AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

[Senior Pilot]

Although they are fixed wing, I find it difficult to accept that Embry Riddle should come out with this attitude in the light of all that is discussed here: Hand flying skills not a priority says Embry Riddle educator (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/523206-hand-flying-skills-not-priority-says-embry-riddle-educator.html).

Especially if this attitude filters through to the helicopter world.

[mary meagher]

I only have 3,000 hrs in this and that, but it required a lot of t/o and landings.
So even though too old to instruct any more I can still fly and the safety pilot never gets a lookin. And I have followed this thread from the beginning.

Beside the checklists being apparently constructed to satisfy the auditors, there is another point of significance.

In post 1406, the chap entitled "26500 pounds" goes back to the different records of the two nations that specialise in what has to be nearly the most difficult flying in the world, to oil rigs in the North Sea. The Gulf of Mexico is a tranquil warm bath by comparison. Alaska....well, only frequented, I believe, by American and Canadian pilots, probably also has horrid weather and icy water.

The difference between Norway and UK that strikes me as absolutely sinister is that the UK is training with a separate organisation providing the trainers. And in Norway, COMPANY INSTRUCTORS carry out all training, and must have a minimum of 5 years experience in NS flying, and get to know all the pilots who work there. So they are able to assess much better the chap who turns up for a sim session, what he needs to improve.

Exactly the structure of our gliding club, which you may think is irrelevant.
The CFI knows the weakness and strengths of the candidates. We do not want any accidents either.

[HeliComparator]

And other opinion including the "children of Magenta" video from Helimutt that advocates selective use of less automation and more hand flying.


The key point of the video is that automation is there to reduce workload (and therefore leave more time for "big picture etc.). Any time its not doing that is the time to drop down at least one level of automation. I doubt anyone on here would disagree with that concept.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

The difference between Norway and UK that strikes me as absolutely sinister is that the UK is training with a separate organisation providing the trainers.

Mary, only one of the 3 companies at Aberdeen does that. The other 2 use company instructors.

[IFR Piglet]

Better handling skills are always going to be useful provided you have the time to use them. An aircrafts EGPWS will provide crews with the necessary time to use those skills in most scenarios. The Morecambe bay accident may have been prevented by a current EGPWS. However it won’t help you when your airspeed decays then vertical speed increases and you’re on an insidious flight path to result in hurtling towards the ground with little or no airspeed whilst distracted. The radalt won’t provide you with sufficient time to use your better handling skills.

Assuming that some pilots will still not adhere to the message in the magenta kids video or still become distracted during critical flight phases. Why not have a system that alerts the pilot of low airspeed prior to the vertical speed problem, prior to the proximately with terrain/water problem? The S-92 has a min IFR speed yet no means of alerting the pilot of an unsafe flight configuration, as you slow beyond it. The current EGPWS modes could do with an update.

Our training could be improved by emphasising the shortcomings of automation more. Generally we’re only taught how to use the AP functions. A chunk of time should be dedicated to demonstrating the APs gotchas in the aircraft and the sim……….As well as, improving SOPs, checklists, flight safety culture etc.

[HeliComparator]

I think there is some muddying of the waters going on here by failing to differentiate between various pilot skills.

There is manual flying skill (making the heli go where you want it to by use of pedals, stick and collective.

Then there is use of automation, making the heli go where you want it to be pressing buttons, turning knobs etc

Then there is monitoring - keeping a constant awareness of what is happening to the flight path when its being flown by the autopilot or the other pilot.

Then there is situational awareness - keeping track of the bigger picture, where you are in the instrument pattern, how the fuel is doing, what's the weather doing etc etc.

To fail to differentiate between all these skills is to totally miss the point. If this accident is as we suspect, it was use of automation and monitoring that were deficient. It most certainly nothing to do with manual flying skills because they were not trying to fly it manually. Well, unless you include a need to pull the lever up a bit. But I would say the recovery action when the airspeed started to decay would better have been to press IAS and beep it up a bit.

[Hummingfrog]

HC

I agree with your definition of the different skills that a NS Pilot needs.

I perhaps disagree with your final analysis of the last few minutes of this accident.

It seems to be a failure to monitor and therefore notice that the IAS was decaying - I don't know the rate of increase that the autopilot gives as you beep forward - will it be fast enough once the IAS has decayed below say 40kts. I presume a good handful of collective plus lowering the nose would be faster. I understand that minor adjustments using the autopilot during an approach on limits is the way to do it. When it all starts going wrong in a major way then manual flying skills may get you out of the situation. The key, of course, is to spot the divergence from the expected flight path as soon as possible and use the autopilot to adjust back to the required flightpath. Once you get into a UP then manual flying skills may get you out of danger - you may overtorque by pulling loads of power but better trash the transmission than the whole a/c

I am sure you don't teach UP recoveries using the autopilot?

HF

[Al-bert]

But I would say the recovery action when the airspeed started to decay would better have been to press IAS and beep it up a bit. Says HC

I couldn't agree more (I'm not quite the Luddite I sometimes like to profess) so why did they not? Why did two rated and presumably competant pilots fail to maintain situational awareness? Could it be because the 'act of piloting' has become too automated? All the skills which you have identified do not belong in separate boxes. They are all required, all the time. It used to be called Airmanship and when things were less automated (Seaking HAR 3) manual skills were in use nearly all the time (and I trust still will be when Bristow take over SAR with their nice new S92's). Perhaps current teaching methods and routine NS operations with all singing AP's have eroded this concept leading to compartmentalism and a needless and tragic accident?

[Al-bert]

Hi Hummingfrog, you beat me to it! :ok:

[bladegrabber]

Given the last few posts regarding what should have happened ( taking for granted this is a rumour forum and we don't actually know yet what really transpired !)

How about we train the SLF to watch those standby VSI and iAS dials over the monitoring pilots shoulders in case they have become too absorbed in pressing buttons and not actually flying the aircraft ?

We could then extend our "Intervention culture " from the rig or platform and hopefully prevent an inadvertent coming together of machine and terra firma ?

We could even give them a check ride in the sim every 6 months to keep them current. ....

BG

[Hummingfrog]

Hi Al

Well I am younger!!:E

HF

[HeliComparator]

HF yes, near the end it would of course be better to fly it manually. But surely a better aim would be to not let it go that far? To prevent it getting to crisis point, the skills were monitoring and use of automation. Manual flying skill only comes into it once mistakes in those other skills has led to a loss of safety margin at the very least.

[SASless]

If the NS mantra is always use the autopilot as it is safer actually admits that NS pilots are not capable of safe manual approaches.

I am short on time this morning....off to the Nation's Capital to show my displeasure with the current management along with about a Million other motorcyclists, Veterans, and other groups.

Short answer is I agree with the outcome but not the reason you stated that I quoted you on.

Double Bogey a couple of Years back proved Night Rig Approaches could be done better with some standardization of techniques. Today, there is discussion of advancing that concept by use of Automation on the Aircraft.

The end result is the same....better SA, more reliable control of the aircraft.

Yes...it is a zero sum game....the more Automation is used and the less hand flying done....there shall be some degradation to hands on flying skills.

Long sectors out to the Shetland Basin where you are in cruise for a couple of hours each way....what real benefit do you get in hand flying every single mile of that flight. Do you not get far more benefit from hand flying some approaches and landings? Likewise, the Captain flies out....the Co files back....now who gets all the Airport landings and who gets all the Rig landings.

Again, we are discussiing "SOP"s" that sound good but do not effectively address the issues as we would hope.

[212man]

There seems to be a general trend developing within the thread that seems to suggest that now - inexorably - that manual flying skills have been degraded by the use of automation, the number of CFITs has risen. Without picking on HF, I'll quote him as this seems to capture my comments:

It is no good saying that flying using the autopilot is safer - with 2 possible CFIT in modern SPs it doesn't compare well with the early 332L, with a simple autopilot/coupler I flew, which in my time didn't fly into the sea!
I'm not sure when 'your time' was (though I think you mention joining in 1990), but I distinctly remember an SP being flown into the sea on the 14th March 1992! This was shortly after a Puma was flown into the sea in Australia, also operated by BHL. The same company also stuck an S-61 and a couple of B212s in the water too, in the years before that - all serviceable aircraft being hand flown. As was the more recent SP in Nigeria. And the two S76s in 1987 (BIH) and 1995 (KLM). That's just the NS operators.

My point is, don't delude yourselves that "in my day it was never like this, because we really flew the aircraft, not like these button pushers of today". Actually, it was like this and - what's more - the number of ditchings/accidents caused by mechanical failures was much higher and more consistent too.

[Thomas coupling]

I can't resist this after 212's input: Then it must be a Mil Vs civvy thang...:mad:

[212man]

I can't resist this after 212's input: Then it must be a Mil Vs civvy thang

Very constructive! :ugh:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

No it's just annoying that people who are, or have only flown a steam driven AP express opinions on the safety of flight where a DAFCS is deployed.

As for the RAF claiming the moral high ground we would need to forget the 330 accidents numerous, CFITs.

In IMC or at, night, the back of the power curve in a large uncoupled helicopter is a miserable place to find your self even when you deliberately visited it. To find it unexpectedly is a shocker.

Al-Bert, how about some honesty. How many times in your career were you "just lucky enough" and got away with it at the edges of the envelope?

[Vie sans frontieres]

we would need to forget the 330 accidents numerous

I don't think this is a valid comparison to make. Although the RAF Puma fleet has suffered a number of accidents in recent years, the flying is usually tactical, sometimes on NVG, often with a hostile threat to consider and entirely different to the comparatively bland, straight line flying in the North Sea.

[Al-bert]

Dear Bogey Al-Bert, how about some honesty. How many times in your career were you "just lucky enough" and got away with it at the edges of the envelope?

To be honest, since in my world we were frequently 'at the edges of the envelope', I guess I must have been 'just lucky enough' for around 7,500 hours. Perhaps I got away with it 'cos I was (in HC's words) a Sky God (although I prefer Jedi Knight) or perhaps because I mostly kept my hands and feet on the appropriate controls and fully understood what they could do for me. :ok:

ps As for the RAF claiming the moral high ground : I'd never ever do that, I even knew some Army and Navy pilots who could fly too :rolleyes:

[heliski22]

Bloody handbags again....

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Al-Bert, fair enough. Sky god you are. The criteria you set for same is probably equalled, doubled and trebled by many offshore mere mortal pilots.
After 15k, Army, Police, HEMs, SAR and Offshore I have also faired well.

However, unlike you I recognise if it can happen to others it can happen to me. Some very experienced, well respected pilots who are much better than me have come to grief. The pilot of this accident aircraft was very experienced and highly regarded by his peers.

They were not "flying manually" in the traditional sense. The skills needed to fly a modern DAFCS helicopter with a comprehensive suite of SA tools, are numerous and diverse. It is a very different kind of flying than what you are used to.

I have done your job, in your kit but you have not done ours. So please go easy on the "Skygod Hands-on Hero" stuff here. It's not relevant., hard or trendy.

[Lonewolf_50]

LW in general I agree with a good bit of your post, however I don't think you have quite grasped that this accident happened to and L2, not a 225. On the latter, the protections are not overrated (the former has none). To decry them is to deny the benefits of technological progress. Oops, thanks for the correction.
For example (on the 225), if you engage VS alone but have too little collective, the airspeed reduces until about 65 kts, then IAS automatically engages and stabilizes the speed at 65 kts (actual speed varies slightly according to dv/dt). That's fairly easy, but what if the collective channel is not working for some reason?
Use your hand on the collective? :confused:

As I am not familiar enough with each model and its AFCS modes, I apologize for any gross errors.

( its an MEL allowable defect, although I've never known it to be inop). Well then you have VS engaged on the cyclic with insufficient power to meet the needs. This time the IAS cannot engage automatically because the collective channel is inop. So what happens?
You use your hand on collective to get the power you want? :confused:
Well, what would you want to happen? You wouldn't want the IAS to go much below Vy, and that's exactly what happens.
I am with you so far.
The VS mode starts to soft-limit the IAS to around 65 kts. So even though VS is still engaged according to the AFCS status zone, nothing engaged on the (inoperative) collective, the protections prevent the IAS getting too low.
We get back to my paleolithic remark from above. :confused:
So if, after that brief explanation of some of the protections, you still think they are over-rated, then perhaps you would tell us what sort of protections you think should be incorporated?
I don't think any suggestion I can make, without far more detailed grasp of the system you describe, would be worth the paper it's typed on. "Protections being overrated" may be my brain cross referencing a few references, to include some FW accidents where a variety of reasonably well designed protections didn't stop an accident, for one reason or another. As some have described the various traps and degraded modes in this thread, the rotary wing world and fixed wing seems to have a common challenge as new tech is applied to the craft of aviation.

Thanks so much for your insights. :ok:
Also, thanks for recaging the gyro in this thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/522069-as332l2-ditching-off-shetland-23rd-august-2013-a-76.html#post8040811)with your post on the four elements of what is being discussed in types of helo flying.

[Al-bert]

Double Bogey - sense of humour caption failure? I was being ironic but irony seems to be lost on quite a few here. I was merely pointing out that despite the most modern and complicated kit that money can buy certain pilots (even the most qualified and experienced) seem to Fcuk up. Why is that?
Does hands off flying in straight lines not get a little boring - ever? Do pilots ever get a chance to 'do GH'? Maybe they should? If you're satisfied with your status quo carry on - you've all done very well :ugh:

[Ray Joe Czech]

You really are talking out of your rear end.
I was in the military too and, as I recall, the vast majority of flying was overland VFR. On a lot of days I regularly go flying now, I would be sitting in the crew room while I was in the military watching the weather outside.
As to superior handling skills, give me a break. I enjoyed watching those up close: our standards guy hitting the fence at Dungannon twice, because he was flying like a tw*t, watching one guy fly me through a tree after I pointed it out to him, losing three colleagues in a fire when one helicopter taxied into into airway stand, grabbing the lever on a boss because he was flying so low I thought he was going to hit wires and getting a dirty look -- the next week he, and a trainer, did a wing over into the ground while doing that general handling you seem so proud of, a fast jet colleague who pulled up into a wing over after takeoff, went IMC and came out of the cloud pointing downwards into a fireball, the guy who ran out of fuel in a puma and had to autorotate into a landing site breaking the tail off. And that's only the stuff I can remember off the top of my head. You seem to forget the crash mags that littered the crew room tables like leaves in autumn.
Once you have done some time in the North Sea I might be interested in your opinions but until then you just sound like a troll to me.

[Al-bert]

the vast majority of flying was overland VFR RayJoeCzech - since I knew most of the crashers in the RAF to whom you refer,all SH btw, I guess I was probably flying over the N Sea, S Atlantic, Irish Sea and Atlantic when you were still in school, or the bar. "Once you have done some time in the North Sea..." oh how I laughed!:D

[Hedski]

There is a definite over reliance on automated flight in the North Sea, much to the detriment of the competence of newer less experienced pilots operating in the degraded visual environment. During conversation mid CRM course about this very subject one high time pilot insisted "the aircraft was designed to fly by autopilot so that's the way we should always be flying it...." This was not too many years ago. I disagreed firmly (crm moment mid crm course!!!)
It should be noted that one North Sea operator recently recommenced SAR operations with this mantra and openly trains pilots to use autopilot functions more than flying skill in the low level environment even when not required therefore negating the opportunity to maintain appropriate skill levels....:ugh:

[[email protected]]

That's what you get for flying Pumas!

The Puma Force took itself far too seriously with far too little supervision and it had a very torrid time as a result - most other forces in the mil learned valuable lessons about how not to do it from the Puma force, especially with regard to culture.

Albert did, and I currently do, spend the majority of our time overwater, often at night and very often in ****ty weather - don't confuse SH with SAR no matter how much you may look down your nose at it.

The limited (compared to modern helos) autopilot functions we have get us into and out of some unpleasant situations so don't assume our opinions on levels of automation aren't valid.

[Al-bert]

Hedski - I'm relieved that at least one current NS pilot seems to get what I'm trying to say! This was never intended to be a mil v civ willy contest (on my part) - I had my chance to go civ NS, I decided against it. Having encountered some of the egos out there I'm glad now that I did. Safe flying, however you achieve it ;)

[HeliComparator]

Oops, thanks for the correction.

Use your hand on the collective? :confused:

As I am not familiar enough with each model and its AFCS modes, I apologize for any gross errors.

You use your hand on collective to get the power you want? :confused:

I am with you so far.

We get back to my paleolithic remark from above. :confused:


Yes, hand on the collective (and moving it of course!) is the correct thing to do. The point of the protections I mentioned is how the aircraft helps to avoid you crashing when you make a mistake and don't do the right thing - in this case raising the collective.

So (and we are rather starting to assume we know why the L2 crashed, when we don't) if the crew did exactly what they did, and assuming that for some reason raising the collective evaded them, had they been in a 225 the protections would have kicked in and stabilised the speed at 65kts with the rate of descent as set on the vertical speed bug (presumably somewhere around 500'/min). So that is the point of the protections - pointless, until the crew make mistakes that put the aircraft towards an undesirable flight path, like low speed low power flight.

[Hummingfrog]

212 Man

I distinctly remember an SP being flown into the sea on the 14th March 1992

That was the Cormorant A accident where an "experienced" Commander made the classic mistake of linking ground speed to airspeed. If I recall the wind was of the order of 60-70KTs. He therefore ended up at low airspeed and descended into the sea.

The Commander had 5000 NS hrs so as I have alluded before, even in our steam driven 332L, he had about 200hrs manual flying experience on the 332L plus what ever he gained during his training.

My argument is not that the problem of degradation of hand flying skills is not knew - it has been with us for many years.

I just don't agree with the present policy of using the autopilot at every opportunity. I agree that in poor weather one would be negligent not using the autopilot. What I can't understand is what seems to be a policy of not allowing manual flying at any time.

When it all goes pear shaped the ability to recognise the problem and perhaps making large control inputs, beyond the authority of an autopilot, may save the day!

HF

[Al-bert]

HF
My argument is not that the problem of degradation of hand flying skills is not knew - it has been with us for many years.


you might just be a youngster in comparison to me HF but surely GCE English was required for the RAF, if not NSea? :}

[HeliComparator]

HF, I really don't know where you get the "no manual flying allowed" thing from. Well certainly not in Bristow anyway, where there is concern about how the new guys will develop their manual flying skills. There may be a few captains (I can recall one when I was a copilot) who are so lazy and selfish that they don't want the co. to fly manually, preferring the comfort and relaxation of the automation, but I am certain they are very much in the minority.

Personally I think its a great shame that we are no longer allowed to fly AP out on line flights, or practice other minor degradations. That is the fault of the regulator. But I suspect in the absence of such a regulation, the oil companies would no longer tolerate it because they are too short sighted to see the big and long term picture.

[212man]

HF, sure - I wasn't having a pop at you (although I see others have!) But I think my post still stands when I look at the general subtext in many comments.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

There are now a few posters, Al-Bert amongst others, extolling the virtues of hand flying over water. If you fit in this nostalgic group, consider the following:

CASE-01. An S61, being hand flown on a clear day, by a highly experienced crew, hit the sea between Penzance and Isle of Scilly resulting in considerable loss of life. The helicopter had no height hold or RADALT equipment.

CASE-02 An AS332, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander, crashes while attempting to manoeuvre visually at night in a snowstorm close to Cormorant Alpha, resulting in consirable loss of life.

CASE-03 An AS365, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander after a go-around induced unusual attitude recovery, hit the sea at high speed killing all occupants

CASE-04. An EC225, being hand flown, by a highly experienced Commander, in a degraded visual environment, hit the sea at low speed. By inshallah, all occupants survive.

CASE-05 taking the AAIB report at face value, an AS332, being operated in Mixed Mode (collective being hand flown), crashes off the Sumburgh coast while attempting to land off an NPA to minima, resulting in considerable loss of life.

We can talk all night with nostalgia about the role we believe hand flying should play in the task off offshore passenger transport. However it seems to me we have tried it already and from the perspective of the passenger, it seems to suck, a lot!!

THERE IS NO DOUBT that automation, driving a correctly defined flight path for the task, is the key factor that would have expressly prevented every one of these accidents, That's a lot of lives that could have been saved if automation was available at the time or used properly or indeed, used at all.

I have detailed 5 above. I have a further 27 case studies of aircraft seemingly flown serviceable into the sea ( I did not do land CFITs), that I used to support the Night Stabilised Approach concept.

Amazingly one incident, in our own patch, where an S76 touched the sea and miraculously got airborne again, was put down to the Commander having had "a hard session at the gym" - (slight over oversimplification on my part for dramatic effect).

Shields down. We are basically **** at flying manually over the ocean without a really, and I mean A REALLY good picture of the surface outside the cockpit window.

I cannot accept, that there is a single pilot flying over the sea that does recognise the safety provisions of a modern DAFCS. For the experienced SAR posters, CRAB and ALBERT, surely you must also recognise this.

However, providing the crew with an autopilot is just one small part of the fix.

If we are to move forward we need to recognise that we are failing to properly prepare the crews for use of automation at almost every level. As a consequence we have failed to not only to ensure it is issued correctly, appropriatly and safely, we have above all failed to mandate its use such that the maximum safety benefits provided by automation, are delivered at the right moment!

The moment before impact!!!

DB

[Hummingfrog]

HC

HF, I really don't know where you get the "no manual flying allowed" thing from.

I have it second hand from the SP company on the same side of the airfield as you - engage autopilot modes as you pass Vy disengage as late as possible on rig approach. They may have changed their SOPs but that was the way they did it!!

It seems that all 3 companies at Aberdeen need a TRI/E meeting to try and get the best practice from each company - will it ever happen?

HF

[Al-bert]

We are basically **** at flying manually over the ocean without a really, and I mean A REALLY good picture of the surface outside the cockpit window.

I cannot accept, that there is a single pilot flying over the sea that does recognise the safety provisions of a modern DAFCS. For the experienced SAR posters, CRAB and ALBERT, surely you must also recognise this.

However, providing the crew with an autopilot is just one small part of the fix.

If we are to move forward we need to recognise that we are failing to properly prepare the crews for use of automation at almost every level. As a consequence we have failed to not only to ensure it is issued correctly, appropriatly and safely, we have above all failed to mandate its use such that the maximum safety benefits provided by automation, are delivered at the right moment!

Double B - I can agree with ALL that you have said in your last post quoted above. In fact the SK autopilot was a revelation to me and a quantum leap in capability over the Wessex that I'd been flying for thirteen prior years (single pilot, at night, over sea included, occasionally). I'm not against the benefits of clever automation. I'm against neglecting the basic flying skills and the complacency that technology can engender in (dumb ;)) pilots. Knowing which bits of the FCS to use, and when, was what made our job possible.

I fear also that just heaping more rules and sop's onto pilots isn't going to prevent similar FU's - just my opinion of course.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HF - in an EC225, in DVE conditions why would the crew not make full and complete use of the AP.

Are you seriously suggesting we practice hand flying approaches so we will be able to hand fly them in bad WX. OR are you suggesting that the only time we should use the AP is when the WX is bad??

I try to follow one mantra. Train hard to Fight easy!!

Take the worse environment the law allows you to operate in. Work out the safest way to do it......and do it........and do it......time and time again. One concept, one procedure, one outcome....every time.

I often see procedures that allow the Pilot Fying, during an ILS in good VMC, to look up early and complete the landing. Accepting that to crash, we have to actually hit the ground, to terminate a practice ILS without practicing the bit that generally kills you, the bit at the bottom, is a wasted opportunity.

Do not waste a single opportinity during operations to practice hard in favourable conditions so that when real thing is required it is second nature. This includes the briefing, deployment and use of automation whenever it ensures the safety of the flight path being flown.
.

[Lonewolf_50]

Are you seriously suggesting we practice hand flying approaches so we will be able to hand fly them in bad WX.
If he won't, I will. I used to train my C/P's that way, all those years ago, in the Navy. Hand fly it in the goo, auto features off, trim off, SAS off ... and keep the scan alive.
I try to follow one mantra. Train hard to Fight easy!!
Aye.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Given the fact that the wreckage and flight recorder have been recovered and analysed and statements that there was no mechanical problem we have to assume it was a flight deck/crew issue.

Not a peep from the two pilots says it all.

Pilot error.

[[email protected]]

No, I think the answer is a mixture of both - train them to use the autopilot properly and monitor it diligently but ensure that sufficient hand-flying skills are practised and retained so that the ability is there to take over if the AP biffs it.

There is train hard fight easy and there is doing the enemy's job for them by taking training too far - I know some would advocate manually flying (cyclic and collective) our SAR transition profiles but that goes against what the automatics are there for - to make things safer in the DVE.

We don't have to be able to do the APs job for it, just recover to a safe flying condition when it gets it wrong.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

CRAB I hear you but....you have failed to correlate the 5 cases cited above where lack of familiarity, lack of procedure and failure to mandate the use of automatics in DVE (Degraded Visual Environment) killed over 30 people.

In all but one case (the S61), the events leading up to the impact started with a low speed/low height loss of control.

We should never, ever, ever, ever practice or do this in the real helicopter with without the use of a 4 axis autopilot. All of these events have arisen from attempted VMC in a DVE. That has nothing to do with hand flying on Instruments which is the confusion you keep bringing to ths thread.

The association of VMC flight not requiring the use of Coupled modes sits right at the heart of the matter here! Make no mistake about this.

Your repeated posting in support of flying by hand in such conditions tells me, that despite your obvious SAR talents, you do not understand the prime causal factors in these events. I will propose that you do not understand BECAUSE you, and the crews you fly with, do not hand fly in DVE beyond the boundaries of acceptable and practical VMC and when you do, you have have your automatics deployed by mandate or as your airmanship dictates.

CRAB you are important to this thread because, unwittingly, I suspect you actually practise what I preach. However, I need you to open your mind beyond the one dimensional view that more hand flying will solve this problem.

Before you reach for the keyboard ask yourself this one Q. Can the best pilot in the world assure a safe flight path flying visually in a DVE in which insufficient visual references exist?

Now tell me that good hand flying would have saved these lives.

DB

[Hummingfrog]

DB

Take the worse environment the law allows you to operate in. Work out the safest way to do it......and do it........and do it......time and time again. One concept, one procedure, one outcome....every time.


The trouble is - and this is what this thread is all about you are NOT getting the last part of your mantra every time. Otherwise we wouldn't be discussing a possible CFIT.

We all agree that using the autopilot in bad weather is the best method to use. Are you really argueing that NS pilot's don't have the skill set or ability to also use manual flying techniques in good weather - just to keep that side of their professional ability.

I explained before about the difference between getting into an an aircraft and putting an aircraft on, where you feel at one with the a/c rather than just sitting it.

Through my flying of RAF Tutors I meet many fixed wing pilots who are worried that new generation pilots are becoming disconnected from reality as the use of autopilots is nearly mandatory in the FW environment. You only have to read their accident reports to see that basic flying skills seem to have evaporated - especially when the autopilot misbehaves due to icing/leaving tape over static ports - there seems to be an inability to set an attitude and power that you know gives a certain speed in a level attitude.

Now tell me that good hand flying would have saved these lives.

If the pilot flying had recognised he was entering a UP which was beyond the authority of the autopilot and used the correct hand flying skills to recover from the UP then yes. I presume you don't teach recovery from UPs using the autopilot?

I look forward to the recommendations set out when we see the AIB report.

HF

[Brian Abraham]

Apologise if this has already been posted. From Aviation International NewsIn the UK AAIB’s second update on the investigation into the August 23 Eurocopter AS332L2 Super Puma fatal accident, it appears the helicopter was “intact,” with “both engines delivering power,” when it struck the sea. The attitude was near level pitch with a slight right bank. The recorded data shows a deviation from the expected course from about 2 nm from the runway threshold. There, the aircraft was approximately 240 feet below the vertical approach profile, with a rate of descent of approximately 500 fpm and an airspeed of 68 knots. According to a North Sea-based pilot, this amount of vertical deviation is considered major and the aircraft was too slow for such a descent rate. The airspeed continued to reduce speed to below 30 knots, and as it did so the helicopter pitched increasingly nose-up. Flight data shows that the descent rate remained constant for a period, before increasing rapidly. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter struck the sea. The autopilot localizer and vertical speed modes were engaged for the approach, the AAIB noted. The investigation continues.AAIB report http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/S6-2013%20AS332%20L2%20G-WNSB.pdf

[maxwelg2]

How about we train the SLF to watch those standby VSI and iAS dials over the monitoring pilots shoulders in case they have become too absorbed in pressing buttons and not actually flying the aircraft ?

We could then extend our "Intervention culture " from the rig or platform and hopefully prevent an inadvertent coming together of machine and terra firma ?

We could even give them a check ride in the sim every 6 months to keep them current. ....

BG


OK BG, I'll bite...

I don't expect you to do my job offshore, therefore you shouldn't expect me to be doing yours.

A mutual appreciation of the complexity of each person's role in our industry can only be beneficial, as well as understanding that our industry needs both bus drivers and SLF to function.

If your comment is meant to be humourous, sorry, once you've lost colleagues in this industry that type of humour is IMO inappropriate, especially on this thread where others are trying hard to make a change for the better.

[albatross]

Geeze guys- In the last few pages this thread seems to have developed a high rate of descent itself towards a sea of acrimonious BS.
Let's get back to a civil discussion please. We were doing so well!
Remember that for the last few years a lot of non-pilot / non-engineers / non- helicopter at all folks have started looking at our comments on these threads and in some cases what, amongst us is just ordinary crew room banter, may look like a serious lack of professionalism.

It is distressing to see that that old Mil. VS Civ. attitude is still regrettably alive and well. I think the Turkey / Eagle , genius / idiot and everything in between ratio is about the same on both sides of that trench-line.

Some good may come out of this discussion of the tragedy but not if it degrades into a unsupervised kindergarden recess.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HF, in the EC225 pressing the go-around early will recover the aircraft from an onset UP.

Visit the AAIB website and read the report on the Blackpool Accident. These crews were flying mostly by hand in VMC conditions with a very high number of landings. The Commander was vastly experienced in doing this. Yet still they managed to get into trouble in a DVE. You re labouring under the illusion that it could not/would not happen to you if your hand skills are good enough. History proves categorically, time and time again this is a flawed argument.

Good use of automation is a very specific skill set that requires practice and procedure to increase safety and not degrade it. Given what we know of this latest accident I will be bold and say had the crew flown fully coupled it would never have happened. It is that simple.

There has never been an accident caused by loss of AP coupler or Autopilot stabilisation. Flying uncoupled is not the answer here. Flying more coupled is. If all of the above helicopters were flown fully coupled, the accidents would never have happened.

Crews fly uncoupled in DVE because they can. Do you think this option should be removed???

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

YOP if you really are an Olde Pilot then you would know that the term "Pilot Error" is no longer an acceptable closure to any respected AAIB report.

A lot of Swiss cheese holes have already aligned before the pilot presents his own hole to complete the chain. To prevent the accident you must break the chain. The pilot is usually just the last one in the chain.

DB

[serf]

Is this not the crux of the problem? Risk management rule #1, accept no unnecessary risk.

4 of the 5 accidents highlighted by DB had weather as a factor. Just because you can fly in crap weather doesn't mean you should; is it appropriate to operate to a deck that only the co-pilot can make the landing? Or fly when TS are forecast because your SOP says the weather forecast is in limits? On the latest accident, where was the alternate if they couldn't get into Sumburgh?

A lot of Swiss cheese holes have already aligned before the pilot presents his own hole to complete the chain. To prevent the accident you must break the chain. The pilot is usually just the last one in the chain.


I was in the military too and, as I recall, the vast majority of flying was overland VFR. On a lot of days I regularly go flying now, I would be sitting in the crew room while I was in the military watching the weather outside.

[[email protected]]

DB, I think you have me wrong here - I am agreeing totally with you that training to use the autopilot in DVE is essential - that is exactly what we do.

But, I am also advocating that sufficient additional training is given to ensure that hand flying skills are kept polished.

We want to avoid the pilot becoming a slave to the AP; he should be confident enough to over-ride it if it malfunctions rather than letting it crash the aircraft because SOPs mandate its use at all times.

The crashes you catalogue could probably have been avoided with better use of AP modes but ultimately their hand flying techniques and skills (or lack thereof) got them into a situation where those skills ran out (the old cliff-edge of ability and task saturation).

Oh SERF - you'll find some areas of the military are required to fly in weather conditions (day or night) when no-one else is:ok:

[Hummingfrog]

Albatross

It is distressing to see that that old Mil. VS Civ. attitude is still regrettably alive and well.

That quote is a load of b----cks. This is nothing to do with civ-mil it is to do with different philosophies. One is use the autopilot all the time and the other is to use the autopilot the majority of the time, especially in poor weather, but on nice VFR days have the opportunity to fly approaches manually to keep up one's manual flying skill set.

DB

HF, in the EC225 pressing the go-around early will recover the aircraft from an onset UP.

You are truely wedded to your idea of always using the autopilot - fair enough but my point is when it all goes past the point of the autopilot being able to recover the a/c, as in this case, what happens?

Is there any form of electrical failure that would knock the autopilot out or degrade its functions?

In the Blackpool accident I believe the Commander was the NHP - the inexperienced (377 hours were on type) copilot was HP.

HF

[HeliComparator]

Albatross

In the Blackpool accident I believe the Commander was the NHP - the inexperienced (377 hours were on type) copilot was HP.

HF

No, the co was flying initially but the capt took over when he lost the plot. However, the capt failed to get the nose above the horizon and flew into the sea many seconds later, seeming more concerned with how the co was feeling than in the flight path. That suggests that all the manual flying he was used to doing gave him a feeling of great confidence which was unfortunately misplaced.

[gulliBell]

Don't these helicopters have an assigned altitude indicator that you set the MDA/DH at TOD and it barks at you when you reach that altitude, and don't they have a RADALT that you can bug that also barks at you when you arrive at the set height? I don't understand how you can descend below the minima without getting barked out, either by the instrumentation or by the NFP. And somebody must be looking outside when these things start barking at you to check if visual or not....do we know if the crew actually saw anything outside before impacting the water? Unless: I could sort-of understand if they inadvertently lost speed awareness just above the MDA and that caused things to go pear shaped very quickly with insufficient height/time to initiate recovery action.

[tu154]

Also for ye olde pilot, I'm not sure what world you are living in if you think that 2 pilots involved in an accident resulting in 4 fatalities, with the inquiries and court cases that is going to involve, are going to come on an Internet forum and say what happened, just to keep you happy!

[bladegrabber]

Maxwelg2



I don't expect you to do my job offshore, therefore you shouldn't expect me to be doing yours.

If I knew what your job was I could perhaps comment appropriately, you perhaps assume that I am a pilot which I am not in the sense of this forum however I do fly helicopters.

A mutual appreciation of the complexity of each person's role in our industry can only be beneficial, as well as understanding that our industry needs both bus drivers and SLF to function.

Couldn't agree more and this thread has been a fantastic exchange of ideas from both aviators and offshore workers and it would be a great outcome if they are all considered when the proposed review of NS flying procedures takes place.

If your comment is meant to be humourous, sorry, once you've lost colleagues in this industry that type of humour is IMO inappropriate, especially on this thread where others are trying hard to make a change for the better.

Humorous nope, I have lost colleagues in a similar accident and can only wish,pray and work hard to ensure we all learn the lessons from them ensuring they never happen again on our watch.

[Lingo Dan]

I've just "googled" the abbreviation DVE - another new one since I hung up my headset! How degraded must the conditions be they officially become a "degraded visual environment?"

However, to return to the subjects on the thread: my thoughts are, if there is any doubt about "getting in", do a coupled approach. Over the sea, on a "gloupy night" qualifies, in my view, for using all the help you can get. However, if it's a few km of vis and say 500' ceiling on an ILS/localiser approach, why not hand fly whenever the conditions are reasonable.

Otherwise, how DO you keep in practice, either for a proficiency check, where I presume you still need to demonstrate hand-flying ability, or when some or all of the autopilot functions are no longer available? Crab gets it right when he says that flying is a degradable skill - use it or you will lose it!

I appreciate that this sad event off Sumburgh - to judge by the contents of this forum - seems to have been due management of the autopilot functions, rather than manual flying skills. However, it worries me that we may have a generation of pilots who are out of their "comfort zone" when manually flying.

[Lingo Dan]

It is a disgrace that there is not a full ILS available on runway 09 at Sumburgh, given the lousy weather factor for that airport. Also, I've just managed to find the AIP pages for Scatsta. No ILS there either.

Perhaps it would be better had Shetland remained part of Norway!!

[rotorspeed]

Lingo Dan's comments reminded me - just why has the term become the more verbose "degraded visual environment" rather than just "poor visibility"? 25 letters to 14 - and that's without calling it "poor vis" as most of us use!

And absolutely, use autopilot whenever wx poor, as it was here with 2800m vis and 200/300ft cloudbase, but with two pilots, as LD says, why not one practice hand flying (some of the time) if confident cloudbase is 500ft with say 5ks + vis, with the other monitoring of course? Maybe it does happen in the NS - does it? Is is permitted even?

[26500lbs]

HF, in the EC225 pressing the go-around early will recover the aircraft from an onset UP.

Visit the AAIB website and read the report on the Blackpool Accident. These crews were flying mostly by hand in VMC conditions with a very high number of landings. The Commander was vastly experienced in doing this. Yet still they managed to get into trouble in a DVE. You re labouring under the illusion that it could not/would not happen to you if your hand skills are good enough. History proves categorically, time and time again this is a flawed argument.

Good use of automation is a very specific skill set that requires practice and procedure to increase safety and not degrade it. Given what we know of this latest accident I will be bold and say had the crew flown fully coupled it would never have happened. It is that simple.

There has never been an accident caused by loss of AP coupler or Autopilot stabilisation. Flying uncoupled is not the answer here. Flying more coupled is. If all of the above helicopters were flown fully coupled, the accidents would never have happened.

Crews fly uncoupled in DVE because they can. Do you think this option should be removed???

We have to get back to reality here. Assuming this was another CFIT (which seems most likely) it is another clear case not of poor hand flying skills but of poor use of automation. All of the CFIT accidents in the NS in the last few years would have been avoided completely if the automation had been used properly. That is fact. We are barking entirely up the wrong tree if we think the answer is to train people to hand fly better. We MUST be teaching people to fly the coupler and use the automation better. My experience from sitting in the back of the sim is that very often people are just not using the automation properly and to its full potential, resulting in the worst form of flying - neither fully coupled nor fully manual. I find that almost all pilots fly without problem when fully decoupled. We train all to fly AFCS off precision and non precision approaches, (usually OEI or with other malfunctions.) It is very rare that they cannot do this and almost always fly without problem to minima, very often with a missed approach as well! We train this in every OPC/LPC. Where we almost always see problems is when people get coupler confusion. This is invariably due to partial coupling followed by distraction and stress. Lack of good and thorough understanding of the coupler/AP increases their stress. Those who suffer this are invariably those who blindly refuse to use it properly or practice using it properly during normal line flying.
The modern day automation is a fantastic step forward and undoubtedly the greatest aid to safety in the offshore environment. The problem is those who insist on not using it properly and fail to embrace it fully.
I too remember my days of flying without any autopilot at all and only basic AFCS in all sorts of ****tiness, and it was occasionally bloody scary. No need for it these days. The AP and AFCS is a “no-go” item for a reason.
DB - you beat me to it with the stats! Al-Bert you memory is clearly fading and the rose tinted glasses are getting steamy! You know as well as I that the RAF has had more than its fair share of CFIT. Go further and compare the number of flying hours flown in the NS vs the RAF per year and the CFIT stats are relatively low in the NS. I knew several RAF CFIT stats personally. Your glorious career of under 200 hrs per year is all well and good, but i know people who have flown an average of over 600 hrs per year for over 30 years amassing over 20,000hrs in the NS and they have never ended up in the water either! ;)
The reality is that we need to go further with automation and develop better SOPs and software modes and embrace it fully. We can and do still maintain hand flying skills, but we should not do that to the detriment of using the safety devices we are being provided with.

[Lonewolf_50]

Brian Abraham:
From the excerpt you posted from AAIB issued information, one will ask one's self:
were the pilots flying the aircraft or was the aircraft flying the pilots? (See the points on "over reliance on automation" rather than YOP's vague "pilot error" depending upon the answer to that question.
IF, and this is a big IF, the crew were doing a form of automatic approach, at what point did the crew realize "it's gone wrong" and try to salvage it? Hopefully, a more complete report will clear that up, or show that this supposition is incorrect.
crab:
We want to avoid the pilot becoming a slave to the AP; he should be confident enough to over-ride it if it malfunctions rather than letting it crash the aircraft because SOPs mandate its use at all times
Will management listen to such talk?
26500 We have to get back to reality here. Assuming this was another CFIT (which seems most likely) it is another clear case not of poor hand flying skills but of poor use of automation. All of the CFIT accidents in the NS in the last few years would have been avoided completely if the automation had been used properly.

We MUST be teaching people to fly the coupler and use the automation better. My experience from sitting in the back of the sim is that very often people are just not using the automation properly and to its full potential, resulting in the worst form of flying - neither fully coupled nor fully manual. I find that almost all pilots fly without problem when fully decoupled. We train all to fly AFCS off precision and non precision approaches, (usually OEI or with other malfunctions.) It is very rare that they cannot do this and almost always fly without problem to minima, very often with a missed approach as well! We train this in every OPC/LPC. Where we almost always see problems is when people get coupler confusion. This is invariably due to partial coupling followed by distraction and stress. Lack of good and thorough understanding of the coupler/AP increases their stress. Those who suffer this are invariably those who blindly refuse to use it properly or practice using it properly during normal line flying.
This is not a new problem. I'll set aside the issue of "using the systems properly" as that is its own subject. I'll address the distraction piece.

Anecdote: some gents I knew, a bit over 20 years ago, skipped an SH-60B off of the surface of the ocean (fractions of a second away from a crash when one of the crew bellowed for power) as they settled toward the water, coupled at night during a low approach (SAR training exercise, IIRC) both a bit too interested in the tactical display and the PF not quite attentive to the bottom falling out from under the aircraft. The aircraft was damaged, and often referred to afterwards as "Skippy" by people in the know. It did not end up at the bottom of the sea, but could have easily enough.

A few other crews over the years did something similar, but didn't catch it in time and put aircraft into the water due to distraction from the flying task. Clear roles in PF duties and priority, and PNF duties and priority, were a topic of a lot of squadron briefings and sim period emphasis, yet still stuff like that happened. In our wing, one of the better intitiatives was the empowerment of the aircrew in the back (systems/radar operators, SAR swimmers when demanded) too more actively yell for power or call altitude during particular evolutions. Saved no few cockpit crews from a cock up, that did, over the years.

Question for NS operators: is there a "sterile cockpit" period in NS pax flights similar to the "sterile cockpit" standards for fixed wing airline flying?

[HeliComparator]

Yes, certainly in Bristow anyway. However one has to be careful with such concepts. The Ops Man A has had the concept for sterile cockpit for a while. It started out as being in place for takeoff, approach and landing. Then there were some issues with misunderstood departure clearances, so the whole taxi phase was included which in Aberdeen can last 20 mins or so. Then as a result of ATC's fatuous obsession with alt busts being the most evil thing in aviation, the whole climb to cruising level, and descent from cruising level, was included. Thus on a 225 which might be cruising at say FL70, that means the first perhaps 30 mins, and the last say 30 mins (descend from FL70 at 500'/min, an instrument approach, taxy back), plus somewhat less for the offshore arrival and departure, and you end up with a good chunk of the flight sterile cockpit - supposedly! So by overdoing it, the whole thing becomes devalued.

Unfortunately these sort of creeping changes are often done in response to external pressure, rather than as part of any joined-up thinking.

[Al-bert]

26500 Al-Bert you memory is clearly fading and the rose tinted glasses are getting steamy! You know as well as I that the RAF has had more than its fair share of CFIT. Go further and compare the number of flying hours flown in the NS vs the RAF per year and the CFIT stats are relatively low in the NS. I knew several RAF CFIT stats personally. Your glorious career of under 200 hrs per year is all well and good,

I don't know why I'm bothering to respond to you 26500 but my annual reports always said 'this officer doesn't suffer fools gladly' so here goes:

true, we didn't fly 600 hours per annum, of hands off straight lines to a rig. Nor did I ever fly less than '200 hours a year' or 300 for that matter. What I did fly, on top of six years SH was 22 years of SAR - and yes, the Seaking AFCS saw lots of use. If you regard a 2-300 cloud base and 2.8k's vis as poor weather then you have never been where I've been. Lets hope that you don't ever try for the CivSar contract too. Nor have you read what I have been trying to say in my posts on here - but, carry on, you're all doing very well! :ugh:

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Lonewolf,

Question for NS operators: is there a "sterile cockpit" period in NS pax flights similar to the "sterile cockpit" standards for fixed wing airline flying?

At least one operator does (2 now I've seen Bristow do as well), I would imagine they all do. HC's points are very valid though, very few crews will sit in almost complete silence for the 15 mins or so it takes to come down from from a flight level, or at the Holding Point at 0715 when ATC tell you you're number 10 in the queue!

26500lbs,

Please remember when comparing military to civil CFIT per fg hour figures that the vast majority of the military fg hours will have been done within a few hundred feet of the surface, as opposed to a few thousand feet in the cruise in the NS. Not disputing your overall point, but in this context NS hours vs mil hrs are vastly different beasts.

[Paul Chocks]

A question for the NS operators:

How thorough is your AP training? Do you cover such things as AP degredations (of which there are many and not always obvious) and practise them? Do you show your pilots the gotchas?

I am sure many of your new hires will have come through the standard PPL/CPL/IR route of training. None of those courses teaches use of autopilot, or didn't when I did my IR - do any "simple" twins used for initial IR's (AS355, A109, EC135) have 4 axis autopilots?

Many other new hires will be coming out of the military - again, do they come from a background familiar with sophisticated autopilots?

All of those above will have considerable training of single engine rejects and hand flown approaches, but little to no autopilot handling experience.

Where is the emphasis during conversion training with Bristow, Bond and CHC (+ NHV, Dancopter etc)?

My knowledge of the autopilot on my primary aircraft type was picked up "on the hoof" with no formal training that I can recall at all - despite type rating training with a very well regarded 3rd party provider (in level D sim). The "on the hoof" training was not done by the Company TRI/E but provided by other company line pilots while flying the line and each had a slightly different way of doing things (such as AS vs VS hold on 3 axis approaches)
Incidentally, use of the nav system was also only touched upon - basically the training generally went over the stuff that was the same or very similar to every other helicopter I'd ever flown, and barely touched on the bits which were genuinely new to me! I'm not suggesting that NS training is like that, but would be interested to hear.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

OBF you make your point well, military flying is a vastly different beast to Offshore Crew Change Flights. However, it does not stop the sanctimonious SAR fraternity from believing they understand our job.

I welcome any ideas from anyone. However, being told we should fix the problem by "More Hand Flying" is a bit like dunking a witch.

Albert - please explain how you managed to "hand fly" SAR missions in weather less than 300 feet and 1800m. If you can then please explain how you would feel about me doing the same, leaving the DAFCS coupled functions in their box, with your family sat behind me in the PAX seats. Or how about you behind me!!

You talk two languages Sir, "Utter Sh*te" and "Total Boll*cks"

26500 lbs. Great post!!

DB

[26500lbs]

I don't know why I'm bothering to respond to you 26500 but my annual reports always said 'this officer doesn't suffer fools gladly' :
So did mine funnily enough - so we have something in common, but I do not know what that has to do with this discussion.


true, we didn't fly 600 hours per annum, of hands off straight lines to a rig. Nor did I ever fly less than '200 hours a year' or 300 for that matter. What I did fly, on top of six years SH was 22 years of SAR - and yes, the Seaking AFCS saw lots of use. If you regard a 2-300 cloud base and 2.8k's vis as poor weather then you have never been where I've been. Lets hope that you don't ever try for the CivSar contract too. Nor have you read what I have been trying to say in my posts on here - but, carry on, you're all doing very well!

I am not quite sure what your weather reference and CivSar references are about other than condescension, which is unnecessary. I can assure you I am quite aware of what bad weather is! I do know why I am bothering to respond to you Al-Bert. I do not think you are a fool, but I do not think you are seeing the whole picture. I have flown both sides of the military/civil divide, and believe there is a balanced argument and discussion to be had, rather than trying to outdo each other with our CV’s. I hear what you are saying loud and clear, although they way articulate it is not always so clear. I do not disagree with your sentiments. However the situation is more complex in that a civil operation is filled with issues the military operation is not. Training is far more limited due to the nature of budgets and how much the customer is willing to pay. There is always a competitor who will try and do it cheaper, driving competition and stretching budgets ever further. My point is that we have what we have and have to work with that and within some of the constraints we have upon us. That is nothing new to any of is, and we had the same issues in the military world. Maybe we can relieve and adjust some of the constraints but the reality is we are not going to get a new unlimited training budget across the NS. We can do the job better. We have to move forward and discussion such as this will only help that.
It is just no good trying to fly a modern day operation in the NS with modern tech in the same way we ran a JHC operation. The people are different. They have different backgrounds. The culture is different. The operation is a different challenge. The challenge of routine is one in itself I never really understood until I did it. These days my challenge is keeping pilots motivated and engaged. The routine all too often creates a complacency in a different way to what we used to see when flying complex military tasks in NI or Iraq or Bosnia or Afghan or any number of other demanding theatres. The NS is no less demanding, despite what some may believe. The demands are different and often not always so obvious.
Routine operations are inherently linked to human error. Why do we have robots building cars? We make mistakes all the time, but the latent errors in routine often go unchecked until its too late.
All a bit longwinded I know, but we have to take a fresh approach to how we tackle very routine operations. The proper and appropriate use of autopilot is key to this, and development of appropriate SOP’s will lead to a reduction and management of latent error. Better training in the sim and classroom will help us when it is not routine. This is being done in some places already, so nothng new. It does not need to cost any more either, just needs to be better planned and controlled. Better selection of crews and management by companies will also go a long way. However the recent lack of pilots meant very low time pilots being hired, who have effectively no experience outside the circuit. This is just a fact, and has already happened. Do we kick them all out and hire a bunch of experienced pilots? A little facetious, I know, but of course we have to use them. We can train them, but companies must take this into consideration when they hire. The problem of the inexperienced pilot will not be seen for 10 years, until he is a captain.
What we cannot do is the halfway house approach we are sitting in right now.

[Wirbelsturm]

Having moved from the SAR rotary world into the highly automated world of the airline industry I, perhaps, see this problem a little differently.

Hand flying and practice is, IMHO, essential. Given the correct weather conditions and prior briefing it is a crucial part of any pilots 'ability arsenal'.
Good use and knowledge of the automation systems, their purpose and limitations and their fallback and failsafe modes is also essential. With weather conditions marginal then the correct use of automation and the careful monitoring of the systems and aircraft position will, ultimately, add to a reduction in workload and an increase in SA.

Where these things start to fall over is when we, as the seat to stick interface, start to lose track of 'what is doing what' or place too much reliance either on the ability of the automatics to pull us out of trouble or our own 'god like' seat of the pants flying ability to be able to operate in marginal to dangerous weather without the automatics assistance.

Every pilot is different and will place emphasis on either side of the coin of 'automatics/manual'. The trick I have learnt over the years is to know when to switch from one to the other and in what circumstances.

The biggest problem with highly automated cockpits (like the one I now fly) is that the avionics and automatics are very closely interwoven. A 'minor' failure of a sensor can have ripple effects through the systems resulting in the loss of multiple automation aids. A major failure will see the crew dumped, irrespective of the weather, into a potentially 'manual flight' regime where that 'hands on' flying practice will be invaluable. There must be a balance of training that emphasises that total reliance on automation is potentially dangerous but also lack of knowledge of downgrade paths and letting your core piloting skills reduce is equally as dangerous.

I flew many SAR missions in extremely difficult weather, all hand flying because we had no autopilot, just a rudimentary stability system and RadAlt and Baro height holds. I wouldn't say that makes me a better pilot, far from it I feel we 'got away with it' many times. We, as a crew, achieved what we had to do with the equipment we had at the time. No more, no less.

NS crews fly multiple flights in difficult weather to tricky destinations where, again IMHO, the full use of automatics is a godsend to reduce the fatigue encountered in a long days helicopter flying. When it is prudent and safe to do so then perhaps reverting to manual flight for the next approach might well reap benefits on the day the systems all fall over.

Just my ramblings.

[mtoroshanga]

I am surprised that in this on-going forum no-one seems to have mentioned that with reference to the pictures of the floating wreckage no jettison escape windows have been punched out on the port side and the entry door on the starboard side has been opened so blocking off two escape windows including one primary escape panel. From more than thirty years on type I can confirm that once the sliding door is opened and not jettisoned it blocks these exits and cannot be jettisoned if the jettison control is then selected. The result of this situation is that everyone has to leave by this exit and the two windows aft of it if they have been activated. There were 16 passengers in this situation,3 less than normal. May I suggest that the actions of the passengers at the sliding doors be reviewed and the depth of training looked into. From a conversation I heard the old principal of "woman and children first" seems to have been ignored.

[Vie sans frontieres]

DOUBLE BOGEY

The weather limits you quote (300' 1800m) would not stand in the way of a manually flown Search and Rescue operation. Or a day training sortie for that matter. Different worlds. Don't get wound up.

[Al-bert]

Double Bogey - the weather ref came from rotorspeed, I beg your pardon, thought it was you And absolutely, use autopilot whenever wx poor, as it was here with 2800m vis and 200/300ft cloudbase, but with two pilots

however, glad to explain how we all did it (and still do) - either we flew lower than the cloudbase at a speed commensurate with visibilty, if at night we would be on NVG. I don't think I'd be too happy sitting behind you doing the same, I was not always happy doing it myself but it was the job. I have no problem with the use of AFCS, AP's, or whatever the current kit is called and if you'd read my posts properly you would know that.
I entered this discussion because I could not understand why two pilots would permit a serviceable helicoter to crash into the sea in conditions that were not especially marginal (according to the metar). I initially thought that they must have run out of fuel, I didn't know that AP's might be to blame. Keep dunking that witch!

[Wirbelsturm]

2800m vis and 200/300ft cloudbase

That's well above CAT I visual landing conditions in a 200+ tonne aircraft landing at 145 kts.

That's not degraded conditions in the helicopter world these days is it?

[Al-bert]

26500lbs I am not quite sure what your weather reference and CivSar references

sorry (I've already apologised to DB) it was rotorspeed wot said it!

But, you and I are in grave danger of agreeing here!
I have never advocated a 'manual is best' approach. I believe that manual flying skills are required as well as, despite even, the automatics - only then will a pilot know when it is going tits up and do something about it? Isn't that what went wrong at Sumburgh (from all we know via Pprune)?
I have never done the NS line job but I do understand the commercial pressures and constraints. I have spent a 'bit of time' with 'you guys' over the years but your reference to It is just no good trying to fly a modern day operation in the NS with modern tech in the same way we ran a JHC operation means that I must be quite a bit older than you, or you are very senior!
I can imagine that boredom is indeed a great problem as is complacency. If companies are reluctant to fund extra training time then I'm not sure how you address your deficiencies but extra automation doesn't seem to be going too well just now. Read what I've already said, you might discover that we're on the same side after all :ok:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Al-Bert thanks for your reply. We would benefit from any help and advice that experienced hands like yours obviously have.

We do not know either the prime causes of incidents like these. We are trying to reduce the risk with technology.

One of the recurrent themes to majority of these events is the crew fails to hear the final bug backstop height at 100 feet. I am wondering if we have this backstop too low in that the state of arousal by then is so high it is simply not processed. Just a thought.

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

VSF
The WX report is an actual from EGPB. Local knowledge has that a SE wind at EGPB is a "Foggy" wind. The actual conditions downwind of Sumburgh head as the crew approached the threshold of 09 to within a couple of miles may have been very different.

[[email protected]]

26500lbs
Training is far more limited due to the nature of budgets and how much the customer is willing to pay. There is always a competitor who will try and do it cheaper, driving competition and stretching budgets ever further. My point is that we have what we have and have to work with that and within some of the constraints we have upon us surely this is the real elephant in the room and unless such cost cutting is addressed, anything else is simply rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.

DB - is that 100' warning a selectable one or is it, as you imply, a final and automatic warning that chimes on every single approach regardless? If it is the latter, then there is no surprise that crews become de-sensitised to it.

[212man]

One of the recurrent themes to majority of these events is the crew fails to hear the final bug backstop height at 100 feet. I am wondering if we have this backstop too low in that the state of arousal by then is so high it is simply not processed. Just a thought.

I've been saying that for years, and certainly in the period after ETAP. The whole reason for descending through 100ft is almost certainly a loss of situational awareness and a probable saturation of the crews. To expect them to hear the alert, process what it means, snap out of their lost S/A and then respond - and the aircraft respond to their response - seems ludicrous. At 1000 ft/min that's 6 seconds! Hearing also becomes ineffective when the brain is saturated, so it may not even be heard anyway. The mandating of AVAD with a fixed setting came about in response to the BA S-61 accident in 1983, but that was an inadvertent cruise descent (as was the 2004 ERA S76, at night from 2,000ft) and so the AVAD alert would have given a reasonable notice. If we look at all the accidents I've listed previously the time frame would have been absolutely minimal and of no practical use. It's one of the reasons research is being done into modifying the Mode-1 EGPWS algorithms to make them useful.

[Al-bert]

DB and I thank you for your gracious reply!

I think you do set the bug too low. ISTR that in the SK we would bug 20ft lower than our routine radalt height of 200ft when manouvering IMC or night over water and at DH on a precision approach. Perhaps Crab could help (my memory aint what it was). MDA/H might be appropriate?

I see I'm slow on't keys! I can't see how 100ft bug is at all useful to your guys though.

[IFR Piglet]

willy waving....."stop"

The AAIB have stated that this accident was of a non-technical nature. What exactly is their definition of non-technical? Unless you know (different from think or have a theory) don’t answer that.

The cause of this accident is still undetermined. Assumptions are being made as to the serviceability of the aircraft in question. However my aircraft is deemed serviceable with elements of systems unserviceable; including AFCS functions. Which in turn will dictate the method of autopilot utilisation. As an example……collective trim u/s.

In the spirit of speculation this accident (my theory) isn’t because of a lack of handling skills. Possibly compounded by method of autopilot function, but more likely due to a failure to detect the aircrafts departure from the desired element of the flight envelope early, and that’s the last time I’m gonna bother saying so.

willy waving......"carry on"

[212man]

The 100 ft call is not bugged - it's fixed. the bug is separate and is typically set 50-100 ft below the MDH, depending on the operator policy.

[Al-bert]

method of autopilot function, but more likely due to a failure to detect the aircrafts departure from the desired element of the flight envelope early, and that’s the last time I’m gonna bother saying so.


err, isn't that what we've all been saying piglet? :zzz:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

IFR Piggy, that was a quality rant!!

Unfortunately you lost the plot as, despite telling us not to speculate in para 1, you then do it yourself in the last para.

Still a great rant though! How long was the build up of steam.

Do we have a Rotorheads "Wooden Spoon" cos I think Piggy just brought home the bacon!!

DB

[Sanus]

MT raises a good point. How was the SP certified for overwater flights if the escape windows can be blocked by the sliding door? Isn't the rule only one seat away from an escape window? Of course if you can reach the open door all well and good, but if not you are trapped.

Here's to S-92 style airstair doors.

[maxwelg2]

It's been a while since I've been in a SP (circa. 2006 as we switched type to the S92) but I recall the pax safety brief stating that the main cabin doors would normally be jettisoned by the crew, however in the event that they were manually operated they would block the windows. This was only meant to be done during a non-capsize situation as we would be going into the life rafts .

[Bravo73]

How was the SP certified for overwater flights if the escape windows can be blocked by the sliding door?

The AW139 is the same. (And it's not possible to jettison the main doors).

[Screw Driver]

"...the full use of automatics is a godsend to reduce the fatigue encountered in a long days helicopter flying." Interesting comment, Wirbelsturm.

A significant number of our pilots are frequently close to the FTL limits (the limits are of course regarded as a target by the commercial department) and there are regular complaints about being fatigued. I wonder how many pilots come to work on their 5th day thinking that the automation will help them get through the 7 hours of flying and that 3rd ILS following the 4 ARAs? Another hole in the cheese is lining up as mistakes in setting up the AP are creeping in, even for those experienced on type! Would you have turned up for work if you knew you had to fly it all manually?

I agree with those who advocate more training, as opposed to testing, combined with manual flying. The latter has served me well on more than one occasion.

[[email protected]]

Albert - correct on the bug settings for cruise but now 100 for precision approach and 200 for non-precision.

I think the big difference is that we (unlike the SH Force) never fly through a bug, we react and not just 'cancel to land'. That way the audio remains an exception rather than the norm and crews are far more likely to react to it even in a high pressure situation.

[SimonK]

Sounds like the SH force have much they can learn from you Crab. :}

[thelearner]

Still here reading every post with interest. Even if I am not getting in the back presently, my friends, colleagues and some family regularly do. Forgive not quoting, I am going to refer to post numbers and posters. Please correct me if any of my assumptions are wrong.

The pilots involved in this incident. We do not know the full reason or reasons for this accident yet, so let's not presume they are guilty of anything until all the facts are known, we cannot make any judgements until we have the full facts, but we can learn lessons, which I think everyone is doing on this thread on the forum.

victor papa - post 1484 page 75. Please keep fighting to try and implement the improvements you and your colleagues have discovered - keep fighting against the stupidity. I fully agree with Senior Pilots post 1493 on the same page. Perhaps you could remind them there are 4 grieving families, a seriously injured pilot and some others who are very lucky to have walked away from this one.

26500lbs - post 1572 page 79. You have quoted one of the many excellent posts by Double Bogey advocating flying fully coupled which I assume is fully automatic with the flying pilot monitoring. What you said here is that you have seen for a long time in the simulator, that pilots can fly fully manually no problem, and fully auto no problem, but problems arise when mixing the two, when stress and distraction are present. I also assume that getting low in poor visibility make those two factors appear. This may be as close as it gets to hitting the nail on the head.

HeliComparitor post 1574 page 79. Sterile Cockpit - if this is a rule when the 2 crew don't talk to each other I find this quite worrying, but I guess there is a good reason for it? I would have assumed professional crews knew when to keep quiet and when to talk? Would be interested in what the RAF guys think of this? And the NS pilots.

26500lbs Post 1579, page 79. We have hired co pilots with low hrs due to pilot shortages, I understand this, on the rigs its the same. Another poster above your post also suggests that training to become licensed does not cover the complex automation on the modern large helicopters we use - a worry. Although this is surely easily addressed? I can also see how routine and tedium on long flights in cruise is a worry, and complacency but don't have any answers to this.
I do however have a question. Is the culture in the cockpit such that an inexperienced co pilot has the confidence (I would say duty) to question a Snr captain if he thought he was observing bad practice, or to make a suggestion on how to do something better. I would like to think that even if he asked something stupid, this would be seen as an opportunity for the captain to pass on knowledge and experience?

Crab post 1588 page 80 - agree we must make sure training is sufficient and adequate no matter the cost, but also guard against overtraining - training for trainings sake and generating a new industry. Also you should be able to fail training - often does not happen now as this reflects badly on the training provider. The Norwegian training model posted earlier looks good.

I may be an old cynic, but I don't think a House of Commons select committee or Scottish Parliament ministers will help us learn the lessons and make the required improvements, but hopefully I am wrong.
I like the work being done by the HSSG, although maybe for some of the workforce they are perceived as being too close to the oil companies, even although the unions are represented there.

Hummingfrog, post 1549, page 78. The suggestion all 3 Aberdeen companies need some sort of meeting. I think you need some sort of work group which meets on a regular basis, reviews incidents, near misses and feedback from the crews and the sim instructors, and makes recommendations on procedures, automation etc and shares the learning's. If this could be done under HSSG then even better. Most important things - open minds or as you guys say shields down thinking.

Keep up the excellent debate and exchange of views here.

Sorry for the long post. One other thing, don't shut the curtain so often, it seemed to me to happen more often recently. Some of the non sleeping pax like to watch you guys at work.

[HeliComparator]

Thelearner

I would love to be able to tell you that "sterile cockpit" is the cleaning regime whereby all the dropped pilot food, gunge and ship's rat droppings are meticulously cleaned up from the cockpit at the end of every flight. Sadly its not so.

It refers to a "no chit-chat" policy whereby talk in the cockpit is limited solely to stuff required to get the job done safely and efficiently. In other words, no chat about "wot I did last night", the state of Ronnie on Eastenders etc.

Clearly its a good policy when all concentration has to be given to the job in hand during critical phases of flight, but if you extend it too long, it will inevitably not be adhered to.

Not only that, but a part of working closely with another pilot requires you to understand what makes them tick, in order to optimise the way you interact with them, in order to function optimally together. "Idle chit chat" is in fact very beneficial in this respect since it allows you to get a handle on your colleague, especially if you don't know them well. With a newish copilot and a senior captain, it helps to break down barriers and make the copilot regard the capt as being human! So it is a very important part of the job. Granted there is a time for this, and a time not to be doing this, but it shouldn't be dismissed as irrelevant.

[thelearner]

HC, thanks for clearing that up for me. Makes perfect sense now.

I may be wrong, but in military, and possibly civilian SAR, are you much more likely to be flying with the same crew all the time compared to commercial NS ops? In FW going by TV documentary's which I watch too much of, often the crew have little experience of each other?

[HeliComparator]

HC, thanks for clearing that up for me. Makes perfect sense now.

I may be wrong, but in military, and possibly civilian SAR, are you much more likely to be flying with the same crew all the time compared to commercial NS ops? In FW going by TV documentary's which I watch too much of, often the crew have little experience of each other?

It depends on the particular operation, but in general, because a SAR base typically only has one or two helicoptesr (plus a spares of course) the pilot compliment is much smaller than say a major fleet in Aberdeen. Plus with SAR you tend to spend many hours in the crew room engaging in "banter", and thus know your fellows pretty well.

That said, some of the oil and gas bases are not that big, and due to the rosters (in Bristow anyway, where rosters tend to be very predictable) you often are rostered to fly with a relatively small cadre of pilots. That does of course mean that once in a while you fly with someone new, because they have worked a day off for someone else etc.

But a big part of the job is getting on with your fellow pilot for 8 hours or so, when he might be someone who otherwise you would really not wish to spend any time at all. That's why we have to do courses on the subject -aka CRM!

[IFR Piglet]

IFR Piggy, that was a quality rant!!

DB

Thanks, all compliments are welcome! If you re-read my post I was asking for an AAIB definition to "non-technical" with a particular interest in aircraft serviceability state, and not as you inferred; demanding an end to all speculation on this accident. Do I get to keep the wooden spoon?

Al-bert

I believe you touched very briefly on the same point but then spun off in a direction of self praise aboard the band wagon of "pilots these days don't have adequate handling skills".....no doubt, I'm still wrong about that and the willy waving and await further correction. By the way I might be a pig but Dad's a horse!:}

Monitoring an aircraft flown by the other or "third" pilot and handling skills are two distinctly different elements to our daily routine and I don't believe handling skills are the most pertinent factor with this accident......bugger I've said it again.

I agree with all that have made the points that will aid effective monitoring; Reducing checklist items, amending SOPs to time the use of checks during less critical phases or "holding the checks" when necessary, strict adherence to sterile cockpit procedures, etc But also the aircraft we fly could be modified to help improve monitoring by alerting the pilots to an undesired flight configuration.

[industry insider]

26500 wrote and Crab quoted


Training is far more limited due to the nature of budgets and how much the customer is willing to pay. There is always a competitor who will try and do it cheaper, driving competition and stretching budgets ever further. My point is that we have what we have and have to work with that and within some of the constraints we have upon us


I don't accept that at all. My company pays for 2 simulator sessions per pilot per year. Just how many do you need? Each sim trip overseas (there are none here) is followed by equal time off.

[satsuma]

industry insider

I hope you're being ironic

Those that mentioned the door blocking the windows - this was mentioned earlier in this thread with reference to the Bond ETAP ditching where passengers slid open the door in the normal manner, thus blocking two of the windows.

[Hummingfrog]

II

My company pays for 2 simulator sessions per pilot per year

Are these training sessions or "checking sessions" where OPCs/LPCs have to be completed?

The Sim sessions that I had were a mixture and because we used company TREs always had some training value tacked onto the end of the "checking session". Does this happen with 3rd party trainers?

HF

[RL77CHC]

Hi Guys,

How did the crew do this approach legally when the minimums were 300 feet and the reported ceiling was 200 feet?

Would they have just shot it anyway and hoped to see some sort of the runway environment from the MAP at MDA even though they would have been 100' into the clouds? Would they crank up the lights on a day like this in Sumburgh?

I'm curious if they intentionally descended below approach minimums after levelling off because they were still in cloud or just descended straight through MDA into the water in one go?

[OffshoreHeli-Mgr]

In the USA you only need to have the approach visibility to make the approach. Ceiling does not matter.

[SASless]

Are these training sessions or "checking sessions" where OPCs/LPCs have to be completed?

The Sim sessions that I had were a mixture and because we used company TREs always had some training value tacked onto the end of the "checking session". Does this happen with 3rd party trainers?

My that Operator sure throws Money around don't they?

By Session I have to assume an hour and a half as the handling pilot and then the same amount of time as the non-handling pilot for a total of three hours per session.

Please explain to me why a TRE/IRE would do training AFTER the Check Ride?

Would not training be far more beneficial if it were done as part of a regular syllabus and be combined with Classroom and System trainers....then carry on in the Sim and apply what was learned or refreshed during the other training?

Guys.....just reading the Questions tells me there is a huge problem in what is going on.

Sort of a blunt answer but my Butt is hurting from 900 miles of Harley riding and perhaps i am a bit grouchy tonight.....really....two whole Sim sessions in a Year....and probably focused upon doing some required Checks and damn little in the way of useful training.

[Brom]

Article in The Scotsman, nice to know about the S92's run dry capability. :ugh:

Shetland helicopter crash: Warning over Sikorsky S-92 - The Scotsman (http://www.scotsman.com/news/transport/shetland-helicopter-crash-warning-over-sikorsky-s-92-1-3062181)

[serf]

The S-92 was applauded by federal aviation authorities in the US for its safety, including a “run-dry” feature which allows it to go for 30 minutes after running out of fuel.

[dakarman]

Hello again, I would like to put forward a few more remarks from the back seats if I may, of particular concern to me is the apparently barely discussed side doors.

I posted on here a while ago and have been home for a while so my recent helicopter ride experience is some time on a 332L1 yesterday (and then a while last night catching up on this thread). Coincidental to some recent comments I recall wondering as I sat there whether the emergency release on the doors functions when the doors are open and I am a bit disturbed to find they don't.

My theory is that this makes these doors very dangerous simply due to human nature. In the event of a sudden violent ditching, all the folk on board will probably have just one thought on their minds and that is to get out. The 6 persons in the middle row will have the doors and the safest and easiest way for them to leave in a hurry is through the doors and opening the doors will give the largest and therefore easiest gap. In a panic would there be any thought to the training video about these doors obscuring the front windows?

My point is that due to human nature, this will probably be the first choice as it is a well observed method for doing this (i.e. a normal sliding forward opening) - which will condem those in front row. I would suspect in a panic situation the emergency door release would be less likely to be used to to its difficult location in the row forward! This is hard to reach by those next to the door and in panic those in the front row will be trying the windows and not worrying about a door that they are not using. In the event that the door is slid open then they will be unable to release it.

My point discussed before about cramped conditions strongly applies to the front row of seats now I have travelled in them again. My favorite spot is the centre forward facing seat so I can watch the instruments (those I can see anyway - cant quite see VSI) and looking yesterday, I don't see any way that the 6 seats crammed in there could be safe in an evacuation. There was only 4 averaged sized people there yesterday and it would still have been a struggle. I noticed the window closest to me was of the small type and I would have been hard pressed to use it and there was an empty seat between me and it meaning that 2 folk should have been using 1 small window! I would question if window size vs a north sea person in full modern survival gear including air pocket has ever been tested.

There is obviously also the issue of comfort. The 4 people yesterday staggered the seats to give each other leg room but 6 people in these seats leaves 4 people jammed together very closely. Maybe it would be wise to video people disembarking from arriving helicopters and those flights where a percentage of the passengers are staggering in pain to the terminal due to cramp be looked at.

Following that question I would like to ask if anyone knows who defines the capacity of 19 people on these flights and what are the specifications? Does it have anything to do with escapability? From a non technical point of view I doubt it, therefore raising the question is the basic capacity rating procedure wrong? Having looked again yesterday sadly I would suspect most of the casualties in the recent tragic accident may have been in this section of the cabin.

In summary I would like to know what others think of the doors. Would it be wise to have the emergency release next to or on the door itself and clearly labelled that it must be used in emergency? Could it be redesigned to work when open or partially open as well (I realise this would be difficult)? Can anyone define the capacity rating procedure?

[dakarman]

Another quick one, and I will try and keep this short, regarding training and the use of automation.

The view from the back seat is that the guys in front have a difficult job and need to be trained to the ultimate standard possible and be using the safest possible techniques (auto or manual etc). Any suggestion that our safety is being compromised due to financial constraints is not taken well - especially in this industry where for years now the highest priority is safety.

Realistically its all a business but this thread has shown a number of discussion areas that sound like they really need reviewing and changes made at a number of levels.

Personally speaking I like to think that a pilot would be fully skilled and practised at flying manually in the event this is required as well as being capable of using all the helicopters auto systems competently and confidently. Training and assessment should cover this completely and if it does not at present then it needs fixing.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

Dakarman, on the old 330s (the RAF ones at least) the door jettison was on the door itself, both inside and out. Seems far more logical, why it was moved I don't know.

On the subject of the pax opening the door rather than jettisoning it in emergency when they do what is most normal to them, perhaps this needs to be addressed in the training you are given. Sliding the door open may very well condemn those at the front so it must be well drilled into you guys to jettison the door as a well drilled emergency procedure.

The VSI is a small strip gauge on the outermost screens, so if you can see those screens you probably can see it, just not very well from back there!

[Bravo73]

The VSI is a small strip gauge on the outermost screens, so if you can see those screens you probably can see it, just not very well from back there!

Even on an L1/Tiger?

[HeliComparator]

The VSI is a small strip gauge on the outermost screens, so if you can see those screens you probably can see it, just not very well from back there!

He did say AS332L1!

Dakarman, your points are in general true although I think the large windows in the front row are unaffected by the door being open(?). The 2 nd and 3rd rows certainly are affected though.

Regarding the door jettison handle location, I agree that it should be nearer to door, however there would be only one thing worse than it being difficult to jettison following a ditching, and that would be inadvertent jettison in flight with subsequent probable contact with main or tail rotors.

However, the point is that its very difficult to design a helicopter with each person next to a window. Also, I question whether this would be the right way to proceed. Firstly, accidents involving difficulty getting out are very rare and have always arisen from a crash rather than a controlled ditching. It is therefore a sliding scale of crash severity causing some to become too incapacitated to escape, whilst others, either tougher or in a better location, manage to escape. Even with a large window next to each passenger its easy to envisage a crash severity such that some don't exit.

The last loss of life from a survivable crash was the N Cormorant accident in 1992, 21 years ago. In terms of ways of dying accidentally, its a tiny drop in the ocean (no pun intended!). That may sound harsh, but the idea that all life is precious and can't have a price put on it, is naive.

Compare with a fixed wing airliner. One exit per 30 or 40 passenger, many rows away. No pop out windows. Following a crash into water, its acceptable that people are going to drown through not being able to get out. The acceptability arises because such an event is very rare.

Therefore I would prefer that most of the efforts went into keeping the helicopter out of the water, since making a helicopter from which escape can be guaranteed regardless of the severity of the crash, is not possible.

[obnoxio f*ckwit]

My bad! I read it as L2!

[Dry wretched thunder]

This very public thread is creating a monster for the guys in the back. Its getting to the stage after reading it that the pax wont be thinking is this SP safe, but can the pilots actually fly it !!

[Lingo Dan]

Industry Insider,

You say that sim training needs to be carried out overseas. Why is simulator training not available at Aberdeen - or at least somewhere within reasonable driving distance of Aberdeen?

Rather than having to pay for pilots' time off, air travel, hotels, per diems (perhaps?) and for the cost of sim training itself, could not the operating companies form a joint-venture company to provide a simulator locally?

However, I'm sure the bean-counters - in both the helicopter operators and the oil companies - have decided the present arrangement is the cheapest option that ticks the boxes required to be legal. These trips to the sim' presumably cover the legal minimum, plus a little more if time permits.

As SASless says, they are not exactly throwing money at sim' training - and they never will unless sufficient pressure comes from the coal-face users for them to do more. I doubt the oil companies will want to spend an extra penny, unless pressure comes from their work forces.

[HeliComparator]

LD, do try to keep up if you are going to participate! There are a number of simulators in Aberdeen, however mr II is not based in Aberdeen. He is not even based in this country. Not even in this continent. In fact further from Aberdeen is hard to envisage!

[dakarman]

I think its fair to say that I have a practical mind about the risks. I have been travelling on rotary and fixed wing world wide in the oil industry for 17 years and I vaguely recall once landing early due to a dodgy fuel gauge on a helicopter so statistically I know that things will be fine.

If I was really concerned after all, I would take a perceived 'safer' seat at the back by a window but obviously my safety concern does not override my curiosity at the little I can see on the screens. I did once have a trip back from WoS sitting on the pilots briefcase with headset on which was amazing - albeit slightly uncomfortable.

This forum does however seem to be getting a lot of view and response and if any minor point (i.e. not too expensive) could be improved even slightly (relocating the door release for example) it may just save another life, maybe in 20 years, maybe tomorrow.

I will have a look at the door next time I am onboard, after all the only place you can see all the flight info - albeit with a twisted neck - is row one single seat. Although from that position I could hardly smack the pilot upside the head if he was doing it wrong (and I am kidding and would never ever consider this to those who think I am being serious!!)

With regards operating the door release correctly, it does constitute part of the training however I just have a slight concern that in a panic this will be forgotten in the need to escape, Particularly as you have up to 4 people all trying to get out of this door. Maybe I misjudge people in this situation and it is after all very very rare that this will happen in exactly these circumstances.

Having the quick release adjacent to the door with a safety design to prevent coming off in flight (seems like a good idea) would give an instantaneous better option. If anything it seems slightly odd to have it where it is now. Please note that generally the passengers rarely open the door themselves, my comment comes from having seen the door opened in the normal way many times.

I would also like to point out that from a couple of brief conversations yesterday that the pilots opinion of 225 vs 332 which I have learnt from here is not getting to the workforce very well yet. I spoke to 2 people yesterday attempting to point out what I had learnt from here about a 225 being much safer and it came straight back to 'gearbox broke = 225 bad' (note that personally I have followed the story about the 225 and don't hold this opinion myself)

[Lingo Dan]

HC, Fair cop on location of simulators! :-)

However, does the existing sim training cover only the legally-required minimum for proficiency checks? Or is it possible to have additional time, if sim slots are available?

[HeliComparator]

DWT This is a forum for professional pilots. if the boys in the back reading this are put off due to not understanding, let them get a job stacking shelves in Tesco where they can speculate from a position of ignorance about the price of bananas at no risk to safety.

However I suspect that most of the boys in the back who are bothering to read this thread, are less stupid than you imply.

Sorry but every time there is a post promoting secrecy on this matter, I will rile against it.

[Hummingfrog]

SASLESS

Please explain to me why a TRE/IRE would do training AFTER the Check Ride?

The reasoning behind that I suppose is that the main reason you are in the SIM is to complete the mandatory checkride.

In my case with the 365N2 we had to go to France to use a SIM - we usually went with a Capt and Co-pilot along with a company TRE. We had 4 x 2hr SIM sessions 2 as HP and 2 as NHP and they were very good value as you would expect. We were treated to the delights of complex failures, insiduous failures and down right scary failures!! This was of great value.

The training after the checkride was also good value as we could ask for any failure we wanted - fenestron failure on transition being a favourite, along with single engine failure, heavy, just as you rotated to come off the deck.

I am a great fan of the SIM as it allows complex and maybe dangerous failures to be practised in a safe environment. Though you do get so involved with flying the a/c you can actually believe it is the real thing!!

I was lucky we had a good SIM and TREs who flew the line and knew how the company operated. I hope that that system can be protected from the bean counters!!

HF

[HeliComparator]

HF, just a thought but yes we do practice a lot of emergency drills in the sim -its the only place you can do it. We all consider it "good value", however if you look at the accidents how many were caused by system failures, and how many caused by piloting a fully serviceable heli to its doom? So, is the balance of sim training correct or should we put more emphasis on normal operations training?

[pumaboy]

DWT This is a forum for professional pilots. if the boys in the back reading this are put off due to not understanding, let them get a job stacking shelves in Tesco where they can speculate from a position of ignorance about the price of bananas at no risk to safety.

However I suspect that most of the boys in the back who are bothering to read this thread, are less stupid than you imply.

Sorry but every time there is a post promoting secrecy on this matter, I will rile against it.

HeliComparator is online now Report Post


Nice post HC :ok:

[212man]

So, is the balance of sim training correct or should we put more emphasis on normal operations training?

Probably, and it was certainly how I structured 'our' (as was) sessions, though we had the luxury of 20 hours per crew (5 days of 2X2hours per day), which is not that common unfortunately.

[HeliComparator]

If you do training before checking, you might be coaching the pilots to pass the check. They should be able to pass the check without just having had a warmup sim ride, if not they are incompetent.

They will also be in a better frame of mind to take in what is being taught if they already kow they have passed their checks, on which their livelihood depends.

It also gives the TRE some slack in the event that a particular weakness is found during the test, either time for a retest and/or time to retrain a specific element that wouldn't have been covered unless it had been found to be deficient.

This brings us to the point about 3rd party training and and sims. When I was on the L2 we had to use Helisim. A good facility for sure, but very hard to get time in as it was so busy. Thus a marginal candidate who probably should have failed and received retraining, was passed because anything else was too difficult. No spare time in Sim, flights already booked etc.

By contrast on the 225 once we had our own sim it was a joy because extra slots could always be found at short notice. Well that was until a bean counter sold all our spare capacity to 3rd parties! Yes we too have middle management who have no concept of flight safety, or at least not when it might cost a few quid! Anyway, fortunately that didn't last too long and we were back to limiting 3rd party use and keeping spare slots for ourselves.

It really does make a massive difference.

[Colibri49]

Dry wretched thunder "This very public thread is creating a monster for the guys in the back. Its getting to the stage after reading it that the pax wont be thinking is this SP safe, but can the pilots actually fly it !!"

Would the pax be happy to go in an airliner which is fully automated and carries no pilots?

I didn't think so, even though this technology is do-able right now.

No doubt the pax would be far less keen on a fully-automated pilotless helicopter. This will never be possible in the offshore environment, due to the huge number of variables and unpredictabilities.

Very rarely pilots make mistakes which coincide with other factors (the holes in the swiss cheese line up) and there are tragic consequences.

The best protection against human error in difficult weather is a really, really good autopilot which is used to maximum effect by pilots who are well trained in its use and can monitor it intelligently, only taking over manually if necessary.

Colleagues who have flown both the S92 and the EC225 almost universally agree that the EC225 has the more capable autopilot. It "protects the flight envelope" (keeps everyone safe) to a very high standard.

Having flown various types over the years and seen the advances in automation, its my belief that you need the best autopilot possible, along with some of the other improvements being suggested. I'm one of the many pilots who are open to the balanced views coming from some pax.

[dakarman]

With respect to those 'in the back' becoming disillusioned by this thread, I think its a good bet that after 80 pages of very technical discussion in places, only the very keen and somewhat knowledgeable on aviation will still be reading.

With respect to full auto - no pilot heli's in the north sea. Nope, no and no thanks.

[gulliBell]

The best protection against human error in difficult weather is a really, really good autopilot which is used to maximum effect by pilots who are well trained in its use and can monitor it intelligently, only taking over manually if necessary.


Maybe, but in the past 10 years or so I've been flying IFR offshore I've never had an autopilot to rely on so automation systems induced degradation of situational awareness has never been an issue. Neither have I ever sat in a sim let alone done any training in one. The oil company loves it, no sim training to pay for, and a very cheap basic IFR helicopter that virtually always gets through whatever the weather.

What I have found is if the weather is really bad I go VFR, because sticking to the rules under the IFR just doesn't get you where you need to go. I'm just astounded that a modern 2-crew helicopter can come to grief in a way where "technical aspects" don't seem to be involved. Maybe there's an argument to made to go back to basic stick-and-rudder flying and common sense airmanship from time-to-time, as part of a wider structured training regime, and just forget about all the complex automation stuff that time and time again we see giving rise to holes in the Swiss cheese.

Just a thought.

[Al-bert]

omg gulliBell!:ooh:

do they still burn witches in NZ? :D

[HeliComparator]

omg gulliBell!:ooh:

do they still burn witches in NZ? :D

I believe they do, but they are also renowned for having a dry sense of humour!

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Albert you got Dunk em before your allowed to burn them!!

[26500lbs]

Maybe, but in the past 10 years or so I've been flying IFR offshore I've never had an autopilot to rely on so automation systems induced degradation of situational awareness has never been an issue. Neither have I ever sat in a sim let alone done any training in one. The oil company loves it, no sim training to pay for, and a very cheap basic IFR helicopter that virtually always gets through whatever the weather.

What I have found is if the weather is really bad I go VFR, because sticking to the rules under the IFR just doesn't get you where you need to go. I'm just astounded that a modern 2-crew helicopter can come to grief in a way where "technical aspects" don't seem to be involved. Maybe there's an argument to made to go back to basic stick-and-rudder flying and common sense airmanship from time-to-time, as part of a wider structured training regime, and just forget about all the complex automation stuff that time and time again we see giving rise to holes in the Swiss cheese.

One of, if not THE, most bizarre replies to this thread.

[industry insider]

Satsuma

I wrote a post about simulators, you asked if I was being ironic but you seem to be talking about windows. Forgive me but I think that we speak of different things.

SAS yes, you are grouchy and quite rude. We are trying to do the right thing by our company, passengers and pilots.

Our Simulator testing and training is done by our contracted operator (HC would know them well) and pilots get 8 hours per "session" not 1 1/2 hours of OPC. If they need more for any reason, we will work with the operator on additional costs where justified....so stick that up the tail pipe of your noisy antique Harley willy extension.

[bondu]

At the risk of giving the bean counters some ammunition, a quote from the great Bell X-15 test pilot Scott Crossfield -

Man is the most efficient and flexible control device you can install in an aircraft. Furthermore he can be produced cheaply by unskilled labour.

Produced cheaply, but expensively trained!

bondu :E

[Um... lifting...]

The AW139 is the same. (And it's not possible to jettison the main doors).


Untrue. Opening the sliding doors on the AW139 blocks no windows. The doors slide aft, the first row windows are forward of the doors, which contain the second & third row windows. It is true that the doors can't be jettisoned.

The EC175, on the other hand...

[Bravo73]

Untrue. Opening the sliding doors on the AW139 blocks no windows. The doors slide aft, the first row windows are forward of the doors, which contain the second & third row windows. It is true that the doors can't be jettisoned.

That is true but only if the airframe maintains it's correct shape. After a heavy landing, there is a very real chance that the cabin shape might be distorted thereby the doors might only open part-way. Hence trapping the occupants in the rear row.

This is why the only approved emergency exits in an AW139 are the windows, both up front and down the back.

[Um... lifting...]

It's also a matter of stability in the water. In the Sky Shuttle incident, the passengers made no attempt to disembark once the aircraft was in the water, so the crew opened the doors from outside, which sped up the taking on of water, as you might imagine.

Training on opening the windows from outside the airframe probably wouldn't go amiss, but I think you'd need a real training device, so people would have a sense for how much force needs to be applied, and where.

[keithl]

However, does the existing sim training cover only the legally-required minimum for proficiency checks? Or is it possible to have additional time, if sim slots are available?

It IS possible. Indeed it 's what I do. Pure training (S92 at present) on instrument approach procedures. However, in my opinion - which many here have heard repeatedly from me - pilots do not get enough pure training. It is often included in the OPC, but as HC has indicated, they are not always in a receptive frame of mind when checking is the aim.

I recently tried to start monthly groundschool sessions, just to answer the sort of technical questions which are always cropping up. The pilots were very enthusiastic about the idea - but couldn't be released from the flying programme, there were no "spares".

Training doesn't earn revenue. It is therefore seen as a drain. Operators do what they have to, and if I get to do pure training sim sessions it's because of some fancy footwork by CTCs.

CAA requires OPCs. I'd like to see the outcome of this incident being a requirement, so many hours a year, for pure training.

[Screw Driver]

"I'd like to see the outcome of this incident being a requirement, so many hours a year, for pure training."

Couldn't agree more, Keithl.

"receptive frame of mind", also crucial.

[HeliComparator]

Keithl - one thing I suspect is that the equal time rosters make this sort of training much harder. With a 4:2 type roster, pilots were at work for more days (about 27 more IIRC) and so could fly less each day to stay within their annual totals and/or had more days on standby or when they could be spared for training.

Now, with the equal time roster, every day "on" is precious to the company and so the current situation is not surprising. Perhaps it is time for the Union to put flight safety ahead of lifestyle and agree that a few of those many days off per year can be assigned to recurrent training?

[SASless]

II,

I question the concept of recurrent training consisting of a Check Ride. Does that mean if the pilot passes the check ride...in reality there is no prescribed minimum standard for training that must be done to satisfy Recurrent Training Standards?

Do you in the UK have Minimum Training Standards and Courses of Training for Re-Current courses? Does the CAA have to approve your training courses, materials, videos, or do you just decide on your own what is sufficient?

If you do not have a formal Recurrent Course....one that is approved by the CAA....to what standard do you train?

Is there a Common Standard that all UK Operators must adhere to.....re Ground Training, Flight Training and Simulator Training? Must the Sim's be approved by the CAA.....does the CAA do any sort of Inspection procedure to certify the Operator is actually compiling with the Approved Standard?

[keithl]

HC - I do SO agree.

I can't quote the numbers, but I have seen the comparison between training days and revenue days and the balance is surprising. Your last sentence is my opinion, in a nutshell!

[bondu]

HC and Keithl,

When the equal time roster was constructed in BHL, six training days were 'built in' - the same number of training days as in the previous roster. This was agreed on by both the management and BALPA. The ET roster also gave BHL management the increase in productivity they demanded before they would even consider its introduction - on average, well over 50 hours per pilot per year. If you are now saying that more training days are required, then there should be no problem in scheduling those days within the 182/183 days on, still leaving an increased productivity over the old roster.
However, I seem to remember that the running of the roster deteriorated badly after the first couple of years, with many of the advantages of ET being eroded. And of course, management also took the increase in pilots' hours as 'the norm' and wanted more.

As someone has already posted, the CAP371 limits have become targets, rather than a fatigue safety issue. Perhaps this is another subject that should be included in the independent 'full and wide ranging review' of North Sea helicopter operations, alongside:
Helicopter design and certification;
Operational limits;
Management culture in oil companies and helicopter operators;
Role of the regulators - CAA, EASA, HSE;
Pilot training;
Passenger survival training;
Role of all media in reporting incidents/accidents;
Role of all unions in North Sea operations.

There are probably more aspects that need to be included and I'm sure other Rotorheads will suggest them. So rather than waste posts slagging each other off, why not use this fantastic thread to look at what we need to do to advance safety in our operations.

bondu

[heliski22]

HC,

Does that mean that you expect your people to complete Type Rating training on a particular Type, including such emergency procedures as can only (sensibly) be carried out on the Sim, then 6/12/18...months later, to perform to the required standard without any opportunity to refresh/practice/re-train on those procedures in the interim?

And if they don't achieve the required standard under those circumstances, they are incompetent?

Did I misunderstand...?

22

[HeliComparator]

HC and Keithl,

When the equal time roster was constructed in BHL, six training days were 'built in' - the same number of training days as in the previous roster. This was agreed on by both the management and BALPA. The ET roster also gave BHL management the increase in productivity they demanded before they would even consider its introduction - on average, well over 50 hours per pilot per year. If you are now saying that more training days are required, then there should be no problem in scheduling those days within the 182/183 days on, still leaving an increased productivity over the old roster.....snip....

So rather than waste posts slagging each other off, why not use this fantastic thread to look at what we need to do to advance safety in our operations.

bondu

Ah, I'm guessing you are a union chap! Firstly are you aware that such comments as "slagging each other off" is confrontational, and therefore contrary to union strategy? There is no off-slagging here, just a suggestion for a rethink from the union, just as much of this thread is calling for a rethink from many other parties (phew, nearly said "stakeholders" there, lucky escape!).

Yes there are 6 training days included in the 182/3 days worked. However in the past when there were more days worked, it was easier to allocate more training days on an ad-hoc basis in particular for copilot development, since each worked day "costed less" and there was more flex in the roster.

Yes, the union could maintain a policy of intransigence here, but with its alleged commitment to flight safety, I think it will be "seen through" in due course, to its overall detriment. Food for thought perhaps?

[HeliComparator]

HC,

Does that mean that you expect your people to complete Type Rating training on a particular Type, including such emergency procedures as can only (sensibly) be carried out on the Sim, then 6/12/18...months later, to perform to the required standard without any opportunity to refresh/practice/re-train on those procedures in the interim?

And if they don't achieve the required standard under those circumstances, they are incompetent?

Did I misunderstand...?

22

Yes, yes, and no.

Are you saying that a newly qualified pilot is entitled to forget what they have been taught within 6 months and not be expected to be able to cope should an emergency happen after 5.9 months?

[OffshoreSLF]

Bondu

Can I add - Review of current survival suit/lifejacket/rebreather and their help/hindrance in the evacuation. I would suggest that the survivors from this incident's views would be invaluable to this aspect.

When I went offshore first, we went in jeans and tee shirt, with a lifejacket in a little pouch tied round our waist. Before I left, I was feeling like the Michelin man with all the clobber we had on. I just wonder if we perhaps have gone too far down the"survival" route to the detriment of "escape" or perhaps I've got the wrong end of the stick.

O-SLF

[heliski22]

Hm...

I'm sure people don't willingly forget anything but I had the idea that all aspects of flying skills are perishable in the absence of practice, not just hand-flying on instruments, as has been much discussed here. If there is no opportunity to refresh, other than the next check, when does training take place?

Or is it that way simply because the training budget in the contract doesn't allow enough hours in the Sim?

[HeliComparator]

Hm...

I'm sure people don't willingly forget anything but I had the idea that all aspects of flying skills are perishable in the absence of practice, not just hand-flying on instruments, as has been much discussed here. If there is no opportunity to refresh, other than the next check, when does training take place?

Or is it that way simply because the training budget in the contract doesn't allow enough hours in the Sim?

It seems to take about 3 months to type rate a pilot fresh from CPL/IR school these days. For a 225 type rating, over 2 weeks groundschool, the 50 hrs in the sim for the type rating, 20 hrs for the operator conversion. Then LSTs and sim to aircraft adaptation. Plus of course all the ancillary stuff such as fire drill, WDD, CRM etc.

After that its 3 days training every 6 months, although of course a good bit of the 1st 6 months is spent with line training. Just how much more training do you think should be provided? You can never have too much training, but then some revenue work also has to be done from time to time!

[keithl]

Bondu, we live in an age of "evidence based" conclusions. May I ask where your evidence is that HC or I have been slagging anyone off?
[Edited to add: "In fact, I have been struck by how little 'slagging off' is happening on this thread, compared to others. I think people really want to get to the right answer.]

Your further remarks about the topics to be covered in a "wide ranging review" simply support a post of mine around - oh, page 40 or so, I can't be bothered finding it again. There is much to be looked at, and although I can't see MPs doing much good, I do think it may be time to go beyond the AAIB report.

On the "how much training do you want?" question: From where I sit (in the back of the sim) I'd say, "As much as you can bleedin' well get!"

[heliski22]

HC,

Yes, I do understand.

You're right, of course, with new people after such an intensive start-up process. Perhaps the scenario I outlined while trying to keep the post short wasn't the best example.

I've been in company where more senior people, well established on Type, have been complaining about the idea of going straight into Check mode after 6 months on the line without any or very little preparation. I had the impression at the time that one of the problems giving rise to the situation was a cut-back in the number of Sim hours available for each training interval.

I've been labouring, perhaps naively, under the idea that the objective of Training/Checking was to ensure standards of proficiency are being maintained and, where there is evidence of some degradation in performance, to provide an opportunity to recover the ground lost rather than it becoming a check-driven, livelihood-threatening moment.

Am I wrong to think that the level of proficiency in certain areas, emergencies which are practiced/trained only in the Sim being one, would follow a slight downward trend over time?

[HeliComparator]

HC,

Yes, I do understand.

You're right, of course, with new people after such an intensive start-up process. Perhaps the scenario I outlined while trying to keep the post short wasn't the best example.

I've been in company where more senior people, well established on Type, have been complaining about the idea of going straight into Check mode after 6 months on the line without any or very little preparation. I had the impression at the time that one of the problems giving rise to the situation was a cut-back in the number of Sim hours available for each training interval.

I've been labouring, perhaps naively, under the idea that the objective of Training/Checking was to ensure standards of proficiency are being maintained and, where there is evidence of some degradation in performance, to provide an opportunity to recover the ground lost rather than it becoming a check-driven, livelihood-threatening moment.

Am I wrong to think that the level of proficiency in certain areas, emergencies which are practiced/trained only in the Sim being one, would follow a slight downward trend over time?

There is of course a legal requirement for ground and refresher training. The requirement is annual, though Bristow does it every 6 months. In the Bristow training regime this is typically day 1 of a 3 day trainer. Mostly classroom but also a 2 hr sim trip, usually for night offshore recency.

Days 2 and 3 are 2x2hr sim each. Normally roughly half testing and half training. So that's effectively 2 days training and 1 days testing every 6 months.

As I posted earlier, its inappropriate to coach prior to testing. I very much doubt our passengers would be too pleased to know that our pilots may not be able to cope with emergencies etc unless they had been coached in the sim the day before.

We train to proficiency plus a bit, thus allowing for the inevitable decline over the following 6 months so that they should still meet the minimum standard at 5.9 months.

In a large fleet, there will be some good, mostly average, and a few weak pilots. Unfortunately as I keep saying, we cannot and should not coach the weak ones into just being able to pass their check following extensive coaching. That inevitably means that a few weeks later they will be below the standard. This is certainly not fair to our passengers, our other fellow pilots etc.

In such cases, the correct course of action is to take the pilot off line duties (aka fail their check) and give them some retraining, followed by retesting. If this has to happen over consecutive checks, there is something wrong and it could be that the pilot lacks the ability to operate in his/her current role, and might for example be appropriate to regrade them as copilot for a while, fly them with a Line Trainer etc.

One thing I have noticed is a massive difference between individuals in terms of the amount of preparation they do before checks. Some arrive keen, full of knowledge they have read up on, and are a pleasure to check/train. A few arrive having clearly not opened a book, cannot describe a normal takeoff that they (supposedly) do each day from Aberdeen, and have no idea how systems work etc.
This latter group (fortunately a small minority) seem to benefit from being failed - they subsequently buck their ideas up big time!

There are hardly any I can think of who, after an attitude adjustment, can't make the required standard each 6 months.

[heliski22]

There are hardly any I can think of who, after an attitude adjustment, can't make the required standard each 6 months.:)

Thanks for (all) that...

22

[maxwelg2]

Colleagues who have flown both the S92 and the EC225 almost universally agree that the EC225 has the more capable autopilot. It "protects the flight envelope" (keeps everyone safe) to a very high standard.

The recently released TSB report on a S92 auto-pilot mishap just shows where the training on that type was lacking IMO. Here's the link to the report.

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Aviation Investigation Report A11H0001 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11h0001/a11h0001.asp)

There may be a separate thread on this already, but thought I'd post it here seeing as we're discussing various types and AP modes.

(EDIT: I see the link was already posted, I just hope it doesn't take 2 years for the AAIB report to come out. I know a few of the pax who were on that flight and to say that they needed replacement underwear is putting it mildly]

Safe flying

Max

[HeliComparator]

Max, however if you read up on the history of the capt he was obviously pretty marginal, they knew that but gave him command anyway due to a shortage of qualified and competent pilots. Was that the fault of the pilot, or the fault of the management - who of course hoped to absolve themselves by sacking him? Its good that the TSB-C saw right through that one!

It also reminds me just how clunky the S92 automation is!

Quite a good report, I thought.

[maxwelg2]

HC, I agree, the report is very concise. What caught my eye was the two previous occurrences in 2007 and 2008 that were not reported to the TSB but internally investigated only.

The 16 main findings and 3 other findings are as always valuable lessons learned. If we are to truly adopt a shields down mode of transparency then we should end up in a better place down the road for all.

Safe flying

Max

[bondu]

Keithl,

I'm sorry if you thought I was accusing you and HC - I was not. However, there are others on this thread who have not been very complimentary to one another (better, HC?).
As for the review, that is exactly what BALPA has asked for, so I must agree with your earlier post!
The AAIB report will give us the answers to this accident, but unless we as a group push very hard, that is where it will end. As professional pilots we cannot 'rest on our collective laurels': we owe it to our passengers, our families and ourselves to continue to push for better flight safety, in all aspects of our operations.
The latest Transport Canada report shows that there are still major problems we must confront - only extremely good fortune prevented another CFIT disaster.
As SASless has already said, "shields down" is the only way forward.

bondu

[gulliBell]

One of, if not THE, most bizarre replies to this thread.

Maybe, but let me elaborate. I have 3000+ hours experience on modern IFR helicopters with DDAFCS, EFIS, IIDS, 4-axis coupled autopilot and all that other fancy stuff. I gotta say I don't feel any safer with all those black boxes I've got to look after, taking up all that brain power making sure they're doing what I thought I've told them to do, and contemplating whether I am where I'm supposed to be. Supposedly making the flying easier for me. Because it doesn't.

More recently I've gotten back to basics flying busted-arse 40 year old IFR helicopter with no auto-pilot, no electronic displays, no nothing, just a weather radar and a single GPS. More-over, the float bottle might have no gas in it, the engines might be on extension 100 hours past TBO, the liferafts might be time-ex, and the windscreen wipers don't work especially when it's bucketing down in a tropical thunderstorm for 5 months of the year. In my situation, if I had a modern helicopter with all that elaborate auto-pilot stuff mentioned before, wouldn't get me home under the IFR, and it would be a maintenance nightmare. If I can get down to 300' and see the sea surface through a hole in the scud that's all the break I need to get VFR and get home. Failing that, just turn around and go back to where I started out from, which doesn't happen very often.

Which is why I say; sometimes these modern helicopters can be a hindrance, just keeping on-top of everything, with all those check-lists and other things to contend with that keep a 2-pilot crew busy. I know, I've been there. Which is why my busted-arse 40-year old helicopter with the pilot door window wound down can get me home, because once I can see what's going on outside is probably much safer than all those black boxes taking up my concentration and brain power when I can't see outside.

I know my circumstances can't be applied to the NS environment, for a whole stack of reasons. I'm just making an argument that getting back to the most basics as part of a wider training regime can be of benefit...

[Brian Abraham]

One of, if not THE, most bizarre replies to this thread.Not if you understand where the author received his indoctrination to the offshore world. It was with an operator (owned by the oil company lock, stock and barrel) where VFR was ostensibly he mode of operation. VFR in name only. Flogging around at 300 or so feet fully IMC was par for the course. No alternate planning despite the regulator and company requiring same. Full OEI accountability was required, but having to shut down off shore was a regular occurrence because of weather issues. Sim training for the captain every two years, but none for the copilot. Flights were never conducted with cognisance of formal weather reports, was a case of looking out the window and going if you deemed it OK. I think you get the idea. I have an email from very senior oil company manager saying to the effect "the operation has never had an accident which illustrates the companys high standards".

Interesting that five months following discussions with the regulator they came out with the following CASA Search -- Federal Agencies meta-collection -- CEO-PN029-2005 (http://agencysearch.australia.gov.au/search/search.cgi?query=CEO-PN029-2005&btnFilteredSearch.x=35&btnFilteredSearch.y=12&collection=agencies&form=simple&profile=casa)

It's basically a reprint of what was once included as a supplement in the flight manual. But it has one very important revision, it absolved this particular oil company from complying with OEI requirements, because it is a private operation. So should you lose an engine in crap weather and all bolt holes are clagged, good luck. The weather to be contended with had everything the North Sea could dish up, save the icing.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Gullibell, your last post has me lost for words. If only half of what you post is true then for the love of god...find another job. Vote with your feet.

DB

[gulliBell]

What I'm saying is throwing more money at training and fancy helicopters might not be the solution....the Op I gave example too is perfectly safe, not because we have a $15m+ helicopter with all the bells and whilstles and simulator trained crews and the rest of it. Because we don't. We have completely busted arse helicopters (by International standards), very limited on-going training (I never did an off-shore check in 3 years), and no simulator training at all, not for anybody. We don't have check-lists and manuals and documentation of Encyclopedia Britannia proportions. Everything is boiled down to the important stuff, plus the not-so-important mandatory regulatory stuff which gets kept on the shelf for when the auditors come once per year.
The Oil Company (client) is perfectly happy, for $150k/month + $1k/flight hour + fuel they get 24/7 IFR helicopter with experienced crew and maintenance support. And the bears are happy, despite getting soaking wet when it rains because the cabin leaks like a sieve, and despite not having much fresh air because the cabin ventilation is disconnected to help keep some of the rain out. Fortunately they don't need to wear the Michelin Man suits because the water is a comfortable 28+ degreesC all year round. The pilots do their very best at keeping them out of the water, because the liferaft probably doesn't work and the sharks will get you for sure if you went for a swim.
What works for us is having 2 very experienced Captains up the front, where if the guy driving did something hair-brain or through temporary loss of attention the other surely would whack him, and a very simple helicopter with nothing too complicated to think about. Total attention can be focused on finding a hole in the scud and then creep home up the river in sight of at least 1 river bank without any complicated distractions like coupled auto-pilots and other things. And of course just as important is the guy who's swinging the spanner back in the hanger totally knows his stuff, despite probably coming off the end of an 18 hour shift after clearing any maintenance snags encountered during the day.
And let me just say the Op mentioned here is not the Op mentioned by BA above. But I did learn the ropes at said Op mentioned by BA and I am very appreciative for that. I learned a lot. And I have him and about 15 or so other Captains to thank for those lessons learned.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Gullibell, I am sure you are really good at what you do. However, I would suggest you have Been lucky thus far - if you actually operate in the manner you describe!!

The statistics indicate, that more often than not, these events occur to experienced pilots. Like you purport to be!!!

You ought to at least recognise, that flying in marginal VMC (and I would class scud running up river banks as marginal) below mandated limits, in what you describe as a "Busted Arse" helicopter without AP, having the opportunity to train only every three years, leaves you with very little margin for error.

I started on a S341 in Germany flying pax in the IF corridor, IMC without even a SAS. I was young, dumb and utterly naive. I now operate the most capable and sophisticated helicopters ever built. I have seen both ends and I know which end is safer. Sophistication enhances safety only when the Pilot fully understands it. Your post implies to me that you prefer scud running to even attempting to progress. There is nothing to fear in the modern cockpit provided the crew are correctly trained.

The worst aspect of your post is you almost seem proud of what you are doing. I feel sorry for the passengers subjected to such a shoddy operation. They deserve a lot better. You deserve a lot better.

Read your posts again........

You are actually suggesting we solve our problems by throwing away our modern helicopters and replacing them with helicopters with "Broken Bottoms", serviced by engineers who get only 6 hours rest in 24, doing little to no training, no checking at all, removing all known VMC limits, stocking the North Sea with Sharks (to motivate us to stay out of the water - your words), disabling the heaters (Kristiandsund Bears will love that), burning the checklists and manuals and replacing CRM and MCC with a mandate to inflict Physical Violence for any transgressions, with the sole aim of offering the Oil Companies a service at £1k per flight hour.

You should be in management!!!

Having said that, stay safe and I wish you luck. Lots of it.

DB

[[email protected]]

No, that is not a perfectly safe operation - you are just riding your luck!

If you end up in the sea, any investigation will leave the oil company and the operator (and possibly the pilots) in very messy litigation.

I suspect we have all pushed the limits in our time but to make that normal operating procedure is irresponsible - to then pretend it is somehow safe is fatuous (and probably criminal).

[gulliBell]

No, what I'm suggesting is more of the same doesn't seem to be working in the NS. Perhaps it's time to look wider afield and take a fresh look at things, encompass even what might seem on the face of it to be extreme views. As we all know there is more than one way to get the job done safely.

What I'm not suggesting is transposing my environment to yours: it's horses for courses. Your flash modern horse just wouldn't work in my environment, it might get in the air but some of the time it wouldn't get back, not unless you can creep up a river visually when the weather is below IFR. Our old busted arse helicopters aren't dropping in the tide, our bears are happy despite getting rained on occasionally, and the client seems happy. With all this simplicity surrounding us we just haven't seen the holes in the Swiss cheese coming into unfortunate alignment yet. Introducing complexity into the equation is likely to change things for the worse, certainly in our environment.

So I'm advocating simplicity, reliance on experience and common sense, and 2 pilots up the front who would whack each other very vigorously if either saw the other do something that they shouldn't, or not do something they should.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Gullibell, you are a walking talking Swiss cheese and a shocking example to anyone reading this thread. I can only hope you are some king of "wind up" merchant OR if this is not the case, CASA identify you and take you out of the system along with anyone else involved in that operation!!

DB

[Prawn2king4]

gulliBell………

Your venture into this thread is on a par with your current flying environment – you’re taking on the odds buddy! Stay safe….

[keithl]

OK, bondu, that's fine.

While I completely agree that there are many things to be looked at, the only area where I feel I can make a contribution is the area of keeping the aircraft out of the water. That's why my posts concentrate on training and instrument approach procedures. I'm just cleaning my bit of the hangar floor.

And...well...my earlier post did slag off "MPs and posturing Trade Union leaders", so fair cop on that one. But I do support the idea of a wider review.

[Jetboxer]

gulliBell

40 year old IFR helicopter with no auto-pilot, no electronic displays, no nothing, just a weather radar and a single GPS. More-over, the float bottle might have no gas in it, the engines might be on extension 100 hours past TBO, the liferafts might be time-ex, and the windscreen wipers don't work especially when it's bucketing down in a tropical thunderstorm for 5 months of the year.

YOU''re are getting paid to make the decision to 'go' or 'no go' with this aircraft.
To make this decision is part of your job.

This decision is a big hole in the swiss cheese.

YOU MUPPET.

If the world comes to bite you in the ass, due to you not being able to see out of the windscreen, and you end up in the water with no floats or liferaft, YOU and YOU alone will have some explaining to do. - to your passengers' families, and your employer.

I think neither of the above would wish you to be doing what you are doing.

Please consider a change of career.

[Fareastdriver]

Outside the oil industry, gulliBell is probably describing the life of half the world's helicopter pilots.

[Prawn2king4]

F E Driver....

Yup, agree with that.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

FE Driver and P2K4 - If you're correct then that is awful.

However, you are both missing the point here. If Gullibell was bemoaning his fate and piggybacking this thread to bring his plight to the world that would be commendable and everyone would be sympathetic and supporting.

However, he actually thinks his operation (in so much as he describes it) may offer an alternative to the rest if us relying only on the statistic that (in so much as he claims) they have managed to avoid a ditching.

Having said that I still think there is some merit in the Shark idea. Does anyone know if mahoosive sharks can survive in the North Sea or would they need a survival suit???

I am still hoping he is a wind up merchant and I am not DB. I am Gullibell (Gulible) and have succumbed to a quality trolling.

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

GULLIBELL

I can fly safely up a river in an EC225, 4 axis coupled at 30 feet and 30 knots.

I can monitor progress up the river using the TAWS display validated by Radar.

I can control all flight capture parameters with one finger.

If I suffer a systems failure that requires an immediate landing, or at my destination, I can ditch or land in Zero/Zero conditions, in whiteout, brownout or blackout, fully coupled, all the way to touchdown.

I think I would fare a lot better than you in your helicopter with it "Broken Bottom"

After arriving, unless I can prove to my Company and the regulator that my Operational Flight Plan was IAW my OM requirements I would expect to be relieved of Command.

[mary meagher]

I really enjoyed reading gulliBell's description of his New Zealand operations...and would love to hear more confirmation of operating conditions down under, Fareastdriver says he is probably describing the life of half the world's helicopter pilots! O my.

Going back to the Canadian AAIB report about the close call of the S-92A 200 nm east of St.John's, two conclusions seemed very significant:

11. "If flight crews do not receive recurrent training in unusual attitude recoveries, they are more likely to experience difficulties in recovering from unusual attitudes."

12. "If flight crew members are not trained to recognise and respond to subtle incapacitation, they may not have the confidence to take control from a more experienced pilot."

Shades of San Francisco, and the Bali splashdown!

Bondu pointed out that only good fortune prevented another CFIT.
Ernest K. Gann had something to say on this point in his book. Trouble is that so seldom one has enough time to say "I have control"

Of course the intrepid gulliBell of Down Under says that in his company "if the guy did something hairbrained, the other would surely wack him....."

[26500lbs]

What I'm saying is throwing more money at training and fancy helicopters might not be the solution....the Op I gave example too is perfectly safe, not because we have a $15m+ helicopter with all the bells and whilstles and simulator trained crews and the rest of it.

It is nowhere near perfectly safe. You just haven’t crashed yet. The way you are describing your operation is pretty much the lead up to the majority of CFIT accidents around the world.
It does not matter how much experience the guys in the front have and how much they hit eachother. The fact that you believe that experience alone will prevent you from having a CFIT is scary. The fact that you think 3000hrs in an IFR machine is a lot and experienced is also scary. The fact that you think you are safe is borderline criminal.

[xny556]

Mary,

I can assure you that gulliBell is most definitely NOT describing operations in New Zealand !

Water temperature of +28 degrees...somewhere much closer to the equator I expect!

Beware of the trolls!!

[Fareastdriver]

DOUBLE BOGIE

Who is going to PAY for all that kit when they just want to send a couple of blokes up and down a river two or three times a day.

[SASless]

Post 1664 by Brian Abraham holds so much truth and could be applied to a great many of our Offshore Operations in Third World Countries. Nigeria begins to ring a Bell unless there have been some extraordinary changes in the past couple of years.

Perhaps there have been some improvements in the Aircraft but the Weather has not changed and the ATC situation and weather reporting has not improved.

At least one of the maligned Operators will shut down operations due to lack of visiblilty in the Dusty Season from what I have heard.

But for decades....Bristow did exactly as Gullibell describes re VMC/IMC operations without reliable weather reporting, no alternate planning, and no Ground Based naviads or Radar Approach or Enroute services. Just climb into the world's oldest Bell 212's and off into the Rain, Fog, Clouds you went. Most of us Coffee Drinkers found a Seismic Line in the Mangroves and beat feet. The Tea Drinkers flogged out in the clag and hoped to find the rig using Radar. Finding the land based rigs on Radar was a bit harder and involved far more luck. MDA's were based upon how you felt that day. After the Nigerian CAA mandated GPS, we at least had a reliable way to fix a location once we had been there which made it far more likely we would find the landing site.

Despite that.....not a single confirmed case of CFIT. We lost several to mechanical/engineering failures, one to cutting down a set of wires, and one suicide, and of course the one Ditching. There remains the one 412 that disappeared on a Night Medical Flight.

One absolute....if you never lose sight of the ground...you never have to find it again which would eliminate a vast number of the Offshore CFIT events we do have.

Gulli has raised some issues that provoked some heated discussion.

He is not as far off the mark as some of you think....or wish that he was.

[Lingo Dan]

I've been asking myself the question, who would I rather fly with:

gulliBell or the S92 pilot, details of whose incident is in post 1659?

Your thoughts on that one?

[serf]

What is the policy with NS operators regarding minimum experience levels?

In addition to the crew pairing policy in the Cougar Helicopters SOPs, all pilots must first be approved by the offshore operators before these pilots are permitted to fly their workers offshore. As part of the process, the offshore operators have established minimum requirements of 1000 flight hours on helicopters and a minimum of 250 flight hours of PIC time.

[mtoroshanga]

Well said SAS, the point is the Bristow pilots in Nigeria (and World Wide for that matter) were real pilots and not system managers and could fly.
I was with Bristow for 34 years all over the world and until the arrival of OLOG was with the best company in the world. When we lost a Wessex and could not establish the reason we grounded the type although the Queen continued to fly in them for years afterwards so lets not hear anymore guff about standards.
In my time with the company I could count on one hand the pilots I was concerned about flying with in ANY conditions, from Greenland to Malaysia and Borneo and many countries in between including Zagross in Iran and Mogadishu during the UN fiasco. I shudder to think how some of the current crop would cope!! (I never worried about flying with you!)

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Mtoroshanga, it is always interesting to hear from the "old and bold" who look back with nostalgia and rose tinted glasses, claiming they did it harder and better than anyone else.

There is no real place for this kind of Macho bull**** in this thread. It's serves no purpose other than to allow you to grandstand and gloat with a holier than thou type of attitude.

If all you can offer is a dissitation on how good your guys were we will sadly not really learn anything from you and that's a shame because with all that experience you must have learned something that might help!!

I have never worked with anyone I was not happy to fly with.

DB

[Al-bert]

Double Bogey - I find it interesting, if a little sad, that whenever an 'old n bold' pilot, or shall we call them a 'pre 4 axis fully coupled pilot' offers an opinion, helpful suggestion even (like I attempted) it is immediately derided by yourself and others who are understandably wholly committed (roger committed!) to the NS 'Airline' way of doing things. Rose tinted misted spectacles aside, there are other ways of flying a helicopter that are not acceptable to commercial operations like the one you are tied up in. But I can remember when NS operators would find a platform on radar and fly up the leg in fog - NO, I don't think that was a better way than the one you use now (but is that how the RM do it still?) but military pilots do all sorts of strange things that wouldn't be acceptable on the NS shuttles. It's not boasting, just a fact, why, even SH types don't always understand what SAR Buoy (wankers) get up to (unless it's all got incredibly pc since I retired) and I wouldn't have much of a clue about the Stan. I can fly on instruments, even had a proc IR courtesy of Aberdeen's Sim and would have loved to have the automation that you enjoy but it wasn't much use up a mountain, day or night. What I think various O+B people are trying to say is systems operating, whilst very important, isn't the whole story when it comes to helo flying. Maybe, just maybe, some other essentials have been lost along the way? Perhaps due to accountants who do not really understand aviation? :)

[[email protected]]

Albert - the difference is the fact the NS have fare-paying passengers in the back who, quite rightly, demand levels of safety over and above what can be tolerated in the pursuit of a military goal or that required to save lives.

Gulibell's third-world approach to 'safe' operations is like so many things - it is behind the times because it is allowed to be whereas most first world operations actually have some regulation and safety standards applied to them.

I don't believe that there are a bunch of numpties in the NS who can't actually fly a helicopter or are too procedure-bound to use their captaincy and flying skills in the best interests of their passengers.

The operations in the NS clearly aren't perfect or the crashes wouldn't be happening but defining the root cause and therefore the solution seems to be problematical.

[Al-bert]

FFS Crab - I knew all that!!!

I wasn't saying "fly like SAR Sky God (JOKE! I say again Joke!) or you're a numptie"!!!
I understand the commercial reality too (I even have a BA(Econ) :=) but if you listen very carefully (I will say dis only wanz) I think, just perhaps, that SOME skills are in danger of being lost, or not even developed in the 'straight through' co to capt scheme of things in the pursuit of savings. It is hard to see how to change this 'culture' but throwing increasing technology at the problem is not altogether successful is it? :{

BTW I think prob Gulli is a wind up - a first class one though! :ok:

[keithl]

Thing about pPrune is - when you try to calm things down, you end up inflaming them, and when you try quoting observed fact, you are sure to be accused of making it up. Still, I want to nail this "we could fly in those days" vs "dinosaurs should know when they're extinct" digression.

I'm a sim instructor. Have been for years. FW and RW. Like the doctor, I've seen you all at your embarrassing worst and I've kept it to myself. Because when I was flying, I had bad days, too. People were screwing up on steam-driven old bangers long before they were screwing up on fancy full-colour, automated wizzocopters.

I have seen people so lacking in manual flying skills that the arrival of automation couldn't come too soon and I have seen people so baffled by the automation that they forgot to use their manual flying skills.

Only the detail of the problem has changed. The underlying issue is just the same. Familiarity with, expertise with, practice with, the equipment you are given to fly is what makes a professional, safe pilot. There are no prizes for guessing what I'm going to say next!

Where does that familiarity, that expertise, that practice come from?

TRAINING. And as much of it as you can get.

And don't tell me me about "real world" limitations. This thread is all about where that has got us.

Out.

[albatross]

AS332 L2 - YouTube (http://youtu.be/qxV60XLe4zY)

Nice little off topic L2 video here.
Eurocopter film. Norway ops.

[satsuma]

The most astonishing thing I've read for a while was in the Cougar report


Although the first officer had almost 1000 total flight hours on the S-92A, many of those hours were spent in coupled flight during instrument flight rules (IFR) flights to and from the offshore facilities, and not hand flying the helicopter. As a result, the first officer did not feel confident about having the necessary instrument flying skills to safely recover from the unusual attitude that had developed.


This discussion has bounced back and forward over the last few days with the automation versus manual flying debate but when a situation such as this is discovered to exist within the Oil & Gas flying fraternity overseas, are we supposed to believe that similar cannot exist in the North Sea? :uhoh:

[HLCPTR]

keithl,

Bravo!

[[email protected]]

With you 100% Keithl:ok:

Al - calm down, its not good for your blood pressure at your age;) The problem with the written word is that making yourself clear while trying to be concise is very difficult since people will always read what they want rather than what you have actually written.

Such problems have plagued me on these fora since I have often written what sounds correct to me but inflames others who interpret what I have written completely differently to what was intended.

We are all pretty much in agreement that flying skills (handling) are vitally important in all areas but management of systems and knowledge of the limitations and capabilities of those systems is crucial.

The balance of the 2 is, as Keithl echoes, all down to quality and quantity of training.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

KeithL & Crab.

Amen to all you say. You have hit the nail right on its head!!

DB

[Brian Abraham]

Outside the oil industry, gulliBell is probably describing the life of half the world's helicopter pilots.FE, the sad part is also the standard in certain parts of the oil industry in a first world country.
CASA identify you and take you out of the system along with anyone else involved in that operationDB, the operator I referred to is CASA sanctioned, so no help there. Have a read of threads re CASA in the Oz forums - it'll bring tears.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

BA - I do not need to read the CASA thread - I know the organisation extremely well. like all organisations there is Good, bad and ugly.

Just a word of caution though. Blaming the regulator for the behaviour and attitudes of Gullibell is a gross over simplification.

Just because the law says you can it does not mean you should. That's still called airmanship I believe.

However, in loyalty to CASA and the many fine people who work hard there each day - the operation Gullibell describes is not IAW with CARs either in respect of Maintenance or Flight Operations. If you like I can explain why!!

Come on Brian you are much better than that!!

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SATSUMA - in majority of these accidents the pilot has not reacted or attempted to recover from the UA. When the pilot does react the outcome is usually favourable, like the recent S92 incident. The copilot will have passed his OPC and I am sure UAs would have been on the menu. Our Canadian brothers are as regulated and professional as anywhere else.

I can think of only one case where attempted recovery has subsequently and horribly failed. That was the AS365 in Morecombe Bay.

No this problem is far more complex and insidious and it may be related to how we train for these events.

At present we generally ask the Pilot Flying to close his eyes and then set up the UA, he opens his eyes and recovers. In doing it this way we are not actually training him to recognise the most important aspect which is the onset of the UA.

By not seeing the full progression of the UA we are not practising the intervention skills and/or policy nor are we allowing the crew to develop coping strategies and the necessary airmanship, CRM and MCC to optimise his chances of reacting early enough in the sequence of events.

In this class of helicopter, a fully developed low speed UA, especially coupled with a high ROD is a horrible prospect for even the most skilled pilot. I know because I have been there. Twice. Luck, timing and skill and by far luck plays the greater part. By this I mean the you're lucky if you get one at 500 feet, unlucky if you get presented with the the same prospect at 100 feet.

The chances of recovery at this stage depend on whether the pilot runs out of luck, skill or altitude before he can restablish a ROC.

We have to recognise, that despite the intimation from some posters on this thread that their skills have thus far saved them from ever getting there, and this may of course be absolutley true for them, some extremely well qualified, skilful and highly respected pilots have not been so fortunate.

In terms of skillsets, if we accept that luck and height play the greater part, by far the most impactful strategy must be to develop skills that prevent the initial flight path deterioration in the first place. This may be an automation skill or a manual flying skill, depending on the AC at its systems.

To do this we have to get better at recognising the onset of a UA. We have to start practising our airmanship, CRM, MCC and intervention so that hopefully we develop a skillset to deploy, other automation or manual, that will manage these risks better than we are doing now.

The latest EC products do exactly this. The DAFCS actually recognises the early symptoms of a UA, loss of airspeed, loss of height, excessive ROC/ROD and automatically intervenes to restore a safe flight path. These are backstop hidden protections.

Any ideas from TRIs in this respect. Are we actually training for the wrong event here. Instead of putting our faith, and therefore our training efforts solely into recovery, should we be doing much, much more to enable the pilot to recognise, manage and intervene during the early stages rather than simply asking him to open his eyes and recover!!!

These skills re after all, the core fundamental risk management of a stabilised approach.

DB

[The Ancient Geek]

To slightly change the discussion, let me present a scenario which may well be pertinant to the accident under discussion.

You are flying a routine approach in IMC, you have set up the autopilot and all appears to be well but you have made a mistake - we all make mistakes occasionally.

You break out of cloud at 500 feet and find yourself decending at 1000 fpm. You now have 30 seconds to stay out of the water. This is a nasty surprise, you really should have been paying more attention to monitoring but there is no time for recriminations, what do you do next ?

a) Try to figure out why the system is doing something unexpected and fix it.
b) Disconnect the autopilot and recover manually.

Are your reactions and skills up to the challenge ?

[HeliComparator]

TAG - neither of course!

To try to fathom out "what its doing now" whilst plummeting earthwards would be foolish and inappropriate, and possibly fatal.

To disconnect the autopilot would be equally stupid because you now are flying a helicopter designed to always have artificial stability operative, but have removed that artificial stability and are now flying a twitchy and unstable monster.

The correct response is to drop down a level or several of automation - ie go from whatever upper modes were coupled, to basic stability (normally based around attitude and heading retention). Raise the collective to arrest the descent, select a sensible attitude etc. No point in making it much much harder by disconnecting the autopilot unless your macho-ness is more important than your's and the passengers' lives.

[Brian Abraham]

Come on Brian you are much better than that!!Thanks for the boost DB, but should you read what I've written I have not sanctioned the untoward practices, quite the reverse, and have endeavoured in my own small way by conversing with CASA and ATSB to point out perceived shortcomings. In deed I had to give up flying in order to do so. Sadly oil companies have vast political and legal clout, notwithstanding the good people who do work within said organisations.

Both the REPCON program and CEO Policy Notice CEO PN029 2005 2 Multi Engine Helicopters Operational Performance Standards, I suspect, though do not have proof, are an outcome of my discussions with the regulatory bodies. I say "suspect" because they appeared five months following those discussions.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Hi Brian,

CEO 29 follows the doctrine of ICAO and I agree with you, it misses the mark for Offshore Operations by a long chalk. However, it recognises the very diverse nature of Australian helicopter operations and in doing so, gives the radical minority just enough rope to hang themselves.

You can lead a horse to water, but if it jumps in and commits suicide it is not your fault (this was my over riding impression formed dealing with operators and pilots during my time as an FOI(H)).

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

TAG - BWAP ( Ball - wings - attitude (for Vy), power when and as appropriate).

Easy on PPRUNE, very different in a large basiv AP helicopter with a heart full of adrenalin, a bus full Pax and a mouth as dry as a grannies armpit!!

In the EC225, I tut-tut at the instigator, press the GA button, check two green GAs on the FND, follow the "I Press the Button (IPB)" philosophy (Installation, Prioritisation and Behaviour) to monitor the DAFCS, install HDG at 26 KIAS and carry on with my coffee.

But I am fortunate to fly the EC225!!

DB

[SASless]

Back in post 1255 I said this....


One thing I noticed in the Sim was when things started going wrong....one of the first reactions of a lot of Pilots was to de-select the Autopilot and revert to hand flying.

Part of that stemmed from the newness of both Sim Training and Autopilots. I would think as Automation and one's experience/familiarity with modern Autopilots this tendency would decrease.

The single most glaring mistake I saw was the failure to increase power upon executing a Missed Approach.....and when that happened....we saw a slow motion crash. The Crew would decide to go Missed....hit the G/A button....make their Radio Call....start looking for charts, maps, changing radio frequencies or whatever.....and the Autopilot would do its best to comply but at some point the climb rate could not be produced by the decrease in Airspeed and then the loss of control happened.

Generally, Unusual Attitude Recovery training is done with lots of airspeed and at higher altitudes. Low Airspeed events close to the ground are where helicopters are the most at risk.

What is the system in the UK for such training and testing on Base Checks?

Do you practice low or zero airspeed upsets?


In the Training done during Sim and In-flight Checks/training....do the UK Operators perform such practice maneuvers to properly expose Crews to such situations? Are Pilots checked to see if they take proper corrective action for Non-Responsive Pilots?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SAS have a look at post on the S92 thread. Cheers.

hope your "Bottom" has recovered.

DB

[Al-bert]

We are all pretty much in agreement that flying skills (handling) are vitally important in all areas but management of systems and knowledge of the limitations and capabilities of those systems is crucial.

The balance of the 2 is, as Keithl echoes, all down to quality and quantity of training.

I think that is what I was trying to say too, but thank you Crab for putting me straight and the blood pressure is fine now ;).

BTW, do Rafsar crews still get 4hours TRAINING per shift?

[Heliringer]

"Although the first officer had almost 1000 total flight hours on the S-92A, many of those hours were spent in coupled flight during instrument flight rules (IFR) flights to and from the offshore facilities, and not hand flying the helicopter. As a result, the first officer did not feel confident about having the necessary instrument flying skills to safely recover from the unusual attitude that had developed" From the Cougar incident.

Maybe it's time to raise the minimums for co-pilots BEFORE starting off in Offshore flying. Maybe 1500 TT PIC in helicopters would be a good number, at least you'd have decent manipulation skills. I've always been surprised at how low the experience required levels are for Co-pilots all over the world when you are flying in one of the most demanding environments (IFR, Night over water etc)...

Or am I just too cautious:uhoh:

[Brian Abraham]

I've always been surprised at how low the experience required levels are for Co-pilots all over the worldWe used to get them with a bare CPL and a copilot instrument rating, so in the order of 200 hours. As I've mentioned previously we were a VFR operation (wink, wink) and copilots were inclined to automatically plug in george whenever able. I was regarded as something of an a...hole because I'd punch it off and make them hand fly.

Should you wander over to Tech Log you'll find much discussion on hand flying skills v use of george - outcome of the San Francisco 777 accident and incident and others. Has long been a source of discussion among airline crews, and how sim training, as it's currently used, does not enhance manual skills.

[[email protected]]

Al-bert BTW, do Rafsar crews still get 4hours TRAINING per shift? yes and we still do an hour's IF (in the aircraft) of GH including UPs and 2 hand flown approaches every month - we are clearly a long way behind the commercial world in our approach to training, fancy putting safety ahead of £s and pennies;)

[Nigel Osborn]

Brian

You're right. Lloyds got me to do several 76 co-pilot endorsements, their hours were between 80 & 110! Apparently that fulfilled the contract!:ugh:

[Al-bert]

Crab

yes and we still do an hour's IF (in the aircraft) of GH including UPs and 2 hand flown approaches every month - we are clearly a long way behind the commercial world in our approach to training, fancy putting safety ahead of £s and pennieshttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif

and let me guess, co pilots go on to be captains? Do you think that might happen in the 'commercial world' too? How do they ever develop that GH/UP skill in a sim? My glasses are misting up now at the thought of those poor deprived co's - must go- NURSE, NURSE, the screens! :E

[mary meagher]

How can you be sure that the co-pilot has the hours and the experience with the systems to be confident enough to take over from a "Non-Responsive Pilot"? In a rapid descent in any aircraft, heli, or glider in a spin, there is very little time....we were trained to be violent if necessary in taking over....
Confidence has to be part of the makeup of any pilot. I had to take over an approach being made by the Chairman of the Soaring Society of the USA, visiting our club, who was undershooting, and failed to recognise or respond when prompted! Doesn't matter who outranks you, you have to squeak up!

The first officer in the Canadian incident was hesitant. Training, as SAS says again and again, needs to cover recognition of the problems leading to a possible upset so as to keep the situation from ever developing.

[thelearner]

Where does that familiarity, that expertise, that practice come from?

TRAINING. And as much of it as you can get.

I agree, but not training on its own. As mentioned selection of correct personnel is critical and their attitude to their work and profession. I note that most posters on here are the wrong side of 40, we need to be clearer on expectation on the young people who enter our industry.
For you guys and us, a lot of our job is routine, but we have to ensure we are trained and prepared to take the correct actions in the event of an emergency. It is very easy to let this slip.

Correct me if wrong, but you guys are trained how to auto rotate and land on engine failure and have to demonstrate this hands on?
The chance of having to use this in anger seems to me much less than having to get an aircraft out of danger when it finds itself descending quickly at low speed for whatever reason with possible CFIT consequence. Should you not have to be trained and exercised on how to do this with AP and manually?
Also agree on need to be able to recognise quickly when the a/c is starting to get into this situation.

I admire DB's and others passion for safety and automation, but as we all know automation can go wrong - although on modern systems reliability is high. Then you have to be able to use manual skills?

Edited to add this quote from Neil Armstrong which applies to all of us.

You've got to expect things are going to go wrong. And we always need to prepare ourselves for handling the unexpected

[thelearner]

Also this headline (http://www.heraldscotland.com/mobile/news/home-news/helicopter-fault-leaves-offshore-staff-stranded.22142662?_=b5f175ef6f57f1773ab5615946a6080f06a5fc71 )was not what was required for the EC225 and it also got some attention on that social media site. Glad it was a faulty bulb only, but of course this was not apparent on the early headlines.

[HeliComparator]

I think this thread is in danger of getting rather confusing with all the references to the new Cougar report, with its different region, attitudes, legislative framework and training regimes.

In the UK pilot incapacitation is covered in initial (MCC) training and recurrent training. For us, its a 36 month item but after the ETAP we included it in offshore ops recurrent training as well.

The trouble is that in the Sim, pilots are more or less expecting it and have no difficulty in recognising it and taking control.

However in the real world it can be much more subtle, unexpected and accompanied by other factors.

Therefore I would say that no reasonable amount of training can guarantee that the other pilot will take control in adequate time, especially if its the co taking over from the capt. We can only expect that this will probably happen.

In the case of the L2 its still too early for us to know whether there was a failure to take over by the co, although it certainly seems a possibility.

As to allowing recruitment of copilots only who already have thousands of hours, not only is this impractical at a time when the industry needs to recruit fairly heavily, but it also results in the recruitment of people that arrive with a lot of preconceived ideas and possible bad habits. One of the very few new recruits that we had to sack after many months of trying, for failing to reach a satisfactory standard, had about 5000 hrs.

I think its ridiculous to expect junior copilots to have the same skills and confidence as a high time captain - that is how the system works, one highly experienced pilot, one further down the learning curve than his captain (you never get to the top of the learning curve!). The captain is not supposed to screw up but if he does, the probability of a good outcome is less than if the roles were reversed.

[Fareastdriver]

I was told a story, fictitious, before anybody starts jumping up and down, about some NS pilots made redundant during the collapse in the eighties.

They were offered a job building a wall around the United Kingdom. The money was good, as expected in the building trade; equal time with travel and accommodation plus a generous daily allowance. Half a dozen people applied and off they went.

The first few days were a bit shambolic as non of them knew anything about bricklaying but with a bit of professional instruction they went on their way by themselves. As they went on the standard improved and in a few weeks their finish was as good as any.

A few years later they approached the point where they had started off. Every one of them was a highly experienced bricklayer operating to a standard second to none. When they reached the beginning of the wall they all stood around in confusion.

None of them knew how to splice the new wall into the old.

That story illustrates the fact that experience is not the be-all and end-all of knowledge, A pilot can have thousands of hours monitoring an autopilot but in that there is no experience of piloting.

Some post ago somebody listed some accidents where he maintained that would not have happened with an autopilot engaged. I would counter that by suggesting that two of them would not have happened if the pilot had been trained in a military environment because he would had been there before.

In the military environment Auntie Betty gives you an aeroplane to play about with. Invariably it ends up in some hazardous situation but has the advantage of being either empty or light so there is the power and the manoeuvrability to get you out of it. The pilot puts the incident in the back of his mind and promises himself that he will not do that again. Later in the crew room or the bar he will recount the story and so others will tuck that information into the back of their heads as well.

There is none of that in the North Sea. There is not an opportunity for the training and even if an incident did happen neither of the crew would dare, for the sake of their careers, publicise it so the experience is not spread around. There are not many that trust the so-called anonymous reporting.

You can thrash somebody in the simulator as much as you like. It will only do what the programmer tells it to do. The actual aeroplane may have completely different ideas.

It does not affect me but I feel that the over reliance on automatics is wrong. I speak from forty eight years of flying and I started using automatic pilots in 1962. I have never had an autopilot go seriously wrong on me but I do know that they react slower than a pilots backside. I know that from years of monitoring them.

The profession dictates that a pilot should, without any prompting or resistance, should be able to fly a complete flight without monitoring an autopilot in perfect safety. If he cannot because of his training or company policy then he is not a pilot. He is what the beancounters call a button pushing bus driver; and should be paid as such.

One day somebody is going to have a total electrical failure at night in IMC and have forty five minutes with only basic flight controls to get on to the ground. I wish him luck.

[satsuma]

HC

The Cougar incident is entirely relevant if in the North Sea, as FED says

if an incident did happen neither of the crew would dare, for the sake of their careers, publicise it so the experience is not spread around

and

A pilot can have thousands of hours monitoring an autopilot but in that there is no experience of piloting

Surely you can see the parallels.

[maxwelg2]

I would add the Cougar 491 to the list with parallels to the Shetland accident on the basis that the co-pilot was not authoritive enough with the PIC in making the decision to do a controlled ditch. We would most likely have had more survivors in that tragedy...this was stated in both the TSB report and the Wells inquiry.

Max

[HeliComparator]

Satsuma, yes of course there are (probably) parallels, however as I said if multiple events with different circumstances in different continents all get lumped into a thread ostensibly about the L2 accident, thing will get so convoluted as to become dysfunctional. We have already seen plenty of contributors struggling to keep up when it was just about the L2. Its a free country and you can discuss what you like on here, just don't be under the illusion you are helping. Why not bring in every loss of control accident there ever was, that way there will be plenty of grist for fatuous comments such as "more manual flying required", even though some of the events occurred on an R22!

[flyer43]

Maybe it's time to raise the minimums for co-pilots BEFORE starting off in Offshore flying. Maybe 1500 TT PIC in helicopters would be a good number, at least you'd have decent manipulation skills. I've always been surprised at how low the experience required levels are for Co-pilots all over the world when you are flying in one of the most demanding environments (IFR, Night over water etc)...

It is a misconception to believe that a pilot with umpteen thousand hours is much better than one with only a few hundred. It all depends on the way in which each pilot has been trained, the way in which each pilot applies him/herself, the way in which competence is maintained and verified etc, etc...
Which pilot would be better suited to offshore, multi crew operations? A pilot with 2000 hours crop spraying on Bell 47s who converts to a CPL/ATPL on an EC225, or a pilot who goes straight from a CPL training course, completes a full IR course, then converts onto the EC225 and is monitored and managed through a robust training process?

I recently visited a location where a senior captain with more than 20000 hours had been responsible for several very serious accidents due to lack of competence, thankfully none of them fatal! I've seen various other similar cases which fly in the face of experience versus competence.

A robust system should be in place to assess a new pilot's capabilities. They should then be assigned appropriate training to bring them up to the appropriate standard before initial line training on non-revenue flights. After this decreasing levels of supervision should be implemented to bring them on until they are eventually released to fly with any captain.
This process has been successfully applied by a number of operators for many years.

Lights blue touch paper, stands back and waits for the bang............................

[The Ancient Geek]

fatuous comments such as "more manual flying required", even though some of the events occurred on an R22!

Indeed, but a few years herding african wild game in an R22 would probably improve the skills of some button pushers. :rolleyes:

[satsuma]

fatuous comments such as "more manual flying required"

There's none so blind as those who will not see.

[Al-bert]

OK, more training and practice too expensive and not relevant to todays whizzocopters so - if more automation is the only safe answer why not go the whole way?
Surely the answer is ultimately RPV's 'flown' by operators sat in air conditioned comfort somewhere, it needn't be Aberdeen, it could be Mumbai. Four axis, quadrupled AP's, no chance of disorientation, no human factors like fatigue and boredom or lack of manual skills. On a typical winter NS night the 'pilot' could be sitting on a veranda sipping non-alcoholic cocktails in perfect safety. One operator should be able to handle a couple of RPV's at once when they get to senior operator level. Think of the improved safety and cost savings, once the bears got used to the idea. :E

[HeliComparator]

My point is that those with a Luddite agenda are in danger of hijacking the thread. We don't know why the second pilot in each of these cases didn't take control and rectify the situation. A lack of confidence, quite probably. But to equate that to a lack of manual flying practice is a wild leap of (biased) faith, especially in an industry where manual flying skill are utilised for every takeoff and landing where, especially offshore each one is different and potentially challenging.

Those harking back to more manual flying are doing so because its all they know. These days we need to be more intelligent about it, and realised that the detail of what went wrong and more importantly why, will be different in each of these two cases. To imagine that flying a few more manual NPAs is going to fix it, is pathetic and counterproductive. So there.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Fairesrdriver

Every NS pilot,including the newest co-pilots, is capable of flying any mission with the AP coupled modes disengaged.

To infer that this does not happen to military trained pilots. Utter and complete rubbish:

1. The Blackpool accident aircraft was operated by two highly experienced ex military pilots who spent nearly all of their offshore flight time uncoupled.

2. The worse real UA I have been presented with, at night, accidentally set up by a highly experienced ex military pilot.

3. The ETAP ditching, flown into the sea by a highly experienced ex military pilot - the DAFCS with full envelope protection was not even deployed. The aircraft was bing hand flown.

I am an ex military pilot myself.

This phenomenon, if we can call it that, has happened to all manner of pilots with vastly differing experience bases and levels. No one is immune and if you think you are......Swiss cheese hole waiting for alignment alert!!

All offshore approaches, from the HDP to the helidecks are flown uncoupled. Day and Night. The coupler is only used to get the helicopter to the HDP. Even in an EC225.

This final act of flying, is a demanding and intensive skill requirement that is archieved by every NS pilot just like it is all over the world. There are no hiding places for poor handling skills especially at night.

General handling ability is not the culprit here. Specific skill sets, as yet unidentified, maybe.

Fareast Driver - I am guessing Australia. Do not confuse the benign conditions around your island with the demanding environment of the North Sea.

Throughout this progression, training and awareness on the AFCS and the coupler has always been poor. The rules concerning when and how I should use it, non existent. Lets try fixing this **** before we abandon the AFCS in favour of "Hand Flying" - which history proves, provides no protection AT ALL from these events.

I have had two nasty UAs on the NS. Both were reported to my Company as required by law. FDM precludes any attempt for crews to "hide" this kind of event. I do not believe they go unreported BUT they are very rare events, most of which result in accidents.

DB

[Al-bert]

HC,
I think that you might be the dinosaur here! Doing more of the same isn't working is it? Plenty of people with all sorts of experience have offered suggestions which you disdain. We have all flown with varying degrees of automation - some of us have even been to rigs without it. Continuing to do more of the same and expecting a different result is, I'm told, a sign of insanity.

[Al-bert]

DB

Throughout this progression, training and awareness on the AFCS and the coupler has always been poor. The rules concerning when and how I should use it, non existent. Lets try fixing this **** before we abandon the AFCS in favour of "Hand Flying" - which history proves, provides no protection AT ALL from these events.


totally agree, with rest of your post too! From an outsider perspective (un-clouded by co policy and financial constraints) more time (and cash) must be set aside for continuation training if things are going to change.

[satsuma]

HC

But to equate that to a lack of manual flying practice is a wild leap of (biased) faith

But that's exactly what the Cougar report said. His 1000 hours had almost all been spent in coupled flight and he didn't feel as though his manual flying skills were up to the job of taking control from the commander.

It's not a question of thread hijacking, it's a case of closely examining the experiences of others and seeing whether any of their shortcomings apply in the UK. If there are inexperienced pilots in the North Sea whose manual flying time is minimal compared to the time they spend in coupled flight then it appears as though they may well do. More manual flying required. In an aircraft!

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Albert, you have offered no tangible advice at all in any of your posts. All you do is bleat on endlessly about manual flying skills. The average NS pilot,including the low time co-pilots, take-off, navigate and land, routinely in weather beyond your military SAR limits.

You are beginning to read like the worst kind of Troll, sanctimonious and arrogant. If that is what you aimed for...well done.

EDITED - having read you very last post - at last, you seem to understand. Please ignore all the above but stay on message now!!

[Fareastdriver]

Fareast Driver - I am guessing Australia.

Sorry; not all Australia. North and Central America, Europe, North Africa, Persian Gulf, the Indian sub continent, Malaysia, China, Australia and the South Pacific.

Plus eighteen years in the North Sea.

I'll back out now.

[SASless]

I have to agree with DB....and take issue with HC.

DB....are you familiar with the Flight Operations in Alaska out of Deadhorse and the weather they fly in up there? The folks in Canada flying out of Newfie Land also encounter some interesting weather. Don't think the North Sea is the worst place on earth for Offshore Flying.....there are places that make it look pretty mild. The Chukchi Sea area is far more remote and much more inhospitable than the North Sea. US Operators out of Deadhorse have been doing IFR Underslung work as a routine mission for Decades.

One of the dangers of running your own Cadet Program and then bringing those young pilots into the system is that it affords a great chance of limiting the "world view" of the organization. Bluntly put....it is incestuous and can lead to Blinder Vision.

That one 5000 Hour pilot failed to cut the mustard does not confirm the wisdom of hiring low hour pilots with minimum qualifications. If you did that.....would you ever hire an ex-military pilot?

I have in the past made comments over the quality of North Sea junior pilots sent to Nigeria to get "Command" time before rotating back to the North Sea as Captains.....most of whom were Cadets who had moved along in the system. Some of these young guys were selected for Training Positions as well.

If you want to teach a singular proprietary method....that is exactly the way to do it I guess....you take a kid and mold him to exactly fit the mold, repeat the Company mantra, and everyone is happy as the system is then self duplicating.

Sadly, if you have built in problems for any reason....those problems are very well entrenched and inflict a great expense before they are seen to be wrong and thus are very hard to change.

I believe in broadening the Gene Pool....by drawing a widely varied pool of pilots, train them to your standards and procedures, and if they cannot adapt then down the road they go. At the same time, it pays to remember there many paths to Salvation and some are better than others. The trick is being wise enough to embrace the different but better even if it is from an "Outsider".

HC's system has those built in problems just as every large Operator has...as over time the end result is a group of folks that see but one way to do things and that begets a bit of arrogance that is counter productive at times.

His outfit has done a great job of training Airline Pilots over the years so it would seem other Operators don't mind bringing in North Sea Helicopter pilots into the fixed wing Airline business which in my mind completely shoots down this notion we should train and retain our own pilots so we have a nice homogenous pool of people working for us.

Are we confusing ability for experience HC?

5,000 hours of Ag work certainly would not be a good foundation for North Sea Offshore flying would it? I can assure you any amount of North Sea Offshore flying does not set you up to be able to Longline or fly Forest Fires.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Satsuma, what the co-pilot said and what the co-pilot may have been capable of doing are two different things!!

However, what he describes is a lack of confidence that can ONLY be overcome by practising that individual particular skillset.

"More Manual Flying" does not address any specific skillsets. It is a generalisation serving no particular purpose.

[Al-bert]

Double Bogey - if you had taken the trouble to read my previous posts instead of jumping to your own pre-formed conclusions you would see that I have never actually advocated manual flying as a replacement for automation, merely that it would seem to be a 'dying art' constrained as you undoubtably are by costs. I think pilots benefit from continuation training. Taking off, navigating and landing are enough to retain manual skills? Are you serious? As for mil weather limits, I'm guessing you were never on RAF Seakings, unless your fog is thicker than our fog, or snow or windspeed! :ugh:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Fareast Driver, I always maintain there is no substitute for experience and you must have it by the bucketload, having read you CV post.

I must therefore revisit your comments and force myself to find some merit or reasoning in them. I have to say you have not made the job easy!!

I am surprised that you seem unaware that so many CFITs have occurred also to Military pilots. I hope you can see from my last post that there are no stereotypes in these events.

I have never, ever witnessed a pilot over relying on the AFCS. in fact what I see is the absolute polar opposite of this. Under reliance, spawned by poor systems knowledge and inadequate basic AFCS and recurrent AFCS training is what I see, every day, every training mission.

All offshore types have different AFCS systems with different capabilities and different traps for the unwary. Like any system or machine it is only as good as the person using it. In terms of training for these systems one size definitely will not fit all.

The latest Eurcopter DAFCS is light years ahead of anything else being produced by Sikorsky and AW. Provided the aircraft is coupled in IAS, or ALT, or V/S or indeed any combination thereof, the aircraft will not descend below 150 feet, OR reduce AS below 60 KIAS, without overridding actions from the pilots.

For you Fareastdrriver, who likes to fly manually. No problems. Even completely uncoupled the collective is still guarded for you by the DAFCS. Thus power is protected AEO which means you do not have to look inside to pull power any more. Just beep up and the collective stops at the first limit.

OEI and this power protection morphs into NR protection. Look outside to avoid all the obstacles and just pull like crazy until you hear the low rpm Beeps. Relax and the collective motors back down to maintain exactly the required OEI reference NR.

Fareastdriver, the EC225 will pay her respects, even to your Luddite appetites allowing you to enjoy your manual flying in a power/NR protected bubble.

This is the future. This is what we need. This us why the EC225 is so important right now.

However, even the EC225 cannot fully protect the passengers from poor crew training as graphically demonstrated in the ETAP ditching. Someone up front has to engage the DAFCS to deploy the flight envelope protections.

A perfectly serviceable EC225 with full flight envelope, power and NR protection HANDFLOWN INTO THE SEA BY EN EX MILITARY PILOT because he failed to deploy the one thing that would have saved him, one tiny little button 24 inches from his face.

And what about the co-pilot sat next to him. He stated that he knew the approach was f*cked up but felt incapable of doing anything about it. All he had to do was say "I have control" and press one tiny little button 2 inches from his left thumb and he could have immediatley closed his eyes for 10 f*cking minutes and they would have been home for tea and medals with only a bruised ego and and interesting FDM trace to explain.

Can you see it now Fareastdriver?

Can you understand now what this thread is about?

Manual flying is the very core of the problem. Too much of it, in ****e weather, at the most inappropriate ends of the flight envelope. Sadly this is aided and abetted by too little time spent learning the automatics AND most appallingly, if adequate time was spent learning the automatics THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NEVER, EVER end up at the edge of the envelope in this first place.

Do you see it now Fareastdriver!!

There is none so blind that cannot see!!

[satsuma]

And what about the co-pilot sat next to him. He stated that he knew the approach was f*cked up but felt incapable of doing anything about it.

Cougar 491, Cougar C-GQCH, Bond ETAP. Developing theme there.

[Al-bert]

So, to continue DB, the solution to your problem is? Come on, it's as clear as day despite my rose tinted misted specs - could it be more training for all? For co's and captains, until it is second nature to use ALL the f'king gizmo's. Two sim trips a year or whatever it is isn't enough is it? Now convince the bean counters. :(

and btw, I don't know of a CFIT in RAF SAR during my 22 years in that particular role.

[S76Heavy]

Probably not just training to use all the gizmo's, but more importantly, training in proper decision making. Both for Captains and Copilots.

Decide what mode to use, when and how, knowing what to look for and decide when it does not do what is expected, analyse why and decide on a course of action, possibly to intervene and prevent a situation from developing into something lethal.
In order to make sound decisions, one needs to know the system, but also when hand flying might be more appropriate (i.e. because it gives quicker responses than many a/p systems would).

So perhaps a different approach in training, more away from training for the test?

[industry insider]

So, we fly manually and we have CFIT. We use the automatics (maybe incorrectly) and we have CFIT. We have had more manual CFITs than automatic ones thus far, but we need to understand that the new generation APs have only really been with us for 8 years out of say 40 years of NS flying.

Let's extrapolate the 8 years of data to 40 years and see where it could get us to with CFIT if we change nothing. At least we have quantified our risk a little. Then we can make a better assessment of the blend of skills that we should be recruiting, training and flying.

I am far from a luddite but was forced into luddite tendancies in my early career because we didn't even have heading or height hold in the S-76A then again we were shuttling a lot of the time, and it was all single pilot in the early 80s.

But what we did have, and something for which I was and will always be grateful and respectful was some very structured single pilot and two crew line training by some experienced LTCs, something which stood me in very good stead for the many hours and nights I spent in the RHS.

[[email protected]]

DB - you have written some excellent stuff on this thread and I agree with probably 99.9% of it but this remark The average NS pilot,including the low time co-pilots, take-off, navigate and land, routinely in weather beyond your military SAR limits. is absolutely untrue - our training limits are COCISS by day and night over the sea and 1000m overland - there are no operational limits!

[Al-bert]

Thank you Crab - I couldn't remember if we had limits except for snow and icing! And serviceability of coffee boiler of course (joke - it never went u/s) :ok:

ps just in case DB thinks you never go IMC because of the day/night trg limit of "CCISS" you'd better explain FCS procedures, RADOPS, modified transitions, AHT etc.......I had to explain all that to various green 78 Sqn types, oh, and the Irish Government, who couldn't understand why their shiny new Dauphin's didn't seem to work :sad:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

CRAB and ALBERT I concede to your posts as I thought your trg limits were your operational limits. My apologies.

DB

[keithl]

So perhaps a different approach in training, more away from training for the test?

I like that one S76H, but your earlier

In order to make sound decisions, one needs to know the system, but also when hand flying might be more appropriate (i.e. because it gives quicker responses than many a/p systems would).

implies a black/white choice. What one actually needs to know is what level of automation is appropriate. HDG & ALT seems to me to be a good intermediate step which doesn't demand rapid adoption of IF scan and 'feel'.

But, you see, that's the sort of thing that (have I said this before?) TRAINING would improve.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

ALBERT do not think for one minute I do not have enormous respect for MIL SAROPS because I do. 3 years of HEMS, day and night (yes before JAR-OPS), in an unstabilsed, let alone coupled, AS355, risking all for often nothing. I know the efforts and the risks you take or have taken.

I am going out on a limb here and say do not judge others by your standards. What I mean by this is Mil SAR crew selection and training produces a very different product than Offshore selection. It has too given the nature of the job.

The success story of military SAROPS is down almost entirely to the skills and qualities of the front and rear crews. It surely was not down to the quality of the kit you had even though we love the old Seaking/S61!

DB

[Al-bert]

Your Apology is Graciously accepted DB. But that doesn't solve the conundrum of what went wrong at Sumburgh (et al) and how to fix it?
All I can offer is the suggestion of more training, more often, especially on the superwhizzokit, and maybe a lucky rabbits foot (joke re rabbits foot!). ;)

(and the Gnome fuel control therefore engine response beats the S61 by miles btw - which helps a lot.)

[SASless]

While we talk about Unusual Attitudes and CFIT.....I have to throw this one in for just a bit of comic relief. Now I want you to think of being in your Office and the Talking Bone begins to make funny noises.....you picks it up...and your Man at the other end begins to tell you about his Day in Nevada.


IDOT helicopter crash blamed on birds - Springfield, IL - The State Journal-Register (http://www.sj-r.com/thedome/x882688282/IDOT-helicopter-crash-blamed-on-birds?photo=0)

[Mechta]

As a number of the incidents & accidents that have been discussed here relate to cases in which the controlling pilot allowed the helicopter to gradually get out of a safe condition, to the extent that the subsequent report deemed that the non-controlling pilot should have intervened, could any of you enlighten me how this practice of recognizing and determining the correct point for taking control by the non-controlling pilot is practiced in the simulator in a realistic manner?

In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?

[keithl]

could any of you enlighten me how this practice of recognizing and determining the correct point for taking control by the non-controlling pilot is practiced in the simulator in a realistic manner?

In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?

Well, now, there you have put your finger on it, Mechta. It would be true to say that EVERY MINUTE in the simulator, the Pilot Monitoring (as the current phrase has it) is checking he/she is happy with what is going on. Whether it is mishandling, incorrect response to malfunctions, failure to follow a clearance - whatever - the PM is expected to voice his concerns, or takeover, depending on severity and timescale. It would be dangerous to take over if you are wrong, so it needs at least a moment's thought.

So, it is not "A Situation" that needs practicing, it is a whole - what shall I say? - job description.

We can't define a point for intervention. It is a matter of judgement. If that judgement is not clear cut, it may take time to decide to intervene.

I don't think we can ever define appropriate action for every scenario. That is, we have drills for predictable events or failures. But as far as is humanly possible, things are designed not to go wrong, so when they do it needs analysis, not impulse.

And time for analysis may be very short.

[[email protected]]

Perhaps the issue is our relationship with automation that is the problem - on one hand we want automation to reduce the pilot workload yet on the other, we require the pilot to constantly monitor what the automation is doing.

I do a lot of motorway miles and I rely on the cruise control to keep me at a sensible compromise between the speed limit and the point where plod will start to take an interest in me.

Depending on weather conditions and traffic I will spend either 10% or 90% of my time monitoring the cruise control to ensure it keeps me in the right place with reference to the surrounding cars. Sometimes the traffic density requires me to disengage the cruise control completely, sometimes a simple blip on the increase/decrease speed control is required.

There is no doubt that the cruise control can maintain a constant speed far more accurately than I can, but there is equally no doubt that sometimes it is too limited for the constant change in circumstances that motorway driving brings about.

Intelligent autopilot anyone???

[PAX_Britannica]

As a number of the incidents & accidents that have been discussed here relate to cases in which the controlling pilot allowed the helicopter to gradually get out of a safe condition, to the extent that the subsequent report deemed that the non-controlling pilot should have intervened, could any of you enlighten me how this practice of recognizing and determining the correct point for taking control by the non-controlling pilot is practiced in the simulator in a realistic manner?

In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?
This is a question for the plank-flyers too. There have been several unfortunate plank incidents recently where exactly this question arises.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

CRAB & PAX BRITTANIC - I think your points are striking at the heart of the matter. We have 3 x recent CFIW where the PM has not intervened and 1 x where the PM intervened (but the CVR actually indicated that in this case the PM only intervened after the PF asked for help) - all 4 end up in the water.

In the NS 4 years ago just after the ETAP crash, all Operators changed there procedures to include the concept of Night stabilised approachs. (to be fair Bristows at this time were already half way there)

The Stabilised Approach should detail the vertical and horizontal profile for all night approaches conducted in VMC and a policy for the use of Automation.

(Please note I personally do not believe "Night VMC" exists until the flight path of the helicopter can be assured by visual references alone. In offshore night approaches we only really achieve this by a combination of the correct sight picture of the helidecks lights supported by some surface texture from the installation environment - there remain many who believe they are VMC at night over water just because there are not in clouds).

Moreover, the night stabilised approach included intervention parameters for the PM (unacceptable deviations) and an intervention policies that detail exactly when the PM should take control.

The intervention policy is intended to "Flatten" any cockpit gradient in place thus empowering the PM, especially if PM is not the Commander, to take over control long before the helicopter.gets anywhere near a unsafe condition.

The same policies should already be in place, detailed in the OM, for all IFR approaches, both onshore and offshore.

I have to say that 4 years ago, in the Company I worked for at the time, I met considerable resistance from fellow TRI/TREs over these policies.

In fact a number refused to buy into the concept that descent beyond the HDP (the point at which the PF announces he believes has has the required visual references I detailed above, in sight), should not occur without the express agreement of the PM In my opinion, this crucial agreement not only regularly and formally acknowledges the latent power of the PM but also is the core concept of the MCC element of the stabilised approach.

This cultural resistance to change was palpable.

As a result I do not believe that any formal training or practice is carried out in the simulator or aircraft to fully familiarise the crews in the intervention parameters and policies. I also believe it is actually very difficult to setup scenarios which would stimulate and develop these skills during training. Finally in the training environment, most Pilots perform well enough that opportinuties for the PM to intervene are few and far between.

I hate to have to come back to CRABs question on whether we should have an "Intelligent Autopilot" to do the role of the PF for us!! This is exactly what the EC225, EC155 and soon the EC175 DAFCS does!!

However, PAX BRITTANICA, the EC225 DAFCS is useless unless the crews actually engage the coupler. You will have already realised, from the number of posters advocating less Autopilot and more Manual flying just how difficult culturally it can be to get them to use the coupler.

I fact Euroopter is so painfully aware of this resistance that serious consideration is being given to design the system so the coupler is always engaged, and therefore the protection always available, on all future helicopter designs, so as to remove this cultural obstacle amongst crews.

In the meanwhile, we will keep pressing for a change that recognises the differences in AP capability such that the CAA, and or the Helicopter Operator, mandate use of the coupler from and to, defined pints in the flight envelope.

We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.

We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.

Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.

In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.

DB

[satsuma]

https://www.sportys.com/PilotShop/product/17594

As long as 'joke' placards like this exist, they'll perpetuate a dismaying mindset that will be found in some corners of multi-pilot aviation and one that it seems is an important factor in a number of the accidents and incidents being discussed.

[26500lbs]

In the meanwhile, we will keep pressing for a change that recognises the differences in AP capability such that the CAA, and or the Helicopter Operator, mandate use of the coupler from and to, defined pints in the flight envelope.

We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.

We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.

Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.

In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.

The last few pages of this thread have really made some interesting reading and some very good points highlighted. I hope some from the AAIB are dropping by from time to time!
Again a very relevant point from DB. There are so many questions to be answered here and it will not be a single simple answer. What we do know is that a helicopter ended up in the drink with both engines operative. We assume that there was no other major technical issue with the aircraft. If this assumption is correct, then we are right in asking why and how. This why and how should be far reaching and most certainly not stop at the crew.
We have gone back and forward on the hand flying debate, and this is in my view an over simplistic argument. As already argued, this is not a hand flying issue, it is a poor use of coupler issue. It is a CRM issue. It is a supervision issue. Lack of SOPs. A company not fully supporting their operation and crew with appropriate supervision and support perhaps? Why? Why and how has this culture developed? Is it widespread across the NS? Is it developing? How has it managed to develop? Have we really lost our basic understanding of aviation safety culture due to commercial pressure? Why are our operators not pushing for better technology to be mandated from the manufacturers and authorities? This should be wide ranging from autopilots to safety equipment. I am still often astonished at how basic the S92 autopilot system is and how sloppy it can be. Why are we still not all flying P2E across the NS after so many years since its incarnation? Why do we not have STASS and proper survival suits? Why do we fly at night when the sea-state is above 6 and aircraft have only SS6 floats, basically condemning a ditching to be fatal to all or most on board? Why do we have inadequate and poorly used reporting systems? I would be willing to bet that a large number of incidents pass unreported.

Ok - not entirely relevant to this particular case, but all an indication of the culture we work in. We accept a lot of questionable risks that could easily be mitigated given the will, and still get the job done. That is the big picture. Why is it the case? That is the real question to ask in my view. Is it just money? Is it leadership? Do we want to accept a situation whereby we do the maximum possible with the minimum amount of money and resources to maximise profit? Only when it falls down will we know we went too far and by then we have gone way too far. I would suggest that is where we are now. We are taking people to and from work. We should not be trying to save their lives in the process.

I agree with Al-bert and Crab in that more training would be a godsend. I really hope this can be a reality. It was always a luxury we had in the military that training hours and aircraft without pax on board were available. Now we only have the sim. Al-bert mentioned the autopilot culture and said should we just go all the way, with pilots really just monitoring? This is the direction we are heading. With the introduction of the new rig-approach into the S92 autopilot system the pilot will effectively only need to take control once committed to landing. With the introduction of all these fantastic levels of automation we must be even more cautious as to how to implement them and how to support our pilots through training. We must also use them completely and thoroughly to reap their benefit. This has to develop. Basic flying skill MUST not be lost. Otherwise we might as well sit in Mumbai with a non-alcoholic cocktail. Sounds nice to me on a dark winter night but not sure it will sell!

[Al-bert]

Great post 26500 :ok:. But the 'guy in Mumbai' won't be you or me - it'll be Derek or Nigel. Spoke to him just last week, a consumer survey I think! ;)

[Fareastdriver]

We had these autopilot/manual flying arguments when I was monitoring coupled ILS approaches fifty years ago. One of the discussions in the BLEU at the time was the potential damage to the runway being caused by the mainwheels hitting the same two square yards of concrete every time.

[S76Heavy]

@Keitll: apologies, did not mean black/white choices just worded poorly. Appropriate level of automation is indeed what I am after; and sometimes that boils down to hand flying (either assisted by the AP/SAS system or not, depending on the system).

As far as cockpit gradient is concerned: as a Line Trainer I stress the fact that I am very capable of making my own mistakes and therefore they have the duty to speak up if they are not happy. Mostly I try to be humorous about it to avoid any tension, saying something like "Don't kill me and don't allow me to kill you".

When correcting errors I make an effort to keep the emotions out and calmly discuss events later. Ensure the safey of the flight, the rest is secondary. Every error, after correction, is first and foremost an opportunity to learn. That also goes for my own errors, and whenever they have corrected me I am very happy with their performance and tell them so.

There is never any doubt about who is in charge on the flight, so my attitude does not diminish the capability to take decisions, very quickly if required. But it also helps to create an open atmosphere where my copilot feels safe to monitor my actions, and act if required.

Guys, this is a great discussion and a shame it needed a fatal accident to generate it.

[212man]

In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?

In my experience, the true value of creating these scenarios - either deliberately or through the crew actually inducing a UP/UA - is debatable. The problem is that the PM will often not take control for one of two reasons:

He knew he was in a sim and wanted the PF to sort himself out for training value
He knew he was in a sim and wasn't concerned about the consequence of hitting the ground/water


That said, such events have normally resulted in fairly forthright debriefs, and those who have taken control are commended.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

212 Man I fully agree. It's very difficult to create these scenarios to any degree of training value. However it is an area we need to really look at closely.

DB

[HeliComparator]

One of the things I noticed since we got the 225 sim, was that the majority of debrief points were aimed at PM. Before that, it was very difficult to do valid PM training in the aircraft.

Whilst there is a general requirement to train for all roles the pilot will act in, IIRC there are no specific PM tick items in the generic multi-pilot prof check, although of course there are in our operator elements.

[thelearner]

More thoughts from an ex Pax

From DB
Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.

In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.
I want you guys, the biggest contributors to this thread, to try and bring the learned outcomes to the enquiry, or the HSSG, I worry that it won't find it's way there otherwise? There has been fantastic input from many here, in particular DB (who already seems to have huge respect from his peers for the improved procedures for night flying after ETAP from what I have read), HC, 26500lbs, keithl, victor papa and others. How can we make this happen?
I know HC works for Bristows, don't know and not asking about the others either, but is there no forum or method for getting some workshop or workgroup together from the 3 Aberdeen companies, with trainers and NS pilots included?

The comparison with Norwegian statistics was mentioned early on lots of times. We should also ask the question why are Bristows UK statistics so much better than the other 2? Is it chance - remember no criticism here - shields down and looking for learnings.

26500lbs quote
I agree with Al-bert and Crab in that more training would be a godsend. I really hope this can be a reality. It was always a luxury we had in the military that training hours and aircraft without pax on board were available. Now we only have the sim. Al-bert mentioned the autopilot culture and said should we just go all the way, with pilots really just monitoring? This is the direction we are heading. With the introduction of the new rig-approach into the S92 autopilot system the pilot will effectively only need to take control once committed to landing. With the introduction of all these fantastic levels of automation we must be even more cautious as to how to implement them and how to support our pilots through training. We must also use them completely and thoroughly to reap their benefit. This has to develop. Basic flying skill MUST not be lost. Otherwise we might as well sit in Mumbai with a non-alcoholic cocktail. Sounds nice to me on a dark winter night but not sure it will sell!
More training - tailored to needs - agreed.
I don't want to be flown by anyone remotely from Mumbai - ever. The new Rig Approach AP mentioned for S92 also worries me (also as previous comments say S92 AP very inerior to EC225?) - the helideck is usually very close to the Derrick - I would want to be hand flown on/off the rig as we are now.

S76Heavy Post
As far as cockpit gradient is concerned: as a Line Trainer I stress the fact that I am very capable of making my own mistakes and therefore they have the duty to speak up if they are not happy. Mostly I try to be humorous about it to avoid any tension, saying something like "Don't kill me and don't allow me to kill you".

When correcting errors I make an effort to keep the emotions out and calmly discuss events later. Ensure the safey of the flight, the rest is secondary. Every error, after correction, is first and foremost an opportunity to learn. That also goes for my own errors, and whenever they have corrected me I am very happy with their performance and tell them so.

There is never any doubt about who is in charge on the flight, so my attitude does not diminish the capability to take decisions, very quickly if required. But it also helps to create an open atmosphere where my copilot feels safe to monitor my actions, and act if required.
Could not agree with this more. Also agree with the post by 212 man - this cannot really be trained in the SIM - it's a culture that needs to be built if it is not there already - and it does not appear to be there from what I have read.

Finally (for this post) EASA already knew a lot of the above. In a much earlier post I mentioned a section of a report from them, first issued in 2009 but then uprevved in February this year - but I don't know if anyone read it - but nobody commented so I am going to post the link and a section in below, but there is much more in this section of the report than I have posted here. (http://www.easa.europa.eu/certification/experts/docs/oeb-reports/eurocopter/EASA-OEB-Final-Report-Eurocopter_Super%20Puma%20Fleet%20including%20(C1eL1e)-%2015%2002%2013%20-%20EC+jms.pdf)

8.6 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE).
8.6.1 General
Within “Super-Puma Fleet”, each variant differs from the others in complexity and sophistication;
EC225 LP and AS332e should be considered as highly automated aircraft.
Several studies have identified that automation (its use and its limitations) is not well understood by a part of the pilot community. This in turn can lead to situations where pilots are unable to satisfactorily control the flight path of their aircraft.
This leads to two separate but connected issues:
a. Understanding how to use the automatics, what can go wrong with the automatics and how to cope when they do go wrong, and
b. The need to retain the ability, when all else fails, to recover the aircraft manually.
Training, initial, additional and recurrent are the only effective mitigation for these issues.
Automatics and their integration with other systems should be taught holistically, rather than treating it as a separate subject.
Training providers should ensure that pilots completing training courses for highly automated aircraftsuch as the EC225 LP & AS332e and to a lesser extent, the AS332L2, have a detailed operational knowledge of the automatic flight systems and have demonstrated competence in their use. The
Type Rating examination question paper should test a pilot’s understanding of how the automatics affect the operation of the aircraft. Furthermore operators should have in place a programme of training that will ensure pilots are able to retain their manual flying skills.

[thelearner]

Some people have also asked if this accident would have been prevented if Sumburgh had a full ILS system. This question has never really been answered?

I know weather delays frustrate the bears, and I guess the pilots too, and cost the companies a lot of money, and make hotels and bars in Aberdeen a vast amount of money.

Would ILS (or the more modern alternatives MLS and upcoming Satellite systems?) be a huge benefit, and reduce delays and therefore costs and pay for themselves over time? I know we will never (hopefully) have ILS for landing offshore, but often the Shetlands are fogged in and the offshore rigs are clear?

I have landed ILS in Aberdeen on helicopters (EC225 not sure about earlier models) and it seems fine - fine for fixed wing so should be OK for helicopters? Can you land ILS with lower height for visibilty than non ILS on a chopper - I am sure you can in fixed wing?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Learner. There is an ILS at Sumburgh but it is on R/W 27 The L2 crew flew an approach to R/W 09. I do not know why but it could be any of the following:

1. 27 was not available
2. or the ILS unserviceable.
3. Crew decided to approach to 09 due to wind direction

Current culture would imply that if the ILS 27 was flown it would likely to have been fully coupled. This is a complex supposition based on observed behaviours.
The presence of both Glideslope and Localiser seems to attract a fully coupled response in most crews.

To put this into some context, in 18 years I have spent flying IFR offshore I have actually never done a Localiser approach for real. It is an unusual occurrence.

In poor WX, such as Sumburgh that day, I personally would have ignored the wind direction as reported and opted for ILS 27, assuming of course that it was serviceable and available. The crew may not have had this option.

DB

[thelearner]

OK DB Thanks, I was not aware of ILS on r/w 27 at Sumburgh. Does Scatsta have ILS?

From what you say crew have the choice of runway in situations like this, and I realise wind direction is important for flight and landing, but in your opinion an ILS landing would have been possible unless there were other factors and r/w 27 or ILS not available.
Edited to add - the crew also have the choice of what AP level or mode to use - obviously - if flying on ILS is your decision point at a lower height or closer distance than when flying manually, as I assume from your reply most use fully coupled on ILS - but it's still their choice, or I assume the choice of the captain?

To put this into some context, in 18 years I have spent flying IFR offshore I have actually never done a Localiser approach for real. It is an unusual occurrence.Can you explain to us non flyers what a localiser approach is? I go to wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Localizer) but not always the best - are you saying r/w09 has a localiser guide which can be used?

ABZ only has one runway, but not for helicopters who have the short side approaches. On murky days at ABZ, do you fly ILS in poor vis and land on the main runway regardless of wind direction? Although on murky days there is usually not that much wind.

[SASless]

The new Rig Approach AP mentioned for S92 also worries me (also as previous comments say S92 AP very inerior to EC225?) - the helideck is usually very close to the Derrick - I would want to be hand flown on/off the rig as we are now.

You will still be hand flown on and off the decks using the Sikorsky Automated Approach.


I would suggest the criticism of the SK Autopilot system while comparing it to the EC system is exactly the same concept as has been done by some comparing the Boeing/EC Fixed Wing automation philosophies.....just accept they are different and each have their merits and perhaps shortcomings.

The questions that keep cropping up now are very much the same that have been brought up before....and the explanation for why they remain is still the same as before.

As noted by way too many of us....it is the "Culture" of the Offshore Helicopter Business (that includes every single one of the participants...CAA, EASA, JAA, FAA, Helicopter Operators, Oil Companies, Unions, Pilots, Engineers, Insurance Companies), that is the root cause of all these issues.

Each participant has its own agenda, own Ox that gets gored whenever changes do occur and thus must be defended.

Until an agreement can be arrived at that will facilitate a truly free debate and genuine willingness to address ALL of the issues and settle upon a prioritized program of improvements, followed up by an evaluation of the various projects to determine if all the players are working together as they should....not much will change. As in the Past....we shall only see incremental change that evolves from biased decisions and not fundamental changes that we need.

We have to get away from the attitude of looking for excuses "not to do something" and embrace an attitude of seeking ways "to do" something.

A quick and simple example.....the Sikorsky Automated Approach....was immediately "Dead on Arrival" in UK waters as expressed by some. I fully understand there are very serious considerations that need to be weighed in adopting such a novel concept....but at least it should be approached with an attitude of "How can we make use of this new Technology?".

We can look back and recall the very great reluctance of the UK to embrace GPS.

Lord knows....we had that discussion all those years here at Rotorheads and just recently it has been discussed here if not in this particular thread. For sure it was at the "Bristow Photos" thread.

There have been excellent ideas for positive change presented here along with some very enlightened commentary by those in a position to see the need for improvements.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Learner,

No ILS at Scatsta. Shell took the ESB Operation there from EGPB to save money. no doubt about this.

ILS is available on both 16 and 34 at Aberdeen. Usually the active runways the one predominantly into wind.

Crews can request another runway other than the active.

The Operating Rules for onshore landings require NS heavy helicopters to adhere to Performance Class 1.

To achieve PC1 in EC heavies we use the CAT A Performance Supplement in the Flight Manual which prohibits landings with a downwind component. The "Landing" in this context is the very last bit from 40 knots and 100 feet. The direction of the approach runway may be different from the actual "Landing" if manoeuvring space exists like a crossing runway.

The regulations permit a Commander to ignore rule(s) if he believes the safety of his crew and passengers is better served by doing so.

There are many factors in play that result in a particular runway being favoured over another and it would be grossly unfair to the L2 Crew to comment on their decision as we do not have enough information but I am sure the AAIB will be looking at this aspect along with many others.

DB