AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

[Heathrow Harry]

according to the BBC they are still looking for the accident recorder

[chopper2004]

Without knowing the seriousness of the trauma per survivor , ICU care required etc, length of recovery time etc etc, could be a long wait before they are able to describe the moments before the aircraft went into the sea. Valuable piece of first hand evidence, IMHO.

The FAkebpok site Destroying the Super Pumas, , the name in itself is ummmmm well judge for yourselves. iMHO, not sure it is appropriate. The accident has cast a dark cloud and like everything and the last thing is more negativity? Am sure like everything else, it was probably started with genuine intentions and people that work in the oil industry and care but best intentions do not always work. Maybe it would be better if the site was dedicated to the memory of those who perished and a speedy recovery for those that did survive and support for the families?

Admittedly did have a quick gander and its predominantly the pax and their relatives who are commenting. Though there was a bit about how better the S92 is, and some1 responded to by listing the date of incidents involving S92 including the Cougar fatality. There was also a guy whom everyone on the site has shunned and slagged off, let's say his name begins with D. D said


" Maybe they should put you all in rowboats because motorboats can travel to fast and turn over.Dont make a joke of the statitics,get another job where you dont have to fly to your workplace but get there on foot because you should now start a petition to destroy trains, busses and anything that moves because it could cause a accident. Are you being forced to do the job you are doing or do you do it of your own free will ?LETS JUST START A PETITION TO DESTROY EVERYTHING THAT MOVES !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Utter and complete IDIOTS. SPEND YOUR LITTLE BRAINPOWER ON SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE !!!!"

Like some1 rightly said on here, one of the passenger gripes was about the delay of a flight because of a tech problem, so they decided to ground it, which showed the integrity of the operator to lose out and take the time in preventing an incident to fix. In the aforementioned Fakebook page a lot of the comments is from the pax observing the technical faults which cause the a/c to be grounded or returned back to base / helipad toute de suite. Nothing that remotely says "oh thankfully they did that" ?

Am sure there is the odd comment which has an ounce of substance to it, then possibly could be taken into the after actions

There is also a laughable from one person, that says


" Also ask why the army banned using super pumas a few years ago
Like · Reply · 23 · via mobile"

And the author of the above has an English name and writes in English so therefore when did the JHC operate the AS332 / 532 at any point!!

I've done Human Factor courses in aircraft maintenance and done the Robinson Helicopter Safety Course and am sure somewhere down the line, Human Factors will be part /play an appropriate and sizeable chunk of the investigation and the actions to follow the outcome?

All the best and speedy recovery to the survivors and thoughts with the families of those who perished.

[pumaboy]

May I suggest something maybe to make or reasurring to the bears.

before each departure would it not be an idea as part of the DVD breifing go down into the depatures lounge and take 10 minutes before start up and meet with the bears you going travel with and have an extra breifing with them and if they have any queries about travelling they can they can adress them to the crews and also they can see who they are flying with and they also be reasurred who and what they flying with in this very difficult times.

Just a sugestion.

[chopper2004]

Also what about the likes of the LA County Sheriff Department , are they gonna ground their Heli-One refurbished trio of L1? Will the Bundespolizei ground their fleet? They do operate SAR in the best or worst of weathers out in the Baltic?

Cheers

[HeliComparator]

Pumaboy, we have done that from time to time following previous incidents where passenger trust seemed to be waning. I expect we'll do it again when the 225 returns to service etc. My personal experience of that is that the passengers look at you with suspicion and are clearly thinking "what on earth are these guys doing here, why aren't they getting on with their real job" or "wow, things must be really bad because now they are sending the pilots down to try to sooth us".

Maybe it works for some, but not for any I have encountered.

[Bravo73]

before each departure would it not be an idea as part of the DVD breifing go down into the depatures lounge and take 10 minutes before start up and meet with the bears you going travel with and have an extra breifing with them and if they have any queries about travelling they can they can adress them to the crews and also they can see who they are flying with and they also be reasurred who and what they flying with in this very difficult times.

FYI, certain companies do that before every flight, regardless of recent accidents or incidents.

[Genie the Greenie]

HC:I understand Bond pilots brief their passengers in the daparture gates at all bases and this goes down very well.Maybe the offshore guys (you know the ones I said shouldn't be on this forum...humble pie being eaten!!)could comment if this gives any added confidence in seeing the crews face to face?

[meanttobe]

Bristow statement to investors on the current L2 incident

Bristow advises investors of changes to Super Puma operations | Vertical Magazine (http://www.verticalmag.com/news/article/24997#.Uhy83aa9LCQ)

On Aug. 26, Bristow Group filed the following report with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission:

On August 23, 2013, an incident occurred with an AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter operated by another helicopter company, which resulted in a ditching on the North Sea, near Sumburgh in the Shetland Isles, UK. The aircraft was carrying 16 passengers and two crew members at the time of the ditching. Four fatalities and multiple injuries were reported.

The cause of the incident is not yet known and is under investigation by authorities in the UK. To date there is no information to suggest that there is any connection between the current incident with the AS332 L2 aircraft and the prior incidents with the EC225 aircraft in the UK in May 2012 and October 2012. The EC225 incidents resulted in the issuance of a directive from the Civil Aviation Authority on October 25, 2012 suspending operations of the EC225 aircraft. No reports or directives have been issued by authorities in the UK as a result of the AS332 L2 incident. However, the Helicopter Safety Steering Group (HSSG), an industry group in the UK consisting of helicopter operators, union representatives and oil and gas customers, recommended as a precautionary measure on August 23, 2013 that operators suspend all Super Puma (which includes the AS332 L, AS332 L1, AS332 L2 and EC225 aircraft types) commercial passenger flights to and from offshore oil and gas installations within the UK. Separately, the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) on August 24, 2013 required operators of the AS332 L2 aircraft to suspend operations of the affected aircraft within Nigeria.

Bristow Group Inc. operates a total of twenty AS332 series aircraft worldwide as follows: AS332 L – Nine in Australia, one in Nigeria and seven in the UK; AS332 L1 – One in Australia; and AS332 L2 – Two in Nigeria.

The company has suspended operations of its two AS332 L2s in Nigeria. Consistent with the HSSG recommendation and after consultation with our customers, the company has also suspended operations of its seven AS332 Ls in the UK.

The company expects to increase utilization of other in-region aircraft and implement contingency plans designed to identify other available aircraft that can be safely and quickly mobilized to minimize or eliminate the impact on our clients’ critical operations. It is too early to determine whether the current incident will impact the timing of the return to service of the EC225 aircraft or otherwise have a material impact on the company.

[Fatigue]

Hey Genie,

I think you'll find Bond DO NOT brief the Pax at the departure gates at ALL bases........
Cheers.....

[Genie the Greenie]

Hi Fatigue:Wow, okay...it was my understanding!!! Does the fact that they brief passengers in the gates upset you, or the fact that they don't do it at your base?

[diginagain]

Mechta's idea has merit. Who would frame the Terms of Reference? OGUK's HSSG?

Genie; I welcomed the appearance of the crewmember at Bond's Aberdeen departure lounge, as it gave me an opportunity to get reacquainted with some colleagues from my past life in a growbag. I have no idea what my fellow passengers thought about the concept. Perhaps they wondered what the other Stick Monkey was up-to in their absence?

[HeliComparator]

GtG - it will be interesting to see what the response is. In my view, when I fly with "Big Airline" I don't expect a face to face briefing from the pilots. If I were to take a ride from some hick Grand Canyon tour operator in a 206, I would expect to get such a briefing. Therefore to me, it smacks of amateurishness, but I am quite happy to be corrected if the pax perceive it differently.

[cyclic]

Let us also mention that Bristow last put a SP in the N Sea water in 1995

and G-JSAR what was that? Sorry, but you have posted some great stuff but you do have Bristow blinkers on sometimes.

[pumaboy]

HC first of all everything you have posted on this thread I have to agree with you 100%

With your last post I hear what you are saying but in this difficult situation when we trying to gain confidence back in the sp fleet I think the punters see it that the crews are taking a little more time to take time an answer any queries the punters may have.

I have keep quite for long enough now and will probably get burned but here I go.

Regarding the FB site I think it should be taking down as I do not think it is right for such an a/c that has generated millions of hours and saved the oil companies millions of dollars when criticle spare parts/components have flown out on a sp at hours notice when it could shut down an installation and caused millions of dollars in lost revenue when it would have taken hours by supply vessel.

These small details are very quickly forgotten.

To me this is a total disrespect to the super puma familiy and I for one is very dissapionted at the hatred shown towards the Super Puma

It has flown many millions of safe hours and yes it has had it moments I do not argue with that but what happens if a S92 were to fall out of the sky's are you to start hatered to towards the S92 and have that banned.

To me the Super Puma is a very safe helicopter and very reilable and would rather fly in a Super Puma than any other helicopter.

I here what the offshore worker is saying and fully understand your arguments but you are reacting to an accident we do not even know the cause of, we are in the habit of listening and reading what the media have to say and most of the time it is BS.

Would it be better waiting for the facts to be published and then take reaction to it afterwards than to start a group calling for the scrapping of the Super Puma as simply riduclous.

[Fatigue]

Hey GTG,
I agree with HC that is seems amateurish...I would rather the crew spent all their time planning the flights and covering all the options and scenarios rather than one going off to brief the Pax....(quite often being the captain,leaving the co-jo to plan/finish up etc) with the one hour report time before flight doesn't actually leave much time for anything extra...When I board an airliner I like to see the two pilots in the cockpit taking care of business, covering all eventualities etc and wouldn't like it if one was chatting to the pax at the gate while one was in the cockpit doing things alone(the reason for two crew is to monitor each other)!
Does it make the Passengers feel better?? Split opinions on that one, some like it, some actually think the companies are trying to hide something!!! :confused:
Cheers.

[HeliComparator]

cyclic, I mentioned JSAR in post #441. I know I have posted a lot, but please don't accuse me of doing something (or omitting to do something) that I have in fact done.

In that post I mentioned JSAR but said I was omitting if from that particular post. So hardly a cover-up!

I didn't say why, but this is why:

It was a SAR machine, not an oil and gas crewchange machine, and once you start comparing accident rates for aircraft in completely different roles, it all gets rather daft.

Secondly, and frustratingly, the cause of that ditching was never really established so its hard to make any comment about it - ie was it the fault of the operator, the manufacturer, pilot issues or technical issues (or a combination) or what.

[Ex Greenie]

I think that all the hatred posted on FB is unwarranted and has been promoted by an ill informed press who are sensationalising and scaremongering to increase sales. Most "followers" have simply "liked" the page out of ignorance and do not really understand the issues.

I for one would be happy to step aboard any variant of Puma.

For offshore workers to complain if an aircraft is late because of a technical fault and then accuse operators of being complacent is a bit two faced and before I get derided for saying this I am an offshore worker and hear the petty crumblings in the "teashack" all day.

We do not yet know the cause of the recent accident and until we do we should reserve judgement.

[SASless]

Why do we see Airline flying being any different from helicopter fights offshore?

We offer a safe, efficient, if not very commodious cabin environment, aerial transportation to the passengers desired destination.

The end result should be the same....on time departure, safe arrival, and hopefully the baggage arrives along with the passenger.

Who does the briefing does not matter....so long as the briefing is done before every single flight.

The passengers have an obligation to pay attention to the Briefing so they can be prepared should something go wrong and they need to perform those actions necessitated by the problem.

That being said....having a personal touch with the passengers is not a bad thing....but after all....Pilots have other important duties to perform that have far more to do with the safe conduct of flight than doing a Pax Briefing.

I do sometimes wonder what drives the "militancy" of the offshore passenger....is it only a concern about helicopter safety....or are there other factors at play here?

[Genie the Greenie]

No problem with accpeting opinions Fatigue that's why we are all on here. I don't have to brief in that manner so no skin off my nose I have just heard some passengers like the eye to eye contact. If it's eating into planning time then that's a safety issue and I completely agree with you however knowing some of the Bond pilots I would doubt if they would allow that to happen.

[Grenville Fortescue]

In the short term, how about another appoach? A confidential survey, or confidential interviews with all personnel who have worked for more than one North Sea helicopter operator? It is bound to identify examples of how similar incidents were handled in different ways.

My concern is that the further away from the spanners/cyclic stick/ops room one goes, the more the true 'modus operandi' is distorted and the detail missed. Only by being right where the decisions are made, can a true feel for the way a helicopter is operated be made.

I think this would be a good start and there are others who concur that what you have suggested is a good idea - take it forward!

[iamthetroll]

When the crew join you in the departure gate everything is wrapped up. Planning was finished long ago, the aircraft started, checks all carried out and rotors running on the hotspot all that is left is to collect the pax.
All of the planning, briefing, and preparing the aircraft is carried out as a crew. You might be under the impression that it is always the captain who briefs you, it is not. Either way the pilot left in the aircraft is more than capable of monitoring the systems whilst the other briefs the pax.
A report time of one hour prior to departure may be the expected minimum, typically you'll find most crews are in before that -nearer an hour and a half- as they are all aware of the variable potential of the schedule; and would prefer to get the planning done and enjoy a cup of tea with the extra time.

This may have all changed since I left, but I don't think it has.

[Fareastdriver]

airway45. One thing that intrigues me is how do the Norwegian operators ensure that replacement shafts where the oil pump extensions are going to fail are not fitted to Norwegian registered. aircraft.

[stilldellin]

Link to photo of position of Bibby Polaris during search for the tail section this afternoon :-
Bibby Polaris & Fitful stack IMG_8227 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/16633132@N04/9605986099/)
As a new member it seems I can not post attachments so apologies in advance if this is incorrect.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

I really can't see any crew from any company allowing something secondary like briefing pax to affect the way they plan their flights. The plan takes as long as it takes.

A quick single stop Forties with a light load on a gin clear solid coastal day does not take long. A multiple stop, tight fuel, big loads, poor weather, changing diversions etc etc flight takes much longer. If the flight goes late because it has taken a long time to ensure that the plan is absolutely right, so be it.

It's quite insulting to suggest that the crews would allow the conduct of their flights to be compromised that way.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Bears - Put on your "big boy" pants - or get out the industry!

Offshore oil workers who expressed concerns about flying were told to put on their “big boy pants” or give up working in the industry days before a helicopter left their platform and crashed with the loss of four lives.

The blunt advice was given to workers on the Borgsten Dolphin rig on August 8 during a briefing that was meant to reassure them about the safety of the Super Puma EC225 aircraft, which was allowed to return to service two weeks ago. The briefing was delivered by officials from the oil firm Total and the helicopter operator CHC, whose aircraft crashed last week.

A recording of the event, featuring CHC’s chief pilot Will Hanekom, and managers from Total, including the head of logistics Christophe Barber, reveals that one worker asked what the oil company would do if workers refused to board an aircraft.

According to the Press and Journal newspaper, a CHC representative said: "I have to say, how else are we going to get there? It is what we do. At some point we have to put our big boy pants on and say either 'we believe', either what I am telling you is the truth and I'm willing to sit in the front and risk my family and everything that I have got. If you don't, well, I wouldn't force any of my pilots to fly if they didn't want to."

During the same conversation an official from Total told workers: "I am hoping we won't get there. I hope we get to the point where we have information so you say, 'I understand there was a problem. But I understand that the gearbox is now safe'."

The worker said: "Every man I have spoken to says they don't want to get on one."

Helicopter crash: workers told to put 'big boy pants' on after expressing safety fears - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/10268574/Helicopter-crash-workers-told-to-put-big-boy-pants-on-after-expressing-safety-fears.html)

[SASless]

OOPS!

Sometimes you just wish you could take back something you said...which when looked at later in a different light sure could have been said better and differently.

We know what he meant....and it was not as it sounds now but oh...my!

[cyclic]

This is very much the problem when pilots are asked to give an opinion like this. We are not risk takers but by the very nature of the job, we are risk acceptors i.e we know that there is always risk associated with aviation and a little more so in the offshore world even in the best maintained, best operated helicopter. If we aren't comfortable with the extra risk, we would never fly and we wouldn't be able to do our job properly. For some of our passengers, it is difficult to accept this risk and I have every sympathy with them, there isn't one of us who have not had a little dark thought during the quiet moments of the cruise. However, we have to put these thoughts stirred up by our inner chimp, aside. For our passengers and us, there is a choice. We are all volunteers, there are no press gangs on the streets of Aberdeen and if your inner chimp starts to take control with dark thoughts, then maybe you need to take a deep look at your life and ask the question, what the hell am I doing here? We all have bills, mortgages etc. but there is always another way.

I have every sympathy for the pilot who uttered these words and we all know what he said is right. You can jump in a S92/139/155 tomorrow and the risk is the same. The fortunes of timing we cannot control and I don't suppose he feels particularly great at the moment but please don't persecute an aviator who was just telling the truth.

[bondu]

Cyclic,

Good post with some very pertinent points.

bondu

[SASless]

there isn't one of us who have not had a little dark thought during the quiet moments of the cruise.

Too True, Mate!

When things are busy....weather is bad....winds holding you back....fuel reserve getting lower....no problem.....but pretty day...George driving...lunch done....music tuned on the ADF....and UH OH! Counting your money sitting at the table is a bad move!

It just proves all Helicopter Pilots are Pessimists.

[pumaboy]

Good post Cyclic could not have written better

We all have a choice.

[pilot and apprentice]

Cyclic: so well spoken

SAS: it's not pessimism, it's realism.

[check]

Yes those statistics look bad, but statistics can be adjusted to suit an individuals leanings. The Puma family has been around for more than 45 years, I first flew them more than 35 years ago.

I don't have them, but if you look at the statistics of Puma family on the NS over this period you will find the ratio of years/accidents very low.

The result is dependent on the time scale short period, not good - long period, very good.

However I do understand where you are coming from, but for those who flew in the Puma before these recent incidents would only be complaining of discomfort.

[SASless]

I have had the same feeling sitting in the Business Class section of a not B-747 over the middle of the North Atlantic in Winter....looking down at the mostly white cap covered Ocean...knowing how big the waves were...how cold the water was...and how far from help we were.....thinking about the ETOPs concept that put us there in an Airplane with exactly two engines....is this trip really necessary!

A couple of double whisky's later....all was fine!

[diginagain]

...looking down at the mostly white cap covered Ocean...knowing how big the waves were...how cold the water was........is this trip really necessary!

A couple of double whisky's later....all was fine! Thoughts that will sustain me tomorrow during the FROG-3 ride down to the Loke Viking.

[heliski22]

Counting your money sitting at the table is a bad move!

...ain't THAT the truth! :ok:

[Pedalo]

Whilst enjoying a nice relaxing beer today at a beer garden, I overheard a few 'bears' sitting next to me that they we not prepared to fly the super puma family again...one of their main topics was alternate transportation ideas to and from the rigs.

After hearing some interesting (kind of) ideas (a-hum) , I'd come to the conclusion that what Aberdeen harbour needs is a pedalo hire place, ideal for transportation/exercise/rig hopping/socialising to and from the rigs.

One could hire all sort of pedalo's , old ones, new ones, big ones, small ones, ones with slides, multi crew ones, ones with blow up palm trees, ones shaped like an animal.

The choice could be endless!! Or what about the banana boat..?

http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Observer/Pix/pictures/2012/7/19/1342706059952/Swandown-008.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/31/BananaBoat.JPG/1024px-BananaBoat.JPG

[airwave45]

airway45. One thing that intrigues me is how do the Norwegian operators ensure that replacement shafts where the oil pump extensions are going to fail are not fitted to Norwegian registered. aircraft.

Not one iota of a clue.
Me, my buddies and the fuel make auw.

What I do know is that there has not been one Norwegian on here giving me a hard time.

Went out for a meal, come back and the conversation has drifted back onto "how well we do things"
And you do. . . . . . Sort of.

The briefings thing.
Imho best if you don't do that.
Along with the epauletes, a bit of mystique makes for a normal pax's confidence in the system.

As a group, you are somewhat predisposed to telling each other how well you do things. Which has it's place.
Probably indicative that you are feeling "got at".

Does a bunch of pilots standing in a circle patting each other on the back about how good they are make me want to get into a Scottish maintanied and run helicopter, erm, no.

Given that a "peaceful protest" is being organised outside the otc gig next month, do I feel the situation will get better soon.
No.

Not one single comment in the last day has indicated to me that any current p1/p2 is doing or organising a sytematic approach to the systemic failures apparent in the Scotish operation.

Now, does anyone have a number to buy stocks in the walk to work systems . .

[SUMBURGH DIRECTOR]

BALPA | STATEMENT ON THE NORTH SEA L2 INCIDENT (http://www.balpa.org/News-and-campaigns/News/STATEMENT-ON-THE-NORTH-SEA-L2-INCIDENT.aspx)

human error then? ;)

BALPA members wish to extend their deepest sympathies to the families of those who have lost their lives in the recent helicopter accident, as well as to the survivors who have undergone such a traumatic experience. BALPA members understand only too well the concerns of passengers about safety and wish to reassure them that pilots will not operate if the statutory authorities advise against or if individual crews believe, for whatever reason, it is unsafe so to do.

Pending release of the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) report we believe, based on experience in the field of accident investigation, that it is a mistake to draw early conclusions which often prove wide of the mark. And, to be clear, the recent suspension of operations was not based on an AAIB recommendation or proven safety concerns but was an understandable response by the companies which charter the operations and if that approach continues then BALPA will support it.

In the meantime BALPA wishes to confirm that the confidence of its members in the Super Puma family of aircraft remains unchanged. Indeed the aircraft continues to operate commercial air transport flights throughout the rest of the world including the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. We should not rush to judge an aircraft which has 3 very different variants and has successfully transported millions of passengers worldwide in safety over 30 years of operation.

However once the recommendations of the AAIB accident report into last Friday’s accident have been published, BALPA believes there is a need to take a step back and, as well as reviewing each of the 5 individual accident investigations, to consider as a whole what can be done to improve the safety of both the offshore workforce (our passengers) and BALPA members who share the same risks, but on a daily basis. Such an investigation might usefully take a comparative view on the approaches of our Norwegian colleagues who do things in the same geographic operating area yet with an apparently better safety record.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

The BALPA statement has just come out, with a lot of references to Norwegian operations (which were heavily discussed on this thread over the weekend and even yesterday) but I suppose that's just coincidence.

I truly wonder what the cause of this tragic accident was.

[mary meagher]

My problem with being an airline passenger is I have absolutely no control over the flight.... being pilot in charge of my car, in statistically greater danger on country roads, I have every confidence in the driver! Why would any sane person ride a motorcycle? So much for statistical analysis of risk informing reasonable choice of transport.

It was always interesting and involving to listen into cockpit RT on some airlines. At least you knew what was going on. Could this be possible on a heli? The more one understands what is actually happening, usually the better one can put away irrational fear and become involved with the flight.

One other question; do the NS oil rig workers get paid for travel time? If the journey took 12 hours on a boat, relative to 2 hours by Super Puma, perhaps a financial incentive might overcome reluctance to board the chopper.

[nomorehelosforme]

I was going to try and ignore your posting, with respect this is a thread that involved the loss of 4 lives, I kindly ask that you show some respect and remove your totally inappropriate and childish post? I also ask the moderator to review it and possibly decide to remove it?

Thank you

[HeliComparator]

The day that moderators remove something like that, that upsets someone looking to be upset, will be a very sad day for this forum.

[nomorehelosforme]

Pm me if you want

[HeliComparator]

I don't want, but feel free to PM me if you have something to say.

[Mechta]

How much of an uproar would it cause if helicopter passengers were told, 'You're a big guy, so sit by the door. You're a slim guy, so sit by the removable window. You can fit through it easily, and agile enough to do it quickly.'?

My guess is that the slimmer passengers would complain like mad that they are being moved away from the larger exit, despite the fact that such a process would give a greater chance of getting everyone out alive, and it wouldn't have crossed their minds if it hadn't been brought to their attention.

There are some aspects of improving flight safety that, whilst valid, are likely never to see the light of day...

[jimf671]

Mechta.

It's crossed my mind plenty. What kind of window? A nice big EC225 window?

[OffshoreSLF]

"How much of an uproar would it cause if helicopter passengers were told, 'You're a big guy, so sit by the door. You're a slim guy, so sit by the removable window. You can fit through it easily, and agile enough to do it quickly.'

My guess is that the slimmer passengers would complain like mad that they are being moved away from the larger exit, despite the fact that such a process would give a greater chance of getting everyone out alive, and it wouldn't have crossed their minds if it hadn't been brought to their attention.

There are some aspects of improving flight safety that, whilst valid, are likely never to see the light of day..."


One thing I did notice about the 3 guys that didn't make it, was that they were all somewhat "older", ie in their 50's. The guys on the TV of the survivors coming out of the CG helicopter all looked much younger.

Is there a case for "early retirement" on safety grounds, I wonder??

FWIW, Thankfully I'm well past the age of having to get on a flight offshore, but if I did have to go, I'd have no problems getting on a SP of any variant.

Just a thought - hope you guys don't mind.

[Mechta]

Jimf671 wrote:
It's crossed my mind plenty. What kind of window? A nice big EC225 window?

Jimf671, given the choice, where would you sit? I've not flown in an EC225, but I would guess that the door, being larger, is the preferred option as an escape route?

[XV666]

How much of an uproar would it cause if helicopter passengers were told, 'You're a big guy, so sit by the door. You're a slim guy, so sit by the removable window. You can fit through it easily, and agile enough to do it quickly.'?

What, like the emergency row on an airliner? The one where the passenger has to meet physical attributes and be briefed in order to sit there?

No one complains about that, do they......

[HeliComparator]

On the other hand, the door is harder to jettison unless you are the one sitting next to the handle.

But I do think some sense of proportion is needed (no pun intended). Yes, its true that old, fat people may find it harder to exit than young fit ones. But set against that, look at the probabilities. Even though we have had these 5 recent events, only one required very rapid evacuation and even then we don't really know the full story yet.

I have over 10,000 hrs on offshore helis is a career spanning 30 years, as do very many of my colleagues. No-one I can think of has had to make a rapid evacuation due to upturned helicopter. So for the average bear making 1 round trip every 5 weeks, the chances of having to do this is really extremely small. It would of course be a personal decision, but I see no logical reason for someone of the grey and chubby variety to give up offshore work. They are far, far more likely to die from eg a heart attack.

[Mechta]

heli wrote:

What, like the emergency row on an airliner? The one where the passenger has to meet physical attributes and be briefed in order to sit there?

No one complains about that, do they......

The fundamental difference is that in the helicopter case, the least agile people would be put nearest the largest exit. That would be equivalent to putting infirm, disabled and large passengers closest to the airliner's emergency exits, to give them a better chance of escape.

[iamthetroll]

Airwave45:

I have enjoyed reading your posts thus far. In general they are a welcomed balance to the forum, and I am pleased to see someone representing the 19 guys down the back actually spend a credible amount of time to-an-fro'ing with the likes of HC, a well respected contributor representing the two drivers up front. Please don't rush off.

My question to you, and the workforce, and those all spouting statistics and likelihood of this that or the other thing versus what the Noggies do on a different or similar type; all protesting that they will never board another Puma: what if it turns out that this accident was the result of pilot error?

Suddenly all the screaming about abandoning the type becomes nothing more than grudge, really. The catalyst of the current protests, and petitions is this most recent incident citing 5 accidents in 4 years and taking it out on the type. If it were pilot error what do you think the industry's response would be? Ground the pilots?
That is not an attack on the response of the offshore workforce, just a parallel application of logic. I'm genuinely curious whether that'd put some egg on faces, or if this might be the beginning of an unstoppable movement - regardless of outcome.

[diginagain]

On the other hand, the door is harder to jettison unless you are the one sitting next to the handle.
If you are sitting adjacent to the main cabin door jettison handle for the AS332-series or the EC225, you are not sitting next to the door, but in the row forward of the door.

Ergo, if you are sitting next to the main cabin door, you are reliant on another passenger to operate the emergency jettison.

[Hummingfrog]

During my time on the 332L and then as pax going to man an offshore based a/c I noticed that there has always been self selection of where one sat. This was done by arranging one's position in the crocodile going out to the a/c! One favourite seat being the single by the door.

As I type this they haven't found the tail. The 332L didn't have a float bag in the tail - does the 332L2.

HF

[HeliComparator]

Obviously, I don't travel in the back very often, but surely you can reach the door jettison handle when you are in the seat row which (on the 225) faces backwards and is in the main door zone, albeit the handle is pretty much above your head and so out normal view?

[HeliComparator]

HF - no, but since there is a sonar pinger on the CVFDR, I am surprised they haven't found it yet. Strange. Does anyone know the range, and effectiveness of direction finding, of such a sonar pinger?

[diginagain]

Obviously, I don't travel in the back very often, but surely you can reach the door jettison handle when you are in the seat row which (on the 225) faces backwards and is in the main door zone, albeit the handle is pretty much above your head and so out normal view? Try it next time you're in the hangar, wearing three layers of clothing, an immersion suit (ours, not yours) and a LAPP jacket. The handle is not above your head.

HF - no, but since there is a sonar pinger on the CVFDR, I am surprised they haven't found it yet. Strange. Does anyone know the range, and effectiveness of direction finding, of such a sonar pinger? Or indeed the life of the battery. Is the data not in the ODM, or civ equivalent?

[MoodyMan]

Regarding the comments earlier in this thread pontificating on the quality of the current version of what used to be called the RGIT.

I did the refresher earlier this year at Petrofac and was amazed that for each ditching exercise they actually stopped the descent of the HUET and instructed everyone to "DEPLOY RE-BREATHER" then waited for a thumbs up from everyone onboard before proceeding to dunk us in the water. It would be damn handy if the pilots were able to be this considerate in a real emergency!!

Complete box ticking exercise.

[HeliComparator]

Beacon battery life, once activated, is 30 days. The spec gives a sound pressure level but I have no idea how that translates into range under water, or how easy it is to locate the direction. Not the sort of info a pilot needs to know.

[terminus mos]

How much of an uproar would it cause if helicopter passengers were told, 'You're a big guy, so sit by the door. You're a slim guy, so sit by the removable window. You can fit through it easily, and agile enough to do it quickly.'?

Really? You haven't seen our " emergency exit ring" then. Its a template of a type 4 exit. If it fits over you, OK. If not, no fly.

[jimf671]

... given the choice, where would you sit? I've not flown in an EC225, but I would guess that the door, being larger, is the preferred option as an escape route?

An aisle seat near the middle of an L2 doesn't give me a good feeling. Between there being somebody between me and the smaller middle window and then the door handle situation, there are too many variables. Upsides down in the dark with 18 other confused people, it may not be a happy place.

Nice big windows all the way along in the EC225 seems far better. More options and less chance of somebody plugging one. If somebody gets the doors off, even better.

What do people think about the exit layout and size on the S-92?

[dmsims]

"Does anyone know the range, and effectiveness of direction finding, of such a sonar pinger?"

2-3 Km range

[HeliComparator]

Thanks - so why hasn't the CVFDR been found?

[diginagain]

What do people think about the exit layout and size on the S-92? Unless you're in either the front or rear row, not particulary useful.
My preferred seat in AS332- or EC225? Row 1, or centre seat Row 2.

[OMONEZ]

No chance Nick with the door jett handles they are really blocked and you cant get to them if the seat is fitted in reverse.

HC Dukane DK 100 was 38 KHz and about 30 Nm range for a hand held hydro-phone. Smaller beacon now.

Sorry N, not an expert in sonar but it will suffer the same problems as radar, false reflections. we used to call it bounce.
Close to rocks etc.

The 92 windows in the middle cabin are VERY tight

Not easy to get a passive sonar boat into Sumb head. I know you worked that out.

[SASless]

I like that Idea of Pedalo's.....If those that decide to refuse to fly in a particular aircraft are then offered several alternative modes of transport then perhaps they could find one that suits their needs and desires.

Now granted, the one Pedalo offers up might find it hard going to keep revenues up in the Winter but in Summer....it would be a far more invigorating ride to and from.....why the Hols could begin immediately upon departing the Rig/Platform.

I do believe he is on to something here.

As I have called for a Shields down review....I would call everyone's attention to his submission as being fresh thinking, innovative, and welcome. On the other hand it does need some Staffing Work before we could do an official test of the concept.


As my Norwegian is about as fluent as my Swahili.....can someone help me out with these Tables.




http://www.luftfartstilsynet.no/flysikkerhetsstatestikk/A_offshore.htm


How does that compare to the UK data?


http://www.luftfartstilsynet.no/flysikkerhetsstatestikk/A_offshore-filer/Offshore_29345_image003.png

[Heliarctic]

@SASless
The top stats, are accidents and activity.
RED color is: Accidents without fatalities.
Black color is: Fatal accidents.
Green color is: flight hours.

Bottom stats, are accident rates.
And the green dots are accidents per 100.000 hours
Blue line is 3 year rates/periods.

Info.is for norwegian aircraft only it says in the bottom.

I am assuming that the danish and dutch north sea statistics look somewhat like the norwegians?

[OMONEZ]

Could we put a few things to bed here now? The Puma family is safe as can be, I am type rated by EASA 330 thru 225LP all version. I also hold type rating for all the other types used in oil and gas support in the North Sea. We have seen Maintenance, Operational and Passenger training issueses that the authority has fail to to deal with. Lets look at the tick box management we endure now rather than the 30 year old over 41000 hours service puma that has never put any one at risk.

[Wiggins61]

It seems strange to me that nothing has been released yet. I would have thought that two experienced pilots would have been better witnesses to the actual occurrence than a CVFDR. There must be some difficult negotiations going on between the OEM and the operator on how best to save the plummeting reputation of the Puma family.:confused:

[bigglesbutler]

I would have thought that two experienced pilots would have been better witnesses to the actual occurrence than a CVFDR

That's a bit unfair on the crew, I had a flight where we were convinced a blade control rod was about to disconnect but it turned out to be a gyro bearing failure. The recollection of the crew is coloured by emotion so until the CVFDR is recovered I wouldn't want anyone rushing around making statements if it was me.

Just my 2 cents

Si

[Wiggins61]

Mmmmmmmm. Perhaps your right.

[Dragoon52]

I am also rated from AS332L through EC225LP. Fully support your confidence. Safe Flight always.

[SASless]

During periods of extreme stress...human memory can be a poor tool when looking back at a sequence of events as one focuses upon the most immediate issues of concern while missing most of what else is going on at the time.

Nothing unusual about that at all.

As good as the Pilot accounts shall be....they do not necessarily tell the whole and entire truth of the event. Not that they are being intentionally deceitful....not at all....just that they were deluged with inputs, sounds, lights, physical forces, and as is common in very serious emergency situations....took actions that were a result of training and experience that they may not even recall having done.

The CVR and Data Recorder does not suffer from those Human weaknesses....the wee digital memory they use retains everything without any emotion or psychological constraints. They too have their weaknesses but when combined with all of the evidence the AAIB shall discover.....the Truth of this tragedy will very likely be found.

The CVR and Data Recorder are crucial to a successful investigation as they do hold an incredible amount of information that is so useful to the investigators.

An example.....during Simulator Training I used to videotape every single Sim Session. Sometimes I would take the Trainees down to the classroom...get them Coffee....turn the Video of the Previous Session on for them to view while drinking their Coffee.....and when i returned....you could see a much changed demeanor in them as they got to watch their own performance....or lack of in the Sim earlier.

It was not unusual for them to admit they were no aware of some of the things they saw in the video.

[OMONEZ]

Si what are you talking about? Never on my shfit.

Check CHC press release and you be happy

Sas that pish doesnt help

[bigglesbutler]

I have no beef, but SASless has put the point far more eloquently than me :D. My point was simply use all the information available for a balanced evaluation, not just human recollection.

Si

[Wiggins61]

The only problem is that the two potential failure modes you use as examples would not be positively be picked up by a FDR. The best proof for this scenario would be a crew member reporting a severe vibration.

[SASless]

I think my question about the "militancy" of the Offshore Workers just got answered.....a small number of the workers seems to be making most of the noise and evidently are out of step with their fellows.

Also....I see BALPA is calling for a broad scale review of North Sea Operations.

This is good news in my view.

North Sea oil workers drop protest as hunt for Super Puma 'black box' goes on | World news | The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/27/super-puma-crash-union-protest)

[bigglesbutler]

You allways were happy when I said good to go.

Yup always trust our engineers :ok:, that's why I am happy who I work for.

Having been in an uncomfortable position myself I was only sticking up for the affected crew as they will be very stressed themselves till this is fully investigated by the AAIB. As such people start to doubt what they saw and heard due to the stress of the whole incident so the CVFDR is vital to get the whole picture. It's nothing malicious just human nature when under stress :ok:.

Si

[Prawn2king4]

This is an “us and them” situation. Why?

The aviation professionals (and in this topic I refer to the pilots - mainly) and the oil company professionals who fly with them are both in the same boat. So why don’t we see the same groundswell of opinion among the flyers? Because, of course, most pilots have, throughout their careers done their own assessment, accept there is an inherent risk in their profession and therefore strive, via training, experience and discussion to minimize that risk as much as possible. And in general they succeed, though I would suggest that most of them who have been flying for more than a few years personally knew someone in their profession who was killed or injured in an aviation related accident. So, that’s a fact – and it’s their choice.

Their passengers on the other hand generally have no such choice, other than to change their profession- and there’s the rub. So perhaps their employers should offer a choice, boat transfer or air transfer – up to you. Of course, this would play havoc with rostering, but it could be done.

The oil companies could also do more. Most either have their own aviation auditors or hire them. I don’t suggest these audits are mere ticks in boxes (though some are), but generally they follow a certain pattern – conducted usually once a year checking management, training, experience, engineering and line flying. But there is no day to day involvement and perhaps there should be; possibly in the form of one of their own crew seconded to the helicopter operator for the duration of the contract. I don’t for one moment suggest this would improve standards, on the N Sea they are already very high, but it would be a useful link between passengers, management on both sides and flyers.

But the bottom line is that by its very nature, helicopter flying and offshore oil support has its risks and no matter how high the professional standard, these will from time to time result in incidents – and these incidents, despite the hysteria regarding the current location, will be random.

[OMONEZ]

SAS. Just read your last post again, only human saw what I wanted to see. Sorry!

The helicopter is safe. Its the structure of the companies and worst the lower managment bonus culture.

As much as I like MB. That will be the same person who though the b--d crew did well with the 225 ditching. CFIT(W) No control at that rate of decent. Crash!

Airwave.
There seems to be a little level head in your last post. I havent read it all but this is the point to start working together.

We have lost the core of knowledge in our section of the North Sea now, so much is ticks in the box. You can help to change that.

Airwave!
Ok,
To be clear, you won't find any of my posts having a go at a specific aircraft.
They are in a thread about one particular incident, but tragic as the loss of life and aircraft is, this specific incident really is not what I'm posting for.

Bollocks

[airwave45]

Airwave45:

I have enjoyed reading your posts thus far. In general they are a welcomed balance to the forum, and I am pleased to see someone representing the 19 guys down the back actually spend a credible amount of time to-an-fro'ing with the likes of HC, a well respected contributor representing the two drivers up front. Please don't rush off.

My question to you, and the workforce, and those all spouting statistics and likelihood of this that or the other thing versus what the Noggies do on a different or similar type; all protesting that they will never board another Puma: what if it turns out that this accident was the result of pilot error?

Suddenly all the screaming about abandoning the type becomes nothing more than grudge, really. The catalyst of the current protests, and petitions is this most recent incident citing 5 accidents in 4 years and taking it out on the type. If it were pilot error what do you think the industry's response would be? Ground the pilots?
That is not an attack on the response of the offshore workforce, just a parallel application of logic. I'm genuinely curious whether that'd put some egg on faces, or if this might be the beginning of an unstoppable movement - regardless of outcome.


Ok,
To be clear, you won't find any of my posts having a go at a specific aircraft.
They are in a thread about one particular incident, but tragic as the loss of life and aircraft is, this specific incident really is not what I'm posting for.

Now, if it does turn out to be CFIT, I really feel for the crew.
Which also comes back to the original reason I got brave enough to come in here in the first place.

Which is, Too Many, Too often.
And after looking at the numbers (Which, I know you can turn any way you want) but without getting too picky with them and being really rough.
One side of the N Sea puts 10x more helicopters in the water than the other.

This could well be a statistical anomoly, it may turn out as time goes past that the Scottish side of the operation doesn't put an aircraft in the water for the next 10 years.
Which will leave us scratching our heads and wondering what is going on (well, we won't, we'll all be fat happy and home for T and medals each night)

I feel that you are asking, Based on "If it is human error, then boo ya to the baying mob out to get the Puma"

Which is missing the point that, had there not been so many crashes, there would be no baying mob (which is dying off, people have short memories)

From the back of the bus, we care not a jot whether it is CFIT, or the elastic band that holds the gearbox to the airframe failing, what we see is another wet helicopter and another funeral to go to.

You are percieved (Helicopter + crew) as "one system" be that human or mechanical factors which cause an incident, it is beyond the remit of the slf to figure out what caused it, that is your job.

And if it is CFIT, it still comes down to Too many, too often.
Why do the Noggies not fly their helicopters into the oggin?

I'm 100% sure that the view from the pointy end is different, there is your personal proffesionalism and respect for the machinery.
Which you can differentiate.

If it is CFIT, why are we so good at that? (as it wouldn't be the first of those recently either)
A "Can do" attitude is great, in the right place. Maybe instead of the bears putting their big boy pants on, the pilots need to put on slippers and be a lot less willing to work up to limits.
It might be time to drop operational limits further?
Worse still, appropriate use of automation (AP) may have to extend further into the flight envelope and you become more like your plank flying brothers who only get to waggle the sticks for the first 45 and last 45 seconds of each flight.

From my perspective, last time I had to go offshore N Sea I did not sleep at all the night before I went and was a nervous wreck through the briefing.
Wasn't so bad going out to the helicopter and felt the flight was a non event.
Was offshore for about 10 days and from 2 days before coming back, started getting myself all worked up about getting on the helicopter again.

Were it just me who was like that, I would have my big boy pants on standby for such eventualities.
But it's not just me.
That baying mob out there is made up of old farts like me who have lost their bottle, there is a reason that the bottle has gone, but we don't know the root cause of that reason (Too many, too often)

I fly for fun, I've been on more plank flights and helicopter flights than is credible, Scottish helicopters scare the crap out of me.
Which is why, I'm not getting on another one.
I'm not going to say never, but I've manouvered myself to a place where I don't have to anytime soon.

[terminus mos]

OMONEZ

Why not save your thoughts for one post instead of shooting from the hip every few seconds. You are becoming tiresome and rude. We are not usually rude to each other on Rotorheads so pack it in.

[parabellum]

Agree with SASless, I had an engine failure at 700' in an AB206A, afterwards I was asked to complete a report that asked for N1, EGT, oil Px and Temp etc. at time of failure! Sorry, wasn't looking, no idea, I may have seen something but all mental ability was directed to getting down safely. Sounds like this accident was a whole different ball game, possible control failure at 400' in poor viz, I wouldn't expect the pilots to remember much at all.

I would have hoped that the Royal Navy still had a helicopter with a sonar buoy that they could dunk near the accident site that would pick up the FDR.

[Hummingfrog]

AW 45

A good post and having been a shuttle pilot most of my NS life living and eating with "the Bears" I do understand your fears. During my time spent offshore I always tried to answer any concerns you all had about line/shuttle flying but was still surprised how many people were terrified of their journey to work. This was long before the present cluster of incident/accidents. I think I managed to allay some fears but more needs to be done.

It would be interesting to know how many workers are unfortunately killed on their way to the heliport. I know of pilots killed/injured on their way in; interestingy mostly on motorbikes! Which is, therefore, more hazardous - flight or commute to flight?

As far as the present cluster goes I think we should discount the 225 gearbox problems as it is just a matter of luck as to who gets issued with a particular box, just like your new car may be a rogue one. We should concentrate on why the "preventable", used as a very loose description occurred.

As an "old salt" I agree with you that the use and complexity of the autopilot is a worry. I understand that the systems are not user friendly, perhaps because they may be fixed wing nav systems not altered for helicopter usage. I am retired so haven't used the new systems but I can give one example.

Fuel is a very important aspect of operations! On the 365N2 I could call up one page which would show me actual fuel at each way point I had in my route. Destination and diversion being the most important, and is was very accurate. This took alot of stress away if the weather was bad and I was operating to minimums. At least one of the modern a/c flying today you need multiple inputs/page fiddling just to get that info-why. Who in management signed off on a new piece of equipment which was less useful than the 20 yr old one we had before. Yes the new one may be able to do a complicated arrival into Heathrow but that is not required.

It is the same with use of the flying modes-yes they are useful and will protect you but there seems to be a rational to engage at the earliest possible moment. Hand flying skills will be lost.

I was lucky enough to have been in the RAF before joining the NS fraternity so I had lots of hands on flying but even so I did not feel that I was putting the 332L on, rather than just getting into it, until I shuttled with it in the 40s. A brand new co-pilot straight out of training may only have a few hundred hours and once online may accrue hand flying at only a few mins/4hr flight:ugh:

The Capt who perfectly landed in the Hudson was also a glider pilot. The Air France pilot who didn't seem to know that if you kept the stick back you would stall and crash wasn't a recreational pilot.

There needs to be a bridge built between the users-pilot and procurers-management to make sure what is bought and how it is operated is improved. As a pilot I want a system that is intuitive and requires one button to activate - and that button only does ONE THING!

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Shetland helicopter crash: Safety advice ignored

HIGH-level flotation devices, which could have saved the four victims of Friday’s Super Puma disaster, were not fitted to North Sea helicopters despite a recommendation from the government’s Civil Aviation Authority eight years ago, it was revealed last night.

The potentially life-saving kit was designed to stop crashed helicopters from “rolling over, completely inverted” and retain an air pocket to help passengers escape.

The use of the devices was recommended in a major review of helicopter ditching and crash-worthiness research in the UK Continental Shelf. But it was never followed through, the British Airline Pilots Association (Balpa) disclosed yesterday.

The CAA report, published in December 2005, concluded: “The single most effective means of improving occupant survival in the event of a post-ditching capsize or a survivable water impact is through the provision of additional flotation devices to prevent total inversion following capsize.”

Captain Mike Buckley, Balpa’s spokesman on helicopters, revealed details of the failure to implement the system as the 
pilots’ union yesterday called for an industry-wide review of helicopter safety in the North Sea. The union is demanding a review to explore why helicopter operations in the Norwegian sector, which share the same geographic operational area, have a better safety record than helicopter flights in the UK Continental Shelf.

Shetland helicopter crash: Safety advice ignored - Transport - The Scotsman (http://www.scotsman.com/news/transport/shetland-helicopter-crash-safety-advice-ignored-1-3063400)

[212man]

Try it next time you're in the hangar, wearing three layers of clothing, an immersion suit (ours, not yours) and a LAPP jacket. The handle is not above your head.

It was something that emerged in the G-REDU investigation, and explains why the starboard door was opened normally and not jetissoned. The AAIB were incredulous.

I would have thought that two experienced pilots would have been better witnesses to the actual occurrence than a CVFDR

Maybe they haven't been in a medically fit state to speak yet?

[mary meagher]

Exactly my point in a previous post. Recommended years ago. Simple improvement, why were high level flotation bags NOT fitted?

[bigglesbutler]

As an "old salt" I agree with you that the use and complexity of the autopilot is a worry. I understand that the systems are not user friendly, perhaps because they may be fixed wing nav systems not altered for helicopter usage. I am retired so haven't used the new systems but I can give one example.

Actually I find the EC225 autopilot, FMS (GPS/flight planning unit) and automation intergration far easier to understand than the (SAR) S61 or AS332L. That may be because I am "Playstation" generation and self confessed utter technogeek. Even my more senior and less computer literate colleagues loved it though, so it's not just me.

Fuel is a very important aspect of operations! On the 365N2 I could call up one page which would show me actual fuel at each way point I had in my route. Destination and diversion being the most important, and is was very accurate. This took alot of stress away if the weather was bad and I was operating to minimums.


225 FMS gives you any bit of fuel information you like at any point quickly and VERY easily. And you can have it on two different routes from your current position, one active and one in the memory on standby.

As a pilot I want a system that is intuitive and requires one button to activate - and that button only does ONE THING!

Yup we call it the Go Around button on the 225 and with one press it gets you going up regardless if you have presset the computer to take you anywhere. I think it will even level wings for you so if it all hits the fan you can press it and bail out, although how quick it levels I am not sure hopefully HC can correct/confirm.

I admit I am biased, I am a 225 Fanboy as is my wife as she feels safest when I fly the 225. Before people roll their eyes she has been in the industry for almost 20 years, helicopter operators as well as oil. The sooner I get on the 225 the better.

Si

[HeliComparator]

Si, yes the GA levels the wings (or makes you track straight ahead if you press it at very low speed). The rate of roll back to wings level is only moderate so if you are in an unusual attitude near the surface, manual recovery is better, but otherwise as you say the GA takes you up and away regardless.

Its a pity that some other operators don't use it to its full potential, IIRC they ban its use below Vy. Crazy!

[NorthernChappie]

Being reported in the local press this morning that the pilot is being treated in hospital for a broken back.

[Hummingfrog]

HC

It is good to hear that the 225 has a user friendly FMS, I have heard that the autopilot package in the L2/225 was superior to that of the 92.

What are your thoughts on overuse of the autopilot - depriving pilots of true hands on flying. I know that rig approaches are much more regimented than my day -500 straight in rather than a gentle curved approach around the back of the rig to arrive fully stabilised at deck +200ft. That approach, of course, required hand flying skills;)

HF

[26500lbs]

I have been following this thread from the start with great interest, and not surprised to see a wide variety of opinions and views from the full spectrum of parties involved. It has been questioned several time as to why there might be such an apparent difference from the Norwegian side to the UK sector in relation to accident statistics. Firstly I would be slightly cautious with statistics. One bad month in Norway could change it all.
I am however familiar with operations on both sides of the North Sea and the differences are smaller than most might imagine. These days the larger operators are employing common OM’s and SOP’s. OMA, OMB and Emergency Checklists are standardized across the sea. I don’t know too much about the engineering procedures, but I imagine they are also similar if not the same.

That, however, is of no use, as there clearly is a difference in the final result if statistics are to be believed. From my experience, whilst everything on the surface is very similar there are some very fundamental differences in the way business is conducted. Whatever the final report on this accident finds, the result will be a complex human factors case. I despair when I see people calling for a simplified single root cause, as it just does not ever exist in aviation. To blame the pilot and say pilot error is a part of the cultural problem and one I thought we had moved away from. It will almost certainly be the case that the crew could have done something differently and the outcome would have been different. It is also very likely there was some form of technical problem be it a minor or major one. Certain phses and flight conditions don’t need much before a minor problem is a major one. If it is a pure technical issue, the same point arises. Why did it occur, and how far back could it have been prevented. It is slightly irrelevant that the last few ditchings have been Eurocopter. What is relevant is that ditchings and accidents have occurred and that the industry as a whole must identify what they can do to improve.

If they want to look at how things differ in Norway, I think it would be a good place to start. The culture is fundamentally different. I see a few key differences.
1. Positive and constructive working relationship between customer (oil company) and contractor (helicopter op). The customer has a good and realistic understanding of the aviation operation and maintains a positive form of communication.
2. Stronger Unions and acceptance of all companies and management to work with and hold constructive dialogue with unions. In this sense offshore unions have a good relationship and communication with pilots unions and management. So far management have not tried to bust unions.
3. Unions have pushed oil companies on safety with great effect. This results in oil companies setting higher safety requirement of their contractors. An example is higher simulator time and more training required annually for pilots.
4. Better working conditions for pilots and engineers - including proper equal time rosters and no “flex time” rosters, allowing proper rest periods away from the work environment. A happier work force?
5. Lack of blame culture in Norway. Norwegians are very open to dialogue and averse to conflict. The attitude is usually to try and move forward and not waste time on finding blame when it is not relevant. They recognised a long time ago that blame is never a simple concept in reality and is very often just an easy way out to close a case. Some poor sod gets the sack - move on - doesn’t work.
6. The understanding that “cheapest is not always cheapest”. This however is changing with new global management structures, and is in my view the single largest threat to safety anywhere in our industry. Fortunately as stated in point.3 the oil companies drive for the latest technology and most modern types. When management sit detached from the operation and whose sole focus is to cut cost, eventually safety will be compromised and by then it will be too late to go back. This, again purely in my own humble opinion, will likely be a major feature in any future report worth its salt. This is not purely the fault of the operator. They are often forced by the oil companies, however there is an element of joint ownership of this particular problem. This is one for the highest levels of management in oil companies and helicopter operators alike to sit around the table and set some basic rules again.
7. Finally - an Authority and a Union structure that protects the industry against cowboys! I am not saying for one minute that there are any cowboy outfits in the North Sea. However if the threat is there, the wolf is at the door and the operators will feel they need to do whatever possible to cut cost to keep the wolf at bay.

That is my take on it. Last friday was a tragic day for all of us who fly, maintain and work on the rigs. Quit the blame game. We are all to blame, every damn one of us in a small way. Now lets identify how we make it better for everyone.

[212man]

Being reported in the local press this morning that the pilot is being treated in hospital for a broken back.

Hence my earlier comment.....

[HeliComparator]

HF brace yourself, long post coming up! The L2 and 92 autopilots are of similar capability in terms of precision and min IAS for use, although the 92 has more "bells and whistles" modes. The underlying technology is of error detection and correction, ie an error has to develop first, then the AP makes a correction.

The 225 is in a different league with the whole AP being driven by hybridised parameters of inertial data plus the parameter in question (eg inertial plus pressure altitude for ALT) with the emphasis on the inertial. This makes it incredibly precise in those inertia related modes (ALT, LOC, GS etc) and slightly less precise, but still very good in the likes of IAS - because gusts etc mean there isn't necessarily a direct correlation between IAS and inertial speed. Min IAS for a number of modes such as ALT, GA is zero, min for IAS is 30 kts. This allows the upper modes to be engaged until very late in eg a night offshore approach, down to 30kts IAS which might be very low ground speed.

As to the point about manual flying skills, it is a good one. Clearly one needs to have both manual skills and a good understanding of the behaviour of the automation. But how to set the balance?

The AP is so much better and more consistent at flying eg an instrument approach in bad weather, or a night takeoff, than the crews, that in my mind it would be criminal for the pilots to take the less safe option of flying these manually and reducing the safety of the flight with passengers, just for their own practice. That is why the Bristow OM requires use of automation in such conditions. Manual practice is only allowed in day VMC.

Does this degrade manual flying skills, well maybe BUT, for example when I learnt to fly on a Bell 47, to start with 99% of my attention was on maintaining the rrpm at 3050 to 3100 in the hover, using the throttle. Now I fly helicopters that don't have a throttle at all, so that skill is completely redundant.

Similarly, I fly a helicopter that, in its entire history with Bristow, has only had one event where a manual ILS had to be flown, and that was caused by a software bug now fixed. So just how much effort and increased risk to the passengers should go into maintaining superb ILS manual flying skills in bad weather? I would say that you just need to be able to struggle by, not put in a polished performance if the less than once in several lifetimes event occurs. There is just so much redundancy that its hard to imagine a situation where a coupled ILS couldn't be flown.

All that is fine for old codgers who can fly, what about those coming new into the industry. Clearly they do need to develop manual flying skills, but my view is that, whilst this can be done on the line in reasonable weather, anything more tricky must be done in the simulator, which we are fortunate enough to have on the doorstep. There is no rule that says pilots can only go into the Sim once every 6 months! I'm glad to see that after a bit of a hiatus, Bristow is once again providing copilot development sim trips in between the 6 monthly checks.

HC

[Beaucoup Movement]

Both pilots are able to speak & have been since it happened. Ones at home & the other is still recovering from back injuries - not a broken back.

[satsuma]

Quote:
Try it next time you're in the hangar, wearing three layers of clothing, an immersion suit (ours, not yours) and a LAPP jacket. The handle is not above your head.

It was something that emerged in the G-REDU investigation, and explains why the starboard door was opened normally and not jetissoned. The AAIB were incredulous.


Don't think that's quite right. An extract from REDU's report is below -

The training [briefing] material, however, did not focus on the difficulty of carrying out an emergency jettison of the starboard main door. It was not made clear that the emergency release handle may need to be operated by a passenger seated in a row further forward than the row adjacent to the door. The passengers were therefore unable to locate the starboard main door emergency release handle and subsequently it was not jettisoned. Instead they opened it normally, sliding it to its forward position and obstructing the two forward right cabin window exits.

Add to this the desire to get out fast, possible inattentiveness during the briefing and the reversion to ingrained actions that many experience during highly pressured situations (eg treating the control column on a light aircraft like a car's steering wheel) and you have a cocktail of reasons why the G-REDU door may have been opened in the normal manner.

[jimf671]

I appreciate that any helicopter makes a far more stable boat when upside down and that this is the reason for studying the option of high level floats. However, I am not sure that I find the idea of inflatable air bags mounted just below a rotor disc reassuring.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Gents,

The last helicopter I am aware of with high levels floats was the venerable Navy Saunders Roe Wasp.

Imagine ditching with high level floats. You are immediately accepting your head will likely be close too or under water even in a calm sea. Now you have to exit, complete with all your gear, and evade the massive float bags positioned alongside the fuselage above your head, body and life jacket.

If the plan is to supplement the low floats with high ones to stabilise the helicopter from rollover, now there is even less room to get out.

Maybe I have missed the point but really. Is this kind of issue relevant to what has just happened taking into account the success of all other ditchings.

DB

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Perhaps they might begin to look at Boat Hulled Helicopters for the next generation!

Perhaps indeed!

[bondu]

If you read the CAA report, you will see that the high level floatation systems were in addition to the standard floatation bags. Various options were considered, including high buoyancy foam incorporated into the cowlings etc. These would help to prevent a total capsize, holding the fuselage in a partially capsized position, creating a large air pocket inside the cabin. Admittedly, one side of the cabin would be low and one side high, but trials carried out using the system proved successful.
The floats were only one of the recommendations in the report: there were several others.
I suggest anyone interested have a look at the report.

CAA Paper 2005/06: Summary Report on Helicopter Ditching and Crashworthiness Research | Publications | About the CAA (http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=2084)

bondu

[stilldellin]

Search is continuing of Garth's Ness this morning, a small local craft, the Ruby May ( not on AIS ) is now involved. :-
Bibby Polaris & Ruby May IMG_8313 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/16633132@N04/9611448897/)

also taking up some of the slack, S92 G-WNSF operating out of Sumburgh today :-
S92 G-WNSF IMG_8305 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/16633132@N04/9614680920/)

[mark one eyeball]

I would advise anyone interested to get fixed wing rating
plenty of jobs around in se asia and conditions good
I was on the super puma 1982 onwards, it was a worry then
went fixed wing and never looked back
still current on R44 though
helicopters that behave are fun

[alhucoll67]

First of all, RIP the four.

I've been following this thread with interest and some good information has come out.

I work offshore and the way I get there is by helicopter, I've been a passenger from the Arctic to the South Atlantic and a lot of regions in between - I accept this and have absolute faith in the pilots and the maintenance crews regardless of what type of helo it is or where it is.

If the pilots are happy to fly the helo, then I'm happy to be a passenger.
If a helo is delayed due to "technical" issues - well, good call, check it out and resume operations when the issue is resolved.

All involved in the flying and maintenance are professionals - are you going to knowingly put yourselves at risk? Is the maintenance team going to put you and the passengers at risk? The answer is no!

Every form of transport has risks, from walking to flight. We all accept this, so why the hysteria at the moment towards the Puma fleet of all types? Totally illogical in my eyes.

I'm flying out of Aberdeen tomorrow morning, do I have any reservations?
No. I'm in the hands of professionals.

So to the teams that get us to and from work, thank you.

Al

I like the term SLF

[pilas40]

?????

god for you...


"went fixed wing and never looked back" i think you are...

[Alloa Akbar]

With regard to high level floats, I was involved in some R & D work for such a system, the overall theory being that the high level floats would trigger on one side only (Higher level Saline switch maybe?) thus preventing total capsize and allowing escape routes to open air. The technology is very simple, however key challenges were flot bag deformation around doors and rotors leading to swift puncture and also where to actually stow the bags. There isn't a lot of room up around the gearbox to house the size of bags you'd actually need for the system to be effective.

The other solution is to mount the main flot gear higher abover the water line and go for a partial sinking of the cabin as a trade off for stability, this technique was suggested for the Apache, however egress from a partially submerged cockpit was an issue.. I think the use of a canopy MDC was mooted.?

As I recall the high level floats project was shelved in 2009 due to lack of interest from CAA / Operators / Manufacturers. I hasten to add that was only from a GKN perspective. I do know others such as Dart and AeroSekur also looked at the idea, but not sure they got much traction either. I'm no longer in the Emer Flot Gear business so my intel may not be current.

[mark one eyeball]

Nah I don't look back on north sea heli flying
that's a very demanding job, I have great respect for those guys
I just saying there is another avenue out there for some

[pilot and apprentice]

How much of an uproar would it cause if helicopter passengers were told, 'You're a big guy, so sit by the door. You're a slim guy, so sit by the removable window. You can fit through it easily, and agile enough to do it quickly.'?

My guess is that the slimmer passengers would complain like mad that they are being moved away from the larger exit, despite the fact that such a process would give a greater chance of getting everyone out alive, and it wouldn't have crossed their minds if it hadn't been brought to their attention.

There are some aspects of improving flight safety that, whilst valid, are likely never to see the light of day...

I had a passenger a few years ago whose weight was in excess of 450 lbs. He had difficulty entering the aircraft on the ramp and the other passengers expressed their concern over exits, evac, etc.

I immediately pursued this with our customer (for offshore work the pax are users, the oil company is the customer) and I was told unequivocally that this was a lawsuit they had already lost and that if we wished to remain on contract, we would carry him offshore.

Quote:
How much of an uproar would it cause if helicopter passengers were told, 'You're a big guy, so sit by the door. You're a slim guy, so sit by the removable window. You can fit through it easily, and agile enough to do it quickly.'?
Really? You haven't seen our " emergency exit ring" then. Its a template of a type 4 exit. If it fits over you, OK. If not, no fly.

A positive change if widely used.

As good as the Pilot accounts shall be....they do not necessarily tell the whole and entire truth of the event. Not that they are being intentionally deceitful....not at all....just that they were deluged with inputs, sounds, lights, physical forces, and as is common in very serious emergency situations....took actions that were a result of training and experience that they may not even recall having done.

The CVR and Data Recorder does not suffer from those Human weaknesses....the wee digital memory they use retains everything without any emotion or psychological constraints. They too have their weaknesses but when combined with all of the evidence the AAIB shall discover.....the Truth of this tragedy will very likely be found.

FWIW, I have had a CFIT(W) many years ago. I had a very clear memory of events that got hazy when (I thought) we hit the water. Later listening to the CVR, I saw I had blocked the last 30 seconds. It came back somewhat later listening to myself saying things that (I knew in my own head) I had never said. Surreal.
=======

Also FWIW, the first person I saw after waking up in hospital was a man in a suit who asked me only "was it a problem with the aircraft that we need to tell everybody about" (or words close and to that effect). I said no, it was us. The rest of the world didn't receive any additional information for some time, because they didn't need to.

I wasn't considered fit for any other "interview", due to injuries, for about a week as I recall.
=======

The info the FDR told me about what we did and didn't do right was amazing!

[night dipper]

I've been following this thread with great interest and like many, I'm very interested in the factors leading/contributing to this sad accident. Let's hope we can take away something good so the 4 lives are not lost for nothing....

Emotions are running high which is understandable but the industry will benefit as a whole if we try to focus on facts and the 'big picture'.

With that in mind I found the post of 26500lbs #604, very informative and non-judgemental.
Imho he hit the nail on the head!

ND

[Prawn2king4]

HC, what about the other end?

IMO one of the most precise bits of flying required is when approaching a single platform at night with no wind and no horizon. It’s a perfect blend of visual and instrument flying that requires inputs that still renders offshore flying a skills based profession. Ok, there’s not many days when there’s no wind on the NS but the requirement for hands on flying is evident. I haven’t flown the 225, but I venture to suggest the requirement still exists. Until the industry comes up with an offshore approach aid equivalent to the ILS, then I think every chance should be taken to practice manual flying in actual conditions, as opposed to the simulator – particularly approaches. And that includes the ILS - you state that there has only been one occasion when a manual ILS had to be flown due to equipment failure, but on how many occasions has flying a manual ILS resulted in an accident? None, I believe. Maybe a good idea to look at the threads regarding automated flying in the FW world – aka Asiana for example.

[bigglesbutler]

I had a passenger a few years ago whose weight was in excess of 450 lbs

Slightly off topic but I wonder what the weight limit on the seats are? Many implications there.

Si

[Agaricus bisporus]

I left the N Sea many years ago now and have since defected to FW but am very interested in the remarks that have been made here about the use of automation, especially a "requirement" to use coupled ILS, autopilot on takeoff and no manual practice outside day VMC. Have I got that right?

Could someone put my understanding on N Sea automation policy right as there are parallels with FW and the situation is causing much debate on that side of the fence too. It would be most instructive to know how you guys do it nowadays as a comparison, inc the FO development sims mentioned.

[heli1]

Wasp flotation? I would prefer to be in a helicopter that stayed the right way up in heavy seas ,even if I did have to wait until the blades stopped and clamber out on the roof/ into a life raft from a semi submerged position, than trying to reorientate myself from an upside down cabin also full of water. It's a no brainer to me .

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

The Capt who perfectly landed in the Hudson was also a glider pilot. The Air France pilot who didn't seem to know that if you kept the stick back you would stall and crash wasn't a recreational pilot.
Sorry Hummingfrog, but the AF pilot you refer to also was a glider pilot. Ergo I'm afraid we can't draw as clear a conclusion as you do, here. ;)

[Colibri49]

The possibility of CFIT has been raised a few times, but there is also a weather phenomenon which hasn't been mentioned, probably because it is extremely unlikely to have played a part. It is the waterspout, which most of us have seen, but never at this time of year that I can recall.

Some 10 years ago a helicopter was returning to Shetland from the Basin and was flying inside cloud. Suddenly it swung violently, so much so that the pilots thought they had lost drive to the tail rotor. Immediately they entered autorotation and commenced the drills for a power-off ditching.

Shortly their descent brought them out of cloud and the handling pilot began to feel that he still had control of the tail rotor with his pedals. Very fortunately they had not yet shut down the engines, as required in a tail rotor drive failure and gingerly pulled out of the descent until they found themselves back in normal flight.

The aircraft landed safely back at base and was eventually given a complete overhaul and replacement of any components which might have been overstressed. The investigation concluded that a waterspout was to blame.

The weather last Fiday wasn't of the kind where I might expect waterspouts. The wind was quite strong from about 140 degrees, so at 2 miles on final approach to 09, they were 3 miles downwind of Sumburgh Head and probably descending a few hundred feet above the surface.

We have all experienced the effect of the Grampian mountains giving strong up and down air currents, even beyond 80 miles out to sea when the wind is strong westerly. What's the possibility of being caught in a strong downdraught when only 3 miles from Sumburgh Head?

Yes, it's all too far-fetched, but I want our passengers to appreciate that there are other possibilities than aircraft failure.

[HeliComparator]

P2K4, assuming you mean the offshore landing, this is conducted at night using the automation until a very late stage, 200' above deck height when the final "sight picture" approach is commenced, or even later. It is still a visual approach, its just that one is driving via the IAS, ALT, VS, HDG trims as opposed to the pole. This results in a much more stable flight path, much less stress for the pax, and much safer as I think any Bristow 225 driver will agree. Not sure of the policy of the other operators.

[SICKorSKI]

Helicopter Accidents - Helicopter Database (http://www.helis.com/database/accidents/?model=79)

This database shows 44 accidents on the Puma family in 30ish years. In fact the frequency has been consistent and contrary to popular belief the Norwegians have been effected by gravity as well! :ooh:

The bears are angry as they have been subjected to a bizarre random phenonmena of 4 accidents in the uk in short time frame, to which they want an answer which will not be found.:ugh:

It's still more dangerous to drive to the heliport then to fly offshore! :ooh:

[Hummingfrog]

HC

Thanks for the reply. I can understand the company requiring the use of the "safer" autopilot approach it protects them should a pilot make a manual approach and have a problem.

I am, however, still concerned that helicopter flying is becoming too like fixed wing where there seems to be a disconnect between managing a computer environment and the outside world.

Things do go wrong - the Air France Atlantic crash being an example. The handling pilot had circa 3000hrs, if you take off say 600hrs for hands on training and he does 15hr trips Paris/Brazil where he is handling pilot then he gets 80 trips of which he may get 10mins manual flying/trip about 14hrs. No wonder he didn't use power/attitude/trim to stabilise the a/c he just pulled back on the side stick with tragic consequences.There have been too many autopilot influenced crashes which were totally avoidable, I don't want that to creep into the NS environment.

Don't misunderstand me I am a great fan of using the modes in bad weather. I remember well doing single pilot night shuttles with cloud base near minimums and having my track on radar so I could position at 1500ft long finals to the rig and engage either speed or rate of descent along with the heading bug and motor down my approach track monitoring rather than flying - at the bottom aids off land on manually-no problem. I could, however, do it all manually if our pimitive coupling threw a wobbly.

HF

[HeliComparator]

HF - but that's the point. On the 225, the coupling isn't primative, doesn't throw a wobbly and so those skills you cherish are less important. Certainly not worth exposing the passengers to increased risk. If we need to improve our manual flying skills in bad weather, it should be done in the Sim.

FW suffers from rules requiring use of automation regardless of weather, up to say FL100, have such things as auto-land and in general fly manually far less than we do. At least we retain the skills of hovering and flying the first / last bits of every takeoff/landing so whilst automation dependancy and loss of flying skills may be an issue, I don't thinks its as significant a one as faced by FW.

[HeliComparator]

AB - I have just received a PM correcting me on a couple of points, one is that manual practice of approaches is disallowed only when the weather is close to minima, so nothing wrong with practicing manual approaches by day or night in reasonable weather. I was getting a bit carried away! By the way, this only applies to the Bristow EC225 - I don't know what other's policy is.

The fact is that the automation is so much better than the pilots, that most people elect to use it anyway, and therefore have more time for the "big picture" aka situational awareness.

Another correction is that the co-pilot development which used to be a routine feature for many years until recently, did have a go at restarting but unfortunately it transpires that the pilots are currently too busy to be spared for it. That is BAD BAD BAD and we need to up our game! I for one found it most beneficial when I was a baby copilot (seems like only last week!). So yes, we are now running the risk of a new generation of can't-fly pilots. Shame on us!

[Hummingfrog]

HC

I think I have made my concerns known and of course I haven't used the new generation of autopilots.

I am not advocating manual flying in bad weather just the ability to practice on those nice sunny days we get.

What I hear is now second hand but if on one particular a/c type it is SOP to engage autopilot at Vy then a chance to manually fly to cruise height and level off has been lost for no apparent safety reason.

I will end the debate now and wish everybody the best and hope the SP family of a/c is back flying soon. The 332L was fun to fly but not as much as the 365N2:ok:

HF

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Two weeks before the first EC225 inadvetent ditching at the ETAP I also had a close call with the sea. This prompted me to explore develop and eventually produce the Offshore Night Stabilised Approach concept. Whilst I am not claiming complete responsibility for the procedures its merits stand alone.

During my research I found evidence worldwide of 27 inadvertent CFIT into the water. It is not a new problem. One of them led to the mandating of RADALTS and Aural Warnings in Offshore Helicopters (Can you believe they were not fitted before).

Automation done correctly is the single most improvement in safety during over water operations. Note my use of the word "Correctly".

Education, Training and Regular practice is the key.

Train Hard - Fight Easy. Why would you not fly the same procedue in good weather as you would in bad. One procedure. One set of data. One concept. One mindset. One outcome.

The exception surely must be the degraded mode. This is the one we should be training in the SIM (for EC225 this is SEMA - not uncoupled mode - CAA please take note), backed up of course during aircraft training and checks.

The current offshore night stabilised approach procedures are a step forward.......BUT.......corrupted by the confusion created by Operator's who insist in beginning the approach at a fixed height above the water in defference to the variable hieght of the target helideck.

It should be a fixed height above the helideck. This way the trigonometry involved for the individual type is consistent for each and every approach. The data gathered by the brain is consistant which leads to much greater flightpath deviation detection when finally established in the descent beyond the HDP. One procedure. One set of data. One concept. One mindset. One outcome.

Discipline is the word that springs to my mind when I am flying offshore. If pilots still want to fly manually, at night, or worse, in IMC, with PAX behind them, then I suggest they start looking elsewhere for their paypacket because that is not what the passengers want, deserve or should be subjected to. WHY - because it is far less safe than flying 4-axis coupled PROVIDED the Pilot fully and completely understands his autopilot, display system and intergration with any associated engine power management system.

One final point. Automation in fixed wing FBW aeroplanes means the Pilots hands are never physically connected to the flight controls. To be clear, this is never the case in an EC Offshore model. Whatever the AP is doing we can always place are hands on the controls and directly manouver the flight surfaces. We do not suffer the same phenomenom as our FW Brethren.

DB

[WaveWarrior]

A few points to make.

1. High level floats.

A long time ago I got 650 hours on the Westland Wasp. The high level floats were mounted above the doors in clam shell pods on a large frame which went right round the fuselage. The floats were attached to the upper clam shell and when inflated they extended down to about halfway down the doors. The aircraft floated with the water level about mouth height - if you were tall like me. Some of our shorter bretheren would have had to hold their breath. If the doors were fitted, you would have to jettison by releasing the jettison mechanism on the door hinges, opening the normal handle and pushing the door down away from the floats, before exiting by releasing harness and ducking down under the floats before coming back to the surface. I believe the late Ben Caesar just stood up from his seat and put his head straight through the overhead canopy - which had no pull out strip and went out vertically, but he was a big strong boy. When we were embarked at sea we never fitted the cockpit doors but flew with wind deflectors fitted to the door hinges - that took 10 knots off our airspeed. It was pretty chilly in the winter time I can assure you, especially in the Falklands in 1982. Fortunately I never had to use the system for real, but we practised it in the hangar as part of our abandon aircraft drills - with a personal survival pack strapped to our backside just to make things more interesting.

2. The Norwegian way.

Great post on their philosophy above. One of the other factors is that Norwegian law compels companies to have 2 members of the workforce on the board of directors. They are bound by the normal confidentiality of boardroom discussions. Their presence especially in an aviation company brings a sense of realism about what the work actually entails to the boardroom table, and ensures that safety and what the implications of decisions will mean in practice to the aviation operation. I have trained 2 of our Norwegian colleagues who have done stints as company directors of our Norwegian enterprise and whose views were given due weight in all boardroom discussions.

3. Use of 225 autopilot upper modes in low viz, low cloud alpproaches.

The 225 is without doubt the finest and safest aircraft I have ever flown in the 36 years I have been doing the job both in the RN and for 2 of the NS operators. It is so unfortunate that the two forced landings/controlled ditchings took place last year, because they resulted in the removal of the best aircraft on the North Sea for almost a year. I am convinced that had the faulty shafts been fitted to one of our aircraft, the aircraft would not have been dispatched for flight due to our downloading of IHUMS/MARMS info after every flight at which point the increased vibration levels of the propagating cracks would have been detected. The level of precise control available at low speed low altitude at night over the sea is superb, and had it been used by the crew, the ETAP crash would not have occurred either.
I cannot wait to get back on to the EC225, especially with winter on its way.

[HeliComparator]

DB well said, I think you and I are on the same wavelength! I am amazed that some operators are using a fixed height above the sea, thus making every offshore approach look different! What is the sense in that?

To be precise, Bristow does have a minimum of 300' above the sea, this was to avoid being very low before starting the approach when landing on a deck with a deck height below 100', but there aren't too many of them.

We all fly the same types but it never fails to amaze me the differences in operating procedures between the 3 companies.

[Tractor_Driver]

HF

you may be referring to the type that I fly. It is indeed SOP to fully couple at Vy. That is what the aircraft is designed to do and it does it very well.

It is perfectly acceptable, if briefed, to manually fly it all the way. It will do it, just not as well.

What is not acceptable is to 'mix-mode'. Coupling to ROC without IAS is a no-no as, in the event of engine failure you will be at great risk of rapidly getting on the back of the drag curve.

When the aircraft was new, pilots converting from steam driven types would, anytime the AFCS/FD wasn't doing exactly as they wanted, pickle it and go for full manual. Trainers had to emphasise the benefits of being fully coupled and encourage its use. Now we have learned the foibles of the system, we can fine tune it and, if necessary de-couple unrequired modes. Perhaps, with a new generation of pilots who have not had the benefit of thousands of hours of uncoupled flight, we should be changing the emphasis back the other way.

[Vie sans frontieres]

Earlier one poster suggested that bad weather training should only be conducted in the simulator. If North Sea drivers return from a platform without any passengers, couldn't they turn that transit into a training sortie and put each other through their paces? Simulated emergencies, dummy approaches etc. Even better in bad weather one would think. Or do North Sea drivers tend not to return with empty aircraft?

[Prawn2king4]

TD:

I'm glad you use the term "benefit" regarding your reference to uncoupled flight.

[jimf671]

One procedure. One set of data. One concept. One mindset. One outcome.

Nice one DB.

We need to do more to bring that into the rear cab too.

[HeliComparator]

What is not acceptable is to 'mix-mode'. Coupling to ROC without IAS is a no-no as, in the event of engine failure you will be at great risk of rapidly getting on the back of the drag curve.


Obviously not a 225 then :8

<Naughty! Dont start that again!>

[Tractor_Driver]

HC

Obviously not.

I used the present tense of the verb 'to fly'.

<also naughty>

[HeliComparator]

Ooooh scratch your eyes out too!

Mind you, I asked for it!

Anyway, what are you doing on Prune, you should be busy flying your tractor all the hours god sends to keep the revenue coming in, whilst we relax at home

[Hummingfrog]

I hope that this accident, whatever the cause, generates good healthy debate on how all companies operate their autopilot procedures in the NS so they are as safe and as consistent as possible. The best practice of one operator being adopted by the rest.

I was a shuttle pilot on ETAP for several years and was amazed how a second generation SP could end up in the water. ETAP is one of the bigger rigs in the NS with a modern, large, well lit helideck with little turbulence. I can't remember the outcome of the AIB report, if it has been published, but I guess the modern autopilot didn't save the day - if used - or the manual flying skills had been degraded.

Having made 100s of manual night landings on there it was never a problem, difficult sometimes in zero wind at night viz/cb limits.

Let us hope they find the tail soon so we can get to the bottom of what happened.

HF

[mark one eyeball]

Pilot error omg

[Colibri49]

Vie sans frontieres (http://www.pprune.org/members/188001-vie-sans-frontieres) During flights which have no pax on board, the chances of being crewed with a training captain at the same time are very, very small. We're not allowed to practice emergencies without a trainer and from the client's point of view, they're paying for us to get out and back without undue delay.

Furthermore the passengers offshore waiting for that aircraft to come back offshore again and take them home, wouldn't be thrilled to know that such training is delaying their escape by many minutes or longer. Sometimes the difference between being first down the ILS back to Aberdeen in bad weather, or joining the back of a queue, can be the difference in who calls first on the radio. Similarly who gets the fuel bowser first, back at base and who gets taxi clearance first from Ground Control to avoid delays at the runway holding point. Seconds can count!

Finally I'm not sure of the insurance implications of mixing training into revenue flying, should anything go wrong.

[SASless]

Some very good posts to read this morning.

I recall the great work Double Bogey did on the Night Approaches and he should be commended for that initiative.

I am surprised to learn the Aberdeen Simulator(s) are not working nearly 24 hours each and every day. I would think every pilot, but especially newer pilots would be encouraged to make use of the Sim(s) anytime they were not scheduled for Required Training.

When going through the US Army Instrument Flying Course on Huey's....my Stick Buddy and I would take a Six Pack of Beer....climb into the Sim in the Evening on our own time....and FLY. We got lots of hours, flew lots of approaches, experienced lots of Turbulence.....and generally just had a hell of a lot of fun. None of that hurt us one bit in the course.....and certainly made the "Legitimate" training much easier and more effective as we had the "pole shaking" down pat.

While teaching in the Sim at two different OEM Training Centers....I would do much the same. Whenever there was a vacant Sim....I would climb in and duplicate routes I had flown or were flying on my other job as a Line Pilot. I did them real time usually....input malfunctions...and always flew in weather that required approaches to minimums....and almost always flew them manually.

On use of Automation.....absolutely use it to the maximum...for continuity of training if nothing else. Hand fly on Revenue trips....why not so long as you do so in decent weather. If the weather is near minimums or at Night Off shore...by all means use the Autopilot system.

Coordination between Flight Departments from Operators.....why not have quarterly meetings by Training Staff and Ops Staff to work at finding the Best Practices for similar aircraft. Let the Commercial Staff compete for business but the Pilots and Engineers should be able to work towards standard Safety Practices and Flying Standards. You share the same sky, fly the same aircraft, why would you not benefit from the other guy's experiences?

Emergency exits.....some problems being reported about Opening Doors that block Emergency Exits because of a Door Handle being in a bad position.....and that has not been addressed and resolved yet? Or did I miss something?

Working Engineers and Pilots on the Corporate Board....now that would really rock the US and UK Operators World wouldn't it!

PA....I applaud you for telling us about your experience with the CFIT. That is the kind of courage we need to see more often as others can benefit from what would otherwise have been just a tragic day otherwise. Every time I read of a friend being involved in an Accident....I understand very well it could have been me instead of them....and I also know that no matter how good we think we are....none of us are immune.

[HeliComparator]

HF - with the ETAP accident, the upper modes weren't being used, the AVAD (EGPWS) had been suspended, and the Ops Man night approach procedure was pretty loose. The AAIB report was published in 2011, worth a look.

[SASless]

Meeting underway in Stavanger about the UK Situation and SP Family of aircraft. Expect news reports on the outcome upon completion of the meetings.

Dødsulykke forsinker norsk offshoretrafikk - Aftenbladet.no (http://www.aftenbladet.no/energi/Dodsulykke-forsinker-norsk-offshoretrafikk-3240464.html#.Uh4FLJUtWTt)

[26500lbs]

In the past many of the AAIB have focussed the majority of the time and effort on the bottom of the pyramid - ie the pilot and engineer and their SOP's. I really hope that this time we might see a more rounded investigation examining and pressing those who are actually owning and running these businesses. That is where the pressure begins and it multiplies and diversifies as it filters down.
There is no doubt for the most part our business is being run in a professional manner, but the question is - despite the improvement of technology and training, why are these accidents still happening?
Where in the chain from cleaner to CEO is it going wrong? The relatively recent phenomenon across all the major operators is the hiring of management from outside aviation, and with no aviation experience. Is this wise? It is someone relying entirely on advice from his minions to make a decision. They will more than likely often only tell him what he wants to hear anyway as they are in a career stepping stone. Nobody wants to tell the boss reality when it is negative, as that gets him the sack. You think that is overly cynical? I assure you it is not. I would never dream of going into a large fizzy drinks company or IT company and try expect to know what I was doing as the CEO - so why does it seem appropriate in aviation? Something that really struck me was the insistence of PR statements to consistently refer to last friday as an “incident”. It was absolutely by clear definition in aviation terms an “accident”. Unfortunately this shows a clear lack of understanding at the very top of the basics of our industry. Yes we are still a business, but any business relies on its top man or lady to really understand their business. One of the large operators recently bought out by an investment company has undergone a large management and structure change, and its main, number one aim was to save 100 million dollars and increase productivity by 100 million dollars. This was all wrapped up with a large PR company and management consultancy company complete with post-it notes on the wall. It was only later on someone maybe realised that safety had featured very low down and another sideline PR publicity campaign and slogan was produced to with a reference to safety, but very little real substance. The really bitter irony was that on the campaign launch day one 225 did not come home safely, although fortunately that time no one lost their lives. The warnings have been there all the time, we are just looking the wrong way, distracted by complications we have created elsewhere. I do not blame that particular company. These are competitive times and the operators have to make money, but when your number one drive and priority is to save money and increase productivity - don’t be surprised when things begin to break. How much breakage is acceptable in pursuit of this financial nirvana?
If we take a sliding scale - left of scale - all the money and resources in the world. Accidents would not happen. We really can prevent all accidents in an ideal world. Right of scale - no money and no resources. Accidents would happen every week, and it would be down to luck whether or not you made it home safely. Where are we on that scale now? How far to the right are our authorities, customers, management prepared to let it go in order to undercut the next contract and save money and cover backsides? These are changing times, but it is not too late. Start looking at the top though and work down with a fine tooth comb and the answers will fall out all around us.

[Vie sans frontieres]

from the client's point of view, they're paying for us to get out and back without undue delay

who gets the fuel bowser first, back at base and who gets taxi clearance first from Ground Control to avoid delays at the runway holding point. Seconds can count

Thanks Colibri49. I can see where you're coming from with the commercial angle but seeing as it's the clients that are twitching in a major way here, perhaps part of the cultural change that has been spoken of over the last few days could be an acceptance by both clients and helicopter operator that it benefits everyone in the long run if things are allowed to happen just a little more slowly. One aspect of that could be pilots taking a little time out to take advantage of a good training opportunity. If young pilots are only being exposed to quality manual handling time and practice emergencies in the simulator, then that's going to create problems in the future.

[SASless]

Texaco in Escravos, Nigeria complained about the standard routing used to return to the airfield, a method that had been used for may years when Chevron ran the place, and demanded it be changed because it added time to the flights. We are talking "seconds" here....not minutes.



Yes....some Oil Companies are damned cheap!

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SAS coming from you I consider that praise indeed. Thank you Sir.

HC we are and I think always were on the same page. Come back already you are missed sorely. Pop in for coffee when you have some time.

DB

[SASless]

If you recall....back when you were doing that....I bragged on you.

The initiative you started on that is exactly the kinds of things that need to be done within the Industry but on all levels and on all sorts of issues.

Improvements can start at the bottom and work their way up the chain as that is where the closest contact with what is actually needed occurs.

Fancy, gold plated, glitzy over hyped programs with catchy Titles sound good...but don't really accomplish much. It is the hard work, which way too often is rejected, refused, or neglected by those well up the Management Chain that holds the best chance for making immediate improvements in safety.

I absolutely pissed off a most Senior fellow at one Operator....when I asked him how it felt to be in charge of an Operation where he knew without a doubt that he would be attending three or four Pilot's Funerals every single year he was in charge. He was a good Guy.....new to the job....and I think took to Heart what I meant by that question.

He had inherited a lot of problems.....and over time a lot of good changes took place. Some years he did not have the need to attend any Funerals at all.

[SASless]

Is this the latest news from Norway's Meeting today?

Norway rejects union calls to ground Super Pumas | Energy Voice (http://www.energyvoice.com/2013/08/norway-rejects-union-calls-to-ground-super-pumas/)

[stilldellin]

It would seem further wreckage has now been located tonight, the Bibby Polaris had left the site to proceed to Lerwick but has now returned. Photo shows two small boats plus a marker buoy right at the point of Garth's Ness. :-
Wreckage location IMG_8349 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/16633132@N04/9614239631/)

[LTNABZ]

As if to remind us that risk is not confined to any one aircraft

Evening Express - Article - Helicopter grounded in new offshore alert (http://www.eveningexpress.co.uk/Article.aspx/3371063)

Helicopter grounded in new offshore alert

Sikorsky S92 reported error on rig

By Oliver Berrow, Samantha Leckie and Chris Foote
Published: 28/08/2013

ANOTHER helicopter operating in the North Sea has been grounded after an alert on an oil rig, the Evening Express can reveal today.

The crew of the Bristow-operated Sikorsky S92 helicopter reported an error as it was about to lift off following a shift change on the Stena Don platform.

The grounding comes just days after four offshore workers lost their lives when a Super Puma helicopter crashed in the North Sea.

[Wizzard]

Quote Mark One Eyeball:

Pilot error omg

Bit early for that:ugh::ugh::ugh:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

LTNABZ

This is not risk. The S92 crew have followed their drills and the risk has been eliminated. This is absolutely stone cold normal aviation activity.

Well done to the crew for doing their job conscientiously knowing it would probably end up in the media.

DB

[SASless]

Gee....the writer of that article sure is stupid!

I hope he reads my comment and wishes to argue about it!

I am sure there are plenty of folks here who could explain on how many levels he is off base.

Non-Laudatory E-Mail sent to the source of that article.

I shall post their response should I get one.

[keithl]

HC, DB and SAS - all respected contributors here - have referred to the importance of training. I have NO IDEA whether quantity or quality of training contributed to this accident. However, if the industry is looking for areas in which to demonstrate it's commitment to improving safety, I'd suggest that increasing training beyond what is strictly mandated by CAA (which is mostly about checking) would be a good place to start.

I do understand that there are commercial implications to doing more training, but this "incident", surely, has shown that accidents, also, have commercial implications. The trouble is that, because the accidents prevented by training didn't happen, you can't demonstrate that training prevented them.

Recruiting sufficient pilots to allow a percentage of FOs to be allocated to post-graduate development training would cost a significant sum, I know, but so did the equipment. The two (pilot skills / equipment capability) should be in parallel.

[SASless]

The situation in Norway as I under it.....

Customer(Statoil/Exxon) says Fly.

Eurocopter says Fly.

CHC/HS says Fly.

Union(SAFE) says No Fly.

There was a Press Release issued at the end of the Meeting.

Don't know if this is it.....

Norway rejects union calls to ground Super Pumas | Energy Voice (http://www.energyvoice.com/2013/08/norway-rejects-union-calls-to-ground-super-pumas/)

Has CHC made a Public Announcement of the Decision yet?










Checking to the only to the Minimum Standard without Recurrent Training as part of the evolution i, Check Pilots checking their fellow Check Pilots, and doing only the Minimum required training is not a recipe for success.

The Check process should be a training procedure as well as just testing for compliance to the minimum standard. That way....hopefully....performance at some point exceeds the minimum acceptable level.

Company TRE/IRE's checking one another if not monitored very carefully can result in serious degradation of standards. Getting third party evaluations of Check Airmen is a very valuable Tool to improve standards.

Using Third Party Audits also assists Management in finding potential weaknesses in the Operation......sometimes an outsider might just have a better idea.

If you are afraid of having someone inspect your operation and make very candid evaluations of what they see......perhaps there is a real need for that evaluation.

One Guy's Opinion anyway.

[thechopper]

Colibri 49,
if seconds can count during routine business to get to the bowser first or to beat somebody else to the holding point you might want to rethink your attitude or get a b/r/g towel.:E

keithl,
I fully endorse your approach to training; maybe more trainers and aircraft should be allocated for that instead for the commercial trip.
But then there's got to be somebody with guts in the companies to run it past the clients.:ugh:

[role]

I have followed this thread since the tragic incidence happend on the 23. My deepest condolences to the families of the "pax" who did not survive the ditch.
Being a norwegian pilot with experience in the NS since 1984 I'm a bit surprised why the focus is so "high"on the different accident rate in the NS between the UK side and the "noggis". Well, first of all we have had our share of serious accidendts back in the 70's with the S61.So did the UK side. Later on we had several accidents/indidents with different helicopter types being used in the NS.
I do not see any significant differences in SOP's or the OM on the UK side and "noggis"side. Having worked close with the operational management on one UK operator I must admit that the standard and high quality of helo ops impressed me. Why then is the accident rate higher on the UK side. I don't have the answer but this has to be solved. We"noggis" do have a high BNP but still we have to argue a lot to safety improvments. The happenings on the UK side is not a booster to the helicopter transport for the "pax".
We need to establish some sort of cooperation between operators in the NS where we sort out best practicies and safety programs and leaving competitions out....

[Nigerian Expat Outlaw]

26500lbs,

On the whole I agree with your post, however in my 23 years on the NS and in Nigeria I have found that the overwhelming majority of coal face commercial pressure emanates from "middle" management, eg Chief Pilots, Ops Managers etc (Sasless and I both suffered it in Nigeria in times past), and not from the very top.

It is exactly as you say, they are worried about their careers and what the top guys will think. Ironically the top guys, having the big picture, would probably much rather a flight didn't go with anything, be it weather, aircraft status or whatever being compromised as they understand the commercial implications of an accident, incident or a flight aborted mid mission.

This could be why investigations focus on the pilots and engineers and not senior management, because experience has shown the investigators that the top people have no idea what transpired. Whether ex pilots/engineers or not the specific operational/engineering issues or that information which would be pertinent is concealed from them by their ambitious subordinates.

I hope, as I think we all do, that in view of the high profile attracted this time, things will change for the better.

NEO

[Grenville Fortescue]

We need to establish some sort of cooperation between operators in the NS where we sort out best practicies and safety programs and leaving competitions out....

Mechta (http://www.pprune.org/8015062-post490.html) came up with a similar suggestion and which I thoroughly endorse.

[Heli225]

North Sea helicopter grounded after safety fear - Transport - The Scotsman (http://www.scotsman.com/news/transport/north-sea-helicopter-grounded-after-safety-fear-1-3063815)

[flyer43]

Yet another embellishment by the media. This appears to be a fairly normal and correct decision not to fly one particular aircraft, NOT the grounding of the S92 fleet!

[role]

OMG, this refers to ONE S92 having a warning lights during T/O from a rig on the Troll field, close to the norwegian coast. 30 min flight to Bergen...
Credit to the crew for landing back and reporting this..

[SASless]

"Grounding" in the way it is used in the news article is not what it means in reality. It would lead the not knowing out there to assume the entire S-92 Fleet had been taken out of service when it is just a single aircraft with some kind of Technical Fault which as any true Aviation Professional knows....is a normal standard common action.

Among the Union Rants was a complaint about how often that has taken place in the past on all types of helicopters causing some inconvenience to the flight schedules.

Here at Rotorheads we usually ascribe to a higher standard of accuracy than does the Media and hopefully we can remember to do that as there are plenty of Media folks that glean information from us. The least we can do is make sure they are getting accurate info when they do that.

Lord knows their proclaimed Experts rarely concern themselves with the truth and stick to saying whatever keeps their Retainer coming in each payday.

[Stu B]

The item on the S92 incident in the Scotsman referred to a couple of posts back also contains a statement attributed *directly* to a survivor of the SP accident (i.e. NOT just attributed only to a family member of a survivor) - as follows:

"The rig worker, who did not want to be named, said: “On approach to Sumburgh the chopper shook severely from side to side before lurching over to the left and plummeting from the air into the water and went over instantly. This all happened in a heartbeat. There was no ‘brace, brace, brace’ or mayday as it was so quick.”

This is the first apparent direct quote I have seen form anyone on board and appears to contain significant new information.

[coops102]

Divers locate more parts from Super Puma that ditched in North Sea | Aberdeen & North | STV News (http://m.stv.tv/news/north/237674-divers-find-parts-from-super-puma-that-ditched-by-sumburgh-in-north-sea/)

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Side to side as in yaw or roll I wonder.

[Brom]

There was a quote from a survivor on day two (I think) saying something similar, that the helicopter had 'lurched' to the left and then to the right before hitting the water. I think the quote was in the P&J but can't be sure.

No doubt we will find out exactly what happened when the FDCVR is recovered.

[Sevarg]

HC, I guess you are the one most likely to know. Many years ago when 332's were known as Tigers, was there not one on approach to ABZ that had a double engine fail, they managed a relight and landed safely. I believe it was never really found out what the reason was but was most likely icing of the chip-pan which of course was long gone on landing. I know it cold in the far north but surely not that cold. Mind I remember snow in June on Shetland.
I was out of the country when it happened and the grape vine doesn't work as well as it might with distance.
Please forgive me if I'm wrong, I'm not trying to add fuel to the fire. I have great trust it any of the machines on the NS and feel the witch hunt is sad to see and poorly informed. I do understand their fear but I feel they are wrong but how one can get it across to them I don't know.

[airwave45]

Comment from the back of the bus (again, I know it's not welcome by all, but, tough, this is the internet)
As non willing pax, I'm so heartened by the tone of the commentary. There are patently people who think outside of the "poleing" box and consider the use of automation, in it's place, with due regard to currency and competency.
Finally saw a comment by a Noggie (not meant to be derogatory, just a shortening of the name, sorry) which came across as complimentary as could be about Scottish sop's, maint practises and standards.

He doesn't get why there are differences. I don't get why there are differences, you (as the boys n girls at the pointy end) don't see why there should be differences either.

Maybe, maybe it is a statistical anomoly.

Maybe it's not.

For those still nailing their colours to the mast and defending one breed of helicopter, you are missing the point.
Sorry.

Two operations, side by side have a world of difference in stats.
.....why is that? ...
i'm buggered if I know, and patently most of us on here are too.

My earlier reference to automation, was really to kick out the CFIT thing, if, and I have no idea, it was CFIT, then, why?
DB champions appropriate use of automation.
(Personally, I hate it, as it diminishes my role, but I do a different job from you)
.....
Sort of.

If guys are not using appropriate levels of automation, why not?

There were some other comments about shaving costs being pushed from oil co's.
That troubles me on two levels.
1) the oil co's are deadly serious about upping standards, they really are.
If you feel that they are only talking the talk and not walking the walk, i'll bet you a month of my wages versus a month of yours that I can prove they mean it.
We may have to dodge middle management biffs to nail that down, but at VP level, they genuinely are sod the cost, make it safe.
2) you percieve that cost matters to the oil co's.
Hand on my heart, if there is a perception on your part that it's safer to be in the cruise for 10 more minutes to make things safer. Not one swinging d1ck from any oil co will disagree.

To give perspective on where that comes from, the bunch of proffesionals I look after, get through 25mil a month (usd) i have calls from field guys who tell me that the senior op on the job is "tired" and needs to take "rest".
I can and do sanction shutting down a 200k/day op, to let them "take rest"
Nobody gives me more than sarcastic passing sh1t for doing that.

Sometimes, the "big boy pants" need wearing at the pointy end.
Sometimes. ( well, by the management of the pointy end)

I'm astounded by the levels of automation you seem to use.
i'm also astounded that, if that actually is the case, CFIT could even be mentioned (so possibly what is said and done, don't match)

The cause of the most recent incident will come out in due course.
I doubt it will change which ship is in use.
I hope, genuinely, that there is a bit of prolonged, serious, navel gazing goes on as to what can de done to improve things.

There is a steady stream of old ( experienced, not too bad at their day Jobs) farts getting out of the N Sea as they perceive it to be just too scary to go to work.
(I know some of them go to work on motorcycles which makes that comment nonsensical, but there are control issues there)

Just for clarity sake here (as a dig at those who have intimated I should button it) if I get it wrong, I can kill the company.
If you get it wrong, you won't.

Many thanks to SP for allowing me on the fora.
Many thanks to SP for deleting the worst of my rants.
However, the Chinooks were atrocious !
:-)



None of your posts have been deleted nor moderated?
Which you may take as recognition that your contributions are more than welcome here, and add to the wisdom generated by this thread.

Even if not all agree with your views: especially about the BV234 and the willingness of oil companies to spend wisely on aviation safety, but that's a personal opinion!
Splot

[OMONEZ]

Good posts HC, SAS and DB.
Sure the small boat will find the tailboom soon. HC ability to fly the aircraft is very important but again we all fall into the hole of junior staff not understanding many basics. Every advance in system can help the crew to do things with less stress but they need to understand the basics. Not the MB ticks in the box. Not many have the gift of a natural and understand the systems.
Correct training for all not just tick boxes. The first holes line up with the Manufacturer then LAE, Crew. We all know and live with these. Lets start to get the Pax training correct that is new holes to line up.

[Heli225]

It's just a thought but the symptoms described make me think tail rotor and the vibrations from it with a subsequent loss of the tail rotor and its gear box.

[TipCap]

sevarg

From what I can remember, the aircraft was skimming along the top of the clouds in an area of super saturation at temperatures around freezing. The air intake baskets were slightly misaligned and allowed a large quantity of slush to build up. This was ingested into the engines which put out the fires.

Fleet realignment of the baskets was carried out and further anti icing was added to the engines. It was also after the introduction of the type and there were a lot of problems which were all sorted out in due time.

I flew over 10,000 hours on the AS332L and it was very kind to me.

Sadly neither of the pilots flying that particular flight are with us (RIP) passing away in non flying accidents

TC

[OMONEZ]

Soory John ! He of the gas mask case carrying entered Vortex ring I did the download. Very close to the boat and sea. After sleepy had gone he phoned me at home for help with a 206 in Burntisland. No way! Sorry to hear he has passed.

[Fox Four]

I think the press need to be particularly careful with the photos. Especially when one shows what appears to be victim in row four drifting out of the window. The papers have used this photo in several instances. :ugh:

[OMONEZ]

Airwave.
I see you guys walking out!!!!!! People flew to the moon with less. 225 and on are the only types that people can get out of.

[airwave45]

me.
I see you guys walking out!!!!!! People flew to the moon with less. 225 and on are the only types that people can get out of.
]

We (bears) are not going to the moon.
We are going to work.
We won't get medals, or recognition, just paid.

We have no choice what we fly in, just whether we do or don't.
I've made my choice, others have too.

There are perceptions of job, role, duty.
You have yours, I have mine.
You carry on playing with the FMC, I'll look after the people I work with.

[bigglesbutler]

Airwave, and the wider offshore "bear" community, I understand your concern on automation as I once felt that way too. Back then I was flying the AS332L after four years of flying SAR on the S61, believe it or not the 61 was more automated for the SAR role than the 332 ever was.

I held off applying to fly the 225 for fear of loosing my flying "feel" and my seat of the pants ability to fly. I had all the same concerns others have expressed here and fully understand and support those concerns. The difference is when you get an in depth look into the 225 and HOW it does things. Perhaps an idea would be to get a few savy operators like you into our sim to watch a crew get put through their paces in a bad BAD weather scenario. Thus you could see how it really does work at the sharp end.

I am being utterly honest and sincere in my praise of the 225, I know 11 years on the north sea is nothing compared to others but given a choice it would be a 225 every time. I am confident in our aircraft, engineers and training and will vouch for them every time. I cannot comment on other operators though as I have only been one scheme of red/white/blue.

I sincerely hope the current situation can be improved, not just a "oh they've forgotten" and business as usual, but a proper review/investigation of how we can drive safety forwards. When it comes to safety we cannot rest on our laurels and it must be forever onwards and upwards folks.

Peace, love and happiness lets see how much of a flaming I get now :}

Si

[SASless]

I know how I would vote....get the ol' girl moving to the point I could hand off to George....sit back and admire the fine job George is doing....and when it is time for me to earn my money again....thank George and take the controls for the landing.

I do hold with the concept that the Autopilot system might be doing the mechanical part....but the Pilot Flying is doing just that by use of the Autopilot system. The Pilot Not Flying....is taking care of all the other tasks...and at the same time making sure the PF and George are in synch and the PF is directly supervising George.

There is no nicer thing than to watch George do an ILS to minimums and put you into the exact same spot every time like clockwork. That it is much safer makes it all the better.

Even in the early days of Autopilot systems....I used them as much as possible particularly when single pilot. If you think they are more trouble than they are worth.....be single pilot all set up and planned for an ILS to a runway in rotten weather.....and get a Runway change close in to the airport and have the auto pilot kick off due to a technical fault.

The stress level can be tremendous especially if it is at night and you happen to drop the Approach Plate when you are shuffling paper around getting set up.

No....Automation is very good.

Just use it correctly.

[jimf671]

0300 UTC Wed. The Bibby Polaris is about to enter Lerwick harbour. Reports indicate this trip was delayed while newly found wreckage (not incl CVFDR) was taken onboard.


Perhaps coincidentally; we shall see later in the morning; an acoustically silent research vessel with an interesting sonar fit and equipped for ROV has just rounded Sumburgh Head after steaming from near the Norwegian coast and having been off Denmark a few days ago. Considering where the search operation is now, it will be a shame if a bit of kit like that just steams on by.

[OMONEZ]

Dual engine failure was just a little bit before HC,s time I think. Derek was blamed for doing an overspeed test in flight. There was another both flew very close to RAF Buchan. Thats covered with the screening of your systems. Can see his face but the name? Dougal was a good safe operator whilst a pain in my butt. My last 330 flight was with Dougal in Miri we were taken in hand nothing valid!. The S--T might remember.We were there there to bring the first 332 to MHS. Derek Douglas RIP.

[Special 25]

Some half decent reporting for once. Shame they had to finish off with a Bob 'and my members' Crow quotation.


Salvage experts believe they know the location of the black box flight recorder from the Super Puma helicopter which crashed off Shetland.

Current sea conditions, however, are too rough for a close inspection of the seabed.

The black box should contain vital information as to why the helicopter suffered a catastrophic loss of power. Without it, crash investigators have been frustrated in their efforts to pinpoint a cause.

Important sections of the aircraft have, however, been found. They include both engines, the gearbox and the rotor head of the Super Puma.


Several important sections of the helicopter have already been recovered
John Henderson, of Shetland marine engineering firm Ocean Kinetics, told Sky News: "Ocean Kinetics have successfully located, lifted and passed the gearbox and rotor head of the helicopter.

"We have also located both engines and parts of the cockpit, which will likely be recovered on Thursday.

"We are still searching for the flight recorder which we believe is located at the Point of Garths Ness. There is a heavy swell running, hampering diving operations."

Representatives from across the North Sea oil and gas industry will meet on Thursday for the second time in two days to decide whether or not to lift a flying ban on Super Puma helicopters.

A meeting broke up without agreement on Wednesday after some companies argued that Super Puma models, other than the L2 which crashed off Shetland, should be allowed to resume flights.

The Unite union has made it clear that it wants flights of all Super Pumas suspended until the cause of the tragedy is known.


Flights by all the Super PUmas like that in the crash have been suspended
Contingency plans have been drawn up to maintain North Sea operations in the absence of the Super Pumas, which account for more than 50% of all flights to and from North Sea platforms. Oil and gas companies are sharing transport and sourcing other aircraft from around the world.

Some have also commissioned boats to ferry workers to and from rigs, although sea transport does not offer an attractive alternative.

Journeys can take upwards of 12 hours and transferring staff from boat to platform typically involves a "basket transfer", in which three or four people at a time are strapped inside a capsule and lifted by crane onto the rig. It is not a pleasant adventure in flat calm conditions; in a rough sea it can be impossible.

The RMT union held a rally at their Aberdeen office calling for improved safety. General Secretary Bob Crow told Sky News that lessons must be learned.

He said: "One thing's for sure, our members shouldn't pay the ultimate price of losing their life as a result of going to work."

[HeliComparator]

This was in the second or third winter of operation, so around 1984. The engine intakes are protected by the "chip baskets" and the engines themselves have hot oil circulating inside the inlets, keeping them warm in icing conditions. But no consideration was given to the 9" or so of ducting between the two. Ice built up in this ducting at around zero C in very moist conditions, then a slight increase in temperature caused the ice to break away in a oner, putting the fires out. The fix was to add electrical heating mats to the ducting. Simples, but the original omission was a classic case of trouble in the bit where airframe manufacturer meets engine manufacturer.

[HeliComparator]

So it seems the bit we saw bobbing around was just the floor pan and a bit of cabin, with fuel tanks giving it buoyancy - the floats looking ineffective. The whole top deck of engines and transmission are separate and only just recovered. Wow, so a very high energy impact and I'm amazed that the injury rate wasn't worse. I would imagine that those who didn't evacuate were too incapacitated from the impact, rather than stuck.

It makes all the discussions about high level floats irrelevant.

[diginagain]

I believe it was Mechta who suggested the use of a confidential reporting system for raising concerns. Of course, air- and ground crew as well as maintainers can do-so using CHIRP. The oil industry have been offered a similar confidential occurrence reporting system but this offer has been rebuffed. It seems that while OGUK/Step Change In Safety would like greater workforce engagement, there are limits as to how much engagement is warranted, it appears.

[TipCap]

HC

You put it much more technically than I did :ok: but I have age on my side

TC

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

AIRWAVE 45 Biggles suggestion that we give you guys some visibility of the levels of automation is fully supported by me. If you and others like you, would like to see the EC225 in all its glory my XMT have given me the opportunity to demonstrate this to you in our Full Flight Simulator.

PM or call on the number given. It may not help you overcome your fear of the helicopter but it will make you understand just what a tremendous step forward the EC225 and the procedures we emply to operate it, really are. AW and Sikorsky are fine ships and as a 2.5K S61 driver I have a huge affection and respect for the Sikorskys. however, the EC225 is the cutting edge in terms of RELEVANT automation and systems integration. AW and the S92 have some great advances too and they will catch up.

Having said all of this I wholly agree with all your posts which are eloquent, well constructed and logical. Even one accident is unacceptable. loss of life intolerable. I can tell you that my Company's approach is that no stone shall be left unturned in resolving these issues and no steps ignored that could or would reduce risk to zero. This is the aim. In aviation we will forever by judged by our ability to be as close to that aim as possible.

Keep providing us with your opinions which 99% of my professional colleagues appreciate, understand and value. You represent what this is all about. the passengers.

SASLESS - Big respect for your support for the NS industry with you insightful posts and sharing your experiences with us. hands across the ocean!! Some of our wierd culture must have rubbed off on you eventually!!

DB

[skadi]

Wreckage
So it seems the bit we saw bobbing around was just the floor pan and a bit of cabin, with fuel tanks giving it buoyancy - the floats looking ineffective. The whole top deck of engines and transmission are separate and only just recovered. Wow, so a very high energy impact and I'm amazed that the injury rate wasn't worse. I would imagine that those who didn't evacuate were too incapacitated from the impact, rather than stuck.

It makes all the discussions about high level floats irrelevant.
These destructions might have happened when the wreck floated into the rocks? Maybe that the helicopter was almost in one piece after the ditching.

skadi

[HeliComparator]

Possibly, however an intact upside down helicopter doesn't tend to drift much with the wind, whereas the visible wreckage seemed to get to the rocks quite quickly in moderate wind (not sure about the current though).

I'm a bit confused about where these heavy bits have been found - "off the southern tip of Shetland" according to the Beeb. If they are in shallow water by rocks, your theory is sound. But if nearer the original impact location, surely they must have separated at the time?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

OMONEZ - whatever you are on or smoking, please stop it. Your posts are random and confusing and I would suggest unhelpful. Especially your sideswipes at our passengers!

DB

[Ray Joe Czech]

Airwave45:

"Two operations, side by side have a world of difference in stats.
.....why is that? ..."

You have repeatedly referred to "two operations" and "Scottish helicopters" over the last few days. I would point out these are artificial constructs that exist only in your head.

There is no "Scottish helicopters" at Aberdeen; there are three completely separate companies, one of which has had three of the accidents and the other two. To lump the third, which hasn't been involved in any of these, into some imaginary grouping may simplify things for you but it does not match the reality of the situation.

What seems to be going on in your posts is an attempt to use a lack of accidents to show the Norwegians as having a level of excellence we should all aspire to, while disregarding the same lack of accidents at Bristow in Aberdeen as statistically insignificant or some kind of dumb luck. You can't have it both ways. I realise you haven't explicitly said this in your posts but the subtext is clear.

As to levels of excellence, perhaps we should all, Norwegians included, look at how they do it in Scatsta where they have had ZERO fatalities since the operation started. Yes, I am being sarcastic, but this is the kind it thing that statistics throw up. Like any other operation they too have had their share of close calls.

Finally, can I just say how disappointed I am with the final line of the BALPA statement, which buys into this intellectual vacuousness. I'm pretty sure you could go to _any_ offshore helicopter company and learn things about improving safety.

[HeliComparator]

RJC - so if I say "hand brake" that means nothing to you? Depends on your definition of an accident i suppose:8

Although I agree with your general sentiment, neither should we be complacent.

Edited - oh you said fatalities, not accidents, sorry!

Anyway, I think Bristow is lucky to have at the top not some faceless accountant, but a guy who has been SLF in his time and is passionate about safety, whether that be out of altruism or because he knows the cost of accidents I don't care.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Ray - I have to say I disagree with your assessment of Airwaves posts. He is deeply concerned, as are we all, at the accident rate. He has correctly identified that for the past few years it seems to happen to the UK sector more than the Norwegians. This is a fact.

The statistics imply that there may be some differences in culture, procedure and operating requirements that are responsible for this partisan disposition. This is also a valid assumption and should therefore be explored. As SAS says, we must drop our shields and look at all aspects of the situation.

To illustrate this point and pick up on your own observations, both the Norwegian and the Scatsta operations do not routinely undertake extreme long range flights such as ABZ-EGPB-ESB-EGPB-ABZ which one could infer place considerable strain of the operational infrastructure of those Companies that do.

DB

[Ray Joe Czech]

Yes, like everyone else round here I pick my words and examples carefully to get the statistics I want :)
Complacent, not ever. There but for the grace of God...

[Grenville Fortescue]

I believe (given the tack which the general response has taken since this tragedy) that a comparative review of North Sea operations (overall) is inevitable.

This, necessarily, should include the Dutch and the Danes of course as well as any other providers.

I think most would be keen to discover whether there are any significant differences in the flight crew training and maintenance regimes between North Sea operators.

But, experience also tells me that sometimes it isn't just the seemingly significant variations which always possess the answers for it could just as easily be something subtle which contributes to an overall enhancement in safety.

Such a review should be conducted if for no other reason to verify that the overall standards are comparable so that this comparison can be dropped from future debates. Hopefully along the way some beneficial lessons can be learned.

From PPRuNe I suggest we pack off Mechta and HeliComparator to join the assessment team!

[Ray Joe Czech]

DB, we are all concerned, but sweeping generalisations do not help. I am not a UK sector pilot, I am a pilot with company A, with base management B on fleet C, maintained by engineer D, flying for company E. This is grossly simplified but each of those and more has a quantifiable effect on the safety of my cockpit.
Maybe at that level statistics might throw up something meaningful but I have serious doubts that macro level ones do.

[Impress to inflate]

Sounds like the P and J and Evening Express are stirring the sh&t over this, as I remember it, didn't they help in the demise of the Chinook ?

They should start looking at bent councillors as I know a few of them living the high life off a few scams in the N.E, 2 spring to mind !

[jimf671]

... both the Norwegian and the Scatsta operations do not routinely undertake extreme long range flights such as ABZ-EGPB-ESB-EGPB-ABZ which one could infer place considerable strain of the operational infrastructure of those Companies that do.

Interesting.

There have been comparisons with Norwegian, GoM and Bass Strait operations and I wonder if distance may be an important factor. Although there are a few long flights in those territories, doesn't most of the work, particularly historically, consist of flights that are short compared to the UK.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Jim, I think you may be right. However, deep water drilling in GOM has meant that longer flights are increasing there too.

[Fareastdriver]

Sounds like the P and J and Evening Express are stirring the sh&t over this,

They have to do something to counter their falling circulations.

[Thridle Op Des]

Hmm, AAIB are trying to make an announcement about the accident, but the link they provide says "page not found", maybe they are having an automation issue.

Air Accidents Investigation: AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter G-WNSB Press Release (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/as332_l2_super_puma_helicopter_g_wnsb_press_release.cfm)

[Thridle Op Des]

Here we go:

Accident to AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter, G-WNSB, on approach to Sumburgh Airport, on 23 August 2013
At 1717 hrs UTC on 23 August 2013, an AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter crashed into the sea whilst on approach to Sumburgh Airport in the Shetland Islands. Four of the 18 occupants lost their lives.
The AAIB immediately despatched a team of investigators and support staff to Aberdeen and the Shetland Islands. In accordance with the normal protocols the AAIB invited representatives from the French accident investigation authority (BEA), the helicopter manufacturer, and the engine manufacturer to participate in the investigation.
Preliminary information indicates that the approach proceeded normally until approximately three miles from the runway when there was a reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent. The helicopter struck the sea approximately two miles west of the Runway 09 threshold.
The evidence currently available suggests that the helicopter was intact and upright when it entered the water. It then rapidly inverted and drifted northwards towards Garths Ness. The helicopter was largely broken up by repeated contact with the rocky shoreline. Some items of wreckage have already been recovered and will be transported to the AAIB's HQ in Farnborough.
Attempts to recover the Combined Voice and Flight Data Recorder, together with other wreckage items, are continuing. This is a challenging operation due to the nature of the environment in which the wreckage is located.
The investigation is ongoing and at this early stage it is not possible to identify the causal factors leading to the accident.

[HeliComparator]

Interesting, so CFITW not ruled out yet. Obviously my post #687 was way off the mark.

[Beaucoup Movement]

"Reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent" that is interesting. Could that indicate vortex ring state?

[KiwiNedNZ]

HeliC - If it was CFITW then what would explain the reduction in airspeed and the sudden loss of height. If they are 3 miles out what sort of altitude would they normally be at.

[bondu]

And high level floatation may not have been irrelevant!

bondu

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

KwiNed

Flying 3 axis coupled at Vy, ALTA capture at MDA and a failure to raise the collective would produce this exact effect and its progression is exponential as the IAS slides backwards up the Power Velocity curve.

[KiwiNedNZ]

Double Bogey - Thanks and so basically CFITW is a real possibility based on the sequence of events.

[HeliComparator]

KNZ. I'm not saying it was CFITW, just that it has not yet been ruled out with the info we have. A manually flown approach, wx on minima, decide to slow down so reduce collective, nose up a bit, get distracted, next time you look the aircraft is doing 20kts with high ROD that you can't manage to arrest before the surface. Something like that. Even though it sounds unlikely, unfortunately these things do happen, look at the LAX accident recently. All that is pure speculation obviously.

The report mentions 2 miles (not 3) and they would (should) be at 710' at 2 miles on the lLS DME but its a non-precision approach so could be higher or lower.

Bondu - true!

[HeliComparator]

DB's example is of course biased towards the 225 because such a chain of events cannot happen in the 225 - it would automatically go into 4 axis as the speed bled below 65kts, and then increase the collective to stabilise the situation :ok:

[KiwiNedNZ]

HC - Thanks and didnt take it that you were saying CFITW - just asking that with those sequence of events it includes CFITW rather than rules it out. Either way I hope they find out the cause sooner rather than later so you can all get back to doing what you do best. :ok:

[Deux Cent Vingt Cinq]

I would say that the choice of language - and the decision to include reference to the IAS - strongly hint at what DB/HC are suggesting.

[212man]

I would say that the choice of language - and the decision to include reference to the IAS - strongly hint at what DB/HC are suggesting

It could explain the lack of a 'mayday' call.

[Tractor_Driver]

All speculative.

However, if true, would vindicate the 'no mixed mode' policy I mentioned in post #632. A modern aircraft, coupled 4 axis/3 cue would prevent this, hypothetical, event.

All the more reason to get the highly capable 225 back into service ASAP.

[HeliComparator]

Or even a 225 coupled in 3 axis / 2cue. Although why anyone would want to fly it like that I don't know. Are you feeling a little unwell, TD?

[Hummingfrog]

HC

Interesting theory of how the autopilot can trap you and initiate a chain of events that can rapidly get out of control!! Does this not emphasise my point of there now being a disconnect between "piloting" and "systems management".

You can be excellent at setting up and using the autopilot to its best but if it has properties that can basically stop the a/c flying, as DB explained, and your hand flying skills are not refreshed enough to recognise and then correct the displacement from safe flight you are in trouble fairly rapidly

If you were used to hand flying you would see the system is not doing what it should and manually remedy it before it went too far! I flew the SAR Seaking with a simplex let down to auto hover - a very good piece of kit but on still flat calm nights it sometimes needed watching carefully with encouragement to help it along!! This was easy as I also had to demonstrate, to the trainers, that I could fly the profile manually.

Weren't there instances in the early days of the Airbus where pilots were saying "what is the a/c doing now" as some part of the autopilot took over without them realising!

HF

[Mark Six]

In the AS332 does ALT hold disengage once the IAS drops below a certain threshold?

[HeliComparator]

HF - you could either ban all automation, but that would put us back into the accident regimes of yesteryear, or ensure that your crews are fully aware of its behaviour under different conditions, know the pitfalls and have well thought-out SOPs for its use. I prefer the latter approach. Also its a good idea to have automation where the pitfalls are plugged, such as in the 225.

But in this case IF, (and its a big IF) it was as we describe, the fault was a failure to monitor, not an inability to fly.

[Agaricus bisporus]

This is all very well but let's not lose sight of the technique you'd use if something broke and you had to ditch NOW!

You'd lower the collective, raise the nose and slow down as you descended...

Exactly the same indications, descent and reducing airspeed.

I really don't see that anything can be gleaned or inferred form the press elease but those two basic facts.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

In the EC225, flown 3 axis coupled, the flight envelope is fully, and I mean FULLY protected. Inadvertent reduction of airspeed or descent to RADALT 150 feet, results in an immediate automatic reversion to 4 axis coupled and captures safe flight parameters.

These are called Hidden Protections based on the concept that if the EC225 is operated correctly, to a logical safe set of SOPs then in theory the crew will never experience these protections.

Of course we provide 28.5 x 2 = 57 hours of Type Rating Training in SIM and AC to provide the pilot with a comprehensive and fully formed model of how the AFCS, the FADEC and the Display system integrate to support the crew. We believe this is just about enough to get all the messages across and prepare the crew for safe EC225 operations.

I do not know how this compares with the average NS TR on L2 and EC225.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Agaricus, the AAIB have full access to the crew. if something broke and caused the reduction of airspeed the AAIB bulletin would have been worded very differently!!

DB

[HeliComparator]

AB you may be right, but it just seems odd that there is no mention at all of any technical malfunction, even in the most general terms.

[HeliComparator]

DB when I did my EC225 differences course in the aircraft at Marignane (pre-sim days), I seem to recall doing 5 hrs (L2 to 225) and my colleagues did 8 hrs (L to 225). We were tough in those days!

Anyway, glad to see that EC have improved that. We do something similar for a differences or type rating + OC course now that we have the Sim.

Although I have to say, it might be better to do a shorter course, put the guys on line for a bit, then do more after say 3 months. Although all the ground is well covered on such courses, I'm not sure how much is retained by a pilot for whom its all very new.

[Hummingfrog]

HC

I am not against good automation in any way - it is obviously the safest way to make an approach in marginal conditions. The 225 seems to be an excellent machine for this and well trained crews will cope with "outages" if the system has a fault.

My point is the disconnect between "systems management" and "piloting".

the fault was a failure to monitor, not an inability to fly.

I disagree with your comment - the fault was failure to manage the system - including monitoring the ASI and AH and when the system showed failure modes - low air speed etc the "piloting" skills should have taken over to increase airspeed and probably power. If this had been done then "piloting" skills would have saved the day.

By definition if a serviceable a/c crashes the pilot has failed to fly it safely.

HF

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HC I hear you and There is merit in all you say. Retention is an issue but more relevant I think is the continuance of concept and procedures....onto the line. We teach and advocate 4 axis coupled whenever it is appropriate and there is no other compelling reason not to do so.

Of course this accident is an L2 and it works and behaves differently.

DB

[Tractor_Driver]

HC,

I am in the peak of health, thank you.

I do not choose my company car. The S92 is a very good aircraft and has some advantages over others but I don't believe that I have ever said anything disparaging about the 225.

[marcr]

All speculation. But another unhelpful difference between the "variants".....
Weather near minima. You've reduced to Vy 3 axis on a shallow run in to the Missed Approach Point. MDA plus 50' captures. You notice the airspeed dropping off, select IAS and beep forward to accelerate back to Vy+. Whether 3 or 4 axis and even with increased power/collective applied the L2 will most likely "dive" or "descend rapidly" to recover/increase airspeed. (Even if GA mode is selected.) IMC at 300+ feet. Not much room or time to recognise, react and recover.

The 225 has a lot going for it.

Thoughts to all concerned.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

"Reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent" that is interesting. Could that indicate vortex ring state?

Could you explain how during the approach this could happen?

Were they approaching into the prevailing wind?

Wouldn't they have been monitoring airspeed and ground speed (the latter by means of their progressive approach) at that time?

What would be a "normal" approach speed two miles out and what would take the a/c from approach/cruise speed to a speed which could make them susceptible to VRS?

[Pittsextra]

so since about 11am today we are throwing the pilot under the bus whilst using suggestions that promote the 225... nice work.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Also, IF VRS was a factor, per Beaucoup's post, wouldn't Sumburgh Approach have contacted G-WNSB when they saw their approach speed dropping-off from whatever it was to something significantly lower or it is not in their remit to monitor this?

[Agaricus bisporus]

Sure, the AAIB will have extensively interviewed the pilots. If it was human error (CFIW) why would the aircraft be grounded? That makes no sense to me. Surely grounding only makes sense if there are technical issues?

[Spanish Waltzer]

...because as is so often the case there may be many links in this chain including perhaps some technical issues that led to indication or control problems. Lets face it, even IF this is the case, the pilots surely didn't intentionally cause the accident so their version of events would need to be corroborated by AAIB before aircraft could be released to fly.

[PlasticCabDriver]

AB,

They're not grounded. There has been no communication to that effect from any regulator or the manufacturer.

Due to a lack of any real information the operators have, in consultation with the HSSG, elected not to fly the Pumas until there is something to go on.

The AAIB may well already be sure, from the pilots' accounts, that this is a CFIT accident, but will not say for sure until they have the CVFDR. If they were to put something out to the effect of : " there is nothing wrong with the aircraft, this was pilot error" the operators may very well start flying again.

Imagine then retrieving the CVFDR data and realising that there was in fact something very wrong with the aircraft but the pilots hadn't noticed (for all the reasons alluded to earlier in this thread).

The AAIB would be in deep sh*t for jumping the gun.

[toptobottom]

Air Accidents Investigation: AS332 L2 Super Puma helicopter G-WNSB Press Release (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/as332_l2_super_puma_helicopter_g_wnsb_press_release.cfm)

[LTNABZ]

Double Bogey & others

Re. the S92 event, yes it is standard practice not to go up with a warning light on, but unless it was something the crew did during pre-flight checks that created/provoked the warning, then it's slightly semantic to say that this was not risk. If the warning light was due to a time-related event, which equally could have happened after take-off, then it definitely was risk in my book. It was only luck that the warning came before take off.

Fully agree about the inflammatory wording "grounded", but then it's what we expect from our Press

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Agaricus, the AAIB report came out this morning. Upto that point there was no indication at all as to what caused this accident. The report states what happens but does not explain why.

However, with the crew available, for the sake of safety, if they had intimated any technical malfunction at all, surely the report would include this. The express omission of any reference to technical issues is evident.

As it stands it implies there was no technical error.

PITTS - yet again your emotion clouds your judgement. We know the crew personally and you do not. Knowing them as friends and colleagues does not absolve our desire or responsibility to seek the truth.....for the sake of safety.

[helialan]

From the South of France the word is that the crew are not talking

[Pittsextra]

DB steady on...

Agaricus, the AAIB report came out this morning. Upto that point there was no indication at all as to what caused this accident. The report states what happens but does not explain why.

However, with the crew available, for the sake of safety, if they had intimated any technical malfunction at all, surely the report would include this. The express omission of any reference to technical issues is evident.

As it stands it implies there was no technical error.

PITTS - yet again your emotion clouds your judgement. We know the crew personally and you do not. Knowing them as friends and colleagues does not absolve our desire or responsibility to seek the truth.....for the sake of safety.

Like I said you've thrown the drivers under the bus whilst also being able to make some good PR for the 225. As I said nice work.

[Tractor_Driver]

LTNABZ

Don't know any of the specifics of the S92 'grounding', but it's software is written so that there are some 'no dispatch' faults that are not visible to the pilots in flight (don't want to worry the poor dears). The warning only occurs after landing where it is assumed that maintenance support is available. Obviously this is less than helpful if the fault occurred on the climbout from the home base and you are then stranded on a rig.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Even to the AAIB? :confused:

[Pittsextra]

or his very good friend DB

[[email protected]]

Out of interest, how often are NS pilots required to fly a manual instrument approach - ie no coupled autopilot modes just stabilisation?

[Pittsextra]

Due to a lack of any real information the operators have, in consultation with the HSSG, elected not to fly the Pumas until there is something to go on.

The AAIB may well already be sure, from the pilots' accounts, that this is a CFIT accident, but will not say for sure until they have the CVFDR. If they were to put something out to the effect of : " there is nothing wrong with the aircraft, this was pilot error" the operators may very well start flying again.

Imagine then retrieving the CVFDR data and realising that there was in fact something very wrong with the aircraft but the pilots hadn't noticed (for all the reasons alluded to earlier in this thread).

The AAIB would be in deep sh*t for jumping the gun.

...and isn't this the point? Given (as has been said) the pilots are known to many here and perhaps things have been said privately to them and the AAIB/Operators etc. What would be so terribly wrong by just saying the drivers think they dropped it but we will wait to do some further investigation to confirm there were no other circumstances?

If in fact that is the case

[role]

Crab;

I don't know the UK requirements, but CHC HS do have requirements to fly manual approaches. That be both precision and non-precsion, and also ARA's. There is also a req to fly x number of coupled approaches which is relevant to me beeing stationed offshore (EC225 SAR).

It has to be done within every sim session (6month).

[SASless]

My take on the AAIB report differs from most of you. I read "the aircraft was intact and upright when it hit the water" to mean just that and nothing more.

They mention the aircraft was severely damaged by the bashing it got while washing up against the shoreline Rocks.

The mention of the "decrease in speed and increase in Rate of Descent" means just that and nothing more.

They offer no explanations of any kind as to the cause, likely cause, or line of thought about the cause of the crash.

The PR is absolutely neutral in my view and very carefully written to convey only that information they can safely provide without entering into speculative language.


HC,

There is no evidence of any kind at this point to describe what kind of impact the aircraft experienced upon entering the water.....but the PR Release does clearly state the aircraft experience lots of damage while being pounded against the Rocks by the surf.

Folks,

We are no closer to knowing the actual cause(s) of the accident so anything said about a cause remains pure speculation.

I do tire of VRS always being the imagined cause.....that drum needs far less beating....as the empty drum makes the most noise.

[helimutt]

The rig worker, who did not want to be named, said:
“On approach to Sumburgh the chopper shook severely from side to side before lurching over to the left and plummeting from the air into the water and went over instantly."
“This all happened in a heartbeat. There was no ‘brace, brace, brace’ or mayday as it was so quick.”


I still have trouble with this statement given by one of the pax. If an aircraft is in bad visibility, the pax can't see out. They have no idea how high they are. Shaking? as in the feeling of vibration as you pass through ETL? the sudden contact with the water? it's going to roll around if the sea is even flat calm, then overturned by the sounds of things. Remember the ditching of the Bond aircraft? Didnt the pax say they didnt even realise they'd landed on water until they saw the sea surface outside of their door?

My point is that before people start hanging others out to dry, then maybe we should wait just a bit longer for the cvdr info?

Just because a statement doesn't say something in particular, you can't then just say well because it doesnt say one thing it MUST mean another.

:(

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Helialan may have a good point.

Does anybody know for sure if the crew have actually given their accounts to the AAIB?

The AAIB report doesn't actually say that much that couldn't be got from sources other than the crew.

"Preliminary information indicates that the approach proceeded normally until approximately three miles from the runway when there was a reduction in airspeed accompanied by an increased rate of descent. The helicopter struck the sea approximately two miles west of the Runway 09 threshold." could easily be extracted from ATC information and

"The evidence currently available suggests that the helicopter was intact and upright when it entered the water" could be survivor testimony.

If the crew are not talking yet, perhaps on legal advice, the AAIB could be just as in the dark as the rest of us.

No inside knowledge from me at all, and no criticism of anyone intended, just wild speculation.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Pitts yet again you appear doing your Troll thing.

YOU are the only poster here suggesting crew error by inadvertently suggesting the crew are being "thrown under a bus". That emotive childish term is an offence to most of the professionals (both aviators and passengers) reading this thread.

Please go and play with the fixed wing threads.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Rumour has it CHC Norway are flying L2s in Norway today.

If this is fact?? What does it mean?

DB

[bigglesbutler]

...and isn't this the point? Given (as has been said) the pilots are known to many here and perhaps things have been said privately to them and the AAIB/Operators etc. What would be so terribly wrong by just saying the drivers think they dropped it but we will wait to do some further investigation to confirm there were no other circumstances?

My first though......... litigation, no lawyer or union rep would advise them to say anything prior to concrete evidence. In my days of union representation I would have advised the crew to say nought to anyone but the company safety dept (and only then a select few) and the AAIB.

There, a reasoned response to your question Pitts.

Si

[role]

Both the EC225 and L2 are flying i Norway.

Frykter norsk helikopteroppstart vil presse britene - Aftenbladet.no (http://www.aftenbladet.no/energi/Frykter-norsk-helikopteroppstart-vil-presse-britene-3241882.html#.Uh9Cr391kSo)

[Mechta]

It is rather surprising that the AAIB describe the Super Puma's arrival in the water as a 'crash' given that they also say that they believe it was upright and intact at the time. The fact that it subsequently rolled over and was broken apart on rocks does not diminish the fact that it was an apparently complete helicopter the right way up in the water for a short while.

[Pittsextra]

Flying 3 axis coupled at Vy, ALTA capture at MDA and a failure to raise the collective would produce this exact effect and its progression is exponential as the IAS slides backwards up the Power Velocity curve.

Agaricus, the AAIB have full access to the crew. if something broke and caused the reduction of airspeed the AAIB bulletin would have been worded very differently!!

As it stands it implies there was no technical error.

We know the crew personally and you do not. Knowing them as friends and colleagues does not absolve our desire or responsibility to seek the truth

All the while explaining how this couldn't happen in a 225. My friend either you know and have it all worked out and that's cool, but unsure the need for this run around. OR you don't and you have thrown them under a bus. Not sure how else you term it in Scotland.

[SASless]

if the Pilots are smart and BALPA members....they will already have Lawyers and have made any statement only after being advised by those Lawyers.

They can count upon being sued by the families of the four passengers that were killed and also by the survivors too.....thus they need to be very judicious about what they say to the AAIB and everyone else.

I can assure you when it comes to going to Court....the Lawyers representing CHC are not representing the Pilots.

[Colibri49]

Biggles and others:

Please put into practice what Biggles himself advocated not so long ago

"Don't feed the Pitts"

[Grenville Fortescue]

if the Pilots are smart and BALPA members....they will already have Lawyers and have made any statement only after being advised by those Lawyers.

They can count upon being sued by the families of the four passengers that were killed and also by the survivors too.....thus they need to be very judicious about what they say to the AAIB and everyone else.

I can assure you when it comes to going to Court....the Lawyers representing CHC are not representing the Pilots.

How true and how our little world has changed over the years.

Let's just hope this does not impede upon the quest to discover what actually happened.

[Pittsextra]

Unfortunately Colbri what other conclusion can you draw from my last post?