AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013 [Archive] - Page 5

Anthony Supplebottom

1st Sep 2013, 11:57

As we appear to be onto hypothetical helicopters now; for ultimate passenger safety, if a helicopter such as an S-64 Skycrane was used, and passengers travelled in a purpose-made detachable freefall lifeboat suspended underneath, then the hazards of passenger evacuation, risk of drowning/hypothermia, need for immersion suits/liferafts etc. would all be avoided.

Ha ha - - brilliant! :D You've probably just come up with the safest offshore helicopter of all time. The "suspended" lifeboat could also have a parachute an fulfill the safety concern of someone earlier on who asked if there was a way to slow down helicopter descent in case of emergency!

Probe to compare UK safety record in North Sea with other countries

Statistics uncovered by the Sunday Herald show Norwegian and UK offshore helicopters had similar fatality rates between the 1960s and 1990s. But in the last decade, the UK's record has worsened while Norway's has greatly improved.

Probe to compare UK safety record in North Sea with other countries | Herald Scotland (http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/probe-to-compare-uk-safety-record-in-north-sea-with-other-countries.22027761)

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 12:03

Statistics uncovered by the Sunday Herald show Norwegian and UK offshore helicopters had similar fatality rates between the 1960s and 1990s. But in the last decade, the UK's record has worsened while Norway's has greatly improved.

Why is the question in each case....the UK getting worse....and the Norway rate improving.

I can remember too clearly some of the Helicopter Services S-61's winning Spindle Throwing contests.....was airborne in the Ekofisk when one of them happened....but that was in the mid-70's.

JohnDixson

1st Sep 2013, 12:04

SAS,

Actually there were two different projects, and not directly connected.

There was an S-65 Commercial Compound project, with a large group of design engineers assigned, down at the original a South Avenue ( Bridgeport ) plant. Rather large wings with a T-64/prop on each, cross-shafted to the main box and tail rotor. Likely that was the one Jock Cameron was involved with.

Later on, there was a much smaller effort, whose goal was simply to delineate the scope of work required to take the 53D and certify it. The laundry list was longer than one might think. There was no serious cabin stretch in this look, just the sort of stuff Nick did did in building the VH-92 demo aircraft. ( an aside there: that machine had the additional three force generators and the N/rev ride was excellent. An option that if made standard, would certainly have changed the general impression of the ride quality )

Neither concept generated anywhere close to a break even point in potential sales, or so was the word.

Thanks,
John

Hummingfrog

1st Sep 2013, 13:01

It is all well and good trying to design a cabin that is perfect for evacuation but it will take time (years) to design and certify such a helicopter. We have to look at the present cabins and improve them as required. This is not a new problem in the 1990s some oil companies wouldn't use the rear centre seat on the 332. The seats then were also more bulky and some had head rests as well.

Today the SP windows have been made bigger and the seats redesigned to be less bulky.

In my opinion more should be done in the way we operate to make sure that there is a standard which if flown correctly won't allow inadvertent ditchings.

I quote below from the ETAP accident report where a fully serviceable helicopter was "landed" on the water. The first quote concerns the initial approach.

At 1831 hrs the helicopter descended to a height of 300 ft, at a range of 7 nm
from the ETAP. As it did so it entered low cloud and the crew lost sight of
the ETAP, so they commenced a climb and at a height of 400 ft they regained
visual contact with the platform. The crew discussed the conditions and agreed
that they had encountered a fog bank. They elected to remain at 400 ft and,
with 5 nm to run to the ETAP, continued the approach visually, monitoring
their range using the weather radar.vironment which allows

This is not the way to approach a rig in those conditions - as a former shuttle pilot our limit for "cruise between rigs" was 500ft amsl. In those conditions I would approach at 500ft - flare height, with the intention of orbiting the rig to asses the way the fog banks were affecting conditions - Fog was a common problem in the ETAP area at certain times of the year. Once you assess that a bank is not going to interfere with your approach you make a slightly steeper descent keeping the green deck lights in view at all time. This was a routine procedure but I was very used to flying at night and on some contracts would do 21 night rig landings - 21 being a BP limit. So in a 2 week period off shore I would do a max of 294 night landings.

Contrast this with the experience level of the crew on the ETAP flight below.

Night Deck Landings Commander 12 last 90days 15 last 365 Days
Co-pilot 9 last 90days 16 last 365 Days

12 night landings in the past 90 days it not very many!

To counter this lack of practice a solid foolproof way of approaching a rig at night has to be constructed. This has been done now and DB has done a lot of work to make the procedure safe and hopefully easy and foolproof to use.

A through review of all approach procedures needs to be done, across all 3 companies, to make sure that the best practice of one company can be used to improve the SOPs of the other. ideally the SOPs for every type of approach will be the same for each company :ok:

I won't prejudge the out come of the latest accident but if it was a procedural failure then 2 sophisticated SPs with good autopilots managed to "land" on the water. Procedures and autopilot settings have to be rigorously applied to stop this happening again.

HF

Grenville Fortescue

1st Sep 2013, 13:24

Why is the question in each case....the UK getting worse....and the Norway rate improving.

As mentioned previously, that a review of comparative North Sea operations will take place now seems inevitable. What one must try and do (as best as possible) is to ensure that such a review is accurate and takes the time necessary to draw-out those salient discoveries which could help NS operations overall.

JohnDixson

1st Sep 2013, 13:29

HC,

I imagine your comment addressed the economic practicality of the S-65 in that market, given the purchase price and operating costs. That was the issue, and you are correct.

On the flying side of the assessment though, the S-65 at that time was far and away the best flying big machine. Far better than the 61 and the early CH-47 models ( SA sort of sat on our hands there, and Boeing certainly did not! ).

Someone mentioned the S-64, in jest, and I'll just add that incorporating lateral shaft tilt provides for a zero roll angle hover attitude, but everything else associated with it is a downhill story. Example: think side slip angle ( heading vs track ) at the bottom end of a decelerated, slow approach in the fog/rain.

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 13:33

Brother Dixson,

Can you compare and contrast the Cabin size of the 53D and 92 for us?

If one were to modify the fuselage on the 53D....by adding large...like really large pop-out windows and install airline type seating...put a cabin door on both sides up front....and perhaps an emergency exit of huge proportions in the Ramp....how would that compare to the 92?

PlasticCabDriver

1st Sep 2013, 14:16

Not sure about the cabin size, but S-92A D-value is about 21m (from memory happy to be corrected!), whereas a 53D is nearer 27m.

Chinook used to do it so there must be some, but without the HCA plates to hand are there many in the NS that could take the size?

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 14:34

Rough comparisons....

S61 59 feet long, rotor diameter 62 feet max weight 19,000 lbs

53D 88 feet long, rotor diameter 72 feet, max weight 42,000 lbs

234 99 feet long, rotor diameter 60 feet, max weight 50,000 lbs

I think the weights for the 53D/234 might be the max weight for external load ops.

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 14:41

Apologies for not reading every post as this may have been asked already but has it been reported if any of the pax deployed rebreather and if it was effective or was the whole thing just to quick with there being no brace warning given, point raised is has the rebreather actually been used in anger ?? , personally I hated it on every foet I've done and found it so bloody diddly I'd likely take my chances without it Like it or loathe it, it's there to give you a fighting chance. 10 or 15 seconds of alternate air could easily make the difference between getting out or not.

JohnDixson

1st Sep 2013, 14:47

SAS, there is a version of the 53D with 53E type blades qualified to 50K. Non-US military. Actually, we did a structural flight qual of a standard 53D to 50K prior to that. Same operator as I recall.

Internal loading.

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 14:53

If one uses an 8,000 pound payload, figures 300 pounds per passenger including baggage, that still allows for 27 passengers or so.

With the 50,000 weight limit....that adds about 10,000 pounds more payload.....and a very crowded cabin yet again as the oil company would demand every single possible seat be filled.....say 60 passengers.

Savoia

1st Sep 2013, 15:16

As we appear to be onto hypothetical helicopters now; for ultimate passenger safety, if a helicopter such as an S-64 Skycrane was used, and passengers travelled in a purpose-made detachable freefall lifeboat suspended underneath, then the hazards of passenger evacuation, risk of drowning/hypothermia, need for immersion suits/liferafts etc. would all be avoided.

The "Mechta M64 Skyboat"

https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-ehEPUiFnxoI/UiM-wiALAeI/AAAAAAAAOHs/OW0KDL3Udhc/w442-h154-no/M64+a.png

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-76ntpNY-E3o/UiM-wobUbCI/AAAAAAAAOHY/DQ0prGNJWIA/w426-h205-no/M64+b.png

https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/-9iInNzroalI/UiM-wnqEf3I/AAAAAAAAOHg/LdvJWX4vFy0/w493-h523-no/M64+c.png

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-w2gSdYP0g4I/UiM-xIV9X3I/AAAAAAAAOHo/-guqXNKP3-o/w213-h336-no/M64+d.png

obnoxio f*ckwit

1st Sep 2013, 15:33

^^^^^^^^ Someone's had a productive Sunday!

HeliComparator

1st Sep 2013, 15:34

Savoia, great schematic but I can't help wondering what happens when the heli arrives in the water unexpectedly, no time to jettison the boat and it ends up being pushed under water by a bloody great big helicopter on top of it!

Hummingfrog

1st Sep 2013, 15:39

Guys we are getting into fantasy land now with these ideas of using airborne lifeboats, bigger helicopters and other slightly far fetched ideas which would take years to certify. The problem is now!!

The a/c SASLESS proposes below would never operate on the NS with out significant redesign and strengthening of every NS helideck - costing?????

If one uses an 8,000 pound payload, figures 300 pounds per passenger including baggage, that still allows for 27 passengers or so.

With the 50,000 weight limit....that adds about 10,000 pounds more payload.....and a very crowded cabin yet again as the oil company would demand every single possible seat be filled.....say 60 passengers.

For those indulging in this fantasy perhaps you should find out the answers to the following questions.

1. What is the maximum allowable landing weight that most NS helidecks are certified for?
2 What is the maximum "d" value that most NS helidecks are certified for?
3 How many passengers are you allowed to carry without a flight attendent?
4.What is the average crewchange number - bearing in mind you can't change large numbers as you lose continuity on the rig?

I know this thread is drifting at the moment due to the lack of further accurate info on what happened but hopefully we will get the fuller picture soon.

HF

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 16:03

Humm,

Is it really day dreaming....or is it provoking some discussion and thinking?

Yes....the North Sea decks are what they are....and the aircraft are what they are.....and the Pilots are what they are....and the Engineers are what they are....and the Safety Standards are what they are.....and on and on.

The question is again "Why?".

The answer lies in a multitude of answers based upon uncountable factors and issues resulting in Decisions that have brought us to where we are.

If we are to have this wide open, no holds barred, review of the North Sea Offshore Helicopter Industry we have all participated in.....then we need to open the box....climb outside the confines it puts upon us....and really "THINK" through all this.

Are we building Helicopters to fit the Decks or are we building Decks to fit the helicopters? Do we continue to place decks on Rigs and Platforms out of habit as an evolution or have the Engineers decided to build the Helideck then build the Platform/Rig to best accomodate the Helideck?

Are we building the right kind of decks, do we have the right kind of lighting, can we not devise some effective sort of Glide Slope lighting system or other kind of Glide Slope system?

Have we formulated a Low Altitude Enroute IFR structure that works for Helicopters? Do we have a method to track Helicopters effectively in a non-Radar environment? Is our methods of controlling offshore helicopter traffic truly innovative or just an evolution from things past?

How many questions can you think to ask....that seeks to fashion the future of Offshore Helicopter Aviation and not just describe the existing system?

That is the kind of review that needs doing.

In order to solve problems, one has to accept there is a problem, then define the problem, determine the significance of the problem, then assess priorities for each of the defined problems and after that....formulate a solution, implement the solution, then assess progress and correctness of the solution.

This thread has shown there to be a lot of immediate, fairly easy solved problems and issues. There are some not so simple and not so easily solved issues as well.

Hopefully, whatever review does take place is done with the intent to look forward as well backwards.

Just because we do something a particular way right now....does not mean it is the best way. Not everything we do today is bad but for sure we need to look at everything if we are to see real improvement in the system as a whole.

The system is that proverbial Chain.....if we ignore one link or fail to ensure the fitness of that one link....the Chain continues to fail with the results we see coming from all these accidents and crashes.

obnoxio f*ckwit

1st Sep 2013, 16:04

Hummingfrog,

Stop being boring, it's Sunday and SASless told us to think outside the box.

Perhaps Mechta's boat could have a couple of those paraglider propeller things on the sides to push it away from the plummeting/plunging/<insert unnecessarily dramatic Daily Mail verb here> helicopter?

Grenville Fortescue

1st Sep 2013, 16:22

SASless, the attitude you propose is what is needed. Let's hope it comes to pass.

pitpilot

1st Sep 2013, 16:45

God this really has descended into bo***cks now.....

jimf671

1st Sep 2013, 16:48

God this really has descended into bo***cks now.....

No, I think HF's 4 questions have prevented that.

Hummingfrog

1st Sep 2013, 16:56

obnoxio f*ckwit

Stop being boring, it's Sunday and SASless told us to think outside the box.

So 4 people have died, the passengers are very concerned about the size of the SP cabin and our oil industry is trying to find a quick solution to their concern so that helicopter transport capacity can be returned to a more normal level and you call it boring:ugh:

If you want to indulge in fantasy solutions then perhaps another thread should be started to try and satisfy those who want to think out of the box!!

HF

airwave45

1st Sep 2013, 17:33

Quote:
Originally Posted by batboy1970
Apologies for not reading every post as this may have been asked already but has it been reported if any of the pax deployed rebreather and if it was effective or was the whole thing just to quick with there being no brace warning given, point raised is has the rebreather actually been used in anger ?? , personally I hated it on every foet I've done and found it so bloody diddly I'd likely take my chances without it

Originally posted by Digininagain
Like it or loathe it, it's there to give you a fighting chance. 10 or 15 seconds of alternate air could easily make the difference between getting out or not.

I personally feel that the use of the rebreather equipment is _much_ more likely to act as an anchor / catch stopping me getting out of the window than any possible positive use under water.
Like many on the Huet courses I detest the things.
I'm not designed to breath under water and it took (not intending doing it again) every ounce of self control I had not to panic while using it in the pool.

I know I'm not alone in that either which is why a diver is sent down with you to watch you use it (first time with it, I and many others just held our breath to do the exercises underwater.)

The best place to be with an inverted helicopter in the water is outside watching it.
Whatever "Genius" thought it would be a good idea to make people wear yet more crap to catch on the windows during egress, really, needs a slap.

Sorry, my opinion only.
I'm sure there are people more comfortable than I using re-breathers in inverted helicopters, in the north sea, in the waves and the wind.

Been speaking face to face to a couple of (helicopter) pilots over the last two days, there is NO concept of how scared the SLF really are.
Watched the local news interviewing bears about to fy offshore Wed, you could almost see their arms being wrenched up their back to say they were happy to fly.

Been speaking to fellow oilfield trash and the guys have a massive dislike of the 225.

There needs to be some serious work done to Show the Bears, why, the Pilots like the 225 so much, and speaking to a guy at the pointy end, he did indicate that the 225 will get you out of the doo doo more times than it will get you in it.
The bears don't know that.

Time would be well spent letting them know what the flying community think _before_ it comes back into service.

Now, I know it's not in your job description to hold the hand of the pax while big boy pants are put on prior to committing aviation, but, if you let the "management" loose on the Bears we'll have another train wreck with "Big boy pants" (or worse) and the already revolting (quietly) bears, really, will dig their heels in.

And bears digging in heels involves them finding other jobs. so, a fair old commitment.

I'd love to take DB up on his public offer of a look round the 225 sim, however.
I've nailed my colours to being Ex N Sea, and am quite happy with that.
(and therefore it would be a waste of good sim time, much as I'd have a hoot playing with it)

There are people EC should be taking round for a look, Safety reps mostly.
But beware bamboozling the guys.
Remember how many years it took for you to be comfortable with what you are doing?
Start with the premise that none of the guys will have heard of gyroscopic presecion and most won't know how a wing works, never mind transitional lift and drag curves.
But all will know how a helicopter in the sea is bad, be that through a gearbox failure or a procedural failure. (Both of which the 225 should now be free of, fingers crossed)

Effort of the flying communities part will _significantly_ reduce the stress levels on the Bears, and will decrease the likelihood of the guys looking for alternates.

Which, is a win win.

And I did like the pictures of the free fall lifeboat / heavy lift 'elicopter.
Serious discussions on improvement are allowed moments of levity, or everyone switches off.

Sorry for the long post.

HeliComparator

1st Sep 2013, 17:50

obnoxio f*ckwit

1st Sep 2013, 18:07

So 4 people have died, the passengers are very concerned about the size of the SP cabin and our oil industry is trying to find a quick solution to their concern so that helicopter transport capacity can be returned to a more normal level and you call it boring

I know 4 people died. I, like many, spent hours on Friday night checking on here and elsewhere hoping to god it wasnt anybody I knew. Fortunately, it wasn't. If you did, I'm sorry for your loss. But I'm not going to sit around being earnestly serious all day on Pprune trying to find a quick solution for a tricky helicopter design problem!

We know the SP is cramped and uncomfortable in the back, this is not news. There is but one quick solution to that problem: fewer passengers, and we covered that pages ago.

Longer term, there is plenty that can be done to design a better interior, but that doesn't need to be done on this forum, right here and right now.

The very first thing we have to do is try and demonstrate to our pax that they are not taking their lives in their hands everytime they step on board. That wont happen on here either. In the meantime, I'm sure they won't begrudge us a tiny bit of levity.

It's not boring, but you slapping people down for trying to have a tiny bit of fun is.

airwave45

1st Sep 2013, 18:27

Airwave, interesting take on the rebreather. When I did my dunker drill the time before last we had a go with them and I thought they were great, really taking the pressure off the rush to get out, and not forgetting that in the real world of cold cold sea, the gasp reflex is very powerful. I had done a little bit of scuba diving so for me, the concept of breathing underwater was not alien. I was rather jealous that the pax got them it we didn't.

you have a door to get out of,
We have a wee window, a very wee window once you think of survival suit, lifejacket and rebreather . . all of which increase our already not insubstantial girth . . . . .

dakarman

1st Sep 2013, 18:28

Finally got some internet back and would like to add a few more brief comments from the back seats.

Rebreathers - hate them personally and the do create more bulk possibly making escape harder but do they work? I remain to be convinced even after use in the dunker - evidence from the recent incident will be informative.

Dunker - A suggestion has been made to make it more realistic. Personally I think this may be a good idea however that is extremely unlikely to go down well with the workforce as every time I have done it there have been several people terrified of it. I dislike it myself and thats in a warm pool with minimum people and safety divers.

A comment was made about testing with 332 dunker (if it existed) with 19 people in a more realistic situation. From my experiences in the normal HUET, there is no way this extreme could be allowed from the HSE standpoint. It would be very dangerous and even in controlled conditions I strongly suspect would lead to injury to the testers. I guess this does not say too much about a real heli full of people and the likelyhood of escape.

A final thought, the SLF often refer to the center back seat as the dead mans seat........

Thanks again for allowing a non pilot to add to this discussion. Oh and by the way, love the skycrane / lifeboat combo. Only change I would make is use a freefall lifeboat. Comfortable backwards facing seats (in the newer type) and could be ejected well before the water.

PlasticCabDriver

1st Sep 2013, 18:44

Comfortable backwards facing seats (in the newer type) and could be ejected well before the water.

So drop the lifeboat from the skycrane, and then eject the seats from the lifeboat?

Outstanding idea! Can I have a go? ;)

dakarman

1st Sep 2013, 18:53

Oops slight description failure there. I was of course thinking of the freefall lifeboats already designed to be dropped from a height and have backwards facing seats. Combined with the parachute would be great.

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 19:03

From my experiences in the normal HUET, there is no way this extreme could be allowed from the HSE standpoint. It would be very dangerous and even in controlled conditions I strongly suspect would lead to injury to the testers

That is under very controlled and benign conditions.....perhaps we should train as we fight....as realistically as possible.

Do you reckon if you spent a full week gradually working your way up to the Full Monte.....fewer people would be as anxious and fearful? Do we spend too little time at this training....perhaps not do it often enough....what about letting folks choose their own time to do the training so long as there are vacancies and they remain current? Would that lessen the stress?

jimf671

1st Sep 2013, 19:07

A comment was made about testing with 332 dunker (if it existed) with 19 people in a more realistic situation. From my experiences in the normal HUET, there is no way this extreme could be allowed from the HSE standpoint. It would be very dangerous and even in controlled conditions I strongly suspect would lead to injury to the testers. I guess this does not say too much about a real heli full of people and the likelyhood of escape.

I think this is work that needs to be done, and looked at very thoroughly, but as a piece of research and not routinely for the general offshore population. Using genuine offshore workers would be a good idea and getting a few dozen dive-qualified ones might not be too hard. Stick bottles on their rebreathers for back-up and you've solved the safety problem.

You need an aircraft sized dunker with movable seats and exchangeable side panels for 332/225/92 ... .

If somebody built this then it could also be a tool for investiging accidents.

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 19:12

One problem that I can see with using volunteers with a bit of dive experience is that the replication of a real evacuation might see 19 blokes watching to see who bottles-out first.

dakarman

1st Sep 2013, 19:29

I suspect you would find with regards to more advance HUET courses a strong reluctance. This may not be due to people not wanting to learn to do it but much more likely the human nature in not wanting it to happen / think it can happen to them (i.e. an accident) and therefore there would be no need to train for it.

If you ask most bears I suspect you would get the answer that the HUET even as it stands is something to be gotten over with as infrequently and quickly as possible. Partially due to the fact its unpleasant and maybe subconsciously it reminds people accidents can happen. I realise this may seem a bit contradictory and hope I am not misrepresenting the opinions of other by too much.

I realise this discussion is regarding safety but I think if you look at human nature my previous comments regarding cabin comfort in the minds of most folk who don't want to think about an accident, that would probably have a greater influence.

With regards the full 19 dunker, I suspect this would be very useful for research etc but please don't invite me to get on it.

Finally can the people pod have rockets and lasers please? No idea why but it should.

Lorimer

1st Sep 2013, 19:46

high floats on a wasp meaning that you would be underwater with potentially a still spinning disc to emerge into....!
VP-F suggests in post 1012 that high level floats could mean a still rotating rotor.
I had the misfortune to enter the sea one very dark and wet night in my Wasp (long story) and can assure of two things.

Firstly the flotation was cunningly devised so that the pilot sat there with his (no women in those days!) mouth and nose just submerged, and secondly there is no chance whatsoever that a rotor is still turning. The splash ensures that the blades come to a very sudden halt and the engine (only one!) is doused instantly. Just as well we flew over the sea without doors!

And in the Royal Navy our ditching training in those days included night submersion, which after the usual variable rotation down to a depth of many feet was a considerable challenge, but was excellent training in case the worst should happen.

PlasticCabDriver

1st Sep 2013, 19:48

SASless,

Pod to pods. Like your thinking.

Perhaps you could link the Peoples Pod to both sets of cockpit pods. This will ensure extraordinarily careful reading of the checklists, and ensure that CRM is rigorously practiced.

Each crewmember gets a set of wirecutters, but they can only be used to cut the other chaps wire. Thereby also removing cockpit conflict.

We're getting somewhere.

check

1st Sep 2013, 20:09

Airwave45
Your comment regarding the door while correct does raise a point or two. Now things may have changed since I left the UK North Sea, but in my day it was writen that the pilots would go aft in the event of a ditching to operate the doors. In KLM Helicopters we always carried a cabin attendant irrespective of pax numbers who operated the rear door of the S61 and one pilot operated the sliding door.

That is the theory, in practice it almost cost a pilots' life as he went aft and was trampled in the rush to get out. In this ditching there was no loss of life.

My point is there is no easy solution to evacuation. While we have cramped cabins and full compliment of passengers there will always be the risk of fatalities. For the foreseeable future the cabin will remain, so the only variable is the pax numbers and while safety is important to the oil companies they may baulk at the extra cost resulting from reduced payloads. The financial controller who receives a request for a multi million increase to the transport budget is not going to be a happy chappy.

RotaryWingB2

1st Sep 2013, 20:16

What about doors that jettison automatically in tandem with the floats firing?

Can't be that hard to design or certify.

airwave45

1st Sep 2013, 20:22

RotaryWingB2 What about doors that jettison automatically in tandem with the floats firing?

Can't be that hard to design or certify.

In the event of a malfunction in forward flight they'll take the tailrotor off.
Which would spoil your afternoon.

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 20:26

The financial controller who receives a request for a multi million increase to the transport budget is not going to be a happy chappy.Without putting too fine a point on it, our financial controller may not have a choice. Would making egress easier by reducing capacity, in the short-term at least as a measure to increase passenger confidence, too high a price to pay?

My experience of this industry, is that at the end of the day the customer, the bod at the end of the supply-chain who puts fuel in his car or central heating oil in his tank will pay whatever it costs to have convenience. All this talk of cost to the oilco is missing the point. It doesn't cost the oilco an extra bean that he cannot recover from the punter at the pump.

n305fa

1st Sep 2013, 20:28

The Scottish Sunday herald is running an interesting piece on the accident.

Crash investigator: 'We can't say the Super Puma is safe' | Herald Scotland (http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/crash-investigator-we-cant-say-the-super-puma-is-safe.22030605)

airwave45

1st Sep 2013, 20:29

The financial controller who receives a request for a multi million increase to the transport budget is not going to be a happy chappy.

The curse of middle management.
A multi million budget increase pales into insignificance with the actual costs incurred in this situation and the possible reputational damage to the OilCo's

That and helicopter management being pussies for operating to limits.
In a highly competitive environment, you'll aim to outperform the competition.
Maybe as a sector, getting torque limits to 80% by reducing range / load is a good thing.
Maybe better than being cheaper than the competition.

There is an oft used saying by the bears.
Fast, cheap, safe.
Pick two.

Works other places than oilrigs.

JohnDixson

1st Sep 2013, 20:31

SAS,

CH-53D:

Length 30' 0"
Height 6' 6"
Width. 7' 6"

S-92:

Length 20' 0"
Height 6' 0"
Width 6' 7"

RotaryWingB2

1st Sep 2013, 20:32

Airwave,

I've worked on AC with explosive jettison canopies. Yes, helicopters. I'm also a LAE, but not on any of the NS types.

Floats only fire when you hit the water, by which time the chance of them hitting the TR are Irrelevant. Have the doors fire on the same circuit.

I'm pretty sure they could be designed in such a way to minimise the chance of TR strike if it happened in flight.

Fareastdriver

1st Sep 2013, 20:33

The Chinese registered 332L1s I flew had their respective main door jettison handles behind each pilot as well as the ones in the cabin. The SOP after ditching was to check that the rotor had stopped, jettison all the doors and initiate the sponson mounted dinghies.
The dinghies were smaller than the standard I remember on the NS but if required the sponsons could always be made bigger. Performance is not a problem. A 332 with large sponsons incorporating fuel tanks goes about five knots faster than an ordinary one.

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 20:34

Floats only fire when you hit the water, .......Hopefully. If they only fire when you hit the water why have an arm/disarm option?

RotaryWingB2

1st Sep 2013, 20:36

Quite, because when they go off in the hangar, they don't half make your ears ring.

Anthony Supplebottom

1st Sep 2013, 20:39

All this talk of cost to the oilco is missing the point. It doesn't cost the oilco an extra bean that he cannot recover from the punter at the pump.

Exactly and that's what we have to keep in mind, constantly.

But the only way to make this universal is for the regulator to get involved because left up to the oilcos - well, you can make your own assumption on that.

The best thing that offshore workers can do is contact the CAA and ask them if they ever have a thought for the "Bears" and if they come back and say yes then invite them to come visit you for the day. During the day arrange for them to be dunked in a 332 fuselage with 18 people inside (in the dark), upside down and let them have a go at getting out.

Then, afterwards, over lunch sit down a talk to them about endorsing a proposal to rip out a few seats in the interest of passenger safety.

With a CAA directive in place the oilcos will readily conform.

Fareastdriver

1st Sep 2013, 20:40

I'm pretty sure they could be designed in such a way to minimise the chance of TR strike if it happened in flight.

In 1978 Royal Air Force Puma HC1 XW 205 had a starboard main door detach in flight. The door flew into the main and tail rotor damaging the main blades and breaking three of the tail rotor blades. The main rotor blades flew down and progressively chopped sections off the boom. The aircraft then fell 300 feet killing the three crew.

I had flown it on its previous sortie.

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 20:44

The best thing that offshore workers can do is contact the CAA and ask them if they ever have a thought for the "Bears" and if they come back and say yes then invite them to come visit you for the day. During the day arrange for them to be dunked in a 332 fuselage with 18 people inside (in the dark), upside down and let them have a go at getting out.I'd pay good money to see that. Actually, HMS Heron have all the facilities to put on a good demo.

Doors departing airframes in an uncontrolled manner isn't an attractive option. XZ244.

Anthony Supplebottom

1st Sep 2013, 20:55

HMS Heron it is then. You've got my vote. :ok:

airwave45

1st Sep 2013, 21:07

Somewhere, someone, can find out how many people died in the old RGIT pool in Aberdeen doing HUET training.
There were a few (i remember being told 4 or 6)
But it's more than 1 and probably less than 10.

There is a reason why the pool is now heated, the lights are left on, the wind machine is no longer needed and the wave machine is not fitted to the new facilities.
(and the windows are huge, the pax in the dunker are limited to 6)

Oilfield trash are too soft to train as we fight (we'd really rather not fight at all, thank you very much) we would gleefully ditch the training too, if we could . .

CYTN

1st Sep 2013, 21:10

The last time I done the HUET - quite some time ago the pool diver told us - Ditch and roll exercise , You count to 7 ( this is the time to allow the rotor blades to stop ) but don't do what the wee japanese guy done the other week . Every one else was out and he was still inside , so we went in to get him and he was clinging on to his seat / harness , so after a while of pulling at him and bubbles coming out of his mouth we finally managed to get him free and pull him to the side . When we got him out we asked what he was playing at . Turned out he was trying to stay put for 7 minutes . Minor misunderstanding .:eek:

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 21:16

Oilfield trash are too soft to train as we fight (we'd really rather not fight at all, thank you very much) we would gleefully ditch the training too, if we could .

Airwave45, I did my last FOET two months ago, and I got the same excuse as to why the training was unrepresentative. If OPITO are reading this, how many candidates have suffered injury as a result of HUET training?

Of course, if we could guarantee that airframes wouldn't drop into the oggin from time to time we could go to work in our 501s and tee-shirts straight from Spiders.

But we can't, so the reality is we must train for the worst-case-scenario to give ourselves every opportunity to survive. Ignore that imperative, and you might as well stay at home.

John Eacott

1st Sep 2013, 21:18

Floats only fire when you hit the water, by which time the chance of them hitting the TR are Irrelevant. Have the doors fire on the same circuit.

Therein lies the rub: floats can be manually operated prior to impact, not necessarily when you're in/on the water. Doors/windows coming off even in low speed flight can spoil what could otherwise be a successful ditching.

Having had a door depart at 160kias in an A109, it can concentrate the mind in a very short space of time.....

Mechta

1st Sep 2013, 21:36

Savoia :ok::ok::ok::ok::ok::D

I love your illustration of the 'Mechta M64 Skyboat' (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/522069-as332l2-ditching-off-shetland-23rd-august-2013-a-53.html#post8024643) (and the name too... :O). Credit where it's due, the parachute was Anthony Supplebottom's addition. It may be worth putting the parachute on the back (so the boat hangs bow down) for a softer arrival.

The S-64 Skycrane was just an example, as most people reading this will be aware of what they look like. I'm not suggesting we use a 51 year old helicopter which is probably too big & heavy for almost every oil platform and wouldn't have the range or speed.

If somebody suitably important from the offshore helicopter industry were to knock on Sikorsky's and Eurocopter's doors on Monday morning, I'm sure they would sit up and take notice if asked:

How long it would take to design and manufacture 'Skycrane' versions of the S-92 & EC225 respectively, using all their existing mechanics and avionics?
What the payload would be?

For those of you who think that discussing long term safety improvements is in someway inappropriate here, here's a thought:

When Jackie Stewart started in Formula 1, drivers didn't even wear seatbelts and stood a 66% chance of being killed if they raced for 5 years. Thanks to his efforts, and against a great deal of opposition, we now have drivers strapped in carbon fibre safety cells that enable them to walk away from crashes that their forebears wouldn't have dreamed of as being survivable.

If there is a will to make something safe it can be done.

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 21:43

If there is a will to make something safe it can be done.Snag. Your example is a form of entertainment. Nikki Lauda didn't put himself out for my personal benefit. Other than that........

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 21:59

Fixed Wing related....but raises some interesting points about Flight Training and Licensing as well as Visual Approaches.

The Pilot Shortage, Visual Approaches and Mc-Pilots (http://project7alpha.com/2013/08/pilot-shortage-visual-approaches-mcpilots/)

MightyGem

1st Sep 2013, 22:14

Seeing there are "underwater emergency breathing apparatus"on sale why don't all passengers carry them.
First read about them on tuna boat flying and someone carried one with him in case he went for an unexpected swim.
Seems they are good for 30 breaths or a couple of minutes.

Why not. They are not that expensive, less than an iPad.
http://www.pose-online.com/index.php/online-catalogue?page=shop.product_details&flypage=flypage.tpl&product_id=1&category_id=3

noooby

1st Sep 2013, 22:16

Mechta, is what you are describing a civil version of the AW101 or CH-53?

The AW101 is civil certified but AFAIK there is only one in service in Japan.

I bet a civil version of either of them is oooooo so expensive!

Mechta

1st Sep 2013, 22:24

Diginagain wrote:

Snag. Your example is a form of entertainment. Nikki Lauda didn't put himself out for my personal benefit. Other than that........

The Formula 1 car may be a form of entertainment for you and me, but it is also an extremely challenging piece of engineering design for its creators.

If offshore helicopters were designed from the ground up with occupant survivability having been given the same emphasis as it is on a modern Formula 1 car, then you would be walking out to a very different beast for your lift to work.

Don't get me wrong, The way I see it there is a very real problem to be addressed. The short term changes to get the best out of the current people, equipment and methods have already been discussed in this thread at some length. After that, the industry needs to look at the tools for the job and see what can be done to change them and overcome the hazards you currently face.

If, in twenty years time, oil workers are still expected to climb through submerged windows and clamber into a liferaft, in typical North Sea conditions, in a manner which has even caused fatalities in training, then we haven't really done the best we can for them, have we?

I expect the first proposal for a freefall lifeboat met with a lot of skepticism and probably some derision too; 'You want to drop us how far?'

SASless

1st Sep 2013, 22:26

Hazmat regulations might be a problem as it is not an "issue" item by the "Carrier".

One example....had my PFD in my carry on as I was going fire fighting at the other end of the State. When I went through Security...despite the TSA guy knowing me, the Airline Station Manager knowing me....and even the Captain knowing me too....(or was it because they knew me....) the CO2 bottles in the PFD were not allowed on the aircraft.

After that....they went into the Hold Baggage.....out of sight out of mind...but a violation none the less.

Hummingfrog

1st Sep 2013, 22:34

During my initial helicopter training my course of 3 had to go down to HMS Vernon to do the dunker. After ascending the tower in an old clanking lift we reached the top. As we arrived about 12 Marines were entering the rear cabin of the Wessex.

As young pilots we stared wide eyed as the dunker then began to rotate and dip cockpit down into the water. After a few seconds under water the water began to froth and boil as the marines exploded out of the cabin through the 4 windows and door. There were bootmarks on foreheads as they fought to get out - it was the most frightening thing I had seen so far in training. The 3 of us looked at each other and wondered what we had let ourselves in for. Fortunately our session was just for the 3 of us, a turn in each seat along with sitting on the door sill - which was the most difficult as the Wessex rolled door to water so you had to really hold on or you would have been swept backwards into the cabin.

I think that the idea of having a full load of pax being immersed would be full of dangers!! The idea of the dunker is to give you confidence that you will get out if you follow the training. Hand on buckle - other on exit route.

HF

diginagain

1st Sep 2013, 22:36

If, in twenty years time, oil workers are still expected to climb through submerged windows and clamber into a liferaft, in typical North Sea conditions, in a manner which has even caused fatalities in training, then we haven't really done the best we can for them, have we?Here's a novel idea; rather than the CAA, invite senior executives from OGUK to try a session in the dunker. Here's their address;
6th Floor East,
Portland House,
Bressenden Place,
London,
SW1E 5BH.

BTW; HSSG=Step Change In Safety=OGUK.

Mechta

1st Sep 2013, 23:03

Nooby wrote: Mechta, is what you are describing a civil version of the AW101 or CH-53?

The AW101 is civil certified but AFAIK there is only one in service in Japan.

I bet a civil version of either of them is oooooo so expensive! I'm not proposing any existing helicopter. What I am proposing is that the helicopter is a little more than a carrier for a pod which could separate in a controlled manner from the rest of the helicopter and is sufficiently strong and watertight that occupants would not need to leave it in the event of landing in the sea. The S-64 Skycrane is the best known of the basic helicopter + pod concepts, but the Kamov 226 is another example.

Ideally the helicopter's crew would also be contained in the pod, although as this would probably require synthetic vision (video screens instead of windows) for pod strength and non-mechanical control connections for ease of separation, I can't see this being popular with pilots.

The freefall lifeboat is used to describe the pod, as it is a strong safety capsule with energy absorbing seats designed to be dropped into the sea from a considerable height.

Diginagain wrote:
Here's a novel idea; rather than the CAA, invite senior executives from OGUK to try a session in the dunker.:D:D:D Agreed 100%

jimf671

1st Sep 2013, 23:24

Originally Posted by Anthony Supplebotton
The best thing that offshore workers can do is contact the CAA and ask them if they ever have a thought for the "Bears" and if they come back and say yes then invite them to come visit you for the day. During the day arrange for them to be dunked in a 332 fuselage with 18 people inside (in the dark), upside down and let them have a go at getting out.

I'd pay good money to see that. Actually, HMS Heron have all the facilities to put on a good demo. ...

Paying good money would be the issue. The CAA tend not to talk to anyone who is not paying good money.

mickjoebill

2nd Sep 2013, 01:13

The freefall lifeboat is used to describe the pod, as it is a strong safety capsule with energy absorbing seats designed to be dropped into the sea from a considerable height.

The seats in the EC 130B helicopter are designed to protect life in a 14g prang.
A few years ago a EC130 with 5 POB. It went from a hover at 220 feet to a spin and descent. It was captured on video. Eurocopter calculated the impact was 1700ft per minute or about 18mph vertical. It hit a beach. Three occupants in the back were found strapped in their seats and deceased.

Having ridden an oil rig escape pod from 20 meters it was a benign impact. You are virtually lying down with a 4 or 5 point harness. Late last year one was tested from a record height of 200ft.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ly05OF6OAWc

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjtIIbucI_o

Mickjoebill

mickjoebill

2nd Sep 2013, 01:29

Therein lies the rub: floats can be manually operated prior to impact,

All three filming accidents in recent years involving the permanently float equipped R22 mariner resulted in a capsize or sinking, despite loss of control occurring from low speed and below 50ft. The recent immersion in oz of a jet ranger with deployable floats was a near thing with it floating on its side in the water and then sinking (much) later.

OK R22 and 206 are miles away from Pumas, but in general are we expecting too much from floats?

Mickjoebill

The Sultan

2nd Sep 2013, 01:53

Come on let get the thread back on track.

If the 53 had entered commercial service the death toll would have dwarfed the one that ended the 234. After Cambodia, Desert One, and Israel you need no more evidence that this ship was never ready for commercial prime time.

The Sultan

Hummingfrog

2nd Sep 2013, 06:27

When we get some more info on what actually happened to cause the SP to enter the water off Sumburgh the thread will get back on track. At the moment we have 3 threads in one.

1. What caused the SP to ditch and how can it be prevented.
2. What can be done now to improve the SP cabin for emergency evacuation.
3. A look ahead at helicopter cabin design, including the fanciful;)

Perhaps once we have more information a new thread will appear on how/why the SP ditched.

HF
(the boring one:p)

pumaboy

2nd Sep 2013, 06:41

HF

You are not the boring one, but the senciable one.

And you are right.

Enough of this S-53 crap it would never work to many casulties in one a/f too expensive and too complicated and it is a sikorsky.

Enough said from me.

Brom

2nd Sep 2013, 07:24

This is a hypothetical argument as I doubt there is any chance of seeing an S-53 or BV234LR on the NS in the future.

Don't know much about the S-53, however, if there are problems getting people out of a submerged EC225 with all its exits, have a look at how many exits there are on the BV234LR and figure out how to get 44 pax + cabin attendant out of that when it capsizes.

I suggest we confine ourselves to discussing the problems we have with existing NS aircraft as we are unlikely to see anything new arriving in the near future.

Pittsextra

2nd Sep 2013, 07:26

Crash investigator: 'We can't say the Super Puma is safe' | Herald Scotland (http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/crash-investigator-we-cant-say-the-super-puma-is-safe.22030605)

HeliComparator

2nd Sep 2013, 07:31

Pitts, your link was already posted in #1071. Keep up!

check

2nd Sep 2013, 07:37

Diginagain

I sincerely hope you are correct with your assumption that extra cash would be made available, but from my experience with some major oil majors it would come (perhaps) with much hand wringing.

In the past I have fought long and hard for changes that were required when JAROPS3 came into being only to be told that they were not covered by their regs so they could not follow ours. It took a number of visits from the Authorities to convince them to change or have their decks closed.

I have to say this was not the UK, but in Europe but they were same companies operating in the UK sector.

I have other examples of requirements that were ignored on cost grounds so I need to be convinced that the large sums required will be provided.

Ray Joe Czech

2nd Sep 2013, 07:55

At the time of the initial CAA statement I didn't think that the AAIB would be best pleased by the former jumping the gun. I thought initially the AAIB statement was a bit of payback but the CAA just tie themselves in knots at the end of the Herald piece. I am not sure they really know what has happened, so it beggars belief that they would put out a statement like their original one.

unstable load

2nd Sep 2013, 08:12

Regarding the HUET training and its inherent shortfalls with regard to realism and the number of people it can take in benign environments, I do feel that if EVERY employee of ALL involved companies did the dunker drill, even once, it would do a lot to drive some of the changes that the system so clearly needs. If people are only involved in making policy and not partaking in their decisions, they tend to lose touch with reality.

The first Offshore Survival course I did was a 3 day affair that involved a day actually working with the dinghies and a (rather old) lifeboat out in he bay with a rather brisk breeze. The highlight of the day was actually being winched into a 61 to experience what it was all about with the rotor wash and noise while bobbing about in the oggin.
For myself, this was part of qualifying as rear crew in the 61 for winching and cargo ops and as a "trolley dolly" for 19+ pax, but the rest of the participants were one Pilot and "Oilies".

Needless to say, that never lasted long once the bean-counters had regained their breath. Now it's a day in class and a dip in the pool with a simulated winch and safety divers etc.
Subsequent highlights have been doing the wet drills with a gang of wagon dragons from one of the domestic airlines...:E:ok:;)

Brom

2nd Sep 2013, 08:19

wagon dragons

:):):) nice one!

Pittsextra

2nd Sep 2013, 09:16

Pitts, your link was already posted in #1071. Keep up!

Yes sorry about that, but whilst on that article given nobody seems to have moved to deny the CAA or AAIB quotes, its staggering isn't it?

Last week there was a suggest from DB that the whole thing was likely to be pilot error, which of course could be and if so fair enough, but why all the smoke and mirrors?

I can not understand why, especially given the obvious sensitivities, nobody has given a statement in plain English and if there can't be clarity over a definitive reason then at least be clear on what is being reported without the contradictions/ double talk.

HeliComparator

2nd Sep 2013, 09:33

Pitts, as I have said to you before, the CAA and AAIB often sing from different hymn sheets and really don't like each other. AAIB reports are often critical of CAA, and make recommendations for change which CAA often decline to do. It was always thus. Your mistake is thinking they are all one happy bunch of pals!

With that in mind, and bearing in mind also that the AAIB are fully resistant to any commercial pressure, they will issue a factual statement once they are as sure of their ground as they reasonably can be (and certainly not before looking at the CVFDR). However, if they had grounds to believe that there was an airworthiness issue thus there was a risk to aircraft continuing to fly, they would say something to CAA/EASA.

The default position after an accident is that a fleet is not grounded unless there is good reason so to do. Just as well, otherwise there would be no airliners flying at all! So without a strong hint from AAIB why would the CAA contemplate grounding the fleet? The only reason for the current suspension of operations is because of the mood of the workforce. If this was the first event in this series, there would be no question of suspension beyond perhaps a day or two.

I and all my colleagues are glad that CAA and AAIB are not in cahoots. If you can't see that, its because you don't really understand aviation.

You say "nobody has given a statement in plain English" but who should that somebody be?

jimf671

2nd Sep 2013, 09:46

Yet another excellent post from HC.

Offshorebear

2nd Sep 2013, 09:49

Been watching from the sidelines as this thread has gone from initial shock to burn the Puma hysteria to how dare the bears question our professionalism to finally get to ok, we each appreciate each others concern and we need to get an agreed solution on how can we sort things.

Big question from us (the SLF) is how do you guys think the return to service process will pan out - the 225 issues have taken back stage but do you think the Operators (both Oil & Helicopter) will want to bring SP back into service at same time and if so, what kind of timeframe.

For the record, I have always worn 'big boy pants' and if the guys in the front will spend 6 hours a day in something as a day job I will happily sit in the back for 1:30 hrs every 5 weeks.

HeliComparator

2nd Sep 2013, 10:14

Offshorebear, good question. It will all be down to politics and not to any technical reasoning. The problem will be that as soon as one of the pilot's farts, it will make front page headlines. As we know, cockpit warning lights come on fairly often, typically either a false alarm or showing a reduction in redundancy. Typically the response to that is that the safest course of action is to return to base, not least because of the difficulties of effecting any repairs offshore. I wonder how many trivial RTBs the fleet can politically survive.

You guys who take the sensible approach can perhaps do your part by being as vociferously positive in your views as the "Destroy the Pumas" lot are negative, rather than sitting quietly and sheepishly in the corner!

Ray Joe Czech

2nd Sep 2013, 10:18

One has to wonder why the CAA said what they said rather than:
'It is not normal to ground a fleet after an accident and we have had no indication from the AAIB that this situation should be any different.'
They certainly haven't improved matters.

Ray Joe Czech

2nd Sep 2013, 10:20

The rumour I have heard is early this week.

Pittsextra

2nd Sep 2013, 10:20

Hi – Yes it does seem that there is discord amongst the various parties and you are right I don’t understand the history or rational behind.

I’m not sure I follow your position re: your 2nd / 3rd paragraphs. The AAIB interim report after REDW shows that even their reports are best efforts – I’d absolutely suggest that they failed because of commercial pressure, in so far as they have limited resource and were led to a conclusion in that case by the manufacturer. Yet whilst one believes that everyone in the chain is acting with the very best of intentions there is surely nothing wrong with the implementation of a clear, consistent and timely reporting process?

You don’t need to take a default grounding position if all the parties are happy with their risk, including those on the ground, but I guess the driver for that is if you see aircraft accidents primarily being technical failures over piloting errors or vice versa.

CAA/AAIB in cahoots? I’m not sure I’d choose that word but I don’t see closer working as a bad thing. When you ask who should do this communicating I don’t see what would be at all wrong with a process that saw an initial AAIB/CAA/operator statement that explained the facts as they were known within 24hours and then a clear set of statements from a nominated PR office subsequently. Otherwise you get an un-coordinated mess as each news agency calls each party at different times, with a fresh story.

There is nothing wrong with good, clear communication and in fact you can see from the EC225 situation that it doesn’t need an AAIB report before you see constructive action.

The last we heard from the AAIB on the 225 was when? March 2013? Seems odd that on one day we all throw our hands up over the need to wait for the AAIB to report (which can take years) and then on another day we are more than happy to run with the read between the lines and rumour.. That doesn't seem the most professional way to work.

In fact its beyond that when there are people who have lost their lives and someone suggests its piloting error, not a technical matter and then refuses to clarify that statement. That's just playing stupid games isn't it?

SASless

2nd Sep 2013, 12:52

The problems between the AAIB and the CAA has many facets.

The CAA Neddies damn sure don't like being told....they are in the business of "Telling" others what to do.

The AAIB oft times are dealing with the results of CAA decisions or lack of decision.

Exactly the same situation exists between the NTSB and the FAA in the United States.

So nothing new in all this.

We all have our favorite examples of the disconnect the CAA/FAA have from reality at times....but mine is the following.

The Airlines wanted to add passengers on B-727 airliners on flights from NYC to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Portions of those flights qualified as "Over Water" but actually paralleled the coastline rather than flying away from it as is normal. The Airlines made their case, the FAA accepted that statistically double or triple engine failures in the 727 would never happen and approved the removal of all the overwater flight required safety equipment....rafts, jackets, etc.

Three weeks later....at the exact furtherest point offshore and well out to Sea....a bumbling Flight Engineer managed to shut down all three engines while mishandling the fuel system. The Crew did manage to get the engines back on line after doing Re-Starts.

The FAA in a rare fit of wisdom reversed itself and back in went the rafts and jackets.

If the aircraft had crashed....and all were lost as a result.....how would/should the NTSB have described the FAA Decision?

The AAIB and CAA, just as the NTSB and FAA, can have reasons for a somewhat adversarial relationship....and should in some cases.

But next day the CAA backed the lifting of the ban, saying it drew its conclusions after reviewing the evidence available including that "already published by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch".

As to the CAA decision.....exactly what data were they basing that decision upon? Just what was the "Evidence" from the AAIB and what were the sources of the other "Evidence"....and what was it?

Harry the Hun

2nd Sep 2013, 13:17

It will all be down to politics and not to any technical reasoning. The problem will be that as soon as one of the pilot's farts, it will make front page headlines. As we know, cockpit warning lights come on fairly often, typically either a false alarm or showing a reduction in redundancy.

Damn, a Fart Warninglight, did not see that one coming. Guess they will get me now.

Brom

2nd Sep 2013, 13:35

Damn, a Fart Warninglight, did not see that one coming. Guess they will get me now.

A warning light by itself will probably be spurious, however, in the event of a secondary indication, such as a smell of...

Never mind, I'll get back under my stone.

JohnDixson

2nd Sep 2013, 13:46

SAS,

From the NTSB website, a short CV of the Chairperson:

Hersman received B.A. degrees in Political Science and International Studies from Virginia Tech, and an M.S. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University. She holds a commercial driver's license (with passenger, school bus, and air brake endorsements) as well as a motorcycle endorsement.

Hopefully, the Chair of the AAIB has some background that will assist in this increasingly technology dependent business of aircraft accident investigation.

HeliComparator

2nd Sep 2013, 14:25

Pitts, you can wish for whatever relationship you like between AAIB and CAA, but it ain't going to happen!

They have completely different roles, agendas and areas of skill and knowledge, so why should they agree about anything, any more than the pilots and the SLF do?

Well to be fair, the pilots and the SLF, as well as the AAIB and CAA, all want there to be no more accidents. But how one arrives at that nirvana is a bun fight.

The AAIB have no remit to ground aircraft. Their sole remit is to investigate accidents and discover what happened and why, and suggest ways to prevent a recurrence.

The CAA have no remit to investigate crashery, only to act as they see fit after the facts are revealed by the AAIB. But inevitably there is a grey area whilst a high profile investigation is in progress. You might not like it, but that's tough as (as I said in my first para) it ain't going to change!

I also think you are trying to tailor your ideas of how things should work, to this particular set of circumstances. There is no way that any AAIB statement should be linked or made jointly with anyone else, not even the CAA and most certainly not any operator. Each has their own agenda and any mixing of messages would be horrendous.

No-one has said it is "pilot error" yet, all they have said is that so far there seem to be no airworthiness issues. Not the same thing, since there are plenty of other things, either in isolation or in combination, that can cause an accident.

Pittsextra

2nd Sep 2013, 15:04

HC I hear you and its a view. Personally I think its a shame and they are perhaps less effective for the self inflicted issues you express. I don't really see a downside to more co-ordination of their communications - for instance the Eurocopter 225 dedicated site is actually a nice piece of work that could quite easily be referenced by the AAIB - at least that then makes the statement that they endorse this work.

No-one has said it is "pilot error" yet, all they have said is that so far there seem to be no airworthiness issues. Not the same thing, since there are plenty of other things, either in isolation or in combination, that can cause an accident.

Well lets be honest "airworthiness" has a fairly big delta. After all there have been some pretty big failures where the absolute cause and the contributory causes have been such that business continues as normal. Like you say even the AAIB recommendations get rejected by aviation authorities.

Regardless I'm not sure whose purpose it serves to maintain vagueness around the kind of statements we have seen.

pmmcdm

2nd Sep 2013, 15:10

Below is a Pprune excerpt from as number of years ago in Malaysia.

Chopper Crashes Near Oil Rig Off Bintulu, All 13 On Board Safe

KUCHING, June 18 (Bernama) -- A Malaysia Helicopter Services (MHS) chopper crashed at sea near the oil operators Malaysia B11 oil rig, some 170km off Bintulu in Sarawak, at about noon Saturday but all 13 people on board, including the two pilots, are safe.

Malaysia said all the 11 passengers -- eight Malaysians, two New Zealanders and a Briton -- and the Malaysian pilots were evacuated by another helicopter to Miri for observation and medical treatment.

One of the passengers is reported to have sustained bruises, according to oil operator's Malaysia officials who were contacted.

The oil company said all family members of the passengers and pilots had been notified.

"The company's emergency response team continues to monitor the situation and will lend full assistance to later investigations into the incident," it said.

The oil company said the mishap happened at about 12.05 pm when the helicopter, on a routine flight, encountered difficulties near the B11 platform and crashed into the water.

The chopper, one of three contracted from MHS for the oil companies Malaysia's upstream activities, was enroute to B11 from the Miri helibase.

The identities of the passengers and pilots have yet to be released.

In Miri, next-of-kin gathered at the Columbia Medical Centre where those on board had been brought for observation and medical treatment.

Reporters were also there to attempt to get eye-witness accounts of the incident, but they were prevented from talking to anyone.

Nevertheless, according to one of the passengers, the mishap happened about 11km from the B-11 platform, and the incident was seen by personnel at the platform.

He said the helicopter was at a height of about 4,000 feet when those on board realised that something was wrong. Then, at about 1,000 feet, the chopper spun and crashed into the water.

He said all the passengers and the pilots managed to emerge from the sinking helicopter and were rescued by the oil company's emergency response team.

He said that thanks to the experienced pilots and the high level of safety standards practised by the oil company, they managed to evade a worst situation had they landed on the platform.

My words

One came up to the surface facing the wrong way and was revived in the liferaft due to having difficulty in pushing out the windows from the middle and two others in the rear of the inverted nose down helicopter had similar difficulties but managed to find an air gap up high and got a second chance.

At that time rebreathers were only used in cold water environments due to cold water gasp reflex. Subsequently within that oil company, rebreathers were introduced for temperate environments and proved a major success for the many thousands in that region.

However this was not limited to those in the back and HEED was introduced for those at the front to great effect.

From earlier posts this does not seem to have been implemented in other environs.

212man, hopefully with your new location you can back me up on this and drive it forward.

Maybe HEEDS is the way to go for all on an offshore helicopter with the appropriate training if rebreathers are seen as too cumbersome.

HEEDS may have been a greater bonus in this very short notice Shetland incident than the rebreather

My ten cents worth.

maxwelg2

2nd Sep 2013, 17:07

I was thinking about the various points being discussed on this thread whilst returning from offshore Canada today in a S92 where we had a missed approach (fog) to another FPSO to drop off/pick up some more PAX, then cooked in the suits for a few hours back to the beach.

I have been "trained" in both the air pocket plus (Malaysia) and the HUEBA (Canada), so I have the benefit of being able to directly compare the two systems from a PAX perspective. The talk offshore over this side of the pond since Friday has been quite muted on the Shetland ditching, mainly because there hasn't been any real media coverage in Canada, but one thing that we all agreed on was we're glad to not be using the SP over here. There are several reasons for this...but in summary it is down to the bulkiness of our current flight suits, the cramped cabin and the limited range for our offshore destinations over here with very few alternates.

Despite the larger room in the S92 cabin, the combination of our suits, HUEBAs and S92 window sizes make it a tight squeeze, especially as we are not getting any smaller in the back over the years :)

Since Cougar 491 on March 12th, 2009, HUEBAs were quickly introduced. We also got a revised version of the Helly Hansen HTS-1 (previously known as the E452 "boil-in-the-bag") to improve the fit of the face seal (still IMO a step back, the Shark suits used in North Sea waters with a full neck seal are far better). These Transport Canada certified flight suits are used as they are also certified for marine use, and with our variable weather we tend to use vessel transfer quite a bit with the Frog system, which for those not using it is actually really safe as you have very tight sea state and visibility limits before it is sanctioned for use, and only cranes with certified e-brakes are allowed to be used for personnel transfer.

The HUEBA IMO is a great piece of equipment, but the S92 windows are quite narrow, especially the 10 knock-out ones over our aux fuel tank and mid-row seats. We have 13 exits in total on the S92 including the 3 larger "pull the handle and hit the bottom of the unit" type, plus the main door in the event of a non-capsize situation. We are not allowed to deploy the HUEBA in our HUET over here in case we get it wrong. I disagree with this as I would like to find out if I can squeeze through the window with the HUEBA mouthpiece in my mouth, goggles on to stop me breathing through my nose, and how long I could really get out of the HUEBA when under stress/exertion. I have no issues with signing a waiver, but sadly the oil companies and the safety regulator will not let us take "undue risk". So much for safety improvements, there will always be risk, by opting to work in the offshore industry for the past 22 years I think I've earned the right to be my own risk level decision maker. The fact that we do the airpocket plus pool training and also use it in the HUET in the MIS-BOISET in Malaysia is much more beneficial. I wonder how many PAX in the Shetland ditching actually used their rebreathers, hopefully we will find out from the AAIB report when published.

What we need IMO is a complete review of helo transport as mentioned by previous posters, e.g. opt for a TEMPS style "escape pod" design that will self-right and be water-tight. If we wished to go with a freefall option there would be very few PAX on a flight as you would most likely have to be held in an inclined position to minimize the g-forces on impact. We can never remove all elements of risk, but we can improve the safety rating and survivability of our transport.

I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training, both military and civil, and just get on with it. For us passengers in the back we tend to expect the same safety standard levels and survivability that we have become accustomed to at our offshore installations. I can remember back to how different the safety culture offshore was back in 1991 in comparison to now, perhaps we need the same step change in culture for our offshore transportation systems. After all, there is a relatively long life left in this industry, so why not have the oil companies invest in it more by working with the equipment manufacturers to come up with a safer survival system design in the helos.

We only move forward by learning from our mistakes and revising our engineering practices, that is the true nature of progress. I just hope we can apply some of that logic to the outcome of this most recent loss of life.

Safe flying

Max

ILOVESMURFS

2nd Sep 2013, 18:26

I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training

Max,

Clarify please.... are you stating that the pilots (bus drivers, as you call them)who transport you to/from your installations do not wear HEEDS or immersion suits? I find this hard to understand.

ILS

maxwelg2

2nd Sep 2013, 18:36

ILS, different operators have different specs for PPE, the Cougar pilots over here flying the S92s wear a navy blue flight suit, not anywhere near as bulky (for obvious reasons) as the PAX suits. They may have HEEDs in the cockpits but from the pilots I've seen doing their visual check on the helidecks there does not appear to be any built-in/attached rebreather on their flight suits.

My point if clarification is so needed is the inherent difference in the PPE used by the PAX in the back and the drivers in the front. Perhaps we need to have the same level of protection, after all we are exposed to the same risks and hazards albeit the drivers have a lot more of exposure to the inherent risks.

Max

Fareastdriver

2nd Sep 2013, 18:37

Last week I posted that in China the aircraft had a facility to jettison the main door from the cockpit. When I flew the 332 in Aberdeen I do not remember a cabin door jettison being in the pre-start checks so I am sure that they were not fitted----but I may be wrong.

I have no idea whether the 225 is fitted with these, the Chinese ones would have been; but if they aren't they should be.

26500lbs

2nd Sep 2013, 18:42

There are plenty of drivers in the North Sea not wearing survival suits today as well. Summer water temperatures of more than a “sultry" +10 in many areas means summer suits on. Not so smart from a survival point of view, as your survival time in water less than +15 is pretty short, but up to 8 hours in the cockpit often without aircon in a survival suit also has its downsides on safety for the pax, as many feel the fatigue caused by wearing the survival suits is a greater hazard.
Pilots do not have any rebreather or STASS either. The main reason for this - there is only one - money. The pilots unions have not been as effective as the offshore unions in pushing safety and HSE at work.

henra

2nd Sep 2013, 19:07

Somewhere, someone, can find out how many people died in the old RGIT pool in Aberdeen doing HUET training.
There were a few (i remember being told 4 or 6)
But it's more than 1 and probably less than 10.

According to this paper (http://uk.opito.com/uk/library/documentlibrary/huet_stress_report.pdf) (http://uk.opito.com/uk/library/documentlibrary/huet_stress_report.pdf))
it was 3 in a timespan of 5 years prior to 1991 when no cardiac screening was executed prior to the Training.
Since 1991 when medical Screening upfront became the norm the paper mentions two fatalities also due to cardiac problems which are at least partly attributed to the HUET.

HeliComparator

2nd Sep 2013, 19:54

victor papa

2nd Sep 2013, 20:04

!Didnt EC experiment with a bigger frame for the 225 before she was introduced? Do some digging. Who decided the current frame was sufficient? What was the reasons?

Spend a lot of time today in a 737-800, then 340-600 and thought of the demands written here for pax. Leg room such that my knees where stuck behind the seat infront and trying to lift them was a camasutra possibility till the person infront decided to lay his seat bck. Trying to lie down low to stretch my legs, the knees got stuck. The person next to me and I had to share a armrest which resulted in me sitting with my arm tucked up in my ribs as I lost. This was a window seat on both flights costing more than my monthly salary:ugh:

maxwelg2

2nd Sep 2013, 22:02

Pilots do not have any rebreather or STASS either. The main reason for this - there is only one - money. The pilots unions have not been as effective as the offshore unions in pushing safety and HSE at work.

To me this is totally wrong, if anyone needs the best available safety equipment it's the pilots. I remember the S61 pilots back in the 90s who took us from Unst to the Ninian field had a blue dry suits with the back of the shoulders zipper, very similar to a divers suit with a full neck seal. Even the stewardess who sat in the back with us wore an identical style flight suit. We wore those old Multifab orange ones back then with the front zipper, before moving on to the Shark suits developed for Shell (and IMO still the best suit I've ever used).

Time for the oil companies to pony up the cash and ensure that the complete service line that brings them huge profits is made as safe as reasonably practicable. When workers start to refuse to go offshore and there are no replacements due to skilled workforce attrition then perhaps the oil companies will think again. After all, it all comes down to economics, the cost to improve helicopter operations will just be transferred to the end user of the industry's end products.

What we need are technical steering groups to be formed by the operators, similar to what was done with JIGSAW, to move this forward. Just look at what the Norwegians went through to get a better flight suit, which I believe is a Helly Hansen product which uses a material designed to provide better thermal control for the user. Here's a link, looks pretty good to me. If they're good enough for Norwegian North Sea I reckon they'll be good enough for the Grand banks offshore Newfoundland.

Sea Air survival suit by Hansen Protection (http://www.hansenprotection.no/survival/sea-air/index.html)

Anybody on this thread used this specific type of suit, and if so is there a variant for the pilot?

Bladestrike

2nd Sep 2013, 23:00

"I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training "

No need to be surprised. I always wore a survival suit (much lighter weight than the pax suits, you couldn't operate the controls in those) and a HUEBA for over a decade of flying offshore off Canada's East Coast....

The Sultan

2nd Sep 2013, 23:42

Max

Passenger deaths are minimized if the pilots only wear t-shirts and shorts. That way they will be less prone to fly the aircraft into the drink.

The Sultan

diginagain

3rd Sep 2013, 07:05

Fareastdriver, the remote cabin door jettisons are fitted to all our AS332Ls. As far as I know it was standard. However, in the L2 and 225 the same handles remotely deploy the life rafts instead. This is because (amongst other things) remotely deployable life rafts are a JAR-OPS 3 requirement, remotely jettisonable doors are not.
Seems rather a retrograde step. We now have three methods of deploying the liferafts, yet only one for jettisoning the doors, which isn't even within easy reach of pax in the doorway.

26500lbs

3rd Sep 2013, 07:09

Passenger deaths are minimized if the pilots only wear t-shirts and shorts. That way they will be less prone to fly the aircraft into the drink.

Or - less likely to want to put it in the drink - even if that is the best course of action, as they aint gonna survive very long in shorts and t-shirt. This might bias the decision to ditch and cause them to try to push on to land, when in reality it may be the best option to put it in the drink.

terminus mos

3rd Sep 2013, 07:19

Sultan, that was a puerile comment.

Max, there would certainly be no obstacle in my company to providing the best suit available for our passengers.

diginagain

3rd Sep 2013, 08:05

Passenger deaths are minimized if the pilots only wear t-shirts and shorts. That way they will be less prone to fly the aircraft into the drink.If we're in the market for radical ideas, by all means give the pilots survival equipment that matches or exceeds the capabilities of that given to the pax.

Then fit a 'weight-on-wheels' microswitch to the pilot's door locking mechanism and increase the gauge of the locking wire on the jettison handles. One of you is nominated Captain, and you have the ability (and are encouraged) to sweep the cabin for reluctant evacuees before joining us in the raft.

mary meagher

3rd Sep 2013, 08:14

While we are all waiting for words of wisdom from the AAIB, I recall a scene from a James Bond film that involved deployment of a rigid inflatable from either an airship, or heli.....perhaps someone remembers more accurately?

Friend of mine, training captain now for a nameless airline, was a young boffin at the time, and actually took part in that interesting ditching, riding the RIB down to the water.... if you buy him a beer he will go into detail...

obnoxio f*ckwit

3rd Sep 2013, 08:37

One of you is nominated Captain, and you have the ability (and are encouraged) to sweep the cabin for reluctant evacuees before joining us in the raft.

and if I pass you on the way out, please assume the rank of Captain..

Mechta

3rd Sep 2013, 08:50

Mary, QinetiQ did some trials with the Royal Marines, to retrieve an inflatable by driving it into the back of a Chinook.

MHztE34Wuuo

Deployment presumably, as Haynes car repair manuals famously quote, 'is the reverse of the above procedure...'

26500lbs

3rd Sep 2013, 09:07

Now that would be seriously interesting if it were 20ft+ sea:ok:

ericferret

3rd Sep 2013, 09:11

Re Post 1134 (http://www.pprune.org/8027012-post1134.html).

Reminds me of the theory that the best way to reduce car accidents is to remove the air bags and install a large spike on the steering wheel.

jimf671

3rd Sep 2013, 09:58

Taking the concept of self loading freight to extremes.

diginagain

3rd Sep 2013, 10:48

and if I pass you on the way out, please assume the rank of Captain..

Someone should.

maxwelg2

3rd Sep 2013, 12:40

Max, there would certainly be no obstacle in my company to providing the best suit available for our passengers.

Thanks Terminus, I'm all for everybody having the same chance of survival in a helo accident/crash/ditch.

Sultan, I'm assuming that your comment was meant to be tongue in cheek, not quite the response I was expecting from a professional in our industry, and in light of the original thread topic not very appropriate.

SASless

3rd Sep 2013, 12:50

Look back and see how many of us have objected to the tone and measure of his posts in just the past few weeks.

I save myself from his charming wit by appointing him to the back row of the Peanut Gallery.

HeliComparator

3rd Sep 2013, 13:47

Come on guys, I know people died in this accident, but people die all the time. Typically, we don't care because they are brown, live a long way away and talk funny. Even when we do care, I think that to try to ban humour is a big mistake because its a great healer and stress reliever. In my case, the jokes definitely get better the more critical the situation is. I can't be doing with mawkishness.

Hummingfrog

3rd Sep 2013, 14:20

HC

I agree with your sentiments on humour. The jokes and comments made by crews when on SAR were certainly very close to the bone and helped to relieve the stress of dealing with some very tragic accidents - an example was a young lad who had his hat blown off on a cliff edge - it landed on some gorse so he reached over to get it unfortunately the gorse overhung the edge so he lost his balance and fell about 80ft but was just alive when we reached him - the winchman managed to keep him alive until we reached the hospital - it affected him greatly but with humour we helped him through his emotional trauma. The difference was they were made in private and we wouldn't have dreamed of saying such things in public.

This is a public forum and we don't know if any of the families have been directed to look at it!

This thread started out as a technical examination as to what has happened. If humour is required then I suggest another thread which clearly says it is humourous therefore warning any families.

HF

Ye Olde Pilot

3rd Sep 2013, 15:11

Super Puma offshore passenger flights resume after tragedy

Bristow said it resumed operations using the Super Puma AS332 L on Monday after an earlier suspension was lifted.

The aircraft is a different model to the Super Puma that crashed off Shetland last month, leaving four people dead.
BBC News - Super Puma offshore passenger flights resume after tragedy (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-23928979)

PlasticCabDriver

3rd Sep 2013, 15:50

Or maybe rename this one:

"Caution. After 50 or so pages this thread degenerates, with occasional comments containing some mild pilot-type humour."

jimf671

3rd Sep 2013, 16:07

The photo in the BBC piece shows George Osborne in a Super Puma. The caption says 'George Osborne flew offshore ... .' Did he? So did he do a dunker?

SASless

3rd Sep 2013, 17:09

I notice a blurb in the Civvie Tiltrotor thread that it has a "Heads Up Display".....which leads me to ask why no Helicopters have them?

They also have synthetic vision systems on it too.....would that not be nice to have as well on an offshore helicopter?

Are we really just Bus Drivers who wear Poopy Suits to work?

SUMBURGH DIRECTOR

3rd Sep 2013, 18:41

The photo in the BBC piece shows George Osborne in a Super Puma. The caption says 'George Osborne flew offshore ... .' Did he? So did he do a dunker?

Probably signed a waiver / disclaimer?
They can take ATC staff, CAA inspectors etc without dunking them AFAIK

diginagain

3rd Sep 2013, 18:47

You can put people on an installation for a limited period without BOSIET, if you can justify it. For example, HSE Inspectors, AAIB Inspectors, Chancellors of the Exchequer....

diginagain

3rd Sep 2013, 19:02

Are we really just Bus Drivers who wear Poopy Suits to work? Tempting...............

If the perception is that pilot's equipment is insufficient, now might be an opportunity for change.

pilot and apprentice

3rd Sep 2013, 19:13

I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training, both military and civil, and just get on with it. For us passengers in the back we tend to expect the same safety standard levels and survivability that we have become accustomed to at our offshore installations. I can remember back to how different the safety culture offshore was back in 1991 in comparison to now, perhaps we need the same step change in culture for our offshore transportation systems. After all, there is a relatively long life left in this industry, so why not have the oil companies invest in it more by working with the equipment manufacturers to come up with a safer survival system design in the helos.

Some of the 'safety features', such as better immersion suits (boil in a bag you say) would increase fatigue at the controls and effectively reduce short term safety to increase the chances in a ditching. I always preferred avoiding the ditching in the first place.

As far as air and the rest, opinions vary, and the issues of obstacles in the cockpit (to interfere with controls). Job no 1 needs getting done first.

The Sultan

4th Sep 2013, 00:30

Max,

I was of course being jokingly flippant with a point. Regardless of the conclusions from the latest NS accident, the Puma crash that started this string of 5 was blatant pilot error.

As to immersion suits with the latest still out, the suits would have done no good on the Cougar 92 or G-REDL and not needed (by luck) on the two Puma loss of oil pressure.

If two out of 5 is proven to be gross carelessness, something has to be done to make the crews take their responsibility more seriously.

The Sultan

albatross

4th Sep 2013, 00:52

I think that if the Cougar S-92 accident had been a controlled ditching then the suits may have been very useful.

mickjoebill

4th Sep 2013, 02:51

Did a NUTEC Bosiet course a few years ago including rebreather.
A brilliant 2 day course that covers fire, smoke first aid HUET with rebreather ect. At the time they showed us HEEDS but course participants were not permitted to try it, due to legal/training/certification re medical issues with trainees breathing bottled air.

You can put people on an installation for a limited period without BOSIET, if you can justify it. For example, HSE Inspectors, AAIB Inspectors, Chancellors of the Exchequer....

In respect to film crews onboard offshore Euro facilities, a non trained person must be accompanied 100% of the time with a Bosiet holder.

Mickjoebill

cyclic

4th Sep 2013, 07:21

If two out of 5 is proven to be gross carelessness, something has to be done to make the crews take their responsibility more seriously.

Yes, because crews go out of their way to cause accidents - you really are a :mad:

Hummingfrog

4th Sep 2013, 07:43

Sultan

If two out of 5 is proven to be gross carelessness, something has to be done to make the crews take their responsibility more seriously.

That is a bit harsh. No NS pilot will fly an aircraft into/onto the sea as the result of "gross Carelessness". There is always a chain of events which lead up to such an event - the old Swiss Cheese theory.

I explained some of the chain of events, on the ETAP, ditching in post 1035.

I will amplify my thoughts on the chain of events.

1. The CAA allows any commercial pilot who has an IR to fly at night. The RAF, in my time, had a 28day currency requirement irrespective of
Experience or role

2. The currency requirement for night deck landings is 90 days so after your night line check - usually done as early in the "night flying" season as possible you could do just 2 night deck landings in the winter and still be current.

3. Crew change flights tend to be scheduled during the day, at least the departure from the rig as crews need time for onward transportation from Aberdeen. This limits the number of night deck landings that are available.

4. Crews are encouraged to do straight in approaches to rigs, so if the conditions are a bit out of the normal - as ETAP was - crews don't have the mindset to orbit the rig to assess conditions. The increased use of automatics also tends to make an orbit unusual.

5. There was no formalised SOP for night approaches. They relied on pilot experience and perhaps the method demonstrated by the TRI on line checks. After this accident a more formal approach was constructed and added to SOPs.

To get back to the ETAP accident we can see that there were several holes beginning to line up.

1. The CAA, I believe, didn't understand the possible difficulties in making night deck landings and allowed a "generous" currency requirement. The Commander had only done 12 night deck landings in the previous 90 days, not many.

2. The construction of a more formal night deck approach and landing SOP AFTER the event perhaps shows the company SOPs needed strengthening before the accident.

3. Automation is very good if used correctly but the pilot also has to have the skill to fly the a/c manually. This seems to be discouraged at the moment.

The conditions were very challenging that night, fog banks, no wind, dark night with only the one brightly lit rig ahead, which probably seemed to float in the air with its reflection on the surface of the flat calm sea.

So we had a crew that the CAA deemed to be current flying a challenging approach without a stringent company SOP to follow and having only flown 12 approaches in the last 90days. You can see how the Swiss cheese holes are beginning to line up. They "landed" on the water through a chain of events. Gross carelessness doesn't feature does it??

As I explained in my post 1035 I would have approached in a completely manner but I was very experienced in night deck landings doing hundred+/month in the winter.

HF

terminus mos

4th Sep 2013, 08:16

I hear that the "cause" is about to be confirmed as not being aircraft related

bigglesbutler

4th Sep 2013, 09:26

They also have synthetic vision systems on it too.....would that not be nice to have as well on an offshore helicopter?

Now that is something I would LOVE to have but how would we implement it? If you had a heads up like a car then the image is only in front of you, so not much better than we have now. If you wanted something that moved then you need a helmet with a visor acting as a screen in front of your eyes, and not a monocle as per Apache because that is likely to be too difficult.

Having said that I would give the monocle a go if given the chance, I would LOVE an EC225 with a monocle provided I could select the information I wanted.

Some good out of the box, and shields down thinking mate :D.

Si

John Eacott

4th Sep 2013, 09:57

I notice a blurb in the Civvie Tiltrotor thread that it has a "Heads Up Display".....which leads me to ask why no Helicopters have them?

They also have synthetic vision systems on it too.....would that not be nice to have as well on an offshore helicopter?

Something like the A109SP Grand New?

_0gPHhhBeuY

uILd5UmJylY

http://4.bp.********.com/-lpojS1H0kyo/ToP-OAISdQI/AAAAAAAAEGg/9FlMsP2sDmQ/s400/IMG_3183.JPG

HeliComparator

4th Sep 2013, 10:33

Bladestrike

4th Sep 2013, 11:06

True, I was part of a test to see how they fared in an offshore environment many years ago. Granted it wasn't the highest end of systems, and it was found to be little more than a distraction and did not help at all. Some of the issues were buggy software, the image was too small to be of any real use, and was slightly out of line of sight, and it shook badly, and as mentioned, it didn't see through fog. There were no positives at all, but perhaps with new technology the idea might have a chance???

SUMBURGH DIRECTOR

4th Sep 2013, 11:11

stupid question from stupid ATCO here

is a non precision approach (the likes of this fateful LOC/DME to 09) in rotary considerably higher workload than the equivalent flown in fixed wing, or are they pretty much the same thing?

HeliComparator

4th Sep 2013, 12:09

SD, pretty much the same thing, especially with appropriate use of even the limited automation on the L2. However, perhaps fewer clues when things start to go wrong such as no low airspeed warning (stall warning / stick shaker etc), and perhaps a little more complacency about low airspeed than our FW brothers.

GJM

4th Sep 2013, 12:13

Whats the general take through the pages and pages of debate....something simple as no fuel?

GJM

4th Sep 2013, 12:19

OT..and not as complex but is there a secret way to be able to 'quote' did have a scan of the FAQ's and it mentioned should be able to by using 'quick reply'

However I only see 'reply'...or maybe I should go back to specsavers

HeliComparator

4th Sep 2013, 12:25

GJM doubtful, if they were low on fuel surely they would have mentioned it to ATC, and its rare for both engines to flame out simultaneously since they are fed from seperate tanks that will likely have different contents. As far as I am aware, they were not arriving at EGPB on a diversion, but as their destination having landed offshore. They should have had plenty of fuel to reach an alternate with reasonable weather.

quoting - a good question, the answer to which eludes me too!

diginagain

4th Sep 2013, 12:37

GJM, the message transmitted on departure from the Borgsten Dolphin indicated that there was more than sufficient fuel onboard for the relatively short flight to Sumburgh.

GJM

4th Sep 2013, 12:44

Thanks HeliComparator, I just had read an article somewhere and they mentioned that as a possibilty, not being a pilot myself but having been involved in Ops previously it was one thing that crossed my mind.

Right on the quote...I know the general HTML but does seem very clunky and searching the FAQ's indicates that there was indeed an option available, I was thinking it might have been down to my very low post count hence asking

John Eacott

4th Sep 2013, 13:15

Mmmh, synthetic vision? - don't think so!

Synthetic vision a la optical enhancement /NVG (lower vid in JE's post) great for SAR in unlit scenarios. Hopeless for offshore with bright lights. Can't see through fog / cloud.

Synthetic vision a la terrain database (upper vid in JE's post) - shows you what was there when the database was compiled, not what is there now, therefore won't know about movable offshore installations /ships, new masts or wind turbines (erected since database compiled). The ultimate alluring trap!

Synthetic vision a la millimetre radar, probably quite good but hugely expensive and complex.

The EVS in the Grand New is (I believe) a lot more capable than the SV that HC refers to: the local operator is very impressed with it.

A better idea in this video, but the only decent images I can find online are in a bl0g, and PPRuNe won't link to the url :(

XHvS4wtFL10

for those asking about quoting: press the reply button bottom right in the post you want to quote, then in the resulting url delete the number 1 at the end where it says &noquote=1, press enter and the post will be quoted.

HLCPTR

4th Sep 2013, 16:16

Enhanced Vision (EV or EVS) and Synthetic Vision (SV or SVS) are two totally different things in current technology.

EV enhances something that is seen, though poorly (fog, haze, etc), with assistance and image enhancement.

SV is purely that - synthetic, not real, created from a database and displayed as a "virtual" scene. It can display terrain with elevation relief (from a terrain DB) and obstacles (from an obstacle DB). Terrain is quite accurate but obstacles are basic geometric symbols.

Current SV technology, as good as it is, would not be of much help in the offshore environment. Not much "terrain" to look at. It could have offshore obstacles (if in the DB), but not a realistic display of each individual rig, etc. Then, any movable obstacles obviously would be an uncharted hazard.

dakarman

4th Sep 2013, 17:57

This link is to a story on the Aberdeen Press and Journal today. I have included the body of text as they tend to delete stuff daily.

Press and Journal - Article - Tragedy probe targets ?cramped? copter seats (http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/3379125)
Tragedy probe targets ‘cramped’ copter seats

SAFETY chiefs are to investigate the seating set-up inside offshore helicopters following last month’s fatal accident off Shetland.

One of the four people who died when the Super Puma plunged into the North Sea was unable to escape from the aircraft.

Today, the Press and Journal can reveal that a task group made up of industry leaders will investigate whether the way “cramped” workers sit can be made safer.

Hope I am not breaking rules posting straight from their site.

HeliHenri

4th Sep 2013, 19:15

.

Bristow reports return of AS332 helicopters to service :

Bristow reports return of AS332 helicopters to service | Vertical Magazine - The Pulse of the Helicopter Industry (http://www.verticalmag.com/news/article/Bristow-reports-return-of-AS332-helicopters-to-service)

.

Fareastdriver

4th Sep 2013, 20:03

At lunchtime today the BBC were promising a statement from the Scottish Parliament about the Sumburgh incident. The day has passed, has anybody heard anything?

jimf671

4th Sep 2013, 20:53

... a statement from the Scottish Parliament about the Sumburgh incident. The day has passed, has anybody heard anything?

John Finney made a statement and answered several questions. Much of it was what you would expect. He firmly states during the statement and the answers to questions that the investigation is ongoing and we must wait until it takes its course.

However, he states that the HSSG change in recommendations about SP flying was based on new information from the AAIB. I am not sure that this is correct.

He also states that the incident Gold and Silver command centre was the Aberdeen Division police command centre. This leaves me wondering what the police were doing getting involved in an aeronautical SAR job below the High Water Mark when they have no appropriate skill set and are not the Statutory Co-ordinating Authority. Surely their place in this is subsequent investigation of an accident or sudden death as required by the Procurator Fiscal.

There may be territorial restrictions on the video content.
BBC News - Shetland helicopter crash: Government says lessons will be learned (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-23954159)

jimf671

5th Sep 2013, 09:33

... one wonders what 50 officers could be working on ...

I believe that continuing part results from the Procurator Fiscal's duties under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976. Under the act, these deaths inevitably result in an FAI because the deceased persons were at work. I think it may be the REDL FAI that a questioner asked Finney about in parliament.

What I question is the police part in an SAR operation at sea. The new Police Scotland regime struggles to operate beyond the street lights on land, and as previously, often defers to the Coastguard in coastals ops, and in large inland waterways. We have the Coastguard for maritime SAR and the ARCC and RAF MRS for aeronautical. I am all for joint working and so on but what can they bring to the party at that stage?

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 09:55

Who said they wanted to bring anything to the party? They probably just want a share of the limelight!

I recently received word that a glider pilot had a minor landing accident in his glider whilst landing in a field in Englandshire, slight damage to the glider and no injury. Police got wind, and next thing it was all over the police's official Facebook page in sensationalist terms, no doubt using words such as "plunge", "fell out of the sky" "wind stopped" etc. Apparently that page has since been taken down but one does wonder how much time is spent on such trivia (not to mention the inappropriateness of it) as opposed to detecting crime (viz Manchester police's recent admission that less than 1/2 of reported crime is investigated).

LTNABZ

5th Sep 2013, 12:09

Looks like though he may have been told not to wear jeans, he wasn't told he might need nappies

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02661/silly-osborne_2661165k.jpg

Pittsextra

5th Sep 2013, 12:29

AAIB update available

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/special_bulletin_s6_2013___as332_l2_super_puma__g_wnsb_helic opter.cfm

LOZZ

5th Sep 2013, 12:35

Link doesn't appear to work, neither directly from the news page:

Air Accidents Investigation: Latest News (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/index.cfm)

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 12:38

That's annoying, the link doesn't work and the report is not yet on the AAIB even though its mentioned on their "latest news" page! Its so "latest news" that it doesn't exist yet!

Edited to add - and now its been removed from the "latest news page". The AAIB is such a tease! But presumably its imminent.

Need money

5th Sep 2013, 12:43

AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter, G-WNSB – Latest News

The combined voice and flight data recorder from the AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter has been successfully recovered and will be transported to the AAIB HQ in Farnborough later today.

..... I think that is it !

LOZZ

5th Sep 2013, 12:43

Link has now been removed altogether.

Was: http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/special_bulletin_s6_2013___as332_l2_super_puma__g_wnsb_helic opter.cfm

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 12:44

TTFD

5th Sep 2013, 12:56

An interesting item on the Energy Voice website:

Jeremy Cresswell: Helicopter safety?... don't reinvent the wheel | Energy Voice (http://www.energyvoice.com/2013/09/jeremy-cresswell-helicopter-safety-dont-reinvent-wheel/)

LOZZ

5th Sep 2013, 13:01

Its back:Air Accidents Investigation: S6/2013 - AS332 L2 Super Puma, G-WNSB (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/special_bulletins/s6_2013___as332_l2_super_puma__g_wnsb.cfm)

Pittsextra

5th Sep 2013, 13:05

just dismal.... I think step 1 on the road to improvement must be a few quid to resource the AAIB.

nowherespecial

5th Sep 2013, 13:16

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/S6-2013%20AS332%20L2%20G-WNSB.pdf

Seems to be working now.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 13:21

Short and concise, however it seems they had VS and LOC engaged but not IAS - so pilots were controlling airspeed via the collective. The autopilot would be controlling VS on the cyclic. But with insufficient collective the airspeed decayed until very slow, high ROD built up. I have seen confusion in the Sim when partial automation is being used - which control controls what. I wonder if the pilot was briefly confused about how to increase airspeed - lowering the nose of course is not the right thing to do.

I also wonder what, if any, the SOP for automation use is in CHC for a NPA, ie whether not coupling the collective is normal. I foresee a push to increase standarisation of use of automation after this.

Pittsextra

5th Sep 2013, 13:21

A fine body of work that has taken a week to produce, have they got 1 person at the AAIB that shares his time between investigating, answering the telephones and doing a bit of cleaning?

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 13:27

dmanton300

5th Sep 2013, 13:29

as opposed to detecting crime (viz Manchester police's recent admission that less than 1/2 of reported crime is investigated).

In my experience as a police officer less than half of reported crime has any realistic leads to follow. It's another number plucked and manipulated to make it seem like somebody isn't doing what they're paid for.

Turn up at burglary-view POE/disturbed areas-call CSI if appropriate-take statement- do house to house-give advice-arrange for boarding up/locksmith etc.-ensure support is there (SNT/family etc.) - record crime & submit. Await results from CSI/house to house/local intel etc. If none then no further investigation. What is there to investigate?

What they mean is there is no investigation past initial enquiries, because those enquiries have exhausted all reasonable lines in the first instance. We can't invent evidence or magic it up (some people's opinions notwithstanding!).

And now, back to your regularly scheduled AS332/EC225 pondering.

212man

5th Sep 2013, 13:31

A fine body of work that has taken a week to produce, have they got 1 person at the AAIB that shares his time between investigating, answering the telephones and doing a bit of cleaning?

I guess you missed the bit about taking 48 hours to be rinsed and dried? :ugh:

I also wonder what, if any, the SOP for automation use is in CHC for a NPA, ie whether not coupling the collective is normal. I foresee a push to increase standarisation of use of automation after this.

I cannot imagine why you would not fly 3-axis in this situation (unless there was a collective trim failure) or would use V/S rather than ALT (or ALTA.)

HC, if you were using V/S only, recognised the low IAS and tried to correct by beeping forward, would it increase the rate of descent in the L2 by moving the V/S datum? I know the 225/155 etc wouldn't, but I don't know about the L2

FrustratedFormerFlie

5th Sep 2013, 13:31

http://flightsafety.org/hs/hs_may_june97.pdf

jimf671

5th Sep 2013, 13:31

Don't you think Pitts that it is much more likely that they know a great deal more than what appears on these two pages but not all of the pieces fit together properly yet, and unlike us, they are not running a rumour network.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 13:32

In my experience as a police officer less than half of reported crime has any realistic leads to follow. It's another number plucked and manipulated to make it seem like somebody isn't doing what they're paid for....

But presumably, since you didn't comment on it, you are quite happy for police time to be taken up with putting sensationalist and trivial news on their facebook page, and infringing some else's privacy in so doing?

Of course 100% of reported crime can't be investigated, but less than 50% seems very low to me.

Pittsextra

5th Sep 2013, 13:33

Ah Pitts, I wonder if you are as perfect in your job (whatever it is) as you expect everyone and everything else to be?

The download was only commenced on evening of 1st Sept, its only lunchtime on the 5th, that gives 3 days for analysis and write-up, and today to publish. That's pretty good I'd say, considering the sensitivities and need to be absolutely sure of your ground before going into print.

If you ever get a real job in aviation, you'd better hope we don't find out who you are otherwise your life is going to be really miserable!

HC I don't think you need worry vis finding me doing a "real" job and not in aviation, although why you'd want to make my life a misery for expressing opinion on a forum probably says more about you than it does me.

In the meantime my comments are based upon the fact that its Sept 5th and actually aside from the publication of some basic data the remainder of the report is a typing exercise of basic information that was available from the first hours?? Or do I read it wrong??

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 13:37

I wouldn't want to make your life a misery, it would just happen naturally to one who is so quick to criticize others (even when there is nothing to criticize).

I'm guessing you have never had to interpret FDR data. Well I have and I can tell you its not as easy as it might seem to an outsider. First of all there are the technical issues of getting the right hardware to read the recorder, then the correct software has to be located, along with the correct data frame layout and conversion to engineering units. This may depend on the mod state of the DFDAU in that particular aircraft.

Then one has to allow for the inevitable data errors that can occur and be really, really careful to not jump to the wrong conclusion which I can tell you, is really easy to do. Yes, you can get the gist of it fairly quickly but with probably over 100 parameters to look at, and an unfamiliarity with that particular aircraft's systems and naming conventions, you have to go carefully and methodically. You would be a prize prune if you put something out in writing that turned out to be a mis-interpretation.

My posts say something about me, but you can be sure that your posts say a lot about you!

Pittsextra

5th Sep 2013, 13:45

I wouldn't want to make your life a misery, it would just happen naturally to one who is so quick to criticize others (even when there is nothing to criticize).

My posts say something about me, but you can be sure that your posts say a lot about you!

Hey come on. So you cool with the detail given the time?? I suppose the industry has the system it deserves.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 13:49

Yes, after 3 days I wouldn't possibly expect any more. They have said what happened in detail, but it takes time to work out why (since at first glance I suspect it defies logic).

Ray Joe Czech

5th Sep 2013, 13:51

I don't know if the AAIB is what the industry deserves but as a professional pilot it is the system I want. They are careful, considered and dispassionate, and I have never heard any of my colleagues criticise them.

LOZZ

5th Sep 2013, 13:52

Earlier in the thread VRS was not ruled in/out until we had some figures available, does this now mean some of the more experienced might comment further on this possibility if indeed it is one?

dmanton300

5th Sep 2013, 13:54

But presumably, since you didn't comment on it, you are quite happy for police time to be taken up with putting sensationalist and trivial news on their facebook page, and infringing some else's privacy in so doing?

Of course 100% of reported crime can't be investigated, but less than 50% seems very low to me.

Of course not, the upper echelons of the police service are staffed with just as many idiots as anywhere else, all greasy pole climbing back stabbing self interested book smart street stupid arses looking to their next promotion board. Some inspector or chief inspector will have decided that this will look good in their PDP and so had it written, probably with a layer or two of insulation should it go wrong and he needs someone to blame later on. All of which martially explains why I resigned last Christmas and am now back building helicopters and much happier for it!

Like I said, that 50% is a manipulated statistic. Due to poorly trained call takers who these days can generate a crime number with a mouse click, probably 20% of recorded crimes should never have been recorded in the first place, but are because of a lack of knowledge. They then get passed to a bobby to go on top of his teetering in tray, he takes one look and realises the error, but by now the crime has been generated. YOu get it reclassified as a no-crime, but even a no crime remains on the books as a no crime crime (if you get my drift!), it doesn't just go away. Very very few actual crimes will have no investigation whatsoever, most will have the bare minimum to establish that all leads have been followed and there's nothing else to do. But many people don't want to accept this basic truth.

I'm glad to be out of it!

FrustratedFormerFlie

5th Sep 2013, 13:56

My posting a couple of pages back got trampled in a handbagging incident between Pitts and HC (Ladies, please!). Any thuoght on this as a theory?
http://flightsafety.org/hs/hs_may_june97.pdf

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 14:01

LOZZ - whenever a helicopter gets into an unrecoverable descent at low speed, theories of VRS are bandied about. However, this is often not correct, and certainly not needed to explain this sort of accident. There is a very steep increase in power required as the airspeed comes back around, and especially below translational lift speed. This is not due to anything to do with VRS but just a function of the rotors trying to scrabble to get lift in what has become a descending column of air.

VRS takes time to develop and you have to be at very low airspeed. I very much doubt that VRS developed before the heli hit the sea due to a high rate of descent resulting from insufficient power for the airspeed. And to be honest, whether it did or not is barely relevant.

SASless

5th Sep 2013, 14:07

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 14:08

I guess you missed the bit about taking 48 hours to be rinsed and dried? :ugh:

I cannot imagine why you would not fly 3-axis in this situation (unless there was a collective trim failure) or would use V/S rather than ALT (or ALTA.)

HC, if you were using V/S only, recognised the low IAS and tried to correct by beeping forward, would it increase the rate of descent in the L2 by moving the V/S datum? I know the 225/155 etc wouldn't, but I don't know about the L2

Don't forget that VS is a prerequisite for ALT.A on the L2. The AAIB doesn't mention ALT.A so we can't be sure whether or not it was engaged but anyway, I think the outcome would be unaffected either way.

Yes, on the L2 the mode on the cyclic is beeped on the cyclic, so if you had VS on the cyclic, when you beep forward you would in fact be increasing the datum rate of descent. This is something that was changed for the 225 (and from what you say, the 155) so that the vertical mode is always beeped on the collective, even if its engaged on the cyclic. Unfortunately I can't remember if the VS datum is recorded on the FDR. It is on the 225, but I suspect it isn't on the L2. Therefore the mentioned increase RoD near the end could be either as you suggest, or just the result of the autopilot being unable to contain the RoD at the very low airspeed and low collective setting.

LOZZ

5th Sep 2013, 14:10

OK, thank you HC.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 14:12

My posting a couple of pages back got trampled in a handbagging incident between Pitts and HC (Ladies, please!). Any thuoght on this as a theory?
http://flightsafety.org/hs/hs_may_june97.pdf

Handbag back on the dance floor... Yes, this report is relevant. My only comment on it is that it lists various events that occurred due to mismanagement of the autopilot, but doesn't really address what to do about it.

Technology does move on, and if that exact same scenario was re-enacted on a 225, the outcome would have been completely different with a safe landing made. That of course is no consolation to those who perished (and their relatives) but it does show the benefits of developments in HMI. Its one thing to make a reasonably functional autopilot, another thing to make it pilot-proof, but the recent offerings from EC are pretty much pilot proof!

Tragic though this accident is, it is in fact a boost for the beleaguered EC225 for those that actually understand the detail.

Ray Joe Czech

5th Sep 2013, 14:17

So at three miles they are at a 1000' with the speed 'decreasing steadily'. A mile on they are at 470' and 68kts. That is getting very close to levelling off just above minima of 300'. I wonder what mode selection was happening in those final moments. Coupling to Alt would presumably increase the nose up pitch as the autopilot attempted to level the aircraft. Or would the autopilot have any effect at all by then?

Plate here if it hasn't been linked to before:
https://flydev.rocketroute.com/plates/adminview/EGPB_IAC_LOC_DME_VOR_OR_NDB_(L)_RWY_09.pdf?cmd=pdf&docid=100000000482275&icao=EGPB

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 14:20

RJC the AAIB report doesn't mention ALT.A therefore (if it wasn't armed) the aircraft would not automatically level at MDA. The engaged modes are recorded on the FDR and I think the AAIB would have mentioned it if VS changed to ALT. But it would be ALT on the cyclic with manual intervention required to raised the collective to avoid even more rapid loss of IAS, so no practical difference in this case.

Ray Joe Czech

5th Sep 2013, 14:24

Doesn't really address what to do about it.

Fly 4-axis approaches? Can the L2 do this? IF so, we would have 2 less CFIT accidents, this one and the ETAP.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 14:24

I shall take a bit of a Contrarian view on this Special AAIB Report.

My view is this report should not have been released.

The AAIB should have waited until they had digested the CVR data and decided what it meant....then released a Special Report that would go much further in describing the sequence of events and the time line of the CVR.

The Report as it reads now...tells very little and only generates more conjecture than it would otherwise had they waited to put out the CVR information.

Far too little information to justify a Report at this time.

SAS as I mentioned earlier, it says pretty much exactly what happened, just not why. But it is confirmation that there was no technical fault with the aircraft on impact, something which had previously only been conjecture, and for even this one fact the report was worthwhile.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 14:28

Fly 4-axis approaches? Can the L2 do this? IF so, we would have 2 less CFIT accidents, this one and the ETAP.

Yes, both can do 4-axis approaches, although the 225 with its much more precise control and flight envelope protection, is much better at it. We would never contemplate flying an approach in the 225 in 3-axis, but then the 225 is flown 4 axis all the time.

Because the L2 doesn't have the same power limiting functionality, its not normal to fly the L2 in 4-axis in the cruise or climb, but no reason not to for an approach. However much of the time the L2 will be being flown in 3 axis and perhaps that makes the fleet culture a bit different.

We are presuming of course that the collective axis was functional at the time, but that the crew chose not to use it.

As I mentioned earlier, I suspect that after this, there will be a tightening up of SOPs for use of automation, something which has mostly been at pilot's discretion up to now.

Ray Joe Czech

5th Sep 2013, 14:31

I guess what I was getting at with the level off was did they exacerbate things by selecting ALT manually and not using sufficient collective or was it already past recovering by that stage. As you say, given the lack of mode selection information in the report, then probably the latter.

212man

5th Sep 2013, 14:31

HC,
in the L2 I assume there is a minimum IAS at which coupled modes are 'dropped out' if in 3-axis (again, another improvement in the 225/155 which automatically revert to 4 axis). If this assumption is correct, what cautions and indications would be presented? In teh S-92 the EICAS generates an FD DEGRADE caption accompanied by the master caution illuminating - which is a significant distraction and could delay reaction/response.

Ray Joe Czech

5th Sep 2013, 14:37

Because the L2 doesn't have the same power limiting functionality, its not normal to fly the L2 in 4-axis in the cruise or climb, but no reason not to for an approach. However much of the time the L2 will be being flown in 3 axis and perhaps that makes the fleet culture a bit different.

The 92 has the same problem but one pilot I spoke to said they fly their approaches 4-axis. Is this common across all 3 companies (agreed, it will be tomorrow...)?

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 14:41

212 sorry, can't remember the detail of min speeds for modes - I last flew an L2 in 2006! However, I think there is no substantial indication of a mode dropping out other than the engaged mode disappearing with perhaps a bit of amber flashery. Nothing to attract the attention if you are not looking at it.

I've always thought this was a weakness (in the 225) since with the amount of dependency on, and the reliability of the autoflight system, it would be good if the pilots were made clearly aware when a mode had dropped out for some reason. We (as in a group comprising CHC, Bond and BHL) did suggest to EC that there should be an aural warning anytime autopilot functionality was lost to the point the pilot had to take manual control, but so far that hasn't been implemented.

212man

5th Sep 2013, 14:49

We (as in a group comprising CHC, Bond and BHL) did suggest to EC that there should be an aural warning anytime autopilot functionality was lost to the point the pilot had to take manual control, but so far that hasn't been implemented.

I agree. The S-92 has an aural "DECOUPLE" alert whenever any axis is decoupled, whether in isolation or in a group and whether intentional or not. That said, it was largely drven by the SAR AFCS certification, not the regular O&G market.

I was just exploring the possibility of there being a significant distraction (Master Caution) at an inopportune moment, but possibly not.

The 92 has the same problem

Not since AMS 3.2 came out in 2006, though you wouldn't know it the way most operators fly it!

Jwscud

5th Sep 2013, 14:50

As a plank driver, all these discussions of automation modes, and various axes are giving me a bit of a headache.

Can somebody give me a link to an idiot's guide to Helicopter Autoflight?

V/S mode on fixed wing can be a killer as again it will maintain selected vertical speed and ignore IAS up to the point of stalling an aircraft in the climb (for example).

"Semi-automated" is a big no-no on the older Boeings - and indeed probably caused the Asiana crash. They firmly recommend either full manual flight or full automation, rather than a halfway house to avoid precisely this sort of problem.

Ray Joe Czech

5th Sep 2013, 14:54

By problem, I meant the autopilot causing an overtorque. Has that been sorted?

212man

5th Sep 2013, 14:57

Can somebody give me a link to an idiot's guide to Helicopter Autoflight?

In simple terms, think of 3-axis as FW without A/T, and 4-axis as with it. There's more to it than that, but in 3-axis a helicopter is potentially as vulnerable as the situations you describe (and Turkish Airlines, Thomas Cook etc)

By problem, I meant the autopilot causing an overtorque. Has that been sorted?

Depends what is being discussed. In turbulence at high power the torque will enter the MCP limit band transiently due to soft limiting, but it's not a true MGB torque limit in the normal sense. The original a/c would fully overtorque if allowed, with no limiting at all.

SASless

5th Sep 2013, 15:01

How distracting can a Master Caution Light and a segment light be?

One pilot is supposed to be flying the machine....always.

On an Approach such as the one in question....one Pilot is supposed to "driving" while the other monitors the other Pilot and taking care of "stuff" that arises.

Even though the Autopilot is "flying" the machine....the Handling Pilot is looking for correct function and performance.

There is far more to this crash than meets the eye here.

What it is shall be explained probably by what the CVR has to say.

Why were Target Air Speeds, ROD's, and MDA's not monitored. Any deviation from the Target or selected speeds/rates/altitudes should have been detected and corrected.

Why the deviation is less important than why the deviation was not detected and corrected. That will be the key to this puzzle.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 15:24

In simple terms, think of 3-axis as FW without A/T, and 4-axis as with it. There's more to it than that, but in 3-axis a helicopter is potentially as vulnerable as the situations you describe (and Turkish Airlines, Thomas Cook etc)

Well some helicopters, yes definitely, although as we have mentioned, not all.

Jwscud, out of interest do some modern fixed wing have flight envelope protection whereby autothrottle is automatically engaged if airspeed is reducing too much, for example due to too high a pitch attitude or vertical speed demand for the power set?

Lonewolf_50

5th Sep 2013, 15:34

In order that I understand the report and the approach plate:

The MDA for that approach is 300 feet.
Weather reported in the was 200 feet scattered 300 feet broken. (IFR)
If I have misread the report, please advise.

Not sure which airspeed they had selected, and which RoD they were using to get to the MAP/ decision point at 0.5 DME/SUB. (The choices on the appr plate provide ample lattitude based on aircraft, flight, conditions, etc)

Without a CVR derived insight of what one pilot said to the other, if either noted "field in sight," or if there was any other indication of going from "in the goo" to "not in the goo," it's hard for me to understand the decel from 68 knots to whatever it was that put them behind the power curve.

Appreciate the folks who have tried to explain how the automated modes interact. I have a suspicion that SASless has put his finger on most of it.

Thanks also to that Flight Safety paper from a few years back. Good stuff.

GJM

5th Sep 2013, 15:49

Question : With the auto pilot engaged, if it was to throw a wobbler...assuming it can as I know it can on ships, how easy is it to regain full control again

Heathrow Harry

5th Sep 2013, 15:54

Generally speaking I don't like reports being issued before all the facts are established but in this case they'd taken all the helicopters out of service in case it was a repeat of the previous problem.

this led to major disruption of the industry and the lives of people offshore & their families

They were able to establish that it was unlikely to be a mechanical problem - and no-one would believe any statement by the manufacturers, the service companies, the field operators, the unions or even the police - the AIB are the only ones who people trust so a very limited statement seems to be a reasonable thing to do in these circumstances

Ray Joe Czech

5th Sep 2013, 15:57

You can 'fly through' easily but the autopilot may be trying to do the opposite of what you are trying to do so you need to keep on top of it.
At some point you need to disengage the upper modes or reset the datums to align them with what you require.

GJM

5th Sep 2013, 15:59

That is a very valid post which totally agree with

Kakpipe Cosmonaut

5th Sep 2013, 16:00

HC saysAs I mentioned earlier, I suspect that after this, there will be a tightening up of SOPs for use of automation, something which has mostly been at pilot's discretion up to now.
When I watched the 225 being introduced on to the NS, I could see that overnight pilots were being expected to move from 60's technology to 00's.
The level of automation of the 225 has been in airline use for a considerable number of years. Airlines have learned the hard way of the mistakes that can be made and have modified SOPs and cultures in light of that.
Should a fundamental review of SOPs for the L2 and 225 come about, I would highly recommend that either senior NS pilots go to an airline and see how they do things, or, better still, bring in airline people to offer advice.

GJM

5th Sep 2013, 16:00

Thanks for that

obnoxio f*ckwit

5th Sep 2013, 16:09

Lonewolf,

It seems, from the report, that the crew had not "selected" an airspeed, and were operating with just VS and Localiser coupled. In this instance the vertical mode is being controlled by cyclic, snd airspeed is being controlled manually by collective. If the collective is set in the right position airspeed is maintained but if not the airspeed will change as it is the only parameter available to the ac to maintain the chosen VS (in this case, the same happens in level flight if Alt is engaged).

If the collective is set too low, ie not producing enough 'power', then the aircraft will reduce airspeed to try and maintain the desired VS. If you are only slightly out then it will stabilise at lower speed. If you're a bit more than slightly too low the airspeed will keep reducing as the system continues to try to give you what you've asked for. However, once the speed passes Vy (which is usually around 68/70kts) the rate of speed drop can be very quick, until at an airspeed none of us can remember the autopilot gives up the ghost and the upper modes drop out.

In a 225, there are protections built in such that, should for some reason you elect to fly it 3-axis, at 60(?) kts the IAS upper mode automatically kicks in and the ac becomes 4 axis coupled.

Bit long winded but I hope that helps.

{Only intended as a description of the autopilot, not as any indication that this is what happened to G-WNSB!}

212man

5th Sep 2013, 16:47

OF, good explanation.

In a 225, there are protections built in such that, should for some reason you elect to fly it 3-axis, at 60(?) kts the IAS upper mode automatically kicks in and the ac becomes 4 axis coupled.

The 155B is the same, using 60 KIAS. The B1 refined it further to include rate of descent detection, so it may revert to 4-axis at higher speeds if required.

riverrock83

5th Sep 2013, 16:50

Jwscud, out of interest do some modern fixed wing have flight envelope protection whereby autothrottle is automatically engaged if airspeed is reducing too much, for example due to too high a pitch attitude or vertical speed demand for the power set?

Depending on various modes and settings, a Boeing auto thrust system is included in the flight envelope protection, but there are various modes in which this is inhibited. See http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/518646-boeing-thrust-hold.html

I believe the Airbus system is more simple, with the envelope protection system on roll / yaw / pitch only (and it has quite a different auto-thrust philosophy).

Special 25

5th Sep 2013, 16:53

I would be curious to know if there are any 225 back to L2 issues.

225 back to 332L1 is pretty easy - It all goes manual. But L2 is a bit of hybrid, 'similar but different' scenario.

I remember converting onto the 225 and being shown how it will fly a coupled approach, even having lost almost everything. Very impressive, but my gut reaction was that I just wanted to take out the automatics and fly manually. At least that way, I knew who was controlling what, not that I have airspeed on the collective, the AP has Glideslope on the cyclic etc etc. Unless you're a TRE and forever in the Sim, I think you are liable to cock it up.

212man

5th Sep 2013, 16:59

TS, yes, and the BHL Nigeria 332L, the Bond 225, the KLM S76B, the BHL Australia 330J, G-TIGH 332L and the BIH S76A in the Fulmar field. Different means of getting to the same basic predicament - low power plus low airspeed equals high rate of descent!

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 16:59

Kaky C - I think one problem is that when the L2 was introduced (1992) all this talk of automation, automation dependancy etc etc hadn't been invented even by FW. Once you start down a bad path its harder to put it right. I recall doing an OPC in an L2, during the autorotation excercise I engaged IAS mode at 80 kts (Vy). The Training Captain / examiner took exception to this and said "you can't do that" but couldn't explain why not. Of course with IAS engaged, the whole excercise becomes much easier and you are guaranteed to maintain Vy until the flare, something which rarely seems to happen when people are flying it manually!

We were still banned from using the (admitedly limited) automation of the 332L during checks, being forced to fly the otherwise fully serviceable autopilot but without using the upper modes. Crazy! For the L2 I tried to introduce some use of automation during checks, but met a lot of resistance! So it was regarded as an extra set of sissy buttons that real men wouldn't use, and therefore the training given in its use was minimal, SOPs for its use didn't exist.

When we introduced the 225 (2005) we did try to look across at FW and hopefully took on board some of the lessons. For example, our SOPs require extensive calls and monitoring for use of the automation. One pilot calls presetting a parameter (eg ALT.A), the other pilot calls that he has crosschecked the setting. One pilot calls engaging a mode, the other calls what he now sees on the AFCS status display (ie what mode has actually been engaged). When there is an automatic transition between modes, eg an ILS localiser going from Armed to Engaged, that is called too.

We also show a video on automation dependancy - ie sometimes its best to drop down a level of automation. eg from coupled to ANAV on an overlay approach, drop down to HDG mode, or even drop down to manual flying (gasp!).

So I believe and hope that many of the bases are covered on the later fleets, its the earlier fleets that perhaps lag behind - although I have no idea what CHC's SOPs for automation use on the L2 are.

The Ancient Geek

5th Sep 2013, 17:01

Which takes us back to the subject of automation confusion which seems to be becoming a major issue nowadays in many different guises.

When the unexpected happens you dont always have time to figure out what it is doing, especially when low and slow.

ShyTorque

5th Sep 2013, 17:09

Just read the latest AAIB report (link emailed to me).

My eyes were also drawn straight to the paragraph about the autopilot modes in use at the time.

As a "3 axis only" rotary autopilot user, (not Puma) I'd be most interested to know what the company SOP is, regarding which AP modes should normally be engaged during an ILS approach.

"VS" mode isn't one I would choose to use at that stage of flight, although I do often use it for the initial descent, or for a non-precision approach.

212man

5th Sep 2013, 17:15

ST, it was an NPA - localiser/dme

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 17:43

TAG yes I think there is some truth in that, but surely the answer is to improve training rather than to get rid of the automation?

Training is a limited resource in practice. Why is it that we spend hours doing single engine stuff when (turbine) engines never seem to fail in reality, and much less time (and its not mandatory) dealing with the likes of partial automation? When you look at the causes of accidents, it seems to me that we don't really train to address them, we spend hours training in accordance with the legal requirements, on stuff that is never ever put into practice and never causes accidents. Something wrong there, too many legislators living in the past of unreliable piston engines, single pilot mandraulic ops etc!

malabo

5th Sep 2013, 18:07

:D:ok::D

HC, we're gonna make you an honorary Canadian!

Lonewolf_50

5th Sep 2013, 18:33

Ob Fwit ...
First off, deeply grateful for your explaining to me some of the nuances of the auto systems.
It seems, from the report, that the crew had not "selected" an airspeed, and were operating with just VS and Localiser coupled. In this instance the vertical mode is being controlled by cyclic, snd airspeed is being controlled manually by collective.
You will I hope forgive me for offering the opinion that this is counterintuitive to helicopter flying. Maybe it is due to me having flown and instructed in both fixed and rotary wing, but I have found that it is best to pick an airspeed as an approach speed, and adjust rate of descent with power (and then of course modest counter corrections with stick/cyclic) when trying to stay on a glide path. I do realize that once one has the landing spot in sight, the transition through translational lift and to touchdown requires adjustments.

I got into a discussion on the Asiana thread about pitch and power equalling performance over at R & N -- I had airline pilots inform me that they were pointing their noses and relying on power via automation to get their airspeed right. That is counterintuitive to how the coupling between pitch and power gats you performance, in a general sense. It took a while for me to understand that they were discussing flying in a mixed mode of hand and auto. While I think I better understand the issue now, I do not find the practice to make sense ... and the Asiana crash is a data point firmly in my favor.

Having taught a bit of instrument flying in rotary wing, a while back, I hold that the same basics apply to flying a helicopter on instruments in actual IFR as they do in fixed wing. Power in this case is collective, as you note.

I do understand the logic behind choosing a RoD in an effort to get a nice constant descent angle. Not a bad thing by itself. Your explanation of the mixed mode traps is an eye opener for me.
If the collective is set too low, ie not producing enough 'power', then the aircraft will reduce airspeed to try and maintain the desired VS.

That's all well and good until one gets below max conserve airspeed, and/or into translation lift since one will begin feel the effects of being on the wrong side of the power curve.

While the details of "the power curve" are not identical between fixed wing and rotary wing, the result of "the bottom drops out from under you" is very similar. I've experienced it in both kinds, without bending metal, and feel comfortable making such comparisons from experience.
However, once the speed passes Vy (which is usually around 68/70kts) the rate of speed drop can be very quick, until at an airspeed none of us can remember the autopilot gives up the ghost and the upper modes drop out.
"You've got it, I'm outta here" says HAL, eh? ;)
In a 225, there are protections built in such that, should for some reason you elect to fly it 3-axis, at 60(?) kts the IAS upper mode automatically kicks in and the ac becomes 4 axis coupled.
It appears to me that maybe those "protections" are overrated.

To sum up:

Please don't beat me up too much for being a dinosaur. I am a bit disturbed with the traps that mixed modes provide when combined with a likely demand from management to use the auto features to the greatest extent possible. No doubt each company will have differences in SOP.

I guess even helicopter pilots must now ask themselves more frequently:

Are you flying the aircraft, or is the aircraft flying you? :suspect:

Awaiting the more detailed findings with great interest.

ShyTorque

5th Sep 2013, 18:44

212, thanks. My first look at this and I promise to try to keep up in future.....

obnoxio f*ckwit

5th Sep 2013, 19:07

Lonewolf, you're right it is counterintuitive, it is however the way the L2 is set up. First upper mode selected goes on the cyclic, whether Alt or IAS. If the other one is selected, making it 4-axis, then Alt is on collective and IAS is on cyclic.
225 simplifies it, Alt is always collective, IAS is always cyclic

That's all well and good until one gets below max conserve airspeed, and/or into translation lift since one will begin feel the effects of being on the wrong side of the power curve.

Exactly!!

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 19:07

:D:ok::D

HC, we're gonna make you an honorary Canadian!

Malabo, I don't really understand why, but honoured anyway!

pilot and apprentice

5th Sep 2013, 19:07

Pittsthe industry has the system it deserves.

The industry has the system forced upon it by the same people who conduct witch-hunts based on scant evidence, chase scapegoats as early in the process as possible, and then sue if a mistake is made. Add in the fact that aviation has a much higher profile than, for instance, road accidents or boats.

HCThey have said what happened in detail, but it takes time to work out why (since at first glance I suspect it defies logic).italics added

Defies logic? I doubt it. But finding the root cause, separating the wheat from the chaff, will take more time than just stating the facts.

I can think of several very plausible and different sequences of events that may or may not have led to this result. Most are AP related but not all. We recently had an intermittent 26VAC bus Inverter issue on a 76C+. The result was seemingly random decoupling of the upper modes with minimal indication to the crew.

FFFMy posting a couple of pages back got trampled in a handbagging incident between Pitts and HC (Ladies, please!). Any thought on this as a theory?
http://flightsafety.org/hs/hs_may_june97.pdf

It certainly sounds like a good place to start.

These are the things the AAIB must now determine. They have a significant amount of data to sift through, including the CVR, to determine what the crew intended, what really happened, and how the difference between the 2 came about.

SASI shall take a bit of a Contrarian view on this Special AAIB Report.

My view is this report should not have been released.

The AAIB should have waited until they had digested the CVR data and decided what it meant....then released a Special Report that would go much further in describing the sequence of events and the time line of the CVR.

The Report as it reads now...tells very little and only generates more conjecture than it would otherwise had they waited to put out the CVR information.

Far too little information to justify a Report at this time.

Sorry SAS, I have to disagree here too. Given the anti-Super Puma/225 witch-hunt that was going on, it was inevitable and, SADLY, necessary to tell the world that there was not an obvious design issue.

HCBecause the L2 doesn't have the same power limiting functionality, its not normal to fly the L2 in 4-axis in the cruise or climb, but no reason not to for an approach. However much of the time the L2 will be being flown in 3 axis and perhaps that makes the fleet culture a bit different.

We are presuming of course that the collective axis was functional at the time, but that the crew chose not to use it.

As I mentioned earlier, I suspect that after this, there will be a tightening up of SOPs for use of automation, something which has mostly been at pilot's discretion up to now.

Finally, something to discuss. OUR 76C+ also lacks some of the power limiting functionality I hear about in the 225. As result, in the highly compressed sim sessions we are now being given (bean counters pay attention with shame!) one can expect nearly every approach to end OEI. The standard I have seen is a consequent discouragement to use 4-axis to prevent troubles related to power limiting. We tend to fight the way we train, which is to then avoid 4-axis.

I personally dislike rigid automation SOP's. I prefer to 'mix it up' from flight to flight in order to explore the capabilities and limitations of both the system, and my knowledge of it. I therefore am comfortable choosing the modes that will best help me when things get busy or difficult, but not surprised when the system is degraded.

HCthere should be an aural warning anytime autopilot functionality was lost to the point the pilot had to take manual control, but so far that hasn't been implemented.

As mentioned above a couple times, easy to miss on many types.

I won't quote you again, HC, on automation philosophy and how it has changed. As I have changed employers, continents, types, and years have passed I agree things changed from all hand flown rides, to all coupled, to something else. Inevitably there is an incident that highlights another chink in the armour and the world rushes to fix it. All this to say you are correct as to the progression.

-----------------
Again, my own personal defense is to, when allowed within the SOP's, use the various modes, in different combinations, and see how it reacts. This way I avoid, as much as possible, having to ask on a dark and stormy night: "what is it doing now?"

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 19:43

(ref the 225)

It appears to me that maybe those "protections" are overrated.

LW in general I agree with a good bit of your post, however I don't think you have quite grasped that this accident happened to and L2, not a 225. On the latter, the protections are not overrated (the former has none). To decry them is to deny the benefits of technological progress.

For example (on the 225), if you engage VS alone but have too little collective, the airspeed reduces until about 65 kts, then IAS automatically engages and stabilizes the speed at 65 kts (actual speed varies slightly according to dv/dt). That's fairly easy, but what if the collective channel is not working for some reason? ( its an MEL allowable defect, although I've never known it to be inop). Well then you have VS engaged on the cyclic with insufficient power to meet the needs. This time the IAS cannot engage automatically because the collective channel is inop. So what happens?

Well, what would you want to happen? You wouldn't want the IAS to go much below Vy, and that's exactly what happens. The VS mode starts to soft-limit the IAS to around 65 kts. So even though VS is still engaged according to the AFCS status zone, nothing engaged on the (inoperative) collective, the protections prevent the IAS getting too low.

So if, after that brief explanation of some of the protections, you still think they are over-rated, then perhaps you would tell us what sort of protections you think should be incorporated?

Bravo73

5th Sep 2013, 19:51

Lonewolf, you're right it is counterintuitive, it is however the way the L2 is set up. First upper mode selected goes on the cyclic, whether Alt or IAS. If the other one is selected, making it 4-axis, then Alt is on collective and IAS is on cyclic.

The reason for the L2 autopilot 'leading with the cyclic/attitude' was explained to me because it isn't a true 4-axis autopilot (although it is sold as such). It is in effect a '3 plus one' autopilot, ie a 3-axis autopilot with the 4th axis tagged on. This is why the L2 will always use attitude first to control or achieve speed or height, followed by power. (eg when the GA button is used :sad:).

Added to the analogue nature of the inputs and/or outputs (TBH, I can't remember which it is) and you have an autopilot that is less than ideal for some of the tasks that it is used for.

GS1140

5th Sep 2013, 19:56

The many crashes I see in the 76 sim are nearly always preceded by a loss of airspeed, whether or not an autopilot is used or installed. Certainly in the 76 if you look after the airspeed everything else will follow. If you don't look after the airspeed everything will fall apart. This applies in manual flight or in autoflight. Hence, if you are climbing, descending or on approach I firmly believe that you should have the autopilot look after airspeed first. Full coupling on approach is better, but if you can only engage one vertical mode, make it airspeed.
I can produce a crash 100% of the time in the sim when 2 cue by having the students set the power too low in a climb with VS engaged, or too low when approaching an ALTPRE level off.
I wonder whether autopilots tend to reduce our attentiveness and monitoring of flight instruments.

HeliComparator

5th Sep 2013, 20:04

The reason for the L2 autopilot 'leading with the cyclic/attitude' was explained to me because it isn't a true 4-axis autopilot (although it is sold as such). It is in effect a '3 plus one' autopilot, ie a 3-axis autopilot with the 4th axis tagged on. This is why the L2 will always use attitude first to control or achieve speed or height, followed by power. (eg when the GA button is used :sad:).

Added to the analogue nature of the inputs and/or outputs (TBH, I can't remember which it is) and you have an autopilot that is less than ideal for some of the tasks that it is used for.

However, in the case of this accident, the autopilot would have been better coupled in 4 axis and in that mode, its quite capable of flying a safe NPA.

SASless

5th Sep 2013, 20:05

PA,

I would have liked for the AAIB to include the CVR data....a couple more days would not make a difference one way or the other as to the future of the SP on the North Sea. It would have made a huge difference in the ability of the Operators and others to provide a better explanation of what happened and why. It could still be well short of a full report but the inclusion of the CVR data would remove a lot of speculation yet to come.

One thing I noticed in the Sim was when things started going wrong....one of the first reactions of a lot of Pilots was to de-select the Autopilot and revert to hand flying.

Part of that stemmed from the newness of both Sim Training and Autopilots. I would think as Automation and one's experience/familiarity with modern Autopilots this tendency would decrease.

The single most glaring mistake I saw was the failure to increase power upon executing a Missed Approach.....and when that happened....we saw a slow motion crash. The Crew would decide to go Missed....hit the G/A button....make their Radio Call....start looking for charts, maps, changing radio frequencies or whatever.....and the Autopilot would do its best to comply but at some point the climb rate could not be produced by the decrease in Airspeed and then the loss of control happened.

Generally, Unusual Attitude Recovery training is done with lots of airspeed and at higher altitudes. Low Airspeed events close to the ground are where helicopters are the most at risk.

What is the system in the UK for such training and testing on Base Checks?

Do you practice low or zero airspeed upsets?