AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

[Hummingfrog]

HC

I'm not sure I have ever received any training in monitoring (or, to be honest, given it) but I have certainly "given feedback" when monitoring has been found to be lacking, a relatively common occurrence. Its a skill that we expect everyone to have innately, but maybe that is expecting too much?

I have made the point before that more and more pilots seem to be becoming system operators rather that pilots. If you were confident in your ability to fly the a/c you wouldn't need "monitoring skills" the auto pilot would just be a tool you use to reduce the workload when it was required.

Although the 365N2 autopilot was simple it would do a coupled ILS. As I spent most of my time offshore the only time I could practice my IFR skills was bringing the a/c ashore or doing rig radars while holding for a beach flight to pass through. I therefore flew manual ILSs when I could. If the weather was on limits then I would use the coupled ILS to reduce my work load.

The emphasis nowadays seems to be use the autopilot at every opportunity which seems to be reducing the flying skills of the crews - hence we seem to have pilots - both fixed wing and rotary who allow the autopilot to take control in unusual situations with tragic results.

I still can't understand a training regime which insists that the autopilot is engaged at Vy and, I believe, has a monitoring system which asks pilots why they didn't should they try and hand fly. No wonder pilots become disconnected between actually flying and operating a computer game!!

In my day you didn't have to have a "monitoring" skill you flew the a/c and if the coupler was engaged you made sure the instruments were indicating what you would expect if you were hand flying. It helped that the coupler wasn't perfect and sometimes needed a nudge with the flying controls to do what you wanted.

HF

[HeliComparator]

Bravo, what you say is true but descending then levelling at say 110 kts isn't going to cause an overtorque. Yes it does dip below the ALT.A height, but the solution is just to set 50' above MDA at the "top of the drop" (or more, if high vertical speed) and then beep the alt down a bit as its levelling. So whilst you are correct in that the L2 autopilot is far from perfect, I maintain its quite capable of flying a successful NPA in 4axis. I should know, as a training capt doing endless OPCs in it (especially before we started to use Helisim) I've done (or watched from the other seat) enough!

[HeliComparator]

HF I think your last para is very true. As I said before, the better the autopilot the less perceived need there is to monitor. But are we saying therefore that manufacturers should intentionally build in software bugs just to keep us on our toes? Don't think so!

Personally I was quite happy to use the 225 autopilot to its full capability because I am intrinsically lazy. My "old fart" colleagues don't seem to have lost the ability to fly, although some still struggle to understand the technology. The newbies of course lap up the technology, but I see a determination in them to also master manual flying and most ask to fly manually quite regularly. So, whilst a balance of both these disparate skills is required, I think we are pretty much doing that already.

[Ray Joe Czech]

I don't know what regime you are describing in your post.
On the only 4 axis machine I have flown, the company -- and the other pilot -- would insist on 4 axis at night or in Poor IMC but I've regularly done manual climb outs to altitude, manual ILS in a variety of weather -- allbeit usually pretty good :) -- and, offshore and on, will manoeuvre visually to the deck/runway from a few miles out. Plenty of opportunity for maintaining manual skills.

[switch_on_lofty]

Having read most of this and other N Sea threads with interest I've got a few questions (some more tongue in cheek than others):
1) If the autopilot can fly the heli down the approach with 1 pilot monitoring, what is the other pilot doing during the sortie?
2) How much do these semi-sub rigs move? (either in terms of degress of pitch or metres etc).
3) What visual references do you get when in close proximity to the FLt deck or over it in order to hover?

Thanks (in particular to those who have kept the standard on this thread thought-provoking and forward-looking.

[SASless]

Hold the Phone Jack!

What is this "Monitoring" crap?

One guy is driving the bus....all the time....George may be wiggling the sticks and doing all the monkey skills stuff....but one of the two highly paid professionals in the front seats is supposed to be "flying" the machine.

Call it "monitoring" but that in itself connotes a detachment from an assigned Duty I am not comfortable with. I see one's attention to what is going on as being "involved"....intimately involved and not merely sat back and waiting for an Alarm Bell to sound to get you to sit up in your fancy fleeced lined easy chair.

Even when George is at the Helm.....he is being given Helm Orders by a Pilot.

Are you guys getting so comfortable with not having to wiggle the sticks yourself that you are not paying attention to what is going on to the degree you should?

Do you just reach up and reset a Bug perhaps and not tell the other Pilot why you are doing it and what data point you are looking for or do you leave him/her out of the Loop?

The "Monitoring" Pilot is the Non-Flying Pilot.....and the guy telling George what to do is "Flying" Pilot with every thing that title requires. If the other Pilot doesn't know what your intentions are.....how can he "Monitor" your actions to ensure you don't make a mistake or fail to catch the Autopilot doing what it should?

Pilots Monitor one another.....one of them Flies the helicopter and controls the Autopilot.

[Bravo73]

1) If the autopilot can fly the heli down the approach with 1 pilot monitoring, what is the other pilot doing during the sortie?
2) How much do these semi-sub rigs move? (either in terms of degress of pitch or metres etc).
3) What visual references do you get when in close proximity to the FLt deck or over it in order to hover?


1) The Pilot Flying (PF) will probably (hopefully!) be covering the controls and making sure that the autopilot is doing what it is meant to be doing. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) will also be monitoring the instruments (to confirm that there aren't any significant deviations), run checklists or secondary items and, finally, be looking out the window at the bottom of the approach. When the PF calls 'decide', the PM will take control if visual or call for a go around.
2) It depends on the sea state. Anything up to several degrees in either axis and several meters up or down. However, the aircraft have very strict limitations for landing. For an aircraft the size of L2/225, one set of these limits is +/- 3 degs pitch or roll, 3.5 degs inclination, 5 metres of heave, with a heave rate of 1.3m/s.
3) Depends on the size of the deck and the available light. But, generally speaking, more than enough. Things get tricky when these visual references are reduced. Particularly with a bow deck at night (because all of the lights will be beside or behind you and there might not be a visible horizon).

[HeliComparator]

S-O-L -

1) remember, there are 3 pilots on an automated aircraft, there is the autopilot, the pilot monitoring the autopilot, and the pilot monitoring the pilot monitoring the autopilot. Simples!

2) depends on the sea state, the installation, and whether a particular installation is ballasted and anchored down, or ballasted up for relocation. If you mean what are the limits of movement, it depends but in general 3 degrees in pitch and roll. There are also heave and heave rate limits. 3 degrees probably doesn't sound a lot to you, but since the point of rotation is well below deck height, associated with the pitch or roll is a lot of sway (ie lateral movement) so you can end up chasing the helideck around!

3) approaching, you have a BIG chunk of illuminated metal. Over the deck, it depends a lot on the wind direction. If you have the structure above the helideck in the field of view (derrick, cranes, flare stacks etc) you have fairly good visual references. However if you are pointing away from the structure looking out over the sea, very little, especially at night. You learn to hover looking down at the helideck just in front of you, something your ab initio instructor told you never to do!

[switch_on_lofty]

Guys,

Thanks for that. I'm surprised how much they can move despite being such huge submerged chunks of metal. I suppose that if you're flying 4 or more routine sectors in a day, all straight line over the water then having 3 pilots doing the same job has it's benefits in terms of redundancy and safety. It's a fair way removed from how we operate though.

[HeliComparator]

Hold the Phone Jack!

What is this "Monitoring" crap?

One guy is driving the bus....all the time....George may be wiggling the sticks and doing all the monkey skills stuff....but one of the two highly paid professionals in the front seats is supposed to be "flying" the machine.


SAS, you're definitely a dinosaur! I know you became uncomfortable when they took the rubber bands out of helicopters!

The autopilot does all the work. Its programmed (via the FMS) to fly the whole route to the rig (and back, if the pilot forgets to fiddle with the knobs). One pilot is rambling on and on about how hard done by he is, how little he gets paid, how the whole operation would fall apart without him, how the wife is giving him a hard time etc. the other pilot is pretending to listen to the same stories again and really can't believe the other pilot has forgotten he said these exact same things on their earlier flight together, and is in fact playing Angry Birds on his iPad hoping his colleague won't notice.

Once the manufacturers install an audio gong that sounds as the aircraft reaches the MAPt, when the pilots have to start paying attention, it will be even easier -but don't tell management otherwise there will be paycuts!

SAS You are so 20th century!

[industry insider]

Special

No 225 to L2 issues, this was not a " downgrade" caused by the EC225 grounding.

[The Ancient Geek]

If you have to ask "what is it doing now" you have already broken one of the golden rules - never let the aircraft get ahead of you.

Call me old fashioned if you like but at this point I prefer the paranoid option, the damn thing is probably trying to kill me so disconnect the fancy contraptions and fly the aircraft. There is unlikely to be time to figure out what it was doing so just get the hell out of there.

Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
Abort the approach, get to a safe place and then worry about what went wrong.

[bladegrabber]

HC your post
The autopilot does all the work. Its programmed (via the FMS) to fly the whole route to the rig (and back, if the pilot forgets to fiddle with the knobs). One pilot is rambling on and on about how hard done by he is, how little he gets paid, how the whole operation would fall apart without him, how the wife is giving him a hard time etc. the other pilot is pretending to listen to the same stories again and really can't believe the other pilot has forgotten he said these exact same things on their earlier flight together, and is in fact playing Angry Birds on his iPad hoping his colleague won't notice.

If this is reality then as an occasional SLF and OC representative I am horrified that technology has turned skilled pilots into highly paid "game players". Thankfully the H269 I fly hasn't got an autopilot and I can still be firmly in charge of my own destiny when flying.

What's gone wrong guys ?

[Jimmy 16]

So, this was a CFIT (water) then, not unlike the Asiana crash at San Francisco.

Having a few thousand hours on the L2, I always found that in marginal weather, 4 axis coupling was a great work-load reducer enhancing situational awareness and thereby overall safety.

After all that has been said how good the 225 is, I still maintain that the L2 has a damn good autopilot as well. But as with all technology, pilots must understand the capabilities and limitations.

I don't want to speculate on why 4 axis wasn't used in this case, but CHC and other operators should take a long hard look at their policies, procedures and pilot training on the use of automation.

[Brian Abraham]

Without prejudging this accident, but possible CFIT has been mentioned, bolding mineAn informal industry working group is producing a data-rich study to convince airlines that deficient pilot-monitoring skills are a widespread safety threat, and it will provide straightforward recommendations for carriers to help remedy the problem.

Industry Turns To Self-Help For Improving Pilot Monitoring (http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_09_02_2013_p36-609937.xml)

[The Sultan]

Nothing I have read is not consistent with some form of loss of collective. Normal approach, a loss of thrust, a flare to arrest descent, and a plunge when stored energy is gone. The report stated the nose pitched up, rate of descent arrested, speed near the power bucket. No crew would still be playing with their IPAD's they would be over torquing to get out of a self made situation.

All the AAIB report really says is the engines did not explode, the rotor did not separate, and the Xmsn shaft was intact.

The Sultan

[pilot and apprentice]

Holy crap guys, no one is playing Angry Birds in the helicopter.

Bladegrabber, HC and SAS have a certain history of back and forth and in the context of the wider thread, it was clear to me he was making a 'joke'.

[Hummingfrog]

The Sultan

No crew would still be playing with their IPAD's they would be over torquing to get out of a self made situation.

While I agree that the crew wouldn't be distracted by their IPAD's. There are, however, plenty of examples of crews loosing their situational awareness of what is happening when an autopilot starts to either misbehave or acts strangely because it is in the wrong mode for what it is required to do.

The Air France crew who failed to fly the a/c when their autopilot dropped out. If they had initially not touched the controls then the a/c would have carried on in stable flight as one assumes the autopilot had the a/c trimmed. After all in a fixed wing power, attitude, trim was a mantra I was taught and still use today. Yet one pilot pulled his sidestick all the way back - what did he expect to happen if he did that? You can easily stabilise an a/c if you set cruise power and attitude! I spent many an IF training sortie with the Squadron QFI sticking pads over flying instruments to limit what I could use and still managed to keep the a/c stable.

We have had 2 highly automated SPs end up, apparently fully serviceable, in the sea and we have to ask is the culture of over use of the autopilot to blame?

I am a dinosaur I suppose but I look upon automation as a tool to make my life easier in poor weather not as a way of making my life easier so I become disconnected from what I enjoy doing which is FLYING the a/c:ok:

HF

[mark one eyeball]

Remember G-TIGH AS332L March 1992
Rig shuttle low airspeed then high rate of descent, maybe vortex ring state made situation worse

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/2-1993%20G-TIGH.pdf

Will be interesting to read the aaib report when it eventually comes out
Same with the Asiana landing in SF

[Grenville Fortescue]

Rig shuttle low airspeed then high rate of descent, maybe vortex ring state made situation worse.

That VRS should occur on a flight such as this (inbound to a NAV AIDS equipped airport) is, at the moment, difficult to understand as is the reason for the helicopter approaching 30kts with two miles left to run?

If the METAR was telling them that the cloudbase was at 200ft then presumably CHC SOP's would instruct them to make an approach which would involve cloudbreak occurring in the final phase of the approach while on automatic and pointing down the middle of the Sumburgh centreline?

Apologies if recently discussed.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

JIMMY 16 - I think your post is absolutely on the mark.

For those posting opinions on autopilots, stating they disconnect the crew from the task, you clearly have not used modern DAFCS equipped machines.

In an AC such as EC225, flown by a properly trained crew with a complete understanding of the DAFCS, the FADEC and the display system, it is impossible for them to sit there wondering "what is it doing now". When there are no abnormal indications, it is doing exactly what it has been designed to do.

If the crew are not properly trained, expectation and delivery may not marry up.

In a modern DAFCS, use of the terms 3 AXIS and 4 AXIS coupling are no longer relevant. It is far more relevant to refer to Fully Coupled OR Mixed Mode flying.

Mixed Mode flying MEANS that one or more of the AXIS (vertical, lateral or longitudinal) are in the custody of the pilot. Knowledge of the display indications make it clear to the pilot which axis he is responsible for. This is a simple concept that is far too often not fully trained and ingrained into the crew.

During automatic mode engagements or switches, such as an ALT.A capture, where V/S is replaced by ALT, it is important the crew recognise, when mixed mode flying, which AXIS, and thus which flight control(s), are in their custody and finally, if they move that control(s), what effect it will have on the flight path.

Of course this is significantly simplified by flying fully coupled. Combine fully coupled mode with DAFCS complete flight envelope protection and now the pilot and passengers are protected from errors in bug selections. Add in terrain awareness displays, with aural and visual warnings, a radar to validate the real world, datamap overlay and now the lateral flight path is also protected. All these systems are fitted to the EC225/175.

In the first EC 225 inadvertant ditching close to the ETAP, the Commander failed to deploy the DAFCS modes AT ALL and the crew deselected the aural terrain warnings. I do not know why! However I would hazard a guess that Commander fits the profile of those of you posting on this thread who state they would decouple and fly manually when things get bad.

For those of us fully trained in modern DAFCS, and involed in teaching these concepts, decoupling close the surface is normally associated with very poor training and/or poor core flying skills.

The L2 has an extremely capable AP. it is a huge step forward from the previous generation. However it has its limitations such that all minimum visibility approaches should be flown fully coupled and NOT in mixed mode to ensure safety. This is required because, unlike the EC225, there are no flight envelope protections. Having flown the L2 for 3000 hours it is a very safe, very competant helicopter in the hands of a well trained, competant pilot. If his operating rules allow latitude for MIXED MODE FLIGHT approaches the first hole of the swiss cheese has already lined up against him.

However, the L2 is not an EC225. The single most significant difference is that in the L2 the Longitudinal Axis always takes priority over the vertical axis. Thus in the cruise, MIXED MODE flight is deployed to avoid unintentional descent under IAS longitudinal prioritisation. However, failure to mandate fully coupled approach procedures when the IAS does not defeat the power available, and by this I mean CAT A ICAO speeds, provides options of mixed mode flight for the crew, and this practice is complex and potentially dangerous at low speeds (as needed for a safe visual transition at MDA/DA), if the crew do not fully understand the axis in their control when in mixed mode flight.

The AAIB reports strongly suggest the helicopter was being flown in Mixed Mode, close to the surface. If you are an offshore pilot reading this, and you do not recognise how dangerous this practice can be, go to your TRI and ask to be retrained. If you a TRI/TRE allowing this practice to occur by pilots in your operation, take all steps you can to outlaw this practice.

Finally, for the hysterical uninformed multitude who bleat on that the pilot is no longer in control, know this, in all EC civil helicopters, no matter what the AP is doing, the pilot always has the option to place hands and feet on and "fly through". However, the entire point of his training procedures, operational SOPs and the underlying regulations are to expressly avoid him having to do so.

I do not really accept "Pilot Error" is ever really to blame for air accidents in proffessional crew. There are usually systemic or cultural factors that lead the crew into un favourable conditions and/or behaviours. I know the Commander of this flight very well. He is Pilot held in high regard by all who know and fly with him. It may be that Mixed Mode flight is the prime causal factor in this case. But reading some if the posts on this thread, by some crews, speaks volumes for the training, culture and practices currently deployed in the UK sector. Look inward and embrace change.

DB

[Jimmy 16]

Well said, DB. I fully agree.

[HeliComparator]

We have had 2 highly automated SPs end up, apparently fully serviceable, in the sea and we have to ask is the culture of over use of the autopilot to blame?


Mmmh, so one SP in the sea following no use of the autopilot at all (other than basic stability of course). Another SP in the drink with what looks like a partial (or some would say inadequate) use of the autopilot, and your response is its all due to a "culture of over use of the autopilot".

Let me see if I can get that logic....... No, I definitely can't!

[HeliComparator]

Nothing I have read is not consistent with some form of loss of collective.

If there had been a control problem, that's the first thing the pilots would have said to the AAIB, and the AAIB would not then have put out a report which rather implies pilot error as the cause.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

So, this was a CFIT (water) then, not unlike the Asiana crash at San Francisco.

Is it possible that the captain having seen a hole in the cloud, slowed down and tried to descend while maintaining visual contact with the surface with the intention of making the final run into LSI low level visual or something along those lines?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

For the sake of clarity and the sanity of SASSLESS and our passengers, the regulations require a "PILOT FLYING" and a "PILOT MONITORING" no matter what the AP is doing.

SAS, breathe man, We have not all succumbed to monitoring "George" instead of using him and supervising his actions. (Still called flying.......I think!!!)

DB

[Non-PC Plod]

Double B - I teach on a different (but modern) type, and I absolutely agree. Company SOPs nowadays generally require flying fully using the automation as the norm for good reason. Training is absolutely the key because lax monitoring skills, poor mode awareness, automation complacency and poor application of automation SOPs are increasingly the issues which I am needing to confront in recurrent training - not handling skills.

[[email protected]]

So can one of you autopilot gurus just clarify -on the L2 the VS mode is a cyclic control (a la fixed wing - nose down to increase RoD, nose up to reduce it) and that the collective channel would be manually flown or in an altitude acquire mode (presumable set just above MDH).

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

That VRS should occur on a flight such as this (inbound to a NAV AIDS equipped airport) is, at the moment, difficult to understand as is the reason for the helicopter approaching 30kts with two miles left to run?

Grenville, have a read of my post #1238 in conjunction with DB's post above about Mixed Modes and it should give you some idea of maybe how the aircraft ended up at 30kts.

If the METAR was telling them that the cloudbase was at 200ft then presumably CHC SOP's would instruct them to make an approach which would involve cloudbreak occurring in the final phase of the approach while on automatic and pointing down the middle of the Sumburgh centreline?

I would be surprised if CHC had an "SOP" for such a limited and specific situation. We don't have an SOP for absolutely every single eventuality that you can possibly think of. The Ops Manual would become far too long and complicated for crews to be reasonably expected to remember it all. Plus too heavy to lift!

There may be instructions as to Rad Alt bug settings or upper mode selections, or sterile cockpits, that sort of thing, but what you describe, apart from the "on automatic" bit, is simply flying an instrument approach, which shouldn't need a specific procedure in an Ops Manual to address.



Crab, in 3-axis, (or Mixed Mode a la DB above), the VS or ALT is on the cyclic. In that instance airspeed is controlled manually with collective. In 4-axis (or Fully Coupled) the VS (or ALT if in that vertical mode) jumps on to the collective and the cyclic then controls the IAS mode.
On 225, the VS/ALT is always on the collective, and IAS is always on the cyclic, irrespective of whether you are 3 or 4 axis.

[Ray Joe Czech]

Call me old fashioned if you like but at this point I prefer the paranoid option, the damn thing is probably trying to kill me so disconnect the fancy contraptions and fly the aircraft. There is unlikely to be time to figure out what it was doing so just get the hell out of there.


Why do that when you can hit the GA button, enter a known flight profile and remain fully coupled?
If fully coupled then dumping all the upper modes at 200' and 0.75nm from a rig isn't going to improve matters.

[Hummingfrog]

HC

Mmmh, so one SP in the sea following no use of the autopilot at all (other than basic stability of course). Another SP in the drink with what looks like a partial (or some would say inadequate) use of the autopilot, and your response is its all due to a "culture of over use of the autopilot".

So having read DB's post and many others what now seems to be occurring is that the autopilot is very good - which I have never disputed, but the training of how to use it is not.

Did the ETAP HP take the autopilot protection out because he didn't understand fully what it could do and then his manual flying skills didn't allow a safe approach.

It seems the Sumburgh HP may have used an inappropriate method of using the autopilot which had a trap in it which allowed the a/c to try and maintain height without enough power selected and a UP ensued which was not recognised and flown out of, either by selecting the correct autopilot function or by manual intervention.

We can't ignore the fact that 2 very capable SPs with modern autopilots ended up in the water!!

I am never in favour of the term "pilot error" there is always a chain of events which end up with an accident - The RAF had some very good Flight Safety films which emphasised that it was everybody's responsibility to try and spot links in the chain and break them - this extended from management to the coal face.

HF

[Grenville Fortescue]

Grenville, have a read of my post #1238 in conjunction with DB's post above about Mixed Modes and it should give you some idea of maybe how the aircraft ended up at 30kts.

Just located your post:


It seems, from the report, that the crew had not "selected" an airspeed, and were operating with just VS and Localiser coupled. In this instance the vertical mode is being controlled by cyclic, snd airspeed is being controlled manually by collective. If the collective is set in the right position airspeed is maintained but if not the airspeed will change as it is the only parameter available to the ac to maintain the chosen VS (in this case, the same happens in level flight if Alt is engaged).

If the collective is set too low, ie not producing enough 'power', then the aircraft will reduce airspeed to try and maintain the desired VS. If you are only slightly out then it will stabilise at lower speed. If you're a bit more than slightly too low the airspeed will keep reducing as the system continues to try to give you what you've asked for. However, once the speed passes Vy (which is usually around 68/70kts) the rate of speed drop can be very quick, until at an airspeed none of us can remember the autopilot gives up the ghost and the upper modes drop out.



I would be surprised if CHC had an "SOP" for such a limited and specific situation.

You mean IFR approaches?

[HeliComparator]

On 225, the VS/ALT is always on the collective, and IAS is always on the cyclic, irrespective of whether you are 3 or 4 axis.

I know its not strictly relevant to this thread, but the above is not really right.

On the 225, yes IAS is always on the cyclic of course, but in 3 axis, VS / ALT is on the cyclic if speed is above ~65 kts (varies slightly with dv/dt), and on the collective if below that. As it transitions from vertical mode (ie VS / ALT) on the cyclic, to the collective, as the speed drops below ~65, IAS automatically engages on the cyclic, but you can decouple it if you want, to be left with the vertical mode on the collective, right down to zero airspeed if you wish.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

OBF on E225 you can fly 3 Axis (why though) and the V/S or ALT will be alone on the cyclic longitudinal channel, but only when the IAS is above 65 KIAS.

However if you do not have enough power such that speed decays, the DAFCS automatically engages the 4th axis (collective), and the helicopter is remains in the safe flight envelope.

The EC225 DAFCS is a complex beast to explain on paper BUT utterly instinctive to use AND in its behaviour. In essence, whatever you try to do, it will respond to safely recover the Attitude, IAS and ALT.

Passengers and non EC225 pilots. We, the lucky ones on the EC225 cannot overstate the massive leap forward in safety the EC225 and EC175 represent. The L2 is Great ship, lacking only in the protections that are built into the modern DAFCS.

DB

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

If the METAR was telling them that the cloudbase was at 200ft then presumably CHC SOP's would instruct them to make an approach which would involve cloudbreak occurring in the final phase of the approach while on automatic and pointing down the middle of the Sumburgh centreline?

They will have weather minimums in their Ops Manual that will require them to do an IFR recovery vs a VFR recovery.

I'm sure it doesn't say:

"In the event that the cloud base is 200', carry out an approach to achieve cloudbreak in the final phase of the approach while on automatic and pointing down the middle of the runway centreline"

Which is what your post implied, to me anyway, it should say.

[HeliComparator]

So having read DB's post and many others what now seems to be occurring is that the autopilot is very good - which I have never disputed, but the training of how to use it is not.

Did the ETAP HP take the autopilot protection out because he didn't understand fully what it could do and then his manual flying skills didn't allow a safe approach.

HF

Yes, inadequate training but also SOPs in the use of automation may be lacking, though these an operator and even fleet specific thing.

As to ETAP HP, maybe "old school" would be a good descriptor.

[Grenville Fortescue]

OFW a clarification then: Irrespective of the cloudbase when flying an IFR approach into an ILS equipped airport in IMC are there not set procedures which, to put it bluntly, keep the airframe well away from terrain until over the runway?

[HeliComparator]

<Confusion Alert> There is no ILS at this airport on this runway!

I must re-check the Bristow Ops Man, but I'm pretty sure it doesn't say "Pilots shall not cause their aircraft to crash into the ground / sea whilst flying an instrument approach".

So THAT is the problem! If only the Ops Mans contained such a statement, there would be no more crashery!

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

HC beat me to it.

[Ray Joe Czech]

The crew would have been expected to fly in accordance with the published procedure -- look at the plate I linked to a couple of pages back -- and in accordance with their SOPs.
Two further points; it was a localiser approach not an ILS, and their SOPs were unlikely to have had direction about how a mixed mode approach should be flown. Myself, I think I would probably have coupled to airspeed rather than V/S, but I can see why they would have coupled V/S -- to get a constant descent type approach.

[Jwscud]

It seems from a FW perspective that you have a powerful tool in your automatics but the training and philosophy of operation isn't there. The hand flying/automation debate rages this side of the fence too, but from what I read it seems the SOPs (and the technical standards for alerting) are slightly more advanced in the FW world.

I work for a company where hand flying is encouraged in appropriate conditions, and most captains are fairly keen when asked. However, in an approach to minima, the SOPs mandate maximum use of the automation.

In the Boeing I fly, the top of the PFD is the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) which displays the A/T, Roll and Pitch modes. Active modes are displayed in green, armed in white, and any change in mode generates a green box around it for 10s. An autopilot disconnect gives you flashing red lights and an audible tone that has to be silenced.

There are still plenty of traps - you can stall the aircraft in V/S even with the autothrottle engaged as it will pitch to maintain the selected V/S in the Climb. It should revert to a safer mode, pitching for selected speed before it does though.

The monitoring task on final is made easier by knowing the expected pitch, IAS and power settings to maintain the path, and by standard callouts. There are also stable approach "gates" which require the aircraft to be fully configured and within speed/profile limits at 1000' in IMC. Are there similar stable approach gates in the rotary world?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Thank you for the clarifications re: localiser/ILS approach.

I must re-check the Bristow Ops Man, but I'm pretty sure it doesn't say "Pilots shall not cause their aircraft to crash into the ground / sea whilst flying an instrument approach".

A little facetious HC. Simply asking whether there are any SOP's which encourage compliance with certain minimas (I suppose those published in the plates?) in order to understand what a normal approach might look like in those circumstances into that airport.

[bigglesbutler]

I work for a company where hand flying is encouraged in appropriate conditions, and most captains are fairly keen when asked. However, in an approach to minima, the SOPs mandate maximum use of the automation.

Ditto we use the same philosophy, in no small part down to HC I might add.

So THAT is the problem! If only the Ops Mans contained such a statement, there would be no more crashery!

You been at the gin again? :E

Si

[HLCPTR]

IMO, Mixed Mode (in any of its variouis forms) is the Devil's work!

Would you consider it "normal" to have one pilot flying one control and the other pilot flying another control during an approach?

If your answer is "No!", then I suggest that the same opinion should carry over to Mixed Mode when using automation. Having more than one pilot in charge of manipulating the controls baffles me, and that includes "George" as one of those two manipulators.

Granted, in 3-axis only aircraft, you have no choice, but to purposely do that in a fully-functional 4-axis AFCS?

Not for me, thank you.

Add to this, the actual or potential mixing of the longitudinal axis (cyclic) for both airspeed and altitude control is the Devil's finest work.

:(

P.S. Generically, I do like the terms "3-axis" and "4-axis" since they fairly accurately describe the fundamental functions/capabilities of the AFCS. "Mixed Mode"? Not a big fan. Too indistinct, especially since there are several different brews you could be mixing.

[Ray Joe Czech]

A little facetious HC. Simply asking whether there are any SOP's which encourage compliance with certain minimas (I suppose those published in the plates?) in order to understand what a normal approach might look like in those circumstances into that airport.

Yes, the ops manual tells you to use the approach minima on the jarops3 plates (helicopter specific) and will probably specify other things such as minimum speed, approach to be stabilised below 1000', standard height calls at 500' and 100' to go, standard calls at Missed approach point, etc. It is a highly regulated procedure in a lot of ways, but perhaps not when it comes to the use of upper modes depending on what type/company you are on/with.

[HeliComparator]

Jwscud I think you are absolutely right. One difference between us and you is that you (as I understand it) have a well defined final approach speed (dependent on mass, density altitude etc), and things ain't going to work out if you deviate from that by much, especially near the threshold.

For us, a very wide range of final approach speeds will result in a satisfactory landing, and as a consequence the Ops Mans are much less prescriptive about what the final approach speed will be, containing such concepts as its OK to slow down as low as Vy (80kts) in poor weather, or do 165 in nice weather if you like. There is nothing wrong with this in principle as long as all the crew are on the same page. With appropriate briefing (and not just parroting some SOB) this can be done, but I fear we can be lax in this area. So a combination of a wide range of possibilities, and repetitive and uninforming briefs, means that PM (PNF) may not be that clear what the intended speed actually is, or at what point he should prompt, or at what point he should take control.

Good briefings, covering all the variables and not the SOB, empower even a copilot of limited experience to take action when things are clearly not going as advertised.

From this, I think we all see a need for a company by company and fleet by fleet review of SOPs on briefing, monitoring and use of automation in poor conditions so that we are all on the same page, and the best page at that.

[Grenville Fortescue]

For someone with a little more patience than others, could you clarify whether an IFR equipped L2 is capable of making a fully automated approach into an airport fitted with a localiser or is this "mixed mode" semi-automated approach arrangement the only option?

RJC - Thank you for being a gentleman.

[Mechta]

Given that an autopilot is only as good as the information it is receiving, how much training and simulator time does one get to practice identifying the effects of abnormal transducer outputs, and the procedures to follow if these are detected?

How much commonality is there between the transducers used by the autopilot and those for the multifunction displays?

If you were flying in manual mode, or a mixed mode which did not require a particular transducer, would you have any way of knowing its readings were erroneous before switching to a flight mode which was dependent upon it?

[HeliComparator]

GF, the L2 can make a non-precision approach by coupling cyclic to airspeed at the nominated approach speed, coupling lateral guidance from the localiser signal to the yaw/roll channels, and coupling vertical speed and a level-off altitude to the collective. So fully coupled in 4 axes, but the pilot has to manage the vertical profile by means of adjusting the vertical speed datum (beeped on the collective in this circumstance) to match up with the descent profile on the plate. I would say that this if fully automated.

There remains the possibility to couple vertical guidance from an overlay approach in the FMS so that the FMS controls the vertical profile, but the L2 doesn't have this facility and neither does the 225.

HC - not a gentleman.

[Bladestrike]

Having instructed on 332L/L1s for years, with fully functioning 4-axis autopilots, I was amazed at how many guys who were quite uncomfortable engaging that fourth axis.

Granted the old steam driven AP on the older 332s left a lot to be desired, and in cruise the collective pulsed too much to provide a smooth ride for the pax, but guys with considerable experience very rarely engaged that fourth axis at all, and it worked swimmingly with descent/approaches, climb outs etc.. The system was not smart, and would easily overtorque the bird or drop below Vy and fall out of the sky, if mismanaged, and had no alt acquire type modes, simply VS or ALT or GS, so most found it increased their workload rather than reduced it, for lack of understanding and practice in my opinion. The full system was always demonstrated and expected to be utilized in sim sessions (with OEI overshoots, etc) and on the line, with training regarding it's obvious shortcomings and things to watch for. Myself and a few guys used the 4-axis all the time, except in cruise, but most just avoided it like the plague. That's almost a decade off Canada's East coast where we had IMC to mins (Approved Lower than Standard - 100 feet DH, etc) a few times a week, and countless rig approaches at night 200 miles offshore.

I was surprised and disappointed at the lack of utilization of the full system.

[Ray Joe Czech]

What are L2 actions post MAPt if visual and remaining fully coupled?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Okay thanks. And do we know if the accident aircraft was "fully coupled" into this arrangement (and executing what might be considered a normal approach) before things started changing?

[Ray Joe Czech]

No, it was not fully coupled.
You may wish to have another look at the AAIB report and the posts on this thread since then.

[HeliComparator]

Metcha, the sensors used are common to the screens and the autopilot. Pitch, roll, heading, slip and vertical speed all come from the two AHRS - normally configured so that AHRS 1 is displayed on the LH set of screens, AHRS2 on the right. They are constantly cross checked at various points and any discrepancies between them are flagged up by the appropriate screen zones going amber.

However, the autopilot is very clever and doesn't just blindly use the pitch, roll, HDG etc data. It looks at the raw pitch rate, roll rate, yaw rate and tri axial accelerating coming direct from the AHRSs fibre optic gyros and accelerometers and calculates its own values of pitch, roll and heading and vertical speed. Long term, it will "like" one of the two AHRS and slowly wash out any integration errors so that it values merge. However, if an AHRS throws a wobbly, it will ignore it and just look at the other one (and the standby AHRS) quite seamlessly.

Air data similarly is used by both the screens and the autopilot, LH Sensor for LH pilot etc. the autopilot will in general use the air data from the pilot flying's side unless it fails or is unreasonable, in which case it will seamlessly use the other side. Again, there is cross checking between the two air data sensors at several levels, and the any discrepancies are made very visible to the pilots.

Nav data is a little more simplistic - the selected Nav data is displayed by the screen and used by the autopilot according to which screen is coupled. But of course there is automatic cross checking and any discrepancy between say ILS 1 and ILS 2 is flagged up. The autopilot is very clever in its use of Nav data - it hybridises it with inertial data so that, for example with a brief loss of ILS signal, the flight path is unaffected.

There is a degree of hybridisation of the air data too, but since there isn't necessarily a direct correlation between air data (say airspeed) and inertial data (ie ground speed), due to gusts for example, the inertial component is not that great. Of course its greater for altitude data since sudden pressure changes don't happen in the way that sudden wind changes do.

Phew, a bit complicated as you can see, and its all very clever! The bottom line for the pilots though, is that it just works, and works very precisely and intuitively.

[HeliComparator]

RJC you would have to ask someone from CHC - we don't have any L2s in Europe any more.

[industry insider]

Yes, inadequate training but also SOPs in the use of automation may be lacking, though these an operator and even fleet specific thing.

HC, surely if there were systemic poor SOPs and training issues, the continued HFDM program should have highlighted any issues? As part of the investigation, I would also be looking at the robustness of the operators HFDM program and how the read and what they do with the data.

[HeliComparator]

II not really, the HFDM can only check compliance with the SOPs as they stand, and only in terms of the flight path and not the briefing, CRM etc.

It will only detect a "near miss" if the flight path deviates from normal, and before this event, most of us would have said that an NPA was a pretty straightforward thing and not prone to "near misses". But the point of good SOPs, CRM etc is not to make most of the approaches good ones, that happens naturally, but to cater for the very rare times when all the holes in the cheese line up.

Anyway, I would say CHC have the best HFDM system of the bunch, although HFDM on the L2 is difficult due to some daft design decisions by EC as to what is recorded.

[Mechta]

HC, :ok::ok::ok: Thank you for your detailed but easily understood description of the sensor and autopilot system. It makes sense to me, and I can also now see why a sensor failure is unlikely to be a significant factor in this accident.

[Irish Steve]

OK, I've been lurking on this thread since it started, and I want to pose some possibly controversial thoughts and questions that may or may not take it back to the "shields down" stage that was mentioned a long number of posts ago.

I need to be up front here and say before I start that I have zero experience at the sharp end of rotary wing, and not much rotary SLF either, but I do have relevant FW professional level licensing, and spent a lot of time working very closely with simulator work, and related areas, including development work with FW MCC when it came into increased focus after Kegworth, as well as some very academic level research work with a major FW manufacturer, which was an eye opener at times, the protectionism even between partners in projects was at times verging on paranoid, but there were probably good reasons for it, given some of the things that have come out of the woodwork since that time.

So, here we go, and I don't have an agenda here against the people at the sharp end, but I do have some issues with the mentality and validity that is behind some of the decision making that's gone on at higher levels.

First, some possibly loaded questions, and the reason will I hope become apparent further down.

If a pilot expresses an interest in learning more about the extremes of the envelope for the type that he (she also assumed for political correctness, ) is flying, and wants to do some extra sim time, is that encouraged or frowned on by the fleet captains, instructors, etc, or facilitated as being "a good idea", or is that pilot black marked for possibly having a handling problem that they don't want to admit to?

Are the simulator instructors people with long experience on the type, or people with a type rating who have been rostered in to sim work for a while?

Is there any "spare" time in the mandatory simulator sessions to allow for "envelope exploring", where a specific scenario can be explored, or analysed, or is sim time so specific that there is only time for the "mandatory" stuff that is deemed essential to pass the check ride and maintain legal currency?

Is maintenance in house, or contracted out to external providers? regardless of where the service is provided, does that service have any "spare capacity" that allows them to cover in a timely manner squawks that are reported but not critical to continued operations?

Is there any slack in airframe usage scheduling to allow for unplanned maintenance, or do non critical squawks get deferred to the next scheduled check date/time?

Does the company have any formal procedure for raising issues with SOP's that don't produce the required result, or for reviewing SOP's that produced an ambiguous result in certain circumstances?

Are there any "local exceptions" to SOP's that everyone knows about, and uses, but are not part of the documented operation?

I am going to digress a little here, and this is unfortunately fixed wing rather than rotary, but it was specific, and may explain where some of my thoughts are coming from.

A long time ago, at a flight simulation conference on the other side of the pond, visits to local sim providers were part of the agenda. One of those visits was to a small GA jet aircraft simulator, and the 2 of us that were in that session (licensed pilots, but not type rated, and with varying experience) were introduced to an exercise that was not "standard training", but was used for fun but with a few fringe benefits. The exercise was to start from "a sea level runway threshold", in CAVOK conditions, ready to roll. As brakes were released, start the stop watch. Take off, climb to 10,000 Ft, then land back, any runway, and stop, at brakes on, the stop watch stops, shortest time wins, only rule is don't break the airframe.

It was an interesting session, and went on over time to become an interesting challenge when taken back to various places with other simulators. In theory a bit of fun, but what it highlighted very positively was the need to have raw data handling and flying skills, and to be able to fly to the extremes of the envelope in order to get the best time, with looking out of the window to assess the progress an essential part of the exercise.

Where it became thought provoking was when the same scenario was moved the other end of the spectrum, a 747-400 simulator, and tried in some spare time on type rated first officers. The same 2 non type rated people that had first been introduced to this exercise had successfully both set a time of about 6 minutes 30 seconds. When 3 different type rated crew members tried the same scenario, 2 of the 3 broke the airframe in the air, and it was clear that the reason was unfortunately that they were so used to flying the magenta line, and staying within the 10% of the envelope either side of straight and level, when it came to doing things at the edge of the envelope, they had never been anywhere even close to it. and to make it worse, did not have the underlying raw data and "look out of the window" flying skills to allow them to do something very different from flying it with everything on and working correctly

As part of a multi disciplinary EU wide research project with one of the major aircraft manufacturers human factors section, we did some serious work with a "generic" airbus, and as part of the research, we had to do a number of exercises in a level D simulator, to validate what "our" simulator was going to do. We "discovered" that one major european airline had not required their simulator provider to handle some of the more extreme ends of the envelope in respect to manual reversion, as "the analysts" (for analysts read beancounters) had decided that the statistical chance of this event happening on an airframe was/is so low, the costs of implementing that level of reality in the simulator, and training how to manage it "are not justified". We ended up having to go across to the West Coast of the USA to a different manufacturer's simulator, in a different carrier, in order to get the results we needed, as they had implemented the needed code to provide training, and were doing so. These 2 examples were not with Low cost carriers, and they happened 10 years ago before the recent recession and increased pressures on margins.

For me, the holes in the swiss cheese are several.

The reduction in the numbers of ex military pilots coming into civilian aviation, (FW and rotary) they have had to be replaced somehow, and there is unfortunately no short cut to experience.

The reluctance of bean counters to respect and retain the high hours experienced pilots, because they are worth paying a premium for.

The downgrading of the skill levels of the instructors in simulators, they now "tick boxes" to show that the exercise has been done, rather than ensure that the subtle "gotchas" have been discovered and learnt, and in some cases, they never learnt the gotchas themselves, because "The system" no longer allows for flexibility in the sim, it only covers the basics, and recurrency.

The reduction in the number and skill levels of maintenance, partly through bean counter pressure, and partly through regulatory "allowance" mean that there is not the "slack" in the system to allow for non scheduled events in the way there used to be, and the reduced numbers of licensed and type rated engineers spend a higher proportion of their time signing and rubber stamping the paperwork to protect the posteriors of the higher echelons of management in the event of a failure, mistake or problem..

The increase in pressure to use automation on all occasions ("To reduce costs") has diluted the skill base in subtle and insidious ways, resulting in an increase in airframe operators rather than drivers, the difference being that drivers are ahead of the automation, operators are with or behind the automation

The increase in allowed duty time, and related issues around things like travel, means that there are subtle increases in fatigue levels, so reacting and responding in a timely manner to insidious events before they become incidents or accidents is potentially more problematic

A close friend of mine was much involved with the design and implementation of the first FW CAT 3 autoland on Trident, and he shares some of the concerns that I've outlined above, and has (with me) only contempt for the scenario where an underskilled crew stayed stalled all the way down to a fatal accident because they lacked the raw data flying skills to recognise and adequately deal with an unreliable airspeed. Some of the other recent FW incidents are equally reprehensible, to the extent that San Francisco has, as a result of the Asiana accident, "banned hand flown approaches" to the 2 runways that approach over water for foreign aircrews. What an indictment of standards!

In the recent and under discussion incident that is the subject of this thread, it is reasonably clear from the comments and suggestions that the airframe has now been deemed to be failure free, but can we really call the now impied and underlying cause "pilot error", or should be more realistically be calling this, and many other incidents and accidents in both FW and rotary flying "system errors", in that while the pilots may well have been the first to arrive at the scene of the accident, it may not have been a failing on their part alone that contributed or caused that arrival to happen in the first place. That for me is what is screaming out loud in this very thought provoking thread, and what needs to be addressed by the oil companies, the operators, the airframe manufacturers, the regulators and the passengers, as it is only when all of these groups are working together that some of these issues will be adequately and effectively addressed.

The last comment, which may or may not be relevant, in among all the statistics about flying hours, and types and accident ratios, has anyone factored in the passenger kilometers, from what I have seen of it, the number of passenger kilometers flown is significantly higher in the NS than in other areas, so the number of fatalities per passenger kilometer will probably end up being lower than places like the GOM.

I'm not saying that the NS operators can be complacent as a result of that, far from it, the stakes are so much higher with larger airframes.

If I've ruffled feathers, I hope I've done in in a constructive way, based on observations and feedback from what I regard as reliable sources, and an unemotional overview of a very long thread.

I have no malice or hidden agenda towards the people that are at the sharp end, far from it, if I have a target, it would be the faceless bean counters at all levels of the oil companies, operators and regulators that make decisions that are unrelated to the wider picture that is the reality of day to day operations in what I recognise is sometimes a very hostile environment.

The people at the sharp end do what they do, in the way that they do it, because "the system" says that is the way they should work, and rarely do they deviate from those ways. I hope that my comments here cause people to stop and think about "the system" in a wider and unemotional way, and if "the system" seems to be faulty, for whatever reason, it is time to find a way to speak out and say so, rather than hoping that someone else will speak out .

[Jimmy 16]

I think some of us are over-complicating the issue of understanding the difference between 3-axis and 4-axis modes. Whether the airspeed or descent angle is controlled by cyclic or collective input during an approach is not really important for most people, unless you are a pilot on the type or a technical nerd. What is important for most to understand is how the aircraft behaves using the different modes.

To compare with our fixed-wing colleagues:
If an airliner is flying an instrument approach using the autopilot to take care of the localizer and glide-angle and airspeed is controlled by the FP, then it is a "3-axis mode". Then in the fixed-wing the throttles must be manipulated by the FP, in a Super Puma it is the collective (power control).
If the auto-throttle is used on the same approach in our airliner, then it is similar to "4-axis", fully hands off.

To state that 3-axis approaches are inherently dangerous is over the top, there are thousands of airliners out there doing non-precision approaches every day with no A/T. Higher work-load? Yes, but with proper training, SOP's and good CRM the risk can be managed and controlled very well.

[Jimmy 16]

AS:

Is it possible that the captain having seen a hole in the cloud, slowed down
and tried to descend while maintaining visual contact with the surface with the
intention of making the final run into LSI low level visual or something along
those lines?


Everything is possible, but I seriously doubt that this is the scenario here. Descent below MDA on a non-precision approach unless you have the runway or the approach light in sight is a big NO-NO.

If that had been a practice, it would have been picked up by my good friend using his HFDM system long ago.

[Mechta]

Irish Steve, You certainly raise some thought provoking points, which I shall leave to people more qualified than me to comment upon.

With respect to:

The last comment, which may or may not be relevant, in among all the statistics about flying hours, and types and accident ratios, has anyone factored in the passenger kilometers, from what I have seen of it, the number of passenger kilometers flown is significantly higher in the NS than in other areas, so the number of fatalities per passenger kilometer will probably end up being lower than places like the GOM.


It strikes me that both hours and distance flown are pretty crude measures for comparing accident statistics. Neither take account of differences in the pilot workload or the forces and fatigue to which the airframe and its systems are being subjected. Some measure of challenging to non-challenging flying really needs to be factored in to make a worthwhile comparison between operations in different parts of the world.

[[email protected]]

Jimmy16 - surely the issue about which control does what in a mixed mode autopilot is exactly the key here.

Is it me or is the idea that the cyclic controlling RoD (VS) and the collective controlling IAS utterly counter-intuitive to everything that is taught in basic (and advanced) helicopter training?

Frankly if these guys ended up in a UP operating the aircraft in this configuration at a point of high workload (IMC looking for cloudbreak at minima), I for one am not surprised.

[HeliComparator]

Is it me or is the idea that the cyclic controlling RoD (VS) and the collective controlling IAS utterly counter-intuitive to everything that is taught in basic (and advanced) helicopter training?

Frankly if these guys ended up in a UP operating the aircraft in this configuration at a point of high workload (IMC looking for cloudbreak at minima), I for one am not surprised.

So let me get this right, you teach that speed is controlled by cyclic and altitude by collective? If so, how utterly crap and no wonder people come out of basic flight school unable to fly properly!

If you are flying in the cruise at MCP, and the aircraft starts to descend a bit, what do you teach? - raise the collective? Oh dear, now we've overtorqued! Oh well, just have to let it crash then.

If you pause to think about it, how you fly, and how you SHOULD be teaching, is that cyclic controls speed and collective controls altitude at low to medium speed, but at higher speeds you must control altitude with cyclic and that leaves collective for speed. Any other way just doesn't work. At high speed the cyclic has massive authority on vertical speed / altitude, the collective has minimal, or zero if you are already at the max. Fortunately this is understood by EC, who make the EC225 fly in just this way.

[Jimmy 16]

Crab:
In a "mixed mode" (I don't like that term, 3-axis is easier) the collective is not part of the automatic game. The flying pilot must control the airspeed using the collective just like a fixed wing pilots uses his throttles to control airspeed. The autopilot is flying the aircraft laterally and vertically but not speed-wise.
In this 3-axis mode, all corrections in the vertical are done by the autopilot by changing the pitch angle of the aircraft. The pilot owns the collective.
I am sure that your SeaKing has something similar?

[SASless]

I sometimes poke a stick at HC....but always respect his views as he is quite experienced and intimately involved in introducing new Types to the North Sea Offshore flying business.

Most times that stick poking is done with the intent to get a response out of him....rarely does it fail.

My point about the "Monitoring" vs "Flying" comment was to bring a discussion on about the division of duties and tasks in the Cockpit.

My concern is Crews get complacent over time and might not be as "engaged" as is the AutoPilot. Some talk has been made about perhaps the Crew were distracted by something that allowed them to miss the Airspeed/Altitude/Power deviations that led to the aircraft striking the Sea in an uncontrolled manner.

My thought was to question just what it could be that would have that amount of attraction for BOTH pilots. In my old fashioned view, one of the Pilots was supposed to be flying the machine...which connotes using the Autopilot to do so. I also firmly believe that when I am the Pilot doing that....I keep a very close eye on the Autopilots performance and accuracy. Any deviation from what it should be doing is my responsibility. In every Two Pilot Crew Operation I flew in....the other Pilot was tasked to keep an eye on Me and the Aircraft amongst his many other duties that he did to relieve Me, the Flying Pilot, to carry out my Primary Task of flying the machine.

In normal operations or during a situation where an "Emergency" or Aircraft malfunction occurs, I as the "Flying" Pilot still had the Primary duty of flying the Aircraft and the Non-Flying Pilot was there to assist in dealing with whatelse was going on.

If I were the Captain/PIC...guy whose signature goes in the Tech Log....I made the Decisions with the other Pilots input and assistance....but I retained responsibility.

If for any reason, the other Pilot who was "Monitoring" my flying saw a problem or had a concern of any kind....he was obliged to speak up (however politely he had time for....) and point out the problem and hopefully announce what he thought needed to be done.

I also believe that if it is a dangerous situation developing due to some mistake or lapse I have had....the "Monitoring Pilot"....should either make the control input that is needed or take control of the aircraft away from the "Flying Pilot".

CRM teaches us that is the correct approach to situations where action needs to taken to keep the aircraft in a safe flight environment.

Thus....If we as a Crew allow ourselves to become less attentive than we should....and it would follow (in my view) that if the "Flying Pilot" is not as engaged as he should be....then the "Monitoring Pilot" is going to be that one step behind....or will often find himself in the position of having to make a decision to speak up or not and over time....his willingness and timeliness will be degraded by custom.

I get back to a question I asked early on in the Thread...."Why did the Crew, Two Well Trained, Qualified, Professional Pilots not realize what was going on and catch the loss of Airspeed and the resulting increase of ROD?" Just what occurred in that Cockpit that allowed this to happen?

I agree with many others....we should reserve "Pilot Error" for those situations where the Pilot(s) intentional violate SOP's, Procedures, Regulations and use the Term "Human Factors" to describe these kinds of tragedies where good Men make mistakes that are the result of many factors largely outside their control and doing.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

In defence (but only a little ;)) of Crab, this scenario is a low-medium speed regime, and it is a little bit (not utterly) counter-intuitive, at least initially, to control speed with collective and RoD with cyclic on an instrument approach.

However, it doesn't take much getting used to once you get your head round it, and our co-pilots seem to manage quite alright in a short time.

However, as the L2 flies apps quite happily fully coupled 95% of the time, there is rarely any need to do it 3-axis anyway.

[Prawn2king4]

HC and, to a lesser extent, DB both come across, at least to me, as slightly patronizing; though I’m sure it’s unintentional. The fact remains that two of these all singing, all dancing machines ended up in the oggin.

On an average offshore flight, probably 90% of the flying is conducted fully coupled which means a 5,000 hour (experienced in offshore work only) pilot has around 500 hours manual flying under his belt. Narrow this down to manual flying where it counts – normally on the approach and landing – and you can reduce this figure considerably.

Now bring in, for example, the Air France and Asiana crashes where it was demonstratively obvious the crews lacked manual flying skills (now resulting in increasing concern among the FW world) and to me the whole indicate an erosion in manual handling skills coupled with a lack of understanding, or improper use of, the automated systems. To which of course, the disciples of automation will reply that more training is required in the use of the systems and those that express concerns should enter (or be dragged into) the 21st century.
And of course, they’re correct in this context.

But I’m puzzled as to why there is only a slight mention of manual skills; almost as though they’re taken for granted. I do feel there should more emphasis than shown on this thread placed on pure poling. Or is it that these skills are, in fact, not taken for granted and instead there’s a recognition that by virtue of today’s operations they are inevitably degraded and therefore we should concentrate on the technology available?

In any event, as one example, I think it would do no harm and probably a lot of good to include in the obligatory items in a visual OPC (and any other training session in the aircraft) a period of intense manual handling, particularly at night, without emergencies (other than the standard few minutes of AP out), coupled with a determination to counter the bean counter’s aversion to non-revenue flying.

[Hummingfrog]

HC

If you pause to think about it, how you fly, and how you SHOULD be teaching, is that cyclic controls speed and collective controls altitude at low to medium speed, but at higher speeds you must control altitude with cyclic and that leaves collective for speed.

You have confused me now - surely an instrument approach is at low - medium speed yet it seems that the way pilots fly the approach is as if it were high speed.:confused:

Being a product of the RAF system I, like Crab was taught that cyclic controlled speed and that power via the collective controlled height. The scenario you put forward of cruising at max power didn't occur in most RAF operations as the helicopter was usually been aggresively flown at low level - 50ft in German Ex areas and 100ft elsewhere

HF

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

I agree with many others....we should reserve "Pilot Error" for those situations where the Pilot(s) intentional violate SOP's, Procedures, Regulations and use the Term "Human Factors" to describe these kinds of tragedies where good Men make mistakes that are the result of many factors largely outside their control and doing.

And I have to disagree. "Error" implies a mistake, an unintended occurrence, or perhaps something you did mean to do, but the decision making leading up to the occurrence was well-intentioned but erroneous, however it is caused.
Intentionally violating SOPs, procedures and/or regulations is not an "error", as the course of action followed was not unintended. That is where the word "negligent" starts to rear its ugly head.

"Human Factors" is very probably part of the chain that led to the Error being made, but to describe every mistake as simply Human Factors is, to me, too simplistic.

[HeliComparator]

P2k4 - I am quite happy to be considered patronising, and lets face it, when you have a brain the size of a planet its hard not to be. But I really don't care what you think of me, my aim is to get a message across by whatever means. By the way, if you've read much of this thread you would realise that whilst the EC225 is all singing and dancing, the L2 is not. And this accident was ....... Oh yes, an L2. So patronise that!

But on a briefly more serious note, your point has been covered before in this thread. Of course manual flying skill retention can be an issue, but in this case, unless you consider skills were degraded to the point they had forgotten what the collective did, its not the issue. Mixing automation with manual flying possibly is.

[HeliComparator]

HC



You have confused me now - surely an instrument approach is at low - medium speed yet it seems that the way pilots fly the approach is as if it were high speed.:confused:

Being a product of the RAF system I, like Crab was taught that cyclic controlled speed and that power via the collective controlled height. The scenario you put forward of cruising at max power didn't occur in most RAF operations as the helicopter was usually been aggresively flown at low level - 50ft in German Ex areas and 100ft elsewhere

HF

Mmmh, so your basic training was limited to expected future roles and types. Not very basic then!

Low, medium and high are relative terms. In my context I was using them to mean pretty much hovering, around Vy, and significantly above Vy. We don't know what the nominated approach speed was but lets say 110kts, I would say that was "high speed" in this context, although I will give you that its only just so, or even in the grey zone in between.

[SASless]

Power determines both height and speed as there are any number of combinations one can get for a particular power setting.

Examples....Full RPM....flat Pitch...minimum power...Zero airspeed....either sat on the helipad or in autorotation with Vne on the clock.

MCP....Max attainable height....low speed.....50 feet AGL...high speed.

MCP...2000 feet.....some speed....to go faster....nose down....but lower altitude for the new speed.....slow down to original speed (nose up) more height.

So I say all you CFS guys are wrong.....it is Power that matters and what you do with it.

Cyclic controls the pitch and roll attitude of the aircraft, Collective controls Power.

In Hover....Collective controls Power which determines Height.

In Forward flight....Collective controls power which provides Speed/Height.

[rotorspeed]

Surely all the extensive discussion on autopilot type and modes selected is secondary here?

This sort of approach is presumably fairly routine in the NS and shouldn't have caused any problems. Autopilot coupled on LOC and VS, pilot sets collective to achieve target AS, adjusts if necessary. Both pilots focused on critical part of flight, standard scan focuses on airspeed, altitude and radalt, as MDH is approached monitoring reaches max, a go around ready to be implemented if necessary. Not complicated, surely? Workload is reduced with the LOC and VS coupling.

Events going wrong didn't happen quickly here either - the airspeed was gradually decaying over 60 seconds or so - plenty of time to see things going awry with decaying AS and heights too low. And it wasn't as if they hit high terrain from loss of situational awareness (eg Mull of Kintyre). The crew knew it was flat sea between them and the airfield and that their critical input was to monitor height and go around if required.

When more information is revealed it will also be interesting to see what happened in the final 200ft or so, when presumably the crew became visual. Did they pull max Tq and try to recover? Or was local vis too bad to properly get visual before hitting the sea was unavoidable. The crew will certainly know.

And yet despite not just one but two experienced crew, this basic monitoring appears not to have happened. Again it is hard to think they simply were not paying attention for such a long time. Could they have been incapacitated somehow? Unlikely, especially both, again. Did each pilot wrongly assume the other knew what he was doing?

And why did the airspeed drop off so much in the first place? Could that have been from something as simple as collective friction not having been set at the top of the descent and it edged down un-noticed? (Never flown SP so no idea if relevant) Of course monitoring and reacting is still the critical bit.

Was there a major distraction? Warning lights? Fire? Passenger interference?

Quite a conundrum.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

HC, if you were flying that approach completely manually, at 110kts, which control would you use to adjust/maintain IAS, and which control would you use to adjust/maintain your "glidepath"?

[Prawn2king4]

Relax HC!

In the context of the accident relevant to this thread. Was a hand on the collective?

[KG86]

A number of posters are clearly confused when they hear that, in the L2, cyclic controls altitude or vertical speed.

In most helicopters, collective controls those two parameters, and cyclic controls speed and direction. However, in the 50s and 60s, the French broke away from this tradition. In their helicopters, they decided it would be better to fly at a fixed collective pitch, and fly the ac like a fixed wing. (And, at the same time, they decided to make their rotors go around in the opposite direction to everyone else!)

So their AFCS systems are optimised with different rules to 'most' helicopters, with the vertical channel being controlled by cyclic.

It's not wrong, it's just different. Pilots become used to it very quickly, and think it normal. But it can confuse those not au fait with ze French way.

[HeliComparator]

OF many moons ago I used to fly the 332L - manually -EEEK! Nominated approach speed for an ILS was 110kts normally. At that speed, presuming the collective was set to the correct ballpark figure, it was by far the easiest to fly the glide slope on the cyclic. Minor adjustments to attitude would of course give slight speed variations, but within limits. If there was severe up or down drafts then some collective action might be required to contain the speed.

When I became an instructor, I found guys fresh out of flight school really struggled with ILSs because they were trying to control glideslope with collective and speed with cyclic. On many helicopters, and especially the 332L, you get a lot of interaction in pitch and roll when the collective is moved, and this was destabilising their flying. Once I had beaten the duff gen they had been given at flight school out of their heads, and got them to fly glideslope mostly on the cyclic, they suddenly found it easy.

However, as SAS correctly pointed out a moment ago, in reality a combination of cyclic and collective is required to control both glideslope and speed in these sorts of speed ranges. Its a sliding scale from (eg height) all collective at zero speed, to no collective at Vh, and vice versa for cyclic. And the same but in reverse for speed. I just wish ab initio flight schools explained this properly.

[Jimmy 16]

Exactly KG86, at speed the L2 behaves like a fixed-wing, and should be flown like that. If you want to make a small altitude correction in cruise, you do not need to touch the collective at all.

You can even keep your feet on the floor and make perfectly coordinated turns without any upper modes engaged.;)

Great machine, and I hear the 225 is even better.

[Jwscud]

I find it interesting that it is considered "just an NPA". In the fixed wing world, almost all CFITs occur on NPAs, with something like 70-80% with the Captain as PF. There are a few very thought provoking diagrams of CFIT type accidents here:

http://www.airmanshiponline.com/1nov01/img/Image27.jpg

http://www.airmanshiponline.com/1nov01/img/Image44.gif

NPAs without any form of vertical guidance are a bigger danger than an ILS and many companies require extra briefings and precautions for them. The large number of beautifully stable approaches on centreline smacking in short of the runway keeps my eyes firmly open.

Do you get any aural EGPWS type warnings when approaching minima for instrument approaches in the L2?

[HeliComparator]

jwscud, interesting statistics. I suppose its because we consider offshore airborne radar approaches and night offshore landing so much more difficult, that we consider NPAs to be "safe". The L2 doesn't have EGPWS but it does have an aural warning of "check height" when you go below the height bugged on the radalt, and also "100 feet" when you go below 100' radalt. I'm not familiar with CHC policy on setting the bugs, but in Bristow we set the bugs 100' below MDH. We don't really want a "check height" interrupting at the critical moment when crews are calling "decide", "I have control", "go-around" etc.

In this case, that would give a warning at 200' and at 100'. The former is suspendable, but Bristow SOP is to only do that when the necessary visual references have been acquired. The latter is not suspendable, although its inhibited for RoD >5000'/min.

However, taking into account reaction time and the high rates of descent at low airspeeds we suspect, there might be insufficient time to recover, certainly from 100' and possibly from 200'

[Jimmy 16]

Do you get any aural EGPWS type warnings when approaching minima for
instrument approaches in the L2?


L2 AVAD warnings:

- CHECK HEIGHT
The message is transmitted twice, with a four-second interval, when the aircraft reaches the DH/A or MDA displayed on the NMD or PFD. An AVAD push-button on the cyclic stick can be pressed to cancel the message for three minutes.

- ONE HUNDRED FEET
The message is transmitted once as soon as the aircraft passes into the altitude zone 100 feet Rad alt.

[SASless]

The "AVAD 100 Feet Warning" is not suspendable, although its inhibited for RoD >5000'/min.

Not that we would want it to distract us as we plummet towards the Oggin at more than a mile a minute you see old chap!:E

[Jwscud]

EGPWS gives you a different way of doing it - it will automatically call something like PLUS HUNDRED and then MINIMUMS (depending on customer option) based on the Baro DA set by the crew. You then call Land/Go Around in response to the EGPWS call.

Not I agree entirely relevant to the scenario we're discussing - I'm just interested in how you guys operate.

Do you have clearly defined SOPs for calling deviations? The following examples for final approach come straight from my FCOM:

Flightpath deviations:
• “___ DOTS(S) FLY LEFT / RIGHT”
• “___ DOT(S) FLY UP / DOWN”
• “SPEED” (Whenever IAS is less than Vref or greater than Vapp + 10 kt or
when the speed trend shows a significant tendency to exceed either of
these parameters and thrust lever position is inappropriate for the phase of
flight.)
• “VERTICAL SPEED” (Less than 300 fpm or greater than 1000 fpm in the
last 1000 feet AGL).

The "speed" call gives you 15 knots range of speed (Vref is the minimum, Vapp normally Vref+5) before it is called to your attention.

[Jimmy 16]

@SAS:
Yes, the French have a policy of not distracting pilots with things they do not need to know about......

[Hummingfrog]

HC

Mmmh, so your basic training was limited to expected future roles and types. Not very basic then!

RAF basic training is done on a fixed wing, this gives you a base line of experience and airmanship. You also fly the a/c to the limits of its envelope so you develop a healthy respect for limits.

My "basic" helicopter flying was done on the Whirlwind 10 a single turbine which was very basic, and it didn't have an autopilot. On this a/c you certainly learnt about limited power!

The basic model of power/collective controls height always works until a power limit is reached - then cyclic can be used to zoom climb or increase airspeed to descend. Every RAF pilot knows this and while flying nap of the earth a mixture of height control was used depending on power settings.

To get back to the accident. The weather at Sumburgh was right on limits.

METAR COR EGPB 231750Z 14019KT 2800 BR SCT002 BKN003 15/14
Q1013 NOSIG=

METAR COR EGPB 231720Z 14017KT 2800 BR SCT002 BKN003 15/14
Q1013 BECMG 4000 BR BKN006=

The MDH for the LOC/DME approach is 300ft QNH so the crew would be very aware that they had to fly an accurate approach. In this case I would aim to arrive at the MDH just short of the MAP so I could level, stabilise and hopefully see the lights/ runway as I approached the coast.

HF

[HeliComparator]

Not that we would want it to distract us as we plummet towards the Oggin at more than a mile a minute you see old chap!:E

No point, too late by then. Anyway, in case you didn't know, the >5000'/min inhibit is to try to stop the "100'" sounding every time you cross the deck edge landing offshore. It works most of the time.

[SASless]

the >5000'/min inhibit is to try to stop the "100'" sounding every time you cross the deck edge landing offshore. It works most of the time.

The Warning Inhibitor....or your Landings?;)

[212man]

In most helicopters, collective controls those two parameters, and cyclic controls speed and direction. However, in the 50s and 60s, the French broke away from this tradition. In their helicopters, they decided it would be better to fly at a fixed collective pitch, and fly the ac like a fixed wing. (And, at the same time, they decided to make their rotors go around in the opposite direction to everyone else!)

So their AFCS systems are optimised with different rules to 'most' helicopters, with the vertical channel being controlled by cyclic.

:confused::confused: All helicopters, regardless of origin, with 3-axis autopilots fly using cyclic to control the vertical mode when it's engaged (and IAS when it's engaged). How else could they, with no collective coupling? That's why you can't have both IAS and a vertical mode engaged simultaneously on 3-axis machines.

[[email protected]]

Therein lies my point 212man - the autopilot modes were designed around what was possible at the time (clearly collective coupling wasn't) but most pilots are taught to fly on a non-autopilot machines.

Is it not therefore surprising that, under pressure, one reverts to what one was first taught (and had beaten into you - attitude= speed and lever = height) not what one has subsequently learned?

[HeliComparator]

Therein lies my point 212man - the autopilot modes were designed around what was possible at the time (clearly collective coupling wasn't) but most pilots are taught to fly on a non-autopilot machines.

Is it not therefore surprising that, under pressure, one reverts to what one was first taught (and had beaten into you - attitude= speed and lever = height) not what one has subsequently learned?


Therein lies my point, it is the ab initio instructing that is at fault!

BTW, hello Sarah!

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi Crab,

I think your comments in post 1237 describe the problem of mixed mode flying extremely well.

With regular practice it is manageable. However, at min speed like Vy, so close to the back ofthe power curve, the margins of safety presented by the complexities of the subsequent "effects of controls" when the vertical mode is on the cyclic, are severly eroded.

It's very hard to understand why a crew of an L2 would put themselves in this position instead of simply leaning forward and engaging the full coupler.

Despite the posters on this site trying to give the impression that this kind of approach is, and should be routine, the reality is that in NS ops, a Localiser only approach to minimums is probably a once or twice in a career event for NS crews.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Does anyone know if the ILS 27 EGPB was serviceable that day?

[26500lbs]

Do any of the North Sea helicopter operators use any form of stabilised approach criteria for normal instrument approaches to airports, as we do in the airlines? For example, 1000ft in IMC or 500ft in VMC. If not stable we go around, no debate.

Yes. Used in Norway by CHC. Used onshore and offshore, IFR or VFR. All approaches must be stabilized and checked as such or else a go around is mandatory.

[206Fan]

Therein lies my point, it is the ab initio instructing that is at fault!Which leaves me wondering what will come of the next ab-initio Bristow had planned on bringing to light this year!

[Unable to register]

Seeing there are "underwater emergency breathing apparatus"on sale why don't all passengers carry them.
First read about them on tuna boat flying and someone carried one with him in case he went for an unexpected swim.
Seems they are good for 30 breaths or a couple of minutes.

Why not. They are not that expensive, less than an iPad.
http://www.pose-online.com/index.php...&category_id=3

In Norway all passengers have emergency breathing systems as an intergral part of their transort suits (3rd picture, 2nd row (http://www.hansenprotection.no/survival/sea-air/details.html)), and of course have the usage of this system as part of their basic/refresh safety training.

I've been involved in dunker training of both HEMS crews and North Sea pilots and passenger, and also had the pleasure of doing the refresher training for the crew of the SA365 N1 (http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.6890983) who crashed in Vågåvatnet, Norway in 2004.

The pilot stated to us and also in the official AIBN-report (http://www.aibn.no/Aviation/Reports/2009-27-eng) that the dunker training had been absolutely crucial for his survival in this situation. HEMS crews and other pilots use HABD or HEED systems, but offshore passengers use a type of re-breather that rules out the complications related to using pressurized air.

When the water is as cold as in the North Sea the extra minutes you gain from these kinds of systems could make a big difference when it comes to escape, and it also will prevent the user from breathing in cold water due to reflex.

[[email protected]]

HC, Sarah is just my weekend name (joke btw) or are you referring to the SAR Force Cdr?:ok:

So you are saying that we should change the way we teach people to fly helicopters just to meet the poor ergonomics of a French autopilot!;)

[HeliComparator]

HC, Sarah is just my weekend name (joke btw) or are you referring to the SAR Force Cdr?:ok:

So you are saying that we should change the way we teach people to fly helicopters just to meet the poor ergonomics of a French autopilot!;)

No Sarah (well its the weekend now), all helicopters are like this as various of us have explained. Only if you never fly near a power limit does controlling height always with the collective, work, and even then it can increase the workload significantly as I explained in my "ILS students" post.

I fully appreciate I'm never going to break you from your military indoctrination via Prune, it'll have to wait until you get a proper job.

[HeliComparator]

Despite the posters on this site trying to give the impression that this kind of approach is, and should be routine, the reality is that in NS ops, a Localiser only approach to minimums is probably a once or twice in a career event for NS crews.

For real, possibly, although I think I have done a fair few. But surely its something that is done every 6 months in training, mostly in the aircraft and recently of course, in the Sim? Well a non-precision approach anyway, whether its a VOR, NDB, or LOC. It was always a favourite trick in the sim to lead the crew into expecting an ILS but then have the GS fail just before (or even during, if you were mean) the approach thus making it a Loc approach.

[[email protected]]

I don't think it is just the military who teach people to fly helicopters using lever for height and cyclic for speed.

I spent several years flying the Gazelle so blasting around at a fixed pitch setting varying speed to gain or lose height isn't a novel experience.

The 3A SeaKing has a TAS hold so ILS and other apps are usually flown with that cyclic mode engaged and the RoD flown manually on the collective - it seems to work well and there is never any confusion about which control is doing what.

The SAR modes can do fully coupled letdowns to the hover but the speed is always the cyclic program and the height is always the collective program - either can be flown manually with the other still coupled. It seems to work for us and is consistent with basic helicopter skills - maybe that is why we haven't flown any serviceable one into the sea.

[Paul Chocks]

These last few pages regarding autopilot use has been quite thought provoking.

Despite considering myself reasonably experienced, I am acutely aware that there is much I don't know and have spent some time considering how I fly and whether it could be improved upon. I currently fly a modern 4 axis AP machine similar to those employed on the NS, but in the corporate role.

So some thoughts:

1. When I fly a 3 axis NPA, I do so with airspeed (AS) hold engaged and I control the RoD directly with collective. It would appear that most of you on the NS, fly with VS engaged, so I have considered why I am at odds with all of you and the following comes to mind:

a) I have tried vertical speed (VS) and have found that the rate of change of VS is too slow (I experimentally tried it on a PAR and there was no way I could control the RoD at the rate the controller required)

b) The controls work in the "traditional" way - ie collective (flown by me) controls RoD. The cyclic (via AP) holds my desired speed.

c) It fits historical expectations - on an initial IR and subsequent LPC's, the examiner asks you what speed you intend to fly the approach, implying a steady speed. By using AS hold, you are getting the AP to do that for you.

d) Finally, and here my knowledge is a little ragged, and my aircraft RFM is of little help - I believe that if you fly an APP uncoupled, BUT with the Flight Director engaged, that the collective demand bar is telling you what to do to maintain GP (on an ILS for example) and the pitch command bar is showing you what to do with cyclic to hold speed - ie "traditional" flying

2. I am one of those pilots who occasionally, when autopilot hasn't done what I expected, have decoupled and flown myself (in fact I did so on my last LPC). Generally, I have regained parameters, and then recoupled. Again, I have asked myself why and come to the following conclusions:

a) Controlling the AP when everything is going as you expect is straightforward - when things go awry (and I admit, most often because of operator error), recovery can be slow.

b) I have NEVER, EVER been taught Unusual Attitude recovery by using the autopilot have you? And at what attitudes/speeds etc?

c) I treat the AP as my co-pilot ("George"). If George doesn't do as I expect (again, most likely because I've incorrectly briefed him - ie pressed wrong buttons/sequence/set wrong datum) and its not possible to quickly correct through autopilot manipulation, then I take control - that's why I monitor it/him.

Going back to the first point, I understand that collective can have marked effects on other axis, but smooth application can still result in rapid response with easily controlled secondary effects.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi Paul why do you not fly all approaches 4 axis coupled. It is much easier and far safer if you have a DAFSC.

CRAB 24 years ago I was flying the S61 in Sumburgh.I think we only had heading hold of some kind. A funny triangle shaped button on the AP panel. No ALT or IAS holds.

Does your Seaking allow you to couple in 3 Axis (ie cyclic alone)???

DB

[HeliHenri]

.

North Sea helicopter safety faces wide-ranging review :

http://http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/north-sea-helicopter-safety-faces-wide-ranging-review-390245/

.

[Paul Chocks]

DB - I should have said, IF I fly a 3 axis approach (up until recently, I was dual rated on a 3 axis aircraft too)

I would generally choose 4 axis approach over a 3 axis one given the choice, although AltA and VS still don't give the same fidelity for an MDA level off as a manually controlled collective.

[[email protected]]

DB - only the 3A Sea King has a TAS hold - the autopilot functions are pretty basic but the RNAV can fly the aircraft round the sky. There are the normal rad alt and bar alt holds with a manoeuvre facility but that is it.

There is no way, other than on the SAR transitions, to get the aircraft to fly any form of approach other than the TAS hold for an instrument approach.

For the SAR transitions to and from the hover, it is fully coupled and, if required, either the cyclic or collective programs can be manually flown.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I sometimes wonder if commercial helicopter pilots should be required to have instrument fixed wing experience.

[pilot and apprentice]

I sometimes wonder if commercial helicopter pilots should be required to have instrument fixed wing experience.

To what aim?

[terminus mos]

Surely with the current EC225 gearbox weakness where the new MOD 45 warning throws a spurious alarm if the aircraft is descending at IAS > 125knots, height would necessarily be controlled with the collective on any approach, I imagine that you have to use the IAS hold to ensure that descent is carried out at < 125knots?

[Hummingfrog]

YOP

I sometimes wonder if commercial helicopter pilots should be required to have instrument fixed wing experience.

In the present climate of automation I think it would be a better idea for commercial fix wing pilots to have recent experience in flying light a/c.

All flying experience is valuable, fixed or rotary. I was lucky to be selected to fly Air Experience sorties for Air Training Corps Cadets in firstly the Chipmunk (bliss) then the Bulldog and finally the Tutor from 1988 til 2013. These 25 min sorties usually involved aerobatics as well as simple "instruction" on how to fly the a/c. I always used power/attitude/ trim to show how to accurately fly the a/c.

The reason that the RAF uses collective to control height and cyclic speed is accuracy. Most RAF missions require accurate time on target so one usually flies at a multiple of 60 to make it easier to work out mentally. I seem to remember the Wessex was 90Kts whereas the JP5A was 240 cruise 300 IP to target.

The ability to fly accurately during training also demonstrates your capabilities - any body can gash around the sky meandering +/-5Kts and 100ft. If you couldn't fly accurately then you were politely shown the door or became a navigator:E.

HC's idea that all flying training should reflect the one case where your are power limited is very odd. If you are a capable pilot then you know not to overtorque - a simple concept:D I believe that most ex mil pilots will be more than capable of flying an ILS using the PAT principal, I certainly did - setting a power, depending on the strength of wind and hence RoD, and an attitude depending on the speed ATC/weather required. Bobs your uncle down the slope you went!!

HF

[llamaman]

Only if you never fly near a power limit does controlling height always with the collective, work, and even then it can increase the workload significantly as I explained in my "ILS students" post.

I fully appreciate I'm never going to break you from your military indoctrination via Prune, it'll have to wait until you get a proper job.

I'm not quite sure what HC means with these comments. It would be an unusual scenario to see one flying near a power limit during a descent on an instrument approach. There are pros/cons to both techniques of flying an approach suffice to say that a modern 4-axis AP will take care of things much more accurately than your average line pilot!

The last comment smacks of a chip on the shoulder, military pilots are no more or less indoctrinated than their civilian counterparts. There seems to be a small contingent within these forums desperate to drag everything back to a military v civilian bitchfest, a shame as this only serves as a petty sideshow to some really thought-provoking posts.

[albatross]

The 225 is happy to descend fully coupled using NAV or HEADING plus IAS ( we use 120 going down) and ALTA. or even VS (which we hardly ever use- why start a descent/climb without tell "George" where to stop. He's a wonderful autopilot but not a deep thinker.)
Never had any problem with this.
If you wish you can change IAS using the chinese hat on the cyclic and VS with the beeper on the collective.
Alt capture with ALTA is very accurate and I have not seen it blow through any selected alt.
Once the alt is captured you can fine tune alt using the beeper on the collective say if you want to desend a few feet to catch a radalt height or climb a few feet for whatever reason such as a QNH change.
IAS selection using the chinese hat is very positive and you can remain fully coupled to <40 Kts. so it is very nice for rig landings.
It is also perfectly happy flying a fully coupled ILS.
The go around mode works a charm and is very positive.

The mod 45 doesn't send an "alarm" in the meaning of the word - what you get in extended descents ->125 kts is a HUMS warning and usually a "No Mod 45" caption once you get the IAS <125 it usually clears in about 5 minutes. Annoying but hardly alarming.

There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding on PPrune as to what these (No Mod 45 / Mod 45 Fail ) warnings mean. Some seem to think it denotes an actual warning of a transmission problem. In fact it is Hums telling you it is not getting the vibration readings it needs due to Hums priority or an out of acquisition parameters.

Once we all got trained in the acquision parameters it certainly doesn't happen very often some folks initially were selecting 123-124 knots going down and getting warmings we now select 120 and the system seems to like that.

During return to service training we got some HUMS No Mod 45 warnings when doing multiple rig circuits because of extended low torque , low IAS. returning to Q>60 and IAS>60 for a couple of minutes would clear the warning.

I am a former S-92 driver and new to the 225 but think the 225 is a fine aircraft. It took a while to get used to the differences between the 2 aircraft but that is normal. You have to learn to dance with your new girl and can't moon over the old one. I will keep my 92 tattoo however. LOL.

I am certainly not a 225 guru so take the above for what it is - ramblings of a driver, airframe.

In the wake of this tragic accident I hope we will see a small change in training priorities with an better Ops manual review with focus on changes since previous training / SOP / Use of automation syllabus. Just opinion.

What I don't want is a blizzard of emails, forms and paperwork from on high.
Too often when something happens there is a kneejerk reaction of this type because some folks think it necessary or are instructed to be seen "doing something" to solve the problem and reinventing the wheel looks better vs reinforcing aready good SOPs ect. (of course In my youth an ops manual was about 5 pages of really large font, double spaced writing and boiled down to "Stay Above 5 Feet and Don't do Nothing Stupid!" there was also a "Common Sense Will prevail" section.)

I think that we as an industry have needed to take a good look at ourselves and where we are, where we are going for a little while. I hope that if this happens the people doing the looking are not the folks who need looking at. Even those with the best of intentions find it hard to be self critical.I've seen that too often. I also hope that they will talk to the troops in the field an not only the generals in the chateau way behind the lines.

[Hummingfrog]

llamaman

There seems to be a small contingent within these forums desperate to drag everything back to a military v civilian bitchfest, a shame as this only serves as a petty sideshow to some really thought-provoking posts.

I hope you weren't including me in that comment.:= I have flown with some very capable civilian trained pilots as well as some mil trained who were not as good. I was trying to explain to HC that there is a different concept applicable to basic Mil Training - basically accurate speed control is paramount for tactical reasons, therefore, using the cyclic to change altitude and as a consequence the speed varies is not acceptable during routine operations.

HF

[[email protected]]

I think it was HC's last comment that was directed at me since I have vigorously defended milSAR on other threads.

HF is entirely correct about mil training - it is just different to what non-mil will have experienced because it has a specific purpose.

HF - only did JP 3 myself before I managed to get the helicopter slot I joined up for:ok:

Albatross - it seems that everyone is very happy with the 225 autopilot - it's just the L2 that seems to be taking flak.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I hope you do mind me saying, your post is the most informative, most incisive take on the current state of affairs.

We need you on the HSSG!!

Striking at the heart of any matter is the singular failing of a culture of management with poor aviation, let alone helicopter knowledge, surrounded by "Yes" men in the senior Training and Operational Positions whose weakness blights us all.
How can it ever be acceptable for Type Rating Flight training (SIM) on the most sophisticated Helicopters in civil operation, to be delivered by individuals who have never flown the type. Fix this first before anything else.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

CRAB and HF, the things you talk about are long forgotten by us ex mil and civilian pilots mainly because we are not spending 90% of our flight time practising these things in the air.

In offshore flying, done properly, there is no scope for exploring the edges of envelopes or pissing about with PAT etc. Our 6 month recurrent training is arguably not sufficient and certainly is spent doing other things than what you two keeping discussing on this thread. It confuses most of us.

In the "average" offshore helicopter your concepts are already extent. This accident, in so far as we know, may well have been caused by the crew not realising early enough that their speed was decaying due to an inappropriate application of AP modes and power setting. Recognising these errors starts with understanding the AP display indications and a very very robust knowledge of "Mixed" mode flying and its potential pitfalls.

Having said all that, to illustrate how annoying your detail can be, you talk about cyclic controlling height, collective control speed or whatever, but on the back of the power curve all these concepts are different especially that the cyclic can no longer hold height. This why in the later EC models, if you are dumb enough to deploy ALT or V/S alone on the back of the power curve, the AP engages the mode on the collective.

Basic flight training is what it always is but we are way beyond PAT when the AP has control of just one AXIS (vertical and/or longitudinal).

For those who do not like the term "Mixed Mode", we are exploring this term now because we cannot describe the condition where ALT is alone on the collective anymore using 3/4 Axis nomenclature. Also, the term "Mixed Mode" we want to firmly associate with the concept that the Pilot Flying must take custody one or more controls.

Someone said earlier, that if they were forced to fly an approach in 3 Axis mode he would prefer to engage IAS and not V/S on the cyclic. I agree with this because from the very outset, the pilot has to modulate collective to maintain the vertical profile and is therefore far less likely to forget it at MDA at min IMC IAS.

DB

[albatross]

I have actually seen in the last years a true effort in many ways to avoid the kneejerk reaction syndrome - in the early 80s it was horrible.
For example there was blade strike incident and a customer aviation manager came out with a new rule that we could not land within 100 feet of a tree on pain of dismissal. The next day we loaded up the pax, flew to the work site circled and returned to base. The power line right of way was 100 feet wide so we couldn't land.
Rule rescinded about 20 minutes after the construction super called the President of the Corporation concerned. LOL
There are a lot of good folks in training / management in many companies but there seems to be something wrong in the system.
I can't comment on the North Sea operations or the companies operating therein in particular and my previous post was an attempt at an overview not location or company specific.
There have been a lot of great suggestions on this thread which if acted upon may improve safety worldwide.
A vast improvement over the 92 witch-hunt / screamfest LOL.

[P3 Bellows]

“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized.

I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization”

By Gaius Petronius Arbiter (Roman Satirist) 27 – 66 AD

[HeliComparator]

I'm not quite sure what HC means with these comments. It would be an unusual scenario to see one flying near a power limit during a descent on an instrument approach. There are pros/cons to both techniques of flying an approach suffice to say that a modern 4-axis AP will take care of things much more accurately than your average line pilot!

The last comment smacks of a chip on the shoulder, military pilots are no more or less indoctrinated than their civilian counterparts. There seems to be a small contingent within these forums desperate to drag everything back to a military v civilian bitchfest, a shame as this only serves as a petty sideshow to some really thought-provoking posts.

The anti mil implication was only a reaction to crab's usual suggestion that "this is how we do it in the military, so by definition if must be the perfect and only way" (my paraphrasing!). Its just a bit of banter, don't worry about it. I do agree with the comment that its not only the mil basic training that teaches use of cyclic and collective too simplistically. Yes it's true that descending at 110 in a 332L is nowhere near a power limit, but it has been repeatedly demonstrated to me that the technique taught in basic training doesn't work in practice, and once the trainee has been de-trained, and then retrained to a technique that works, suddenly they no longer struggle. It would be much easier if they were taught in the first place the relationship between cyclic, collective use for speed and height control, vs the current speed, as i explained earlier, and not some simplistic BS that only works under limited circumstances.

[rotorspeed]

DB

You say that recognising an error of decaying airspeed starts with understanding AP displays and a very very robust knowledge of mixed mode flying.

Doesn't it start with simply monitoring the ASI? For those of us that have never flown an SP L2, what form is the ASI? A big round dial or digital display within a screen?

[[email protected]]

and not some simplistic BS that only works under limited circumstances. it seems to me that attitude=airspeed and lever=height works from the hover, up and down the power curve to Vmax unless you meet a power limit that prevents you raising the lever or you have extremes of attitude.

Conversely, using collective to control speed and cyclic to control RoD only works in specific circumstances and only when using the higher autopilot functions.

If you want to fly a helicopter like a FW, then fine but it seems to have worked for many years when flown as it was designed.

[Ray Joe Czech]

The only reason that normal techniques don't work on 332L ILSs is because the autopilot is a piece of sh1t.
It is the only aircraft I have ever flown where, when you lower the lever the nose comes up and the speed bleeds off. The converse happens and both helpfully occur over a three to five second period so the ab initio HP is forever behind the aircraft.
If you fly the 'normal' technique in a 225, no problem -- I bet you didn't have to teach ab initio pilots to fly the glide path on cyclic in that.

[Grenville Fortescue]

The only reason that normal techniques don't work on 332L ILSs is because the autopilot is a piece of sh1t.

Interesting. Unhelpful AP systems certainly don't reduce pilot workload in times of high concentration.

[Ray Joe Czech]

There are a lot of good folks in training / management in many companies but there seems to be something wrong in the system.

...

There have been a lot of great suggestions on this thread which if acted upon may improve safety worldwide.


Fat chance. If they ask the drivers they might hear things they don't want to hear.
The only stuff that changes in my company is that driven by clients or EASA, and that is mostly addressing non-problems.
As an example of the former we had a stabilised approach policy introduced due to customer insistence (we already had a speed stable one for IFR approaches) that introduced ROD limits that had us all hauling the speed back before 1000' on the ILS and had us royally screwing up ATC. So some of that was binned so we are now in the crazy situation where onshore IFR and offshore have no ROD limit but onshore VFR approaches do. Thanks for your help there! My wife and kids feel so much less anxious!
As to EASA bollocks we now can't commence an IFR approach at an onshore airfield if the temperature is zero or sub zero unless we have minima plus 400' cloud base and possibly some visibility limit -- sorry for the vagueness, but there is so much of this bollocks that comes out nowadays it's in one ear and out the other. This, from my experience solves a problem that only exists in EASA's imagination because they can't get their head round the idea of a limited icing clearance. I can only remember one crew getting badly caught out with icing in all the time I've done this, and that was because they were being idiots.
Rant over.

[HeliComparator]

“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized.

I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization”

By Gaius Petronius Arbiter (Roman Satirist) 27 – 66 AD



Wow! That is so true of current management!

[HeliComparator]

Crab, as I said there is no way I'm going to rid you of your indoctrination via Prune. Just to add one other point, moving the collective up and down disturbs the airframe more than slight cyclic adjustments, and in particular makes the engine noise wind up and down more, which destabilises the passengers' calmness, something which these days is a precious commodity. So you see, there are some things you have yet to have to concern yourself with.

[Ray Joe Czech]

Yes, but I wouldn't want you to get the idea you would be constantly battling against it. You get used to the idiosyncrasies of it but it is quite striking converting onto or off type.
You learn when you have to pay particular attention to it, and it is much better than having no autopilot at all.

[Grenville Fortescue]

I understand, thanks for the clarification. It seems though that the system requires fairly keen monitoring and/or manipulation to keep everything running smoothly?

[Ray Joe Czech]

Not as much as you think. ILS as discussed because of collective-pitch linkage, on level off, fine in stable flight. The PF would be hands on for low-level stuff.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

ROTORSPEED, monitoring the IAS will let you know when the speed is decaying. Knowledge of the AP Display and the pitfalls of 3 axis at min IAS IMC avoids the speed from decaying in the first place. That was my point.

DB

[Hummingfrog]

Perhaps it is time to put to bed the differences in basic training and using different techniques to control height/speed.

We are assuming that, as the serviceability of the SP seems to have been OK, that there has been some form of procedural/pilot error. So how did this happen?

We have 2 experienced pilots flying a relatively simple IFR approach, in IMC, as cloud was probably scattered at 200ft, broken at 300ft. They knew the MDH was 300ft so would be trying to fly as accurately as possible to achieve the required visual clues at, or just before, the MAP. Yet the airspeed was allowed to decay to such an extent that the a/c developed a RoD which was high enough for the a/c to enter the water?

The NHP would have his eyes clued to the instruments while the HP would certainly be monitoring them while looking up to see if he had the required visual parameters to land. His scan in/out would increasingly be out as he neared MDH and probably fully out by the 100ft to go call.

The AIB full report will make very interesting reading especially looking at the casual factors such as training/autopilot approach SOPs/management philosophy on the use of the autopilot. Then the human factors as to why 2 pilots didn't recover from a low speed U/P before they entered the water. Then any technical faults which may have confused or misled the crew into thinking they were in control.

HF

[HeliComparator]

Is it time to address the elephant in the room yet? By which I mean, what contribution to this accident has CHC's strategy of selling off all their training assets to a third party provider made? Many of whose instructors have never operated the types they are teaching in the Sim on, have no idea of the CHC company culture, the North Sea environment etc.

One presumes this was done as a cost cutting excercise, but at what overall cost?

[HeliComparator]

Perhaps it is time to put to bed the differences in basic training and using different techniques to control height/speed.

We are assuming that, as the serviceability of the SP seems to have been OK, that there has been some form of procedural/pilot error. So how did this happen?

We have 2 experienced pilots flying a relatively simple IFR approach, in IMC, as cloud was probably scattered at 200ft, broken at 300ft. They knew the MDH was 300ft so would be trying to fly as accurately as possible to achieve the required visual clues at, or just before, the MAP. Yet the airspeed was allowed to decay to such an extent that the a/c developed a RoD which was high enough for the a/c to enter the water?

The NHP would have his eyes clued to the instruments while the HP would certainly be monitoring them while looking up to see if he had the required visual parameters to land. His scan in/out would increasingly be out as he neared MDH and probably fully out by the 100ft to go call.

The AIB full report will make very interesting reading especially looking at the casual factors such as training/autopilot approach SOPs/management philosophy on the use of the autopilot. Then the human factors as to why 2 pilots didn't recover from a low speed U/P before they entered the water. Then any technical faults which may have confused or misled the crew into thinking they were in control.

HF

Fair enough, but just to add that i am in agreement with other posters who say that for an NPA, it would never be best practice to be coupled to VS alone. Ideally 4 axis but failing that, couple to IAS. An ILS is perhaps different because the most important parameter is GS, with IAS being not that important PROVIDED its kept somewhere reasonable.

In other words, being of the view that in general the autopilot is better at flying than the pilot (certainly in the case of the 225 anyway) I would rather have the AP doing the more critical bit and the pilot the less critical bit, though to be honest I can't remember how well the L2 copes with cyclic coupled to GS in turbulence etc.

[SASless]

The NHP would have his eyes clued to the instruments while the HP would certainly be monitoring them while looking up to see if he had the required visual parameters to land. His scan in/out would increasingly be out as he neared MDH and probably fully out by the 100ft to go call.


I think Hummingfrog may have identified the problem without realizing it.

As i am not flying on the North Sea these days...and do not know what the current procedures are on this......I will rely upon Humm's post to be correctly stating the situation.

My response to his statement quoted above is that it has it completely backwards in my humble opinion.

The HP should be focused upon the Instruments as he is doing the flying and is doing an Instrument Approach. The NHP is the one that should be looking outside and monitoring inside.

If Visual Contact is sufficient when the Decision to continue or Go Around is made....he should take the controls and make the Landing....or if a Missed Approach is done....the HP continues flying instruments and performs the Missed Approach.

As it appears now..... you have the Flying Pilot splitting his focus....at a very critical point in the approach. That is building in a Distraction as I see it.

Anyone remember the "BA Memo" that talked about the shift in controls that was so comical to read....but had a very serious underlying safety message?

It had to do with the shift of duties and altimeter settings as I recall.

What was really funny about it to me was at that time we had three Bar Alts on the Instrument Panel but no RadAlt....and when we did a Missed Approach and shifted control from one pilot to another....the song and dance that took place resetting the Altimeters from QFE, QNH (local), and QNH Regional was just silly....and also left room for mistakes.

HC....you care to expound on why the HP, FP....the one on the Instruments doing the actual control of the aircraft should be peeking outside looking for the runway and not the NHP, PNF, NFP should not be looking outside even though he is not flying the machine at the time?

[rotorspeed]

HC

Do you really think the elepant in the room is cost cutting on training? Or is it that two pilots tragically might have made a mistake - that their training, let alone experience, should have been sufficient to prevent?

Understandably, a number of NS colleagues here are perhaps loath to accept that concept.

But there again, there may well have been an understandable reason for the pilots to act as they did, from a complicated whole scenario.

[[email protected]]

which destabilises the passengers' calmness, something which these days is a precious commodity. So you see, there are some things you have yet to have to concern yourself with. perhaps a little patronizing there HC of course I completely ignore everyone aft of the pilot's seat, especially spinal patients and when the boys and girls in the back are doing CPR!

However what does flying a serviceable aircraft into the sea do for passengers' calmness? - rather a lot of damage judging by many of the SLF posts here.

[Hummingfrog]

HC

In other words, being of the view that in general the autopilot is better at flying than the pilot (certainly in the case of the 225 anyway) I would rather have the AP doing the more critical bit and the pilot the less critical bit, though to be honest I can't remember how well the L2 copes with cyclic coupled to GS in turbulence etc.

I totally agree that in real IMC down to limits I would rather use the coupler than hand fly - the coupler in the365N2 was pretty basic but a coupled ILS was safer to fly as all you had to do - and we were single pilot- was make sure that the instruments showed that you were actually on the glidepath and localiser!!

In my early days we had a member of management who said " we're not paying for a nav coupled function on the 332L because I pay you lot (pilots) enough so we expect you to fly and navigate!!" We had height hold, heading hold via the bug on the compass my memory fails me so I am not sure if we had airspeed or VS functions.

I am sure management views on equiping the a/c have changed since the early 1990s.

SASLESS

Sorry my fault:ugh: - you are right - I got it wrong it is the NHP who is looking out and is the one who takes control to land the a/c as he is seeing the outside picture first. Memory failed me as I was generally single pilot and only really flew 2 crew for the last few years of my career.
HF

HF

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

SASless, the way you describe it is how we do it on the NS (I assume the other companies do it that way as well.)

Hummingfrog's description is how it was (and may still be, I don't know) in the military, when you may very well have been single pilot or had a non-pilot such as a Nav in the other seat and therefore had no one to make the decision or hand over control to. That may well have been the case on the NS, but isn't now.

His paras 1, 2, 3 and 5 though are spot on!

Edited to add:

HF, sorry! Your typing skills are quicker than mine!

[Bravo73]

The NHP would have his eyes clued to the instruments while the HP would certainly be monitoring them while looking up to see if he had the required visual parameters to land. His scan in/out would increasingly be out as he neared MDH and probably fully out by the 100ft to go call.


I think that you might have the roles in a 'modern', monitored approach cockpit slightly confused.

The PF (Pilot Flying) should be eyes in all the way to DA/MAPT, at which point 'decide' is called. It is the PM (Pilot Monitoring) who will be looking out of the window for the visual cues to land. If the PM is visual, then he/she calls 'Visual, I have control' and lands the aircraft. If nothing is seen, the PM calls 'Go Around' and the PF flies the go around.

In this case, like the REDU/ETAP accident, I suspect that both pilots were looking out at the critical time.

[SASless]

Froggie.....sometimes my fingers type much quicker than my brain thinks.

I guess that is what makes us Humans....and thus able to make a mistake now and then.

Note....I don't grant HC such latitude out of a delight in revving him up now and then.

[HeliComparator]

perhaps a little patronizing there HC of course I completely ignore everyone aft of the pilot's seat, especially spinal patients and when the boys and girls in the back are doing CPR!

However what does flying a serviceable aircraft into the sea do for passengers' calmness? - rather a lot of damage judging by many of the SLF posts here.

How very logical to correlate concern for passengers' feeling with crashing into the sea!

[SASless]

HC,

Now slow down....remember who you are talking to here.

Crab has very definite ideas on all this stick wiggling we do.

He is not too concerned about passenger comfort as everyone he picks up are damned glad just to be given a ride home in his antique Sea King.....thus not one of his passengers is inclined to critique such things as yours might.

Different frames of reference you see....even if Crab doesn't.

[HeliComparator]

HC

Do you really think the elepant in the room is cost cutting on training? Or is it that two pilots tragically might have made a mistake - that their training, let alone experience, should have been sufficient to prevent?

Understandably, a number of NS colleagues here are perhaps loath to accept that concept.

But there again, there may well have been an understandable reason for the pilots to act as they did, from a complicated whole scenario.

Yes, at this stage we are of course speculating. I did hear through the grapevine that the copilot was pretty new. If that is true, he will presumably have done his type rating etc via the 3rd party trainer. Reluctantly I can accept one highly experienced pilot making a big mistake, its rather harder to believe two can, u less there were other factors that made the second pilot less than optimal.

TBH I have no idea whether the 3rd party training is a big deal or not, but at first glance it seems a really bad idea. That's why I was hoping to provoke some response from those who do know.

[pilot and apprentice]

HummThe NHP would have his eyes clued to the instruments while the HP would certainly be monitoring them while looking up to see if he had the required visual parameters to land. His scan in/out would increasingly be out as he neared MDH and probably fully out by the 100ft to go call.

Surprising assumption.

SASAs i am not flying on the North Sea these days...and do not know what the current procedures are on this......I will rely upon Humm's post to be correctly stating the situation.

My response to his statement quoted above is that it has it completely backwards in my humble opinion.

The HP should be focused upon the Instruments as he is doing the flying and is doing an Instrument Approach. The NHP is the one that should be looking outside and monitoring inside.

If Visual Contact is sufficient when the Decision to continue or Go Around is made....he should take the controls and make the Landing....or if a Missed Approach is done....the HP continues flying instruments and performs the Missed Approach.

I agree SAS. You described what I would call a Pilot Monitored App (PMA) and that is what I would have briefed with weather so close to minimums. The Pilot Flown App (PFA) that Hummingfrog described is what we use when weather is well above minima, essentially VMC.

==========================================

As far as 3rd party training....I can't believe that we are both going down this road, and reducing the time allotted in the sim.

[26500lbs]

Yes, at this stage we are of course speculating. I did hear through the grapevine that the copilot was pretty new. If that is true, he will presumably have done his type rating etc via the 3rd party trainer. Reluctantly I can accept one highly experienced pilot making a big mistake, its rather harder to believe two can, u less there were other factors that made the second pilot less than optimal.

TBH I have no idea whether the 3rd party training is a big deal or not, but at first glance it seems a really bad idea. That's why I was hoping to provoke some response from those who do know.

HC - you are encroaching on a controversial subject here and one that has certainly been the subject of many a heated discussion. Third party training is definitely cheaper to the accountant. Quality can in theory be just as good if controlled properly. Therein lies the problem.
I do not know for sure if type rating courses are done by exclusively by CAE in the UK, but interestingly in CHC HS in Norway they are not involved at all. Company instructors carry out all training including type ratings. Whilst it was the desire of the company to use third party training, it was actually the customer - Statoil - that stopped this and insisted that all pilots flying their contracts will be trained by operational instructors flying in the North Sea and with a minimum of 5 years experience in Norway.
The customer has had to accept that this will ultimately be a more expensive option but they appear to have made this more of a priority, therefore ensuring CHC in Norway conduct and control their own training. They also insisted on increasing the minimum amount of time required in the sim for OPC and LPC training, which has been in effect for 2 years.

[HeliComparator]

HC - you are encroaching on a controversial subject here and one that has certainly been the subject of many a heated discussion. Third party training is definitely cheaper to the accountant. Quality can in theory be just as good if controlled properly. Therein lies the problem.
I do not know for sure if type rating courses are done by exclusively by CAE in the UK, but interestingly in CHC HS in Norway they are not involved at all. Company instructors carry out all training including type ratings. Whilst it was the desire of the company to use third party training, it was actually the customer - Statoil - that stopped this and insisted that all pilots flying their contracts will be trained by operational instructors flying in the North Sea and with a minimum of 5 years experience in Norway.
The customer has had to accept that this will ultimately be a more expensive option but they appear to have made this more of a priority, therefore ensuring CHC in Norway conduct and control their own training. They also insisted on increasing the minimum amount of time required in the sim for OPC and LPC training, which has been in effect for 2 years.

Well that's very interesting in itself, especially bearing in mind the theme earlier in this thread about differing accident rates between east and west North Sea. So the idea that things are done pretty much the same on both sides has just been rubbished in a critically important area.

ETA with my personal knowledge of the attitudes in Statoil, limited though they are, vs the attitudes of many of their UK equivalents, gives another massive clue.

[Geoffersincornwall]

This just has to be one of those ideas that only a bean counter can conjure up. One of the aspect of training that sets the TR taught by a third party instructor apart from one carried out in house has nothing to do with the quality of instruction. The Third party TRI/SFI can be just as good, if not better than the guy that does it every now and then (bearing in mind that the guy in the TRTO/FTO is doing it every day).

No, the big difference is that the 'in-house' guy has 'ownership' of the people and probably knows the candidate intimately along with his strengths and weaknesses. What is more, there is an inbuilt desire to deal with those weaknesses rather than just submit the guy to a 'tick-in-the-box', 'yes-you-can-have-three-goes', groundhog-day re-run of the same-old, same-old, prof check. The third party guy has no incentive to be more or less stringent that the regs require and 99.9% of the time this equates to a 'pass'.

With in house training there is at least the possibility that the candidate will be given some extra training where this can be justified. I do not detect the use this avenue in third party training.

EVIDENCE BASED TRAINING is the way ahead, 'competence' should be the watchword not 'compliance'. God save us from 'compliance' if we go down that road forever we will be condemned to a spiral of decline. Just take a look at how the world creates the flight instructors - horrendous in many cases. Pilots appointed as instructors with little (relevant) or no training and sim instructors (i.e.. the future) shoved into the box, shown how to turn it on and told to get on with it.

Third party training, if it becomes the norm, will be a triumph of financial convenience over the desire for optimum levels of competence.

G.

[HeliComparator]

Geoffers, yes, "training to proficiency" I think we call it. As a 3rd party trainer yourself, thanks for an honest appraisal. In your case, you have lots of relevant experience in operating helicopters which must be very beneficial. But (and correct me if I'm wrong) you have very little operational experience of flying some of the types for which you teach TRs?

The point being that if you do a manufacturer's course, you tend to get the good bits about the aircraft, but maybe not the bad bits which were not supposed to be there, and which are only known about following in-service experience by the operators.

There is most definitely a place for 3rd party and manufacturer's training, but not however in the context of a mainstream and very large operator, except when introducing a brand new type (IMO!).

[Special 25]

Bearing in mind, the current crop of CAE instructors include at least 4 ex Bristow Captains, either retired or surplus to requirements. JB, GT, GF (on and off - Not sure??) and CC, one of the most experienced instructors on the North Sea.

[Geoffersincornwall]

A very astute observation. There is a very appropriate saying that applies to people like me, appointed to teach on the 139 when there were virtually no type rated drivers in the world.

'In the land of the blind the one eyed man is king'

This translates into "as long as you know more than your student then you can keep on teaching".

We had to get to grips with teaching the 139 from zero operational experience. A necessary evil one might observe.

We became very good at the job because we did it day in day out but there comes a time, and for me it is now, September 2013, when I feel I have exhausted my credibility. It's a fine balance because I can teach most pilots a lot about how to manage the FMS and how to run the AP but without the operational experience you are always on the back foot.

That said my forte is teaching in the simulator environment and I hope to spend the next few years helping those who are charged with working in this challenging world to polish and perfect there skills.

By the end of this month I expect my student count over the last 7 years to be 320 from 49 different countries. I may have taught a lot of guys and girls in that time but they should know that I have learnt from them too and one of the things I have become aware of is how varied the quality of pilot training is around the world. If we are to prevent a spiral of decline then I pray we find a better way of doing things than the one we use today.

G.

[HeliComparator]

Special, yes absolutely right, there are some first rate instructors, although in some cases, whilst having massive experience in the environment, have limited or no experience of both the specific aircraft and the company culture. But are there not also some instructors who lack all these things, making training the luck of the draw? But I am not really sure of my facts so i welcome correction.

[26500lbs]

And it is the “ex” bit that is the difficulty. They may be the best and most experienced instructor in the world, but operating procedures change, checklists change, usually as a result of current and recent experience. It is a dynamic operational environment. Aircraft types are modified and upgraded and have a direct effect on the operation, and this happens regularly and often with little notice. It is far more preferable to have a current operational instructor in this sense as he brings to the table the most up to date information and procedures. In addition the company can clearly and specifically identify trends within the company pilot group that need specific focus for training and implement this with relative ease into scenario based training and briefing during OPC’s. This can and has meant that every pilot in the company will be briefed on specific subjects of relevance and importance and have the opportunity to fly key areas of training importance in the sim during OPC training that is not mandated by the authoruty. This can and has included appropriate use of couple and coupler philosophy, winter operating procedures, night procedures offshore, CRM, highlighting of areas of JAROPS/EUops, relevant technical breifing and training following major upgrades or passage of info following recent safety issues/incidents/accidents.
Using in-house instructors acts as an extremely effective communication tool throughout the company as they are the few people in the company who will have access to the entire pilot group regularly. With the effective use of instructor group meetings it is also a very effective way of enabling standardization and quality control across the company with a good closed loop feedback system. They can act as a good barometer to the overall standard and trends in the pilot group. With further evidence based systems such as FDR monitoring, a very good picture can be built up of what is happening on the line as well. Provided the same person or very small group of people are all talking regularly and closely we have a better system of control. This is far more possible if the company maintains control of all its flying and training assets. One chief pilot has all the feeds and a very good “big picture”.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Amen

G.

[Bravo73]

...and CC, one of the most experienced instructors on the North Sea.

If that is the CC that I think it might be (the second 'C' being of either the bamboo or sugar variety), then I whole-heartedly agree.

He is also one of the finest gentlemen to be found on the NS. :ok:

[HeliComparator]

Yes, one of the best and in fact, probably THE best. Not only did he have a hand in my ab initio training at Redhill, but it was also he who sold me my first car to complement my motorbikes in anticipation of moving to Aberdeen in a snowy February, 1980. Oh, so not perfect then...

[HLCPTR]

Not all "third party" training is created equal. Some teach to fundamental system understanding and proficiency. Some teach to "pass the test".

If 100 out of 100 students pass.... what are the odds of that?

You usually get what you pay for.

[Thomas coupling]

Didn't the Scilly Isles S61 do the same thing, only during the day and in fog?

Is the AAIB interim out yet?

[industry insider]

HC ...that would have been the dark green Saab 96 with the fuel saving freewheel unit! CC was indeed a gent and one of the best instructors.

[satsuma]

The third party guy has no incentive to be more or less stringent that the regs require and 99.9% of the time this equates to a 'pass'

If this statistic is accurate, then that's a big problem. Fundamentally it's an absence of quality control at an organisation's most visible and high profile level. How can everybody be up to scratch all the time?

[SASless]

As the Third Party has to satisfy the Customer....so long as the Customer sets a Standard that must be met....The Third Party has no axe to grind and has no need to play favorites.

A true Third Party impartial evaluation of both the Pilots and the Operational Procedures cannot hurt. Sometimes an outside look is beneficial.

[[email protected]]

It would appear that somehow the institutionalised military, stuck in the mud RAF SAR Force, have somehow managed to achieve what 26500lbs has advocated as the ideal -

Our simulator training is provided by a 3rd party (Thales) who employ ex-mil instructors (not all of whom have SAR Sea King experience operationally) - there are close links between the OCU, the 2 Sqn training teams and SAR Standards to ensure that what is taught is what is required and is kept up to date and relevant to the operational requirements.

Who would have thought? Oh let me guess, the answer is that we have a limitless bucket of money to throw at it - nothing could be further from the truth.

HC How very logical to correlate concern for passengers' feeling with crashing into the sea! no, your implication was that NS flying techniques are dictated by the need for passenger comfort - the technique of flying in a mixed-mode because you prefer small cyclic changes to collective changes, clearly didn't achieve passenger comfort and confidence in this sad case.

[26500lbs]

Crab - you are correct and it is an ideal. It works well in the military. I saw it myself in my time and all the staff used in the sim were excellent instructors and former squadron QHI’s.

The main difference is that in the military environment you have time to train in the aircraft and a large amount of budgeted training sorties. Here the Squadron QHI can have his input on the process and feed down the directives from his boss. That does not exist in the offshore world. There are no dedicated aircraft training sorties available after the initial aircraft famil following the type rating.

If an operator were to wholeheartedly embrace third party training they must be able to address the shortfalls. I think the way it is done in the military is an excellent example of how it can work. The key is the two systems must work closely together and be on the same team. An operator cannot just let go of the ropes and say goodbye to training - “third party provider - you have control”.

[thelearner]

The discussion here is extremely interesting and thought provoking, and I would like to commend all the contributor's and this forum - it is excellent.

I am ex SLF, but still talk to colleagues who are SLF.

If a helicopter crashes, they are normally grounded. If mechanical fault is found, they remain grounded until either all have been fully inspected, or have had component replacement - and then the regulator (and operators) is satisfied the event cannot reoccur and the aircraft start flying again.
In this event, we still don't know the cause, but you guys seem pretty sure it is some form of procedural or human error, possibly coupled with something else that may have distracted the crew until it was too late to take corrective action.

Why then, are the aircraft (L2) then returned to the air without any assurance that the same event cannot be repeated? This worries me a little, although I am sure (well hopeful) that all crews now are very aware of the possible causes of this accident and this makes another occurrence less likely.

You guys are kings of the check list - I assume there is no check list you use when starting approach?, including ensuring both crew are aware of AP modes, who is controlling each axis and who is monitoring what?

I also found section 8.6.1 of this EASA document (http://www.easa.europa.eu/certification/experts/docs/oeb-reports/eurocopter/EASA-OEB-Final-Report-Eurocopter_Super%20Puma%20Fleet%20including%20(C1eL1e)-%2015%2002%2013%20-%20EC+jms.pdf) very interesting regarding automation and training.

The discussion on 3rd party training is very interesting - oil companies are run by bean counters too, but the MD's will release funds if required for safety improvements - as we all know a major accident (like this one) will cost much more than any savings made anyway - a lesson we seem to keep forgetting?

From limited discussion with my offshore colleagues, the EC225 briefings appear to be going well with very good input from the pilots doing briefings, although the major concern of the workers still seems to be how to get out if they end up inverted in the water.
In this incident, there was no warning and no time to prepare or deploy rebreather - I wonder if then the air bottles in the rebreathers activated on contact with water and there would have been air bubbles everywhere as the air escaped the rebreather? Personally my focus would have been on escaping and i would not have tried to deploy the rebreather, and I hope the full AAIB report focuses on what happened in the rear cabin as well as what caused the accident.

I still think the main focus should be on keeping the aircraft from entering the water - I think those of us who have flown in the NS for a long time know if we had to ditch on a winters day with quick overturning of the chopper the outcome may not be very good.

[OvertHawk]

The learner - why would you assume that there is no such checklist?

On the contrary - there is a comprehensive "Approach checklist" that should include all relevant aspects of the approach and landing including a crew brief of the approach procedure, instrument settings and Autoplit modes to be used.

OH

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

The learner,

Thank you for your very well written and informed posting on this forum. It is really good for the crews to hear what you guys in the back are thinking, discussing and worrying about.

CHECKLISTS, actually you may well have stumbled on something really relevant here despite Overthawks simplistic answer.

My previous and current job gives me oversight of a lot of Operators procedures and checklists. All I have seen do not formally address how the Pilot Flying intends to deploy the automatics in sufficient detail to correlate the contingencies when a Mixed Mode approach is flown. It is rather implied by a very simplistic statement like "This will be a 3 Axis coupled ILS etc."

I must stress that there is no valid reason to fly a real 3 Axis approach in a 4 Axis helicopter that I can think of. It is more difficult and potentially dangerous when low and slow at the bottom of the approach if the pilots fail to recognise the collective (power) is in their control.

SASless implores us to let our shields down if we are to identify areas ŵhere we can reduce any risks to our passengers. I think your question is extremely valid, thought provoking and should be carefully considered by all the stakeholders involved in this business.

So Overthawk, Instead of slamming the door in his face lets hear if anyone is currently briefing in such detail that there is no doubt, at the start of the approach, the clear division of duties between the AP and the Crew??

DB

Oh! The Learner, one more point. I well understand your self degenerate reference to you and your colleagues as SLF.

However, please be reassured that to 99.9% of offshore crews on this forum you are "Passengers". Anyone referring to our Passengers as SLF is a stone cold moron and most likely not an Offshore Pilot. Even in jest it is disgusting to me given the nature of the human tragedies that these events actually represent.

[heliski22]

@26500lbs

... That does not exist in the offshore world. There are no dedicated aircraft training sorties available after the initial aircraft famil following the type rating.

Well then, perhaps there should be...? Or does Statoil's interest in safety not extend quite so far as to carry that extra cost...?

22

[pilot and apprentice]

As the Third Party has to satisfy the Customer....so long as the Customer sets a Standard that must be met....The Third Party has no axe to grind and has no need to play favorites.

A true Third Party impartial evaluation of both the Pilots and the Operational Procedures cannot hurt. Sometimes an outside look is beneficial.

Problem is SAS, the customer is the beancounter who lets the contract, not operations. They also have nothing vested in how he performs later, or even if he conforms to the overall company culture.

I myself have yet to see any civil 3rd party training that comes even close to the level of auditing and data acquisition you are talking about.

The main difference is that in the military environment you have time to train in the aircraft and a large amount of budgeted training sorties. Here the Squadron QHI can have his input on the process and feed down the directives from his boss. That does not exist in the offshore world. There are no dedicated aircraft training sorties available after the initial aircraft famil following the type rating.

If an operator were to wholeheartedly embrace third party training they must be able to address the shortfalls. I think the way it is done in the military is an excellent example of how it can work. The key is the two systems must work closely together and be on the same team. An operator cannot just let go of the ropes and say goodbye to training - “third party provider - you have control”.


Exactly!

My previous and current job gives me oversight of a lot of Operators procedures and checklists. All I have seen do not formally address how the Pilot Flying intends to deploy the automatics in sufficient detail to correlate the contingencies when a Mixed Mode approach is flown. It is rather implied by a very simplistic statement like "This will be a 3 Axis coupled ILS etc."
...
So Overthawk, Instead of slamming the door in his face lets hear if anyone is currently briefing in such detail that there is no doubt, at the start of the approach, the clear division of duties between the AP and the Crew??
...
However, please be reassured that to 99.9% of offshore crews on this forum you are "Passengers". Anyone referring to our Passengers as SLF is a stone cold moron and most likely not an Offshore Pilot. Even in jest it is disgusting to me given the nature of the human tragedies that these events actually represent.

SLF is something I first heard on PPRuNe. Agreed!

From my own experience, the SOP's cover a lot of items that shouldn't need to be rebriefed in the aircraft. The checklist covers what is needed very well as long as the SOP's are well understood. Over the years I have found that some pilots, for various reasons, aren't completely aware of every SOP and so confusion results.

An example from my own past: A few years ago, I briefed an ILS to minimum weather. In the brief I stated that this would be a Pilot Monitored Approach (well defined in the SOP's) and asked if there were any questions when the brief was done. There were none. At DH, he asks me, "do you have visual?"! After the missed we had a discussion to clarify things and when I was satisfied we were ready we completed the ILS successfully.

In the debrief it came to light that 1) as an experienced new hire he didn't think that the IFR SOP would have very much new [definitions of PMA vs PFA?] to show him so he gave it scant attention in his studying (and training) and 2) had never done an approach to real minimums outside of the sim.

[thelearner]

The learner - why would you assume that there is no such checklist?

On the contrary - there is a comprehensive "Approach checklist" that should include all relevant aspects of the approach and landing including a crew brief of the approach procedure, instrument settings and Autoplit modes to be used.

OH

It was a question, hence question mark but maybe not clear as such. I did mean a detailed checklist including what the autopilot was controlling and what each of the crew were to control and monitor. Checklists are a great tool - one of the best things to come from aviation to other industries.

Edited to add - communication is one of the things we humans do worst - including making assumptions that others have understood what we mean - needs to be reinforced with feedback/questioning.

SLF - point taken, I always have assumed it was meant as a humourous term - not degenatory - I can still laugh at myself - humour is very important. I don't think most of us mind the term.

[Ray Joe Czech]

I did not know what SLF was until I started reading this thread and have been flying offshore the majority of my working life. That should perhaps illustrate how little used, if used at all, it is in our cockpits.

[John Eacott]

SLF - point taken, I always have assumed it was meant as a humourous term - not degenatory - I can still laugh at myself - humour is very important. I don't think most of us mind the term.

Without taking it too seriously, PPRuNe does have a forum Passengers and SLF (Self Loading Freight) (http://www.pprune.org/passengers-slf-self-loading-freight-61/) :ok:

Are we really so sensitive about such things in this day and age?

[Tractor_Driver]

DB asks:

lets hear if anyone is currently briefing in such detail that there is no doubt, at the start of the approach, the clear division of duties between the AP and the Crew??

Well yes. And for each crew member.

While I might not go into such great detail if we are doing, e.g. an ARA technically required for 9999 Sct/005, if it is likely to be anything near minima then we will brief explicitly.

E.g. for an ARA:
"This will be a fully coupled approach. We will let the FMS establish on finals. When you are satisfied that the approach and go-around sectors are clear, I will beep the radalt hold down to [MDH]. you will monitor this. You will then centre and select the heading hold and give me courses to steer...
... in the event of a go-around, you will select AltP, which is set at 1500ft and I will steer the aircraft at least 30 degrees to the right, and adjust speed and rate of climb as required."

I will also remind my co-pilot that once he is visual, I am more than happy for him to continue to command me to fly headings, speeds, rad-alt height etc. until he is satisfied that he can fly a safe, visual final approach.

Similar guidance for other approaches.

[maxwelg2]

I'd like to thank all contributors on this thread who are proactively discussing ways to improve our safety culture and allowing a "shields down" discussion to continue. It is much appreciated by us pax, or SLF which acronym I personally take as being a light-hearted and good-natured term in the realm of the Rotorheads threads, in the same theme as bus drivers :)

Through the open discussion here on approach methods and SOPs, training etc. I'm getting a much better understanding as a back seat passenger on what is involved in approaches, in my last flight I watched the PNF take control and land at the heliport, I'm flying back out again tomorrow (I do numerous trouble-shooting/short trips offshore as part of my day job) and will make a point of sitting where I can watch the PF (type is a S92A so you'll have an idea of my seat placement in pole position at the main cabin door starboard side).

Wrt. whether or not to use the rebreather, this is something worth discussing further. I have been trained to use them since their inception by Shell back in my NS offshore days. The first version was alien in design and use, with the bag floating up in your face. The next version (Airpocket Plus) was a vast improvement, and at least in Malaysia they let you use it in the HUET exercises albeit with the "one breath" cartridge removed. Our latest version over here in Canada, the HUEBA, is IMHO the best so far, but our exposure to it is limited to pool exercises and inversion in a chair rig, we are not allowed to use it in the HUET exercises due to potential for mis-application and subsequent damage to your lungs i.e. if you forget to breath out on the ascent.

Whether or not the equipment will be used in a capsize will be determined by many variables, however if you end up upside down in a poor visibility environment, disorientated due to air bubbles and cold water hits your face, it could save your life.

When we do our sea day over here as part of our offshore certification we have the option to jump into the sea off the rescue boat. This is done wearing a Fitzswright immersion suit and not the Helly Hansen HTS-1 that we wear on the flight, reason being cost of suits and previous use in the pool. Not many jump in, especially if you are doing a recurrent course, as you generally get a bit more water in your suit from the face seal breaking as some air still finds a way to avoid getting "burped" out prior to jumping. Nevertheless the cold water shock to me and that reflective gasp happens just from the water on your face. You have to mentally tell yourself not to breath, when you have a breathing device the opposite is true.

In the same way that indecision can cause an accident to occur the same action can cause the outcome to be more disastrous.

I look forward to reading the final AAIB report to see how many pax actually deployed and used their rebreathers. I hope that this will force the respective safety regulating bodies who determine the survival training curriculum to revise and improve on what we currently do and make it more realistic. Practice makes perfect, and once every 3 or 4 years depending in what certification you are doing is too long. I would prefer to see annual rebreather/HUEBA training mandatory.

Safe flying

Max

[Special 25]

If a helicopter crashes, they are normally grounded.

I would say that historically, this is not the case. An aircraft with 20+ years of flying experience would not normally be grounded following an accident, unless there was some clear mechanical cause. The Super Puma family has been running since the early 80's and has an excellent safety record, so the decision to ground would appear to be more of an Oil Company decision rather than airworthiness or safety related. I guess that explains the stance from the AAIB and CAA who have not issued any grounding of the aircraft in response to these sad events.

[Bravo73]

Are we really so sensitive about such things in this day and age?

Thankfully, the majority of us aren't. :ok:

[26500lbs]

Quote:
...
Well then, perhaps there should be...? Or does Statoil's interest in safety not extend quite so far as to carry that extra cost...?

22

Perhaps there should be, but that is another debate. Perhaps then you are back to the beginning, where the whole issue is solved by using in-house instructors. Why use third party training organisations then double your costs by addressing all the shortfalls with costly aircraft training sorties and having to buy extra aircraft and increase the burden on the operations dept and technical department, when there is a better solution. It is not as easy as just taking a machine out for a 2 hr sortie. All machines are closely budgeted for and maintenance planned for months and years in advance. One extra aircraft requires far more than just the initial purchase. The running costs are constant. The aircraft has to commercially pay for itself by flying as many commercial trips as possible within the maintenance schedule. You are talking millions of dollars per aircraft per year, not small change. Spare aircraft do not exist. The customer pays for the number of aircraft they need for the contract and not for extra training aircraft. I do not know what the current price of an S92 or 225 is but enough that it would be financially disadvantageous to any company to just have them sitting around. That is if you could even get hold of an S92 right now.
The operators generally do not own the aircraft, so have little say in how many they have to operate as they are usually leased. They simply cannot afford nor need to have more than required and the reality is the current level D simulators are more than adequate for training given appropriately qualified instructors and training plans, so aircraft training sorties are really not required.

[OffshoreSLF]

I wouldn't worry about the "SLF" tag! As you can see I'm not!

On the platform, we used to call the production techs "Growbags", the Instrument techs were "Tiffy's", we of the electrical persuasion were "Greenies", and with guys from around the UK, the banter and name calling between Geordies, Scousers, us Jocks, Welsh sheep-sh***ers and so on, was seen for what it was - harmless banter. It made the trip go quicker!

Like the other passengers who have commented on this thread, I have read all the posts, and although some of the more technical aspects are WAY above my head, I am acutely aware that you are having a good airing of the issues that affect you in your job, and I am in no doubt that these discussions will lead to a safer environment for us all. Keep up the good work, guys.

[HeliComparator]

The first time I heard the term SLF was from a friend of mine who is SLF, therefore if its good enough for them its good enough for me! I believe it has its origins in the military.

Better than pax, which is just a lazy shortening, at least SLF has some ironic humour to lighten the mood.

As has been said, helicopters are not normally grounded following an accident and let's remember that the airworthiness authorities did not even ground the EC225 after 2 ditchings from more or less the same cause in the same year. The CAA Flight Ops put a ban on offshore CAT, only applicable for UK. The reason why the aircraft stopped flying was because the operators and oil companies decided it was the best course of action, and I think we all agreed it was a good idea until the real cause was understood.

II - you have an excellent memory, clearly senility has yet to catch up with you!

[HeliComparator]

Checklists are not the solution to flight safety. By which I mean, you can't have everything that has to be done in a checklist, or at least if you did, it would be far too long and convoluted.

The more things there are in a checklist, the more likely it is that something will be missed /skipped, and it tends to absolve the user from having to think about what they need to do. Checklists are necessary to cover really important things that if not done, are likely to cause a problem. If those vital actions are buried in a mass of fairly unimportant stuff it becomes likely that one might be missed. There is a definite thing called "checklist fatigue" where the reader starts to tire of the whole process and inevitably gets careless. It is very important to consider human factors and performance when creating checklists, and not just slap anything and everything you can think of into them.

Briefs of course should be relevant and concise (ie not waffly) and include everything the other pilot needs to know in order for him to act as a contributor and checker to the approach, or whatever the next phase of flight is, with the usual CRM rules for communication applying (checking ready to receive beforehand, and checking received and understood afterwards).

[212man]

Checklist design - another "blue touch paper" subject for me (after CDFA!). Most glass cockpit FW a/c have around 7-10 items in their checklist from wheels up to wheels down. Most NS operators seem to have about 50! Good SOPs, briefings from the chart and ignore fluff that won't kill you (NASA specifically refer to 'killer items' when discussing the subject) is the key. I know those who joined my previous operator from the NS appreciated the change in philosophy although it was a little alien! Checklists are just that - checklists. Not "how to fly a helicopter for dummies" Tolstoyesque epics!

[HeliComparator]

OF, a rant it may be, but a correct rant!

On the 225 we tried to get away from the parrot brief, but it was a struggle due not only to habit, but to an Ops Man Part A that was a bit old fashioned in this respect. My pet hate was the Aberdeen landing brief "LDP will be 100' and 40 kts, in the event of an engine failure before we can go around, after....zzzzzzz zzzzzz (I had usually dozed off by then). So the same old same old, and NO MENTION of the only variable, which is the selected go-around Vtoss (choice of 65 to 80 in steps of 5). Completely pointless, but gets a box ticked in someone's mind.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

HC, sorry, I deleted it before i saw you'd replied as I re-read it and it was in fact rather rambling and over long, quite what I'd been arguing against!

For those now confused, I rather ranted against the overlong and unnecessary "parrot" briefings that seem to infest our daily NS lives!

[TeeS]

OF, HC and 212 - Couldn't agree more, I failed to convince those around me that heaters, strobes etc. are not a subject for discussion in the final stages of an approach - all concentration should be directed at not flying into the water or ground when you are less than 1000' from it (in my opinion).

Cheers

TeeS

[212man]

TS, it was one of the pleasures of my old job to introduce the concept. I even removed 'brakes' from the 'After Take Off checks' because flying in the cruise with brakes on isn't actually dangerous - but they were in the 'Final checks' because landing with them off or on could be bad news, depending on the location. SOP would dictate they are released for a flight to onshore though. Similarly, no 'cruise checks'. Let's get this right - there is over a quarter of a million dollars going into that cockpit and we need a piece of A4 to help us check we have enough fuel at alternate, the MGB oil pressure is ok and the navaids and radios are tuned appropriately! An Airbus/Boeing pilot would think you were "having a larf" if you tried to explain that...

[HeliComparator]

I got a lot of grief when I removed "parking brake" from the pre-taxi checks. My argument being that if you try to taxi with the parking brake on, nothing much will happen and you will rapidly come to the conclusion that its not moving because you left the brakes on! Some people were not happy though!

[SASless]

Briefs....which are not worn and are not short....were always a rant I loved to go on about.

Eket Airport to the QIT (or reverse)...max air time maybe four minutes....and SOP would have you....well in reality you would be a Stage Act if you could read all the Checks out loud much less get a response....and that was on a Bell 212 with Skids much less retractable landing gear.

A well known American once shortened the Take Off Brief to "We're Outta Here!" which sufficed for the the Ubit Hopping routine.

In Vietnam I heard a VNAF H-34 Pilot deal with both Brief and ATC clearance with the simple Phrase....."I go now!".

Why can we not use the terminology...."Standard Brief" and verbally note any differences just so the other guy knows what to expect and look for while you are wiggling the sticks. No deviation....Two Words gets the job done. Landing Briefs in IMC/IFR do need to be a bit more specific....but still pretty limited.

Why not go to a "Silent Checklist" and a simple Thumbs Up or terse...."Checks Good!" unless there are deviations?

[Fareastdriver]

Company checklists are basically copies of the Flight Manual because when the company takes delivery of a new type that is all they have to work on. The manufacturer writes them to cover itself and also provide guidance to customers to which English (or French) is not their first language. An organisation that has only one executive version does not write checklists, they use the manual. The 332L my company bought from Samsung was an example,

It follows that it is overdone and repetitive. Not only that the people that write the company checklists draw on their experience on other types which is why 332s are flying instrument patterns at the same speed as S61s.

When we flew the S76A single pilot we had a flip out board by the side of the instrument panel that told what to check Not what to do but just to check it.

[TipCap]

HC

Don't I remember an As332L (could have been a 225 even but my memory aint that great now) which nearly came to grief trying to taxy with the brakes on from a "spot" in Aberdeen

[pilot and apprentice]

Briefs....which are not worn and are not short....were always a rant I loved to go on about.

...

Why can we not use the terminology...."Standard Brief" and verbally note any differences just so the other guy knows what to expect and look for while you are wiggling the sticks. No deviation....Two Words gets the job done. Landing Briefs in IMC/IFR do need to be a bit more specific....but still pretty limited.

Why not go to a "Silent Checklist" and a simple Thumbs Up or terse...."Checks Good!" unless there are deviations?

That is what we do SAS (at least where I am now). There are a limited number of short checks that require C/R, but not the majority. Improvements can certainly be made but it's steadily getting better.

An unfortunate consequence of "standard" is that a TRE can make an error, or develop a bad habit (it happens), and insidiously it will become the 'standard'. As discussed earlier, getting the trainers to look at each other regularly helps to alleviate this particular risk.

[HeliComparator]

HC

Don't I remember an As332L (could have been a 225 even but my memory aint that great now) which nearly came to grief trying to taxy with the brakes on from a "spot" in Aberdeen

Not that I am aware of. You raise the lever a bit, push the cyclic forwards a bit. It should be moving by now, if not... Oops, parking brake off!

Maybe you are thinking of the guy who thought the parking brake was like the one on his car, the lever hinged at the back, on his left side. Give it a good pull... Wow!, why has the ground disappeared?

[HeliComparator]

That is what we do SAS (at least where I am now). There are a limited number of short checks that require C/R, but not the majority. Improvements can certainly be made but it's steadily getting better.


If a checklist contains only vital actions as it should, they are all important. Therefore in a 2 crew environment, they should be checked by both pilots. To have "silent checks" is effectively reverting to single pilot ops for those elements. Of course, lots of flying takes place with a single pilot crew, but the idea of two pilots is to improve safety by requiring both pilots to make the same mistake before it can become critical. So by having silent checks, you are intentionally reducing the benefit of having two pilots. Its not a disaster, but it is not best practice.

Silent checks may be appropriate for long and unimportant checklists, but the answer really is to crispen up the checklists rather than allowing one pilot to not have to endure them.

[SASless]

Inertia can be both a good and bad thing.

I once took the initiative to redo an existing CofA Air Test Proforma for the Bell 212.

I felt an improvement in the sequence of the Flight Check Maneuvers and Checks was in order as the existing format did not have a proper flow. Now understand....I was not trying to re-invent the wheel....just grease the bearings a bit.

I made a copy of the existing format, got a pair of scissors, cut out each segment of the existing Proforma....then using a glue pot and some a brush, put the Proforma back together using exactly the existing verbiage and paragraphs.....just re-arranged the sequence a bit.

The old format had you doing a single engine Height Climb, returning to the Starting Height and doing another Single engine height Climb followed by an Autorotation. Then you were off on other maneuvers that required another autorotation.

My big change was to do the first height climb, do an AutoRev Check, do the second engine height Climb, followed by a handling check Autorotation.

There were other minor changes but only as to flow and sequence.

As I was doing the CoA Airtests I mistakenly assumed I might have some input on the procedure.

Not the done thing! Captain!


Some folks were very definitely "Shields Up!" on that.

The Result....as before....you printed out the Proforma....then flip flopped back and forth through the many pages looking for the correct place to enter your data while doing the Air Test rather than being able to start on Page One and simply work your way back to page Last in an orderly fashion.

That is the kind of mentality we must excise from our Industry.

One organization I worked for had SOP's for everything we did....Aviation, Admin, Safety, Training, House Keeping.....everything!

As we were involved in the safe guarding of Sensitive Nuclear Materials....there was much concern, rightfully so, that we be very well organized and effectively carrying out our duties.

Our SOP's had certain "Priorities" assigned to them for verification.

Higher priority SOP's were checked quite often, lesser important SOP's were checked less often.


The Verification Process was done to ensure that the SOP was being followed....and that the way we did things agreed with the SOP. Variances were identified and analyzed to determine the reason for the deviation then assessed to determine if the actual practice was the better way of doing things or if it was deficient or less effective. If it was deemed better, the SOP got re-written to reflect the change in practice. If the SOP method was deemed better, the actual practice was amended to conform with the SOP.

The entire evolution was really designed to keep track of change....and make sure the change was appropriate for existing and anticipated conditions and did not jeopardize the mission objective.....guarding those Special Nuclear Materials.

Swap Human Lives for SNM and I see the applicability of that verification process in the Helicopter Industry.

[SilsoeSid]

I know nothing of the industry or type, but just to say there was an interesting statistical article this evening on Radio 4's 'More or Less' about the Super Puma and North Sea Ops. About 12 minutes in once the episode becomes available.

BBC Radio 4 - More or Less - Episodes by date, September 2013 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qshd/broadcasts/2013/09)

[TeeS]

Tip Cap - I'm not sure that checklists should be there to prevent poor handling skills. If you can't tell that the brakes are on or the cyclic is locked before you raise your left hand too much, then the training/checking system has failed in it's primary task.

On a slightly different subject, do we operate with a 'check list' or a 'do list' I've had pilots voice concerns about switching radars to standby or arming floats prior to running through the checks. Are fixed wing pilots allowed to lower the flaps and undercarriage without written instruction?

TeeS

[p1andy]

Was that not a nosewheel locking pin on a bond craft?

[HeliComparator]

Tip Cap - I'm not sure that checklists should be there to prevent poor handling skills. If you can't tell that the brakes are on or the cyclic is locked before you raise your left hand too much, then the training/checking system has failed in it's primary task.

On a slightly different subject, do we operate with a 'check list' or a 'do list' I've had pilots voice concerns about switching radars to standby or arming floats prior to running through the checks. Are fixed wing pilots allowed to lower the flaps and undercarriage without written instruction?

TeeS

A checklist is a checklist surely, not a do list. There should be nothing to stop a pilot showing some initiative and doing stuff that is beneficial to do, in anticipation of checking it at checklist time. Of course, one has to be reasonable about this and not only ensure that the other pilot knows what you are doing, but also do stuff that is beneficial to the flight, and not just to yourself. Lowering the undercarriage at 30 miles just in case you might forget it later for example, would not be a good idea.

[212man]

TS - absolutely not a 'do list'. Hence my comments about "flying for dummies."

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Is not the clue in the name "check" list? ie by a certain stage in flight, the following items/actions should have been completed, and the list is just a check that they have?

In practice, of course, many of the items are also actioned at the same time as the list is read, but there should be no bar to crews deciding to carry out a certain action/item when they deem it best to the conduct of the flight?

[HeliComparator]

Company checklists are basically copies of the Flight Manual because when the company takes delivery of a new type that is all they have to work on. The manufacturer writes them to cover itself and also provide guidance to customers to which English (or French) is not their first language.

Have to disagree there. The manufacturer's expertise lies in designing and building the heli, not operating it in a variety of environments and roles. Our checklists bear little relation to the RFM. Yes, someone will squeak that "surely we must include all the items in the RFM" (arse coverer) but I say "publish and be damned" because you know it makes sense.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I think the this thread has drifted away from the key question posed by "The Learner". Do we confirm exactly who/what is flying the helicopter during the approach brief?

DB

[HeliComparator]

DB yes it has drifted but that is not necessarily a bad thing. Regarding your point, I'm not too sure why such a thing as who/what is flying what bit needs to be covered, IF the company SOP is to do things in a specific and standard way.

I think most of us here wonder why the L2 pilots decided to fly their loc approach coupled to 3 axes, and probably (possibly?) it would have been beneficial if all occupants of the cockpit had been reminded that airspeed was going to be controlled by the collective.

But I would propose that the better solution than always covering the points DB raises in every brief, would be to have in the Ops Man that "coupled approaches should be flown using 4-axis coupling. Should it be required to fly the approach 3 or fewer axes for some good reason, the briefing shall cover which elements of the flight path will be controlled by the pilot flying using which controls, and which are expected to be controlled by the autopilot" (or some such text more elegantly written).

No, its not in the Bristow 225 part B, but maybe it should be, although I have never encountered anyone who wanted to fly an approach 3 axis in a 225. There could always be a first time though!

[[email protected]]

Yes the thread has drifted and left me with the feeling that nothing will change in the NS as a result of this sad and, it would appear, avoidable accident.

Inadequate post-conversion training and monitoring of 3rd party training solutions, no HEEDs either up front or in the back (the breathing out on ascent issue during training is easily rectified), poor passenger seat layout and escape exit options, flotation gear sited where it is convenient for the manufacturer, not where it will prevent inversion - and many other issues have been raised on this thread - anyone actually going to do anything about it or will it be more wringing of hands and complaining that it is all the bean-counters' fault?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi Crab. Nice summary, lets hope you are wrong and some progress is made in all the issues you raise. There does seem to be a determination to make change by all stakeholders involved. They talk the talk. Whether they walk the walk will remain to be seen.

In this case, it may be the the accident may never have happened had the IAS hold button been pressed before MDA. AAIB and time will tell. If this is the case then this prime causal factor actually sits in our lap. The Trainers and the crews. One thing that has struck me throughout is the difficulty I have encountered explaining how these APs work to all types of management, they have no idea and probably nor should they. That's our job and we need to get much better at it, very quickly.

Attitudes, culture and procedure must change. Too often I have seen risk, in automation, managed to the lowest common denominator. Yet we know that automation is entirely type specific. It follows therefore that the procedures and requirements should also be type specific.

A passenger has asked if we brief specifically on how the approach will be flown between the AP and the Pilot Flying. In my 20 years offshore experience I would say we do not cover this in enough depth. Yet the response from crews is borderline hysterical that seems to centre on the checks being too long already. It is this that has to change. Our culture and our attitudes.

The other issues such as egress, seating and survival are vital because the passengers who post on this thread all seem to accept that fatalistic approach that it might still all go wrong. All they ask, and deserve, is a fighting chance when it does.

DB

[Senior Pilot]

Hi Crab. Nice summary, lets hope you are wrong and some progress is made in all the issues you raise. There does seem to be a determination to make change by all stakeholders involved. They talk the talk. Whether they walk the walk will remain to be seen.

With a continuing interest in this thread (average of 15+ views per minute over 17 days) we can only hope that someone, somewhere with an input to the decision makers will see the analysis and input from so many NS workers, and do something :ok:

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

DB, or even more simply, if one of the two pilots had been actually monitoring the airspeed.

A passenger has asked if we brief specifically on how the approach will be flown between the AP and the Pilot Flying. In my 20 years offshore experience I would say we do not cover this in enough depth.

Probably fair, I for one have not done that in the past, other than "this will be 3/4 axis coupled", but it seems a good idea and I will take that up.

Yet the response from crews is borderline hysterical that seems to centre on the checks being too long already. It is this that has to change. Our culture and our attitudes.

The point being that the important elements of the briefing are often lost in the mass of waffle and verbiage that is trotted out "parrot-fashion" the same way every day. It is that that needs to be cut down, leaving the vital stuff to stand out and actually get noticed.

[212man]

A passenger has asked if we brief specifically on how the approach will be flown between the AP and the Pilot Flying. In my 20 years offshore experience I would say we do not cover this in enough depth. Yet the response from crews is borderline hysterical that seems to centre on the checks being too long already. It is this that has to change. Our culture and our attitudes.

I think HC had the correct response, which mirrors my view - I think! The brief - with respect to this specific element - should only cover whether the approach is coupled (default 4-axis/3-cue as per SOP) or hand flown, along with discussion about speeds (ATC, weather etc). Uncoupled would only be in VMC for practice, or following system degradation, in which case there might be other considerations to brief too. Everything else should be in the OMA/B - such as standard calls (do I really need the brief to include advising half scale deviation?) and handover (or not) protocols.

[Kakpipe Cosmonaut]

Crab and DB are on the money!
There is an area of our industry that has gone through this process (very painfully and is still learning).
Around 7 years ago Boeing, in conjunction with NASA, had a major review of their procedures. This resulted in a rewrite of checklists and SOPs which many people saw as unnecessary. I believe, once you have bought in to their philosophy is successful.
So I, once again, would recommend that the movers and shakers of the NS go and look at how the airlines do it; the attitudes, culture and procedures, and pick out the bits that can be applied.
There are plenty of ex-NS guys who are in senior management/training positions in the airlines (not me) who I feel sure would offer a great deal in this area.
You will find that briefing are kept relevant, checklists are safety nets, SOPs are rigid but offer scope to be modified at Capt.'s discretion, and a culture that reinforces that.
Unfortunately when Operators feel they know better how to fly aircraft than the designers and builders, that's when problems arise. (Asiana 777 at SFO)

[212man]

look at how the airlines do it; the attitudes, culture and procedures, and pick out the bits that can be applied I can think of one operator that has done :ok:

Unfortunately when Operators feel they know better how to fly aircraft than the designers and builders, that's when problems arise

One huge difference between RW and FW - which HC has alluded to - is that FW manufacturers produce SOPs and FCOMs which, with minor variations, are common accross operators for the type. RW manufactures tell you what switches you need move to start and shutdown the thing, and then leave it to the operators to figure out how they are actually going to 'run the show.'

[HeliComparator]

I can think of one operator that has done :ok:



One huge difference between RW and FW - which HC has alluded to - is that FW manufacturers produce SOPs and FCOMs which, with minor variations, are common accross operators for the type. RW manufactures tell you what switches you need move to start and shutdown the thing, and then leave it to the operators to figure out how they are actually going to 'run the show.'

Airliner manufacturers are very likely to have members if their flight test team that have operated their airliners to and from international airports etc(!).

Helicopter manufacturers typically have no-one at all in their flight test teams who have ever flown offshore. Typically they are ex military test pilots and engineers who have left the mil and gone straight to the manufacturer. As far as I am aware the only such people in EC who have been offshore are the 3 that I have personally taken. So anyone who thinks the manufacturer is best placed to define operating procedures for roles in which they have zero experience is wrong.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

212 and others. The point made by the passenger, The Learner, was specifically directed at the brief correlating in simple language who does what with the controls during an approach, such that both crew fully recognise beforehand how all three profiles, lateral, longitudinal and vertical, will be managed and modulated thought the approach.

I am not qualified or intelligent enough to determine if this would improve our performance and if so, how we would do it.

Shields Down is the SASless cry and I would like to see that applied everywhere. Some operators, some fleets and indeed some individual pilots may be doing good things already, however, to cure the patient it needs to first recognise it is sick!!

If this accident is a CFIT, then that is 3 in the last 5 years, 2 of which are fatals. That alone should signal all of us on the UK NS sector that we have a very specific problem. It is probably training, probably procedures, probably environment. The fact is this seems to be a UK NS issue right now.

Pretending that we are immune and therefore not disposed to look inwards a very British disease!!

I have been intrigued by one Norwegian Operator subsidiary who, from the moment I took my job, have worked me hard to answer their questions, demonstrate the full capability of the AP and shown generally a determination to learn, evaluate and apply the design operating principles of the EC225. They have lobbied their Group Training Management hard to effect change. These people, by the way, are know as (Operator Name)-No-Way!! (Norway), Due to their steadfast refusal to see a degradation in their crew training and standards amongst other things. Interestingly they have solid union support for this which immunises them to some extent from outside interference from foreign group issues.

Contrary to this, on my side of the NS, not one UK Instructor has ever approached us for guidance or advice on operational issues such as DAFCS deplyoment and management despite the introduction of new and fantastic tools such as the Standard Groundspeed Mode. This is culture working against us. I am not criticising the individuals involved as I know well they fear that seeking such advice would be viewed poorly by their management and is probably sanctioned formally. This is poor culture. This has to change.

DB

[Kakpipe Cosmonaut]

But surely in designing a RW there must be philosophy in how all the switches and knobs are operated to achieve what they want and what warnings they see as appropriate.
I must dig out my old 332 notes. I'm sure Aerospat did produce a generic normal and non-normal checklist and SOPs.
Maybe they don't any more.
212, I'm glad one company has done this. Has it proved beneficial? Should it be rolled out through the industry?
HC, not many people in NASA have much airline experience, but that doesn't stop them from embracing what is required. Your 225 AP flies an ILS (very well) yet there is little military use for that, it was designed into the A/C with a (French) philosophy!

[HeliComparator]

DB don't forget that when the 225 was first sold in 2005, there was no simulator for several years, no guidance from the manufacturer on how to use the automatics, and a RFM that gave very little info on how the automatics worked, not covering most of the clever stuff we have been talking about on here. Yes, many years after introduction there is a good guidance document and facilities such as you provide, but what were we supposed to do in the 5+ years prior to the existence of these things?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HC you make a very good point and believe me when I say things are and have changed. That is why the facilities now exist in Aberdeen, Malaysia, China and soon hopefully Brazil. The roll out for the EC175 should see an EC FFS in place in the absolute minimum time possible after AC certification.

DB

[212man]

The same situation existed for the EC-155 too: we started operating in 2001 and the FFS came into service in 2004! Meantime, we trained about 30 pilots - most of whom came straight off the B212.....

212 and others. The point made by the passenger, The Learner, was specifically directed at the brief correlating in simple language who does what with the controls during an approach, such that both crew fully recognise beforehand how all three profiles, lateral, longitudinal and vertical, will be managed and modulated thought the approach.

I understood what the pasenger was asking, but my point was that in a properly operated environment these concepts are so basic and intrinsic that they should not require detailed discussion within the cockpit, but should be detailed comprehensively in the OMB/OMA and thereafter referred to as SOP. Variations from that SOP do need to be briefed in more detail - using knowledge gained in training - such as flying with a u/s collective trim and therefore a degraded coupled status. In fact, during simulator training, we would use a collective trim failure as a recognised malfunction, specifically to create this unfamiliar "mixed mode" situation.

[Hummingfrog]

Having left the NS 3 yrs ago my knowledge of SOPs and briefs is a little out of date.

However, in my time briefs would be said parrot fashion as it was generally obvious what type of approach was being done and how it would be flown.

I believe that briefs should reflect the conditions that are being flown in. If it is good VMC and the deck approach is simple the perhaps a call "standard brief - if we go around it will be to the L or R"

Should the conditions be marginal - as it seems to have been at Sumburgh then a very detailed brief should be given encompassing everything that needs to be done/monitored during the approach so a successful landing can be made.

I can see one problem that may happen is that companies want to standardise checklists/SOPs across the whole of their global operations. This may produce checklists/SOPs which are too broad and fail to take account of individual operational limits.

Have the autopilots become too complicated and not fully understood by crews who have had little training in all the quirks and dangers of the system. It seems that the 332L2 autopilot does have "gotchas" which EC obviously recognised and HC praises the 225 as being very capable and safe to use.

HF

[ericferret]

Luck plays a big part in these things. In the early days Management aviation(Bond) had two full main gearbox failures on the 58T's. One just as the aircraft flared on to a helideck and the second just after the aircraft coasted in, resulting in an auto to a field in north Lincs. One minute earlier on each occasion would have resulted in a ditching.

I believe that with the exception of one (two?) helideck accidents Bond never had a fatality up to the point when they were bought out by HS. I believe there was only one ditching, 105 G-AZOM which ironically was a Bristow aircraft on lease.

This was in a period when BA, BIH and Bristow all had serious accidents.

However in the light of the comments on training a quote from I don't know where.

" The more I practice the luckier I get" (Golf related)

[SASless]

Contrary to this, on my side of the NS, not one UK Instructor has ever approached us for guidance or advice on operational issues such as DAFCS deplyoment and management despite the introduction of new and fantastic tools such as the Standard Groundspeed Mode. This is culture working against us. I am not criticising the individuals involved as I know well they fear that seeking such advice would be viewed poorly by their management and is probably sanctioned formally. This is poor culture. This has to change.

Something very similar was discussed in the Military Aircrew Thread during discussions about the Chinook Program and the RAF.

I saw great examples of that when teaching in the Sim when some British TRI's came through for training....with some predictable negative results in both Pilot Performance and Programmed Training for the Crews.

The attitude has got to be such that we can learn from anyone and everyone....being able to pick and choose what works best and produces the best outcome should be the goal.

I have always tried to learn from others even if it was "I shall never ever do that in that manner!".

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Mitcha,
thank you for the chronological correction. Still I think the point is valid, 3 x CFITs in 3 very different and disperse in capability helicopters in the UK sector.

I think this strongly implores us to look inward at our training, procedures, attitudes and culture. No stone left unturned.

A good start would be an emphasis on the appropriate use of automation and its associated procedures. Above all, 3 axis approaches in minimum weather in a 4 axis capable machine we should endeavour to rule out by OM prohibition.

DB

[diginagain]

Hand-flying an instrument approach isn't impossibly difficult; you can teach Squaddies to do it. Using the available technology to make life easier makes sense. I can see the argument for allowing the autopilot to do the work, but have we (ie you) allowed manual IF skills to be degraded enough to see another aircraft flown into the sea? What were our gallant aviators doing while the aircraft slowed and descended from the "recommended" profile?

[cyclic]

I am not criticising the individuals involved as I know well they fear that seeking such advice would be viewed poorly by their management and is probably sanctioned formally. This is poor culture. This has to change.

DB, never a truer word spoken. The culture is wrong at all levels and hasn't changed after each incident. If I have heard a top to bottom review mentioned once, I have heard it several times, yet once the dust has settled, it is back to the massive rush for the dollar. We are here to make money for ourselves and our masters but not at any cost. If the customers are really interested in seeing this culture change, they can be instrumental in forcing it through. If not, we will continue the rush to the bottom. This isn't a North Sea specific issue either, it pervades a great deal of British industry.

In the meantime, we, the crews have to do our level best to provide the service that our passengers deserve when they are our responsibility. With winter approaching, I hope we don't hear "well $%^& have just launched" or the like. We need to be a little more joined up and take the best from all the operators. We don't need to share commercial secrets, but flying and operating safely isn't a secret!

[SASless]

Used to be we sat on the ground until the first scheduled aircraft took off....jumping the queue was considered bad form...even when it was the other guys who were first up.

Are we saying those days of Pilots working with one another have passed on to competition in every aspect of the Operation?

[victor papa]

I have worked in a EC subsidiary and a high priority from Marignane was that the subsidiaries must work closely with local industry in order for the factory to better understand, anticipate and help prevent incidents and improve the product. Problem is politics and self importance and mistrust often rightfully from the industry made this impossible and thus the experience and knowledge that could have been gained is lost-culture again? My interpretation only!

We have been evaluating all our SOP'S, manuals, checklist etc the last week using this thread as a different reference-ie suggestions, possible weaknesses listed, causes and prevention etc. Although approved and having passed many a OGP audit, we very quickly found big discrepencies in light of what is to learn here-unnecessary complexities, missing detail, incorrect references to our specific aircraft and systems and operation etc. Simple things but we had gaps that could have led to a incident. Enthusiastically we started cleaning up and removing big words that made no sense, changed briefings, shortened checklists, simplify multi crew ops etc. Handed in our suggested amendments with great pride as normally we dont like paperwork. Culture? We were told by Quality and Safety that our amendments does not comply with their laid down requirements they use for auditing:ugh::ugh:

[victor papa]

As somebody stated earlier-compliance is everything, competence and practicality only if it complies....:ugh:

[Brom]

Hand-flying an instrument approach isn't impossibly difficult; you can teach Squaddies to do it.

At a push you could probably teach SLF to do it as well, given enough time. :E

[heliski22]

Enthusiastically we started cleaning up and removing big words that made no sense, changed briefings, shortened checklists, simplify multi crew ops etc. Handed in our suggested amendments with great pride as normally we dont like paperwork. Culture? We were told by Quality and Safety that our amendments does not comply with their laid down requirements they use for auditing:ugh: :ugh:

In the circumstances that would be cause for some alarm, would it not...?:confused:

[helimutt]

I'll admit I haven't read the last few days posts so please excuse me if its a repost, but all of this talk of the ap/fd being the cause, I was sent this and it's worth watching even if not related to this accident.


h3kREPMzMLk

[HeliComparator]

Yes, it's an excellent video. We showed it to everyone as part of recurrent training.

[[email protected]]

Well done helimutt - I couldn't remember where I had seen that clip - it is certainly very pertinent.

About 15 years ago, my parents' next door neighbour who was a recently retired senior training captain on 747s with BA, told me a number of his colleagues had taken to hiring light twins (no, not the cheeky girls) in their own time as they had so little hands on time in the 747, they were seriously concerned at their ability to hand fly the aircraft was waning quickly.

[diginagain]

At a push you could probably teach SLF to do it as well, given enough time.
I'm sure that they could quickly understand that the instructions on how to successfully fly the approach give you enough clues to be at the right height at the right distance to keep your wheels out of the water.

[IFR Piglet]

On the topic of CFIT style accidents. Apart from the development of our own SOPs and amending of checklists with the intention of making aircraft operation as safe as possible. I think the aircraft OEM’s have still much work left to do to help improve helicopter flight safety.

Should you be unlucky to still fly in an older machine the use of a RADALT bug might be the only system available to alert the crew of it’s proximity to either water or terrain and that’s not much of a safety net. I’m fortunate to operate a modern aircraft that provides far more S/A, largely thanks to it’s EGPWS, which is an improvement albeit with the odd spurious or unnecessary warnings from time to time, but I think we could do with more system improvements to aid S/A and safety.

Ultimately this accident occurred after the aircraft departed a desirable part of the flight envelope into the undesired for reasons yet to be determined. Should a crew not spot this development, why can’t the aircraft systems alert them? Or better why can’t they intervene? Or even better….do both?

During instrument approaches a programmable airspeed alert bug or/and vertical speed alert bug with ability to temporarily suspend the warning could be introduced to help alert a crew of an aircrafts departure from a desired segment of the flight envelope thus improving S/A. I’m thinking of a setting for either low airspeed or high rate of descent, which in addition to the present EGPWS modes could be useful.

The ability to temporarily suspend the protection is useful to prevent unnecessary warnings that merely desensitise the crew to warnings. Personally I believe this desensitisation to warnings is hugely underrated. The key is to get the warning when you absolutely positively need it; a point lost on far to many pilots, operators and perhaps OEMs who seem all to happy to hear them……it really bugs me…..boom boom!

As an example of a potential design oversight, the aircraft I fly can be flown coupled through it’s alert bug for RAD ALT whilst in a coupled hover mode……I’d love to know why? I think the AFCS demanded reference should always stop at the alert “safety” bug as the pilot will have set the radalt alert bug with the intention to remain above it. Should the pilot need to go lower they can always take control manually and do so.

Extra automation could help. I’m sure this has probably been already considered by the OEMs, but why not have an auto go-around function? Many generic helicopters can’t presently “couple up” at low airspeeds. But the aircraft is able to perfectly record data all the way to its demise. Clearly there are parts of the flight envelope you do not want to be in whilst operating close to water or terrain. So why don’t the OEMs provide an option to equip aircraft with an automatic AFCS “get out of jail card” upon detection of its occupancy in the undesired bitty of the aircraft flight envelope. To costly?

Soz if already discussed, been occupied.

Pig

[Senior Pilot]

We have been evaluating all our SOP'S, manuals, checklist etc the last week using this thread as a different reference-ie suggestions, possible weaknesses listed, causes and prevention etc. Although approved and having passed many a OGP audit, we very quickly found big discrepencies in light of what is to learn here-unnecessary complexities, missing detail, incorrect references to our specific aircraft and systems and operation etc. Simple things but we had gaps that could have led to a incident. Enthusiastically we started cleaning up and removing big words that made no sense, changed briefings, shortened checklists, simplify multi crew ops etc. Handed in our suggested amendments with great pride as normally we dont like paperwork. Culture? We were told by Quality and Safety that our amendments does not comply with their laid down requirements they use for auditing:ugh::ugh:

My bold.

If anything is picked up from this thread by someone within management, it is this.

If anything is picked up from this thread by the passengers, it is this.

If anything is picked up from this thread by the CAA, it is this.

The very culture that has been railed against for 75 pages.

[Old Age Pilot]

I'll admit I haven't read the last few days posts so please excuse me if its a repost, but all of this talk of the ap/fd being the cause, I was sent this and it's worth watching even if not related to this accident.

It is indeed an excellent video.

And I always wondered what happened to Henry Winkler

[mary meagher]

Victor Papa is one brave individual, and I hope he doesn't lay down and conform. Keep presenting the improvements, to the top if you can! Show them what Senior Pilot had to say: for 75 pages it is your initiative, scorned by the auditors, that can substantially improve safe use of their product.

[OffshoreSLF]

At a push you could probably teach SLF to do it as well, given enough time.



Yes Please!

I'm willing to give it a go in the sim. Purely for academic research, you understand.
:ok:

[SASless]

Given enough time we might be able to teach Crab even!;)

[Hummingfrog]

diginagain

I totally agree with you but the present philosophy seems to be hand fly as little as possible and engage the autopilot at Vy (SP) and deselect at the last possible minute before landing on the rig. No wonder there is a disconnect between being a pilot and systems operator/monitor.

There have been so many accidents where the crew - FW mainly but some RW - have sat there wondering what is going on as the autopilot takes them to the scene of the crash - in the early days it wasn't unusual for Airbus pilots to say "what is it doing now?" The infamous incident where a fully serviceable Airbus did a low pass and instead of climbing away it stayed level and flew into the trees - I believe the wrong mode in the autopilot had been selected!

You need to maintain your manual flying skills for the time that everything seems to be going wrong - the crew at Sumburgh may have been distracted at the critical point where the IAS started to decay but they should have been able to recover. The ETAP crew should have done a visual approach to the rig - flown round it with the rig on the handling pilot's side so he had a reference - especially in those conditions and at night – ETAP was visual from Mungo which is about 15nm away. This would require good handling skills for night flying. To descend to 300ft 7nm from the rig was an odd decision!

It is no good saying that flying using the autopilot is safer - with 2 possible CFIT in modern SPs it doesn't compare well with the early 332L, with a simple autopilot/coupler I flew, which in my time didn't fly into the sea!

HF

[[email protected]]

Given enough time we might be able to teach Crab even! shock horror, I flew an ILS today to minima with absolutely no autopilot modes engaged whatsoever - goodness me what was I thinking, hand-flying is just so tricky!

Instead, I selected an attitude, trimmed the aircraft and chose a power setting that would give me the required RoD - somehow we stayed within half a division of localiser and glidepath all the way down.....must have been luck I suppose;):ok:

[SASless]

Blind Hogs do find an Acorn now and then.

[HeliComparator]

shock horror, I flew an ILS today to minima with absolutely no autopilot modes engaged whatsoever - goodness me what was I thinking, hand-flying is just so tricky!

Instead, I selected an attitude, trimmed the aircraft and chose a power setting that would give me the required RoD - somehow we stayed within half a division of localiser and glidepath all the way down.....must have been luck I suppose;):ok:

Wow, what a man you are! I wish I could be like you, instead I am just a button pushing weedy geek.

Or to put it another way, Yawn.

Anyway, what this thread shows is that the old adage is true - you can ask 5 pilots the correct way to do something, and get 6 different answers.

There are a wide range of views here on how to fix the world of helicopters, the best way to operate etc, with a lot of confliction. So how is the correct strategy, out of all the crowd, to be determined? There would only be one thing worse than the present situation, and that would be to get everyone doing things the same, wrong way.

[Vie sans frontieres]

fix the world of helicopters

Not the entire world of helicopters, just yours.

[Al-bert]

Seems like something has been lost along with the adoption of exceedingly clever Ap's and no amount of Crab bashing can excuse poor flying skills on the part of NS pilots. I never flew commercially but thirty years of SH and SAR Wessex and Seaking was a damn sight more demanding than rigs and Sumburgh and yes, I've landed on rigs (and Sumburgh) by day and night in the ****tiest weather imaginable and in both hemisheres as well as numerous ships, some of which were never designed to be landed on and mountain tops that shouldn't have been landed on in the prevailing conditions! Come on guys, stop making excuses for wrong check lists, over complicated autopilots, checks and procedures. Learn to pole the bloody things and if company accountants don't agree sue or shoot the b@:mad:rds!

[AnFI]

Crab is right here ... people enrolling in the NS often cannot hand fly an approach, you know it is true, its not that hard. Some people don't even know whether they should use the cyclic to maintain a descent angle or the collective. As for illogical AP modes :rolleyes:

Great to see simplicity and rationalisation being taken seriously here.


HC: "There would only be one thing worse than the present situation, and that would be to get everyone doing things the same, wrong way." - that's prophetically true.

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[HeliComparator]

A-b, so you have had a long aviation career doing the things you did in the way you did them, without crashing. So bully for you, you must have all the right ideas!

Trouble is, so have very nearly all the rest of us. Just because one person, or even 10 people, get through a lifetime of aviation without crashing doesn't mean they are flyboy gods. Chances are it just means they were lucky, or at least not unlucky. It depresses me to hear the "I've always done it like this, its worked for me" line because its so unintelligent and fails to appreciate the nature of statistics and chance. The right way to operate is based on careful consideration of what could go wrong, how to trap it before it causes an accident, having error tolerant procedures to allow for inevitable human error and all the other good stuff which too many people never think about.

This is why, say, a democracy on how to operate would be a complete disaster. But that's the problem, which dictator is going to decide the right way?

[Al-bert]

HC - I don't claim to have all the right ideas, but it seems you think you do.
I, and most of the people I knew, put more emphasis on flying the aircraft rather than 'pushing buttons'. We had fewer buttons true, but the way we waggled those sticks kept us out of the sea. Maybe it might still work for todays pilots? :E

[SASless]

A-B,

You stated "No amount of Crab Bashing can excuse poor flying skills of North Sea Pilots.". Care to expound upon that will you....as that is a serious accusation.....the lack of flying skills you are talking of amongst the North Sea Pilots.

Do you excuse former RAF pilots from those you consider having poor pilot skills or are your comments all inclusive no matter the background and former training? Do you allow a subset of former RAF SAR Pilots to be excused from those suggestions as North Sea Pilots they too have sub-standard skills?

Why do you think North Sea Pilots have poor skills?

What is a cause for that you think?

Care to cite some data or incidents that would lead you to think of North Sea Pilots as you seem to do based upon your comments?

How would you remedy this unsatisfactory situation you see extant on the North Sea?

I have advocated a "shields down review" on the situation....so drop your Shields and tell us what your really think please.

[Al-bert]

SAS - simple, fly the aircraft! If you need inumerable checklists and ap options to fly an IFR approach to minima and you still fly into the sea (which most NS posters on here seem to think is what happened recently) then someone wasn't flying the aircraft. I cannot recall anyone that I knew in my RAF service making that particular mistake. More flying practice, less system monitoring perhaps?

[Hummingfrog]

SASless

Why do you think North Sea Pilots have poor skills?


I don't think that NS pilots have poor skills it is just that their hand flying skills do get degraded over time.

I joined the NS in 1990 to fly the 332L and began line flying up to the Shetland Basin. At that time the company mainly had long range contracts so we would sit in the cruise for 2-2.5 hrs with the height hold in and adjusting the heading every so often using the bug. We would take turns flying sectors so generally the Capt flew out and the Co-Pilot back. The rig landing pilot would be decided by the wind direction. So in a 5.5hr flight I might handle the controls for 5-10MINS. A 5000hr NS pilot could have, therefore, about 200hrs actually flying the 332L plus an hour for each base check he has done!

I don't know if the expressions "getting into an a/c" and "putting an a/c on" are familiar to you as a cousin but I felt I was "getting into an a/c" when I flew the line ie I didn't feel fully at one with it, I felt I couldn't read what it was doing. I then transferred to shuttle operations on the 332L this entailed very short sectors - hand flown and up to 21 landings a sortie - both day and night. I soon felt I was "putting an a/c on" as I could sense what it was doing - I didn't need to always check speeds/height etc as my spatial awareness was so much better as I flew the a/c more.

I think this is what is happening in the NS. You might join with good handling skills but they degrade with time and lack of practice. The relentless pressure to use the autopilot functions at every opportunity - driven by whom?? Just exacerbates the problem.

If I was HC's Dicator I would mandate that manual flying should be done at every opportunity but set wx limits for when the autopilot should be used. The NS does have some fine weather days when manual approaches can be safely flown to rigs and runways.

If the NS mantra is always use the autopilot as it is safer actually admits that NS pilots are not capable of safe manual approaches.

There is something wrong! We shouldn't see perfectly serviceable a/c ending up in the water:ugh:

HF

[high spirits]

Does the SP have radalt? If so, is there a procedure in NS for setting it at approach minima? Do NS operators carry div fuel or are the locations too remote?
Soz for all of the questions...

[[email protected]]

HC - you really do need to take a chill-pill (in the modern vernacular) - I was only riposting SASless' swipe at me and you suddenly believe I am bigging myself up as some skygod! calm down dear, calm down.

Flying skills are perishable, no matter how good you are (or think you are) - it's one thing coping with a situation and another being comfortable and in control with spare capacity - that's what regular training gives you, both the skills and the confidence in your ability.

[Bravo73]

I've not been around for a couple of days so apologies for referring to a previous posts but I feel that there are a couple of points that need clarification:


Both 2012 cases could have limped home had they not had emergency lubrication fail warnings.

I disagree. The EmLub system is designed to work in the case of total loss of MRGB oil. It is not a 'fix all problems' solution that can make up for the catastrophic failure of the main gearbox shaft. This was the case for REDW and CHCN.

What strikes me there is 3 for CHC, 3 for Bond, 0 for Bristows. Have Bristows just been extremely lucky or is it a given that the next incident will involve a Bristow's helicopter?

Hmmm, I wonder which company operated REDW's gearbox before it had recently returned to EC for overhaul...? Yep, like you said, 'extremely lucky'.



The infamous incident where a fully serviceable Airbus did a low pass and instead of climbing away it stayed level and flew into the trees - I believe the wrong mode in the autopilot had been selected!

This was Air France Flight 296. Due to the unexpected low height for the fly-past (30'), the aircraft engaged it's 'alpha protection' mode so that when the co-pilot selected TOGA power, the elevators did not respond to the pilot's command. This was to prevent the aircraft stalling because it was already being flown at maximum angle of attack. The outcome, like you said, was that rather than climbing away, the aircraft flew straight into the trees.

[rotorspeed]

Quite reasonably this is the time for pondering whilst we wait (no doubt for some time) for the AAIB report to divulge pretty much all.

But to me there still seems to be not enough discussion here on why, as Al-bert says, the aircraft just wasn't being flown here, given the assumed basic scenario. IR rated single pilots are expected to be able to perform these basic scanning functions on an IFR approach without any problem, and indeed this happens frequently and normally in the corporate world. Yet here we had a 3 axis autopilot, plus an IR rated co-pilot, and it apprently wasn't done. On, it would seem, a pretty straightforward IFR approach over flattish terrain.

We have opinion that says more automation is required with 4 axis autopilots used. And other opinion including the "children of Magenta" video from Helimutt that advocates selective use of less automation and more hand flying.

Before people get too carried away with the need for more to be spent on more training, better training, better avionics, autopilots, check lists, SOPs etc it would be good to get a sense of perspective on this accident. Just how many IMC approaches with say a 500ft or lower cloudbase safely take place in the NS every year? Anyone care to guestimate?

This approach ended up tragically. But all those others were presumably satisfactory, despite/because of the level of training/aircraft equipment etc. Or have NS pilots been worried for some time that there have been rather too many IFR approach errors that could well have caused an accident? And if so, have they been voiced on Pprune? I don't recall any such major threads.

[Thomas coupling]

75 pages and counting!

At the end of the day, the 2 pilots will lie in their beds and know exactly what went wrong - and they will have to live with it for the rest of their lives. Where they have gone, others will surely follow, perhaps for the following reasons:
As has been alluded to (and I subscribe very heavily to this theory), modern helos AND pilots employ modern techniques...perhaps, just perhaps we are running a little too fast into the future with aviation in general. Example: French A330 lost in bad weather due to poor understanding of basic aviation. The pilots were unable to resort to basic SA and flying techniques.
Crab referred to a colleague of his who flew 747's and needed to privately fly a light a/c out of hours to stay sharp. Ironically, one of my closest colleagues is a senior TRE for Virgin and he, too flies privately, doing aerobatics - to keep his hand in! Modern a/c coupled with modern flying techniques leave NO room for basic appreciation of flying skills.

Secondly: As has been touched on by Senior Pilot in post: #1495. The SOP's and processes of these companies are flawed due to bureaucracy yet when they are flagged up - senior management either can't or won't do anything about it.

Thirdly: Training programmes employed by these companies are unfit for purpose. They have been driven in the wrong direction for too long. We are seeing evidence of this even in the mil. I was teaching a Merlin driver the other day and she didn't know what to do after the flare phase of an auto because she hadn't been taught it for years and years!!!
Money (in the commercial world) has a lot to do with this as the emphasis is on automation and efficiency measures and not basic flying skills like teaching autos / recoveries from unusual attitudes / IVR / Settling with power / downwind approaches etc etc etc.

The above might be partly the answer to why the Norwegians have an impeccable track record...perhaps?

All food for thought. But I would wager a years salary that the crash eminated from some or all of these, in an environment where different pilots had different 'type' experiences, resulting in a most unfortunate outcome for 4 innocent bystanders.

For some of you reading this - you could be next if you don't break the chain...:uhoh: