in good steed should the unthinkable ever happen again.

I hope those of you reading this take it for what its worth. My thoughts are with everyone here.

Ned Dawson
Publisher - HeliOps Magazine

[airwave45]

Colibri 49

Irrational hostility as a phrase is incompatible with 5 crashes in 4 years and 20 dead.

There is some rationale behind the hostility, honestly.

[SASless]

I've already said that some of my colleagues would call our management tw_ts to their faces.

Nothing changed there I see!

49, You are quite right that almost without exception, pilots like to get home to their easy chair and pint at the end of the day and would not knowingly fly and unsafe aircraft.

The qualifier is "knowingly". We have to admit that as Pilots and by transference....Passengers "trust" or have "faith" the aircraft is in fact safe to fly in all regards.

Engineers too, with almost no exceptions, have a Conscience they know they shall have to live with, should they provide a Pilot an aircraft that is un-airworthy. They too take it on "faith" the parts that are make up that aircraft are as they should be when made by the OEM.

Sadly, our "faith" is challenged by an event or events that cause us to have concerns.

We have to fall back on "faith" again that the system works to ensure that as few of these events occur as is humanly possible.

There in lies the rub....."the human".

As long as humans are involved in the process, we have to accept the process shall never be perfect. We have to do everything that is reasonably possible to ensure the process prevents our human frailty from tripping us up. Again, that requires more "faith" yet from us.

As i see it....the Passengers who ride the Super Puma are in need of assurance the "process" is going to be examined and every reasonable effort made to ensure the Super Puma Aircraft is as safe as it should be. Pilots, Engineers, Designers, and Test Engineers along with the AAIB and CAA are going to do that before they themselves express their confidence in the situation.

If the Pilots will fly it.....then you can feel confidant that you are taking a very reasonable risk. As in all flying there are risks.....we just have to make sure they are reasonable risks.

Hopefully, that is what will transpire during the coming few weeks and months.

[Freewheel]

Airwave, its like this;

The primary goal of the crew is to ensure that everybody sees another day, themselves included. Considerable effort is expended by all of the personnel of an operator, the aircrew, engineers, pax handlers, management etc in ensuring that this occurs. When that effort fails, it is VERY personal.

You have suggested that you feel equipped to decide whether an aircraft, and now you are extending that to an operator is suitable for the entire industry.

You can make your decisions for yourself, not your entire industry. I have suggested an option for you. Your threatening undertone is uncalled for.

Do not seek to demean the operators or personnel of any operator that has had an accident. You have made an emotional response and despite the rebuttal provided by many on this forum you have heightened your response with an emotional tone.

What I and others have said is this; apply a logical thought process to these events. Living involves dying. Flying includes the risk of death, yet statistically flying by helicopter, even by super puma in and around Scotland is a manifestly safe activity.

I recognise that your emotion is hot and that you feel strongly about the fact that your colleagues have perished. Don't for a moment think that they have gone unnoticed.

In parts of the world where immersion suits aren't required and the numbers are fewer, moments like these give pause for considerable contemplation and action.

In other words, chill out grieve and consider your own needs.

[SASless]

I understand the passengers concerns.....yet they go live and work on places like the Piper Alpha....we usually just drop in for a quick meal and pee then off to the hill.

We could begin to tote up the casualty list for those disasters and perhaps develop some concerns about the safety of rigs and platforms ourselves.

If we are going to discuss risks....that could be one of the topics.


In this article there is mention of action taken in the GOM.....and weather related accidents for helicopters dropped to ZERO over a three year period.


Offshore Worker Fatality Rates Seven Times Higher Than U.S. Average, CDC Study Says (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/offshore-workers-fatalities-cdc-study_n_3180566.html)



Loss of Concentration on an oilrig by driller - YouTube

[airwave45]

FW,
i reread my earlier posts, there absolutely was no threat in them.
Purely a statement about whether I would fly in a Scottish based Puma.
Simple answer, no threat, no innuendo.

I understand it's personal.

It is from my side too.

Google helicopter crash frequencies, at some point down the list that pops up you'll find fatalities per million hours.
GoM and N Sea are the same.
GoM does single pilot, single engine ops.
N Sea does not.

The bears in the back are simple, we like it that way.
Too many crashes, too frequently and too many people killed.
The offshore population these days is about 30,000.
That is a very small town.
Very small.

What if a small town taxi company killed 20 people in 4 years?

And the taxi drivers told us it's ok, we know what we are doing ?
It's all a bit complicated for you to understand, but get in !

. . . .

Oddly, we think the drivers are a bit deluded actually.

Perspective comes when we look across at the next small Town where no one has been killed in ages . . (Norway, Same weather)

[The Sultan]

X
G-REDL did not have to happen if it had a competent chip detection system. As to living with the design you are given I still can not believe anyone would dispatch a ship which had chips in the very recent past while the HUMS is logging many more. The old HAS never would.

The Sultan

[The Sultan]

Mitch

HUMS was made to "work" for the shaft failures only after the incidents. Before they did the postmortem they had no clue what a failing shaft would look like. They look at the data found one of 100 plus indicators and cried EUREKA!

The Sultan

[The Sultan]

SAS

What caused the 234 to disintegrate recently in South America killing all on board?

The Sultan

[Treg]

During crisis it is important for those managing it to understand the difference between the perception and reality of their crisis.

Operators responding to an event are dealing with the reality of the incident, so are their immediate management. However, those in management responsible for brand reputation are dealing with the how the reality is perceived by stakeholders, and it is their job to bring perception and reality into sync... quickly, if brand reputation is to be maintained.

To achieve perception and reality sync requires effective crisis communication i.e. tell them what you know, what you don’t know and what you are going to do about it. Moreover, this needs to be done in simple, non-jargon language, so that core audiences (“bears” and their families) are not distracted with knowledgeable, yet inner-circle-speak.

If you do not respect your core audience, you will struggle to change the imbalance.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

AIRWAVES 45 we hear you and you completely correct. The accident rate is unacceptable. None of us on this forum disagree with you and everyone wants this to improve. However, aviation is an unforgiving activity when things go wrong.

The important thing here is to clearly establish what went wrong and take steps to ensure it does not happen again.

We have suffered an unusual batch of incidents and accidents in our backyard and that has created a very understandable emotional response. However, all types of aviation suffer from unacceptable accidents. In the last three years there have been over 75 fatal fixed wing accidents with the loss of life exceeding over 3000 souls. None of this is acceptable.

I can assure you that every single person involved in NS operations wants this to stop. Unfortunatley this is a Pilots forum and in some cases attitudes are hardened to the risks and the environment in which we have chosen to work in. They are not against you. They want the same thing as you. It's just that our experience tells us these are not issues related to one type of helicopter. They affect all types, everywhere around the world.

In the case of the EC225 it has a design error that has thankfully not resulted in hurting anyone and if you consider it's large windows, superior avionics then maybe we can feel a little comforted that despite the seriousness of the failure at least the totality of the machines safety systems led to highly favourable outcomes. I believe with the later generation of helicopters we are progressing definitely in the right direction and I include AW, Sk and ECs in this.

I do not know much about boat transfer operations so I do not know how safe they would be compared to helicopter options.

The mission for all of us is clear. We need to get much better very quickly in all areas identified by this accidents and in some that we may not yet have experienced. It is an unforgiving environment and we must step up tothe plate.

We hear you Airwave 5 by 5.

DB

[John Eacott]

As DB said, the current situation is not acceptable to many, but to put into perspective the hysteria about the Super Puma: in the same three year period there have been 380 fatalities in Boeing 737 accidents.

How many of the offshore workers and their unions have called from the scrapping of that type, and how many of them happily board a 737 as part of their normal commute? A type that had fatal flaws early in its life (rudder PCU) which despite 204 deaths attributed to the fault up to 1994, it was 2002 before the FAA AD was complied with.

Simplistic, but the Super Puma accident on Friday hasn't even had a preliminary report, which may absolve the type altogether.

[bigglesbutler]

I second what DB has just said and would like to add, the people denigrating on this thread probably aren't north sea aircrew.

Traditionally "Bears" has been the nickname for offshore workers and in my 11 years I have never used it or heard it used as a negative, to me "Self Loading Freight" is far worse a nickname.

Having seen the north sea in it's best and worse I am thankful I don't have that any more here in Australia but in all honesty cannot think of a different all weather platform to deliver you to work. Bucket transfer from a ship in 55kts of driving snow? No thanks.

I hear your pain and emotion but as with all of life we need to learn and improve not fight. If the Offshore workers are so inclined they could push on the oil companies to improve things like funding projects within the helicopter industry to push safety on. For example HUMS, Bristow started of it's own back years ago, think on where it could be now if the oil companies had helped fund and research it in the interim.

My wife and I are truly horrified and upset to hear the fatal outcome of this recent accident and our hearts go out to ALL the families affected.

Si

[maeroda]

John,

the point is that as plank passenger you and I can select the air carrier and plane type as our desire is, oil workers cannot.

[John Eacott]

John,

the point is that as plank passenger you and I can select the air carrier and plane type as our desire is, oil workers cannot.

Good point. But nonetheless, how many bears (using the term in a friendly fashion!) think nothing of flying on a 737? And how many would do so if they were aware of the accident history?

Going (slightly) OT, but relevant to the campaign being waged against the Airbus Helicopters Super Puma family.

[effortless]

May I ask a question as an outsider? How do failure rates in civilian Pumas compare to military? I've seen maintenance in both environments. It seemed to me, as an observer, that military, RAF, maintenance crews had much more fixed routines and practices. Admittedly, there was a twenty year hiatus between my military and civilian observations so I may well be talking out of my 'arris. Forgive me.

[HeliStudent]

Duncan Trapp of CHC Helicopter has said: "The Shetland helicopter crash will be "painstakingly investigated".

He was speaking after a meeting of key offshore operators and contractors in Aberdeen where contingency plans were being discussed after the suspension of flights by all Super Puma models to and from UK installations.

BBC News - 'Painstaking' helicopter crash investigation promised (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23839112)

[Kerwin]

sorry if this has been mentioned before, but on this facebook page there
are several messages concerning safety incidents relating to the pumas.

https://www.facebook.com/pages/Destroy-the-Super-Pumas/649173595095243?hc_location=stream

[helirally]

I also second DB post regarding current situation earlier. However Airwave your post and analogy earlier about the towns proves what many on here are so frustrated about. The fact is that there maybe things that the town, (Norway) do different that we can learn from, albeit I believe that their ops manuals are much the same as this side of the NS. However it should be noted that the Norweigians also have SP's of all variations on their fleet as well, which makes this social media witch hunt of the SP all the more disturbing. All this and we do not even know what caused Fridays tragic events.

[gasax]

I periodically work offshore - and have done for over 25 years. My day job however is risk assessment and much of what is being posted here is simply incorrect.

Boeing 737 - the most numerous scheduled airliner - approximately 100 times safer than present N.Sea helicopters.

Boat transfers - not yet routinely used for crew changes, but you can bet that is going to change! To date zero fatalities in 400,000 personnel transfers. A small number and the process is very installation specific and weather dependent. In pure risk terms if managed within the correct operational windows it would be on a par with fixed wing scheduled, not managed that way, it might get to currrent helicopter levels!

For me the fundamental issue is that the Norwegians - if you believe many of the posters here - are so much luckier. Statistics really do not work that way for that length of time. In 15 years their accident rate is so much beter than the UK there has to be some underlying differences. Some of it is I suspect the underlying culture, Noway is a small country and people generally are much more concerned about their fellow countryman (if only because there is a real chance they eiter know or are related to them). You will never see Norwegian pilots posting comments about their passengers the way some on here do!

But over those 15 years in the UK we have had a number of pilots fly serviceable aircraft into the sea, a number of mis-communications and maintenance screw-ups, some design issues. All have resulted in an accident rate which contrary to the O&G industry PR is not improving, it is heading back to the sort of rate we experienced pre-332.

As some of the offfshore posters have tried to explain that is not acceptable and platitudes will simply not work at this point. To say that helicopter pilots understand the risks is also not true. If you use the standard methods of calculating offshore workers risks, the average N.Sea helicopter pilot is exposed to risk levels which exceed the acceptable limits. The companies response to that is simply to say they meet the rules and that 'safety comes first' - which patently is not the case.

I await with interest the outcome of 'Kill the SP', it should lead to a re-examination of why the UK N.Sea has such a poor safety record. What it will probably do of course, is release a load of 332s for service elsewhere in the world.

[airwave45]

I appreciate that I'm not qualified to sit at the front of the bus, I am capable of reading some stats tho.

Taken from http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/434-11.pdf

Between 1998 and 2006 (ok, old data, but still relevant)
North Sea 1.3 million hours flown, 12 accidents, 18 killed.
GoM 3.7 million hours flown, 106 accidents, 53 killed.
Everywhere else 3.1 million hours flown, 69 accidents, 149 killed.

Given that the Noggies are unfairly saddled with Scottish prangs, we'll take them out, giving 650,000 flying hours to work the stats against.

In the Scottish sector, in the above period, you flew 36,111 hours per fatality.
The Americans flew 69,811 hours per fatality. A large amount of which was in single engine single pilot helicopters, which even slf understand is not as good as medium/heavy twins with two pilots up front.

Rest of the world is 20,805 hours per fatality.

Reasurances that you'll investigate specific incidents mean nothing, you already do that and it doesn't actually make any difference.
(in the overall picture)
Too many and too often is the problem.

And now that we are irked enough to actually look at the stats in detail, it's looking an awful lot like there is a Scottish specific, long term, failing.
Why, with better equipment, are you killing people twice as often as the Americans?

ok, the above is a tad emotive.
But it's meant to be.
If you are leading the world at what you do, great, patronise away.
You are not leading the world at anything bar dropping helicopters in the oggin.
And you are in them whilst they are dropping in.

What can be meaningfully done to improve things?
Why are the Noggies so much better than the Scottish operators?

[HeliComparator]

gasax, nobody is saying that the current accident rate is acceptable. However, as you will know, very infrequent events can throw up a good bit of randomness that can make them cluster. So the question is, is this spate an unfortunate random cluster (which by the way, has used up all our ditchings for the next 20 years at least!) or is there an underlying cause. Or a bit of both? Either way, its clear that it is not the fault of the SP as witnessed by the Norwegian accident record on this type - they have only had 1 fatal accident (albeit a bad one) that I can recall.

In that Norne accident IIRC there were some maintenance failings (not following best practice for HUMS, and the original maintenance error that led to the nut coming loose) and they have subsequently upped their game considerably.

Let us also mention that Bristow last put a SP in the N Sea water in 1995 (GTIGK lightning strike, everyone was OK) and before that in 1992 (GTIGH N Cormorant, several fatalities). The first was the "fault" of the aircraft in a way, but really because the certification requirements in force at the time were insufficient to deal with mother nature. The second was in no way the fault of the aircraft, it was pilot error combined with commercial pressure. (I am for the sake of this discussion, discounting the SAR L2 in Den Helder)

So the question is, why has Bristow not put a SP into the N Sea water since 1995 when the others seem to be making a habit of it? Is it luck, is it because we are jolly clever chaps, or what? I honestly don't know, as from where I sit the other operators are very similar to us in their attitudes and competancies. But as I mentioned, a case can be made that these accidents (last one aside for the time being) were avoidable. The operators did 99.99% things correctly, but they fell down in some small way and were bitten by it. Aviation can be very unforgiving.

If you want my honest opinion, I would say Bristow's track record vs the others is mostly luck. We have our weaknesses and failings, but we have been lucky that they have never bitten us.

So in summary, we all do things correctly 99.99% of the time, but in aviation that is not sufficient and we have to strive to do better, even Bristow, whose turn it definitely is to have the next one! But what is also clear is that its not a fundamental failing of the SP, and the anti-SP campaign will only serve to obscure the underlying issues and is therefore very dangerous.

[African Eagle]

According to airwave45 North Sea operations are half as safe as those in the Gulf of Mexico!

Who would have thought it!

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Effortless. I started my aviation career as a Helicopter Engineer in the Military. Both Military and Civilian maintenance requirements are comprehensive and follow strict regimes for servicing, component replacement and quality control. Both have in built proactive and reactive components that are driven at heart by reliability programmes.

For offshore helicopters there are additional maintenance practices to support the operational and environmental operating conditions.

As an offshore pilot I spend plenty of time in the hangar watching how our engineers work and behave and in my opinion they are the best in the business. There skill and dedication is second to none. However, just like pilots, engineers and offshore workers we are all human and errors can occur.

I hope this answers your question.

[airwave45]

According to airwave45 North Sea operations are half as safe as those in the Gulf of Mexico!

Who would have thought it!

AE,

Not my Stats. (and not N Sea as that includes the Noggies, but Scottish)

Taken from http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/434-11.pdf

Between 1998 and 2006 (ok, old data, but still relevant)
North Sea 1.3 million hours flown, 12 accidents, 18 killed.
GoM 3.7 million hours flown, 106 accidents, 53 killed.
Everywhere else 3.1 million hours flown, 69 accidents, 149 killed.

Given that the Noggies are unfairly saddled with Scottish prangs, we'll take them out, giving 650,000 flying hours to work the stats against.

In the Scottish sector, in the above period, you flew 36,111 hours per fatality.
The Americans flew 69,811 hours per fatality. A large amount of which was in single engine single pilot helicopters, which even slf understand is not as good as medium/heavy twins with two pilots up front.

[HeliComparator]

Airwave - lies, damned lies and statistics! Firstly if you look at the accident rate, as opposed to the fatal accident rate, the GoM is far worse. Because they fly small helis, each accident only risks the lives of a handful, so they can have far more fatal accidents than we can. At least a good chunk of the N Sea fatals in that period must have come from the Bristow 76 that disintegrated off Norwich. Really, its hard to see how the operator could have avoided that accident - it was down to an undetectable maintenance error on a rotor blade at Sikorsky. So that one accident really skews the stats. Plus, lots of people can fall into the sea in GoM and in general, because its a more benign environment, they get away without dying. Comparing stats from different types of operations can be misleading.

[lostinp]

As one who has been associated with military helicopters since the Vietnam era and now working in the offshore industry and sometimes spend time riding in the back seats of said helicopters may I put in my five cents worth.

I recently flew out of the Shetlands and during the preflight briefing not one mention of what to do in the event of a ditching ie How to don you rebreather etc. I went through all this during my HUET 3 years ago but ones memory tends to gather cobwebs after a rime.

What I think should happen is a more robust preflight briefing where all this is information is demonstrated. During any operation that involves a risk offshore we have to fill out JSA;s and have toolbox talks where every risk is discussed and what preventative measures must be taken. An extra ten minutes briefing may have saved some or all the lives lost in this accident.

Lastly my insurance company will not cover me for helicopter rides offshore. If helicopter flight is so safe why is this?

[Anthony Supplebottom]

At least a good chunk of the N Sea fatals in that period must have come from the Bristow 76 that disintegrated off Norwich.

To save me searching the entire web, this was the poorly repaired blade post-lightning strike?

[HeliComparator]

AS - yes it was.

[HeliComparator]

lostinp - surely you have the (rather lengthy IMO) DVD briefing? Do you feel that a human briefing would be better?

There are a couple of factors here - yes, the DVD doesn't grab your attention the same wayas a human does, but on the other hand the DVD ensures a consitent brief every time, free from the frailties of human memory. There have on occasion been times when we pilots have been asked to go down to speak to the passengers, but the reaction I have got is that they wonder what's up, and why are we doing that instead of concentrating on preparing to fly! (can't win!)

[S76Heavy]

@lostinp: that should have been covered in the sfaety briefing video that you no doubt were shown. SOP for offshore flights.

[imsafe]

"Airwave - lies, damned lies and statistics! Firstly if you look at the accident rate, as opposed to the fatal accident rate, the GoM is far worse. Because they fly small helis, each accident only risks the lives of a handful, so they can have far more fatal accidents than we can. At least a good chunk of the N Sea fatals in that period must have come from the Bristow 76 that disintegrated off Norwich. Really, its hard to see how the operator could have avoided that accident - it was down to an undetectable maintenance error on a rotor blade at Sikorsky. So that one accident really skews the stats. Plus, lots of people can fall into the sea in GoM and in general, because its a more benign environment, they get away without dying. Comparing stats from different types of operations can be misleading."

Totally agree, the GOM is a less hostile environment. Furthermore it's not correct to leave out the Norwegian sector. It is like leaving out a base in the GOM that had few or none accidents.

[Oldpilot55]

Boat transfers will never be an acceptable method of transferring folk from rig to ship because they involve basket transfers. Basket transfers are inherently dangerous and terrifying to anyone scared of heights. Personally I have seen two go badly wrong with one guy ending in the sea and the second damaging his leg. He stepped off before the basket was on the deck of the pitching ship, basically he panicked. He had to be returned to the barge that had just dropped him in the same basket.
My company, a major offshore construction company, banned basket transfers years ago and are rarely used. Too many folk get hurt.
BP came up with something called a Frog. The victims would sit inside, strapped in, no windows and were craned from ship to rig. This, as you can imagine, is pretty scary too.
Basket transfers are hugely weather dependent. You can forget a transfer on anything over 30 knots. Helicopters remain the safest method of transferring workers to and from the platforms, rigs and ships in the North Sea.

[airwave45]

imsafe, from

http://www.sintef.no/upload/Teknologi_og_samfunn/Sikkerhet%20og%20p%C3%A5litelighet/Rapporter/SINTEF%20A15753%20Helicopter%20Safety%20Study%203%20_HSS-3_%20Main%20Report.pdf


Table 5.3.
Accidents in the North Sea in the period 1999–2009.

No. Date Helicopter Country Fatalities Survivors
1 2000-02-15 AS332L UK - -
2 2001-07-12 S-76A UK - -
3 2001-11-10 AS332L UK - -


4 2002-02-28 AS332L UK - -

5 2002-07-16 S-76A UK 11 0
6 2002-11-05 AS332L2 NO - -
7 2006-03-03 AS332L2 UK - -
8 2006-12-27 SA365N UK 7 0


9 2008-02-22 AS332L2 UK - -

10 2008-03-09 SA365N UK - -

11 2009-02-18 EC225 UK - -
12 2009-04-01 AS332L2 UK 16 0

Sum 34 0

the formatting has gone, but you see now why I can leave the Noggies out of this ?
They do more flying than us and have a vanishngly small crash rate.

Now, why is that?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Aircraft safety briefing videos represent a leap forward in safety for, as HC mentioned, they deliver consistency but, for more importantly, are able to illustrate key safety factors, in most cases, far more effectively than "live" briefs.

I encourage helicopter operators to have a downloadable safety video for each type they operate on their websites and would encourage bears to download these onto their tablets and laptops and to watch the relevant video prior to their next flight.

This can never be a substitute for the pre-flight safety video but it can be an important enhancement to offshore safety.

[What happens if I pr]

Resources. Is the easy answer to that.
Noggy oil companies are willing to pay for a better level of cover on all fronts.
Including back up aircraft, instead of trimming to a minimum level.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

HC. The 76 blade defect was a manufacture defect that was accepted and release to service by SK.

I should like to remember this correctly.

I thought the blade had suffered a lightning strike, was sent to SAC for repairs, then returned to Bristow whereafter it failed on take-off from a platform?

[bigglesbutler]

Originally Posted by OMONEZ View Post
HC. The 76 blade defect was a manufacture defect that was accepted and release to service by SK.
I should like to remember this correctly.

I thought the blade has suffered a lightning strike, was sent to SAC for repairs, then returned to Bristow whereafter it failed on take-off from a rig?

Yes thats how I remember it, lightning strike followed by repairs and subsequent failure.

Si

[lostinp]

S76Heavy
HeliComparator

Unfortunately it was not included on the DVD, but before the flight I did a check of each piece of safety gear I was wearing trying to remember exactly what I was taught
Perhaps a physical demo would have been much better. especially in my case as I had not flown in a chopper in a cold water environment since my HUET 3 years ago

[HeliComparator]

Airwave, what are all those accidents with no survivors and no fatalities? Where they ground incidents or what ( maybe it depends on the definition of an accident, which varies from region to region).

Anyway, we have of consequence:
in 2002 the 76 accident that was solely the manufacturer's fault

in 2006 the Morcambe Bay dauphin, solely pilot error (with some underlying questions about training and Ops Man)

in 2009 the nasty L2, down to maintenance issues.

The rest are what? Bumping the rotor blades on the hangar doors when tractoring it in for example? Publishing a list of events, without knowing what they are, is not helpful.

[HeliComparator]

AS / Si yes, and in fact several years of service went by after the repair, until it failed.

[gasax]

Oldpilot - boat transfers are not done by basket but by hydraulic gangway. There are still weather restrictions but to date gangway transfer is significantly safer than helicopters.

Helicopters win on convenience and weather limits - not safety (although if the gangway limits are pushed that will change!)

[S76Heavy]

Lostinp; every safety video from every company I've worked for showed the correct use of all safety equipment. In the old days we used to have a cabin attendant as well, nowadays when embarking r/r is will be a bit difficult but I always answer any queries from pax about the flight and equipment.

It should have been on the video, if not then it is a serious omission.

[imsafe]

Airwave,

If you look into the statistics from the GOM you may or may not (i don't know) find that a majority of the fatal accidents occured from one specific base. If you then leave those "safe" bases out of the statistics you may find that NS is safer after all.

Talking about statistics it would be interesting to see statistics of accidents/fatalities per helicopter type and operating hours in the NS.

[OMONEZ]

HC. The 76 blade defect was a manufacture defect that was accepted and release to service by SK.

The fold in the strip holed the spar when it had a lightning strike, it was returned to service after going to a blade facility in the UK, wonder who owned them????? We don't use multi section strips in the EBU any more.

HC, BB. The 76 blade had a production consession for a folded over abrasion strip edge. This created a point for the lightning to burn the spar. None of this was recorded on the log card. The blade inspection after the strike was done in the UK I seem to remember. In the same area of the country.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Unfortunately it was not included on the DVD

Could you indicate what was omitted from the safety video?

[imsafe]

Another good questions is why the fact that minimizing the exposure time to reduce the risk has not been brought into the spotlight. Why fly to North Alwyn from Aberdeen when it is a lot shorter from the Shetlands or Norway.

That is all about politics.

[diginagain]

Sorry, gasax, but the contingency plan for crewchanging on my rig is currently FROG-3 or Billy Pugh.

[Genie the Greenie]

I log into Rotorheads to sometimes learn from experienced commentators like HC, SASless etc, as well as enjoying the contraversial banter. However the injection of the offshore workers viewpoint is dragging this thread and network to a point that interest is waining. What has happened is sad, but has to be fully investigated, the root cause identified and procedures or rectifications put in place to prevent re-occurance. Accidents happen and other than the 2 x 225 incidents every incident over the past 3 decades have been unrelated. The SP variants have proven themselves reliable aircraft over a 30 year period, this should not be forgotten.The level of competence of pilots, engineers and support staff in the UK helicopter companies is second to none, remembering that a good number of these people rotate around all 3 major players. They also take their skills to places all over the world because foreign companies respect the abilities of the UK aviation trained professional in all fields. As mentioned by several individuals in various points and threads this is a "Professional Pilot Rumour Network" not a forum for aviation professionals to be questioned by the other "aviation Professionals" who sit in the back of every offshore flight.Entertaining questions from the cabin will only encourage more to participate. I have nothing against the offshore workforce who are skilled and qualified in what they do, however, we drive you drill holes in the floor, lets leave it there.Each to their own forum please.

[b.borg]

Update: CHC Statement on Sumburgh Aircraft Accident (http://www.chc.ca/AboutCHC/News/Pages/CHC-statement-on-Sumburgh-Aircraft-Incident.aspx) 25 August, 2300 UK time

Harry O & Mitcha have previously commented on the CHC press release of 25 August 2300 (UK time)

Given the political climate and possible repercussions, I would presume that both Eurocopter& the AAIB were aware of the text - if not party to its drafting.

If you deconstruct the text an interesting conundrum appears.
“AS332L2 aircraft landed in the water” – Interesting use of semantics – why does CHC, a helicopter company, call the AS332L2 “an aircraft” and not a helicopter. There is however one line where CHC refer to “the helicopter”, which is either sloppy editing or could indicate more than one author was involved in writing the document. Further, “landed” implies a deliberate, intentional action. Why the helicopter “landed” on the sea and not on the runway “about two nautical miles” away, is not mentioned.

CHC state: “We believe that engineering and operating differences associated with AS332L/L1 and EC225 aircraft warrant continuing flights with those aircraft”. In other words CHC believe that the “engineering and operational differences” associated with the L2, do not warrant continuing flights with the L2.

CHC again point to the L2: “…we canceled all of our Sunday (Aug. 25) flights…” “…”in order to give us time to take stock of any implications associated with Friday’s accident, which involved an AS332L2 aircraft.” and, “CHC plans to resume normal operations on Monday with AS332L/L1 and EC225 aircraft.” But CHC does not plan to resume operations with the L2.

I have never flown any of the SP family of “aircraft” - L/L1/L2/225 - and my time in the North Sea was happily spent only on Sikorsky types, however almost every Emergency checklist I have used will have a mandatory requirement to “land immediately” in case of specific warnings, failures, instrument indications, which could have a catastrophic consequence if ignored.

So, now to the conundrum and perhaps HC or any other knowledgeable SP L/L1/L2/225 pilot can provide a hint:

What engineering and operational differences are associated specifically with the L2, but are not found on the L, L1, or 225, which in case of a caution warning, failure, impeding malfunction or other indication, requires the helicopter to land immediately?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Lostinp, your safety video must surely have been similar to this:

3vmEW04gcjQ

[Wander00]

Am I misreading the CVs of the top echelons of CHC - lot of experience in the computer industry but don't see a lot about aviation, especially rotary.....................apologies if I am getting wrong end of the stick

[Grenville Fortescue]

Am I misreading the CVs of the top echelons of CHC - lot of experience in the computer industry but don't see a lot about aviation, especially rotary.....................apologies if I am getting wrong end of the stick

You clearly haven't read the recent pages in which we have been decrying the "big company" culture which, among other things, lends favour to those with "big" corporate experience but who do not necessarily have an ounce of aviation expertise in their past.

[gasax]

Diginagain

That would be in common with many others - but if helicopter availability is threatened, or people simply refuse to get on them, that plan will be rapidly changed.

This year there are to my personal knowledge at least 4 walk to work vessels operating - so the total is probably much higher.

[Wander00]

GF - guess we are on the same side then. Isn't "management" one of the factors taken into account in deciding whether or not to issue an Operator's Certificate - how far down the chain can there be the first appearance of someone who can spell "helicopter" or "aeroplane"?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Operations Manager.

[diginagain]

gasax, my understanding is that TOTAL have spot-hired three DP vessels to carry-out crewchanges for their three clusters. Transfer will be by FROG-3/Billy Pugh for units with cranes certified for personnel transfer, such as ours on the Borgsten.

[diginagain]

Way to go, Genie. :ugh:

[Grenville Fortescue]

Way to go, Genie. :ugh:

Genie, I didn't want to criticise your post (and do not do so now) because I respect your opinion.

However, the "bears" lives are in the hands of the drivers in a way that is not reciprocated (unless of course someone does something unthinkable on the platform as an aircraft comes into land but that, as we know, is unlikely).

While the bears may not possess any formal knowledge of aviation operations we would be fools to believe that they cannot comprehend a good portion of what goes on generally and their vested interest (their lives), to me, represents a valid component of the ongoing safety discussion which, necessarily, needs all stakeholders to be involved.

I would say that this incident, where bears were potentially "trapped" inside the fuselage, and in the wake of recent Puma incidents/accidents - that embracing the views and concerns of the bears is not only appropriate, but necessary.

[Senior Pilot]

As mentioned by several individuals in various points and threads this is a "Professional Pilot Rumour Network" not a forum for aviation professionals to be questioned by the other "aviation Professionals" who sit in the back of every offshore flight.Entertaining questions from the cabin will only encourage more to participate. I have nothing against the offshore workforce who are skilled and qualified in what they do, however, we drive you drill holes in the floor, lets leave it there.Each to their own forum please.

Genie,

We very specifically amended Rotorheads forum to be inclusive of all those who are:


Rotorheads A haven for helicopter professionals to discuss the things that affect them

This is obviously a much read thread and many emotive posts have been suitably moderated, but there is no reason to exclude those who have valid and reasoned contributions.

Just as your occasional visit and posts are welcome, so are those posts here from other 'occasional' contributors.

[DMackie]

Entertaining questions from the cabin will only encourage more to participate.

Absolutely dreadful statement.

Despite your name I presume you're a pilot? In which case prior to every take off you announce that anyone who has any concerns or thinks anything is wrong should approach the crew. Maybe that should be stopped as well?

[HeliComparator]

b.borg, a valid question but as one who has flown the L, L2 and 225 I am unable to answer. There are of course many differences between each variant's lights and procedures, but what in particular they are alluding to I don't know. The L2 for example is the only one with the rather odd pendulous balance weights on the main rotor blades, but it would be pure and unfounded speculation to say that this might be the issue. If it was, I'm sure there would be an EAD out by now.

[jimf671]

Airwave 45

Well done for bringing us those figures but take care that you are comparing like with like. Importantly, the regulators define >45 deg lat as Hostile Environment for a reason. GoM, frankly, is largely short hops across toy-town in the sunshine compared to NS (and yes, I have been there, though it was a while ago, like your figures).

There is a complex balance of factors in play with figures like these. HC makes several good points. Water temperature is a very serious issue. The size of aircraft is a more complex one than we usually accept: I believe that the complexity of escaping from a cabin with 19 confused people in it is somewhat glossed over compared to a handful in a Dauphin.
------------------

What Happens If I Pr

Resources. Is the easy answer to that.
Noggy oil companies are willing to pay for a better level of cover on all fronts.
Including back up aircraft, instead of trimming to a minimum level.

Agreed. Using 2011 conservative World Bank figures the Norwegians have a Gross National Income per capita 135% higher than the UK. It is not rocket science to work out that if you have over twice as much money then you can make things safer.
--------------------

WINDOWS

The window sizes on S-92 and SP up to L2 are a disgrace. Well done to AH/EC for the window sizes on the EC225. Looking to the future, AW189 and EC175 look like they will provide us with excellent escape windows.
--------------------

ONLINE RESOURCES

As has been stated above, better use could be made of ICT to transmit safety information.

The online presence of the three main Aberdeen operators is pretty dreadful. Even scheduling and luggage info is done poorly. This is 2013 guys. (Minimum fancy rubbish please. Up-front options for plain, easy-to-load website info that can be seen on dialup, a ropey drilling rig sat link or a phone.)

Schedule, luggage restriction, safety videos (including rebreather!), type safety cards and yes, even accident stats. This takes effort to get right and keep updated but it will be worth it. And every rig helo guy should get an update message when stuff changes.

[gasax]

Thanks for the update diginagain. None of our clients have been in touch yet for a formal assessment but discretion is the watchword at the moment.

I suspect many/most of the offshore operators have similar continguency plans.

I've done a lot of these transfers in the bad old days of the N.Sea and had a colleague who was within a whisper of being killed (they had to punch him to make him let go of the remains of a Billy Pugh (old type) which had caught the superstructure and been ripped apart!). You get used to it pretty quickly - and the risks are very obvious.

But Aviation professionals talking about luck and aviation companies talking about 'landing' in the sea are not going to turn these things around.

A significant difference in accident rates across the N.Sea over 15 years is very difficult to explain simply on the basis of randomness. It can happen, but it is a question which has to be answered by some concrete actions.

[pilot and apprentice]

Airwave45
HC, read your point.
I'm not a fan of the press, too much power, too little responsibility.

Just a bear.

Have a bit of p1 time, but way more slf time, so have a wee bit of insight to both sides (currently non grafting)
No p1 on anything H (or p2 on anything H)

But what I'm trying to get across to the boys n girls up front is that the pax are genuinely, seriously, scared to get into any of the 330 variants.

If you don't seriously address those concerns, an alternate will be found.
I refer you back to sassles, proper ground up introspection is required.

Not on here (too public)
But really, when your frequency of unplanned arrivals on heavy / medium twins is equal to the GoM with singles/single pilot ops....(i've done the research, it is)
You really, really should be looking closely at what you do.


then Pitts:
Question. At what point is a Super Puma seen as a family of helicopters or individual models??

Recent events seem to blur things where I think it would be fair to say many seem to like to quote X number of flight hours of the Super Puma fleet as a whole when looking for statistics to promote a positive view on the model (s) and then instantly wish to differentiate individual models when one or another goes in. Just an observation.

There has also been comments around if the UK side of the North Sea is as safe or are individual operators / industry as a whole doing all it can safety wise. Given the community isn't that big in the grand scheme what are the pilots that complain doing about it? Maybe they are putting their hands up for huge change and its being ignored? (although that doesn't seem to be reflected here).

HC suggests that poor exploitation of HUMS is to blame for the crash of G-REDL and the two recent 225's that ditched, yet in order for the 225 to fly in the interim we have further reliance on HUMS...even more incredible is that there has been a complete change of view from Eurocopter regarding onboard HUMS data from the AAIB recommendations from the G-REDL crash to recent events with the 225.

The point is its all very well moaning about a faceless "industry" but thats just made up of individuals whom for the most part seemed to just rely on the fact that Eurocopter has a bunch of clever people and the rest should but out.

The problem with this entire incident, hysteria, FB bull$hit, and endless stats being thrown about is that manipulating the numbers to support a preconceived idea is one of the easiest jobs out there. I am curious what snapshot of the GOM and NS would produce comparable stats. I would say limited in time (specific years) and excluding ares of the NS that didn't have a statistic to add.

I don't have the necessary hours in the day to go back and quote every post that needs addressing, but I can add some examples.

Someone stated that his son worked offshore, and that his perception of an unsafe operator was reinforced by aircraft that were late or cancelled because of a technical fault (so different from the airlines that they use to get to the heliport). Bollocks!! That shows an operator that is willing to cancel, and lose the revenue, rather than say nothing and just get the job done. When BA delays a flight for 4 hours, or you get in a 777 and the ticket said 340, what do you think was going on? They just didn't tell you.

Airwave45:I am lost, as a group you want the bears to accept that the current level of attrition is ok.
As a bear, i'm letting you know, we disagree.

Noone says that an accident is ok, but lets get REAL about the "attrition".

OF the 5 332 variant hull losses that have everyone riled up about (not 330, that's even more barely related variants) one was not related to type AT ALL. CFIT is crew/training/etc. The Bond incident had a clear cause, not related to specific design. One is unknown. The 225 bevel incidents wouldn't even be in discussion of the EmLub hadn't been a factor. EC, the operator, etc would know but the hysterical media would not.

The Boeing 777 has had a fatal accident every second month for the last 2 months. It's true, check the statistics. A quick wiki search provided 9 737 airline crashes, several hundred fatalities, from 2010 to 2013, but I doubt anyone is refusing to buy a ticket on RyanAir (or whatever low budget 'airline' is operating the 737 beside them on the airport).

My point? What I just wrote is "fact" but no sane person would use stats like those to make real life decisions. This knee-jerk hysteria around the Puma/Super Puma/225 family of aircraft is a collective game with the same rules.

I have had many nervous offshore passengers over the years, and I have always tried allay their fears as best I could, but I always wonder if they actually look at themselves when they ask the questions they do.

Flying a 212 offshore, we had a minor technical fault (bad gauge, don't remember which one). Rather than defer the defect and carry on (legal), or just ignore it (not legal but in real life and years ago it would have happened), I elected to shut down and get it fixed now. Walking back to the passenger lounge I explained why we had shut down and that we would be ready to go in a short time. One older gentlemen asked me many more questions, and wanted to know several times if it would be safe. I assured him it would be, and that I would only accept the aircraft when I was fully satisfied. He stated "I don't want to die" and I answered "neither do I". He seemed satisfied and we shortly completed the flight.

My question is: Do you really think that we are so much more willing than you to die out there?

[Bravo73]

Oldpilot - boat transfers are not done by basket but by hydraulic gangway.

Not necessarily. From another thread (elsewhere) during the recent foggy patch in the NNS:

http://i.imgur.com/B0M5KCwh.jpg

http://i.imgur.com/hEgDDcYh.jpg

http://i.imgur.com/lDBrBDUh.jpg

Q3jJhRSqVB4

ZIwaBV_-EwI

This was onto the John Shaw semi-sub at the end of July/beginning of August and, as you can see from the clips, the sea state was very benign.



Sorry, gasax, but the contingency plan for crewchanging on my rig is currently FROG-3 or Billy Pugh.

Ah, I should have continued reading the thread before I responded to gasax. :O

[Savoia]

Genie, We specifically amended he tRotorheads forum to be inclusive of all those who are "helicopter professionals".


And I remember commending this inclusive decision by Heliport and Senior Pilot at the time.

I think this is the right opportunity to mention how lucky we are to have someone such as Senior Pilot as our Moderator. I've seen some of the 'acts of moderation' on neighbouring forums and, as I say, we are lucky.

Since Heliport's departure from day-to-day involvement with Rotorheads, the burden of checking almost every single post on the forum has been carried almost exclusively by Senior Pilot.

Accident threads such as these throw-up a plethora of comments, some of which are potentially libelous for PPRuNe if they are not 'amended' and many others which run high with emotion and are charged with passions both professional and private.

Sorting this out while giving everyone their 'voice' requires impartiality and commitment, both of which Senior Pilot constantly displays. And, as with all PPRuNe Moderators, he does this on a voluntary basis.

So, to Senior Pilot, for his constant and commendable efforts, our sincere thanks. :D :D :D

[pilot and apprentice]

NST1990:
Be on no uncertain terms, there is a lot of anger in the work force, and it's being fuelled by the assumption by the pilots that they are that 'little bit slower'.

This thread is in the public domain now, and spreading fast, there are a few furious groups angered even more by being called 'bears' and questioning their intelligence.

I was agreeing with you (I am less 'educated' than most of my passengers) until you indicated that an anonymous internet forum is being seen as indicative of what any group thinks. It's like FB, it's not real life.

If the guys in the back are judging me based on what they read online, then I have just lost an enormous amount of the respect I had for them.

No, i don't fly in the NS. Before anyone asks.

[diginagain]

gasax, understand your feelings completely, buddy. I take a rather more pragmatic view about the randomness of chance, possibly due to experience. I don't waste money on lotto tickets because of the odds. If two blokes pitch-up this afternoon with an L2 to take me home I have no issues with joining them onboard. I stand more chance of being wiped-out going home on the M5. We make our choices based on our perception of the risks involved.

[lostinp]

Grenville Fortescue
There was no information on how to use the re-breather
Perhaps a one off wrong video.

[pilot and apprentice]

maeroda:
John,

the point is that as plank passenger you and I can select the air carrier and plane type as our desire is, oil workers cannot.

Carrier yes, they may change the plane and never tell you.

And then, as an employee, like them, my employer buys the ticket, like them, and chooses the carrier, like them.

We are more alike than some seem to think.

[Ex Greenie]

I have read with interest a lot of good discussion on here but People Like Greenie Genie should be aware that there are those of who now work offshore who indeed have had years of experience in aviation other than as a passenger.

[phive]

airwave 45

Rework your figures to 1997 and include Helikopter Service flight 451.

[Unusual Attitude]

The hydraulic gangway systems or "Walk to Work" as they are commonly known in the industry are indeed a good sollution for getting people sefely from vessels onto rigs and I was personally involved in 4 such charters this year, 3 of which are ongoing. There are two main systems in use at the moment, the Amplemann system and the Offshore Access Sollutions system, there is also a 3rd system just arrived from Uptime but its largly unproven at this time.

The problem is however that these take time to mobilse, they are by no means plug and play systems and each has to have design approvals for any vessel they are mobilised onto. You also have the issue of vertical reach for rigs and in some cases large platforms need to be designed, constructed and installed onto the vessels deck to give the required vertical reach, the last one of these took about 3months from design to approval.

The MCA also threw a spanner in the works this year by declaring that any vessels to be used for passenger transfer / walk to work duties need to comply with SPS 2008 coding otherwise they are limited to carrying a maximum of 12 passengers. This has led to the crazy situation where vessels doing walk to work all last season have not been allowed to do so again this season and the market is currently pretty much sold out for SPS coded vessels.
We did have a situation a few weeks ago due to the backlog caused by the fog where the MCA were issuing waivers on a voyage by voyage basis to allow passenger transferes and there are rumours they may be about to relax the rules in the next day or two given this unfortunate incident.

You are then however back to having to do FROG transfers for at least several weeks until Walk to Work systems can be mobilised onto vessels and there is no 'fast track' sollution for this, not if you want it done safely. Shell, BP, Talisman and Chevron have one vessel each with a gangway already in place but these vessels are already tied into offshore maintenance scopes, the BP vessel only has about 40 spare beds anyway, thats hardly going to make a dent.

Also as we approach the winter and the weather picks up walk to work and FROG's will be off the table given their limited weather operating criteria. Its going to be a tricky situation for the Bears and it may be that the only sollution in the interim is longer durations between crewchanges.

UA

[bondu]

Well said Savoia! :ok:

bondu

[lostinp]

gasax

basket transfers should be banned Lost a workmate on one just a few months ago
Crane operator screwed up big time

[Anthony Supplebottom]

To Senior Pilot, for his constant and commendable efforts, our sincere thanks. :D :D :D

Absolutely right, thank you sir!

Helikopter Service flight 451.

Helikopter Service Flight 451 was a Eurocopter AS 332L1 Super Puma helicopter which crashed into the Norwegian Sea 100 nautical miles northwest of Brønnøysund, Norway, on 8 September 1997. The aircraft was en route from Brønnøysund Airport, Brønnøy to Norne, an offshore oil platform.

The accident was caused by a fatigue crack in a spline of a power transmission shaft connector, which ultimately caused the power transmission shaft to fail.

All twelve persons on board were killed.

[Rocket2]

Omonez
Just read post 464 " it was returned to service after going to a blade facility in the UK, wonder who owned them????? "
May I suggest you get your facts right? The blade was returned to service by the OEM, not the UK company, nor its US parent company.
Both companies were given a hell of a going over by the CAA & FAA after the tragic accident & totally exonerated (cue spelling police!)
Cheers
R2

Edited to add that your wrong on another point - at the time neither company was owned by who you imply in your post.

[pilot and apprentice]

Airwave45:
I appreciate that I'm not qualified to sit at the front of the bus, I am capable of reading some stats tho.

Taken from http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/434-11.pdf

Between 1998 and 2006 (ok, old data, but still relevant)
North Sea 1.3 million hours flown, 12 accidents, 18 killed. 108k hrs/accident
GoM 3.7 million hours flown, 106 accidents, 53 killed. 35k hrs/accident
Everywhere else 3.1 million hours flown, 69 accidents, 149 killed.

Given that the Noggies are unfairly saddled with Scottish prangs, we'll take them out, giving 650,000 flying hours to work the stats against.

In the Scottish sector, in the above period, you flew 36,111 hours per fatality. 54k hrs/accident
The Americans flew 69,811 hours per fatality 35k hrs/accident . A large amount of which was in single engine single pilot helicopters, which even slf understand is not as good as medium/heavy twins with two pilots up front. and explains lower numbers of fatalities

Rest of the world is 20,805 hours per fatality.

Reasurances that you'll investigate specific incidents mean nothing, you already do that and it doesn't actually make any difference.
(in the overall picture)
Too many and too often is the problem.

And now that we are irked enough to actually look at the stats in detail, it's looking an awful lot like there is a Scottish specific, long term, failing.
Why, with better equipment, are you killing people twice as often as the Americans?

ok, the above is a tad emotive.
But it's meant to be.
If you are leading the world at what you do, great, patronise away.
You are not leading the world at anything bar dropping helicopters in the oggin.
And you are in them whilst they are dropping in.

What can be meaningfully done to improve things?
Why are the Noggies so much better than the Scottish operators?

OK. Nothing about the above relates to the 332, but ok.

I have looked at YOUR stats and found new numbers. Others have added their own observational bias.

HC:Airwave - lies, damned lies and statistics! Firstly if you look at the accident rate, as opposed to the fatal accident rate, the GoM is far worse. Because they fly small helis, each accident only risks the lives of a handful, so they can have far more fatal accidents than we can. At least a good chunk of the N Sea fatals in that period must have come from the Bristow 76 that disintegrated off Norwich. Really, its hard to see how the operator could have avoided that accident - it was down to an undetectable maintenance error on a rotor blade at Sikorsky. So that one accident really skews the stats. Plus, lots of people can fall into the sea in GoM and in general, because its a more benign environment, they get away without dying. Comparing stats from different types of operations can be misleading.

Again, we aren't saying there is no issue. We are saying that an emotional attack on a type, location, operator, or trade does noone any good.

[Pittsextra]

P&A I agree with you regarding your sentiment around knee jerk reaction and statistics, although given recent events its not hard to see how we are where we are.

HC directed me to read the REDL accident report and so I did, it makes for some pretty poor reading and depending on which side of the fence you might sit you could throw any number of bodies under the bus. From the guy in the workshop to the manufacturer to the aviation authority and their certification process.

In the end I think its terribly condescending of those who harp on about how accidents will always happen and its part of managing your risk. of course they know that. What I suspect people don't like is to be told how they should trust a set of people that have been seen to let them down in the recent past.

I read today that Bristow have suspended some Super Puma family helicopter services in the UK and Nigeria. That's not knee jerk, that's probably just good old fashioned common sense at this stage isn't it?

[212man]

The L2 for example is the only one with the rather odd pendulous balance weights on the main rotor blades

One of which detached in flight from a Norsk Aircraft in 2002 and would have led to a ditching if the crew hadn't spotted a passing ship (to land on)!

[airwave45]

P and A,
Very well put together post.

There is a view from the front of the bus that every effort will be made to understand root cause for each incident, I believe you as an industry do that exceptionally well.

It's a very reactive way to address safety issues though.

The Norwegian approach seems to be significantly more proactive.

As for comparing stats, you can get them to say anything as you pointed out, the 777 may have crashed every other month over the last two but despite flying into a wall at close to your Vne, it still only killed one person.
(terrible tragedy with the emergency services, for all concerned)
It's a tank.

Data mining the stats GoM vs NS is possible as Take off and landing data is there. But it's pretty obvious that N Sea ops are only, at best, almost as good as GoM. (but you would be stretching things to say as good as)
Given the differences in machinery, that should not be so.
Look at the difference between the East and West of the N Sea and a blind man in a dark room could see that something is not right.

I'm with you in that I don't think any specific aircraft is responsible for this.
Given the percieved difficulty by the pilots / mechs on here to pinpoint why we are not as good as the Norwegians, I'll happily see the SP sacrificed to the press as that will shake the business up sufficiently to make us find out what is going on.

It's not big and it's not clever, but it will make change happen.

[pilot and apprentice]

At no point have I said 'accidents happen' Pitts. I am saying statistics lie and that emotion clouds reality. This accident is a tragic loss of life and I hope that we all can learn from it to avoid repitition. Pandering to FB, basing the public opinion on hearsay from a relative of a passenger, and picking and choosing which stats to look at are the issues I am completely sick of.

When an oil rig catches fire, explodes, leaks crude, or kills people do we shut them all down? Or all semi-subs? No, it's ridiculous. I trust that the men and women working on the vessels I land on, spend time on, and race to when I am needed are professional enough to do their best to provide a safe environment for me.

I do the same for them!

As for the grounding....good sense for the PR guys. Limited adverse effect if not necessary. But if a 332/225 has an incident removed from the previous by every magnitude possible, no connection whatsoever, the damage to the type and the operator will be insurmountable. Risk assessment says pander to the mob.

Operationally, given the paucity of information, the groundings are unjustified. The history of the type does not support it nor do the stats. I believe that if there was a design flaw that had come to light there would not be a single individual trying to hide it. We would all know.

We are where we are because too many people have traded in their brains for paperwork, their balls for PR and longevity, and our CEO's have no connection to their industries.

[Mechta]

Given;


the current lack of confidence in the Super Puma variants by those who travel to work in them,
the potential loss of revenue to UK PLC and the rig operators from a sudden reduction in available helicopters,
the evident difference in accident/incident rates between the various North Sea helicopter operators,

the industry and regulators need to find out what the differences are between the various operators' day to day methods which enables some to have a considerably better safety record than others.


This is not going to be revealed in an hour-long tour by a company's PR department, so what is needed is a task force of experienced (maybe retired?) helicopter industry professionals who can go into each company and work alongside the personnel there, in all operations and maintenance departments, to establish which aspects of one company's culture enable it to operate the same machine as its competitors, but with less incidents.


Each visit would need to last weeks, if not months, to give time for a range of incidents to be observed and see how they are managed, as well as giving sufficient time for the 'being watched' feeling to go and the true style of operations to be observed.


Such an exercise would need the cooperation of all the operators, and assurances that the sole objective is to bring industry standards up to the level of the best.

[SASless]

Gentlemen (and Ladies),

I awoke to find five new pages to this thread from when I left it late last night.

It took a full cup of coffee to read through the new posts and consider what I had read.

In a previous post I warned that there would be shoulder dropping, finger pointing, spinning, etc....before this issue or issues had been resolved.

I was right....it started while I was sound asleep, safely snug in my bed.

Air Wave in post 440 hit the Nail squarely on the Head.....every damn one of you posting here need to go back and read that post again.

Reasurances that you'll investigate specific incidents mean nothing, you already do that and it doesn't actually make any difference.
(in the overall picture)
Too many and too often is the problem.

He stated words to the effect...."Every accident gets investigated and recommendations are made." His point being, as I understood it....is the "System" never gets investigated.

That is the crux of the problem.....the entire system needs investigating and the System needs fixing. It is the System that is causing the problems that manifest themselves in the form of Incidents, Ditchings, and Crashes.

A direct example of what I am talking about.....the Bristow 76 that had the Lightning Struck Rotor Blade re-installed on a different Aircraft.

HC refuses to accept, admit, or confront the Bristow Management Decision to re-use that Blade after it had been involved in a Lightning Strike on a different aircraft.

Get him to list the damage done to the aircraft that was struck by Lightning and pass judgement on the Management Decision, which would have required the Engineers agreeing to it.

That Blade should never have been put back into service.

He is correct there was a manufacturing defect in the blade that upon being struck by Lightning.....led to the blade failure. The defect would not otherwise have harmed the integrity of the blade EXCEPT for the Lightning Strike.

The System failed in that case and good Men died as direct result.

Ask HC what the Bristow Policy is now on re-using parts from aircraft that are struck by Lightning.

Folks, Drop the Shields!

Go back and look at every single accident, at every single incident, and re-consider all the causes of the problems. That is what is needed....not protecting your turf, shifting blame, spinning the truth.

The Truth is the UK North Sea Helicopter operation has problems that need to directly addressed.

The Accident rate in the GOM are DOWN.....even the US HEMS Industry Accident Rates are DOWN. They had to go down as they damn sure could not go up very much. Key.....The American Helicopter Industry and the FAA did something. Kicking and Screaming....they did something but they finally admitted there was a problem and then set out to improve the situation.

That is where you are today.....and kicking and screaming you are going to have to do something about it.

Nick Lappos in a Safety Seminar I attended.....said "The harder you have to argue you have no problem.....the bigger your problem really is."

So ya'll keep on arguing about how big your problem is.

[Genie the Greenie]

Senior Pilot & GF:My apologies if my post was viewed as insulting those who have contributed to this thread this was not the case. I guess I am as frustrated as others in that accusations are being made about the abilities and competence of UK aviation professionals by individuals who do not work in the aviation industry they merely use it. GF you are entirely correct that the lives of the passengers are in our hands and, agreed, we always welcome questions from those passengers who come forward from the cabin and this will/should continue. To start down the line of UK aviation standards versus Norwegian aviation standards is drifting off the events of what happened last Friday and is nonsense. Why does the UK have more incidents than Norway is exactly the same as HC stated in why CHC & Bond have had more than Bristow...that being luck.My opinion.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Mechta, yours is a sound idea.

But do you know one of the most effective ways this could be accomplished?

Well let me tell you first of all how it could be stifled. If you leave it to the operators to sort it out among themselves it will never happen because there will be suspicions as to allegiances and agenda.

If you give it to the authority they will draw-up some fabulous list of requirements any such task force would need to possess and in the process most likely circumvent those who could realistically offer the most (ie. the retired jocks and spanners you suggest).

One of the areas in which you might therefore find the most support, is from the bears themselves. A North Sea Helicopter Operations Task Force comprised of retired pilots and engineers, supported in their mission by offshore workers and paid for by Oilco Plc.

I encourage to pursue what you have proposed.

[SASless]

"Luck" is made....not inherited.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Senior Pilot & GF:My apologies if my post was viewed as insulting those who have contributed to this thread.

No apology necessary. As stated, I respect your view.

I apologise myself however if my support (earlier in the thread) for a comparison between British and Norwegian operations was in any way unhelpful. I can only plead ignorance together with an initial alarm at the statistics being touted. The situation is still far from clear though and it would seem that some recommendations from the Sintef report may be applicable as well as other general operational procedures from Norway but, none of this is as yet confirmed.

We've had something similar this morning with another set of statistics being touted telling us that GOM ops are safer than NS ops and which comes as a surprise because within the industry NS operators use their NS ops as a sort of professional benchmark. Again, as with the 'Norwegian scenario' the facts are too sparse for us to draw any substantive interpretations let alone conclusions.

Hence my support for Mechta's proposal which I think is a sound idea.

[HeliComparator]

SAS, I don't know too much about the 76 blade, it is a type I have never flown and the event occured on a base I have never operated from. However I believe that the manufacturer's recommendations were followed to the letter. You could argue that Bristow should have known better than Sikorsky about how to deal with damaged parts, but I think that is unrealistic. In accordance with the MM, the part was returned to the Sikorsky facility, who had full knowledge about the nature of the damage, they as the experts in the field, did what they considered necessary to return the part to service. What you are saying is something along the lines of "anytime a helicopter develops a defect, it should be thrown away and a new one put into service. Everytime a component reaches its overhaul life, it should be thrown away and not overhauled." Not terribly practical.

Yes, with hindsight everyone now realises the potential danger of those actions, but before the event, everybody (operator, manufacturer, regulator) though they were doing the right thing and not cutting any corners.

The true cause of that accident was the latent manufacturing defect in the blade. As witnessed by the fact that all the AAIB's recommendations were aimed at the manufacturer, none at the operator.

[Pittsextra]

At no point have I said 'accidents happen' Pitts. I am saying statistics lie and that emotion clouds reality. This accident is a tragic loss of life and I hope that we all can learn from it to avoid repitition. Pandering to FB, basing the public opinion on hearsay from a relative of a passenger, and picking and choosing which stats to look at are the issues I am completely sick of.

When an oil rig catches fire, explodes, leaks crude, or kills people do we shut them all down? Or all semi-subs? No, it's ridiculous. I trust that the men and women working on the vessels I land on, spend time on, and race to when I am needed are professional enough to do their best to provide a safe environment for me.

I do the same for them!

As for the grounding....good sense for the PR guys. Limited adverse effect if not necessary. But if a 332/225 has an incident removed from the previous by every magnitude possible, no connection whatsoever, the damage to the type and the operator will be insurmountable. Risk assessment says pander to the mob.

Operationally, given the paucity of information, the groundings are unjustified. The history of the type does not support it nor do the stats. I believe that if there was a design flaw that had come to light there would not be a single individual trying to hide it. We would all know.

We are where we are because too many people have traded in their brains for paperwork, their balls for PR and longevity, and our CEO's have no connection to their industries.

P&A - I didn't attribute the "accidents happen" element to you.

I hear the view over the groundings but I'm not sure what message it sends had they not occurred, even if there are willing passengers to fly in them today in any event? I don't know. One can suggest its irrational but the one who pays the piper calls the tune...

I don't agree with the last paragraph. I don't think the stockholders of Bristow (keep the piper and his tune in the front of the mind) give two fecks about Bill Chiles ability to fly a helicopter. They care that the business is tightly run with increasing margins and revenues, end of.

The same will be true for the stockholders at EADS, however it does seem that the man now at the helm of Eurocopter is in fact a professional pilot but I don't expect much to change, do you?

[Nige321]

From the BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-23846713)

It appears they are still looking for the tail section...

[gasax]

I enjoy reading the posts that SASless makes. He has a great talent for aiming at right spot - but a completely warped love of the Chinook!

On this thread he has posted the quote Nick Lappos in a Safety Seminar I attended.....said "The harder you have to argue you have no problem.....the bigger your problem really is."

I've read all of the accident investigations of the UK crashes and they make sad reading - failed procedures, failed processes, engineering or design errors. Their cumulative effect has got us here. Most of the non-pilot contributions have been trying to point this out.

Airwave I think sums up the passenger view quite well. If the 332s have to be scarificed to shake things up, tough! It is not fair and I for one would be happy to go offshore tomorrow in one - I do not believe (perhaps until the AAIB preliminary bulletin!) that there is a type specific fault. But things have to change.

What I do believe is there is no active safety management and nothing pro-active within the system (EASA, CAA, Helicopter companies, O&G companies) which will eliminate the sources of potential accidents and so reduce the real accident rate. Plugging the holes which have appeared in the bucket is not working.

Anold Palmer is reputed to have said "the more I practice, the luckier I get". In the majority of cases luck is practice. I'm right behind Mechta.

[Mechta]

Grenville,

Thanks for your reply. Yes, I am well aware that both the industry and the authorities would be able to mess up such a proposal before it even starts. Getting the customers/users (oil companies/'bears' unions) to apply the pressure sounds like a good idea.

In the short term, how about another appoach? A confidential survey, or confidential interviews with all personnel who have worked for more than one North Sea helicopter operator? It is bound to identify examples of how similar incidents were handled in different ways.

My concern is that the further away from the spanners/cyclic stick/ops room one goes, the more the true 'modus operandi' is distorted and the detail missed. Only by being right where the decisions are made, can a true feel for the way a helicopter is operated be made.

[SASless]

HC,

Read the accident report and the incident report for the Lightning strike.

All the gearboxes, tail rotor blades, and several other components were scrapped.

Yet....they wanted to re-use this blade?

As I have said.....the "System" has some flaws in it.



Gasax,

We all have our favorite sweetheart don't we.....in helicopters mine is the Chinook and I am quite glad to admit it. She never let me down and always got me home even if she did give me some white hairs in the process....but then the majority of my time in them was in "A" Models....early "A" Models with all the teething problems that incurred....and in a place where the locals were very hostile NIMBY's.

[lvgra]

Choppers Rule, Torque limitations recommendations by CHC are followed not only in Norway, they are followed all over the world, it's an FSI

[HeliComparator]

SAS yes, but that decision will have been based on the contents of the manufacturer's maintenance manual, not on the whim of some manager.

[pilot and apprentice]

Thanks for replying airwave. I would like to continue this debate a little more. I will add my own highlights to your post:

Airwave45P and A,
Very well put together post.

There is a view from the front of the bus that every effort will be made to understand root cause for each incident, I believe you as an industry do that exceptionally well.

It's a very reactive way to address safety issues though.
I could take some exception to this statement. Do you really think that the only safety efforts made in the helicopter aviation community are in response to crashes?

I know that as a check and training pilot over more than a decade I have seen different. Take a CFIT accident for instance. After the accident there is a flurry of blame, dissection of the crew, operator, CAA, etc. Then highly publicized changes are made. You see the reactiveness of the system most of us dislike (and I personally despise) because that is all anyone on the outside sees.

On a daily basis we are on the line watching how procedures are being flown, suggesting changes, assessing the effectiveness of training, makes changes to curriculums, monitoring flight checks for trends, etc. No one outside our sphere sees this proactive work because there was no accident to put it on FB.

That doesn't mean the work wasn't happening.

Not so long ago I was receiving an update during a monthly safety meeting (hate the name) and at that time CHC's accident rate was equivalent to a first tier airline. Despite a much harsher and volatile operating environment. I don't recall the particular metric being used but the point is that those of us at the coal face have faith in the system because the real system is us, not the PR machines of the manufacturer, authority, and employer.

I have seen the same daily input into maintenance procedures, reporting of trends, and assessment of data on the engineering side.

There are weak operators out there yes, and weak individuals, but not a majority.

The Norwegian approach seems to be significantly more proactive.

As for comparing stats, you can get them to say anything as you pointed out, the 777 may have crashed every other month over the last two but despite flying into a wall at close to your Vne, it still only killed one person.
(terrible tragedy with the emergency services, for all concerned)
It's a tank.
You agree that stats are easily manipulated, then you say...
Data mining the stats GoM vs NS is possible as Take off and landing data is there. But it's pretty obvious that N Sea ops are only, at best, almost as good as GoM. (but you would be stretching things to say as good as)
Given the differences in machinery, that should not be so.
Look at the difference between the East and West of the N Sea and a blind man in a dark room could see that something is not right.

I'm with you in that I don't think any specific aircraft is responsible for this.
Given the percieved difficulty by the pilots / mechs on here to pinpoint why we are not as good as the Norwegians, I'll happily see the SP sacrificed to the press as that will shake the business up sufficiently to make us find out what is going on.

It's not big and it's not clever, but it will make change happen.

It's not big, it's not clever, and it could kill a type (225**) that has brought many advances to the business of moving people offshore. The net positive effect is zero. Blunt instruments don't make for effective surgical tools, they just force a patient into surgery.

This is akin to having a man complain that he is in pain but it's not serious enough to get looked at. You whip out a sledge hammer and break his leg and say "now he'll see you". He asks you why you did that: now his leg is broken and his shoulder still hurts.

**I don't fly the 225, nor do I particularly want to. A VFR 212 would be a dream.

[SASless]

The AAIB report on the S76 that had the Lightning Strike.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/dft_avsafety_pdf_501501.pdf

[pilot and apprentice]

I don't agree with the last paragraph. I don't think the stockholders of Bristow (keep the piper and his tune in the front of the mind) give two fecks about Bill Chiles ability to fly a helicopter. They care that the business is tightly run with increasing margins and revenues, end of.

The same will be true for the stockholders at EADS, however it does seem that the man now at the helm of Eurocopter is in fact a professional pilot but I don't expect much to change, do you?

Pitts, I'd say you just agreed with me. Share price over the truth, profit over doing the right thing. Cost-cutting over valuing experience.

to add:

A CEO demonstrates to his subordinates what is most valued in a company, effectively creating its culture. In the last year, my employer has sent me dozens of emails regarding fiscal and financial reporting policies, revenue generation strategies, auditing standards, corporate restructurings, senior appointment responsibility reassignments, and the list goes on and on and on and on and on.......

I have not received a single email announcing new (or lost) operations or contracts, I have never seen an email above the base level that refers to a customer at all, and the only mention of a helicopter at all is when one goes in the water.

[Pittsextra]

P&A - maybe although my own view when you talk to the guys at Bristow management on the telephone I think safety is very high on their priority and Bill Chiles seems a stand up bloke.

[pilot and apprentice]

I hope so

adding characters so pprune will post my post