AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013 [Archive] - Page 10

DOUBLE BOGEY

18th Nov 2013, 06:31

I think understanding the dangers of the more difficult parts of the flight envelope is key here.

As a result of this accident, during EC225 simulator training, We now force this error on the crew during SEMA approaches (SEMA only provide 3 Axis mixed mode with the pilot responsible for the collective vertical channel). Simply asking them to reduce speed in this condition to 60 KIAS is usually enough to destabilise the approach and create confusion as the helicopter flight path slides back up the power/airspeed curve.

This exercise helps the crew to recognise the dangers of low speeds in mixed mode operations and emphasise to them to avoid this.

We also apply a similar philosophy to OEI landings, deliberately flying an LDP at 1/2 speed at MLW, resulting in a crash into the lead in lights.

Simulator training is ideal for demonstrating areas of the envelope that we should try to avoid. It needs to be briefed beforehand to avoid negative training but the effects on crews is dramatic. After one crash into the lights they monitor there speed at LDP like hawks.

Consider the good pilot. You sit behind him and he meets all profile parameters accurately and appropriately. You tick all the little boxes on his form! However, does he really understand the dangers of the bits of the envelope you have not seen him explore??

Introducing "Exercises to Failure" into initial and recurrent training is a good step in the right direction. In fact some of the posters on this thread who feel that manual flying skills and intelligence will save them from these errors would probably fit in my "Above Average" category and paradoxically benefit from this type of training.

For the record, the Commander of the accident aircraft is a qualified Civil Engineer. I suspect had someone shown him the dangers of mixed mode flight in the Simulator one week before this accident it would never have happened. This is an opportunity for real change in the methods and content of initial and recurrent training. I have some good ideas but I am just one man.

Somehow we need a forum and opportunity to collate, evaluate and conclude better. More effective and more beneficial ways to train. The CAA I believe recognise this themselves but it is we, the industry SMEs that must stand up and lead the way.

ZDB

cyclic

18th Nov 2013, 07:43

Consider the good pilot. You sit behind him and he meets all profile parameters accurately and appropriately. You tick all the little boxes on his form! However, does he really understand the dangers of the bits of the envelope you have not seen him explore??

Spot on DB. How many times have I heard, "when I flew with him, he did nothing wrong". Yes, all the boxes were ticked and the exercises completed satisfactorily but how useful was the training? A little imaginative thinking in the sim, which appears you are doing, would definitely be the way ahead. I hate to say this (sorry HC), but my experience of the military sim always included a little of this. Perhaps that was because there wasn't a huge time or commercial constraint and generally the instructors had a huge amount of experience on the type. I for one would really value the opportunity to do this as opposed to the constant OEI scenarios, which I might add, are relatively straight forward.

rotorspeed

18th Nov 2013, 08:08

DB - I think you're absolutely right that training involving things going wrong - and I mean divergence from normal flight profiles rather than failures - is likely to be more valuable than just monitoring lots of properly done approaches. In fact I'm surprised this is isn't done more, by the sound of it. People can look very competent when they do things by rote, (eg accurately following a prescribed approach) but it's only when you hit them with something abnormal that you can see how much awareness they really have of all the crucial parameters, and skills to get them back on course if they are not right.

With regard to pilot competence, there have been a vast number of posts on this thread about training, quite reasonably, but virtually none about basic aptitude.

I do wonder whether the industry has sufficiently realised that, particularly with such increasing sophistication of aircraft and systems, a pretty high level of intelligence is necessary to be a good safe pilot. When everything is hunky dory yes, flying is not too challenging and a lot of people, trained, could do it. But when things get challenging, intelligence is required to make sensible rapid judgements and decisions.

It really worries me when I read of the occasional story of some kid being picked to have a free full CPL/ATPL training course, with no apparent selection process to ensure they are bright enough. You wouldn't want a surgeon operating on your kids, or a lawyer acting for you, who had only got 5 poor GSCEs! I'm not saying all pilots similarly need 3 or 4 Grade A A levels, but flying modern IFR twins well is a challenging job and I do think consideration should be given to ensuring commercial pilots are selected on some sort criteria to ensure they are sufficiently bright and quick thinking to be able to deal safely with the dramas they will inevitably encounter from time to time.

Can anyone shed any light on what academic qualifications are required by any commercial and military organisations to qualify for CPL/ATPL training?

Finally I must make it clear I am not suggesting this point applies to this Sumburgh accident - it is a general comment.

FC80

18th Nov 2013, 09:36

Rotorspeed -

Commercial - zero if self funded. I believe the Bristow/Air League sponsorship from earlier this year specified at least an A/1 in GCSE/Standard Grade maths, which was the cause of some consternation at the time!

RAF - "2 A-levels (at grade A-C) or 3 Highers or equivalent, plus 5 GCSE/SCEs at Grade C/2 minimum or equivalent including English language and grade B/1 in maths."

industry insider

18th Nov 2013, 11:54

Lots of good ideas and valuable discussion here but the "how" word is still eluding us it seems. I don't have an easy solution.

Being mildly old, I was line trained on the S-61 which was not endowed with power although magnificent. "Never get below Vtoss (67kts if I remember) except when taking off or landing" said my LTC. In later years, shuttling S-61s on the SNS as a Captain at night in haze and still conditions, I never forgot his wise words.

We have had 332Ls, L2s and 225s now for 30+ years. Have we bred a generation of pilots not used to low power aircraft in the real working environment? Was the old "Command Course" using a Bell 206 a good thing and should we reconsider its merits?

Being below Vtoss in any helicopter without it being a deliberate action is not a good place to be. Are we preaching automation without reinforcing the basics?

SASless

18th Nov 2013, 12:06

DB,

Sounds like a perfectly good approach to learning.:D:D:D:D

I used to do something similar in the Bell 412 and S-76 Sim.

My favorite scenario was set up by the Students themselves.

If they failed to brief the Missed Approach when doing an ILS....I "disappeared" the airport so they would not see a thing when arriving at DH.

Immediately....confusion set in.

Almost invariably....they hit "Go Around" but did not think to raise the Collective (three Axis system only). Shortly, we saw the equivalent of what happened off Shetland.

Taking the video tape down to the classroom, grabbing a cup of coffee while they watched themselves on TV....usually got the point across they needed to listen and learn from the Instructor and Course of Instruction.

There were other ways as well.....set up the situation...get them "busy" and watch them make a mistake that resulted in a crash....and they started listening to what was being said.

Key point....once they "SAW" it could happen to them....there was a much better attitude shown re understanding how easy it is to be the cause of one's own demise.

If time was available I liked to take the crew out to the Aircraft Carrier....make it a very dark, very hazy night....no reference but the lights and wake of the carrier. Then ask them to perform an EOL to the Carrier from 5,000 feet MSL.

The teaching point was to get them to thinking about the "Basics" of helicopter flying....in this case....did the intended point of landing move up or down on the point of the windscreen....meaning are you going to make the spot or not. It was not about landing on the Carrier....but forcing them to revert to one of the first things we learn in flying helicopters after all the sophisticated and complex topics and maneuvers they had been dealing with for up to a week.

That was my way of ending the sim session reminding them that remembering the basics is something we need to do all the time we are flying the helicopter for at some point it might make the difference between going home to the Wife and Kids or not.

[email protected]

18th Nov 2013, 13:35

I I, bizarrely, I find myself having to teach pilots to be comfortable in the low speed environment and how to handle the aircraft to maintain ETL when manoeuvring, especially with limited power - this as a result of exactly that type of thinking eg speed makes you safe.

SASless

18th Nov 2013, 13:44

But Crab.....your most important work is in that flight regime....so it is exactly right you would do so.

Offshore Oil Flying....other than SAR or Winching, some kinds of Shuttling and perhaps the extremely remote chance of some underslung work does not require Crews to operate in that flight regime so it is commonsense they would see things differently than you.

That is why the Cook Book method of flight training, the one size fits all concept, just doesn't work.

Box Ticking is just another way of describing that mindset that rejects the notion that training should impart or refresh some wisdom about our craft and trade.

Uneasy Rider

18th Nov 2013, 16:22

Shawn Coyle

18th Nov 2013, 16:24

Has anyone ever thought of the completely unpredictable failure scenario?? A failure that is common, but may not be a major or complete failure of a system is introduced during the sim session at a time that is not known to the instructor - heck, the instructor won't even know what the failure is...
That's the way it is in real life.

[email protected]

18th Nov 2013, 17:15

Shawn, there was one of those not long ago in the Sea King sim when the instructor (on the console) suffered a TIA - one of the pilots noted the instructor had gone very quiet and stopped the sim in order to give first aid and call qualified help. Try finding that one in the FRCs!

Sasless - perhaps it is because people have stopped thinking about aviation as a craft or trade, instead thinking of it as just another job that can be deconstructed to its component parts and made cheaper by leaving stuff out.

HeliComparator

18th Nov 2013, 20:50

It appears Helicomparator doesn't rate the current level of training for either CPL or IR, claiming it's all down to whether you have the money or not, rather than the aptitude.

Quote:

"No, by no means everyone. It is amazing how many candidates pitching up for a job, with fresh flight school CPL/IR, are unemployable either for personal reasons or because they demonstrate an inability to actually fly. Having the licence can simply mean you had the money but nothing else."

I take it he's including the students fresh out of Bristow Academy?

Yes, most definitely. Lots of money and time will get you a license regardless of your aptitude, intelligence or interpersonal skills. BA is no different - its a commercial enterprise to take people, their money, and turn that into a person with a license. It does seem to have a good reputation but I have never been there so I have no idea what it's like.

SASless

18th Nov 2013, 21:15

Crab,

I have posted this before and yet again state categorically that to be an Aviator....one must know Gann!

The emergencies you train for almost never happen. It's the ones that you can't train for that kill you.

Ernest Gann

There are airmen and there are pilots: the first being part bird whose view from aloft is normal and comfortable, a creature whose brain and muscles frequently originate movements which suggest flight; and then there are pilots who regardless of their airborne time remain earth-loving bipeds forever. When these latter unfortunates, because of one urge or another, actually make an ascension, they neither anticipate nor relish the event and they drive their machines with the same graceless labor they inflict upon the family vehicle.

ERNEST K. GANN, Ernest K. Gann's Flying Circus

SASless

18th Nov 2013, 21:40

Shawn,

In the very early days of the S-76A Sim out in the swamps of the Sikorsky facility we had few interesting situations within the Sim Computers Models that could be quite interesting.

One was the six inch difference in the Taxi Way Height somewhere on the airfield model. One could be taxiing along sweet as life itself and you either got a hell of bump when you drove off the Curb or a real smack when you drove into it. Patching that particular "Pot Hole" took a lot of work for our guy dedicated to resolving so many of the issues.

Later we discovered the "Black Hole of Pahokee" which was really interesting.

While flying around the Pahokee area which had a nice Instrument Procedure we used quite often....there was sometimes the impression you had flown into a mountain or had a mid-air collision it was so violent.

The results could be quite entertaining as the Computers all went crazy, various systems and gauges quite working....but nothing in a rational normal manner.

For training purposes it was great as no one in the Sim knew it was coming or what the results would be and we were left to cope with the results.

Taking the Instructor out of the Loop is not a good thing as a standard practice but inputting a random malfunction in at some point in the flight can work too. That should be the Instructors task....not some Wally set at a desk somewhere playing "What Happens If I Push This Button?".

LOZZ

19th Nov 2013, 07:52

HC,

I'm interested to learn what you think the development path should be for those aspiring to fly over the NS?

Clearly not everyone who chooses to aim for that is minted and some spend many years in other lines of work in order to be able to fund their training and survive on bare essentials during the time that takes.

I would imagine to make such a life decision one believes one has the necessary qualities in respect of personality, aptitude, motivation and much more besides; however sounds like that may not always be the case come the time to fly. So how can those heading in that direction discover before embarking on such a journey in the first place whether they indeed do have what it takes, or the ability to develop it?

Also I'm sure there are some, who have been reading this thread every other day since it started, that would want to know if we are likely to see a shift in the employment requirements or approach of the main operators around the NS; do you envisage any changes in this regard further to this accident?

best wishes
Lozz.

HeliComparator

19th Nov 2013, 09:22

Lozz, probably a bit off topic but I will give you my best answer, bearing in mind I have now retired from the industry. First, a bit of history: I came from the fortunate era when sponsored courses abounded. Bristow recruitment policy (onto their sponsored courses I mean) was as follows:

Have a PPL(A) - shows you have some interest and aptitude in flying

Have a good few O levels and an A level in a science or maths based subject (these were the days before everyone got an A grade A level by birthright!).
Pass an interview
Pass some physical co-ordination/aptitude and group working tests (at Hamble, which at the time was the BA flying school)

I don't know what the success rate was to reach the end of this process, but once on it, most people completed the sponsored course and gained employment in Bristow. Our course for instance had a 10/10 success rate, and it was rare for more than 1/10 to fail.

Those people now form the backbone of Bristow ops department ie are the trainers, chief trainers, head of flight ops etc.

Winding forward 30 years we had a big recruitment drive recently. Lots of people knocking on the door with still-damp CPL(H)/IR in hand. We were desperate for new pilots but I think the acceptance rate was something like 10%. One or two of those turned out to be "problem people". I wasn't directly involved in recruitment, but I heard that a lot were incapable of flying a pretty mundane instrument approach in the Sim without ending up upside down etc. Obviously procedural approaches in strange sim, with no experience other than a IR test under your belt, is hard work. But that some were quite good at it, whilst many were hopeless, means it was not an unreasonable test.

At interview I believe quite a number were plain weird. A lot were uncertain whether they wanted to relocate to Aberdeen long term. Some were trying to play off the different operators all of whom were recruiting. Etc etc. I don't think we were particularly picky but a lot of people were obviously unsuitable.

So none of that really answers your question! It perhaps gives you an idea of the problems faced by the employers.

I would say that you need to be reasonably well educated preferably with A levels in maths/science subjects. A degree in an engineering-type subject always goes down well. You need good verbal and written communication skills. No text-speak please! Good interview technique (plenty of interview technique coaching establishments out there these days). A little bit of experience beyond a basic licence / IR because just like a car, passing your driving test doesn't really mean you can drive, but once out there on your own experiencing a wider range of roads and conditions, your driving rapidly improves. In terms of IF I think there is value in flying procedural instrument approaches, from proper approach plates (jep or Airad), on a PC flight sim. At the very least, its a very cheap way to hopefully make a difference.

But I suspect, when you consider that these days schools and even colleges are churning out folk who, according to industry, are often unemployable, that it is your personal demeanour rather than your flying that is the most important thing to worry about - after all, you have passed a test for your flying, but not for your personality! As a really really big generalisation, it seems to be the case that the chap who has struggled financially to get his licence, is better motivated than the chap whose rich daddy has coughed up for one as a birthday present.

As to future developments, sorry I am now out of the industry and all I know is that Bristow realises that it may be worth reverting to the process I mentioned right at the beginning, and having more sponsored courses, since the investment pays off in the long term.

Hope that is slightly helpful!

Editing to add that CRM is very important these days. I don't know if any foundation CRM is covered for basic licence issue - probably not, in which case perhaps a CRM course should be considered prior to application. Not only would this look good, the issues covered, whilst perhaps looking a bit touchy feely mumbo jumbo-ish, in fact are very useful and really do make a difference. You are going from single pilot to multi pilot, and having a colleague with poor CRM strapped up close and personal to you for 8 hours is a most unpleasant experience!

LOZZ

19th Nov 2013, 09:55

Very helpful and much appreciated, by not only myself but I'm sure others lurking on this thread HC.

I particularly like the idea of using a flight sim s/w to practice procedural instrument approaches.

Back to the books and lurking for now.

Cheers!

Lozz.

P.S. Edited to add, further to HC's edit above, that certainly one ground school provider includes a CRM course by default.

bigglesbutler

19th Nov 2013, 12:07

On the note of CRM courses I was fortunate to be put through one which was a turning point not only in my professional life but personal too. If you want a quality CRM course try LMQ in Gatwick, I did the CRMI and I cannot tell you what specifically but I came out a different person heading in the right direction. It helped a "problem child" turn a corner so it can also help you steer in the right direction from the start.

Back on topic then.

Si

Fareastdriver

19th Nov 2013, 19:54

When these latter unfortunates, because of one urge or another, actually make an ascension, they neither anticipate nor relish the event and they drive their machines with the same graceless labor they inflict upon the family vehicle.

So right Sasless. In my decades of flying with hundreds of pilots of different nationalities and enthnic origins I have found out that there are:--

Pilots who love flying and you cannot keep them away from an aircraft.
Pilots that enjoy flying because it's a great way to earn a living.
Pilots who tolerate being a pilot but who are always nm the look out for a more rewarding career in another occupation.
Pilots who do not like flying but do it because it pays the bills.
Then the ones I admire the most; pilots that are afraid of flying but it is all they can do.

I've met them all and they all make the same mistakes, as I used to, because we are all human beings.

'Let he who is without guilt cast the first stone.'

SASless

19th Nov 2013, 20:19

Or in my case....Too lazy to work....and too nervous to steal.:ok:

heliski22

20th Nov 2013, 07:26

Or in my case....Too lazy to work....and too nervous to steal.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

Ringing bells there... :D

Torquetalk

20th Nov 2013, 09:03

The contention that this or other accidents in the last few years is related directly or indirectly to a less intelligent crop of pilots is dismaying to say the least. What evidence is there for this? I cannot recall, in any form whatsoever, the suggestion, in any accident report, that this is a relevant point. More still, as a broad impression (supported also by personal knowledge of the single fatal accident where I knew PF well), accident candidates are likely to be highly intelligent. But of course, intelligence doesn't cause accidents, and a bit less of it doesn't seem to either (assuming there was any merit in the point in the first place, which I doubt). Hazardous attitudes or a lack of flying discipline, bad or inadequate training, fatigue, poor communication, poor procedures and so on are the primary cause of accidents.

People who really should know better were taking the discussion for a bit of a walz in the woods here.

HeliComparator

20th Nov 2013, 09:36

TT that charge is probably levelled at me, so I shall answer.

I don't think anyone has mentioned intelligence. A pilot needs the manual skill and co-ordination to be able to fly a helicopter. There are some very intelligent people who are hopeless at that, and some thickos who are very good at that. Of course few are born with this innate skill, they have to be trained and again I don't think there is any correlation between intelligence and rate of learning or final skill level.

But in modern helicopters with complex systems and where the pilot primarily interacts with the helicopter via those systems, more than via stick, rudder and collective, a whole new skill set is required. Again there are some classicly thick people who seem to find "getting inside the head" of these systems quite easy, and some highly intelligent people who are hopelessly impractical and struggle to even understand how a light switch works. As a massive generalisation, perhaps those at the higher end of the intelligence spectrum might find this skill a bit easier, but intelligence is certainly not a suitable metric for determine this in advance.

As I have said before, the major problem seems to relate to the large amount of time and effort devoted to selecting, teaching and checking pilots based on manual flying skills, whereas relatively very little time and effort is devoted to selecting, teaching and checking pilots on this now predominant skill set of complex system comprehension.

I will admit that the relevance of this to this specific accident is questionable, but this thread has widened to take in the whole recent accident history and state of the N Sea / oil and gas helicopter industry. Those at the sharp end are aware of a number of recent "near miss" events where automation confusion was the primary factor, even though they are not in the public domain and so not advertised here.

For me, the bottom line is that I wouldn't want to be a passenger flown by a pilot who was not quite sure what will happen to the flight path when he moves the cyclic, collective or pedals. Fortunately the current selection, training and testing regime ensures that this is not the expected case.

But these days, I also wouldn't want to be a passenger flown by a pilot who was not quite sure what will happen to the flight path when he presses some buttons on the autopilot/FMS/EFIS system. And I mean under the whole flight envelope, without or with reasonably foreseeable partial failures.

He probably is pretty confident pressing buttons within a reasonably small envelope of what behaviour lurks in the software, but typically these days he doesn't have any idea about the whole gamut of available behaviour lurking within the software, and I find that scary!

Lonewolf_50

20th Nov 2013, 12:58

The FAA has just figured out that, in the airline industry, automation dependence has become too common. (http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/19/21537851-airline-pilots-depend-too-much-on-automation-says-panel-commissioned-by-faa?lite)

Is this becoming true in the helicopter industry? (Or in certain segments of it?) Is this accident a threshold event?

I have no idea, but that thought may be worth following.

albatross

21st Nov 2013, 02:44

A good question.
What kind of aircraft? Are you just lowering the collective or are you pulling the "trigger" and lowering the collective? Are you manipulating the trim switch on the collective?

The " Hollywood " answer is that the helicopter would explode in a fireball that would put the Bikini nuclear tests to shame.

"Humour" answer - 7 of 10 captains would slap you upside the head with the OPS manual.

reality depending on the aircraft is that probably the collective trim would go to full travel and then the collective trim would give up and alt should decouple.
In a 225 you will descend and you will get advisory chevrons on the FND. until you release the colective - order will be restored and the ac will return to the altitude selected the autopilot will not decouple..

albatross

21st Nov 2013, 08:48

Don't know about the command course but I have flown with some crusty commanders in the good old daze who got their CRM course from the John Wayne movie - "The High and the Mighty":} during which John slaps Robert Stack into submission.

"Sit down, strap in, shut up, gear up, gear down and if i want your opinion i will tell you what it is!"

Cheers.:E

SASless

21st Nov 2013, 12:29

Albatross.....you should remember it was the Co-Pilot who slapped the Captain back to reality! A classic example of CRM if there has ever been one!

Lone......we thrashed that topic around about 75 pages ago.

What is interesting is....assuming my alcohol ravaged brain is working right today....is the FAA's position is directly opposite to Double Bogey's view that more effort needs to be dedicated to teaching the AFCS and FMS.

If I have it twisted up....my apologies to DB....but at one point that argument was made by someone.....perhaps it was Geoffers. No matter....Geoffers and DB seem to be our leading experts on Sims and training...with HC coming a close third.

Not indicting who it was....just pointing out the polarity of views shown here.....and the breadth of discussions we have had on so many topics.

HeliComparator

21st Nov 2013, 16:05

I think it would be foolish to assume that the issues with helicopters and airliners are identical. At least in helicopters we manually fly an inherently severely unstable beast (albeit with autopilot stability assistance) for every takeoff and landing (which lets face it are the tricky bits - any idiot can fly in the cruise) and compared to many airline pilots our number of takeoffs and landings per year are much much greater, and more varied. We have to demonstrate that we can fly without any artificial stability every 6 months / year at which point, compared to an airliner, a helicopter is a wild bucking beast (well, it is when I fly it anyway!).

Certainly in both cases, the pilots must know what will happen when they move the flight controls, and what will happen when they press buttons on the automation, but I think loss of manual flying skill is less of an issue on RW than FW. The wrong mental attitude, where automation dependency results in a delay to take manual control or drop down a level of automation, I agree is an issue for both but that is not the same as loss of manual flying skill.

When we first got the EC225, people coming from the 332L really struggled with being at ease with the automation. I used to make them fly a VFR circuits using the automation / datum beep switches etc - not because that's a good way to fly a circuit, but to get them familiar with the various modes and controls. They hated it and just wanted to fly it manually, and I was like the a John Wayne character beating them over the head to make them do it. But gradually they became more accustomed to it, then they loved it, and finally, 6 or so years later, we started to notice signs of automation dependency. So it is a fine balance to be sufficiently comfortable in the use of the automation to make best use out of it, to becoming dependant and thus reluctant to revert to a lower level of automation or manual flight. I still think we are some way behind the airlines in this area though - but we have to make sure we don't catch up with them.

SASless

21st Nov 2013, 17:47

6 or so years later, we started to notice signs of automation dependency.

Thus, it is an issue.

Properly diagnosed and treated....it becomes an non-issue until the next relapse.

kirkbymoorside

21st Nov 2013, 18:18

The FAA report that underlies the press coverage linked by Lonewolf_50 has now been released with a summarising factsheet (that contains a link to the full report).

Fact Sheet ? Report on the Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems (http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=15434)

The report, "Report on the Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems" is some 267 pages long with 29 findings and 18 recommendations.

"The findings address:
Many of the sources of safety and operational risk mitigation in the current aviation system;
Equipment design, pilot training and qualification, and airspace operations; and Lessons learned from the analyses of different sources of safety and operational data."

On a quick scan of the contents page there is quite a lot in there from the fixed wing world across a broad front relating to Flight Path Management not just automation.

It should allow the helicopter world to aid its reviews of similar issues.

HeliComparator

21st Nov 2013, 18:33

Thus, it is an issue.

Err yes, that's what I said! Shall I call you "Polly"?

[email protected]

22nd Nov 2013, 15:43

I don't think Sasless has had his feet nailed to the perch to stop him shuffling off this mortal coil yet;);)

Or is he just pining for the fjords???

SASless

22nd Nov 2013, 18:13

Fareastdriver

22nd Nov 2013, 19:20

But gradually they became more accustomed to it, then they loved it, and finally, 6 or so years later, we started to notice signs of automation dependency.

Who taught them automation dependency?

HeliComparator

22nd Nov 2013, 20:31

SAS I don't really get your point. Maybe you used insufficient words?

My post related to the various completely different factors of loss of manual flying skill, lack of knowledge of the full gamut of automation behaviour, and automation dependency. Apart from them all being something to do with flying, there is no significant connection but I perceive that some, including you, don't really "get" that. Next time I shall try to use more words in the hope you will thus finally understand it.

HeliComparator

22nd Nov 2013, 20:32

Fareastdriver - Alas like so many other bad habits, they are self-taught. It is the job of the training system to train for countermeasures to automation dependency.

Mars

26th Nov 2013, 07:43

In previous posts on this thread there were attempts to attribute the cause of the L2 accident too simplistically. A passage from pages 103/4 of the recently issued report "Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems" puts forward a much more enlightened viewpoint:

Data are collected primarily about “front line” operations. Attempts to diagnose safety-related problems in analyses and investigations are dominated by categorizing events as due to “pilot error” and “controller error,” and the WG found this is no different when addressing flight path management and use of automated systems. The persistence of this attitude reduces the ability to understand the factors that create the conditions for, or lead to, these errors (Woods et al., 2010). One class of latent or underlying factors is that of organizational factors related to organizational culture, including policy, procedures and economic pressures. Another class of latent factors relates to effects of complexity - increases in the degree and kinds of interdependencies across factors (including tighter coupling of systems). Unfortunately, very little information about these classes of latent factors is gathered at all (what is gathered is not done so in a consistent way), and little of the available data is utilized to assess the effects of such factors.

I think that most of us would subscribe to the view that "...organizational culture, including policy, procedures and economic pressures..." were issues that have to be examined when determining how to prevent other such accidents in the future.

Mars

76fan

26th Nov 2013, 09:59

Mars: "I think that most of us would subscribe to the view that "...organizational culture, including policy, procedures and economic pressures..." were issues that have to be examined when determining how to prevent other such accidents in the future".

I'll second that. From my experience preventable accidents are rarely due to one thing only, there are usually other factors in the build up to the actual event.

SASless

26th Nov 2013, 10:37

My best example of what Mars and others rightly suggest is the Air Methods Bell 412 crash at Bluefield, WV several years ago.

The flight was a Two Crew, fully IFR equipped Bell 412, operated on an IFR EMS Operation based at a Hospital. A different Vendor, operating a VFR Single Pilot BK-117 experienced a Fatal Crash several years earlier while operating from that Hospital. The first Crash happened when the aircraft impacted a mountain side near Fancy Gap, VA. That crash prompted the Hospital to upgrade their operation to the Two Pilot IFR Program.

If one does a front-line only review of the accident....it would show the crew never found the Glide Slope on the ILS, reverted to a Localizer Approach, completely missed the Airport and flew into a Mountain several miles beyond the airport.

There would be some question as to how they could have managed that as it would take some really gross incompetence to do that.

Then if you were to take a larger look....as was done....one then sees there was a structural problem.....there was only an Outer Marker Beacin.....not a Locator Outer Marker Beacon.

Then you see, despite the Crew asking to be vectored well outside the Marker, ATC (Radar) turning them inside the Marker.

If you stopped looking at that point....you would then miss the rest of the story.

The aircraft the crew was flying was a "Spare" aircraft flown in that day by the Corporate Check Pilot who was there to do IF Base Checks. The "Spare" aircraft had different Avionics, particularly Area Nav, than did the Base Aircraft.

The Bluefield Flight had been turned down due to weather and the Crew had decided to fly to another location that had suitable weather and do a Public Relations Appearance.

The Captain, was the Base Manager, Safety Officer, and Base Training Pilot.

As the Operator bragged about its IFR capability in its sales and PR....the Crew felt compelled to do the Bluefield Flight after the Corporate Check Pilot had flown in with the Spare Aircraft and the Med Crew had swapped over the Medical Kit.

If you lay out the Accident Chain on this fatal crash that killed four people....the second fatal crash at that one EMS Operation.....it shows a much different situation than if you limited it to what happened from Takeoff to Crash.

I used the crash data to create a Simulator Training Scenario....without telling the Trainee's anything about the flight. I set up the Scenario by suggesting we go someplace none of us had ever gone before....and made a show of flipping through the Approach Plate Booklet and happening upon......Bluefield, WV.

Then I acted as ATC and provided the vectors to place the Trainees in exactly the same location the AM Crew found themselves that day.

Out of a dozen or so such flights in the Sim.....not one crew crashed or came close to hitting anything.

I firmly believe a thorough wide ranging investigation to effectively describe all of the factors that play a role in these tragedies. That is why I suggested a "Shields Down" investigation of this latest crash and the industry itself in light of the past several ditchings and crashes.

[email protected]

26th Nov 2013, 15:19

The Captain, was the Base Manager, Safety Officer, and Base Training Pilot. from that comment it would appear that personality and a conflict of interests was a main causal factor.

What was the co-pilot doing? assuming his boss was too good to get it wrong?

Are there parallels with the Shetland crash? Poor monitoring of the PF by the PNF perhaps?

Shawn Coyle

26th Nov 2013, 15:26

SASless:
Nice post and great story. One of the important things that would ensure that all your sim 'students' (victims???) would do well was that they should have all been very familiar with the avionics and systems in the simulated helicopter.
One wonders what would happen if they were suddenly presented with an avionics suite they were not completely familiar with....

Geoffersincornwall

26th Nov 2013, 17:40

Many years ago I was asked to audit a company that had suffered a fatal CFIT by the management of that company. What I was able to establish was that the 6-8 pilots regularly employed had all completed their 6 monthly IMC Base Checks on the same medium twin helicopter - the one owned by them.

The company routinely operated up to seven different medium twins but whilst they were all the same type each had a different avionics suite and area nav.

So, the only time you were asked to demonstrate your competence was on the same helicopter with very familiar avionics.

The rest of the time you had to struggle with any one of seven alternatives without one single jot of instruction on how the systems worked.

"The handbook is in the door pocket" - sound familiar.

Is it no wonder........

I bet there are charter outfits out there still doing the same.

G.

SASless

26th Nov 2013, 17:45

Crab,

The Captain was a very nice fellow, well liked, experienced, former military pilot. The Co-Pilot was also a Military aviator.....and was active in the National Guard (Territorials).

There was no hint or record of the Captain being anything but professional.

The Crew plainly goofed up.....and in my opinion....their being unfamiliar with the aircraft they were flying that day played a huge role in the chain of events (or chain of Non-Events if you will) that ultimately killed them and their two Medical Crew Members.

Recall the ILS Approach extant the day of the accident did not have a Locator....but just a Marker Beacon.

If my memory serves me right....the Accident Aircraft had a LORAN and the Duty Aircraft had a GPS.....but for sure the Area Nav unit was quite different from the one they were well used to from their regular flying.

There was a DME and VOR at the Airport.

Now ask yourself some questions about how you could fix the location of the AIRPORT if you had dual VOR/ILS Receivers, a DME receiver, an ADF receiver, and an Area NAV?

As there was no Locator....I would have been concerned about being turned in too soon by ATC, EXACTLY as the Crew was. They appeared to trust ATC would do as they asked.

It appears they never saw the Glideslope or never got onto the Glide Slope and seem to have abandoned the ILS and opted to complete a Localizer Only Approach.

It is surmised they confused the Outer Marker for the Middle Marker/Inner Marker due to the reported altitudes that were flown. They hit the mountain that was something like Seven Miles beyond the Airport (if my recollection of the distance is correct.....but it was quite some distance past the airport).

They could have used the "Hold" function to retain the DME readout.
They could have used the Area Nav to fix the Airport.
They could have used the Area Nav to "fix" the Outer Marker (even if not legal).

They did not or they would not have flown the profile they did.

So is that Crew Error, Training related, Management Error, Policy/SOP error?

Did the Federal Air Regulations and the Operator's OpSpec's cause a problem?

Could the company have purchased IFR Certified GPS for all of their Aircraft...should they have Standardized Cockpits in all their aircraft?

Excerpt from the NTSB Report

Aircraft Accidents and Incidents - Bluefield, Virginia 24605 Mercer County Airport Friday, April 22, 1994 14:45 EDT (http://www.aircraftone.com/aircraft/accidents/20001206X01039.asp)

rotorspeed

26th Nov 2013, 20:01

SAS

What do you think the crew would have been looking at displayed on the HSI if they were completing a localiser approach - it seems from the report they were tracking parallel to the localiser 1 mile left? And even if they thought the middle marker was the outer marker, why would they not have seen from the DME readout that this was incorrect?

How could such errors possibly be training, management, policy or SOP errors? Wasn't it just largely basic crew error, with mitigation for poor radar vectors?

industry insider

26th Nov 2013, 20:27

Talk about thread drift. An EMS Bell 412 in the US versus the 332L2 in Sumburgh.

SASless

26th Nov 2013, 23:00

Taking the short view again are you II?

Can you not see the correlation between the practice of looking at Accidents as isolated events and not a long list of factors?

Both crews were doing an Instrument Approach....both either were or seemed to be doing a Non-Precision Airport based Approach....both hit the surface despite having autopilots, co-pilots, had passed training and checks, and four people died in each event.

The FAA and NTSB each limited their reviews with the Crew, Aircraft, and ATC....and gave scant mention to anything else.

Is that what you want the CAA and AAIB to do on the Shetlands crash....take the short view as you seem to be a proponent of that by your last post.

[email protected]

27th Nov 2013, 07:00

Sas, I am sure they were both professionally competent and nice guys who didn't set out to crash that day but doing real IMC IFR does tend to sort the wheat from the chaff.

They clearly didn't brief the MAPt or the MAP and alarm bells should have rung if they were listening to a properly coding ILS but not able to see glideslope indications. Presumably the DME told them directly where the airport was (in terms of distance) and an increasing DME indicates you are going away from the airport.

LORAN has one really useful function - the airport button, that gives you heading and distance to the 20 nearest airports.

Now the suggestion that it is perfectly fine to go IMC in an aircraft you are not familiar with seems to be the point at which most aviators would say no - these guys didn't (military-indoctrinated get the job done attitude?)

Yes, there are, as always, a lot of threads in this accident that could be highlighted in any report but both the aircraft and the airfield were perfectly serviceable - the failures were all human, from getting airborne in the first place in an unfamiliar aircraft to poor IFR procedures and briefing.

You can blame what you like as contributory factors but two experienced guys f*****d up when they shouldn't have - you can't legislate for that.

Hummingfrog

27th Nov 2013, 07:20

I think what SASless is alluding to is the role that management can play in forming a link in the accident chain. Failing to provide a common IFR fit across the fleet and always doing the IFR training using one particular a/c being the link in his example.

It does/did happen in the N Sea as well. At the time that DECCA was on its way out and despite having notice that new area nav kit was required nothing was done until the last moment. The end result was that our offshore replacement a/c turned up with a Trimble GPS instead of DECCA. I had no company training on the Trimble, there was just an instruction booklet in the door pocket!!

Fortunately we were a mainly VFR operation which gave me time to study the booklet.

This episode showed how management were not focused on Flight Safety:ugh:. As far as they were concerned the a/c had a usable GPS it was up to the pilots to learn how to use it!!

HF

ShyTorque

27th Nov 2013, 08:05

HF, that happened to me; I went to a new job on a new type of aircraft. It was so new that there was no recognised training syllabus for it. It had a nav/ comm system I had not seen before but there were no instruction manuals. I spent three days in the hangar with the GPU connected working it all out.

industry insider

27th Nov 2013, 10:34

SASless wrote

Can you not see the correlation between the practice of looking at Accidents as isolated events and not a long list of factors?

Both crews were doing an Instrument Approach....both either were or seemed to be doing a Non-Precision Airport based Approach....both hit the surface despite having autopilots, co-pilots, had passed training and checks, and four people died in each event.

The FAA and NTSB each limited their reviews with the Crew, Aircraft, and ATC....and gave scant mention to anything else.

Is that what you want the CAA and AAIB to do on the Shetlands crash....take the short view as you seem to be a proponent of that by your last post.

....and they were both helicopters!

Firstly, the CAA are the regulator not the investigator. Secondly, their involvement into any North Sea helicopter safety investigation has been ridiculed on this thread. Thirdly, the AAIB is normally very thorough and professional in these investigations, taking the long view and considering all contributory factors. Fourthly, I do not agree that these accidents have much in common. Fifthly, I believe that management has a huge role in the prevention or otherwise of accidents, safety culture does start at the top.

Yes, the NTSB and the FAA limited their views in the Bell 412 case, they can be a little light in their respective analyses as we all know.

The so called "cooperative investigation" between the helicopter operators has so far not amounted to anything more than a nice signed letter. The Shields Down will never happen in my opinion.

Sometimes, I think you post rubbish, just for the sake of posting.

Thomas coupling

27th Nov 2013, 13:08

Industry: Concur.

SASless

27th Nov 2013, 13:09

II....are you completely secure in thinking the AAIB will chase down every single investigative Lead and look into Operator Training, Checkride, and Management Policies, Standards, and SOP's during the investigation extant? Or do you think they will limit their inquiries into just the events of that day, in that particular aircraft, at that unique location?

If they do the Latter, will you be satisfied they have done an adequate job of finding and identifying the Factors that lead up to the Crew losing control of the aircraft and killing four people in the process?

Crab,

No doubt the Air Methods Crew committed gross errors.....even the FAA Human Factors Division has done a Study of this Accident. I am trying to get a copy of their Power Point Presentation about the Crash. Thus far, I am able to locate one on-line version that is incomplete. When/If I get one from the FAA i shall post it here. There is no evidence available to determine if they had put the DME into "Hold" which would have allowed them to know their distance from the Airport. We have to assume they did not as if they had....and observed the readout increasing rather than decreasing....they would have realized something was quite wrong.

As simple a thing as using a DME "Hold" function is....not doing so is failing to use available "automation" features.....in every sense we are concerned about in the Shetlands Crash. Granted the Shetlands issue is far more complex overall in that we are talking about an AFCS with multiple modes that are capable of flying the aircraft....but the Pilot decision process is the same in both cases. They all had available something they did not use.....or mis-used.

Humm,

I am very much saying Management played a role in the 412 Crash....and said so while working for them at a different location. Pointing some of the factors I saw at play with the CP, GM, and Training Department did not make me very popular despite it being politely done in private.

Management very often does play a huge role that gets left out of most Accident Reports as what they do is not illegal, is not a direct measurable effect necessarily, and escapes examination.

They presumed to know better and were not interested in hearing anything other than how great a job they were doing. A quick review of their Safety Stats would have contradicted that view.

I am sure in the Shetlands event it shall turn out to be very much the same.

Is it not a Management Responsibility to ensure the right equipment is provided, effective training is completed, and Standards are maintained? Part of that is setting up an intern mechanism to seek input from all levels of Staff in an effort to identify problems and ask for suggestions on how to remedy the perceived problems....with a Management Response to any such input.

JohnDixson

27th Nov 2013, 13:39

SAS, I concur with the direction you have taken with regard to the Shetlands accident explanation ( to come ).
Wanted to offer a comment on your simple, but really on point remark:

"Management very often does play a huge role that gets left out of most Accident Reports as what they do is not illegal, is not a direct measurable effect necessarily, and escapes examination."

Management pressure to press on when the evidence already on hand says " caution ", or to place people in position to accomplish a task when they really don't want to be there, are realities that can exist, with fatal results. There are other versions of people in direct line management doing, or perhaps, not doing something that had a direct bearing on the ensuing accident, and the AAIB/NTSB have no way of learning these details. Hard to criticize in some respects, because these issues can be judgmental/opinion based.

Anyhow, a fertile discussion.

rotorspeed

27th Nov 2013, 23:06

SAS

So just to be clear, from your previous post, can you confirm that you believe management deficiencies will turn out to have a "huge role" in the Sumburgh crash?

And any particular reason why you didn't respond to the questions I asked you in post 2281?

Mars

28th Nov 2013, 09:26

Rotorspeed,

If he doesn't then I certainly do - and not just management of the operator!

Mars

SASless

28th Nov 2013, 10:55

I see post 2281 belonging to Biggles.....perhaps you might repeat the question as I do not see your post.

As "Management" can have different meanings at different times...I will say "Yes"....as I include Training Captains, Check Captains, Sim Instructors, Safety Managers and the like in "Management".

As to "Huge"....that is your choice of wording.

Significant....yes, notable......yes, will they be called out by the AAIB....who knows at this point!

industry insider

28th Nov 2013, 11:02

As "Management" can have different meanings at different times..

Anyone you may have left out? Wasn't the Captain supposed to be "managing" the flight? What about the Regulator?

A very vague description of Management with weasel words

rotorspeed

28th Nov 2013, 16:28

SAS

My post 2281 related to your post on the Air Methods accident and was:

"SAS

What do you think the crew would have been looking at displayed on the HSI if they were completing a localiser approach - it seems from the report they were tracking parallel to the localiser 1 mile left? And even if they thought the middle marker was the outer marker, why would they not have seen from the DME readout that this was incorrect?

How could such errors possibly be training, management, policy or SOP errors? Wasn't it just largely basic crew error, with mitigation for poor radar vectors? "

No SAS, "huge" was your wording actually. Read you own post again - para 2 under Humm.

Quite right, industry insider! SAS, I think you know that most people will assume you mean the company business managers when you say "management". And if not, and you mean training captains and check captains, why not be a bit more specific and say so? Or perhaps you would rather responsibility was heaped on corporate management - in fact I do find that tends to be your style. If flight crew don't believe they are trained to fly a task they shouldn't do it - and surely they should be able to be judge that. Do you think that the Sumburgh crew were not confident they were sufficiently trained to fly the NPA safely? I very much doubt it.

SASless

28th Nov 2013, 17:51

I don' guess you two would consider non-standard cockpits to be a Management issue or concern?

Would you consider having one guy fulfill the Base Manager, Base Training Captain, and Base Safety Officer tasks as being good thinking by Management as well?

Do you reckon the Corporate Check Pilot arriving on site then watching the Duty Crew launch in the Spare Aircraft after doing a Bag Swap from the Duty Aircraft...into IMC Conditions in a mountainous area in an aircraft they were not familiar with (and having significantly different equipment) not a Management Concern?

Would you consider the Corporate Mantra of anytime, anywhere, any weather (contingent to FAA OpSpecs minima)....but ignoring the actual practice of most of their IFR crews avoiding flying in actual IMC whenever possible a Management issue?

If you disagree with the notion Management (at all levels/functions) does not play a role in the environment Flight Crews find themselves operating in....then just say so. But....you are already aware most others disagree with that view.

You certainly are free to disagree.....but at least offer up some corroboration of your own views.

Answer some of your own questions.....why did they parallel the course and not track the course? What would explain that?

I presented an explanation for the lack of DME information....did you not read that? If they did not use the DME "Hold" function they would not have had any DME readout to see.....if you recall how that system works in a Sperry Cockpit.

If they did not use that function.....why not? Did they train that way? Did they not understand how that function worked....did they not understand how that particular piece of equipment worked on the Spare Aircraft?

Did the Check Pilot do an Orientation Briefing on the Spare Aircraft before the Crew launched in it?

You have a lot of questions you could be asking or is it you just want to disagreeable?

industry insider

28th Nov 2013, 20:49

SAS, I wasn't even considering your unrelated onshore EMS Bell 412 accident in the USA. I haven't studied it, read of it, and I am not interested in it. This thread is about an AS332L2 fatal accident in Sumburgh UK at the end of an offshore flight.

I don't think its appropriate or relevant to drag up any old CFIT accident on the other side of the world and start pontificating about management. The AAIB won't even think about or consider this Bell 412 USA accident.

If disagreeing with you and wanting to stick to relevance is "disagreeable" to you, so be it.

Mars

29th Nov 2013, 08:04

Last week the FAA issued a report on “Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems”.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2501.pdf

A small (informal) helicopter group has been looking at that report and their view of it, and its relevance, is as follows:

“The report is comprehensive and appears to cover and summarise most of the issues that we have addressed over a short period of discussion. However, when the report is being read, it is difficult not to fall into the trap of confirmatory bias.

The comparisons between the population examined in the report and our industry is not just one of scale it is also a matter of (lack of) parallel experiences, foreshortened timescales, and variance in operations (for example, we might perhaps require less emphasis on manual skills). We benefit from the application of automation, but this comes at a price because we have not had time to adapt our thinking and processes to, what is, a revolutionary approach to operations. Only in the offshore industry - and probably only in deep-water operations - is there a move to comprehensively re-equip with equipment that has cockpit integration/automation approaching the complexity of the population in this report. Fortunately, this is one of the few corners of our industry that does have the ability to move as one and make necessary changes. Perhaps we might be the exemplar in any changes that are made and this needs to be conveyed to other parts of our industry.

Compared to the airline industry, which is largely homogeneous, we are a collection of very small operators who, for understandable reasons, are more interested in competition than cooperation. For that reason, we do not have the clout to force a change in design (even the authors of the report are only recommending that the process 'takes account of' human-centric design - they make few recommendations for concrete changes in regulations). Nevertheless, because we are a small industry, it is possible to engender the required change in the culture of oversight, training and operations (in a reasonable time scale) although deciding what constitutes 'required change' is going to be the first and most difficult step.

It is accepted that, although changes (of various magnitudes) are necessary in design, certification, training requirements, training regimes, operating procedures, crew cooperation etc., the process of change must be owned at the highest level and be applied and driven from the top. Hence there is a need to ask questions about required changes in:

1. the system;
2. the regulator;
3. the regulations; and
4. oversight.

It needs to be understood that the system should include a version of the ‘plan/do/monitor/adjust’ improvement cycle as part of the State Safety Programme (SSP) – as does the operators SMS. We can continue to discuss how the recommendations of the report are applied to our industry but, in the final analysis, unless the solution at all levels contains a version of this process, it will not be enduring.”

Mars

FrustratedFormerFlie

5th Dec 2013, 09:45

The Sumburgh thread seems to have gone missing - possibly a formatting error somewhere? The most recent couple of pages of entries appear to be imaccessible. Any chance one of the 'deities' could take a look (and then delete this?)?:ok:

[email protected]

12th Dec 2013, 16:13

It appears from the graphs at the end of the AAIB report that the HP must have sub-consciously moved the collective down every time he got a height check (and was always above the nominal glidepath) - the graph shows clear steps of reducing Tq and lever position during the approach.

This would account for the cyclic program reducing the speed to keep the desired RoD which eventually resulted in the high nose up, low speed condition (despite speed calls at 80 kts and 35 kts) that finally led to the VRS.

As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?

Lonewolf_50

12th Dec 2013, 17:08

As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?
Chances are one of the test pilots at EC could explain that, since I expect they were involved in the development process.

212man

12th Dec 2013, 17:58

Quote:
As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?

Chances are one of the test pilots at EC could explain that, since I expect they were involved in the development process.

Anyone would think ths was the first 3-axis autopilot ever invented! There were 3-axis Sperry 7000s flying in S76As in the eighties (to name but one prior model). It's nothing new......:confused::confused:

Pittsextra

12th Dec 2013, 18:47

As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?

The work done by Qinetiq on the VAAC Harrier / JSF is interesting in terms of the thought process gone through to get the solution they have. Perhaps something that could translate to rotary winged aircraft?

HeliComparator

12th Dec 2013, 20:00

As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?
It is only counter intuitive if you have been badly trained - trained that you always use cyclic to control airspeed and collective to control the vertical element. As I have mentioned before this plain doesn't work throughout the flight envelope, so why do the dipsticks teach it?

To me, engaging a vertical mode on cyclic and controlling speed with collective is just as intuitive as the other way round, under the appropriate conditions. It is just a matter of selecting the optimal way of doing it for the circumstances. A pilot who can't cope with that shouldn't be flying.

ChristiaanJ

12th Dec 2013, 20:44

212man,
I worked on a 3-axis A/P that was fitted both to the Alouette III and the 212... but that goes back to the mid-seventies, so I reckon I'd better stay out of the discussion !

TripleC

12th Dec 2013, 21:23

That's the way the Puma was designed. Counterintuitive maybe but it worked. Set a pitch and fly on the cyclic, I know having attended No 1 Puma course in the RAF, we didn't have multi-axis AFCS's in those days though.

ShyTorque

12th Dec 2013, 21:25

Either method can work but obviously you have to fully understand what the autopilot is doing, and what it is not doing.

I often fly off airfield letdowns, i.e. non-precision approaches. I find it more intuitive and more accurate to let the airspeed hold do it's job and to initiate and subsequently control the ROD with collective.

At MDA (actually just before) I level off the aircraft using collective. It helps to know the required S+L Tq setting for the IAS being flown but this was already in use at TOD, then I activate "ALT" hold mode. That way the IAS will not decrease under influence of the AP. If I am visual, I then disengage the Alt and Heading modes together using the release button and fly with all AP modes out. If not visual, with the ALT mode engaged, lowering the lever again will cause the IAS to be decreased.

I prefer this method because levelling off using the VS mode requires hand swapping on the cyclic at a critical stage (to reset the VSI bug to zero). This is in addition to raising the collective to avoid a reduction of IAS as the aircraft levels itself off.

HeliComparator

12th Dec 2013, 21:47

HC.
I'm kind of in agreement with crab, but open to discussion. How do you fly the other way round? Set a power setting on collective and then set a speed either side of the curve to get a rate of climb or descent? Not something I'm familiar with. Could you explain?

The simplest example is when you are cruising at max continuous power. That means you can't raise the collective any more. So if the heli starts to descend, you have to raise the nose slightly and accept a reduction in airspeed. You are in fact flying altitude on the cyclic and leaving the power alone.

In the context of autopilots, when you engage altitude hold on a 3 axis machine, or a 4 axis machine being flown in 3 axis, the altitude hold goes onto the cyclic (assuming you are not going too slowly). It all seems totally normal to me!

In a 3 axis machine flying a non-precision instrument approach you could chose either IAS or VS / ALT.A on the cyclic. The former has the advantage of ensuring an L2-scenario doesn't develop. The latter has the advantage of allowing precise control of the vertical profile including level-off at MDA. Which is best I think depends on a couple of factors: How fast you intend to go, and which is the most important parameter.

So for an approach flown fast, well above Vy, you might choose to couple to VS/ALT.A . For an ILS, where glideslope is the most important parameter to be precise with, I would want to couple it to the autopilot (presuming the autopilot was good at flying it!). However the pitfall in the event of a go-around is that you now have a climb being demanded on the cyclic, you must remember to raise the collective or risk running out of speed, and if you go OEI the most important parameter to have the AP controlling is the airspeed, at Vy.

For an approach flown near to Vy, I would definitely want to couple to IAS and control the vertical mode with the collective.

So there is no one-size-fits all answer. But the pilot of a modern autopiloted helicopter who can't make a sensible decision about which mode to couple and which to fly, and follow it through to a safe conclusion, is incompetent. Just like a pilot who can only turn right, but not left!

Whilst I am rambling on, also consider the interchangability of kinetic and potential energy 1/2 MV^2 = MGH. Cancelling out the constants M and G gives us 1/2 v2 proportional to H. Note the speed squared term. So at low speed, a modest change of speed has a small effect on altitude. At high speed, a very small change in speed (very small change in pitch attitude if you like) has a huge effect on altitude. So if you are intent on maintaining a certain speed with the cyclic whilst doing 150kts, tiny changes in cyclic will induce high vertical speeds that the collective is probably unable to contain, or at least it will be very uncomfortable if you try. It is just not the right way to fly at high speed because it doesn't work!

212man

12th Dec 2013, 22:21

212man,
I worked on a 3-axis A/P that was fitted both to the Alouette III and the 212... but that goes back to the mid-seventies, so I reckon I'd better stay out of the discussion !

Quite, I just wanted to mention one (non EC) type.......

1/2 MV^2 = MGH

and, of course, F=G.M1.M2/R^2 .......:)

HeliComparator

12th Dec 2013, 22:39

and, of course, F=G.M1.M2/R^2 .......:)

So, we only have to make either M1 or M2 zero, and then all problems disappear! I curse Prof Higgs who invented his Boson which means that M1 and M2 are non-zero. Anyone got an anti Higgs Boson Boson?

[email protected]

13th Dec 2013, 17:43

Out of interest, all twin engine mil training at DHFS has been on the Griffin which has a similar autopilot such that instrument approaches are flown using cyclic to control RoD and collective essentially controls speed.

Now the basic and advanced training for all other approaches is cyclic for speed and collective for RoD.

So all our recently trained pilots have managed to cope with both concepts and are specifically checked on their IRTs to ensure the 'counter-intuitive' method is understood and correctly managed.

Guess what? It all comes down to training!

micraman

13th Dec 2013, 17:56

You can press as many buttons as you wish,but in my time of flying in the north sea the non handling pilot should be keeping a very good eye on airspeed/rate of descent and rad alt,looking for a visual at mdh ,,and did no one see the sea appear below and infront of them

tistisnot

13th Dec 2013, 18:07

micraman

Think they now call him the Pilot Monitoring ...... but surely the PF is the primary man scanning the instruments - PM backs up whilst also head in and out searching for the visual clues. I would reckon the loss of control occurred IMC ? .... so imho they probably did see the sea below and in front.

soggyboxers

13th Dec 2013, 19:49

212 man, HC and crab,
I think we're all in agreement that few things in a helicopter are truly intuitive, there is still machinery, the roots of which are in the 70s and that whose roots are close to the turn of the new Millennium, flying and any pilot who wishes to be considered a 'professional' needs to stick his nose in the books at regular intervals and do some homework. If the only time he/she does this is before an annual sim ride then, as Timothy Cratchit said, 'God bless us all' (or God save us all as I say :*)

JimL

23rd Jan 2014, 08:27

Latest bulletin:

Air Accidents Investigation: S7/2013 - AS332 L2 Super Puma, G-WNSB (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/special_bulletins/s7_2013___as332_l2_super_puma__g_wnsb.cfm)

Jim

HeliComparator

23rd Jan 2014, 10:15

Slightly disappointing in that there isn't an awful lot of new stuff. Once again I notice that the airspeed, whilst very low at 35 kts, was still quite recoverable when the co-pilot called it. But it took 8 seconds to reach full power by which time it was too late.

The engines on an L2 etc accelerate very quickly, you could probably go from 24% to 100% Tq in 2 seconds and thus have recovered the situation. Less than 2 seconds with a bit of rotor droop.

I do wonder to what extent the reluctance to make a rapid collective movement was linked to a desire not to reveal to the passengers that something had gone badly wrong. Is it in part, at even a subconscious level, a result of the culture of passengers complaining about, and pilots having to explain, the slightest deviation from normality, with big stick oil company constantly banging the "we pay your salary so you are totally accountable to us for every minutia of your misdeeds"?

ps, is it just me, or is everyone seeing another 2 phantom pages on this thread (117 and 118) that cannot be accessed? Edit: they've disappeared now!

jimf671

23rd Jan 2014, 12:10

... ... is it just me, or is everyone seeing another 2 phantom pages on this thread (117 and 118) that cannot be accessed? Edit: they've disappeared now!

The phantom pages seem to be happening regularly across pprune. Sometimes they simply don't exist but at other times there are posts on pages that are not accessible until they are displayed below a reply window.

terminus mos

23rd Jan 2014, 12:35

At the bottom under the pink recommendations box, it shows a publish date of 18 October 2013. Is this latest bulletin really that new?

HC, whether it's your operating company or the oil company, when you are on the clock, you are accountable for your time, just like we all are.

I understand that its uncomfortable when Sky Gods are asked a question by a pesky passenger but that's what you are paid to do. Perhaps EI and interpersonal skills should be part of your selection process like they are for most careers.

HeliComparator

23rd Jan 2014, 12:41

TM my point was a genuine one. If you have an interest in flight safety, as is implied by your general demeanour on here, you shouldn't dismiss it so glibly. Or perhaps you don't really understand the human factors behind my point?

Perhaps you have a better explanation for why the pilot, having initiated recovery action, did it so slowly and gently that a crash resulted?

SASless

23rd Jan 2014, 13:24

Lonewolf_50

23rd Jan 2014, 13:36

Once again I notice that the airspeed, whilst very low at 35 kts, was still quite recoverable when the co-pilot called it. But it took 8 seconds to reach full power by which time it was too late.

The engines on an L2 etc accelerate very quickly, you could probably go from 24% to 100% Tq in 2 seconds and thus have recovered the situation. Less than 2 seconds with a bit of rotor droop.
Which leads to the question raised previously: who is flying the aircraft?

SASless

23rd Jan 2014, 13:45

It would appear no one....including George!:uhoh:

FH1100 Pilot

23rd Jan 2014, 14:26

Personally, I think HeliCompator is onto something here, whether we're willing to admit it or not.

I'm certain that every pilot on this board privately considers himself to be the best pilot to ever be certified to fly helicopters. SASless certainly does. And I'm equally sure that every pilot on this board arrogantly thinks that he/she would *never* be subject to the subtle psychological issues and pressures that HC brought up in his post. Moreover, every pilot here probably assumes that every other pilot should and would always react the same way he/she would: appropriately and in a timely manner.

The trouble is, we're *not* all Chuck Yeager or Chuck Aaron. We're *not* all the best of the best...other than in our minds. I know that for SASless (and surely others as well) it's simply preposterous to consider that the PF of the Puma wouldn't have immediately recognized their peril and yanked in an armload of power and saved the day. Because that's what we all would have done, right?

But he did not. And so we are left to wonder why not? Was he that clueless, that weak of a pilot? I'd guess not - weak or poor pilots generally don't rise to the level of AS-332 captain. No, there had to be some other reason he was so slow on the power increase.

Me, I think HC's premise is plausible.

HeliComparator

23rd Jan 2014, 14:49

HC,

If a Pilot in Command of a Passenger carrying helicopter has developed a mindset such as you have suggested possible....there is something sadly missing in his Helicopter Pilot DNA!

Imagine the guy realizing things have gotten all pear shaped and very dangerously close to the water....with a high rate of descent showing....alerts going off in his Ears....the Copilot telling him about too....and the SOB would first think through whether his abrupt raising of the Collective might cause the SLF to complain or question what happened?

You cannot be serious?

You reckon those same Passengers who wind up in the water because of his indecision might be prone to file a slight objection?

Like TM, you dismiss a possible human factor without proposing any other explanation. Rather negative, but of course such ideas don't fit your Vietnam vet mindset.

Regarding your last sentence, it seems you are proposing that such a possibility is not investigated lest it upset some of the passengers who ended up in the water. Surely you are demonstrating EXACTLY the mindset to which I am referring. I'm surprised you can't see it.

FH1100 Pilot

23rd Jan 2014, 15:03

HC about SAS:Regarding your last sentence, it seems you are proposing that such a possibility is not investigated lest it upset some of the passengers who ended up in the water. Surely you are demonstrating EXACTLY the mindset to which I am referring. I'm surprised you can't see it.
I'm not.

HeliComparator

23rd Jan 2014, 15:12

HC about SAS:
I'm not.

I was just being polite!

SASless

23rd Jan 2014, 15:57

HC....it is a possibility the crew got distracted by a Meteor shower too I guess.

I know the AAIB is very detailed in their investigations.....and in interviews with the two Pilots...I am sure they traveled that path....about why the hesitation and what factors played a role in that delay and lack of response.

Commonsense tells us they surely did that.

Commonsense also tells us that Pilots will raise the collective when the choice is do and live....or don't and die....and we do not consider much more than acting upon the need to take corrective action when needed.

That is survival instinct....which is native to all of us and just a normal part of the Human Psyche.

Perhaps my instincts go honed by exposure to events and risks you have had the luxury to avoid but I see my being here to participate in the discussion as proof I must have learned something from it.

Perhaps you might explain why combat service in Vietnam as a Helicopter Pilot lessens my abilities, knowledge, and experience since you seem to think that so somehow?

Do explain what you mean by your comment please. You seem to be speaking for me.....and as usual....you make no sense whatsoever when you do. I trust you will let my post stand on its own and you limit yourself to your own comments in response to what I said.

Now how is it you think I said the investigation should not investigate the possibility of the Pilot searching his Soul before pulling up on the Collective out of fear a passenger might complain somehow if he did too abruptly?

You got your knickers in a wad a while back when a Passenger asked about an unusual occurrence on a flight into Aberdeen.....any reason you are so particularly sensitive any imagined criticism of a Pilot's control touch that it puts you into "snot" mode?

Like TM, you dismiss a possible human factor without proposing any other explanation. Rather negative, but of course such ideas don't fit your Vietnam vet mindset.

Regarding your last sentence, it seems you are proposing that such a possibility is not investigated lest it upset some of the passengers who ended up in the water. Surely you are demonstrating EXACTLY the mindset to which I am referring. I'm surprised you can't see it.

satsuma

23rd Jan 2014, 16:42

Could PPRuNe please set up a forum for retirees with too much time on their hands?

diginagain

23rd Jan 2014, 16:57

The latest AAIB Bulletin S1/2014 SPECIAL refers to the hybrid mode of the LAP jacket/rebreather, and is of relevance only to us pax, and the training-providers.

HeliComparator

23rd Jan 2014, 17:23

SAS, no, there were no meteor shower at the time and even if there were, they wouldn't have been able to see them due to lots of cloud.

The point about the Vietnam vet thing is that you guys have (I suspect) been exposed to more life or death situations requiring instant reflexes to survive. This was learned behaviour aided by a massive dose of adrenalin.

By contrast a career N Sea pilot may well have never had a life/death instant decision situation. The human brain is an analogue computer, various levels of analogue input from various sensors are summed up to create a resultant output. In your case, life/death reflex had a lot of gain in the computer due to it being learned, and was thus the predominant stimulus. By contrast a career N Sea pilot has seen many situations with someone else (often unqualified) breathing down their necks and making grief for them whenever there is a hiccup. In the absence of life/death familiarity, a reluctance to fall foul of this sort of thing becomes the predominant autonomous reaction. Of course, if the pilot were able to press pause and think for a few seconds, he would decide to rapidly raise the lever and stuff the passengers' upset. But he didn't have that luxury so his brain was in autonomous mode due to the lack of thinking time, resorting to its learned behaviour which is to avoid upsetting the pax.

Regarding your penultimate para, I think that because that is what you said.

satsuma

23rd Jan 2014, 20:56

The real latest bulletin.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/S1-2014%20G-WNSB.pdf

HeliComparator

23rd Jan 2014, 21:16

Ah - good spot!

Anyway, it is short and not too sweet. Although it is a valid point, it seems a little picky. I remain unconvinced that a passenger, already submerged in icy water, had the clarity of thought to say "no point in deploying the rebreather because I forgot to take a breath prior to being submerged", or, following implementation of this AAIB recommendation, would now say "oh dear, I seem to be underwater with empty lungs (having miraculously resisted the gasp reflex), I'd better deploy my rebreather and use the air in its cylinder".

satsuma

24th Jan 2014, 08:05

Icy water? The sea temperature is approaching its warmest in August, even at 60 North. Still, cold shock is a player and you have a point.

Nevertheless, the existence of 64 limbs flailing around the water-filled cabin is of far greater detriment to the passenger trying to either escape or deploy their rebreather. If the forthcoming parliamentary visit does not seek to address the root causes behind the necessity for helicopter companies to cram as many passengers as possible into the cabin, then they'll have wasted their journey.

9Aplus

24th Jan 2014, 08:36

In BBC news...

BBC News - Helicopter safety briefings to be amended over AAIB concerns (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-25867868)

Pittsextra

24th Jan 2014, 08:44

Good job the AAIB are there to hold everyone's hand and come up with all the ideas.

terminus mos

24th Jan 2014, 13:30

Pitts, problem is that the helicopter companies are no longer run by helicopter people, but MBA qualified accountant types with Safety Directors drafted in from other industries.

They don't think that running a helicopter company is any different from a chocolate factory. It's just a quarterly result with an annual bonus cheque.

Pilots are all sore that they don't have a solid door between them and the passengers like big planes do, good heavens, the idea of having to engage with Rig Pigs who might ask a question!

Then there is the customers who pay the bills, they are all evil because they, as Satsuma says, just want to "cram in" as many pax as possible, pay as little as possible and they know nothing about flying helicopters.

So, you are right, where is the innovation coming from? The helicopter industry is still stuck in the last century but with new equipment, for which, after 10 years, they are just developing the correct operating techniques!

The first helicopter operator which shows some leadership and reduces the number of seats in a 332L, EC225 and S-92 to a max of 15 or 16 will set the tone for the industry. There will be little option but for others to follow.

I am not waiting, I have asked our helicopter contractor to de configure both contract aircraft types (225 and 92) down to no more than 16 seats. I have the full support of management for this policy.

We have other ideas to stretch people's comfort zones and to improve understanding and mutual respect.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 13:57

TM a little patronising and disingenuous. The oil companies get what they demand from their contractors. If an invitation to tender is sent out for passenger transport, the operator who said "we can give you an (eg) EC225 for $x but it can only carry 16 passengers" would not get the contract. It would go to the operator who said "we can give you an EC225 for $x and it will be able to carry 19 passengers on your route".

So to downsize the number of passengers is only within the power of the contracting oil companies, not within the power of the contractors. It is the oil companies who have dragged their heels on this, trying to minimise the cost of transportation (because they are run by accountants just like the operators) and now that there is a mood change, they are finally being dragged screaming into reducing the number of pax carried which is of course going to cost them more, and increase business for the operators.

To try to make out that this is somehow the operator's fault is transparently pathetic. You convince no-one except yourself, and your reputation suffers as a result.

SASless

24th Jan 2014, 14:13

May I assume this Learned Panel in Aberdeen shall be discussing this issue in detail?

Will the Operator's Presentations point fingers at their Customers?

Will the Worker's Union raise the issue and force discussion?

As the AAIB and CAA are Missing in Action from the Scheduled Witnesses....I guess we can assume they shall have no position on the matter despite one being the agency that makes Safety Recommendations and the other writes the Rules and Regulations that could require those Recommendations be applied.

Am I being entirely to cynical about this "Board of Inquiry"?

HC.....in the old days....flying the Wessex, S-58T, and venerable old Whirlwind did have its benefits....we sat well above and isolated from the Bears....and came to our looking down on them quite naturally as a result.

Pittsextra

24th Jan 2014, 14:18

As I think I've made clear I'm not inside the industry - my interest was fuelled as a mate working for Total when 225s started shunting.

That said it is clear that there is division and that it is all too easy to sit back on regulation before action, in other walks of life that is commonly termed closing the gate after the horse is down the lane.

HC there is clearly history between you and TM and whilst I don't disagree that the customer is going to call the tune at least TM describes actions which are self motivated and noble (for want of a better term).

Perhaps number of seats, HUMS, crew training, equipment fit and type certification are as good as they can be and in the end we have to accept accidents can happen - although that doesn't seem to fit with your view on the variance between HUMS between operators.

What is still a mystery is you have the group called HSSG so where is the intelligent conversations inside that? Bristow's CEO constantly bangs the zero accident policy - which he seems very sincere upon.. yet perhaps any good policies from that could be spread industry wide and finally the manufacturers. Ironically in a June 2012 note from HSSG you can see that the main players are in disagreement on HUMS.

The detail is irrelevant but lets not pretend that there isn't a forum for debate and make change if there was the motivation. It shouldn't take the publication of AAIB reports years after the event before evidence of the work starts, and they shouldn't be the driver of change.

Pittsextra

24th Jan 2014, 14:22

To try to make out that this is somehow the operator's fault is transparently pathetic. You convince no-one except yourself, and your reputation suffers as a result.

That's not entirely fair. In your postings on the G-REDL FAI you suggest differences in HUMS process was in play... how is that anyone but the operators influence?

Lonewolf_50

24th Jan 2014, 14:22

I remain unconvinced that a passenger, already submerged in icy water, had the clarity of thought to say "no point in deploying the rebreather because I forgot to take a breath prior to being submerged", or, following implementation of this AAIB recommendation, would now say "oh dear, I seem to be underwater with empty lungs (having miraculously resisted the gasp reflex), I'd better deploy my rebreather and use the air in its cylinder".
HC, while my gut instinct is to agree with you, I learned a few things about "negative training" when I was in the service (particularly about survival gear) and feel less critical of the point AAIB is making.

There are a variety of tools/types available. It seems a valid approach to refresh one's memory before a transit on what tool is being provided, and how it works. I agree that initial training, and recurrent, ought to address this, but a little refreshment never hurts for life critical skills.

When I was instructing in fixed wing, in a parachute equipped aircraft, my students and I on every flight briefed and went through the procedures, all steps, for bail out. (A very rare event). Why? To refresh the mind on a particularly "you only get one shot at this" event, however low in probability it might be. I got a lot of positivie feedback on that approach.

When we flew from ships, a number of tail rotor malfunctions were addressed in the brief, top to bottom, since those malfunctions were of critical nature to get right if one ever cropped up in flight (rare, but not zero).

For a passenger flying over the North Sea, refreshing just what that survival tool does (and these guys don't transit every day, right? Once a week? One a fortnight? ) puts them into an alert mind set, which, God forbid it all goes pearshaped, may make the difference between successful or failed emergency egress. You only get one chance at it.

gasax

24th Jan 2014, 14:25

I think TM has a point and HC is demonstrating that point. If helicopter companies have so little committment to the safety of their passengers that they will do whatever the oil companies want, then TM wins!

HC does have a point though in that the helicopter companies will happily undercut each other and only run to the regulatory minimums in all things. Of course the oil companies are well aware of this, and the inability of the helicopter compnaies to demonstrate any effective leadership. Of course the re-introduction of Bond into the UK offshore market was a pretty cynical ploy to ensure 'more' competion and make any form of united front more difficult.

Can any of the helicopter operators demonstrate effective escape from an unturned helicopter in water carrying 19 pax? Highly unlikely even with the LAPS system.

My last flight with Bond at the end of last year, at night and they were just starting to use what felt like a long stabilised offset approach - for which the pilot apologised as the approach and landing would take longer - no mention that it is fundementally safer. The wheels seem to turn very slowly sometimes.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 14:33

... It shouldn't take the publication of AAIB reports years after the event before evidence of the work starts, and they shouldn't be the driver of change.

Unfortunately it is and will always be thus. Its the autopsy approach - where you wait for folk to die before you do anything. But in general you don't know there is a problem until after the accident. To address what you think is the problem in a knee-jerk way, is prone to wasted effort and lack of concentration on the real issues when they finally come out in a properly thought-out report, and every unnecessary change has it's own hazard to contribute.

HFDM goes some way to being pro-active, but even a well-run HFDM programme (which is a bit like a hen's tooth!) can only prevent accidents that have had a preceding "near miss".

So I'm afraid that accidents have always been, and will always be, the driver of change not just in this industry but in every other one.

On the particular subject of the number of pax in the cabin, a reduction would be welcomed by the pax on comfort grounds and who could blame them for that! It could also be justified on evacuation grounds, with caveats.

However, if I were a pax, I would prefer that max effort went into keeping the helicopters airborne, rather than spending too much effort on what happens after an uncontrolled ditching, only a small spectrum of which would entail any benefit by reducing pax numbers.

ie a controlled ditching - everyone gets out OK.
A completely uncontrolled ditching (crash) - chances are everyone dies on impact.
A slightly uncontrolled ditching such as the Shetland one, yes for that case certainly the chances of sucessful evacuation is improved with fewer pax. But it is the only one out of all the recent arrivals in the water, where that is the case.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 14:34

That's not entirely fair. In your postings on the G-REDL FAI you suggest differences in HUMS process was in play... how is that anyone but the operators influence?

I was referring specifically and only to the point about reducing passenger numbers per flight.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 14:37

Lonewolf, I don't disagree with your points, and I agree that the videos (which a few pax do actually watch) should be improved to include the hybrid rebreather. My point was just that I didn't think it was sufficiently important to warrant a special bulletin (that got us all excited!). The overall contribution to safety of this change will be miniscule.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 14:39

I think TM has a point and HC is demonstrating that point. If helicopter companies have so little committment to the safety of their passengers that they will do whatever the oil companies want, then TM wins!

Unfortunately there is no point in being the safest helicopter operator in the world if you win no contracts and thus go out of business. Like it or not (and I don't like it!), we have to do whatever the oil companies want, in order to survive.

Pittsextra

24th Jan 2014, 14:40

Unfortunately it is and will always be thus. Its the autopsy approach - where you wait for folk to die before you do anything. But in general you don't know there is a problem until after the accident. To address what you think is the problem in a knee-jerk way, is prone to wasted effort and lack of concentration on the real issues when they finally come out in a properly thought-out report, and every unnecessary change has it's own hazard to contribute.

OK so what is Bristows Target Zero doing? Waiting to react to accidents?

Pittsextra

24th Jan 2014, 14:41

For colour here is a transcript of Bill's opening gambit on the last earnings call:-

Thank you, Linda. Good morning to all of you and thank you for joining us on our fiscal year 2014 second quarter earnings call and I'm going to start on slide five, as I always begin talking about safety. As always, our commitment to Target Zero is our fundamental goal and serves as a cultural touchstone for our company. Touch wood to this point: year-to-date our air safety performance has been consistent with our Target Zero goal with no accidents or no incidents reported so far, obviously a great credit to the entire team around the world.
However, we continue to be vigilant and as I just said, touch wood, highly collaborative within Bristow and highly collaborative outside, which I'll talk about in just a few minutes. Our goal is to improve safety performance not only within Bristow but also help improve the safety performance in the entire industry.
On ground safety, we were challenged. We were able to continue to reduce our lost work case rate from an non-acceptable high of 1.26 per 200,000 man hours in April to 0.44 in September. Good work on everybody's part to improve from a really bad start. We are highly focused on making improvements in the area of safety.
And to this end, I would like to formally introduce Steve Predmore as Bristow's Vice President and Chief Safety Officer, who's just joined the company. Steve's job is to further our grab to Target Zero work to improve safety across the entire industry and as I said within Bristow and outside. Steve has a long and proven track record of outstanding leadership in aviation and ground safety including 11 years with JetBlue Airways as Vice President and Chief Safety Officer and six years with Delta Air Lines as Director of Safety Performance and Quality.
Bringing in world-class safety professional to further our air and ground safety capability will make Target Zero a reality sooner and, most importantly, more sustainable for our clients, passengers and our employees worldwide.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 14:42

OK so what is Bristows Target Zero doing? Waiting to react to accidents?

Perhaps you should ask someone who works for Bristow, but I would say that it is trying to eliminate known risks. But to therefore presume that there are no unknown risks would be foolish and plain wrong. For example, a bog standard non-precision approach into Sumburgh was not on anyone's radar as a risky practice, but look what happened.

SASless

24th Jan 2014, 14:49

in general you don't know there is a problem until after the accident.

True statement when One does not look for a problem and ignores any report of a problem and relies upon established procedures and policies to be totally effective and compliant with all Rules and Regulations.

The reality is only through continuous examination and consideration of the way we do business can we be assured what we do and how we do it....is not subject to unrecognized potential failures.

Waiting for the Autopsy results is just waiting for proof positive we failed on the front end of the process and any changes we make after the fact ignores they should have been seen much earlier and acted upon.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 14:58

True statement when One does not look for a problem and ignores any report of a problem and relies upon established procedures and policies to be totally effective and compliant with all Rules and Regulations.

The reality is only through continuous examination and consideration of the way we do business can we be assured what we do and how we do it....is not subject to unrecognized potential failures.

Waiting for the Autopsy results is just waiting for proof positive we failed on the front end of the process and any changes we make after the fact ignores they should have been seen much earlier and acted upon.

Yes that's all true and of course is what we try to do. But it is most certainly not a perfect process. As I mentioned before, there were no reports of near misses during an NPA, no crew disquiet, in other words absolutely no indication that this would be our next serious accident.

Once you have eliminated all the know risks, the remainder can only be dealt with by to the autopsy approach. Sad but true.

SASless

24th Jan 2014, 15:13

Had someone done a fresh review of use of Automation with a view towards ensuring the Crew's were making the best and most appropriate use of the features and functions of the AFCS systems....would potential pitfalls been discovered that might have prevented this last crash?

Had bad habits been allowed to grow?

Had SOP's been reviewed to to confirm the Industry Best Practices were being incorporated.....would that have made a difference?

I take you back to the work Double Bogey did on Night Approaches to Offshore locations....is that not a perfect example of what I am talking about doing?

Look at current procedures and see if they can be improved.....and done at regular intervals.....skinning that Onion back looking to see if all the layers are as they should really be.

terminus mos

24th Jan 2014, 15:36

The oil companies get what they demand from their contractors. If an invitation to tender is sent out for passenger transport, the operator who said "we can give you an (eg) EC225 for $x but it can only carry 16 passengers" would not get the contract. It would go to the operator who said "we can give you an EC225 for $x and it will be able to carry 19 passengers on your route".

That's the whole point Comparator, it's about leadership and innovation. If Helicopter Company "A" introduced such a policy in a thought out and structured manner by engaging its customers and the workforce, yes, those horrible annoying passengers, pressure from those very passengers with whom you don't want to engage would soon use pressure to ensure its leadership position was rewarded. Operator B and C would be tripping over each other to follow. Before you know it, a new standard exists.

The fact that you don't see it demonstrates the very lack of leadership to which I refer. CEOs can pat their Directors of Safety on the back all they like. Target Zero is admirable, it's a good slogan. But real safety leadership involves actions not slogans.

Currently, the helicopter industry reaches Target Zero very well, Zero Innovation, Zero Action and Zero Effort. Pat yourself on the back Comparator, your bonus is coming.

thelearner

24th Jan 2014, 15:39

Rebreather - UK LAP

I posted about this earlier in the thread and still don't know the answer. I am fully aware through my survival training, and the flight safety briefing (I think) that the rebreather also has an air cylinder which will discharge when the rebreather contacts water.
But my thoughts are - and I'm not sure - if you have not deployed the mouthpiece and popped the valve (which you do after breath in - before breath out to fill rebreather) the air from the cylinder will vent out the bypass into the water?

I also suspect through conversations offshore about rebreather, that a % of the workforce do not like them and would not necessarily deploy them - on a controlled ditching I think there would be more chance as they would tend to do what the leaders in the cabin do - but I am not convinced in an uncontrolled crash like this they would be deployed. Main thoughts would be escape from cabin. Also much harder to deploy inverted and under water.

Also I have always felt that on the 4 yearly refresher in the pool, we should experience the air cylinder discharging into the rebreather - this is not done due to the need to charge/recharge cylinders - and they are small and I imagine would be easily marked and weakened when recharging, and a lot of new cylinders would be required - I don't know what they cost.

I really want to know how this helicopter ended up in the water - it should never have. I hope the focus on this is not blurred by evacuation/escape.

HC - I agree with your scenarios about ditching - I would never dismiss your theory about the PF worrying about being questioned by passengers/companies and this stopped him taking the required corrective action. But it alarms me greatly. In my experience PAX are not complaining, but often would just like an explanation for any unexpected in flight event. Pilots should worry only about keeping the aircraft, themselves and pax safe.
The very good point made was that North Sea flying is mainly routine, and maybe pilots take time to recognise the danger of the situation before reacting, or maybe they were distracted by something else.

I saw a press report saying 3 of the 4 fatalities drowned - has the cause of death ever been confirmed?

thelearner

24th Jan 2014, 15:44

TM - some companies are already restricting pax numbers to 16/17 in the EC225 and have been doing for some time - to improve comfort - although I agree they still have 19 seats.

I agree the oil companies can easily drive this change and make it easier for the contractors, but if it is required for safety reasons the regulatory authorities should also be driving the change through?

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 15:50

That's the whole point Comparator, it's about leadership and innovation. If Helicopter Company "A" introduced such a policy in a thought out and structured manner by engaging its customers and the workforce, yes, those horrible annoying passengers, pressure from those very passengers with whom you don't want to engage would soon use pressure to ensure its leadership position was rewarded. Operator B and C would be tripping over each other to follow. Before you know it, a new standard exists.

The fact that you don't see it demonstrates the very lack of leadership to which I refer. CEOs can pat their Directors of Safety on the back all they like. Target Zero is admirable, it's a good slogan. But real safety leadership involves actions not slogans.

Currently, the helicopter industry reaches Target Zero very well, Zero Innovation, Zero Action and Zero Effort. Pat yourself on the back Comparator, your bonus is coming.

Jolly good, glad to see you residing happily in commercial cloud cuckoo land!

If operator A went to the oil cos saying they wanted to cut down pax numbers, the first reaction would be "cheeky b******* just trying to make more money" because typically our interface with the oil cos is via someone who is a budget controller only interested in the bottom line of his transport budget. It would only be a "good idea" if it was invented in the oil co's office, not if it was invented in the operator's office. OK things have changed a little bit recently, but only as a result of these accidents.

Of course there is history to this - many years ago it was decided to reduce the pax numbers in the AS332L from 19 to 18 but I don't know whose initiative that was - almost certainly the oil co's for the reasons I indicate.

terminus mos

24th Jan 2014, 15:56

Learner, good on them but if you don't remove the redundant seats, it improves neither comfort nor safety. Your post though illustrates my point, you say "some oil companies", surely you don't mean those evil ones who know nothing about aviation and who don't care about safety?

Comparator, of course your interface is with the budget controller, that's because you Sky Gods won't engage with the workforce, not even at a union to union level to improve safety. If you can't understand the relationship between innovation and commercial reward, I can't help you. Anyway, as usual, it's the oil industry's own aviation advisors who will drive safety outcomes.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 15:56

... but if it is required for safety reasons the regulatory authorities should also be driving the change through?

It isn't required for safety reasons - by which I mean not to reach internationally accepted safety standards. If you want to increase the level of safety beyond that, then that is fine but it shouldn't be enshrined in law by regulators as they have no basis for such a change.

As I said before, far better to concentrate on stopping all this crashery rather than fretting too much about escapability under a very narrow set of conditions which may not be repeated for a very long time (last time I guess was cormorant A, 22 years ago).

thelearner

24th Jan 2014, 16:15

HC - you know I think I wholeheartedly agree with your post above.

TM - it increases comfort a little in the back where it's most cramped - if you are not squashed in there with some other big lads - although I of course accept that to make the biggest difference an improved interior layout is required.

I'd like some more opinions on the rebreather. Not sure improving the briefing video will help much.

diginagain

24th Jan 2014, 17:17

I'd like some more opinions on the rebreather.I started flying offshore before the first version was introduced, which fitted snugly between the stoles of the lifejacket. ISTR that it was introduced as a result of a series of losses, to improve escape-times and instill a little confidence. The LAP jacket combined the hybrid re-breather with the lifejacket replacing the two previously seperate items.

Initial training included teaching the passenger that an additional supply of air was included in the re-breather, that the initial exhale into the jacket would provide some extra time, and the training-rig also allowed the demonstration of the effects of water-pressure on the assembly.

Personally, I accept the discomfort of wearing the LAP, given its purpose. Where my take on the item may differ from my fellow passengers is that I have no difficulty with the HUET due to considerable HUET training in a previous job, and recreational diving.

It always helps, of course, if you are given a little prior notice of the need to use it.

HeliComparator

24th Jan 2014, 21:49

... Anyway, as usual, it's the oil industry's own aviation advisors who will drive safety outcomes.

Well could you get on with it then instead of dragging your heels? The safety record recently demonstrates you are not doing your job properly. At least we now know who to blame!

Perhaps if you had spent less time cheering on the race to the bottom, eg by such tactics as on-line inverse auctions for contracts, things would be in a happier place.

jimf671

25th Jan 2014, 00:14

From the NATO website, referring to both rebreather and hybrid rebreather equipment.

" ... the main disadvantage is that it requires a number of steps to make it operational during a critical part of flight. The system, currently the most popular used in North Sea, requires the human to physically perform up to six separate steps after the impact phase of a helicopter ditching to make it work. If these procedures are not carried out the system is rendered inoperable and the survivor could drown."

DOUBLE BOGEY

25th Jan 2014, 08:19

If money were no object............

Our PAX would be issued with a one piece suit incorporating the life jacket, beacon, heated elements and quilted construction. Neatly built into the chest would be a lightweight full face mask connected to a small lightweight SCUBA kit which is integrated into the suit.

Air, vision and warmth, the lack of, being the three main obstacles to facilitating easy egress, should you be lucky enough to survive the impact with the water.

At present our pax appear at the AC door as a walking talking snag hazard. Bedecked in straps and kit that we know is simply not fit for purpose.

When will we wake up and stop pissing in the wind with cheap, impractical solutions, that arguably, create far more problems for a submerged passenger than they actually solve!

If money were no object............

DB

P.S. before you reply to my post, if you are not a current offshore PAX and therefore take no part in the risks involved, think before you bleat out some negative backward thinking bollocks, the like of which is the very reason our pax are saddled with such **** kit!!

thelearner

25th Jan 2014, 08:41

jimf671
" ... the main disadvantage is that it requires a number of steps to make it operational during a critical part of flight. The system, currently the most popular used in North Sea, requires the human to physically perform up to six separate steps after the impact phase of a helicopter ditching to make it work. If these procedures are not carried out the system is rendered inoperable and the survivor could drown."

agree 100% with this statement.
If you cannot deploy and prepare before you enter the water, chances are it will not be used. If you do not pop the valve before the valve and bypass on the mouthpiece enters the water, you are going to suck in water, unless the air cylinder discharges and stops the water entering - momentarily. I don't know if once you are in the water if the rebreather will fill with water if the valve is not popped and the bypass remains open - I guess it would. But I'm not sure.

What we have is good if you have time to deploy. No time to deploy - as in this CFIT - a scuba type device you put in your mouth to get air would be much better. Maybe much better for all scenarios. I don't know if they exist.

DB - correct.

rotorspeed

25th Jan 2014, 09:20

There has been a great deal of discussion here about reducing the pax numbers on acft and whether it should be driven by the helicopter operator or oil company, and clearly this is a balance between operating economics, safety and comfort. But in most forms of transport the balance between particularly safety and economics is set not by the operator or customer but by the manufacturer of the car/bus/vessel/aircraft in certification, when the seating capacity is specified. No one seems to have mentioned this aspect recently. Should not responsibility be fundamentally placed on (in this instance) Eurocopter to set the appropriate seating capacity? Accepting that if an operator or customer wants more comfort or space (rather than significantly more safety) a more spacious "executive" seating layout is optional.

Being responsible for setting criteria for acceptable safety (and let's face it, it can always be improved if money is no object) is a very onerous task and in general it is best set by the one, arguably most knowledgable, organisation to avoid exposure to criticism and alleged negligence in the event of accidents.

HeliComparator

25th Jan 2014, 09:34

Rotorspeed, such things are set by the certification rules. Manufacturers have to demonstrate emergency evacuation with the specified seating configuration. So it already happens as you suggest.

But aren't jumping the gun a bit? We don't yet know why some of the pax didn't escape. Maybe they were knocked out or otherwise injured in the impact? Maybe they panicked and took a large lungful of water as soon as they were submerged? Maybe they froze in panic?

It is one thing to know that they didn't get out, but it is a non-sequeter to conclude from that, that having a more spacious cabin layout would fix the problem.

rotorspeed

25th Jan 2014, 09:42

HC - yes sorry should have made it clear I do know capacity it set in certification. Just wondering why some seem to think others, eg operators or oil companies, are better placed than the manufacturer to determine a safe capacity. And agree with with the rest of your post.

Pittsextra

25th Jan 2014, 09:46

Someone said all the things they could of, would have should have if money were no object... Personally that's nonsense because the kit described doesn't cost unlimited amounts however lets look at the players involved.

How about BP... the multi billion dollar corporation, Royal Dutch Shell...the multi billion dollar corporation, Total...., Statoil.... not talking oil companies? Perhaps the manufacturers? EADS... the multi billion dollar corporation, United Technologies? Same. Not talking those either? Perhaps the operators? Bristow?? guess what the market capitalisation is of Bristow Group? Goes by the ticker BRS on the New York Stock exchange.. Its $2.8bn.

Quite aside from which there is no point bleating about it here - how about some evidence of what you'd do in all those places where it might actually gain some traction??

I think in the course of history there have been many more difficult struggles than complaining to some corporates - who have the money - to get proper kit. If there was a committed effort to get the correct kit you'd have it. End of.

DOUBLE BOGEY

25th Jan 2014, 10:06

Pitts...........take a deep breathe.......brace yourself........for the first time ever........I AGREE WITH YOU 100%

Congratulations on your first productive, positive post!!

DB

terminus mos

25th Jan 2014, 10:22

A good point Rotorspeed. Sadly, in some ways, the OEMs are like the operators. always thinking that more is better because that's the conventional thinking.

But, the helicopter travelling workforce has had enough and the message is getting through to the oil companies very quickly. The travelling workforce want more room and less clutter. Improved comfort will be a welcome by product. Those companies which don't listen will find themselves without a willing workforce.

Even EC / Airbus is now beginning to realise (probably trying to avoid future liability claims) by pushing a better seating plan to the oil companies and operators. The operators are not selling it to the oil companies because they have no leadership, they still think more is better.

Cramming 19 passengers into the woeful cabin of the EC225 will soon be a thing of the past. You can agree or disagree but lower passenger numbers are coming to EC225s and S-92s soon. The 175 and 189 may also be re configured, both Airbus H and AW are talking to those who pay the bills.

SASless

25th Jan 2014, 12:00

such things are set by the certification rules. Manufacturers have to demonstrate emergency evacuation with the specified seating configuration.

Do the Emergency Exit Specifications include allowance for the use of bulky Survival Suits and Flotation gear over heavy Winter Clothing?

All the passengers are not 165 pound "average" folk especially when outfitted for a Winter time flight over the North Sea.

Pitts gets a Gold Star on this one.....as I have in the past noted the very small percentage Helicopter Costs are in an Oil Company's Transportation Budget. Don't tell me they cannot spend a few Bob extra to enhance safety and comfort for their employees who fly out to Sea to get to work.

I can assure you their CEO's Gulfstream V has spacious seating.....and damn fine catering to boot.

terminus mos

25th Jan 2014, 12:20

as I have in the past noted the very small percentage Helicopter Costs are in an Oil Company's Transportation Budget. Don't tell me they cannot spend a few Bob extra to enhance safety and comfort for their employees who fly out to Sea to get to work.

Of course they can SASless and they will spend more with fewer pax per flight. It's just a shame that the real so called specialists, the helicopter operators, are dragging their feet instead of leading the industry. Actually, the helicopter operator's understanding of their customers is very poor.

maxwelg2

25th Jan 2014, 14:04

Just back in from an offshore job in Canada, I had a UK based guy with me who had to do our survival training course as we use different survival equipment over here. Thought I'd share some feedback he gave me as we chatted about the recent helo incidents.

He thought our survival suit (Helly Hansen HTS-1) was very bulky, with it's built in lifejacket, and added accessories (HUEBA, PLB). He found the HUET training over here much more realistic in comparison to the UK BOSIET course, especially the additional number of capsizes and having to do a sea day, similar to the. Norwegian course.

He found the HUEBA much more useful in comparison to the Airpocket plus, but didn't like not being able to use a nose clip or mask in the chair inversion HUEBA training (we're not allowed to use the HUEBA in the HUET exercises due to the remote possibility of damaging your lungs if you hold your breath and don't exhale when > 1 metre submersion). For clarification in the Newfoundland training centres you are allowed to use the nose clip/mask in the HUEBA training exercises, it's the Nova Scotian training centre that doesn't let you use these aids, I'm assuming that they want you to be ready for the worst case deployment scenario.

The S92 configuration we use over here has the aux fuel tank mounted on the starboard side, and that reduces the number of PAX to 17. He commented on how much more cabin room there was in comparison to the NS buses, even with the bulky HTS1 suit on. He did comment on how the window sizes were a challenge to egress with the bulkier suit, but obviously not impossible. The bigger you are the harder it is, so for me even at 240 lbs and a 52" chest I still manage even the smallest window as you have to go through that in the HUET training.

As for the Airpocket plus versus the HUEBA, I'm certified on both, but prefer the HUEBA as you don't have to pop the valve and you have a good couple of minutes of breathing if you keep calm.

The oil companies over here are currently looking for a replacement to the HTS1 survival suit as the ones we use are now at least 4 years old and must be coming up for certification expiry, I hope the next suit has less bulkiness and moves away from the large integrated rubber boots that are IMO far too bouyant.

My question to the pilots is "are you satisfied with your current survival suit/equipment?" I understand with the longer flying hours in comparison to PAX that some additional degree of comfort and protection from overheating is necessary, and that you generally have HEEDS mini-scuba sets. I know how fatigued and overheated we get in the back, especially if we boomerang and cannot land due to weather/visibility, so the last thing I would wish is same on the bus drivers.

Looking forward to lessons learned and further improvements in our primary mode of transport to do our jobs, both for PAX and bus drivers.

Safe flying

Max

jimf671

25th Jan 2014, 14:48

... ... Cramming 19 passengers into the woeful cabin of the EC225 will soon be a thing of the past. You can agree or disagree but lower passenger numbers are coming to EC225s and S-92s soon. The 175 and 189 may also be re configured, both Airbus H and AW are talking to those who pay the bills.

Are you not being hard on the wrong aircraft there?

The 225, and especially the newcomers 189 and 175, have fat bar steward sized escape windows everywhere.

I am not a fan of the window size in the 92 or the middle section of the 332 in spite of what maxwelg2 tells us. The distances to good-sized escape window in a 92 has always concerned me. Then there is the 332 door jettison farce and the door-mounted liferaft.

(My favourite seat in a 332 is still starboard window 2nd row in spite of this. From this location I hope to be able to see the look on the co-pilot's face as he turns to the captain. :eek: )

Keke Napep

25th Jan 2014, 15:47

Meanwhile, out here in Africa in Bristow we are really looking forward to getting the ultra-modern S76D with its comfortable seats and hectares of cabin space. The passengers are going to notice a huge difference after those awful old-fashioned S76C+ and Bell 412 EP types :\ . Luckily, we don't need survival suits for our ultra-slim passengers to slide through those huge rear and front exits. But it's okay, it's Target Zero, it's new tech - even if it is a 1970s design with marginally larger windows and a 'crashworthy' rear seat so good ole Bill, can still stay true to Target Zero.

Steve Stubbs

25th Jan 2014, 19:10

Helicomparator

IIRC the initiative to reduce from 19 to 18 in the AS332L came from Bond Helicopters (Engineering Director Tony Cox I believe) when they showed a reconfigured machine with some seats reversed to the UKOOA aircraft committee and the other operators (BIH and Bristow). UKOOA agreed that should be the standard along with a whole raft of modifications done on all types on a collective basis around that time, such as push out windows with integral water operated lighting, video briefing of passengers, ADELT beacons and other stuff like floor lighting. All operators fitted everything agreed, paid for by a time limited supplementary charge on each contract until the cost recovery was complete.

cyclic

27th Jan 2014, 09:11

Terminus

You are wrong on so many levels. If you saw the pressure applied by the big operators when the weather is poor, the back-log develops and general leading questions as to why a captain has decided that the flight isn't going ahead, then you wouldn't say that it is all down to the operators. The operators are like any other business when it comes to leadership etc., some good, some not so good. Generally, they are trying to react to an ever changing requirement and it is a race they can never win and still remain profitable. I don't know much about the structure of the oil companies, but I do see the shop floor result on a daily basis and I can assure you, it ain't pretty.

If the oil companies and their aviation experts can do it better and safer, know all the answers as HC says, then why aren't they? Because, it is easier to drive the price down amongst competing contractors. I would like an oil company pension and equivalent salary to the OIMs, so bring it on, I am ready to sign up.

terminus mos

27th Jan 2014, 10:16

Cyclic, whether or not you think I am wrong, passenger numbers will reduce in order to improve cabin escape chances, firstly on the old 332Ls and L2s. Once one oil company leads (it sure won't be a dinosaur helicopter operator) and reduces cabin congestion, others will follow.

Generally, they are trying to react to an ever changing requirement and it is a race they can never win and still remain profitable. I don't know much about the structure of the oil companies, but I do see the shop floor result on a daily basis and I can assure you, it ain't pretty.
I imagine you are a helicopter Pilot or Manager? It is therefore not expected that you would have anything other than an adversarial attitude to the customer. That's the problem with the helicopter industry.

I would like an oil company pension and equivalent salary to the OIMs, so bring it on, I am ready to sign up.

You won't make it into the HR office, the door is too small.

cyclic

27th Jan 2014, 10:51

adversarial attitude to the customer

I'm not going to get into the proverbial peeing competition with you, but I can assure you at grass routes level there is definitely not an adversarial attitude to our customers, in fact, quite the opposite. Regularly, those doing the job go out of their way to make sure it gets done despite the ever increasing hurdles that are put in our way. If your operator is adversarial, then I suggest you change them, after all, you call the shots.

If the oil companies and their aviation experts can do it better and safer, know all the answers as HC says, then why aren't they? Because, it is easier to drive the price down amongst competing contractors. I would like an oil company pension and equivalent salary to the OIMs, so bring it on, I am ready to sign up.

Trickier one to answer without just being "adversarial" eh?

SASless

27th Jan 2014, 12:12

When an Oil Company refuses Contractor Staff the use of Oil Company recreational and social facilities....tell me about adversarial Helicopter companies?

terminus mos

27th Jan 2014, 12:56

Cyclic, you may not be adversarial at grass roots level but every time a "customer" contributes here there is the same old song, which seems at odds with your claim not to be.

Trying to drive the cost down, don't care about safety, dare to ask technical questions, you don't need to know because it's pilot's stuff, you don't pay enough, helicopter travel is only 2% of transport budget, oil companies make obscene profits etc, all those comments seem adversarial to me.

Maybe that's just pilots on this forum?

To answer your "trickier" question about always wanting to drive down cost by wedging helicopter operators, we have already introduced max pax loads of 16 with unused seats removed in 225s and 92s. The initiative was led by our aviation department (and supported by our workforce),not the helicopter operator. We do not fly the 332L because we do not believe in flying passengers in 32 year old (cheap) helicopters and they wouldn't fly in them anyway. However, helicopter companies like to try to tempt us with cheap 332 deals believing that only money talks.

Phone Wind

27th Jan 2014, 17:00

To answer your "trickier" question about always wanting to drive down cost by wedging helicopter operators, we have already introduced max pax loads of 16 with unused seats removed in 225s and 92s. The initiative was led by our aviation department (and supported by our workforce),not the helicopter operator. We do not fly the 332L because we do not believe in flying passengers in 32 year old (cheap) helicopters and they wouldn't fly in them anyway. However, helicopter companies like to try to tempt us with cheap 332 deals believing that only money talks.

Oh yes the oil companies always want the best and most modern equipment with good emergency egress, crashworthy fuel tanks, and comfortable cabins coupled with 'twin engine reliability'

That'll be why in Nigeria, Chevron (ranked no 6 in the world) is still using single engine Bell 206 and Bell 407s offshore, despite the NCAA ruling more than 20 years ago that only twin engined helicopters would be acceptable for offshore CAT :yuk:. That'll be why Chevron operates the ultra-modern Bell 412 in Nigeria and is rumoured to be asking for tenders to replace it with the ultra-modern S76 with it's excellent cabin, crash-worthy seats and huge emergency exit windows (and don't even get me started on the marginally larger windows on the later models of the S76D :rolleyes::ugh:. That'll be why Exxon Mobil, ranked number 2 in the world is looking to replace it's ancient Bell 412's and S76s with ultra-modern S76Ds :yuk:. Yeah, the oil companies lead the way in ensuring that only safe, modern, crashworthy machines operate for them. They're the ones who decide which types they're going to operate when putting out invitations to tender. Oil companies leaders in safety - you're having an egg yoke aren't you :ooh:

SASless

27th Jan 2014, 17:30

Phone,

At least Nigeria no longer holds the title for "The Place Where Old Helicopters Go To Die!" as it once did not so long ago.

The 76D might be old tech...but at least it is new build.

Phone Wind

27th Jan 2014, 17:36

The 76D might be old tech...but at least it is new build.

So were the S76A, A++, B, C, C+ and C++ in their time. So tell me again about all the brilliant new safety innovations which are of positive benefit to passenger survivability and comfort.

Where do all the old helicopters now go to die? Where are all the S76As, S76C+s Bell 212s, 412s, SA365N and Cs and SA 330l and L2s? I guess there are none in Nigeria:confused:

cyclic

27th Jan 2014, 19:03

To answer your "trickier" question about always wanting to drive down cost by wedging helicopter operators, we have already introduced max pax loads of 16 with unused seats removed in 225s and 92s. The initiative was led by our aviation department (and supported by our workforce),not the helicopter operator. We do not fly the 332L because we do not believe in flying passengers in 32 year old (cheap) helicopters and they wouldn't fly in them anyway. However, helicopter companies like to try to tempt us with cheap 332 deals believing that only money talks.

So, to answer my question, if you are totally unhappy with the awful service you are being provided with, why don't you do it yourself? There is nothing to stop the oil majors setting up and doing it better. They won't because it is too expensive. Well done, you took some seats out of a type, it doesn't make the operation any safer. I can make the system safer, probably, you will need more helicopters and staff, you will need to invest considerably, you will need to commit to long term contracts, you will need considerably more training (passengers and management) etc, etc. Positive suggestions, not adversarial. By the way, this is a pilots' forum not a "trade" magazine whether you like it not. Quite happy to give reasonable answers to reasonable questions whoever asks, we do it everyday.

HeliComparator

27th Jan 2014, 23:34

DNFTT springs to mind!

maxwelg2

28th Jan 2014, 09:58

Loss of life in our work place is always a subject that brings a reality check for me in this part of my job.

There is a price to safety, and in our current industry that reveals itself in the most unfortunate way, whether in the air or on the rig floor.

Training, equipment, safety culture, are just a few of the mitigating factors in what happened off Shetland.

All we can do is try and prevent the same thing happening again, or being totally realistic at least minimize it.

I'm about to drive to work, which is inherently less safe than flying in the back of a helo, do I choose not to do it or do I keep the risk as low as possible by adopting a safe driving style and using a piece of equipment with the latest built in safety features. I decide myself the level of risk in how I drive and what I drive in.

What I don't have much control on is the other drivers out there and what they use. That is only influenced by a larger safety culture, and what is accepted by my fellow man and woman.

We should always learn from our mistakes and experience, here's to doing the same in our shared working lives. It is only with our voices singing from the same hymn sheet that this will happen, so please take a step back and look at the causal factors of this tragedy and so many others like it and see what you can do as an individual and within your own organization to mitigate the causal factors.

That's all we can do, we all just want to do our jobs to the best of our ability with what we've got.

Safe flying

Max

micraman

28th Jan 2014, 10:01

All the things about passenger safety is wonderfull,but to stop the aircraft landing on the water in the first place would help.Something very wrong in the training or crew awareness here.

HeliComparator

28th Jan 2014, 10:14

Something very wrong in the training or crew awareness here.
No doubt. However that is very easy to say. What is much harder, is to know what to do about it.

Thridle Op Des

28th Jan 2014, 10:38

The problem is that both the rotary and fixed-wing world are wrestling with the issues that events like these throw up. It is slightly interesting to look at Air Afiqiyah in TIP, Asiana at SFO, UPS at BHM and CHC at SUM; they all have common threads tied up in both procedural and Human Factor issues. This is not only a North Sea problem, it is an air transport issue. There has to be a recognition that we are balancing risk against productivity - never two good mutual stablemates. How we manage that risk through material improvements is important as well as taking a long hard look at how we train pilots. It should not need an accident to promote improvements, in theory this is what all these wonderful SMS are supposed to do, however effecting an expensive improvement is always an uphill battle unless the parties who sign the contracts have hard evidence as the cost/benefit. Sadly this evidence is not usually publishable in the public domain.

SASless

28th Jan 2014, 13:28

Bickering over who is at fault between the Operators and the Oil Companies is wasted effort.

Of course they both are guilty, as are the NAA's, and the OEM's, the Passengers, Pilots, Engineers, Executives, and every link in the chain that makes up the environment under which we live, work, fly, and in some cases die.

Rather than bicker like old Women.....start addressing the real issues and admit your own respective roles in the situation.

If all the dancers at this party did that we would be a lot better off.

Ultimately it does get back to that trade off TOD reminds us of.

I pose the same question but phrase it this way....."What is the Value of a Human Life to an Oil Company?".

marcr

28th Jan 2014, 14:03

I pose the same question but phrase it this way....."What is the Value of a Human Life to an Oil Company?".

To which there is not a single or straight forward answer. Nicely underlining the complexity of the whole discussion.

But can I try and be better? Can I try and do more?

Enough said?

thelearner

28th Jan 2014, 17:44

This is the only press article (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-25905636) I can find so far regarding the transport committee "gathering evidence" in Aberdeen. But driving to work this morning listening to Radio Scotland, I heard an American Sikorsky spokesman giving an interview - he says in 50 years helicopters will be flown remotely with no pilots on board.

Well, I won't be here in 50 years, far less getting in a helicopter, but humans do make mistakes, so I would rather the guy flying suffered the same consequences of a mistake as the pax, and not be able to crash from a comfy desk and office flying the aircraft remotely.

Wish I could find a link to the interview.

Edited to add - already discussed on PPRUNE (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/404295-sikorsky-pilotless-helicopter.html)in 2010.

diginagain

28th Jan 2014, 18:27

Hopefully, the technology in the drilling industry will have moved-on at a parallel pace, and we won't be cramming blokes into unsuitable airframes in 50 years either.

Fareastdriver

28th Jan 2014, 18:48

What drilling industry?

diginagain

28th Jan 2014, 19:15

What drilling industry? You don't believe that there'll still be hydrocarbon exploration and extraction in 50 years time?

HLCPTR

28th Jan 2014, 20:00

In fifty years, everything will be powered wirelessly from orbiting solar satellites.

:hmm:

Lonewolf_50

28th Jan 2014, 20:32

... and we won't be cramming blokes into unsuitable airframes in 50 years either.
Would you care to offer some examples of unsuitable airframes here?

diginagain

28th Jan 2014, 20:41

Would you care to offer some examples of unsuitable airframes here?

1111
Really?

Lonewolf_50

28th Jan 2014, 20:52

Yeah, really.

Make your case for
"unsuitable airframes"
if you think you can.

Torquetalk

28th Jan 2014, 20:53

Yes, really.

diginagain

28th Jan 2014, 21:18

SASless

28th Jan 2014, 21:49

I heard an American Sikorsky spokesman giving an interview - he says in 50 years helicopters will be flown remotely with no pilots on board.

Was his Elbow propped on the Bar of the Runway Pub at the time by chance?:rolleyes:

jimf671

29th Jan 2014, 08:37

... I heard an American Sikorsky spokesman giving an interview - he says in 50 years helicopters will be flown remotely with no pilots on board. ...

Yeah, blame the computer programmer. He's probably not in a union!

jimf671

29th Jan 2014, 08:45

Don't least suitable airframes readily fall out of the last 120 pages and elsewhere on the forum?

332
window size (all)
door jettison arrangement (all?)
door-mounted starboard liferaft (some)

92
window size
run dry
vibration

...

Fareastdriver

29th Jan 2014, 11:16

Bar of the Runway Pub

Sorry SASless. Doesn't exist any more. It's now a Thai restuarant or something like that.

TipCap

29th Jan 2014, 14:42

Close FED. IT became a curry house then Jimmy Chungs Chinese and the last I heard Jimmy Chung had moved on so maybe one of the ABZ based guys can tell us what it is now!!

UKpaxman

29th Jan 2014, 19:29

Dyce tandoori, or it was last week..

CHC's turn for a 332 emergency landing.

BBC News - Distress call helicopter lands safely in Shetland (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-25955143)

Lonewolf_50

29th Jan 2014, 19:36

How about a derivation of a military troop-lifting helicopter adapted for other purposes, one that I get to sit in every three weeks or so. But hey, if it's only me that thinks it's unsuitable, what does it matter. What do you guys get to travel offshore in?
Good enough for the troops, but beneath you, is that it?
Are you aware that the Bell 212 (the Huey) and the AB212, and indeed the entire "Huey" family of helicopters, one of the more successful helicopter designs ever built, is a derivation of a military troop lifting helicopter adapted for other purposes?

Bell Huey family - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_Huey_family)

Suggest you look into how many hours and how many sorties have been flown by that model of aircraft (the Puma variant in question in this thread) doing just what it does for you on occasion: get folks to and from a rig.

It was built to haul people places.
It hauls people places.
How much more Fit For Purpose can one get, I ask? :confused:

(Observations on window and door size appreciated and taken into consideration).

diginagain

29th Jan 2014, 19:51

Good enough for the troops, but beneath you, is that it?
Your interpretation? Rather beneath your normal output. I've been both, thank-you. The 332L1/L2/EC225 is a compromise, based on a military requirement, and so, with your permission I'll return to my original premise; let's hope that in 50 years time the industry will provide aircraft specifically designed to be fit for the specific purpose of getting people to and from offshore installations in such a manner that doesn't compromise their safety.
How much more Fit For Purpose can one get, I ask?(Observations on window and door size appreciated and taken into consideration).
I take it you've never had the pleasure of sitting with your legs inter-twined with those of four of your compatriots, wondering which of the two windows available to you, you'll be able to get-to first?

HeliComparator

29th Jan 2014, 21:45

I take it you've never had the pleasure of sitting with your legs inter-twined with those of four of your compatriots, wondering which of the two windows available to you, you'll be able to get-to first?

So is your primary interest here in passenger comfort, or safety? I can't blame you for wanting more legroom, but please don't try to piggyback your comfort needs onto the back of a safety case.

You are saying you already have 2 windows to choose from, how many more would you like? Or would it be easier if there was only one - then no decision needs to be made?

diginagain

29th Jan 2014, 21:49

So is your primary interest here in passenger comfort, or safety? The supposition does you no justice at all, HC.

HeliComparator

29th Jan 2014, 22:05

The supposition does you no justice at all, HC.

I think you'll find that a supposition is a statement, whereas a question has a question mark. But since you have declined to answer the question and instead created a smokescreen, I guess I can reasonably switch from a question to supposition.

satsuma

29th Jan 2014, 22:08

HC

Surely you can make the connection between inter-twined passengers crammed in like sardines and the difficulty that is likely to be experienced trying to evacuate a ditched helicopter before they drown.

Who in such a situation is realistically going to follow HUET discipline and allow their fellow passenger to exit first and who is going to have the room to manoeuvre to correctly activate their re-breather should their exit be impeded?

I am constantly amazed at the advertised seating capacity of virtually all helicopters. Japanese subway trains offer more breathing space for passengers. An eye-watering number of often 'well-fed' passengers are being squeezed into North Sea helicopters and being bulked up further with survival suits and life jackets. It's not on to suggest that people are merely concerned with comfort.

diginagain

29th Jan 2014, 22:16

I shall cede the point to you, HC, and thank satsuma for his post, which puts rather more eloquently that which I had considered writing in response.

Do feel free, when the opportunity presents itself, to observe the ergonomic-nightmare that is the 332/225 cabin when full.

HeliComparator

29th Jan 2014, 23:53

I am well aware of how cramped a 332/225 cabin is when full of well fed and well suited chaps. However, poor legroom, which I fully agree makes it uncomfortable in some seats, does no translate into poor safety. Even after we understand that we are only looking at a small subset arrivals in the water - those between where an orderly and calm evacuation right-sides up is the consequence, and where the impact forces make the arrival unsurvivable (ie currently a 1 in 22 year event), I don't see a connection with legroom. Window size, proximity, ease of operation, not having to be second out etc, Yes. But legroom? No. That is just a comfort thing. There is nothing wrong with the unions clamouring for more comfort but I resent it when it is disguised to look like a safety plea.

diginagain

30th Jan 2014, 00:05

That is just a comfort thing.Then you and I will have to differ on this point, as on a number of others.

SASless

30th Jan 2014, 01:33

Excuse me....I seem to have lost my way on this discussion.

If you are Cheek on Jowl....elbow to elbow...legs intertwined....your noggin is bumping the overhead....and you are even second in line for an exit....assuming everyone does exactly as they are supposed to and no one is incapacitated.....is it really just "comfort" HC....really?

Now I really do hate to broach the topic....but is it a situation that is common to all the aircraft operating on the North Sea...or is it unique to the 225/332 aircraft the guys are concerned about?

Even the old lovely 212 had its downside when it came to emergency exits with nine folks trying to get out of two windows. The Dauphin must have been a real thrill if you were stashed away in the rear end of it. The 76 was not much better.

Do we need an aircraft that has a big Window by each row of seats or perhaps turn the seating so that each two rows face one another with a huge window on either side of the aircraft like the 212?

satsuma

30th Jan 2014, 05:39

Offshore Addict

30th Jan 2014, 05:50

If the legroom on a 225 is just a "comfort thing" then might I suggest you try sitting in the right hand seat of the starboard aft facing row of two in front of the three rearmost seat with a full load of pax. There is literally nowhere to put your legs, everyone is clamouring for space. I did a just over a two hour flight in that seat and after landing my legs ached until after I got home. Even cattle have minimum space requirements when being transported. But not apparently offshore workers.

But not to worry as I wont be doing it again, I have decided to move on from the offshore industry as it quite clearly has its head inserted right up its rectum. And they wonder why they are struggling to get workers when you go to check in, have your bag checked only to be told that you cannot take your sealed bottle of Centrum multivitamins offshore "because its a drug".

Think I need a name change .. ;)

thelearner

30th Jan 2014, 08:08

Helicomparitor
However, if I were a pax, I would prefer that max effort went into keeping the helicopters airborne, rather than spending too much effort on what happens after an uncontrolled ditching, only a small spectrum of which would entail any benefit by reducing pax numbers.

ie a controlled ditching - everyone gets out OK.
A completely uncontrolled ditching (crash) - chances are everyone dies on impact.
A slightly uncontrolled ditching such as the Shetland one, yes for that case certainly the chances of successful evacuation is improved with fewer pax. But it is the only one out of all the recent arrivals in the water, where that is the case.
I agree with this - edited to add apart from the thrid scenario which I consider a crash - not a slightly uncontrolled ditching - offshore pax have to accept there is some risk - I always have, and I have the following points.

1. Comfort - yes it has to be improved, the post above is exactly accurate. But I don't think it should be improved to the point where we have 10 pax in a 225, requiring double the aircraft and double the pilots. I think this increases risk - the last two fatal crashes seem to be due to maintenance, and the pilots flew an airworthy aircraft into the sea. It is already hard finding pilots and maint crew - don't want to dilute the existing pool with rushing in newly trained people.
2. Escapabilitly - has improved over the years from days of chinook, bell 212/214, s76, dauphin. 225 has best escape windows but most cramped cabin. S92 has spacious cabin - windows are too small.
3. Rebreather - really needs to be reviewed - this accident probably will show it's totally ineffective if you have not advance warning to deploy. There appear to be better systems out there.
4. Pax size - needs to be looked at - offshore pax must realise their size (getting bigger and I include myself) does not help in comfort or safety terms - so perhaps we should put stricter limits in place - if I had to be lighter and less bulkier to keep my job I am sure I would achieve that goal.

and to be clear - a ditching is a concious decision on the part of the pilots to land on water - anything else is a crash.

HeliComparator

30th Jan 2014, 09:17

HC,

Most of your arguments are logical and well-reasoned but here I think you're just being argumentative for the sake of it. The reference to inter-twined legs is clearly just a method of highlighting conditions in the back of the aircraft, not a reason for randomly accusing an entire workforce of being a bit precious about levels of comfort. You're starting to come across as a bit dim, which you're obviously not, so please stop it. Furthermore, I feel it would be sensible for you to stop tempting fate by labelling ditchings of this type as a 1 in 22 year event. Cold statistical facts are for the use of management and money men.

My point really is that the offshore industry in general tends to have the memory of a goldfish - ie they only remember the accident that just happened, not the previous ones. In the case of the Sumburgh L2, some folk didn't get out. We don't really know why yet, although of course a cramped cabin MAY have been an issue, maybe not. But suddenly there is a big focus on the issue of cabin density, and the implication that if we just cut down the number of pax then all will be well. But to my mind this is a very minor issue in the great scheme of things, and not the universal panacea to end all offshore fatalities as is being made out.

We are quite happy to fly over water in an airliner, without pop-out windows and with the nearest exit many rows away. Why? Because they don't fall into the water very often (and when they do, it is usually unsurvivable). Surely we should be aiming for the same thing?

I think your dislike of statistics is a little childish - if were to deny ourselves the use of statistics to drive the direction of effort to make the best improvements, we would be very foolish.

Finally, in response to O. A., yes I know that seat leaves very little space to put you legs and no, I wouldn't want to spend 2 hrs in it. On the other hand you are sitting right next to a class IV emergency exit, and I don't think that having your legs overlapping (not intertwined, unless you have rubber legs) is a significant factor in an emergency evacuation. FYI the space for me in the front, having to drive at the same time, at 6'4 1/2", is no better than it is in the back. So yes I would like more room in the front and the back, but it is not the highest priority safety issue.

AnFI

30th Jan 2014, 10:01

HC - "they don't fall into the water very often (and when they do, it is usually unsurvivable). Surely we should be aiming for the same thing?"

What make it unsurvivable too !?

thelearner

30th Jan 2014, 10:31

I don't think that's what he was saying at all. He was saying most fixed wing crashes are not survivable - and I think statistics back him up - although some do have survivors and the controlled landing on the Hudson River was a great example.

I think he is saying - controlled ditching - good sea state - easily survivable for all with easy evacuation of the cabin to rafts - proved with the 225's incidents.

Uncontrolled crash - as with the bond L2 - not survivable at all - regardless of cabin config.

This is what I am trying to say

The Shetland L2 crash - rare event - a crash which is not fully uncontrolled - but helicopter inverts quickly - which could be same as controlled ditching with poor sea state - this is where exits/space come into play and a much more difficult evacuation. One person next to window who fails to get out for whatever reason (e.g. heart attack from cold shock)- that exit remains blocked - and the person next to this is searching for an alternative - which may be very difficult.

But making cabin spacious and easy to evacuate for this scenario may decrease risk in this rare case - but the overall risk to pax may increase if we double the fleet and pilots and movements - and landings on offshore platforms - and for the bears more delays!

I don't think we know how many failed to get out in this incident, definitely one, possibly two? And we do not have confirmed cause of death yet for all 4?
In this scenario I think the current rebreather is useless - and the use of it needs to be reviewed to see if there is something better.

HeliComparator

30th Jan 2014, 10:54

HC - "they don't fall into the water very often (and when they do, it is usually unsurvivable). Surely we should be aiming for the same thing?"

What make it unsurvivable too !?

Massive impact g forces that kill you instantly, or at best render you incapacitated.

thelearner - yes, good post. It is always very important to look at the effect any change makes on overall safety. There is no point in putting the blinkers on to fix a problem when you create a new and worse one!

jimf671

30th Jan 2014, 11:21

Good point about the consequences of more space resulting in more trips and more landings.

I am not convinced that more space is a cure-all. Bigger escape windows, along the lines of 225, 189 and 175, are likely to be beneficial in any sinking or inversion. When I think about the chaos of all those guys struggling with kit and looking for exits, there may be cases where more space would be unhelpful if it provides somewhere to get lost in a panic.

O&G is clearly an important market to manufacturers in a certain range of aircraft size and it is also the most challenging for emergency escape. Ideally, there needs to be a logical approach to cabin design at an early stage that provides for any passenger a single logical approach to getting out. The fewer deviations from a single logical approach that there are the more people will survive.

Pet hate: 332 door jettison regime.

FrustratedFormerFlie

30th Jan 2014, 11:21

Forgive a former fixed wing maritime flier inquiring...

Much is made of the supposed enhanced safety through twin engined helicopter operations offshore. But if all the power from both/either engines go through a much 'weaker link' in the chain - a single gear box and rotor head - then is the latter negating the benefits of the former?

How many North Sea twins do come home on one engine?

And if the answer is 'very few', is the added gearbox complexity of feeding power from two engines (to mitigate those 'very few') through one MGB and rotorhead introducing more potentuial catastrophic failure points?

Is there a difference in frequency of MGB failures between single and multi engined helicopters?

gasax

30th Jan 2014, 11:32

There is a massive difference in the rate at which airliners end up in the water compared wih offshore helicopters (over 1000 times..). Hence the concentration on survivability with helicopters.

It would be very good to reduce the frequency of these events occuring to offshore helicopters, unfortunately the introduction of the new types has actually reversed what was an improving accident rate.

Some of that has been down to mechanical issues, the others down to operational ones.

What is inescapable is that accident rates vary across the world. In clement areas a ditching is a real inconvenience and not necessarily even reportable.... In our neck of the woods it is another matter, read the report on the ETAP ditching and note that although recovered in less than 2 hours, many of the passengers were severely hyperthermic.

The thing that really occupies my mind is the apparent difference in rates between Norway and the UK. The somewhat adversorial relationship betwen contractors and clients and what seems to be a lack of real safety leadership - from either side, appear to have created a needlessly dangerous situation in the UK. Reversing out from there will not be easy and at the moment there are no obvious champions.

SASless

30th Jan 2014, 12:18

But suddenly there is a big focus on the issue of cabin density, and the implication that if we just cut down the number of pax then all will be well.

It wasn't offered as being the cure all.

It was offered as something that would IMPROVE the current situation re Survivability and go a very long way towards making the Flight much more comfortable.

Perhaps the Oil Company Management types that ride around in the G-5's should revert to flying in Coach/Tourist on Airliners for a while to get the sense of what their Offshore Workers are telling them. Hell...for that matter maybe they should ride in the back of a 225 for a week....do a flight a day and see how it really is for the passengers in the helicopters.

Perhaps do the "Undercover Boss" thing for a week.

HeliComparator

30th Jan 2014, 12:23

It was offered as something that would IMPROVE the current situation re Survivability.

Yes. Marginally, and for a very limited subset of accidents. So long as it isn't viewed as a get out - ie "we have addressed the problem by reducing the pax number per aircraft - end of problem!"

But we have already seen how, for example, TM is crowing about how wonderful his oil company is for doing it as if this were the panacea.

gasax

30th Jan 2014, 15:15

I don't think anyone is pretending that the cabin issues are the silver bullet. What is depressing for me is that we have been here before with the Cormorant crash and before that the Scillies Isles - both crashes where escape was severely compromised - although for differing reasons.

Recently offshore I was on the receiving end of some company propaganda for the 're-introduction of the 332L2'. In that it stated that flying at night was no more dangerous than during the day. With that sort of near complete denial of the facts, I cannot see the helicopter operators as potential leaders in improving the situation.

They should be, much of the discussion here demonstrates a knowledge of how in many cases to fix things, or certainly improve them, so the expertise exists. It just appears that the safety culture to support those approaches is pretty tenuous.

SASless

30th Jan 2014, 15:49

In that it stated that flying at night was no more dangerous than during the day.

Guess they never looked at the Accident Statistics then....much less talk to anyone doing that sort of flying offshore.:D

thelearner

30th Jan 2014, 16:02

Gasax
In that it stated that flying at night was no more dangerous than during the day.
They just missed out a bit.

Except if you end up in the water in the dark - escape from the helicopter and rescue from the sea becomes much more difficult and chances of survival are much lower.

We were lucky the 225 ditchings were in daylight with calm seas. In darkness with rough seas the outcome could have been much worse.

But I know this and I accepted the (low) risk when I chose to work offshore. I still think more chance of harm driving to/from work every day than getting in a chopper. Could be wrong with stats now though over last few years.

212man

30th Jan 2014, 20:35

In that it stated that flying at night was no more dangerous than during the day.

Where was that statement coming from? A helicopter operator, oil company HSE spokesman, oil company aviation advisor?

Lonewolf_50

30th Jan 2014, 20:58

digin, thanks for your measured response, and Jim thanks for your points. I apologize for the snarky tone up there, it was not needed. But making cabin spacious and easy to evacuate for this scenario may decrease risk in this rare case - but the overall risk to pax may increase if we double the fleet and pilots and movements - and landings on offshore platforms - and for the bears more delays!
The airframes themselves don't seem to be the problem.
Configuration and cabin layout (which depending upon airframe can be customizeable, as usual if one will pay for a certain configuration).
Point in quotes is something similar to the helicopter design process: each problem you think you've solved raises another problem. It is thus a matter of tradeoffs, which appears where the seating capacity/sardine syndrome seems to fit. This gets to the heart of the matter: a company hires another company to use its fleet of helicopters to move persons from place to place. There was a time, a long while back I guess, that some oil companies had their own fleed of helicopters. In such a situation, customizing a design for a specific purpose may result in an in internal cabin configuration that might address some of these sore points better.

But that isn't the world we live in anymore, is it?

The broad statement that the airframes are not fit for purpose still makes no sense to me. As to window count and size, there are design considerations for the airframe itself which may limit how big a hole one can fill with a window. Not familiar enough with the type in question at that level of structural detail to comment further.

diginagain

23rd Aug 2014, 00:35

Sarah Darnley, George Allison, Gary McCrossan and Duncan Munro. Sadly missed, never forgotten.

HeliComparator

19th May 2015, 13:03

Legal wrangle over Super Puma voice recorder - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-32781230)

HeliComparator

28th Oct 2015, 14:25

I see BALPA have now decided to drop the appeal against granting the police access to the FDR/CVR. Shame, as it sets an important precedent. I suppose that with the draft report out, they perceive that by the time the police's agent (the CAA) have decoded and interpreted it all, the report will be in the public domain anyway, and so they have taken the pragmatic approach to save money.

Hedski

28th Oct 2015, 15:37

I'd say it's just typical BALPA, the gummy tigger....

HeliComparator

27th Feb 2016, 20:16

Draft report out October 2015, now end of Feb 2016. Just how much longer do we have to wait? Anyone know any rumours about when the final report will be published?

TwoStep

28th Feb 2016, 14:48

Briefings in Marignane recently suggested it would emerge in the next few weeks.

nowherespecial

29th Feb 2016, 10:08

Megan, are you replying to a post from 25 months ago?! :ok:

Sir Niall Dementia

29th Feb 2016, 11:11

Nowherespecial;

16 000 hours of off-shore flying tends to have that effect. It takes at least 24 months for any thread to sink in:E

SND

nowherespecial

29th Feb 2016, 11:40

True... Smiles all round.

TipCap

29th Feb 2016, 19:59

only 16,000 o/shore. Get some time in :cool: :ok:

TC

[email protected]

29th Feb 2016, 20:31

16000 hours of straight and level with the AP holds in - sounds riveting:E

megan

29th Feb 2016, 22:40

Megan, are you replying to a post from 25 months ago?!Seems I was, now deleted.

TorqueOfTheDevil

7th Mar 2016, 09:57

It takes at least 24 months for any thread to sink in:E

Choice of words Sir?!

Sir Niall Dementia

7th Mar 2016, 10:07

TOTD;

Now I think about it..................................:O

SND

PlasticCabDriver

15th Mar 2016, 07:03

BBC reporting that the report is finally going to be released:

AAIB report due on Shetland Super Puma helicopter crash - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-35808691)

HeliComparator

15th Mar 2016, 07:56

It says "due to be released" - no-one could dispute that.

And that it will be published "later". Not "later today"! But let's hope that is what they mean. As it stands the news item is meaningless:ugh:

BabyGravy

15th Mar 2016, 08:03

nowherespecial

15th Mar 2016, 13:21

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/aircraft-accident-report-aar-12016-g-wnsb-23-august-2013

Fareastdriver

20th Mar 2016, 13:52

Why an ILS at 80 knots. It's a hangover from the days when a VNE of 90-95 knots was the norm. On every ILS there is at least 6,000 ft. of concrete at the other end so what is there to slow up for.

!20 over 80 equals 2/3rds the drift, windshear effects and most importantly, less time to screw the approach up. I started my ILS career strapped to 70 tons of aluminium and I had far less trouble at 145 than trying to fly it at 80 knots.

If a 737-200 with the same decision height can come out of cloud at minimums, line it up and carry out a crosswind landing whilst staring through two letterboxes why can't a helicopter do the same with wide angle windows and no crosswind problems.

Should this approach have been flown with a target speed of 120 knots this accident would not have happened.

finalchecksplease

20th Mar 2016, 15:17

Fareastdriver,

RWY 09/27 EGPB 3871 ft long so a bit below your 6000 ft and RWY 09 they flew is LOC only so higher MDA than would be on ILS.

Following our stabilised approach procedures we can slow down to not below Vy on approach in bad weather but in deciding the speed, consideration must be given to the headwind component, increased drift angle in a crosswind and handling qualities.
This reduced speed is to assist in gaining the required visual references for landing.

Higher target speed might have prevented the accident but it all boils down to monitoring whatever you nominate as your approach speed, not?

Regards,
Finalchecksplease

Fareastdriver

20th Mar 2016, 21:24

RWY 09/27 EGPB 3871 ft long so a bit below your 6000 ft and RWY 09 they flew is LOC only so higher MDA

So a 332L2 coming out of cloud with 125 knots at MDA wouldn't be able to stop with ground distance plus 3.781ft. of concrete.

There is a different feel at 120 compared with 80. I used to open my window on finals offshore because I then had an instant Audio ASI. The same technique when looking over the side of the cockpit in a Tiger Moth. Even with the windows closed you will notice an unexpected change of performance.

You notice when it goes quiet. You pay more attention to how the aircraft feels when doing anything and if it doesn't feel or sound right there is something going wrong.

Kept me alive for forty-eight years.

finalchecksplease

20th Mar 2016, 21:54

So a 332L2 coming out of cloud with 125 knots at MDA wouldn't be able to stop with ground distance plus 3.781ft. of concrete.
Never said you couldn't but I wouldn't have done the approach at 125 knots either.

Do the same "crack the window open" on finals offshore, one of the "old" Brent 212 shuttle pilots thought me that when I was a young co-jo and I still use it today :ok:

TroyTempest

20th Mar 2016, 22:26

Going slower, you obviously have more time to see a light in marginal conditions on the approach. Rather do 80kts in a helicopter than 155kts in a Lightning.
Far East Driver, today we can't open the window as the flight manual prohibits it, well in a 76 or 92, unless you can lock the stupid little window open (and most people don't have the lock).
Also the days of hearing what the aircraft is doing? Forget it, we are now in an airline type cockpit with most of the noise coming from air cooling fans for the electronics and EFIS.

The SAR RC

20th Mar 2016, 23:07

Surely of more concern is the 'if we aren't clear of cloud at the published minima we'll just land anyway' mentality - which the co-pilot didn't challenge. That didn't go very well at the Cork (fixed wing) crash either, as I recall. Or the one with the Polish president on.

HeliComparator

21st Mar 2016, 22:36

I agree that excessive speed reduction down to say Vy can be counterproductive and is not something I did, though I know lots of other people who did. However if there isn't much crosswind it is probably no big deal. The issues here however are that making a big speed change halfway down the approach thus totally destabilising it was not contrary to the stabilised approach policy in force at the time. Huh, some "stabilised approach" policy!

Also very relevant is the lack of appreciation not just of this crew, but from the sound of it lots of other crews, of the inappropriateness and danger of using VS mode without IAS mode when the speed is back near Vy or in fact I'd say below about 110kts.

Bottom line is that for the want of a button press (IAS mode, either with or without VS mode) the accident would not have occurred.

212man

22nd Mar 2016, 09:09

Bottom line is that for the want of a button press (IAS mode, either with or without VS mode) the accident would not have occurred

Yes, I agree entirely. The report is astonishing.

terminus mos

22nd Mar 2016, 11:12

212

That's a very good description. its almost unbelievable actually.

Some of the recommendations seem a little academic, cameras on passengers for example?

HeliComparator

22nd Mar 2016, 12:39

EESDL

22nd Mar 2016, 21:51

I'm not sure it's that astonishing if you mean the crew error. Pilots make errors, get over it!

What we need is error tolerance built in, such as clearly defined procedures whereby both pilots know exactly what is expected to transpire, and using the automation to its best advantage so the pilots can focus on the "big picture".

Please - let's leave automation out of this.
This is not an automation issue.
This crash was caused by 2 pilots not carrying out their duties.
Pressing the IAS button would have reduced the required monitoring to a degree but not the duties of the crew.

Not sure about anyone else but if I know weather is 'doggers' I tend to pay that bit more attention during the approach???
So, if the crew were not monitoring the flight - I would be interested to know what were they doing?
I am fully aware pilots make mistakes (even monkeys fall out of trees!) but this 'error' appeared to extend for majority of the important part of the approach, starting with a woefully inadequate brief considering the known conditions.
There was an interesting line which confirmed that 'non-operational' crew discussion had been omitted from the report........
Shame as we might have learnt something.

Like most reports - the reader is often baffled as to why the crew reacted/behaved in a certain way. Please do not think that having the OEM prescribe how to use their aircraft will reduce accidents - fixed-wing have had such manuals for a while and still fall out of the sky due to all manner of automation-related reasons.
Very sad account with such a tragic outcome.

HeliComparator

22nd Mar 2016, 22:29

Automation is of course not the cause of the accident, but the accident is a good demo of why good automation and it's correct use enhances safety. The captain was very experienced and had a good record, and yet he made the fundamental mistake of failing to look at his airspeed for a long time, just at a time where his choices had made airspeed monitoring especially important. Classic human frailty. Like it or not, if he had engaged IAS mode which, one would have though, would be normal practice for flying an approach in marginal weather, the accident would not have happened.

The passengers wouldn't care why the accident wouldn't have happened, they just didn't want it to happen, and so foolish ideas that we should fly these sorts of things manually in order to maintain our skills, would be ridiculed and rightly so. Bottom line is that humans make mistakes, automation helps to reduce the impact of such mistakes. But only if it is used sensibly.

Let's hope that the 4 lives at least have a legacy of demonstrating to all other pilots why using a vertical mode on the cyclic near Vy is such a foolish thing to do.

Geoffersincornwall

23rd Mar 2016, 07:39

.... when we train and rehearse scenarios that we use on a frequent basis. The fourth phase in the classic four-stage learning model (see below) leaves us exposed to the vagaries of 'unconscious competence'. This is clearly demonstrated when we drive our well worn route to work and upon arrival cannot remember vital details of the journey.

The role of the PM is critical in this respect but in the helicopter world we do not appear to take this role as seriously as we should.

In the FW (airline) world the LPC/OPC examiner will occupy the PF seat for a portion of the flight and 'seed' it with errors requiring intervention by the PM. That then leads to an assessment of his capabilities in the PM role. Does anyone in the RW world use such a system?

The four stages of learning -

1. UNCONSCIOUS INCOMPETENCE - The subject is not aware that he/she needs the knowledge/skill on offer or believes that in his/her case it is unnecessary.
2. CONSCIOUS INCOMPETENCE - The subject now recognises that the skill/knowledge is indeed required and sets about acquiring/understanding it.
3. CONSCIOUS COMPETENCE - The subject now knows what to do and how to do it and carefully applies that knowledge/skill.
4. UNCONSCIOUS COMPETENCE - The skill/knowledge is so well practiced that the task can be accomplished without conscious thought or monitoring.

EESDL

23rd Mar 2016, 08:28

HC
Which one of the 'mistakes' do we put down to 'human fraility' - all of them?
Will the aftermath ensure that MPs ( co-pilot in this case) who will not say "boo to a ghost" are seriously reminded of their responsibilities or shown the door? Huge company culture scenario?
I 'killed' a v experienced instructor in the sim by deliberately crashing on approach to a rig - TWICE - and after him being reminded of his responsibilities before the exercise even began!
I am pretty sure this mistake would not have happened if the approach was able to be flown 'single-pilot'. Completely different mindset and not relying on loosely adhered too multi-pilot procedures.
Complacency due to routine/boredom/ego/over-familiarity - more human frailties - all we need to do now is take the human element out of it .............
Humans are not meant to fly but we insist on it and still pay 'lip service' to critical elements.

Torquetalk

23rd Mar 2016, 11:35

EESDL

It's stating the obvious to say that the approach wasn't flown properly and that even in the absence of a better method of carring out the approach, it shouldn't have ended badly if either of the pilots had been alert to critical deviations. But the accident did play out as it did. And it isn't the first of it kind. So you have to look both at and beyond the failings of that crew in that situation.

Using VS rather than IAS for a single cue descent is something that I often see (where 4-axis is not available), and is in some company cultures the preferred method. I am personally leery of it because it is less intuitive with basic flying sklls (using PWR to manage ROD). Learning and culture...

Allowing yourself an approach below minima and acquiesence by the left seat? Culture? Probably not the only person on the forum who can think of examples like that.

No clear breifing and conducting the approach according to it? Culture.

Across companies it's pretty clear that rotary is still working its way towards standardisation and real MCC.

I agree with you that the accident probably wouldn't have happened if flown single pilot because the PF would not have been so complacent and taken the same risks.

Single cue descents need particular care and monitoring: It isn't an automated approach or a hands-flown approach, but a mix of both. In an age of automation, using less of the AFCS than you can, may well cause an expectation gap in the cockpit: How aware was the PM of what he should be expecting to see as the captain reduced speed? Neither pilot seemed to have any seat-of-the-pants awareness as they began to fall behind the power curve. Suggests to me that they were both off the page when the method required them to be absolutely on it.

TT

diginagain

12th Jun 2019, 11:42

FAI to be held. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-48607634

nomorehelosforme

12th Sep 2020, 13:08

Came across this earlier, not sure if this has been discussed before.

https://www.expressandstar.com/news/uk-news/2020/09/11/helicopter-would-not-have-crashed-if-pilot-had-stabilised-speed-inquiry-told/Helicopter would not have crashed if pilot had stabilised speed, inquiry toldUK News (https://www.expressandstar.com/news/uk-news/) | Published: Sep 11, 2020 | Last Updated: 21 hours ago

Four people were killed when the Super Puma L2 ditched in the sea on its approach to Sumburgh Airport in Shetland in August 2013.
https://www.expressandstar.com/resizer/ioUPuZYxshzhqV0CclblkhFVVbo=/1000x0/filters:quality(100)/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/expressandstar.mna/KDT6SFE6MFFYZMAKK5ZJNAO7WM.jpgShetland helicopter crash A helicopter which ditched in the sea with the loss of four lives would not have crashed if the pilot had stabilised the speed on approach to the airport, an inquiry has heard.

Mark Prior, an expert pilot, said that if the pilot had stabilised the speed at 80 knots he would have been able to level off and would not have ended up losing control of the aircraft.

Two crew members and 12 passengers on the Super Puma L2 survived when it ditched on its approach to Sumburgh Airport in Shetland at 6.17pm on August 23 2013.

But Sarah Darnley, 45, from Elgin, Moray; Gary McCrossan, 59, from Inverness; Duncan Munro, 46, from Bishop Auckland, County Durham, and George Allison, 57, from Winchester, Hampshire, died.
An AAIB report published in 2016 found that the pilots failed to properly monitor the flight instruments and failed to notice their speed was decreasing until it was too late to avoid the helicopter plunging into the sea.

Crown witness Mr Prior, a private aviation consultant who previously worked for the RAF for 40 years, prepared a report on the crash with three other pilot experts for the Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI), which is being held virtually due to coronavirus measures.
There was still an issue due to the autopilot configuration, it would have been difficult to level, but, that point aside, they would have had enough energy to level off and perhaps commence a missed approach

Aviation consultant Mark PriorSheriff Principal Derek Pyle, who is leading the inquiry, said: “What we know is, at some later point, the aircraft got down to the correct speed of 80 knots and that was more than two miles from Sumburgh Airport.

“In the event that the pilot who apparently said just after that point ‘Right that’s 80 knots, that’ll do’, if the pilot had then stabilised the speed at 80 knots would the accident have occurred?”

Mr Prior replied: “In my opinion no, because if they had flown at 80 knots that would have allowed them to continue. There was still an issue due to the autopilot configuration, it would have been difficult to level, but, that point aside, they would have had enough energy to level off and perhaps commence a missed approach.

“Certainly they would not have been in a regime of flight where the manual handling of the aircraft became more difficult and in the end they lost control.”

The inquiry heard that later in the flight the air speed dropped from 70 knots to 35 knots over around 23 seconds and then crashed

Mr Prior said he did not believe the crew scanned the instruments effectively during those 23 seconds because they had not noticed the drop in speed.Asked what would have happened if this performance had been replicated in tests for an examination, he replied: “They would certainly have failed the test.”

Mr Prior said both the pilot flying (PF) and pilot non-flying (PNF) had responsibility for monitoring the air speed, though the PF had “more weight” in the role as the PNF had other tasks to carry out.
https://image.assets.pressassociation.io/v2/image/production/ca0cad3296347ddd1f1154957e165719Y29udGVudHNlYXJjaCwxNTk5OTEy OTU2/2.17395319.jpg?w=640Victims Duncan Munro, George Allison, Gary McCrossan and Sarah Darnley (Police Scotland/PA)He told the inquiry that by the time the crew noticed the airspeed, when the helicopter was below 300 feet, it was “too late” to recover the aircraft.

Martin Richardson QC, who is leading the inquiry for the Crown, asked which factors he considered particularly relevant to the cause of the accident.

Mr Prior said the accident followed a chain of events including the fact that if the crew had been aware of the weather before they set off they might have made different decisions.

He told the FAI: “Having commenced this approach, the major factors, I believe, are the fact that they did not achieve a stable approach, and because they did not achieve a stable approach that made them more prone to any errors in scanning, and so the secondary factor here is that the crew did not see the change in the air speed, they did not see the nose pitching up and they did not see the low power set.”

Mr Prior also told the inquiry that the lack of a stabilised approach meant they were not compliant with the operations manual.

Mr Richardson asked about the training given to crew and passengers in relation to ditching, with Mr Prior saying his training in France was “a very realistic test” compared with the UK training.

He said: “The French like to have a cold pool, you are wearing just a thin cotton flying suit, and it is a very realistic test.

“The second you go into the water, you shiver and gasp. You don’t have a briefing beforehand. You have to immerse yourself completely for a minute, then swim along a rope and do all of these types of tasks.

“You were then dunked into the cold water in the dunker, you were not allowed to escape until you were tapped on the shoulder by a diver. It was a very long pause and you had to wait until your breath was about to run out and then escape.

“As a young, fit military pilot, I found that a very demanding task, but you could say that was the most realistic training I’d had.”

He said in the UK, the pool is reasonably warm, and you are given a thorough briefing before.

Having completed the same training that offshore workers received, Mr Prior said: “To have a reasonably warm pool is false, but if you are teaching people how to escape, you don’t want their first instinct to be to panic as they descend – so there’s a balance to strike between the realism of the training and the training itself.

“I believe if most people had to go through the French training, they would not choose to go offshore.”

Survivor Samuel Bull took his own life in London in 2017, which Sheriff Pyle said was “directly caused” by the crash.

The inquiry is being held virtually due to coronavirus measures.

A statement of agreed evidence read at the start of the inquiry confirmed that no mechanical fault was discovered with the helicopter, which was returning from the Borgsten Dolphin support vessel to Sumburgh Airport when it ditched.

The inquiry continues.

UK News (https://www.expressandstar.com/news/uk-news/)

[email protected]

12th Sep 2020, 14:18

I've been using that accident regularly as an example of how not to use a 3-axis AP.

TorqueOfTheDevil

14th Sep 2020, 17:25

He said in the UK, the pool is reasonably warm, and you are given a thorough briefing before.

UK News (https://www.expressandstar.com/news/uk-news/)

Things have changed since his day - the pool at Yeovilton is somewhat chilly these days!

212man

15th Sep 2020, 10:17

I've been using that accident regularly as an example of how not to use a 3-axis AP.
or how not to use a 4-axis AP!

[email protected]

15th Sep 2020, 10:41

or how not to use a 4-axis AP! Yes, absolutely:ok::)

marcr

15th Sep 2020, 20:21

Yes, absolutely:ok::)

So. Why was this approach not flown fully coupled?

The AAIB reviewed the last 1000 ft of over 3000 onshore approaches where upper modes had been used. They found that less than 20% of these were flown with 4-axes engaged.

cyclic

16th Sep 2020, 18:40

jimf671

17th Sep 2020, 02:57

An enlightening insight, cyclic.

DOUBLE BOGEY

17th Sep 2020, 13:59

It was common practice to fly the L2 in 3 axis as the IAS hold was quite poor. To fly 4 axis, you had to be very gentle with any speed changes or the aircraft would exchange altitude for speed. During a 200’ ARA this could be quite exciting. There’s no issue flying 3 axis as long as you monitor and apply power as the aircraft levels. Have I ever had to remind the PF to raise the lever in 3 axis...yes.

Not wanting to dispute the above but the AS332L2 deserves a bit more credit than this. ALL helicopters have a the same Power-Required for Level Flight Curve. This curve reverses as we pass through Vy!
If flying in 3 axis, with ALT hold engaged and the power setting is insufficient for level flight at Vy, the venerable AP will continue to raise the nose, speed decaying, to maintain the commanded altitude ([ALT]
If the power has been set low enough (paradoxically), the speed will decay through Vy. Now things get really exciting as the power demand for level flight increase exponentially as each knot of IAS is lost.
The AP keeps raising the nose in a departed effort to maintain the commanded ALT. Eventually a ROD will set in, now at low IAS, and if the crew do not intervene quickly enough and/or the surface is not far below the helicopter, a powered recovery may simply not be possible in time to prevent impact with the surface.

NOTE, the IAS and the ALT hold on the AS332 is more than competent. (as actually demonstrated by this accident). However, in 3 axis mode, power set below that required for level flight at Vy in any part of the envelope will result in a descent, required or otherwise.

This problem should be the No1 lesson for all 3 axis systems and 4 axis systems when operated in 3 axis.

As an aside, AIRBUS APM 2000 (EC225/175/145/135) incorporates flight envelope protections to "save" the crew/helicopter from these potentially disastrous mistakes.

[email protected]

17th Sep 2020, 15:35

This was not with ALT set, it was with VS engaged but the same concept applies.

You would expect a channel to disengage along with a warning with reducing IAS below a certain level (60 Kts for example) rather than stay engaged all the way to VRS.

DOUBLE BOGEY

17th Sep 2020, 16:01

Hi Crab, in the AS332L2, an engaged mode that cannot hold the selected parameter +minus a small value, will flash amber. No aural warning.

My understanding of this approach was the V/S was active to a preset ALT.A. So ALT would deploy at the set altitude. The previous stabilised approach during the descent then destabilised as there was no automatic or manual modulation of the power (collective).

As an aside, we spent many years teaching ourselves to reduce the IAS for an approach to minimums. Odd really when our FW brethren cant do that and have higher speeds and lower minimums than us. In 3 axis AP and modes its seems more prudent to mandate an approach speed at a minimum IAS of 100 KIAS. This provides some reaction time to modulate power etc. Flying a descent at Vy leaves little or no margin for correction if the IAS is allowed to tumble backwards with the PV curve working against the crew.

For 3 axis approach it is better to fly with IAS engaged for the descent as in order to maintain the glidepath the PF must routinely modify the collective setting which in turn keeps the control in his conscious mind at any level out for an MDH/A. This combined with a sensible IAS for the descent provides some protection albeit human rather than automatic.

[email protected]

17th Sep 2020, 16:49

Agreed DB - on N3 and 412EP I have either flown with IAS coupled and manual collective or ILS/GS coupled just helping it with a small collective reduction at top of drop when the GS captures - all flown between 90 and 120 kts. Or just done it the old fashioned manual way:)

If I remember the accident report, they were already behind the drag curve of reducing IAS (not enough power applied) before they reached MDA (which is what they would presumably have had the ALTA set to)

Fareastdriver

17th Sep 2020, 18:01

As an aside, we spent many years teaching ourselves to reduce the IAS for an approach to minimums. Odd really when our FW brethren cant do that and have higher speeds and lower minimums than us.

Every ILS I have flown all around the World have had thousands of feet of concrete behind them to allow you to stop. Why make things difficult by slowing down on the approach.

The faster you come down the slope the less time you have to cock it up; smaller groundspeed differences and less drift.

marcr

17th Sep 2020, 22:07

Whether or not you can, or indeed how you should, carry out a 3-axes approach is not the issue here.

The question remains - why would anybody CHOOSE, especially in marginal weather, to perform a 3-axes approach in a 4-axes capable aircraft? Or are we now advocating mixed mode flying?

If a similar coupled approach data set was analysed for the 225 we are unlikely to see even 2% of approaches flown 3-axes, let alone 82%.

So, is it the case, as Cyclic contends, that the L2 "IAS hold was quite poor" or is it reasonable to argue that, as DB puts it, "the IAS and the ALT hold on the AS332 is more than competent"?

The factual information gathered by the AAIB, and presented in their report, seems to support Cyclic's statement. Whether or not they were correct in doing so, for some reason, pilots were voting with their feet and electing to fly an approach in the L2 with only 3-axes coupled, the majority of the time.

This data was drawn from the operator's FDM records and that raises some further questions. If the clearly identifiable, mixed mode, 3-axes approaches were not neccessary, as the autopilot "was more than competent", then you might be forgiven for assuming that these events would be flagged to the training department for consideration and correction. On the other hand, if the evidence suggested that the "IAS hold was quite poor" you would perhaps expect to see some communication with the OEM to highlight the issue, and the associated feedback regarding the fault investigation and intended resolution.

However, if nothing was being done to address the perceived, or otherwise, problem with engaging a 4-axes coupled approach on the AS332L2 Super Puma, and pilots were being left to establish their own "work around" - then some might say, this was already "an accident waiting to happen".

Taking the quoted news headline,

"Helicopter would not have crashed if pilot had......"

I'll let you fill in the many blanks, which I'm sure will also be explained in detail to the inquiry.

DOUBLE BOGEY

18th Sep 2020, 05:57

Marcr, I cannot ever remember flying an IAP in 3 axis mode in the L2 except during training for degraded AFCS approaches. Prior to the EC225 it was the bestAP out there., L2 AP had no real disabilities when operated within its published AFM limitations. Certainly the IAS hold was competent as were all other modes.

Not wanting to go over old ground but the I remember that the general consensus at the time was had the helicopter been operated in 4 axis this accident would most likely not have happened. It was unusual approach. LOC ONLY. 09 to LSI. Maybe the mindset of the lack of G/S continued into the AFCS approach plan.

After this accident further tightening of industry policies for use of upper modes was widespread as it had started to be after the EC225 went into the sea on a night approach several years earlier. Hopefully, in this respect, crews are better informed and controlled by mandatory policies. Cue the old nutmeg “What about manual flying skills” well, we have to train hard to fight easy. All skills must be kept fresh......but just don’t do the degraded ones in IMC unless you have a real degrade.

Culture and common sense have to coincide.

[email protected]

18th Sep 2020, 06:39

From the summary of the accident report
The commander was the Pilot Flying (PF) on the accident sector. The weather conditions were such that the final approach to Runway 09 at Sumburgh Airport was flown in cloud, requiring the approach to be made by sole reference to the helicopter’s instruments, in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) set out in the operator’s Operating Manual (OM). The approach was flown with the autopilot in 3-axes with Vertical Speed (V/S) mode, which required the commander to operate the collective pitch control manually to control the helicopter’s airspeed. The co-pilot was responsible for monitoring the helicopter’s vertical flightpath against the published approach vertical profile and for seeking the external visual references necessary to continue with the approach and landing. The procedures permitted the helicopter to descend to a height of 300 ft, the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) for the approach, at which point a level-off was required if visual references had not yet been acquired.

Although the approach vertical profile was maintained initially, insufficient collective pitch control input was applied by the commander to maintain the approach profile and the target approach airspeed of 80 kt. This resulted in insufficient engine power being provided and the helicopter’s airspeed reduced continuously during the final approach. Control of the flightpath was lost and the helicopter continued to descend below the MDA. During the latter stages of the approach the helicopter’s airspeed had decreased below 35 kt and a high rate of descent had developed.

The investigation identified the following causal factors in the accident:

The helicopter’s flight instruments were not monitored effectively during the latter stages of the non-precision instrument approach. This allowed the helicopter to enter a critically low energy state, from which recovery was not possible.

Visual references had not been acquired by the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) and no effective action was taken to level the helicopter, as required by the operator’s procedure for an instrument approach.

The following contributory factors were identified:

The operator’s SOP for this type of approach was not clearly defined and the pilots had not developed a shared, unambiguous understanding of how the approach was to be flown.

The operator’s SOPs at the time did not optimise the use of the helicopter’s automated systems during a Non-Precision Approach.

The decision to fly a 3-axes with V/S mode, decelerating approach in marginal weather conditions did not make optimum use of the helicopter’s automated systems and required closer monitoring of the instruments by the crew.

Despite the poorer than forecast weather conditions at Sumburgh Airport, the commander had not altered his expectation of being able to land from a Non-Precision Approach.

Interestingly (just re-reading the report) They had identified an intermittent problem with the collective friction on climb out - it appeared to throw off a small amount of pitch after the lever was set at the desired Tq.

Second interesting point for DB - they did not arm the ALTA for the approach.