Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[B-HKD]

ATC wants you to maintain that speed for spacing and to maximise their arrival/departure rate. If you can do it, DO IT. If you cant, DONT DO IT.

Most competent operators are more than capable of politely saying "Unable LAHSO" to ATC on a daily basis at many of the major airports in the U.S. So why was it so hard with speeds on final approach for the Asiana crew?

The moment they heard the infamous "Maintain 180 knots to 5DME" they no doubt began sweating. I wouldnt be surprised if these guys even knew that they could "dare" tell ATC "Unable" :ugh:

Blind adherence to instructions as usual in Korea. What if ATC asked them for 200kts to 5DME? No doubt they would have tried.
Flying 101?

[PlatinumFlyer]

I'n not sure that this has been posted yet. It is from Today's Wall Street Journal and appears to infer that people who have heard the CVR report:

"Instead, these people said, it came from a third pilot in the cockpit, first officer Bong Dong-won, the most junior pilot on the flight who was sitting on a jump seat. Mr. Bong repeatedly yelled out the phrase "sink rate," intended to warn the two captains at the controls that the jet was losing altitude too quickly, these people said. An NTSB spokeswoman declined to comment."

Pilots' Recollections Differ From Cockpit Recordings in Asiana Crash - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324694904578598034034670950.html)

[Photonic]

@Lonewolf_50:
"Causes and effects aside, and mitigation, the NTSB has been releasing a lot more info a lot faster than I am used to seeing after a fatal accident."

Well, they had immediate access to the crash site, quick recovery of the voice and data recorders, and the flight crew all survived relatively unharmed to interview. Given the circumstances, I don't think the info release is surprising.

It might also have something to do with the compressed media atmosphere that exists now, i.e. an attempt to quash unsubstantiated rumors before they spread virally over social media.

[Etud_lAvia]

@Rananim:

The NTSB does not have the authority to correct anything in aviation (or, to my knowledge, in any other form of transportation). The Board is not a regulatory or rule-making agency -- it is not an agency at all.

It functions in an advisory capacity, and makes many RECOMMENDATIONS concerning regulation and the like. Those agencies with actual authority (in civil aviation matters, the FAA) may follow those recommendations in whole, in part, or (in many cases) not at all. There is a long history of tension (to put it mildly!) between the NTSB and FAA, that is well known to those who follow aviation safety issues in the United States.

@BBK:

You have it correctly -- in accident investigations, the NTSB quite purposefully refrains from allocation of blame, guilt, etc. It is not a judicial or quasi-judicial body. The goal of accident investigations is to make findings of probable cause, to the extent that available evidence and analysis support such findings. Sometimes, the result of an investigation is that the Board cannot determine a probable cause. Frequently, there are multiple causes, or more typically causes composed of several factors that acted in concert to contribute to the accident.

[One exception to the "no blame" principle: when the NTSB has previously recommended regulatory changes, and find that a new accident might have been prevented had their recommendation been followed by the regulatory agency, the Board is not necessarily shy about pointing this out!]

[B-HKD]

KSFO ATIS has no advisory whatsoever regarding a green laser as of 1821z

If you want to hear it for yourself, give the ATIS a call. +1 (650) 877-358

NOTAM's mentioned on ATIS. 28L/R GS out of service, 28L/10R closed, etc. However nada, zip, 0 about any green lasers. Making up stories now are we? :E

[dash34]

Can't help but wonder if this isn't a simple human factors issue. ASI has been reduced to a small tape indication on the display. I can't believe that the PF would have allowed the airspeed to continue to decay if he knew what it was. So, why didn't he know?

Airspeed needs a more prominent display.

FO in the jumpseat calling "sink rate" (should this rumour turn out to be true) just distracted the PF from the real problem, which was airspeed. He might have responded to the sink rate call with the pull-up seen on the video, which put the AOA so high that the subsequent (and too late) power application had no effect.

We'll get the answer pretty quickly, but this has to be autothrottle function misinterpretation plus situational awareness caused by HF. Possibly also a heuristic error due to previous A320 experience.

[Discorde]

Two quotes from How-Airliners-Fly (first published in 1997). The first refers to landing technique:

You can be sure that PNF will be monitoring attentively and will have no compunction about calling out deviations from the correct approach path and speed.

In this accident it seems the 'attentive monitoring' and 'compunction' were absent, perhaps because of the cultural factors to which many posters have alluded.

Again, will our future pilots be able to fly their aircraft without the assistance of autopilots and computers when necessary if they never get the chance to practise these skills during normal operation? A related factor is that a pilot whose job is merely to watch the aircraft fly itself is unlikely to be as well motivated as one who can get his or her hands on the controls now and then. Designers of future aircraft and airline managers must address the issue of how much and under what conditions pilots should be allowed, or indeed encouraged, to fly manually and without guidance systems. It is likely that compared to a mere aircraft monitor, a skilled, motivated pilot will always make a greater overall contribution to flight safety.


It would seem that airline managers, and perhaps regulatory authorities, have not addressed this issue.

[West Coast]

ETUD

The NTSB as an organization does have authority beyond recommending change. Pertaining to accidents, however I believe you're correct.

Legal - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj.html)

[Etud_lAvia]

@West Coast:

Thanks for the info! I was not aware of NTSB's role an adjudicating administrative law cases.

This does not conflict with my understanding that the NTSB is completely devoid of regulatory or rule-making authority. Its Office of Administrative Law Judges apparently interprets FAA regulations, but cannot write or amend them.

[West Coast]

I believe your understanding to be correct.

[roving]

The NTSB can only recommend, not demand, that the FAA consider these procedural changes.


NTSB: FAA Can Do More To Prevent Go-around Midairs | Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ainsafety/2013-07-08/ntsb-faa-can-do-more-prevent-go-around-midairs)

[roving]

From the same website ...

July 8, 2013, 3:10 PM

The FAA has published details outlining new procedures for air traffic controllers conducting simultaneous approaches to offset parallel runways (SOIA) at airports separated laterally by less than 3,000 feet, such as San Francisco International (SFO). The new procedures, published on June 27, are expected to improve arrival rates at qualifying airports that employ the required high-updating radar–one second per update–to be able to track aircraft closely enough to warn pilots should one intrude on the other’s airspace during poor weather.

ATC must still provide a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical or a minimum of three-mile radar separation between aircraft during turns onto final approaches. The order also outlines a number of additional separation requirement standards as they are applied to the leading aircraft on one runway and the trailing aircraft on the parallel.

Simultaneous Approach Guidance Documents Updated | Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ainsafety/2013-07-08/simultaneous-approach-guidance-documents-updated)

[Lonewolf_50]

de facto, consider the time of day of the landing (oops, crash) and the landing direction. ;)

Of note, some of the best posts in the thread since the OP went up:

suninmyeyes (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-16.html#post7926629)

ASRAAM (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-17.html#post7926760)

Rashid Bacon (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-20.html#post7926893)

pudljumpr (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-23.html#post7927239)

There are a number of other good points worth pondering. When a wreck happens and there is a possibility that pilot error was a contributing cause, it is usual for the investigating body to dig into what is behind that potential factor. The number of factors that feed an error in the cockpit is non trivial.

Photonic, I appreciate the points you make in terms of data availability and trying to quash rumors using the press as a tool. I get that.

The investigative process itself is supposed to be deliberate.

[Teldorserious]

Boggles at the depth and pernicious level of airline pilot apologism there is on this forum.

So flying on sunny days is dangerous now? Auto throttle not working is an emergency event?

[Self Loading Freight]

Request for information - in the NTSB briefing for the 10th July, they say at fifteen minutes that approaches to 28L and 28R are alternated so two don't happen in parallel.

I've flown into SFO many times and have most definitely been in a parallel landing; indeed, I remember asking about separation rules for this on Pprune a few years back, and someone has described a similar situation on this thread. It's unnerving enough as pax; I wouldn't like to be up front with TCAS complaining.

How often does this happen, and does the NTSB know? I know this wasn't the case here, but boy, thank goodness for that.

[B-HKD]

How often does this happen, and does the NTSB know? I know this wasn't the case here, but boy, thank goodness for that.

You have personally been on a parallel approach at KSFO and question if the NTSB knows? :ugh:

No conspiracy here...

Paralell approaches have been standard operating procedure at KSFO for 10+ years. As 28L/R centerlines are in very close proximity to eachother, a PRM (precision runway monitor), think of it as a high speed radar (not as fast as the new one being installed) and using OSIA (Offset Simultaneous Instrument Arrival) procedures, aircraft are cleared for the 28L and R ILS approaches while required to maintain separation visually from the aircraft ahead on the parallel approach.

The PRM will warn ATC and ATC will issue an immediate instruction for the offending aircraft to safely abandon the approach.

The most likely reason it wasnt being used on the day, is that it requires both GS and LOC to be available for both runways. And as we all know, the GS for 28L/R have been out for over a month now due to the new displaced thresholds and the associated new GS antenna being installed.


When all is said and done (still scheduled to be Aug. 22nd) then the guys at Asiana will once again be happy campers. One push of APP, and the beloved 'LAND3' on the FMA will once again be displayed.

[Lonewolf_50]

Teldorserious:

If you've read the entire thread, you'll note a rather raucous chorus of opinion that flying a visual approach on a VFR day is a standard required task and skill. It is somewhat surprising to see comments to the contrary, however.

If you read up on organizational culture, and the root of air mishaps -- there are plenty of links and points provided throughout this thread -- you'll find out that pilot error has, or can have, roots in training, practice, currency, and organizational habits.

If you read (a non pilot) Malcolm Gladwell's Outliers and his narrative of how Korean Airlines went to some effort (with help from a number of other airlines and airline related organizations) to identify organizational issues that contributed to their (at the time) poor safety record, you might understand why any number of posters here don't simply point at two pilots and declare: their fault, problem sorted.

Beyond that: pot stirring, perhaps? ;)

[the heavy heavy]

Boggles at the depth and pernicious level of airline pilot apologism there is on this forum.

So flying on sunny days is dangerous now? Auto throttle not working is an emergency

There's no apologism on this forum, what there is is an attempt to understand the circumstances that led to what appears to be a huge deriliction of duty by the operating pilots. There's also a degree of sympathy from those of us who have dealt with SFO's novel way of controlling heavies. That's sympathy, but it's a long train ride away from apologism!

Here's a news flash for you buck, flying on a sunny day can turn out to be a very dangerous day out indeed. The weather during my last Mayday was just wonderful, wasn't much help at putting out a fire though. What you call our 'apologism' is what NASA publish as its team skills debriefing guide which we use to review our performance. Learning from accidents like this is what the industry has spent 20 years trying to ingrain in us all! Negligence is rarely a result of willfull disregard, aviation is littered with the graves of the good intentioned performing below the standards required on that given day. We keep learning and relearning or we step back into a past that I'm in no hurry to return to.

If you believe its as simple as jonny foreigner isn't as good as us yanks then I despair. If your hearing apologism, I suggest your not listening.

[WillFlyForCheese]

Boggles at the depth and pernicious level of airline pilot apologism there is on this forum.

So flying on sunny days is dangerous now? Auto throttle not working is an emergency event?

Thank you. 3 pilots - automation either failed or was used improperly - plane crashed while attempting a landing. Either way - isn't it the error of the pilot for allowing the speed to drop that low? If not - who's fault is it?

I don't care how many ways you slice it - the THREE pilots watched (or ignored) the aircraft's speed degrade below safe levels and tried to compensate when it was too late. It's not like the aircraft's automation reconfigured the aircraft and caused the accident . . .

:rolleyes:

[Yancey Slide]

"Every air traffic control frequency is under the control of the ATCO who is providing the service on that frequency. A pilot would virtually never speak directly to another pilot, although that is simply a matter of pressing the transmit button. Usually what happens is to speak through the ATCO i.e. "Tower, doesn't the 777 on finals look a little low?" This serves to bring everyone's attention to the situation and the Controller might well respond with a call to the 777 such as "Asiana 214, you look a little low, are you OK?"

I was wondering the same thing. Isn't ATC required whilst on an IFR flight plan to give you low altitude alerts (7110.65U 2-1-6)? "a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/initiate an alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude that, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain and/or obstructions."

Or does their obligation end just because they cleared you for a visual approach. When I was working on my rating I'd gotten nudged on practice approaches in VMC/VFR under the hood.

[Dolfin]

It is quite obvious to all professionals that this approach look pretty much like what is called an unstable approach, but was that the only cause?

An accident or even an incident is always the result of multiple things going wrong, sometimes even things that are not so obvious at the first glance.

We know the glideslope was off, that might have been a contributing factor, but it can be replaced by other things like fix distance / altitude checks, the simple rule 1NM - 300ft that all pro's should know applies.

The flight was vectored to a 17NM final and cleared for a visual approach after more than 10 hours flight time, a visual approach can be a demanding manouver, maybe another contributing factor?

Initially the aircraft was high and fast on the approach, descent rates from 1.600ft to 500ft was around 1.400 ft/min average, about double of what is normally required. Another contributing factor? Maybe.

The A/T was mentioned, it did not perform as expected in maintaining airspeed. A contributing factor? Maybe.

Anyhow, a pilot must be able to take over an aircraft from any state of automation to manual flying (that means manual flight with manual thrust without flight director) at any time when the automation does not perform as he wants it to do. Some discussions about which mode on the Boeing does this and that mode on the Airbus does that is just nutpicking and bores me to death, it really does not matter: If it does not do what I want it to do or expect it to do, I switch it off and do it manually myself. So what? So simple! The very basic competence of a good pilot. It is the pilot who controls where the aircraft goes to, not the aircraft that controls where the pilot goes to.

As the flight was a training flight, several questions arise to me:


How much training did the Captain under Supervision receive during the transition to the new type?
Airlines in Korea are known to hire contract pilots on all aircraft types, so who did pay for the new type rating? The trainee or the airline?
How much, and what kind of training did the Training Captain receive during his training to Instructor Pilot?
Was the training the pilots received sufficient? The training certainly met the minimum standards required by authorities, but is that enough?


Modern Jet Airplanes are very complex systems, I would even say they belong to the most complex systems, mankind is able to build. The are heavy, they are fast, they have a lot of interacting systems and computers build in.
The Operating Manuals are really thick books with hundreds of pages, some even way over thousand pages. Pilots are expected to know every single sentence and note of their Operating Manual, additionally to the aircraft manual, a pilot must know a whole bunch of other books and rules to perform his job well. But there is a difference between just memorizing a book and putting the knowledge to good use in an instance of a second while handling an aluminium tube of two hundred tons of weight through 3 dimensions of space and put it down on a 60m wide and 3400m long piece of concrete in one piece (or even less...).

There are minimum requirements defined by the authorities for a new type rating course, but are these minimums enough to feel comfortable as a pilot in command on an airliner? Take a four weeks ground course, click a few thousand pages of CBT (Computer Based Training) slides, have 10 sessions of each 4 hours simulator, maybe even at night time when every other brave soul lies at bed and sleeps, have a check ride and here you go, you are legal to operate the big aircraft as Commander or First Officer. Do you feel safe and comfortable now to operate your new aircraft in any condition, in any weather, in any technical condition, at any time?
Could minimum training might be a contributing factor as well? Maybe.

How about the company culture? Is a go around a mandatory report in the company or has the company so much trust on its skipper (who they trust a 250M$+ aluminium tube) to decide whether he likes to go around or not for a few hundred or thousand bucks? A Go Around is just 10 or 15 minutes more flight time, sometimes even less than circumnavigating a bad weather area or fly a little bit holding because the runway needs to be cleared of snow and ice. A Go Around seems to cost money, yes, it burns fuel and uses flight time, but if not done, it is much more expensive if the aircraft crashes and not only the fuel burns. A pilot makes this decision to produce safety, not to save money. If he would be there to save money, he would be called a banker, not a pilot. But converting safety to a monetary value is really difficult.

Another point of company culture is the hierarchy gradient between flightcrew members. Does the Captain loose face if the First Officer gives a speed call? Does the First Officer (or Second Officer) have the authority to call for a go around? Possibly even as an observer from the jump seat? What if you call for a Go Around just because you think "It does not feel right..."?
What will happen? Nothing? A report written followed by coffee without cookies with management?

[nigegilb]

Heavy Heavy, Amen to that. Deep down we all know this should never have happened, but those of us who have operated into SFO where parallel approaches are REQUIRED in order to get maximum use of BOTH northerly runways know that an approach into SFO can be hair raising at times. This article from Der Spiegel, lays it on a bit thick, but gives a flavour of operating a heavy into the Bay.

San Francisco: Crash 'Was Only a Matter of Time'

By Gerald Traufetter


REUTERS
The cause of the crash landing of a Boeing 777 in San Francisco is still unclear. But pilots say they had been worried about conditions at the West Coast airport for a while. An important flight control system had been out of service for weeks.

A lot of newsprint has already been devoted to speculating about the cause of the dramatic crash landing of an Asiana Airlines Boeing 777 at San Francisco International Airport on Saturday. But pilots that have flown into the California airport in recent weeks also have major questions about the accident that left two people dead and 182 injured.

A landing safety system has been out of service for weeks because of renovation work, including a component of the facility's instrument landing system that tracks an incoming airplane's glide path. Deborah Hersman, head of the United States National Transportation Safety Board, said that investigators would examine what role the absence of a glide slope system played in the accident. A statement from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Sunday said that the glide slope system, which pilots were informed would be turned off, is "not necessary for safe landing" on visual flight routes at this particular airport.
A German airline pilot who regularly lands at the airport and has asked to remain anonymous says he was not surprised by the accident, though. "A stabilized arrival in San Francisco has become practically impossible," the pilot said in an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE. "It was only a matter of time before something like this happened."

An 'Unstabilized Arrival'

No one can say with certainty what the cause of the accident was. But what is known so far about the circumstances of the crash do fit the profile of an "unstabilized arrival," the German pilot, a captain, told SPIEGEL ONLINE. The Boeing initially approached the runway at too high of an altitude and then began to decrease rapidly. The automatic landing system that is currently out of service would have warned the pilot earlier.

Before it hit the runway, the aircraft apparently crashed into a seawall that protects the beginning of the runway from the water of the San Francisco Bay. The airplane was catapulted back into the air and came down again hard, with the undercarriage slamming against the asphalt. The impact was so powerful that it ripped the tail of the plane clean off.

Without the tail fin, it is nearly impossible for a pilot to steer a plane in a straight line. Plus, several parts of the undercarriage had snapped off. The scattered debris and luggage are evidence of just how great the impact was. "Under the circumstances, one could say that it turned out much better than it could have," the captain told SPIEGEL ONLINE.

Chaotic Circumstances

Among his colleagues, the San Francisco International Airport has a particularly bad reputation. In addition to the electronic landing system being off, the pilots were often instructed by the air traffic controllers to approach the runway at an extremely steep rate of descent, he said. Presumably due to noise concerns, the aircraft were supposed to make their path of descent as short as possible, so that they would only be flying at low altitude for a brief period. "This rate of descent is often the maximum of what is allowed, and sometimes even higher," the captain said.

Adding to these stressors, the pilots must also land in quick succession. These chaotic circumstances are not without consequences. SPIEGEL ONLINE has learned that some three weeks ago, a Lufthansa Airbus had to abort a landing at the airport. Furthermore, Lufthansa statistics rank the San Francisco International Airport at the top of the list for aborted landings, which is why even before the Asiana crash landing, the German national carrier had implemented special safety instructions for ending flights there.

On Sunday evening, Hersman said the Asiana pilot had attempted to abort the landing about one and a half seconds before impact. The flight recorder shows that just seconds before that, there were no complications. Hersman has so far remained silent on what may have caused the accident, but commenters on several pilot forums suggest that it was indeed because the landing system was unavailable.

Even without technical deficiencies, pilots consider the airport to be a challenge because of the onsite conditions. Legendary pilot Chesley Sullenberger, who successfully crash-landed an Airbus in New York's Hudson River in 2009, has confirmed this in television interviews. The now-retired Sullenberger also said that descending over water makes optical assessment of altitude extremely difficult for pilots.

According to Asiana, the pilot of the Boeing 777 had little experience with that particular plane model, and it was his first time landing it in San Franciso. Though he'd completed some 10,000 flying hours over the course of his career, just 43 were in the cockpit of a Boeing 777, an airline spokeswoman said.

[Halfnut]

I was through KSFO Sunday 07/07/13 and the green laser light warning was up on the ATIS.

[clayne]

I spent many years flying 747s to Africa and the Caribbean and rarely saw an ILS. The more approaches you do without an ILS the better pilot you will be.

And this is the highly visible elephant in the room that the automation-loving posters just refuse to acknowledge. In essence, ATC offering visual approaches in safe conditions is, in the long-term, SAFER for everyone. Removing the option or requiring functional glide slopes, ILS, etc. everywhere is just reducing the problem to the lowest common denominator "solution." That's the knee-jerk "easy" way out but does nothing to raise the collective bar. This is only "safer" when dependence on automation and lack of pilot skills is the norm.

The true solution is not to increase automation, but instead to raise the collective bar through increased training and daily exposure to approaches which are not dependent on automation for success. It certain airlines cannot meet this requirement then they quite simply aren't safe to fly. Any other workaround such as requiring x, y, or z to be active at all times coddles unsafe pilots and pleases the bean counters at the expense of aggregate pilot skill.

[BBK]

Clayne

So you are saying that a non precision approach is safer, in the long run, than a precision approach. Words fail me!

[Volume]

ASI has been reduced to a small tape indication on the display. I can't believe that the PF would have allowed the airspeed to continue to decay if he knew what it was. So, why didn't he know?
Airspeed needs a more prominent display.Being a glider/PPL FI I used to do jumpseat rides frequently (pre 911...). Of course I always monitored what the pilots are doing (once an FI, forever an FI...). I always scanned speed on the backup ASI, which was a "propper" mechanical one, not an electronic small tape. Matter of habit of course, but mayby also indicating a human factors issue. I still find it extremely hard to see any trend on a speed tape unless some new color is coming in, while on the old fashioned round dial I find it so easy. I also find it easier to see margins to the ends of the colored arcs if I can see the full arc. It makes it so much easier to put the reading in proportion. I don´t know how others stepping up to "serious" aircraft after thousands of hours on "toy planes" managed the new style ASI. Or do you simply leave ASI to the A/T ?

[UAVop]

I've flown into SFO many times and have most definitely been in a parallel landing; indeed, I remember asking about separation rules for this on PPRuNe a few years back, and someone has described a similar situation on this thread.

Just recently, actually as of Wednesday, May 15, 2013, 0600 PDT (1300Z), the FAA recently approved the WTMD system and procedures for SFO.

WTMD is the crosswind-enabled elimination of wake turbulence separation minima when Heavy/B757 aircraft depart the downwind runway and any aircraft follows departing the upwind runway.
This system will be fielded at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), followed by George Bush Intercontinental/Houston Airport (IAH), and Memphis International Airport (MEM) to demonstrate operational benefit and support operational experience for potential expansion of airports for WTMD operation.

INFO May 2013 (https://www.faasafety.gov/files/notices/2013/May/InFO13006.pdf)

[Agaricus bisporus]

imo there are considerable differences between flying a formal "procedural" visual circuit or the equally procedural visual circle-to-land that my company trains and radar positioning to a visual approach. It may seem a strange suggestion to non-pilots but I think other pilots will understand what I mean.

If you haven't been specifically trained to do this it may seem quite alien, simply because it isn't "linked" to flight regimes we are used to. I've certainly seen our exceptionally well trained (Eu) FOs quite unsettled by having to do this without instrument guidance when they're more than capable of doing the first two manoeuvres mentioned simply because they aren't used to it.

As the fast jet pilot said several pages back (sorry, name escapes me now) if you don't train and practice simple manoeuvres you're quite likely to get them wrong.

Add to this a clearly unsuitable approach profile for any airport outside a mountain range, a (to me) ludicrous request for 180 to 5 (as by our operating standards we'd risk inability to land from such an unstable approach in an aircraft of one third the weight - is this really Europeans being "over cautious"???) and finally RT so atrociously mangled and gabbled that imo this alone have the place shut down for retraining of ATC and its beginning to look like the Koreans are by no means alone in shouldering the responsibility for this accident. That anyone with English as a first language copes with that sort of gobbldegook is impressive, how anyone without it manages is nothing less than incredible.

I don't usually go in for US bashing, but several aspects of the environment these guys were flying in look more like Africa 20 years ago than anything I've ever seen or heard in 15,000hrs in Europe.

[deefer dog]

BBK....read clayne's post again. He is NOT suggesting that visual approaches are the safest option, merely he is stating that the training bar should be raised, and that all pilots should be quite capable of carrying out a visual approach without sweating about it.

[awblain]

If the crew of the United 747 waiting to depart did say "Asiana. Go around", I am most impressed.

If I remember correctly, that was the exact phraseology the Heathrow controller used to the (Qatari?) aircraft following the Hatton Cross 777 crash.

Perhaps the most direct way to try to get Asiana to pay attention to their impending accident.

[archae86]

These are my own notes. While I was typing as I listened, I am neither stenographer nor pilot. If someone posts better notes, I'll happily delete this post, or respond to corrections. I've consolidated material from the opening statement and answers to press questions.

From the CVR:
There is a sink rate comment before the 500 foot auto callout
Over time there are verbal glide path comments: first above, then on, then below

timestamps were not provided for the above, but were provided or relative order given for this final set (where I is the time of impact)
I-35 automated 500 foot callout
shortly thereafter crew member calls landing checklist complete
I-18 200 auto altitude callout
I-9 100 auto altitude callout
very shortly thereafter is the first comment regarding speed
I-3 a call for Go-around
I-1.5 second call for Go-around by a different crew member

Regarding the FDR:

220 of the 1400 parameters have been validated so far.

Engines and flight control services appear to have responded as expected to control inputs.

No anomalous behavior of the autopilot, flight director, and autothrottles observed.

She specifically stated that the fuel tanks were not breached, and that it was not a fuel-fed fire. She re-iterated a previous comment giving the near engine as the starting point, with an oil tank rupture providing the initial fire fuel.

Personal note: because the discussion here has shown intense interest in modes, I listened carefully, and believe no Flight recorder based mode information was given today at all. (yesterday's presser mentioned that multiple A/P and A/T modes were seen in the last 2.5 minutes, but today did not even revisit that).

[Machaca]

NTSB: Preliminary review of FDR data traces do not indicate any anomalies with autopilot, flight director or auto-throttle systems.

[Wizofoz]

Clayne

So you are saying that a non precision approach is safer, in the long run, than a precision approach. Words fail me!

BBK

If doing nothing but ILSs means that skills industry wide are degraded to the point where there's a fatal accident every time an ILS is NOT available, you words should be able to restart any time...

[Lorimer]

... but Archae 86, what was her very last sentence? Something like:

"This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility."

A very telling comment I would suggest, which she didn't have to make, but has a telling inference.

[archae86]

... but Archae 86, what was her very last sentence? Something like:

"This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility."

A very telling comment I would suggest, which she didn't have to make, but has a telling inference.
She said something very like that, but the context is important. She had been asked a challenging question, of approximately the form "You said another day these planes could land themselves, and said today all the systems were working fine, so how could it get so far off in both speed and altitude. Aren't your claims in conflict with each other".

A rough approximation to her answer was "but it was not doing an autoland--they were hand flying it" and went on to say that was a perfectly reasonable thing to be doing--using comments you likely recall more accurately than I.

(at least that's what I recall)

[HazelNuts39]

Maybe a dumb question, but if 137 kts was the VREF, doesn't that mean that the stall speed may have been 111 kts?

[fflow]

A question from a non-pilot.

Those of us who live in the Bay Area are all too familiar with SFO delays in low vis conditions. Caused - I've always been told - by the need to essentially cut takeoffs/landings in half because the runways are so close together that modern jetliners can't safely operate in parallel at that airport without optimal visibility.

Are the "sporty" maneuvers requested by SFO controllers motivated entirely by noise abatement requirements, or does it have something to do with the closely spaced runways? Would moving the runways farther apart make any difference?

[West Coast]

Fflow

The terrain and adjacent airports along with the direction of departures (off 1L/R usually) under flying the downwind for the landing runways (usually 28L/R) would contribute in addition to noise abatement considerations.

[reynoldsno1]

There is an RNAV GPS Approach available for R28L
They could have programmed the FMC and followed LNAV VNAV right down to the runway if they had wanted to

The chart I have seen is based on the original threshold, not the displaced threshold - so it is possible that the approach is not available. Adjusting RNAV approaches for displaced thresholds is problematic, as the waypoint positions & database coding have to be changed.

[dba7]

14 min long video of firetrucks trying to put out the fire of the Asiana AFTER everyone got out.

Comments there are NOT highly complementary of the SFO firefighters.

Anyone here care to comment?
San Francisco Boeing 777 Plane Crash - HD 7/6/13 (Part 2) (Actual Crash Footage) - YouTube





Btw, here's 1st half of video showing scene 4 seconds after impact (although the uploader has the time wrong...).
San Francisco Boeing 777 Plane Crash - HD 7/6/13 (Part 1) (Actual Crash Footage) - YouTube

[Etud_lAvia]

automation dependency will come up as a huge factor in this investigation if they are Truthful


I'm at least as skeptical of the US government as the next guy. And of course, there are such strong emotions, varied interests, and vast sums of money surrounding air carrier crash investigations, that criticism and controversy are sure to happen.

That being said, I don't remember an NSTB air carrier crash investigation in which partiality to any business entity, department of government, preferred "philosophy of flying" or any other bias has deflected the Board from seeking the truth. Their investigations are pretty much the gold standard against which accident investigations performed in other countries are assessed.

If, as public information so far suggests, flight crew performance was a primary cause of this fatal accident, then we can depend that the NTSB will carefully consider all aspects affecting that performance -- and those aspects will included flight crew initial and type-transition training, qualification, recurrent training, and how the patterns of company flight operations (and transitions between types) affect crew skill levels and their cognitive biases.

For those on this forum who haven't read NTSB Accident Reports on air carrier crashes, I suggest that you may find it well worth your while to invest some time studying a few. Given the strong opinions voiced here, I'm sure many can find fault with these reports. For me, they are models of calm, objective and impartial truth-seeking.

[Transition Layer]

I-35 automated 500 foot callout
shortly thereafter crew member calls landing checklist complete

In my company, that's a requirement for a go-round right there. No questions asked. Checklists must be complete by 500' in VMC or 1000' in IMC.

Go-round, come back for another go. :ok:

Loss of face - maybe...Loss of aircraft - no

[tdracer]

14 min long video of firetrucks trying to put out the fire of the Asiana AFTER
everyone got out.

Comments there are NOT highly complementary of the SFO
firefighters.

Anyone here care to comment?

Educated guess, but I'm thinking the fire was being fed by the passenger oxygen units. The pictures of the interior post crash show most if not all of the oxygen masks deployed - either there was a crash-induced short that deployed the masks, or the vertical g-forces overcame the restraints - my money being on the later. If even a few of those activated, they would be dumping lots of oxygen into the fire. As the Apollo 1 tragedy demonstrated, in an oxygen rich environment, fire resistant and even some normally fire-proof materials burn quite well. Worse, once one of those oxygen units starts burning, they provide their own oxygen and are close to impossible to extinguish (see ValuJet Everglades cargo fire and crash). Get a couple of those burning, chain reaction to nearby units, and you'll have a heck of a fire that can't be extinguished using normal methods.

Sort of what appears to have happened to Asiana...:rolleyes:

[SalNichols]

That picture can't help but tear at you. I hope those kids understand how well they performed last Sunday. Three of them were chucked out onto the runway, a couple of others knocked senseless in the impact or in the attack of the slides, and yet not one single passenger that remained on the aircraft perished. When the shock wears off, I sincerely hope they find the ability to look at themselves with pride. Very well done, all of them.

[West Coast]

I wondered about the delay myself. The only thing I could think beyond the fog of war was an attempt to configure the plane per their SOP not knowing the true extent of the damage. They did still have operable radios as evidenced by transmissions to the tower, perhaps that led them to believe he still had an airplane behind him rather than a carcass.

My bet is fog of war. Among other questions, that is one I hope the crew is asked.

[mangere1957]

HazelNuts39 #1815

Asked

"Maybe a dumb question, but if 137 kts was the VREF, doesn't that mean that the stall speed may have been 111 kts?s?"

A reasonable question, and nobody answered, so I'll have a go.

I'm super lazy, so going from memory, last I looked was probably over 25 years ago, VREF was 1.3 Vs so stall with VREF = 137 would be 137/1.3 which is 105. I stand ready to be corrected.

[pattern_is_full]

"Maybe a dumb question, but if 137 kts was the VREF, doesn't that mean that the stall speed may have been 111 kts?s?"

A reasonable question, and nobody answered, so I'll have a go.

I'm super lazy, so going from memory, last I looked was probably over 25 years ago, VREF was 1.3 Vs so stall with VREF = 137 would be 137/1.3 which is 105. I stand ready to be corrected.

Sounds right...

Plus - once below 200 feet AGL (with the ~200-ft wingspan of the 777) there would have been a growing cushion (literally and figuratively) from ground effect, allowing the aircraft to mush along at - or even slightly below - Vso.

Not that I'd ever want to have to count on it to make the runway.

[ghw78]

On the heavy weight B777-200ER with a max landing weight of approx 213,000 kgs or 465,000 lbs the Vref varies from 139 knots at Max Landing Weight to 129 knots at very light weights.

Vref is either the greater of 1.3 Vs or 1.2 Vmca.

The 129 knots figure covers a very wide range of lighter weights and is obviously the Vmca protection figures coming into play. It is also a general requirement for an 'add on' to Vref commonly all the headwind and half the gust up to a maximum of 20 Knots although with the 777 the add on with autothrottles in SPD mode is 5 knots. Have I have read that the V ref figure was 134 Knots but the 'bugged' figure was 137 Knots . the 'bugged' figure being V ref PLUS the add on.

134 Knots as Vref covers a landing weight around 435,000 lbs, 187,00 kgs mark.

APS weight typically for a 11 hour flight 320,000 lbs 145,000 Kgs. 300 plus people plus a bit of cargo 75-80000lbs, 35,000 kgs plus minimum fuel for say a divert to LAX and 30 mins reserve 22-25,000 lbs 10,000 kgs give a weight appropriate to the V ref of 134.

[going grey]

Considering the total damage to the fuselage - separation of tail section, landing gear and engines and also the post impact fire - it was truly miraculous that the wing tanks did not rupture and ignite a nightmare inferno, TG. (I'm assuming there was fuel in the wings). Perhaps we could learn from Boeing's 777 wing tank fuel design?

[bobcat4]

Centaurus wrote:
Thus the sophisticated computer systems will do their best not to allow the pilot to crash.

If the sophisticated computer systems will do their best not allow the pilot to crash, why disable (by design) the A/T wake-up in FLCH-mode? Or to rephrase the question: In what cases will the plane crash when A/T wakes up in FLCH-mode? I’m not a professional pilot, but just curious; who would ever say “Thank God the A/T didn't wake up in FLCH mode”? Is this feature really needed?

['round midnight]

Without the ILS, it's likely they tried VNAV approach. This, however, does not always work in SFO (FMS glitch, witnessed by some airlines), and the plane can go into VNAV ALT instead of VNAV PTH descent.
It may be that the pilot got high on approach (maybe for the reason stated above, or maybe just trying to fly visually).
Next, he possibly selected FLCH to get down. If he then got too low and tried to recover the profile, this might explain why he disconnected the A/P.

If he then flew in manual without disconnecting the FD, two things would happen.

First, the elevators, hitherto controlling speed (in FLCH), are now being used to control pitch (F/D would still be demanding attitude for speed control in FLCH) and, two, the thrust, hitherto controlling ROD (in FLCH this could mean IDLE or 'HOLD' IDLE), is now 'controlling' (not much control if in IDLE) speed.

But, and this is the BIG but, there will be no automatic speed protection or speed control, for that matter, without pilot input, regardless of whether the A/T is engaged or not (in this case, it was).

It's easy to imagine the pilot, late in the approach, struggling to recover the path with pitch inputs, staring outside, not keeping an eye on his speed, believing he has A/T speed protection, and not realizing that the throttles are near idle and will stay there without his input. Classic stall scenario.

Educated guess.

[framer]

It seems to me that the posters calling for greater automation are in the main not pilots of airliners and don't quite 'get' why the airline pilots are so adamant that more automation is not the answer. Maybe an non flying analogy would help.
Lets say you owned a fleet of 18 wheeler truck and trailer units that deliver goods to super markets and the most likely time for an incident was when your drivers were backing the trailer unit into the loading docks of the supermarkets. Each incident cost you money and was a risk to personnel but 99% of the time your drivers got it right, after all they are backing up to the docks two or three times a day and have become very skilled at it over the years.
Then, an automatic parking mode becomes available on all your trucks. It is very reliable and in an effort to reduce the number of broken tail lights etc you mandate use of the system for all parking and the drivers use it often. The young drivers coming through use it exclusively. Furthermore, when training drivers, you teach and asses their skills only at using the automatic system, not at actually backing the truck into the dock.
When, as is bound to happen every so often, the automatic system is not available for some reason, how do you think the new generation of truck drivers will fare when it comes time to back the truck and trailer unit in manually? For that matter, how do you think the older drivers will go having not backed a truck for a year or so?
That is a fairly crude analogy but it roughly aligns with the problem we are discussing in my opinion. More automation is not the solution. Capable, well trained and current truck drivers is the answer.......but who pays for the training?

[BusyB]

As one who regularly flies heavies throughout USA the big concern with visual approaches is the lack of protection from other aircraft. The restricted vision and manoeuvrability in a B744 means, to me, that it is unprofessional to give up positive radar control.

As far as SFO goes, regular "slam dunks" are what I am used to.

I'll await the investigation results before passing opinions on the accident although I would ensure, if possible, that the engines were shutdown before evacuating.

[going grey]

@ 'round midnight
not familiar with the A/T on the 777. PF according to reports has 9000 hrs on 320 and 43 hrs on 777. Quantum difference between Boeing and Airbus is the A/T (and speedbrakes) --- T/Ls (and speedbrake lever) move on Boeing and don't move on Airbus. The early transition can be dangerous. But dispatching per MEL with the A/T u/s on any modern aircraft is a steep learning curve

[bubbers44]

Automatic pilots are the problem here. Can't you see this? Three pilots let a perfectly good B777 fly into the rocks because they didn't know how to fly an airplane. They were trained to program a computer, not fly an airplane.

[local]

Quote.
Personally I suspect that the evac probably should have been called earlier, maybe even much earlier, in an ideal world. But I do not have the knowledge/data to criticise a fellow professional from afar, so will await that information.

Oh yes, NigelOnDraft, I for one, will await that information with bated breath.

[Airbubba]

I was just wondering if the seawall could have been missed with less pitch in those final few seconds? Less pitch would have also reduced the forces on the rear paxs on impact.

Glob99

Don't fly much? Lowering the pitch angle would have progressively "unloaded" what lift the wing was producing to increase the rate of descent and impact forces.

Could they have preserved precious speed and extended the glideslope by not pitching up as much, as well as arrest the sink rate a bit?

Could pitching-up less have given them those few extra knots, after they commanded go-around, that would've allowed them to get enough altitude to clear the sea wall?

Wouldn't the pitch-up slow them down more and increase their sink rate?

Or would not pitching-up have made it more likely to hit head on into the seawall/runway?

Actually, I think these are fair questions. They are on the back side of the power curve so the rapid pitch up with late power application might have increased the rate of descent, right? Or was it a quick trade of remaining airspeed for some upward acceleration? Would a somewhat less agressive pitch angle have allowed the tail to clear the seawall to cruise over the runway in ground effect and accelerate to a climbout (perhaps with a tail scrape) or a less hard pancake landing?

Obviously they should have never gotten to the point of being in extremis in the first place with an apparently fully functional aircraft on a visual approach in CAVOK weather.

[StormyKnight]

Pitch up was probably due to the go-around call, however it takes between 5 & 8 seconds for the engines to reach full throttle after being commanded to do so from idle.

I read here somewhere that the engines had only reached 50% throttle at the point of impact. So whilst the nose it up, there's considerable time before the thrust comes on...

If the pilot knew he was going to crash, he may have planned a more level angle of attack, but since he was intending to abort the landing altogether and gain altitude as quickly as possible the high angle resulted in the tail striking the wall.

[bubbers44]

Pushing the stick forward on the flare only works if you are at the proper speed. If you are in stick shaker as they were it won't work. Pilots know how to fly an aircraft with adequate airspeed but they didn't have any.

[StormyKnight]

Regarding the Evac, its not always safer outside the plane than inside....Its possible to have engines still running at moderate throttle & other external dangers....
An assessment needs to be made (quickly) as to the threats & then act.
Not as easy as it sounds in the moments after a crash however.

I also suspect that the default answer by airlines is to stay in the plane as the safest place in most circumstances & they need a strong reason to override that. It was clear that the stewardesses by procedure had to ask the pilot for a decision no doubt as their training advises them to do so.

[going grey]

Considering the total damage to the airframe - separation of tail plane, landing gear and engines, and post impact fire - it was truly miraculous that the wing tanks didn't rupture and ignite a nightmare inferno TG. (I have to assume there was fuel left in the wings)

[nitpicker330]

Crap, the high AOA was needed to keep the thing in the Air as the speed bled off with no thrust......simple aerodynamics....
If he had lowered the nose back down to normal it would have impacted the water short of the sea wall just like Lion Air did in Bali.

Maybe then it would have floated intact long enough for all to EVAC without any deaths.......?

I do like the idea of a Shallow Boat style ramp instead of a rock wall... Not as silly as it sounds...

[ironbutt57]

Hope this is a wake-up call to all PNF..PM whatever you prefer to call them....to be monitoring inside the flt deck...as one should be...it is the PF's job to be "outside" flying the plane when in visual conditions...this accident and many others show what happens when nobody is minding the store...

[FIRESYSOK]

NTSB says the autopilot, flight director, auto-throttle: 'all responded normally'.

Read between the lines and see they were programmed incorrectly for approach.

Still blown away by the stoutness of the airframe..It really was the main reason the wreck was survivable IMO.

[Indarra]

Note that in her press conference on 11 July Deborah Hersman appeared to state that all of the passenger seating structures remained in the aircraft. This suggests that the two pax were ejected because they were not properly seated for the final phase of landing with belts tight across hips. If so, sounds like a CC responsibility, not fulfilled.

[RatherBeFlying]

From all these posts, I'm getting the impression that A/T is almost never switched off in the T7.

If the 3 pilots all have the mindset A/T is always there, then why bother monitoring the airspeed?

Just set it in the window and it will be taken care of:}

[M.Mouse]

I have avoided contributing to the 99% of utter drivel that can be read in this thread but statements like: It was clear that the stewardesses by procedure had to ask the pilot for a decision no doubt as their training advises them to do so. really cannot be left unchallenged.

Certainly in my company and several others that I am aware of the CC are trained to use their initiative to evacuate if events are clearly 'catastrophic'. Debate can often be interesting in SEP training regarding how you define 'catastrophic' but to the suggestion that the CC waited to be told to evacuate in this instance beggars belief.

This suggests that the two pax were ejected because they were not properly seated for the final phase of landing with belts tight across hips. If so, sounds like a CC responsibility, not fulfilled.

The two (some reports say three) people ejected from the aircraft were CC.

If the 3 pilots all have the mindset A/T is always there, then why bother monitoring the airspeed?

Because that is basic airmanship and it is also part of being type rated that you understand the way a system operates and its LIMITATIONS!

[Capn Bloggs]

the press keeps telling that they were using auto-pilot until 1,600 feet. What were they doing with the autopilot when there is no ILS operative? Just set the heading and a rate of descent? Does not make sense to me...
Obviously you've never one one. Makes a lot of sense, actually. No problem at all driving the aeroplane around visually with the autopilot using TRK/HDG and VS or FPA. Reduces the verbal diarrhea to your PM. It obviously has to come out at some stage, and 1600ft in this case is quite reasonable.

this is a wake-up call to all PNF..PM whatever you prefer to call them....to be monitoring inside the flt deck...as one should be...it is the PF's job to be "outside" flying the plane when in visual conditions...
No, the PF's job is to fly the aeroplane, that's in (speed and sink) and out (slope). Doesn't matter whether it's VMC or in the gloop. The PM's job is to monitor all of that.

[ironbutt57]

No, the PF's job is to fly the aeroplane, that's in (speed and sink) and out (slope). Doesn't matter whether it's VMC or in the gloop. The PM's job is to monitor all of that.

Read my post..PM=pilot monitoring..PNF= Pilot Not Flying..or Pilot Monitoring....one of the biggest mistakes I have seen from the back seat of the sim is nobody inside monitoring sink rate/speed etc....the TRI has a busy job...I know...been there done that...

[Schnowzer]

1867 posts in the thread and all "trained pilots" know the key is that the speedo on the left of the PFD has to be looked at occasionally and the throttle then moved appropriately. I am not one to be overly critical but sorry, it is all getting pretty silly nowadays. It is now 70 years since the Link Trainer was used to teach folks how to fly on instruments; it doesn't matter how well designed the aircraft are if those in the seats can't fly!

http://www.461st.org/co%20album/images/G-22-1-large.jpg

We have had Afriqiah, Turkish, Lion, Colgan and now Asiana fly aircraft into the ground that were perfectly Servicable. Pay to fly is rife around the world and I'd guess less than 1% of pilots have their basic training paid for by the carriers that employ them. I heard at a conference that the only entry requirement into pilot training is a credit card with a big enough limit. At the time it seemed pretty trite but until the industry decides it wishes to pay to select and train pilots with the appropriate aptitude and skills this will continue. The bean counters rule and right now accept this as being a cost of doing business!

[bobcat4]

Knot Apilot wrote:

Also I imagine they would be designed to not wake-up because you do want the A/Ts to spool up uncommanded after you've made a successful touch down on the runway!

Well… We’re talking about A/T in Flight Level Change (FLCH), right? I imagine an approach and landing is not a flight level change (although technically it is; a flight level change to runway altitude).

Assuming FLCH is not a common/normal mode during approach and landing, I repeat: Why would anyone want A/T HOLD when throttle leavers reaches idle in FLCH mode? This is obviously an intended design.

[Ranger One]

Note that in her press conference on 11 July Deborah Hersman appeared to state that all of the passenger seating structures remained in the aircraft. This suggests that the two pax were ejected because they were not properly seated for the final phase of landing with belts tight across hips. If so, sounds like a CC responsibility, not fulfilled.

Indarra, with respect that's a very premature call. Given the impact, the forces, and nature of the injuries reported, they could easily have just broken their belts.

[BOAC]

Also I imagine they would be designed to not wake-up because you do want the A/Ts to spool up uncommanded when you're about to make a successful touch down on the runway! - this would be avoided by the inhibition below 100'RA and one would hope a crew would be 'on speed' at 100' anyway, and if not, then 'spool up' would probably be desirable..

I too have commented on the lack of reversion in FLCH and would like to hear why it is part of the programme.

I hope the quote by Lorimer from Deborah was inaccurate - "This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility." - I would not classify a 'request' for 3-400 ft high and several kts fast at 5 miles to be 'a completely normal approach' and I hope the NTSB comment on this SFO procedure. I await the transcript/video of the conference. It is certainly another of those 'holes in the cheese'.

[Indarra]

Ranger 1

Thanks your comment, maybe so. But I kind of think that two Chinese teenagers (aged 14 and 15, I recall) are unlikely to be of a body mass that would cause failure of seatbelts and their fixtures. Such safety equipment is crash tested to restrain people much bigger than these two girls, by substantial margins. I have seen reporting that they survived for a period outside the aircraft, being missed by triage teams, and one showing signs of being run over by a vehicle. We're not talking about the overwhelming trauma one would see when breaking a seat belt. A Chinese school group, maybe first or second flight ever for these kids. The two girls were best friends, I understand. Perhaps they might have been in the WC.

[nigegilb]

Cavok69

7-4-1. VISUAL APPROACH

A visual approach is an ATC authorization for an aircraft on an IFR flight plan to proceed visually to the airport of intended landing; it is not an instrument approach procedure. Also, there is no missed approach segment. An aircraft unable to complete a visual approach must be handled as any go-around and appropriate separation must be provided.

7-4-4. APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE RUNWAYS

a. All aircraft must be informed that approaches are being conducted to parallel, intersecting, or converging runways. This may be accomplished through use of the ATIS.

b. When conducting visual approaches to multiple runways ensure the following:

1. Do not permit the respective aircrafts' primary radar targets to touch unless visual separation is being applied.

2. When the aircraft flight paths intersect, ensure standard separation is maintained until visual separation is provided.

c. In addition to the requirements in para 7-2-1, Visual Separation, para 7-4-1, Visual Approach, para 7-4-2, Vectors for Visual Approach, and para 7-4-3, Clearance for Visual Approach, the following conditions apply to visual approaches being conducted simultaneously to parallel, intersecting, and converging runways, as appropriate:

1. Parallel runways separated by less than 2,500 feet. Unless standard separation is provided by ATC, an aircraft must report sighting a preceding aircraft making an approach (instrument or visual) to the adjacent parallel runway. When an aircraft reports another aircraft in sight on the adjacent final approach course and visual separation is applied, controllers must advise the succeeding aircraft to maintain visual separation. However, do not permit a heavy/B757 aircraft to overtake another aircraft. Do not permit a large aircraft to overtake a small aircraft.

http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/ATC/atc0704.html

[cwatters]

Not being a jet pilot I'm curious why there isn't an audio warning if you get a bit slow on approach? Triggered say 10kts below Vref and slowing?

[Lookleft]

Regarding the delay in starting the evac I can understand the delay. In the sim you don't practice evacs from a position of just having crashed the aircraft, it usually the result of some sort of non-normal possibly a gear collapse but often some sort of uncontained fire. As has been posted previously these guys do things strictly according to their training so doing an evac without going through any checklists is not within their thinking.

With the engines having been ripped off and the avionics possibly u/s I doubt that they had any fire warnings in the cockpit. They were trying to work out what happened given that they thought they were conducting a go-around.


From what has been released by the NTSB,(not a big fan of the drip feeding of the investigation day by day BTW, why not wait until the 30 days for the prelim as required by ICAO? Just sayin'). As soon as the pilots were made aware of the fire they ordered an evac.

[Knot Apilot]

Not being a jet pilot I'm curious why there isn't an audio warning if you get a bit slow on approach? Triggered say 10kts below Vref and slowing?

Another poster addressed this issue a few posts back and referenced the following article:


Source: (http://sfist.com/2013/07/10/boeing_may_still_be_blamed_in_asian.php)

"Boeing could still end up being on the hook for never having installed an aural warning system of low airspeed on the 777, a system which the NTSB had recommended the FAA look into requiring 10 years ago"

[Lookleft]

Not being a jet pilot I'm curious why there isn't an audio warning if you get a bit slow on approach? Triggered say 10kts below Vref and slowing?

There is its called the stick shaker. It is an aural and tactile warning that bad things are about to happen. On an Airbus there is also something called Alpha Floor which in this instance might have been useful and was possibly what the trainee was relying on given his previous experience on A320.

[Knot Apilot]

Well… We’re talking about A/T in Flight Level Change (FLCH), right? I imagine an approach and landing is not a flight level change (although technically it is; a flight level change to runway altitude).

Assuming FLCH is not a common/normal mode during approach and landing, I repeat: Why would anyone want A/T HOLD when throttle leavers reaches idle in FLCH mode? This is obviously an intended design.

Hmm, yes I think I see what you mean. Why does the FLCH let the airplane stall or get close to stall even at altitude. In other words, what are the protections, if any, vs. A/T off?

Several posters a few posts back explained the FLCH mode in more detail.

I did some digging(aka google) and I found these explanations on another forum. They are quite interesting!

Source: (http://aerowinx.com/forum/topic.php?post=13133)


From the 777 FCOM, in the flight controls section (Pitch Envelope Protection & Stall Protection):

"The autothrottle can support stall protection if armed and not activated. If speed decreases to near stick shaker activation, the autothrottle automatically activates in the appropriate mode (SPD or THR REF) and advances thrust to maintain minimum maneuvering speed"

I spoke to a friend of mine who flies the 300 variant, and he told me something I also validated in the FCOM: the EEC enters an "approach idle" mode when certain criteria is met... one of these being using flaps 25 or 30 (which was the case). This prevents "under spooling" the engines in case of a GA or if an engine goes out.Just for the sake of completeness: the 777 FLCH trap is described as follows.

When flying with both A/P and A/T engaged, and the AFDS working in a speed-on-elevator mode such as FLCH, for a descent the A/T will sit at idle and then HOLD as you expect. If you then disengage the A/P but leave the A/T engaged, the AFDS will keep the A/T in the speed-on-elevator mode -- i.e., it does not activate the throttle servo if your speed drops under the target MCP speed. It simply expects its other half (the now disengaged A/P or the real pilot) to fix the speed by pitch.

It is quite possible there is another protection far lower down the speed tape, just above stall speed, but either that didn't work or it wasn't in time. I can imagine that if you pull up hard enough to get the PAPIs back to two red, two white, you bleed off speed so rapidly that by the time the A/T comes back up, you face spool-up times longer than time to impact.Also remember that although Asiana 214 got pretty close to stall (103kts!) it never did actually stall. I believe speed at time of impact was 122kts as engines were starting to kick in.

[armchairpilot94116]

Former pilot?s animation re-creates Saturday?s SFO crash | SFGate Blog | an SFGate.com blog (http://blog.sfgate.com/stew/2013/07/11/animation-re-creates-saturdays-sfo-crash/)

Simple animation of what it should've been like.

[HazelNuts39]

ghw78,

thanks for the information on Vref. In the final seconds the airplane was more than 30 kts below the intended speed of 137 kts. That is equivalent to more than 300 ft of height. At the intended speed a slight pull-up would have easily recovered the glideslope, the engines would have been at a higher trust and would have spooled up more rapidly. If the airplane was not already stalled at 105 kts (I think it was) then the pitch-up would have caused it to stall.

[Knot Apilot]

Former pilot?s animation re-creates Saturday?s SFO crash | SFGate Blog | an SFGate.com blog (http://blog.sfgate.com/stew/2013/07/11/animation-re-creates-saturdays-sfo-crash/)

Simple animation of what it should've been like.

That's fantastic!

Also, he says this:


“this was a very unique crash that will be influential in evaluating pilot training and qualifications.”

[clayne]

Sadly it's not all that unique and I fear we'll be seeing more of it.

[J-Class]

So at the end of a long night, the Airbus-experienced OZ 214 pilot may have mistakenly thought he had alpha floor protection on a B777? Perhaps this shouldn't surprise us - after all, the pilots of AF 447 seem to have thought they had alpha floor protection on their A330 too, even while their aircraft was operating outside Normal Law and they were in a deep stall...

[chksix]

Why wait for the Alfa floor? Add thrust sooner....

[Knot Apilot]

Here's a tremendous post (http://aerowinx.com/forum/topic.php?post=13148&usebb_sid=f1jak0un7tsa7stne45ba2oj60#post13148) on the aerowinx.com (http://aerowinx.com/forum/topic.php?id=1381&page=2&usebb_sid=3nf92vm94ld5783uq2e8kbml44) forums that bears posting here.

A nice gentleman has indexed all the best posts here on PPRuNe regarding the the 777 A/Ts and FLCH issues. Great job!

Most definitely I'm not a pro (I sometimes wonder even about "amateur"), but FWIW: after ploughing through 1360+ posts (the dole lets you do that...) in the "Asiana Crash" thread (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco.html) of PPRuNe, the following consensus regarding the "FLCH trap" seems to emerge:

¤ The "trap" notwithstanding, FLCH is still useful (and popular),
¤ because it provides the fastest way to lose altitude
¤ while still offering automatic overspeed protection.
(V/S, by contrast, may require too much "fiddling" (quote) with setting the rate and/or deploying speedbrakes, in order to keep the speed in check.)

But to avoid the "trap", FLCH is a no-no (per personal rule or company policy) for any or all of the following:
¤ on approach
¤ below 3000 ft
¤ with the MCP altitude set to 0000 (or runway altitude)

If anyone wishes to dig deeper: To spare you the ploughing, here is a list of links to posts from the PPRuNe thread which I found helpful for understanding the issue:
(Disclaimer: subjective selection, FWIW and YMMV apply; in chronological order; no guarantee of completeness or correctness; posts ploughed through up to #1372, 10th Jul 2013, 06:44 GMT)
* asterisks denote posts I personally (!) found especially illuminating

¤ Link01 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-16.html#post7926629)
¤ Link02 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-36.html#post7928289)
¤ Link03 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-37.html#post7928311)
¤ Link04 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-44.html#post7929151)
¤ Link05 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/518646-boeing-thrust-hold.html#post7928099)*
¤ Link06 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-58.html#post7931126)
¤ Link07 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-59.html#post7931173)*
¤ Link08 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-59.html#post7931261)
¤ Link09 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-59.html#post7931288)
¤ Link10 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-67.html#post7932453)*
_ but see also Link11 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-67.html#post7932497) and Link12 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-68.html#post7932518)
¤ Link13 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-67.html#post7932494) (picture!)


The FLCH 'trap' is just speculation of one the possibilities that led to underspeed.

We don't know what mode the A/Ts were in prior to crash yet .

For all we know, the Asiana crew were well aware of this 'trap'.

All we know about Asiana 214 is that the Auto-Throttles were in fact in the 'armed ' position

It does appears the crew erroneously believed the A/T setting they had selected would automatically control their descent rate.

[FullWings]

Looking at the released FDR readings for the last part of the flight, it's appears that a crash was probably inevitable a significant distance/height from the runway, whatever the crew actions after that point.

When a jet aircraft is undershooting just above the stall not far from the surface, with gear and full flap deployed plus a significant rate of descent and engines at idle, the recovery options are severely limited, if present at all.

Increasing the pitch would reduce lift and bring it down faster. Reducing pitch would have the same effect. The engines would need five seconds or more to produce significant thrust and then would be working against an airframe in a very high drag configuration to reduce the rate of descent. It's like "coffin corner" only at the other end of the flight envelope. In days of old it would have been noted as: "running out of height, speed and ideas"... :ouch:

[NigelOnDraft]

So at the end of a long night, the Airbus-experienced OZ 214 pilot may have mistakenly thought he had alpha floor protection on a B777? Perhaps this shouldn't surprise us - after all, the pilots of AF 447 seem to have thought they had alpha floor protection on their A330 too, even while their aircraft was operating outside Normal Law and they were in a deep stall... I disagree in principle.

I've flown A340, B757/767 and now A320 series in commercial aviation. We spend some training time on seeing / practicing the protections. However the only occasions I can think we actively rely on them are:
(E)GPWS Pull Up
Windshear Pull Up
when in the Airbus types we use Full Back stick relying on AoA protection. Even in these cases we do not rely on Alpha Floor but manually select TOGA.

In my operator, and I would guess most, if you trigger any "Protection" (Alpha Floor, Alpha Prot, Pitch, AoB) you are going to trigger all sorts of "events" on the Flight Monitoring kit, and potentially ATC as well. You will both professionally and practically do all you can to avoid this, and the resulting enquiries / investigations...

It is also fine to say pilots must monitor speed, and use Thrust Levers to correct as required. Trouble is, if you have never flown Manual Thrust on your type, have always had your ATHR system work perfectly, then on the day your workload goes up, you are tired, you are getting "mode confusion" (be under no illusion, we all get confused by the modern levels of technology), then the risk goes up that someone will get it VERY wrong. Maybe here, certainly THY @ AMS and others...

[framer]

In days of old it would have been noted as: "running out of height, speed and ideas"..
That's a bit like another saying:
" Speed, Height, and Skill......you always need two of them"

[Greenlights]

On an Airbus there is also something called Alpha Floor which in this instance might have been useful and was possibly what the trainee was relying on given his previous experience on A320.

320 or 777 or cessna 152, you still have to check the speed on final anyway. :suspect:

[jfkjohan]

Just a thought but, the PF had his FD off and the PM had his FD on. Confirm?

Could the PF have been "looking outside" primarily at the piano keys, and the PM "looking inside" primarily at the FD bars?

I say the word "primarily", with a grain of salt too.

[AF Eagle]

Volume wrote 11th Jul 2013, 21:45:Being a glider/PPL FI I used to do jumpseat rides frequently (pre 911...). Of course I always monitored what the pilots are doing (once an FI, forever an FI...). I always scanned speed on the backup ASI, which was a "propper" mechanical one, not an electronic small tape. Matter of habit of course, but mayby also indicating a human factors issue.

There is one problem in the display logic of speed tape.

The flight instruments and the ergonomy of a commercial jet's cockpit aim to be as simple and easy to understand as possible. So that when **** hits the fan and pilots' capacity is not sufficient to see, process and understand all info and indications coming from several sources, the systems should guide the pilots as much as possible to the right direction.

Like if the plane is in abnormal nose up position, there are red arrows in the artificial horizon that show the direction where to steer, push down. Or if you get a TCAS avoidance command, your instruments show clearly the direction where to go, up or down, the wrong direction is displayed on red, you can't misunderstand the correct direction.

But the speed tape is different. The logic goes just wrong way. If your speed is too slow or too high and you "steer the plane away from red", you go wrong way. I know this misunderstanding sounds impossible in our ears, we don't make such mistakes and we understand easily and immediately all situations. But we are only one percent of all pilots, the other 99 % make mistakes, and every now and then very stupid ones.

There are some writings here about so called "FLCH-trap". I can't see any way how that could have been the case here. No one uses FLCH-mode with zero altitude in alt selector. As far as I understand that would have been the only way to have this situation in this low altitude. And this was a line training flight. So I'm pretty sure that has not been the case.

But what I would like to know is the mandatoriness of using AT in manual approach in T7. Many airlines accept their pilots to practise their manual flying skills and disconnect AP and AT when there is no special need to use them. This is the case in both Airbus and Boeing families, no big difference. But some triple seven pilots say that triple seven is different, in T7 there are Boeing's own operating procedures require the use of AT in all approaches, and all airlines follow these procedures. Is this really the case? I find it not very easy to believe. My opinion is that it is good for me to practise manul flying, and it's better for the flight safety that I can both fly the plane and use the automation. My idea of Boeing's aircraft design philosophy is that they want the pilots always to have the final authority to decide what to do, and the automation is only a very good help, not so that the automation understands everything better than pilots. Sometimes it feels that Airbus philosophy is a bit different. But is it really so that Boeing is going the Airbus way and have even more strict recommendations to use automation all the time?

[westcoastflyer]

This flight was operated with a 4 men crew.
None of them picked up the very low airspeed or the unusual sight of the runway being way too low!
1. Any pilot flying any commercial airplane must be capable of reading and interpreting an airspeed far too low and the associated attitude (unusual attitude…flight with unreliable airspeed
2. There is a TCH of probably 60 feet! When this altitude is reached way in front of a runway pilots must realize they are in serious trouble
3. This was obviously a pax airplane and towards the end of its flight is very light, so landing distance is NOT a factor. I know many pilots who fly freighter 747 at 302 T landing weight into 8000 feet runways on non-precision approaches. That is not too big a problem as long as they know what they are doing.
in case of Asiana, again very light, there is NO need to even land within the TDZ because there is enough runway available.


While this accident is a very sad one it was completely avoidable by 1,2,3 or 4 pilots watching for it to happen.
This is very likely a mentality problem about airmanship and CRM

[deSitter]

This has all been fascinating to read. This incident is the perfect bookend to Air France 447. Conditions could literally not be more different, and yet so similar.

We will never be able to trust our crew again. In the past, if we worried at all, it was about the equipment breaking. We knew that our crew would fight like hell for our lives. Those days are gone. There seem to be no more pilots, just aviation systems administrators.

As a profession, as a whole, you guys should be mortified. You should rise up in unison and demand that the people sitting in your seats know at least how to operate the throttle. You should all be embarrassed.

Thankfully it usually works. But it's no fun at all.

[tilnextime]

Having a spent a fair deal of time as a flight instructor (initial entry and line) and mishap investigator, I would offer the following about qualifications and standards:

It is common pilot chatter bemoaning "lowest common denominator" standards. The fact is, all standards for qualification are effectively "lowest common denominator". That "common denominator" is established, and you are either found to be qualified to a given standard or you are not. One danger is when the standards (or enforcement) are set to produce a given number of "qualified persons" and not based upon the actual requirements of the task. Another danger is when subjective higher "standards" are bandied about by the pilot population (particularly the self anointed "better" pilots), yet are never formalized into the actual standards, training and enforcement.

In order for standards to be of any value, not only must they address the minimum performance to successfully accomplish the task, but they must be the basis of the training provided, the operating behavior of the crews and then enforced. But we, as a group, do not like to discuss how we are trained and evaluated to a "minimum" standard, even though there can be no other rational method for certifying individuals for a given crew position. You are either "qualified" or you are not, in the flying world. As one of my mentors would say, "It's just like pregnancy. You are either pregnant or you are not. There is no such state as almost pregnant, more pregnant or less pregnant."

I find it hard to imagine a justification for bestowing "qualified" status to any position that would be at the controls of any aircraft that did not include the ability to shoot a visual approach in VMC, but I'm long retired and the world changes. However, if that standard (ability to land hands on) is legitimate, then rather than decrying airports without G/S (which is confusing airport standards with pilot standards), get that standard established, trained to and enforced. And by "trained to", I include the opportunity and requirement to perform it on a regular basis.

I haven't a clue as to what caused this flight crew to get in the pickle they got into. That's the task of the mishap investigators of the NTSB. However, I do know the principles of standards, training to standards, operating to standards and enforcing standards, and a lot of the chatter in this thread is oblivious to these.

[Mowgli]

Automation can really catch you out. If you are flying manual thrust, you absolutely know who is responsible for the thrust . YOU! Pilots get tired, and used to autothrust taking care of the speed. However, we are still responsible for airspeed whether it's being achieved by our own efforts, or by the AT system. I believe we need to be reminded about the basics, and practice them. I say this both as a current airbus pilot and FI/aeros instructor.

[BOAC]

This site (http://www.sooeet.com/aerospace/what-happened-to-asiana-airlines-flight-214-p01.php) seems to be pretty detailed on what happened in terms of FDR.

[AF Eagle]

J-Class:
So at the end of a long night, the Airbus-experienced OZ 214 pilot may have mistakenly thought he had alpha floor protection on a B777? Perhaps this shouldn't surprise us - after all, the pilots of AF 447 seem to have thought they had alpha floor protection on their A330 too, even while their aircraft was operating outside Normal Law and they were in a deep stall...

No way. These protections activate only in situations where the correct control of the plane has been lost, alfa floor activates when the plane approaches stall AOA.

Planes can not be flown so that the pilots in purpose let the protections take care of anything. Exception: Airbus stall protection takes care of stall margin when pilots pull the stick fully back after receiving GPWS warning.

[tcas69]

Quote:
On an Airbus there is also something called Alpha Floor which in this instance might have been useful and was possibly what the trainee was relying on given his previous experience on A320.
Quote:
320 or 777 or cessna 152, you still have to check the speed on final anyway.


You are so right, but having converted recently from A 320 the PF could have been in a mindset of false reliance on the systems( alpha floor, alpha prot). I saw it happen to myself, when things got tight in a sim session I ( sometimes ) lapsed into the old aircrafts SOPs. But this was real life!
BTW this is not Boeing bashing, do not know the 777 in detail.
Basic flying skills would have saved the day....and they are eroding!

[deSitter]

Quote:
Originally Posted by armchairpilot94116
Former pilot?s animation re-creates Saturday?s SFO crash | SFGate Blog | an SFGate.com blog (http://blog.sfgate.com/stew/2013/07/11/animation-re-creates-saturdays-sfo-crash/)

Simple animation of what it should've been like.

That's fantastic!

Also, he says this:

Quote:
“this was a very unique crash that will be influential in evaluating pilot training and qualifications.”


It's completely useless! The ghost would have a big speed advantage. The left engine would not execute a non-ballistic maneuver (and just where is the left engine??) If the front of the airplane had slammed down like that everyone on board would have a broken neck. The sad thing is, people will see this stupid unphysical video and take it for reality. Are computers good for anything other than spreading nonsense?

[givemewings]

It really saddens me to see people placing thegblame on cc for the deaths of those 2 girls. By all accounts the cc did what they were supposed to do, including passing on vital info to the cockpit crew. The picture of them out of uniform, looking for all the world like they have just had a scolding from mum just breaks my heart. They no doubt will be wondering if there was anything else they could have done.

I have flown many times to Asia, including China. Now while I'm not saying this is the case, it is very difficult to get non English speaking Chinese pax to sit down if they don't want to. Especially kids and teens. And I can be a very assertive person when I need to be. Now lets imagine this. Let's say those crew did go around the cabin, trying to put on seatbelts of non compliers. They would have been up for landing and possibly killed. Less crew to evacuate now. The priority is the safety of the crew member. You can only tell them, you can't rugby tackle them. Once you've secured the cabin and that no contact period has started, if they stand up, they stand up. You do not get out of your seat.

I'm just appalled by some of the comments here. I hope the crew of OZ are getting the appropriate support. There is currently a BookFace campaign by flight attendants worldwide for anyone who wants to send a letter or card of support to the Asiana cc. Perhaps knowing that their colleagues the world over think they did an incredible job will make the recovery process that bit easier. If I find the details I'll post them here.

[filejw]

Wings, I have not seen anything but high phrase for the CC here in the US. How can anybody blame the CC for the deaths of the 2 girls as they were ejected from the A/C. Foolish really.

[bubbers44]

No one here in the US faults the cabin crew. Going from what they considered a normal approach to sliding sideways off the runway with landing gear and one engine ripped off in two seconds gives them no time to prepare.

[Lost in Saigon]

Many have asked why there is no low speed aural warning. There is. The Stick Skaker is both an Aural, and a Tactile, Stall(slow speed) Warning.

The Stick Shaker activated 4 seconds before impact.

Lots of talk of A/T Hold, but if the Flying Pilot had just pushed either one of the Go-Around Switches the first time he heard the Stick Shaker, or the first time someone said "Go-Around", I am pretty sure this accident would have not happened.

This was obviously an Unstable Approach by any normal standard, and the Go-Around call should have been made much earlier. The big question is "Why was no Go-Around call made much earlier?" and/or "Why were the Go-Around switch not pushed when they should have been?"


http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/Clipboard01GA1_zpsd1fd44c8.jpg
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/Clipboard02GA2_zps6d5bbbfb.jpg

[arismount]

The explanation below the animation states that the ghost airplane would have departed frame immediately if animated with the proper approach speed, and thus the image was purposely slowed down to match the too-slow speed of the mishap aircraft.

[cosmick251]

I totaly agree with "Lost in Saigon".... with the limitted amount of information I could collect from overseas .. it seems pretty obvious, that the approach was never ever stable. So, why did this crew continue when passing the MAPt?? Just follow the given instruction (without knowing asianas SOPs, but I would be really horrified, if there are SOPs with a differnet instruction..)

[captseth]

I think Flight Level Change for a final approach segment is particularly dangerous. I have never done it, except once on a B734 while observing a prospective Captain upgrade who I was giving OE (line training) to. I immediately terminated his training. I don't have the enthusiasm to root through my manuals at this time, and I don't recall if there is a particular prohibition on the use of FLC when low to the ground, but there should be one.

In the past, I had always been taught that the acceptable vertical modes for a final approach segment are: GS; VNAV; or VS. Is there a gap in training where this is not being stressed at Asiana or other carriers?

[SA JET]

Airbus has kind of solved the problem by requiring that you switch off both FD's on a visual approach , this forces the a/t into speed mode . The Airbus equivalent to FLCH though can also trap you if you leave the FD's on and select idle open dec with the alt selector on airport elevation. One wonders why there was no awareness that the thrust levers were at idle as on Boeings they are back driven unlike on the Airbus , if the PF had his hand on the throttles he would have been aware that they were at the idle position.

[jolihokistix]

If Asiana pilots really want to gently practice visual hands-on approaches coming in over water, they have the best opportunities and the best place in the world to do it, Incheon.

[AF Eagle]

jientho 12th Jul 2013, 13:49:
This seems to be a classic case of lack of real-world awareness in software design. What POSSIBLE real-world condition would justify allowing a flight-level-change target of FL000?

There is no such condition. Nobody does that.

Airbus works just same way on "open descend" mode.

It is possible to reduce speed below lowest acceptable when flying manually against FD guidance with both Boeing and Airbus, if autoflight computer guidance is on FLCH or open descend mode, that is not Boeing-specific thing.

That is not the case here, I'm pretty sure of that. Nobody selects 0 feet in alt selector in any situation. Never. That happens only in wannabe pilots' nightmares, never in real world.

Let's wait until we know what really happened. So far we only know that the approach was unstable, "hot and high", and that the control of the plane was not in acceptable level when the plane finally went through glide slope with reducing speed and engines on idle.

[Airbubba]

I hope the quote by Lorimer from Deborah was inaccurate - "This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility." - I would not classify a 'request' for 3-400 ft high and several kts fast at 5 miles to be 'a completely normal approach' and I hope the NTSB comment on this SFO procedure. I await the transcript/video of the conference. It is certainly another of those 'holes in the cheese'.

You can see Debbie (as she usually introduces herself at the podium) respond to a final question about automation starting at about 27:20 in this video:

Raw Video: NTSB Final Update On Asiana 214 Crash Investigation - Pt. 2 « CBS San Francisco (http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/video/9083512-raw-video-ntsb-final-update-on-asiana-214-crash-investigation-pt-2/)

Her comment about a manually flown approach being normal and intended coming into an airport like SFO with the glideslope out on a clear, 10 mile visibility day is at 29:10.

You will have to let the video load for a minute or two before you can view the final minutes of the clip. Also, if you don't stop the video prior to the very end you will have to recue the clip starting with the commercial to review part of it.

[RAT 5]

I find it hard to imagine a justification for bestowing "qualified" status to any position that would be at the controls of any aircraft that did not include the ability to shoot a visual approach in VMC,

Agree. However the requirement for test would need to be instigated by XAA's and they don't. Further more the airlines actively discourage visual approaches as crews without training and practice tend to screw up and cost time and money. The gulf in 'piloting' ability between the major airport iLS jockeys and the charter carrier Greek island visual pilots is greater than it should be. I used to fly for one of the 'discouraging airlines. Occasionally an F/O would ask permission on a severe clear day to conduct a downwind visual circuit to an ILS. Be my guest. The ensuing horlicks was interesting. I give credit that they wanted to try; they explained that with so little training or practice it was difficult etc.
The TQ courses designed by the airlines and approved by the XAA's are both good & bad at the same time. They do not produce pilots and their line flying does not either. I reckon that give a modern young pilot a visual approach from 20nm 6000' 210kts on a severe clear day, with no ILS or PAPI's they could not do a CDA and be stable at 1000'. I doubt many new young captains could either.
The same true for a descending visual circuit from 3000' abeam. I find that very very sad; indeed perhaps unacceptable. I will not speculate on the pax opinion. It is a sad state of affairs and XAA's and airlines must take some responsibility.

The engines would need five seconds or more to produce significant thrust

I can't remember from my CF-6 days, but on CFM-56's I used to suggest a min of 40% N2 on finals, for instant response, but if idle was needed to ensure that you had 40% when your speed was target +5kts at the latest, again to give instant response to freeze you at target speed when it was reached.

These protections activate only in situations where the correct control of the plane has been lost, alfa floor activates when the plane approaches stall AOA.

I'm not a FBW pilot, but is this not similar to the A320 crash at Basle? They descended onto the trees expecting the A/T to spool up. An Indian pilot did exactly the same thing a couple of years later and planted the a/c short of the runway, watching & waiting but doing nothing, as was the A320.

Capable, well trained and current truck drivers is the answer.......but who pays for the training?

The analogy of the truck drivers and the automated parking system is excellent. Money talks: Who pays for the training should not matter. If the training is necessary for the qualification then it gets paid by necessity. How, is a debate, but where we are now is that the training is so expensive, and pilots are self-funded, that basic elements have been chopped. Even the basic CPL is 100hrs less than 40 years ago. Sims can do some IR training, but not all. Just watch the ladies in the streets trying to park the SUV without parking sensors. Good game, but we are discussing something more critical than a dented shopping car.

Three pilots let a perfectly good B777 fly into the rocks because they didn't know how to fly an airplane. They were trained to program a computer, not fly an airplane.

In many TQ courses I've given the FBS is dedicated to systems knowledge and operation, both normal & non-normal and all on autopilot, except for takeoff. 20hrs of button pushing. FFS then commences with a token 2hrs of manual flying ticking the boxes of turns, stalls, buffets, FD ILS's & raw data ILS's. Once that's done the next 32hrs of PF/PNF is taken up with autopilot operation, but manual landings, while various QRH items are ticked off and the accompanying emergencies are also ticked off. Thus the total manual flying in a TQ course, before base training, is 2-4 hrs. assuming a PCST session of 1 hr. On the line it is autopilot all the time. They think it is 'sportive' to disconnect on an ILS at 2000' if visual; or perhaps 1000' if a x-wind. Airlines often prohibit visual circuits with finals <4nm, yet base training used 800'. Not only that, but they want an LNAV/VNAV guidance to he visual finals. Give me strength!
In one TQ course a very intelligent lad, and well prepared in his studies, sharp and very computer literate: the a/c was not doing what he wanted on autopilot. I suggested LVLCHG or HDGSEL would help solve the problem quickly. No; he was straight into the FMC and dancing over the keys with gay abandon. Head down and wanting Bill Gates/Mr. Mac to give him guidance. I suggested rather disappointedly that as he wanted to be a pilot perhaps he might like to fly the a/c out of the problem; or at least use the MCP directly to have control. This was not impressive. In 5 years he and his ilk will be captains teaching new wannabes. More AGH! & Ouch! Get me out of here.

But surely there is a massive wake-up call here. I find it trite to read all the ergonomists and social behaviour gurus talking about 'training pilots in different skills; humans are bad automation monitors etc; the interface of human and automation needs to be better understood; perhaps even that the pool of pilots should come from a different back ground than previously'. All fine and dandy, but that does not excuse an industry from failing to train a pilot to fly an aeroplane. Once you can fly it you then learn how to operate it. The flying bit has been by-passd and needs recovering. Base training is insufficient.

[steamchicken]

They were trained to program a computer, not fly an airplane.

Were they? It sounds more like they learned to use one, badly. The degree of systems knowledge a programmer might have seems to be lacking.

[SeenItAll]

One point that I have not seen adequately discussed is the amount of time required for emergency services to respond to the crash. Some have suggested that it seemed to take an inordinately long time. But I believe the video in Post 1819 provides the answer.

San Francisco Boeing 777 Plane Crash - HD 7/6/13 (Part 1) (Actual Crash Footage) - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=WczPnDDipKw)

You will note that at about 7 seconds from the beginning of the video, the escape slides are deployed. We know that this occurred roughly 90 seconds after the crash. You can see that at about 1:30 into the video, the fire trucks begin to arrive. This suggests a total time of 3 minutes from crash to emergency arrival. Given that the crash took place without warning and at the far end of the runway by threshold 28L, almost 2 miles remote from the nearest fire stations, to me this suggests a pretty immediate response.

See KSFO map at http://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/1307/00375AD.PDF

[AF Eagle]

Money talks: Who pays for the training should not matter. If the training is necessary for the qualification then it gets paid by necessity.

FAA begins to require all new airline pilots at least 1500 flight hours before they are allowed to fly an airliner. That is a lot, requirement used to be 250 hours.

Meanwhile in Europe... ICAO Multi-Crew Pilot Licence is implemented here. That means new pilots need to have at least 240 hours flight time, and as far as I understand, approximately two thirds of that can be flown in flight simulator.

What does that mean? That means the airlines want to get pilots with as cheap training as possible, and European Union has listened to them and accepted this.

USA was the first continent to face the changing world of the airline business, towards low-cost operations and low-cost pilots. This new 1500 hour minimun requirement is a large step back, now it is almost impossible to begin your career as airline pilot in USA, and you won't have the cheapest pilots there anymore.

But we get cheaper and cheaper pilots here in the other world. So you can say whatever you want about necessity of expensive training, but money talks. Airlines lease their pilots via contract agents that work in countries with laws and taxes that are cheapest and easiest for the airlines. The most important thing in recruiting is that the work force is cheap.

The reputation of Asian airlines is such that they need to pay more than the others for Western pilots. Western pilots are not loved members of the work force in Asian carriers, I believe, and both Asian pilots and management of the companies want to get their own people flying their planes as soon as possible.

Maybe you should close the borders and not accept non-American airlines to fly there at all? You can recruit the best pilots from other world after they have flown their first 1500 hours somewhere else. But be careful, we pilots in the other world are going to be worse and worse, you should really think twice before accepting us to fly in your airspace.

[dba7]

jolihokistix
If Asiana pilots really want to gently practice visual hands-on approaches coming in over water, they have the best opportunities and the best place in the world to do it, Incheon

EXCEPT Incheon ATC probably doesn't give out approach instructions like the ones routinely given out by SFO. Seems like many foreign pilots flying into SFO have called SFO ATC's approach instructions as 'stupid'.

[jientho]

jientho 12th Jul 2013, 13:49:
Quote:
This seems to be a classic case of lack of real-world awareness in software design. What POSSIBLE real-world condition would justify allowing a flight-level-change target of FL000?
There is no such condition. Nobody does that.

Let me clarify -- I am not saying that FL000 setting happened in the Asiana approach (as you say, we shall see). I was referring to the capability for a pilot to set such a thing (and the system to then "use" it). Maybe I'm wrong, but I understand from comments here that that capability does exist on the 777? And as anyone from the systems world knows, anything that can be input by "users" must be assumed will be input by someone somewhere sometime, especially in life-critical systems such as those used in transport aircraft. Now, you seem to agree that there is NO condition where it makes any sense, so WHY IS IT ALLOWED BY THE SYSTEM to be entered if there is risk (even the tiniest bit)? That is my point.

[BOAC]

Thanks for the video link, airbubba. Again an impressive performance by Deborah. It would seem that the quote by Deborah from Lorimer was a generic for 'visual approaches' and did not specifically refer to this SFO visual approach which I trust the NTSB will look at for suitability.

I have to say that the Boeing airframe appears to have survived remarkably well. The news that the floor had collapsed behind door 4R is not pleasant and it is a wonder how folk survived in that area, since I assume the seat supports had gone as well. There appear to be a significant number of seat rows behind doors 4..

The support from other agencies including UAL appears to have been excellent.

[DaveKnell]

Slightly out of the general flow, but I found this interesting - it's a Korean's view of Malcolm Gladwell's view of Koreans. Indirectly linked (i.e. you'll need to click through to the main article from the following link) as the forum wouldn't allow the original link to be posted.. Gladwell's Culture & Air Crashes Analysis Badly Flawed - Slashdot (http://tech.slashdot.org/story/13/07/12/1247225/gladwells-culture-air-crashes-analysis-badly-flawed)

[Lonewolf_50]

dba:
Interesting point there.

It seems to me that each airfield has its own interesting features, be they geographic, navaids, routing, approaches, runway/taxiway, NOTAM that day, or ATC sequencing habits. Whatever. As a professional, I'd think that if one's destination is deemed by one's company (or by one's own experience) to be a difficult one, that becomes a briefing item, and a prep item. In a good organization, it's added to the company "smart book" for the best ways to deal with all the odd ins and outs of a given destination or mission.

A few pages back, one of the pilots calls that approach the "threat briefing." I'd say he was on the mark. In a generic sense, it's part of the risk management feature of any mission briefing.
"Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to get this group of passengers to their destination safely."

Those complaining about SFO being "stupid" strike me as stupid: one needs to brief the flight for what is, not for what one wishes it were.
It's why we brief and plan ... to reduce the number of things that can surprise us or go wrong during the flight.
FBW or not
Short or long haul
IFR or VFR
Pax or Cargo
domestic or international

Brief the flight, prepare the flight, and address risks to the flight, in order to get the most out of the flight and to stack the odds in favor of the flight coming off as "routine" regardless of how much effort it takes to make it look that easy. ;)

From the AF 447 CVR, there was an discussion between the captain and one of his FOs on the temp not being as forecast at altitude, hence the scheduled climb to FL 390 not possible as planned ... a perfect example of how valuable the planning process is to executing the flight as one encounters it, not as one wished it were. (That the two FO's later made fatal mistakes in flying is another matter)

[MPN11]

ATCO tiptoes in again.

What sort of procedure calls for 1800 ft at 5 miles, to achieve a <3º glide path, with a request to maintain 180 kts until that point?

Oh, SFO does … with 5 miles to go, you are now c. 40 kts fast and already above the GP.
As a radar controller, if I ever demanded someone do that, my ears would burn.
And then the FD is expected to stabilise? :mad:

May I ask who signs off the plates for a visual to SFO 28L?
Regardless of the ins and outs of this case, that seems to me to be … ummm … stupid?

[tilnextime]

Lonewolf 50

Brief the flight, prepare the flight, and address risks to the flight, in order to get the most out of the flight and to stack the odds in favor of the flight coming off as "routine" regardless of how much effort it takes to make it look that easy.

Oh how many mishaps I have investigated where the real "slice of cheese" at the heart of causation was a poor or non-existent pre-flight preparation and briefing.

On that subject, our crusty old safety officer in primary flight training (WWII, Korea, just back from VN) said, "No flight should be considered routine until you are giving the post flight debriefing. Otherwise, you are setting yourself up for a mishap."

[Lonewolf_50]

MPN, the captain is always in the position to decline, or say "unable."

As you will note from this thread, any number of Captains who post here do that when they get such a request.

You do raise a valid point.

After I looked at some back of the napkin math in terms of the time and distance, and deceleration to stable approach asked for in the 180/5 call, I'd have to ask you this.

Doesn't the controller usually know what kind of aircraft he is tallking to? (local or not, large medium small, etc)
Does a controller have a "smart book" or "smart card" with expected approach speeds for a given heavy handy at his station?

Is the controller taught to rely on a crew telling him if they can or not?

EDIT: tilnextime. Amen. The mishap investigation we did on some unbriefed formation flying (which ended in tears) remains one of the most depressing tasks I ever got involved in. :(

[filejw]

Seth
Funny how different airlines do things. You are terminating somebody for something I teach on OE. Mind you MCP alt alert is set 1000AGL or at FAF alt if IMC and we would never want to see use of V/S down low. Our AB guys do same thing too.

[barit1]

RAT 5:
The engines would need five seconds or more to produce significant thrust

I can't remember from my CF-6 days, but on CFM-56's I used to suggest a min of 40% N2 on finals, for instant response, but if idle was needed to ensure that you had 40% when your speed was target +5kts at the latest, again to give instant response to freeze you at target speed when it was reached.

I submit you probably mean 40% N1 (fan rpm).

Core speed N2 at ground idle won't be less than about 60% for either CF6 or CFM56.

[ironbutt57]

Mind you MCP alt alert is set 1000AGL or at FAF alt if IMC and we would never want to see use of V/S down low. Our AB guys do same thing too.

Many ways to skin a cat, our Boeing procedures were MCP altitude set to GA altitude passing the FAF on a VOR approach/GS capture on an ILS...if MCP ALT was set to 1000' AAL then ALT CAP would occur if using VS when not locked on to a GS..Airbus had the advantage of FPA which lessened the workload and allowed for more precise flight path control

[AF Eagle]

Just to clarify something assuming FLCH on a Boeing is equivalent to OP DES on the Airbus: Airbus prohibits use of OP DES (on the A320 and I imagine across the board) if altitude in the FCU is set lower than 500' or MDA/H, whichever is highest.

Ok, that's good. Having flown both A and B aicraft I have never tested that, and I can't see any situation where I would use FLCH or open descend with selected altitude lower than FAF alt. And I didn't know there is such logic that you described in Airbus even though I believe I know the Airbus logic quite well.

Why don't they fix the bug in Boeing? Why don't they build planes that can't be flown to any unsafe conditions? Why is it possible to shut down all engines airborne? Why is it possible to switch off flight instruments and IRU's airborne? Why is it possible that both pilots open their seat belts at the same time if the plane is flown in severe turbulence?

Why do they build cars that can be driven straight to a stone wall?

It is not possible to build such automation that lets crew fly the plane in all possible cases, but prevents them to do anything that might lead the plane to danger. Understanding and controlling plane's energy level while flying an approach is still pilots' job, automation doesn't understand what lies ahead. There are many cases where the automation doesn't work as it should, and the automatic systems are very stupid if things don't go as they should. That's why the pilots are needed in the cockpit. And the pilots shouldn't be stupid or sleeping. This "FLCH trap" is not something that can ever happen in final approach if the pilot's have brain in their heads.

[tilnextime]

MPN11:

2. Controllers know what aircraft type they're controlling. They are not, surprisingly, trained to know what the aircraft/crew can/cannot do.Not surprisingly at all. The Pilot in Command is the final authority on what a given aircraft and crew can or cannot do. ATC deals in general procedures, the PIC deals in determining if he and his crew can handle the aircraft to comply with those procedures. If not, it's the PIC's responsibility to request an alternative.

If automation is making some of the decisions, and ATC is making some of the decisions, what the hell are we pilots doing?

[deSitter]

Confirmed - one victim hit by a responding truck

Police: Firetruck hit girl after Asiana Airlines crash (http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/12/asiana-victim-fire-truck/2512493/)

Inexcusable.

[phil gollin]

The body was hit AFTER having been covered with foam

[dba7]

tilnextime

Not surprisingly at all. The Pilot in Command is the final authority on what a given aircraft and crew can or cannot do. ATC deals in general procedures, the PIC deals in determining if he and his crew can handle the aircraft to comply with those procedures. If not, it's the PIC's responsibility to request an alternative.

If automation is making some of the decisions, and ATC is making some of the decisions, what the hell are we pilots doing?


And that brings up another point, language/culture issue.

I hate bringing in culture/language issue but you have to remember the Korean pilots are not native English speakers.
So they had a choice
1. Say Unable and end up using English even more for explaining why and figure out new approach etc, ALL the while possibly risking getting too close to another aircraft

2. Or you trust your piloting skill and put your faith in your flying skill. I know that may sound hilarious to many at this point but I doubt they thought they lacked flying skill. Otherwise, they would've left the job long ago.


No idea about the comfort level the pilots had with English though. As someone who had to start learning English at pre-teen age, it's PRETTY hard. If you don't start young (like elementary school, even earlier), learning a new language is not easy.

who knows...

[deSitter]

Covering a victim with foam is a bad enough mistake. The foam goes on the hot places.

[MPN11]

Covering a victim with foam is a bad enough mistake. The foam goes on the hot places.

Not according to that rather strange video of the fire crew[s] in action (search up-thread, please). The apparent inability to even squirt the foamy stuff where the fire was raging was disturbing. I have no idea about the techniques, policies or equipment, but watching a Major Foam Unit [as we called them] squirting foam at the left engine [that didn't exist] and not even moving close enough to achieve the necessary trajectory was …. interesting.

It got better when the local RED fire trucks arrived. They are used to dealing with fires.

[wcorcoran]

I am torn between protecting the airline pilots and getting the accident details.

I am deeply concerned that we are shifting into an environment where pilots can't make a mistake without fear of having ones life turned upside down prematurely. I don't think it serves the traveling public very well to have pilots walking on egg shells every time they enter the cockpit.

I also think pilots should be required to have three go arounds per year. This way, the embarrassment will be completely removed from taking such an action.

We need to focus more on why this crew waited until the last seconds to call a go around. To me, that is of equal significance than failing to monitor.

Airspeed works against you in high workload situations. Slowing down the plane gives you more time to process. How many crashes will it take related to airspeed before we admit that a stand alone warning is required. Requiring flight crews to monitor a small box on the speed tape that turns from green to yellow to red for such a critical parameter is absurd.

Yes. Professionals should be able to monitor these things without incident. But, why? Why take the risk? Humans are terrible monitors. Computers are excellent monitors. When the airspeed is trending too slow, give a blessed alert---with or without the autopilot engaged.

Finally, I appreciate the transparency of the NTSB, but we need to protect our pilots and I see no reason for not waiting to disclose any crew statements until more facts are in. I still want crew interviews conduced immediately. But, there is no reason we can't wait for other details to be fully corroborated before releasing one word from the pilots.

[jientho]

This "FLCH trap" is not something that can ever happen in final approach if the pilot's have brain in their heads.

Again, this is never something you just assume in life-critical system designs. In fact, you assume the opposite and then look for any possible valid use of said configuration in light of its catastrophic nature if ever fallen into. If there is NO possible redeeming feature of said configuration, then you design its prohibition into the system. "Pilots want the freedom to 'crash into brick walls'" is not a redeeming feature. It's just Darwinian.

[Etud_lAvia]

I have no idea about the techniques, policies or equipment, but watching a Major Foam Unit [as we called them] squirting foam at the left engine [that didn't exist] and not even moving close enough to achieve the necessary trajectory was …. interesting.

We agree about at least one thing ... I have no idea about air crash firefighting either.

Perhaps they saw fuel pouring from the attachment point of the missing engine? Possibly they were responding in accordance with their training? Maybe there were some good reasons why the responded as they did?

The function of the foam is primarily to starve the fire of oxygen. How effective it is to stream the foam from a distant nozzle, when fire has burned a hole through the roof, I don't know.

Some airport fire departments have special trucks for attacking fires inside the fuselage. The trucks have purpose-designed nozzles on long-reach arms, able to puncture the aircraft skin, and disperse the foam in a volume-filling mist designed to suppress flame and reduce temperatures with great rapidity. Were the fire crew you found so interesting taking care of the area around the plane, while waiting for other equipment to handle the interior?

I don't really know ... but it would be great to hear from somebody who does.

In a similar vein, I've read several posts excoriating the flight crew for their delay in authorizing emergency evacuation. It seems plausible, at least, that they were physically and then psychologically stunned after their ship came to rest -- the nose may have experienced some of the largest sustained accelerations as the plane pirouetted on the runway.

After taking a few moments to recover themselves, they would presumably need to pull up their pre-evacuation checklist, and run through it. As more than one person has observed, evacuating passengers in the proximity of gigantic 100,000 lb thrust-class turbofans could have resulted in dreadful casualties, without assurance that the engines were stopped (or in fact, detached). With the ship badly damaged and an engine missing, the engine indications were presumably different from what the crew is used to. Mightn't they have wanted to take a bit of time to make sense of what they were seeing, and to confirm that the engines were stopped?

I'd be interested to hear from experienced air carrier pilots here how long they expect it would take them to complete their corresponding checklists in such a scenario.

Maybe the Asiana crew took an unconscionably long time to OK evacuation. Or maybe they were doing reasonably under the circumstances. What do the veteran airline pilots say?

[MPN11]

All you have to do is look at the approach radar data for Asiana 214. It clearly shows the aircraft far above glide slope at 4.5 NM and 190 knots. Then it began a descent to acquire glide slope. It acquired glide slope at 1.3 NM and 140 knots, but continued descending! Then increased its rate of descent!! And continued to slow, until it hit the rocks.

Statement of the obvious, meant politely ....Any aircraft trying to comply with that procedure will be too fast and above the glide slope, with 5 nm to sort it out. Most pilots, I hope, can resolve that scenario in the time available.

But I ask again - and again - what is that procedure? Who on Earth approved something that puts you hot and high at 5 nm and then, on a Visual Approach, leaves you to sort it out?

Don't you think that's a bit unfair? I know/hope most of you can do that within 5 nm, but do you think thats a proper way to handle c. 300 pax down the back? Fighter pilot, yes … Civil Air Transport, perhaps not. Is this a factor? NTSA might determine so.

[RunSick]

bobcat, don´t you know the system knows the airfield elevation?

It´s there next to "LDG ELEV", it normally says AUTO and displays correctly the field´s elevation. Therefore a simple "landing elev + xxx feet" inhibition on the altitude selector shouldn´t be that difficult.

[220mph]

Not according to that rather strange video of the fire crew[s] in action (search up-thread, please). The apparent inability to even squirt the foamy stuff where the fire was raging was disturbing. I have no idea about the techniques, policies or equipment, but watching a Major Foam Unit [as we called them] squirting foam at the left engine [that didn't exist] and not even moving close enough to achieve the necessary trajectory was …. interesting.

It got better when the local RED fire trucks arrived. They are used to dealing with fires.

I was immediately concerned when I saw the amateur video the first time ... fire trucks raced up at high rates of speed - including on the left side where passengers were coming down slides ... I believe you could see passengers scattering as the trucks maneuvered right in front of the slides.

And they seemed they kept moving in that area. Despite having a relatively long throw on their foam they drove up very close to the aircraft. It seemed 5 or 6 trucks arrived almost same time. One would think they would each pull up and stop in positions surrounding the aircraft and deploy fire measures as necessary. Many however kept moving, jockeying position.

This photo (http://s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/styles/v2_article_large/public/2013/07/07/asiana-airlines-san-francisco-airport.jpg)shows a good idea of the fire truck tire tracks. Sadly, if you look to the left front corner of the truck near the wing the yellow tarp might also show something else.

I believe one report noted the victim was found appx 30' from a boarding slide on left side of the aircraft.

There are several higher rez copies of this and similar shots - none conclusive - however the yellow tarp was in almost all of the post crash photos.

As this early pre-fire photo (http://i1.wp.com/www.buzzmontgomery.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/cache/98990_130706190825-san-francisco-plane-crash-18b-horizontal-gallery.jpg?resize=640%2C360)shows - there were many people in the area as trucks arrived, and there was no one/nothing in the spot the tarp now appears.

This higher rez shot shows the large number of people in the area as deplaning was occurring - again nothing appears visible in that spot.

In the overhead shot the tire tracks and tarp coincide.

I find it very hard to believe they sprayed foam on this young girl without seeing her. And if they did and she was run over in the foam - then that seems equally problematic.

Hopefully the emergency teams will develop an improved response plan - one that minimizes truck movement when survivors are present and requires on the ground spotters in that case.

Not an attack on the fire crews, just hopefully constructive review - I'm sure they are doing the same

[sb_sfo]

The SFIA ARFF trucks are chartreuse. The red ones you see in the video are from local communities providing assistance. I have watched SFIAFD in action, and in this video, I wonder why they didn't get in a little closer to the right side before the fire really took off. But I wasn't there...

[xcitation]

Recent incidents are following a worrying trend. Has automation incidiously outgrown the the current licensing framework to the point of impacting safety?
Simplying counting the hours whilst PIC in the front seat is too crude a measure of experience when it comes to the fundamental skill of manual flying e.g. a flight can take 11 hours and only require 2 mins of hands on.

What's the solution?

If logged hours were split between manual hours and automated hours then appropriate licensing baselines could be establish to guarantee the pilots routinely practice their most fundamental flying skills. This can only be implemented across the board if imposed by the licensing authority. Currently it is mostly left to airline policy to influence the amount of manual flying hours. This is not adequate for such a fundamental skill. This minor change would not cost much more to implement and I would expect it to get the backing of Unions/Pilots afterall don't most pilots want to actually fly?

Automation improves safety but so does having pilots experienced at manual flying, so lets have both.

[CityofFlight]

Just announced that a minor child has died from complications of the crash.

[givemewings]

Children from the flight recount their experience:

Shock and survival: Asiana plane crash through the eyes of children - CNN.com (http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/09/us/asiana-children-crash/index.html)

[sandiego89]

For desitter in post #1911, I think your term "Inexcusable" regarding the fire fighting vehicle perhaps running over a victim is out of line and does not help at all.

Tragic is a better word.

As others have indicated the victim, perhaps alive, perhaps not, was outside the fuselage and covered in foam. Debris were everywhere. Obviously several of the posters here have no idea of the complexities of operating a heavy foam truck near an active incident, or the procedures involved. There are clear procedures and getting foam on active flame, hot spots, spilled fuel, positioning etc. Foam application is not precise, it tends to go everywhere. Even with the engines clearly ripped from the aircraft they would have wanted to get foam around the engine pylons and wings to cover any leaking fuel. Remember foam is designed to cover fuel and prevent the oxygen chain from causing more fire. This is likely the reason they were spraying the engine areas.

Foam apparatus needs to be moved during an active incident to best fight the fire. These are huge trucks, often operating without dismounted ground crew to guide them to ensure the path is clear. These are huge trucks, and again the area was littered with debris, all covered with foam.

desitter would you prefer the foam truck sits 500 yards away and let the plane burn, with passengers perhaps still aboard, out of fear of running over a evacuee? I think not.

No one feels worse than the firefighters, believe me, and blaming them does no help.

Tragic, yes. "Inexusable" likely not.

[deSitter]

I have read many accident reports involving scattered passengers, dead and alive, and never once heard of a single one being run over by a vehicle. They sprayed foam everywhere but on the small fire near the still-present engine. Yes, it is inexcusable.

[givemewings]

Just because it's never happened before doesn't mean that it couldn't. If you read accident reports so often, I'm surprised that you cannot see how this could happen. It's an accident, they didn't chase her down and run her over.... :rolleyes:

Inexcusable is driving drunk.
Inexcusable is leaving your kids in the car while you go drink and gamble.
Inexcusable is being cracked off your face and rolling on your kid in your sleep.

This was a tragedy, plain and simple. Could it have been avoided? Maybe, but at the expense of a fast response and saving other lives? Possibly...

[sandiego89]

desitter, please understand that foam is also designed to prevent further fire, and smothering spilled fuel is high on their priority list, not just the "hot places" you used in you post. You and I were not there, and have no idea where fuel was or may have been leaking from.

[Ranger One]

Wings, I have not seen anything but high phrase for the CC here in the US. How can anybody blame the CC for the deaths of the 2 girls as they were ejected from the A/C. Foolish really.

You missed this post by an idiot who decided that the pax were ejected because their seat belts weren't done up right - which of course means the CC must be to blame… :confused: :yuk:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-93.html#post7936332

In retrospect I was significantly more polite with them than I should have been…

[Ranger One]

I have read many accident reports involving scattered passengers, dead and alive, and never once heard of a single one being run over by a vehicle. They sprayed foam everywhere but on the small fire near the still-present engine. Yes, it is inexcusable.



I lived in the USA for a good few years. While I was there, I was a volunteer firefighter with my local fire department. Very good professional bunch of guys.

None of them would have dreamed of telling me how to fly.

I suggest you extend the same courtesy to your fellow professionals.

Trust me, they will be debriefing, critiquing, and examining their response as throughly as we would examine our flying.

[EEngr]

I wonder why they didn't get in a little closer to the right side before the fire really took off.

Which way was the smoke/fire blowing relative to the airplane's position?

[parabellum]

I have read many accident reports involving scattered passengers, dead and
alive, and never once heard of a single one being run over by a vehicle.


deSitter - it would be good to know just how much experience you have of being on a foam dispensing vehicle, in action, approaching the wreck of a serious accident that is starting to burn?

What, none? - your kidding?:mad:

[mm43]

The NTSB has accepted responsibility for the names used by some media outlets.
July 12, 2013
WASHINGTON – The National Transportation Safety Board apologizes for inaccurate and offensive names that were mistakenly confirmed as those of the pilots of Asiana flight 214, which crashed at San Francisco International Airport on July 6.

Earlier today, in response to an inquiry from a media outlet, a summer intern acted outside the scope of his authority when he erroneously confirmed the names of the flight crew on the aircraft.

The NTSB does not release or confirm the names of crew members or people involved in transportation accidents to the media. We work hard to ensure that only appropriate factual information regarding an investigation is released and deeply regret today's incident.

Appropriate actions will be taken to ensure that such a serious error is not repeated.

[thesafepassenger]

Apologies if this has been covered, but would the low airspeed, and cockpit (low) height above ground level when approaching the sea wall, be similar to an A320 on approach which the Flying Pilot was used to earlier?

[jientho]

jientho wrote:
Quote:
Now, you seem to agree that there is NO condition where it makes any sense, so WHY IS IT ALLOWED BY THE SYSTEM to be entered if there is risk (even the tiniest bit)? That is my point.
Because it makes no sense to disallow FL0000. If is did, you have to disallow FL10 for runways 1000 ft ASLNo. You misunderstand. The requirement is to disallow entries that make zero sense in the real world. Take the lowest altitude of any possible airport in the real world, add say 500', and disallow any target flight levels below that. Probably eliminates FL000, FL001, FL002, FL003, and FL004 only. Yes it may only eliminate the "trap" for approach to near-sea-level airports. But that ain't peanuts. Or Boeing (or FAA) may determine that adding 1000' or even 2000' may be more in line with the only valid purpose of FLCH, which would bring in even more airports.

Editing to add: also see http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-96.html#post7937752 for an even better solution.

[Etud_lAvia]

For what it's worth, I just did a quick online search, finding (apologies if I'm getting any info wrong here) that in the USA fire-fighting vehicles are involved in about three collisions per year with pedestrians or bicycles. About 20% of those incidents results in fatalities.

Accidents happen. Not one of us is more or less than human.

Who doubts that as we discuss these events with such detachment, the soul of that truck's driver is in torment?

[nitpicker330]

Thesafepassenger------ there might be a slight difference in the Pilots seating height but hardly noticeable.
They still fly the same 3 deg ( actually 2.85 deg in SFO ) approach and look for the same lights beside the runway. ( PAPI lights should still show 2 white 2 red if on correct slope ) they should still cross the threshold around 50'.

The only real time a smaller Aircraft visual perspective looks/feels different to the Pilot is in the flare below 50'. If you're used to a small Aircraft you can flare to land too late in a big Aircraft until you get used to it. This had no bearing in this accident.

Conversely I'm used to large Aircraft and last time I sat in a 737 jump seat I thought the crew had forgotten to flare and expected a heavy landing!!

[galaxy flyer]

The FMS knows the landing elevation and all the needed approach altitudes, when an approach is loaded. It wouldn't be hard to inhibit FLC when within some altitude above the FAF altitude or field elevation. Say, 3,000' above the field or 1,000' above the FAF crossing altitude, FLC inhibits an altitude selection below those.

GF

[tdracer]

I have read many accident reports involving scattered passengers, dead and alive, and never once heard of a single one being run over by a vehicle. They sprayed foam everywhere but on the small fire near the still-present engine. Yes, it is inexcusable.

An investigator told me that the same thing happened at the Sioux City DC10 crash (I've not been able to independently confirm).

For someone who wasn't there, you sound awfully high and mighty. There was a massive debris field where that girl was lying - likely including lots of clothing and such that would do a nice job of camouflaging a young girl lying amidst the debris. Especially since airport fire fighting vehicles are designed to contain the fire-fighters within a (relatively) safe interior compartment. These aren't the fire trucks that drive down the street with guys hanging off the side.

Also, according to the reports I've seen, they've not determined if the girl was still alive when she was run over.

Tragic - definitely. Inexcusable? That's a highly questionable call.

[thesafepassenger]

NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman stated in one of her daily briefings that three flight attendants from the rear of the aircraft , in their seats, were ejected from the aircraft and received serious injuries. No passengers.

[olbob]

I am an old pilot who has not had the joy of all the automation gobbledegook and I get rather disgusted with all the acronym-driven jargon about what or what was not on and this or that was engaged or charged that caused the undershoot. It was a clear, a no-wind day and the airplane was doing everything that it should have. The target that was the end of the runway was in sight, if the target moved up you add power. If it moves down, you retard power. You concentrate on where you want to land and act accordingly...but then, that is if you are a pilot.

[tdracer]

Dirty

I understand where you are coming from. But, many (most?) of the posts are 'how and why' - learning from our (collective) mistakes in order to prevent future mistakes. How the heck could a professional flight crew do a CFIT of a modern jetliner doing a visual approach on an ideal summer day, and how do we make sure it doesn't happen again?

20 years ago, I was directly involved in the investigation of the Lauda 767 that crashed when the thrust reverser deployed in-flight. It was the first fatal on a 767 - an airplane that - at the time - I'd worked most of my professional life. Initial reports pointed at a bomb, or other terrorism. While it still bothered me, designing an airplane that is 'terrorism proof' isn't reasonable. Then, several days after the crash, we got data (I was among the first to see) that said, definitively, it was an in-flight T/R deployment. Something we'd designed to "never happen". We'd missed something.

I will never forget that feeling - even though it wasn't my system. An older supervisor - who had been involved in several fatal accident investigations over the years - told me "you'll never look at your job the same way again". Truer words have never been uttered. I went home that night and downed the better part of a bottle of Scotch. The only way it could have been worse is if it had been my system :uhoh:.

So I have an idea how those involved in Asiana feel. By most accounts, the cabin crew performed admirably - but they will still have nightmares - for the rest of their lives - about what they might have done differently that might have saved a life or prevented a serious injury.

I want to either laugh or cry when I see press speculation that Boeing employees have 'covered up' the cause of a crash. My second worst nightmare is that my system causes a fatal crash. My worst nightmare is that I know there is a problem with my system and I covered it up, resulting in a fatal crash.

I've done my professional best to make sure my second worst nightmare never comes true. Not only do I know my worst nightmare will never come true, if there is an engineer that would allow it to happen, I've never met him or her.

[JimField]

I agree completely.

On July 11 the NTSB practically ruled out mechanical and avionics problems with the Asiana Boeing 777.

The NTSB was practically saying that the accident was caused by human factors, and not by the equipment.

The aircraft was far above glide slope at 4.5 NM and 190 knots. Then it began to descend to acquire glide slope. It acquired glide slope at 1.3 NM and 140 knots, but continued descending! Then increased its rate of descent!! And continued to slow, until it hit the seawall.

You can see it all in this analysis of the approach radar and FDR data : What Happened to Asiana Airlines Flight 214 - Analysis by Sooeet.com (http://www.sooeet.com/aerospace/what-happened-to-asiana-airlines-flight-214-p01.php)

We must look carefully at too much reliance on automatic controls during landings. Either fully automate landings, or land manually. Trying to mix both is problematic, as this accident shows.

[clayne]

The FMS knows the landing elevation and all the needed approach altitudes, when an approach is loaded. It wouldn't be hard to inhibit FLC when within some altitude above the FAF altitude or field elevation. Say, 3,000' above the field or 1,000' above the FAF crossing altitude, FLC inhibits an altitude selection below those.

Then after this is "perfected", people will be back at it attempting to use FLCH for approaches - because of inbuilt "protection" the system now offers. When such protection fails, it'll be rinse repeat, "I thought it wouldn't let me do that" all over again.

Here's a couple of alternative ideas: don't use FLCH for approach, don't enter in stupid values, manually control the throttles. They all require paying attention and not letting a computer make all the choices for you.

[PPRuNeUser0172]

TDracer,

Concur sir, the human aspect is the most tragic here. 3 deaths, god forbid more?? Yet there are idiots arguing over semantics for what propose?

The crew of this flight will never get over this incident, the drivers frankly may not deserve to if what the NTSB are inferring is true.

The meat will be pulled from the bones no doubt, the truth will out as they say. What concerns me is how much will it be digested, distilled and ACTIONED? The industry has managed to sleep walk into a state where being a "good" pilot has less to do with stick and rudder and more to do with managing a computer (sh!t in,sh!t out). I find it abhorrent that alleged lack of basic aircraft systems knowledge and/or inability to fly the aircraft in near perfect conditions killed 3 kids.

Hoping for some official FACTS soon so that armchair pundits move onto the next salacious episode.

[Tallman]

RangerOne post 1946

The NTSB stated that 3 flight attendants had been ejected, and NO passengers. The three flight attendants are alive. 3 passengers sadly died, amongst them 2 Chinese girls of which it was first reported that they had been ejected.

It seems that these two girls had thus deplaned AFTER the accident and at least (as per the police's statement) one of the girls had been run over. They were found in the vicinity of the aircraft.

I don't need to be such a smart detective to figure this one out. Hopefully something can be learned from this, emergency services can also receive recommendations from the NTSB

[armchairpilot94116]

IIRC, reports were that one of the girls was found by the seawall and was dead when found. The other girl may possibly have managed to leave the aircraft on her own and was the one that was run over. Reports are she had massive injuries from being run over, but so far no apparent injuries from being ejected from the aircraft.

[HotPants]

???? ?? ?? '20? ??? ??? ??' - YouTube

20 mins!?

[OldManRiver]

They do not produce pilots and their line flying does not either. I reckon that give a modern young pilot a visual approach from 20nm 6000' 210kts on a severe clear day, with no ILS or PAPI's they could not do a CDA and be stable at 1000'. I doubt many new young captains could either.

As a lowly 2500hr taildragger pilot who has never progressed beyond doing visual approaches into a lot of unmanned bush strips, not always in the best of conditions, I find that statement totally terrifying. Please can someone reassure me that I'm wrong to do so, have no idea what I'm talking about, and that it's all different in those big heavy aircraft? Otherwise, already being a nervous airline passenger, I'm going to be utterly petrified in future!

[tilnextime]

Dirty Sanchez:
The industry has managed to sleep walk into a state where being a "good" pilot has less to do with stick and rudder and more to do with managing a computer (sh!t in,sh!t out).

Dirty- If I wanted to talk to "the industry" about this, who would I call? Kinda reminds me of the notorious "They" who are at the heart of every dysfunction in the military, but when I would turn to the section of the phone book for the letter "T", I can never find "Them". Probably because "They" are really "Us", individually and/or collectively.

Will a finding of "low proficiency in conducting a hands on visual approach" as a cause of this mishap result in the pilots' unions publicly demanding that their members be required to do visual approaches a minimum of two or three times per month to maintain proficiency? Or will the unions fault ATC and airport officials? Have the unions ever struck for higher standards or more rigorous training to be imposed on them? Or are the pilots not "Them"?

Fortunately, mishap investigators are not in the "blame game", but are tasked to make a technical investigation that identifies causal factors. Eliminate the cause, and you don't get the effect. Unfortunately, when human factors are involved, humans don't like being identified as the cause. Rather, we default to the, "you don't understand" mode, or "the other guys made me do it." Knowing that an aircrew will "carry this burden for the rest of their lives" does not provide me with the knowledge necessary to avoid their errors - assuming that I am willing to admit that I am also capable of such errors.

Thus, we see a hodge podge of comments that may or may not shed light on what is wrong.

[hitchens97]

1) I totally get that you need to make a clear and rationale decision and weigh trade offs on an evac, but 90 secs seems long given all the damage and fire. What were the tradeoffs/checklists he was making during that 90 secs?

2) In the BA 777 crash at LHR, I think the pilots were faulted for not pulling some lever that stopped the fuel after the crash. Did this happen here?

3) 2 chutes opened inside. Is this just normal given hull damage, or is there likely going to be some changes that Boeing might need to make?

[deSitter]

Quote:
Originally Posted by obgraham http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-98.html#post7938180)
deSitter:

I fail to see how you can tell, by watching that video, which fire vehicle ran over the victim. Neither foam truck moves during the video, and the view is from a looong way away.

obgraham, if you had seen the post deSitter put up a couple of hours ago (and which it appears the mods correctly and promptly deleted) where he made some disgraceful comments about firemen on 9/11, you would realise he was simply a troll with an anti-firefighter agenda.


I deleted the post myself because it was made in anger. I am heartily sick of overwrought heroes, and prefer quiet competence, something that is all but gone in the modern world.

-drl

[bobcat4]

RunSick

bobcat, don´t you know the system knows the airfield elevation?

It´s there next to "LDG ELEV", it normally says AUTO and displays correctly the field´s elevation. Therefore a simple "landing elev + xxx feet" inhibition on the altitude selector shouldn´t be that difficult.


Yes of course, but now we’re back on the track discussing new sophisticated navigation systems vs. having a pilot flying the jet. As a software engineer, a professional developer, I know it’s possible to design software which removes the pilot from the loop. Automation has put robots on Mars.

But then pprune.org would be psdrune.org (Professional Software Developers rumour network), and the next crash would be speculations of a bug in the software. Perhaps even a Korean coder working at Boeing, and his cultural background… (just kidding!)

We have to face the fact that we cannot (yet) design a robot which walks better than a 3-year old child. Having pilots on the front row seats is an “intended design” for a reason.

[King on a Wing]

Been to Ksfo numerous times.
I have rarely seen more dangerous ATC controllers anywhere in the world than in Sfo.
Speaking fast is considered to be a sign of efficiency. Speaking faster in English with a pilot for whom English is obviously a second or even a third language is considered to be super efficiency, bordering onto things in cheek humour for their colleagues.
What business does a controller have, to clear a heavy jet for a 'visual approach' into a fully controlled airfield where ALL landing aids are available.
That too, very frequently when simultaneous parallel ops are in progress.
Besides absolution of responsibility.
Notwithstanding the obvious lack of certain flying skills, I would have the ATC equally share the causal blame. And therefore have them partake equally in the cure.

[RAT 5]

Will a finding of "low proficiency in conducting a hands on visual approach" as a cause of this mishap result in the pilots' unions publicly demanding that their members be required to do visual approaches a minimum of two or three times per month to maintain proficiency?

To maintain proficiency you have to have it in the first place. As explained the TQ courses include only a very rudimentary couple of hours on manual flying in an everyday environment. Thus I am discounting the jump through hoops SE handling. Then there is base training conducted in a calm controlled manner using level circuits and timings etc. This puts you in a good slot to make a 2-3nm finals on a good clear day. The real world is not like that; it usually means a descending circuit with anything from 270 degrees turn overhead to a straight in. The skills required to perform these basic manoeuvres are not taught, nor encouraged and so are not maintained. Then one day they are required; the end result is a dog's dinner or worse. The root cause could be said to lie in the approved TQ courses. The foundations have not been laid.
All the guff on here about the fault lying in the A/T FLCH system, and how to design out the 'trap'; let's teach pilots how to fly an a/c and THEN train them how to operate it. Let's encourage them to hone and maintain those basic skills. This is not the case now. The emphasis is on operate, and the emphasis is also on designing fool proof systems, with so many back-ups, that a robotic trained monkey can operate from any educational culture in the world. Everytime something goes wrong (human) the answer is sought in technology. Let's design out the weakest link. I say let's strengthen the weakest link as well. The optimum lies with a combination of the two, but it seems cheaper and more reliable to concentrate on technology.
The single pilot and a dog is not far away.

[fg32]

Originally Posted by obgraham
deSitter:

I fail to see how you can tell, by watching that video, which fire vehicle ran over the victim. Neither foam truck moves during the video, and the view is from a looong way away.

I think , obgraham, you are looking at the wrong video.
"Neither foam truck moves during the video" makes this certain.

This video is the most comprehensive:

San Francisco Boeing 777 Plane Crash - HD 7/6/13 (Part 1) (Actual Crash Footage) - YouTube

It clearly shows the fire trucks engaging in a huge amount of jockeying and manoeuvring which to the lay eye appears to be unnecessary and indecisive.

With regard to "the view is from a looong way away", please make sure that your computer is capable of viewing it at its full resolution, which is 1080p. The clarity is astounding.

Once you have viewed the correct video at full resolution, I think you might wish to reconsider your quoted reaction to deSitters post.

Anyone who wishes to form a view of post-crash events really needs to watch this properly as their starting point.

You are correct that one cannot with any certainty identify which vehicle drives over the unfortunate victim, but at this level of clarity one can make a fair guess. I think that this video will provide vital evidence in the investigation, and I would be very surprised if knowledgeable investigators will be unable to deduce and see the moment it happens.

Are you aware that the latest NTSB announcements seem to be suggesting that this child was not in fact ejected during the crash, but evacuated normally, possibly almost unharmed?

Please, no more about the distress of the driver. What about her parents?

[tilnextime]

RAT 5

Which points to my question:

Have the unions ever struck for higher standards or more rigorous training to be imposed on them? Or are the pilots not "Them"?

[Shutterbug]

@King on a Wing

Early in this thread when very little data was available on the incident a lot of BA 38 comparisons were being made. I went back and listened to the ATC recordings from the BA 38 incident and compared them to the OZ 214 recordings. World of difference.

Ask yourself objectively... which controller's handling of an emergency would you have preferred?

Maybe there are some ATC tapes on separate freqs that have not been made publicly available at this time. We'll see.

[777boeings]

Having operated into SFO many times over the years, I would not say it's inherently unsafe provided a crew prepares thoroughly.
Just because an approach is visual does not make it dangerous. But the risk factors need to be addressed for any approach. A good example is an autoland in non LVP conditions. Is it more risky than one flown when LVP are in force?Well, actually it is because of the lack of protection. But provided a crew has strategies to mitigate any threats, then it should be fairly routine.
SFO is a high workload airport for a crew that has perhaps arrived after many long hours of flying. So the detail in the planning and preparation must cover all eventualities including the possibility of a visual approach, sidestep or PRM to name a few examples.
All airline crew are trained to fly a visual approach. It does take more skill than an ILS but it certainly isn't rocket science.
Last but not least, good monitoring from the PM is essential as is his willingness to call out any deviation of correct flight path or SOP.

[glad rag]

Third passenger dies of her injuries.

BBC News - Third Asiana flight 214 victim dies of her injuries (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23296760)

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/68706000/jpg/_68706144_68609241.jpg

RIP.

[tilnextime]

King on a Wing

If you have a problem with SFO assigning visual approaches to you, then as part of your preflight planning, why not sent a message forward to ATC stating that you are unwilling or unable to accept one? That way, you have given them the common courtesy of having as much time to prepare for your limitations as you do for theirs.

[BBK]

Tilnextime

I would suggest that there is a huge difference between a visual approach where the aircraft is in a position to fly said approach easily and one where the aircraft is vectored "high and fast" and then has to sort that out first before landing visually.

Whether that's a factor in this accident I don't know. I've not seen the recent NTSB press conferences so I don't know if there's any mention of them being "hot and high". There have been numerous posters, me included, who have mentioned the infamous "slam dunk" approaches practiced at SFO.

[737-NG]

I read a lot of posts about how dangerous it is to fly the visual 28L into SFO. I am thus surprised that 99.9% of the time, things go well.
1800-1900 ft recommended altitude on a 5 mile final calls for a 4 degree descent. Meaning the VSI would show -1000 instead of -800 for example for a classic 3 degree slope at 160 ground speed.
Now apparently SFO also calls for 180kt till 5 DME, and not the classic 180 to 10 160 to 4 at most international airports. More difficult to achieve, but not impossible, especially when you have had 10 hours plus preflight to brief that possibility. Plus, you are getting paid big bucks for this, the least passengers expect is someone in front who knows how to fly the damn thing better than THEY can. Because honestly, everyone can push buttons...
Now I suppose they were already flying flap 5 @180 when descending. Vref was 137@ flap 30, leaving them about 90 seconds (1900 to 500AGL for stabilized approach criteria in VMC conditions) to loose 40 knots ideally, 20kt at minimum to meet the criteria. More than feasible. In fact NTSB report shows they were at 134 kts at 500 feet. BUT, obviously, instead of anticipating and letting the engines spool up, they remained at idle until about 150-200 feet. WHY??? That is the question we should be asking ourselves.

[HPSOV L]

To everyone banging on about how disgraceful it is that pilots these days can't fly visual approaches:
Please tell me how I am supposed to achieve and maintain proficiency. I typically fly 90 hours a month and am lucky to do two take offs and landings. This is because I share sectors with the FO and am regularly rostered as relief crew where we don't do the landing. Often the landing will be off an RNP1 arrival or vectors to an ILS. The traffic situation is usually heavy and the flight time can be up to 15hrs. The airport is often unfamiliar with foreign ATC and maybe QFE metric altimetry procedures. Haze commonly reduces visibility in the Middle East, India and Asia to around a mile or less. Multiple runways and parallel taxiways create the risk of identifying the wrong runway.
We do not faff around trying to do visual approaches in those conditions with 300 people paying for the highest level of safety down the back.
So I only do about two or three a year in the actual aircraft, usually only in the USA, perhaps one or two to 13L in JFK (more of a visual segment) and one to fit into the traffic situation in SFO.
I have thousands of visual approaches under my belt from my domestic flying days but these days my skills are only adequate at best. So please try to understand why most long haul operations recommend an instrument approach. It is an extra level of safety for the benefit of passengers, not because the pilots are lazy or stupid.

PS - for the laymen out there; usually the final part of an approach is flown manually by visual reference. Autolands are not that common because the ground antennae is only 'protected' when visibility is low.

[Piper.Classique]

How many people on here flying heavies also fly SEP, and is it a valid way, in your opinion, to keep up to speed on visual approaches and general handling?

[Capn Bloggs]

Please tell me how I am supposed to achieve and maintain proficiency.
Practice in the simulator.

[HPSOV L]

I do, every six months.
You are kidding, right?

[caber]

Given the navaids available, in this case an rnav approach and at bare minimum an extended centerline that is easily created i should think a visual would be relatively easy to remain proficient on. It's rare these days i do a visual approach with absolutely no internal aids.

[quadspeed]

Piper;

Flying GA on the side keeps your eyes out and your handling skills up, with the obvious differences in mass/thrust/momentum. But the basics remain the same.

777/748 driver.

[Ian W]

If retaining currency in fully visual approaches from 10 miles or more out with 'special' speed and level restrictions such as SFO is considered 'required as part of the job', then it MUST be trained for. If pilots demonstrably cannot do this and have incidents/accidents due to lack of training or continuation training, then the airline training system should be called to account for a crash and take legal/financial responsibility for certifying a crew that cannot fly as 'required as part of the job'. If the training department can show documented, and objected to financial constraints that led them to reduce training for crews to fly as 'required as part of the job', then the accountants/finance department/CFO of the airline that issued those spending constraints should be held accountable for a crash and take legal/financial responsibility for their decision to reduce the amount of training for what is 'required as part of the job'.

This accountability trail of course does not absolve the pilot - the end result of the limited training - replying 'UNABLE' when given an approach by ATC that they are uncomfortable with.

Out of interest to all you active 'heavy' pilots, what would be your company's response if you said "I need more continuation training on manually flown visual approaches and landings"? Almost certainly a negative response - both in denying the extra training and on your career with that carrier; negative to the extent that you would not even consider admitting that you needed more training. But it should be the opposite. That is a stone that should be lifted.

[Capn Bloggs]

I do, every six months.
You are kidding, right?
So your current sim program doesn't equip you with skills/currency you need.

And no, I am not kidding. It would be easy to develop a meaningful sim training program to maintain basic flying currency. Where there's a will there's a way.

[HPSOV L]

Caber:

That's a fair point, I should clarify that I am really talking about a visual approach without aids involving some sort of base turn to finals.
Actually, I think the pilots in question should not have been particularly challenged by this approach, after all they had a long final and probably had a VNAV reference as you say.
In my opinion it all went south in a matter of seconds when they failed to notice the autothrottle abnormality (or unusual mode) when increasing pitch to intercept the correct profile.
Thus visual approach skills are a bit of a red herring in this case (although it was untidy).
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.


Bloggs:

Hey, I don't write the syllabus! I take your point although I don't think every 6 months in the sim gives you anywhere near the proficiency a regional pilot gets. Yet ATC in the States tend to treat us the same.

[Greenlights]

Actions...no excuses.
The crew has no excuses to me.

on final, with full automations or not, on small or big plane, with 3 or 1 pilot, you check speed. Simple...

no need a checkride every 6 months to check speed and knowing to go around when it's necessary. :rolleyes::ugh:

[HPSOV L]

NEW YEAR:
Three crew were ejected during the crash and a further two trapped under slides that inflated inside the a/c. That left only five to conduct the evacuation.
The passenger possibly run over was lying in the debri field (reportedly obscured by fire-fighting foam), and apparently hit by one of the arriving trucks while the evacuation was in it's early stages.

[Capn Bloggs]

Thus visual approach skills are a bit of a red herring in this case (although it was untidy).
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.

But that is the secret. If you can hand fly, then you will pick up that errant airspeed, because you are used to scanning the instruments. I don't mean looking at them in a trance like we do every day, I mean really scanning and understanding what they are saying. That comes with handflying proficiency. You don't necessarily have to practice specific manoeuvres (although radar vectors to a 5nm final with a hold-up and no ILS GS or VNAV for final will get your brain going); what counts is that you're being forced to use your cross-reference skills to control the aeroplane. Then, in a surprise event such as this, you will pick up the low airspeed way before these guys did.

[Dash 42]

HPSOV L:

Thus visual approach skills are a bit of a red herring in this case (although it was untidy).
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.

You are bang on. The visual approach is neither here nor there. As has been mentioned, they achieved Vref (-3) at 500ft, yet failed to notice the speed decreasing and lack of ATHR response. One of the (apparent) issues was a lack of mode awareness. As with the Turkish 737 crash, you don't need to be on a visual for that to bite.

[casablanca]

(The cabin crew should have done better?)

No full blown emergency is ever going to be text book!
I think the cabin crew did fantastic....I think there were only 5 able to assist in the evacuation of which they had zero warning or time to prepare for an evacuation of 300 people. I think they did as well as any other cabin crew in the world would have.

[FO Cokebottle]

As an active "heavy" jet pilot and having been subjected to SFO's QUIET BRIDGE visual and 8000' overhead SFO VOR visual approaches onto 28L/R with and without the 180 to 5 requirement regularly for a five year period.

I have noticed in this debate that those deriding the ATC instruction of 180kts to 5 miles have not considered this........

It is acceptable and assumed by ATC that a "heavy" can COMMENCE speed reduction two miles from the speed constraint point - in this case 5 miles.

This is what is called and energy management and what is required to loose, in this case, approximately 40kts and be "stable".

[BOAC]

Out of interest,for UK airlines, what Cat is SFO at the moment - A. B or C, and is this appropriate?

[Machrihanish]

It is acceptable and assumed by ATC that a "heavy" can COMMENCE speed reduction two miles from the speed constraint point - in this case 5 miles.
Hi, I'd read you: You commence slowing from 180 at D7?

[Etud_lAvia]

OK, I am an absolute non-pilot, and until now have been careful to avoid matters of piloting skills / techniques / etc.

To my mind, most of the Highly Categorical posts about flying approaches fall into two camps:

A) Every pilot MUST be proficient enough to handle a visual approach with reduced or no navaids on a nice day, within adequate margins of safety. There is absolutely no excuse for not being able to do this. Obviously, some emergency scenarios would be far more demanding than that, and a flight crew lacking such proficiency could never save the aircraft.

B) Given the realities of airline operations, fatigue at the end of long hauls, the gap between opportunities for hand-flown approaches and the frequency needed to keep skills sharp, ATC aggravations, distractions, and the need for the system to function with the actual population of ATPs (as opposed to who we think they should be), even quite decent and well motivated flight crew may occasionally be stressed near their limits of performance when conducting such a (seemingly) elementary maneuver.

It seems to me that those in the (A) camp have been rather more passionate, and the (B) folks more measured ;)

Of course, (A) and (B) are not mutually exclusive. They both make sense to me. Things SHOULD be better. And at the same time, things are what they are, and it would require Very Serious Industry Investment to shift them.

If it were up to me (speaking as an ignoramus who has never landed a plane), ATPs would have recurrent training on recovery from approach-to-stall and full-stall conditions, even though these are "never" supposed to happen.

I'm such an extremist about skills development, I would even prefer training in recovery from gross upsets, even though these are never, never supposed to happen.

With a life-long interest in aviation safety, I'm aware of a number of crisis situations where all would very likely have been lost, had the people manipulating the controls not possessed exceptional stick-and-rudder skills (for example, flying sailplanes as a hobby). Such situations are rare, and growing rarer (but see the "miracle on the Hudson"). Still, hundreds of passengers have been saved over the years because the flying skills of the people at the pointy end of their aircraft were much more acute, than the licensing authorities and industry standards required.

So, having fantasized about my ideal world of air carrier training... it Ain't Never Gonna Happen. What about the real world?

[BBernd]

... Despite having a relatively long throw on their foam they drove up very close to the aircraft. The trucks need to get near the fire to bring their nozzle arm to best use. Unfortunately the arm of the truck on the left of the plane was damaged.

... This photo (http://s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/styles/v2_article_large/public/2013/07/07/asiana-airlines-san-francisco-airport.jpg)shows a good idea of the fire truck tire tracks. Sadly, if you look to the left front corner of the truck near the wing the yellow tarp might also show something else.The tracks near the tarp have been there before the crash. Even the tarp might have been there, see:

http://img577.imageshack.us/img577/8176/cj1q.jpg

... I find it very hard to believe they sprayed foam on this young girl without seeing her. And if they did and she was run over in the foam - then that seems equally problematic. If they would have seen her they wouldn't have sprayed her. It is simple.

The discussion about firefighters performance is necessary and better placed on YouTube than here.

Update:
The tarp indeed covers the body of a victim.
In this Saturday, July 6, 2013 aerial photo, a firefighter, right, stands by a tarpaulin sheet covering the body of a Chinese teen struck by a fire truck during the emergency response to the crash ... The girl was hit by a fire truck while covered with firefighting foam, authorities said Friday, July 12, revealing a startling detail that suggested she could have survived the crash only to die in its chaotic aftermath. (http://media.sacbee.com/smedia/2013/07/12/18/23/kVJfT.St.4.jpeg)
Credits: Marcio Jose Sanchez, AP and The Sacramento Bee

[Etud_lAvia]

I'd be delighted, to read what you air carrier flight crew on this forum think of a safety-support concept. If you will, imagine that:

1. Imbedded somewhere in the cockpit instrumentation, is a continous assessment of stabilized approach criteria.

2. Attention-getting (but not highly distracting) indication when an approach is nearing the limits of stabilized approach.

3. Loud and annoying (but not too persistent) audible "Go Around! Go Around!" when (for example) the approach has deteriorated to the extent that recovery of the flight path would come too close to the aircraft's performance limits, or other criteria based on the company's stabilized approach procedures.

4. Company policies requiring flight crews to obey a "Go Around!" alert, unless fuel emergency or other extreme situation should override.

Some thoughts about this concept:


It could help, in situations where monitoring and situational awareness are inadequate due to whatever factors.


Some of the folks writing here have identified a reluctance to say "Go Around!" even when the situation calls for it. In the literature of aviation safety, such psychological factors have long been studied because of their frequent role in accidents. I can imagine that in a long-haul landing with the relief crew in jumpseats, one dynamic that could occur might be "none of the other guys are objecting, who am I to speak up?" Whatever the causes of this "psychological barrier" to acknowledging that things aren't as they should be -- having "the robot" make the call could bypass this.


In modern-era ships (that is, most of today's fleet), all of the resources to do this are already present, and the addition of such an alerting system would probably be a matter of software upgrade.


Although it would be highly desirable for such a system to be reliable, it is not strictly necessary -- for example, negative failure rate (not alerting when it should) of .1% would hardly reduce its safety benefit, and positive failure rate (alerting when it should not) as poor as .01% might be tolerable -- I'm just making these up, and it should be possible to make it more reliable than that; my point is, it doesn't have to be perfect to be useful, and doesn't have to meet the standards of perfection required of other flight systems.


To those who will quite reasonably object that a Real Pilot shouldn't need such a gadget: did you know that many skydivers use Automatic Opening Devices, that deploy their parachutes should they fail to by a certain altitude? Of course, any idiot will pull the rip cord before it's too late ... except that sometimes, people don't, hence the AOD.

[BOAC]

Hi, I'd read you: You commence slowing from 180 at D7? - if your 'D' means DME, I think that should be D8?

[Coagie]

In the case of the SFO Asiana crash, the pilot flying either forgot, that he put the engines in idle, when he needed to drop down quickly, to make an approach, and when he realized he was going too slow, instead of thinking, "Wait, let me think ... Oh yeah, I forgot that I turned the engines to idle a few minutes ago, to drop down, since I was too high, so I'll turn them back up", or he thought they automatically came back on, after being turned down, in which case he should have thought "Well my speed is too slow, maybe I was wrong about the throttle going back to automatic, automatically, and need to push them forward myself". Instead he doesn't think. He just continues to go in for an all but dead stick landing, after his speed was siphoned off from coming in low and flat at the end of his approach. I've studied how people think my entire life, and there's two kinds of people. The ones, who actively think most of the time (unless they are very tired), and people who only think when called upon to think. These pilots were the latter. In order for them to think, someone has to ask them a question. Maybe that's the answer for culturally challenged CRM. Instead of the telling the pilot flying to increase thrust, ask him "Are the throttles still at idle?" or for a little less thinking, the more immediate "Do you think we should push the throttles forward?". It's the Socratic method, where the teacher asks the students questions to make them think, and come to their own conclusions, but using it for non-ego-threatening or non-mutinous sounding CRM. Now that I think about it, this should be incorporated in training at risk for culturally challenged CRM crews.

[VinRouge]

Anyone know if the airline in question utilised FQA debrief?

[r747]

I agree with comments by RAT 5 and others concerning training for Visual Approaches.

Most training programs I have seen use the Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern and call it training for a Visual Approach.

While the Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern may be useful for local aircraft training, it has little in common with Visual Approaches used at major airports.

The Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern is a fixed track, starting downwind at pattern altitude. The use of automation and navigation aids is discouraged.


Some Visual Approaches show defined tracks and recommended altitudes, but most do not. The Visual Approach may start at varying distances, altitudes and positions relative to the airport. Automation may be used up to a point, and available navigation aids should be used. The pilot must maneuver and configure the aircraft to achieve the desired track and vertical path.

Training should not only be for operating the aircraft and its systems, but also to prepare the pilot for operations at destination airports.

[costalpilot]

cant believe I went thru the registration process just to make this observation, but I couldn't help myself:

deterioration of flying skills due to computer ascendancy is (imo)a valid and worthwhile concern, but I think it has not as much to do with this crash as a couple of other factors.

the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the instructor/check airman to do his job.

it surely can be anticipated that the pilot who has never flown a 777 into sfo might well screw up the approach. that is why the check airman is there.

He failed. It was his responsibility, not the upgrading line pilot's.

the upgrading line pilot was not certified to make that approach. the instructor was certified to monitor it and intervene if needed. He did not.

i understand that it was the check pilots first check assignment.

The institutional failure was certifying the instructor to do a job he failed at in his first try.

imo,

the airline has a instructor certification problem. this contributed to the crash more than anything else.

[FIRESYSOK]

FQA debriefing?

As in: 'That was an insane wreck. Let's not do that again!'

[Machrihanish]

- if your 'D' means DME, I think that should be D8?
Aw, thanks, yes, remembering the actual station is even farther infield...

So to put my thought to precision: start slowing from 180 at TDZ minus 7 NM, when constraint called for '180 at 5'.

This is what I understand FO Cokebottle wants to do.

[portmanteau]

1. voice speed is not such a problem as you might think. even in this accident I have'nt heard anyone ask for a repeat. once pilots start flying into these high density airports they would get used to it. obviously laymen cant understand what is being said and that is probably frustrating. tip, just keep running the videos one word at a time, you will soon get the message.

2. the voice saying go around was heard in the background to the controllers voice. it suggests to me that "go around" either came into the Tower from United on another frequency ( taxy/groundcontrol?)and was picked up by the controllers mic or even that it came from another controller alongside him watching events unfold . simultaneous transmissions on the SAME frequency cause interference with each other and usually result in nothing understandable being heard by anyone. hence the rapidity of speech, you have to get off the air pronto in order to allow others to speak. controllers are bound to speak faster than pilots because they have a lot more transmissions to make than an individual pilot.

3. stand to be corrected but it seems logical that everyone must be off the aircraft before fire trucks start filling it with foam etc. the running over is a terrible tragedy and ought not to have happened.

[Wizofoz]

In the case of the SFO Asiana crash, the pilot flying either forgot, that he put the engines in idle, when he needed to drop down quickly, to make an approach, and when he realized he was going too slow, instead of thinking, "Wait, let me think ... Oh yeah, I forgot that I turned the engines to idle a few minutes ago, to drop down, since I was too high, so I'll turn them back up", or he thought they automatically came back on, after being turned down, in which case he should have thought "Well my speed is too slow, maybe I was wrong about the throttle going back to automatic, automatically, and need to push them forward myself". Instead he doesn't think. He just continues to go in for an all but dead stick landing, after his speed was siphoned off from coming in low and flat at the end of his approach. I've studied how people think my entire life, and there's two kinds of people. The ones, who actively think most of the time (unless they are very tired), and people who only think when called upon to think. These pilots were the latter. In order for them to think, someone has to ask them a question. Maybe that's the answer for culturally challenged CRM. Instead of the telling the pilot flying to increase thrust, ask him "Are the throttles still at idle?" or for a little less thinking, the more immediate "Do you think we should push the throttles forward?". It's the Socratic method, where the teacher asks the students questions to make them think, and come to their own conclusions, but using it for non-ego-threatening or non-mutinous sounding CRM. Now that I think about it, this should be incorporated in training at risk for culturally challenged CRM crews.

Try and asses the competence of the audience you are posting to before hitting the "Reply" button- do you really think you are contributing anything useful to the hundreds of highly experienced pilots reading and writing here?

[Wizofoz]

coastalpilot,

I think you are being a little to narrow in your analysis.

YES an IP should have detected, called, and ultimately corrected the low-speed situate=ion, but, then so should any competent FO- AND, new to type or not, the LHS pilot was not a cadet- he was an experienced commander changing types, who already held a Type Rating on the Aircraft. Maintaining airspeed on approach would not seem to be an unreasonable expectation.

While you are quick to find an individual to blame, you miss asking an important question- WHY would an IP, even an inexperienced one, not monitor and correct a low airspeed situation?

THAT is where a deeper investigation into attitude, training and culture may reveal problems we can fix.

Simply saying "It was His fault" does nothing to prevent things like this happening again.

[Airbubba]

Suddenly, this voice came up and said:

"Army Ninety Twelve; ya'll follow the United Fluff."

My captain looked at me in some amazement and looked sceptical when I told him to get after the United 737 right-to-left ASAP.


I had a similar experience years ago on an early crossing to the UK talking to London Military (don't know if it even exists as a separate ATC control sector anymore).

The controller asked 'Are you carrying a sick parrot?' :confused:

It was NATO jargon for an inoperative transponder.

[RAT 5]

Some interesting comments on the last 2 pages: please let me ask some questions.

The thought that an SFO visual profile should be a trained manoeuvre: there are many airports where terrain causes them to be a self-briefed or trained airport due to extenuating circumstances. If SFO visuals falls into that category then so be it.
However, my experience of a visual approach is one requested by me. If granted it means I can manoeuvre my a/c as I see fit onto a final approach path to execute a landing with visual references. If it has an ILS it is usually promulgated that the approach will not be flown below the G.S. and sometimes not to establish below XYZ feet. How is it that ATC can determine the 'visual approach' profile?
If they can, and pilots find it demanding, how come it has not been challenged before? How can ATC impose visual approach criteria? It would suggest they are radar vectoring for a difficult energy management visual approach. How has this been allowed to happen AND continue, if it is the case?
I suspect that once the carpet is lifted there will be much to be found has been swept under it over the years.

[galaxy flyer]

Clayne,

WRT to inhibiting FLC, my point was there are relatively simple ways to inhibit FLC that would prevent it being used inappropriately. A safety standard protocol when addressing a hazard is to engineer a fix that eliminates the hazard from causing an accident. We have numerous protections installed in planes presently that don't need to be there, if the plane were flown properly and are very rarely encountered by the pilots.

GF

[flyingchanges]

Geez, how do we ever land at KORD when 210 or greater to the marker is the request of the day routinely?

[costalpilot]

coastalpilot,

I think you are being a little to narrow in your analysis.

YES an IP should have detected, called, and ultimately corrected the low-speed situate=ion, but, then so should any competent FO- AND, new to type or not, the LHS pilot was not a cadet- he was an experienced commander changing types, who already held a Type Rating on the Aircraft. Maintaining airspeed on approach would not seem to be an unreasonable expectation.

While you are quick to find an individual to blame, you miss asking an important question- WHY would an IP, even an inexperienced one, not monitor and correct a low airspeed situation?

THAT is where a deeper investigation into attitude, training and culture may reveal problems we can fix.

Simply saying "It was His fault" does nothing to prevent things like this happening again....................................................... .............



sorry I dont know proper way to quote and respond clearly so I just copied your comment..

as to the possibility that someone else could have also made the same mistakes as the IP, I don't see what that has to do with it. His was the ultimate responsibility, not the PF.

as to the reasons why the IP failed, I agree they are more important than the fact. I alluded to them in my comment about "institutional failure." Maybe I wasn't clear enough. Thanks for pointing it out.

The real failure was the certification of an IP that did not do his job. Its a big job.

Its a certification/training problem since the airline certified the IP to do a job he failed at his first time out.

a big one.

imo all the angst about the deterioration of hand flying skills is obscuring the real failure. I think its absolutely understandable, even predictable, that the PF would have problems with that approach...new airplane, special airport,(with a very unique visual approach procedure and requirements), back of the clock fatique...and so on.



but the company certified a IP who didnt do his job.



that was the problem, imo.

[OK465]

Geez, how do we ever land at KORD when 210 or greater to the marker is the request of the day routinely?

Never heard that at ORD. Have often had 170 to the marker requested.

[tilnextime]

RAT 5

How can ATC impose visual approach criteria? It would suggest they are radar vectoring for a difficult energy management visual approach.

Been a long time since I managed ATC facilities, so my terminology may be a bit imprecise.

ATC is responsible for managing the safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic through a given block of airspace, with specific horizontal and vertical separation requirements. ATC effectively routes you to a given point in space at which the approach is now the pilot's task, be that intercepting a precision instrumented approach fix, a non precision instrumented approach fix, or a visual approach fix. For an instrument approach fix, obviously, you should be at an altitude and speed conducive to flying on your instruments according to the published approach, as the instruments are your only reference until you can take over visually. Since the approach profile has to be able to deliver you, without any visual reference, to DH or MDA in a stable configuration, airspeed and altitude at the point of initiation of the approach is important, so that you have proper control of the aircraft when "breaking out".

The whole concept of a clearance for a visual approach is that you have visual cues to make the approach from the time your are released at the visual approach fix through to touchdown. It is pilot basic skill that is called upon to manage the approach, not instruments. At the risk of sounding impudent, that's why it's called a "visual approach", not an "instrument approach". And yes, for separation and airspace management reasons, you may be expected to work a bit harder on a "visual approach", but it is an approach from which you have visual reference for a considerably greater amount of time and space to execute the maneuver to the touchdown point.

Yes, it's much easier to shoot an approach in VMC using IMC intended automation. But, since, allegedly, all aircrews are capable of flying an aircraft visually, when an airport is VMC and the safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic requires the pilots to use these alleged skills, it is, at least to anyone who has managed airspace (not just operate a single aircraft in airspace) reasonable to expect crews to expend the extra effort they are alleged to be certified to possess. Knowing, however, that some pilots may not be as skilled as others, ATC entertains requests for special handling. Keep in mind the phraseology is "cleared", not "ordered" to make a given approach.

If the regularly issued ATC clearances are over taxing aircrews, then the aircrews should report them as such, no less respond, "Unable". The silence of the pilots is their implicit assent to such approach conditions. If you are waiting for the NTSB to investigate a mishap that proves your position that a given approach, about which the pilots remain formally silent, is over taxing, then your failure to come up on the frequency before the fact could quite well be a contributing factor to any mishap that such an ATC procedure may, at least in your eyes, cause.

[fox niner]

The point is, that in some "culturally challenged CRM situations" it is impossible to admit that someone is "unable" to do a certain approach.

[armchairpilot94116]

San Francisco plane crash's 3rd fatality identified - CBS News (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57593622/3rd-fatality-from-asiana-crash-identified/)

3rd girl who died was a classmate of the two others.

[jugofpropwash]

This is the first definite confirmation that I've seen which states that the girl who was hit by the fire truck was located in front of the wing (relatively near the slide), rather than behind the plane where those who were ejected ended up.

ID emerges of third girl to die of SF plane crash - SFGate (http://www.sfgate.com/news/crime/article/ID-emerges-of-third-girl-to-die-of-SF-plane-crash-4663308.php)

I have to wonder if she came down the slide (perhaps injured) and collapsed/was overcome/passed out. Of course, it's possible someone carried her down the slide.

[tilnextime]

Fox Niner:
The point is, that in some "culturally challenged CRM situations" it is impossible to admit that someone is "unable" to do a certain approach.

By that reasoning, a crew member from any other "culture" should not be bemoaning the visual approach at SFO.

[fox niner]

Tilnextime: sorry, I had to look up "bemoaning", despite my LPE level 6 endorsement. :)
But you are right. And I don't bemoan the visual approach at SFO, or anywhere else for that matter. It is a routine maneuver.
What's next? The canarsie approach under review? Or the short lineups that I get offered regularly at schiphol? Or the turn towards final at Nice in southern France?
Nah. You must be able to do it otherwise you are simply not worth the salary.

[CL-44]

Tilnextime--some very good points about piloting skills needed to execute a visual approach . Pilots of air carrier jets should also have the skills to execute considerably more difficult tasks such as a single engine go around and return for a single engine visual approach.

[framer]

CL-44 Tilnextime--some very good points about piloting skills needed to execute a visual approach . Pilots of air carrier jets should also have the skills to execute considerably more difficult tasks such as a single engine go around and return for a single engine visual approach.

I suspect most do have those skills as both those manoeuvres are practiced regularly in the sim. The visual approach however........

[WynSock]

Tilnexttime,
Thanks for your well-written post. I have been cringing at all the posters trying to suggest that ATC has a responsibility to spoon feed every aircraft in case they aren't up to FLYING the aircraft within reasonable limits on a CAVU day.
If you can't comply, just SAY SO!


Framer,

I suspect most do have those skills as both those manoeuvres are practiced regularly in the sim. The visual approach however........

Perhaps that is why we are starting to see the results of a generation of flight crews with bare minimum EXPERIENCE of flying anything but an FMC transitioning to commands.
I have always thought that a solid exposure to multiple aircraft types, without sophisticated AFCS is of far more value than 10,000 hours of monitoring.

It's all coming home to roost.

[Capt Kremin]

A video of the last portion of the approach has been produced.

Asiana 214 ver 2 - YouTube (http://youtu.be/JhoAfgYhhs0)

If accurate, it seems the the right lateral offset that developed was the reason this aircraft didn't descend into the approach lighting system.

Also, the exemplar aircraft is only programmed to follow the correct glide path, not the correct speed for the approach.

[Machaca]

jugofpropwash: This is the first definite confirmation that I've seen which states that the girl who was hit by the fire truck was located in front of the wing...


That is in no way confirmation, let alone definite.

[ExSp33db1rd]

.............WHY would an IP, even an inexperienced one, not monitor and correct a low airspeed situation?

(Sorry if I'm repeating what has already been stated, I just don't have time to wade back through 2000+ posts.)

As a one-time I.P myself, I can appreciate a situation that is "Supervising" rather than "Instructing". If one instructs, then one tells the student what to do, but in this situation I see it as an experienced pilot who has presumably gone through "instruction" about the B.777 and passed simulator checks, and maybe even other flights, and is now being "supervised", in which case I can also appreciate a need to give the subject enough rope to - not hang himself as in this case - but to recognise and correct his own mistakes, i.e. as the Supevisor not leap in too soon with criticism and condemnation. But in this case of course he left it too late before intervening.

I would sometimes tell my, apparenty experienced, candidates for route supervision, that I wouldn't interfere unless they were going to kill me. Clearly this was a necessity - the interference that is ! - in this case, why it didn't happen is a mystery.

If 'Loss if Face' is considered a factor, surely the I.P. wouldn't have 'lost face', the student would, and why not if he is about to kill everybody ?

I've picked up from a previous post a suggestion that the handling pilot might have had a 'mind-set' that stationary throttles with A/T engaged was OK, because he was recently from the Airbus, and so thinking that the A/T was engaged, as has been reported, stationary throttles on the Boeing that he was now flying might not have alerted him - maybe - but that again begs the question of what the I.P. was thinking ?

Not excusing, just saying.

[clayne]

If 'Loss if Face' is considered a factor, surely the I.P. wouldn't have 'lost face', the student would, and why not if he is about to kill everybody ?

Just wanted to add a note about the subtleties of face within these cultures. It's not always about you or I admitting fault and hence losing face - in a lot of cases it's frowned upon to point out fault in others because *they* lose face. Literally, admonishment of the type that can embarrass others is frowned upon - it's mostly delivered in a way that gives the other party a "chance" to correct something while at the same time not pinpointing their fault. Lots of heavy contextual cueing and reading between lines involved.

Now would the instructing pilot take it to this level when it's a matter of life and death? I sure as heck hope not. Even if he gave the PF plenty of hints to correct something, sooner or later survival reaction should kick in (and hopefully not 7 seconds before impact).

[Rananim]

Lots of political correctness going on here.We need to cut the bs.This was a crew training error.They had not been trained to fly the plane.Forget stabilized approach criteria,SFO ATC,long flight,no electronic guidance,FLCH trap etc etc.The crew were not properly trained.Such a basic error(failure to monitor your flight instruments) can only be explained by incorrect training.All this malarkey about the pilot expecting the AT to have alpha floor and take care of it for him is just like saying the THY crashed at AMS because of a faulty radalt.They crashed because they couldnt fly the plane.Tough I know.But you have to be.Lives are at stake.The NTSB have the chance now to call it for what it is.Not pilot error but rather an endemic problem that is rooted in incorrect training,political correctness and automation reliance.This should be their probable cause.The problem is worldwide but worst in Asia(recruitment cant catch up with economic growth rate plus the unique culture).
Mandate the following:
a)Call a worldwide conference to address issue with Qantas and SWA taking the lead.They are both persistent in rejecting rote push-button ops and should be heralded as beacons of hope to turn the industry around.
b)Identify the weak spots and clean out those airline training establishments .Change of personnel from CP down.Reject political correctness(ie.no visual approaches,fly the 15 mile procedure turn and burn more fuel,we want our pilots to use the automation OR we cant fly manually it puts too much stress on PM OR the pilots are running scared of the QAR)at all costs.
c)Back to basics for new hires.De-emphasize automation,paperwork,SOP,FCOM whilst maintaining a min standard.Instead focus on FLYING.Does the pilot know target pitch and thrust N1 for all flight phases rather than FCOM/SOP theory.This is the way it was.Mandate 3 manual approaches a week policy,more if needed.No AP,No AT,No FD,nothing.Just you and the stick and your hand firmly on the thrust levers,your feet guarding the rudders(not planted on the floor),and YOUR FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS.FLY THE PLANE.AFter 3 months when the guy has it mastered,introduce the superfluous items like SOP,FCOM,paperwork.But instill in that recruit from day 1 that he/she has a lifelong duty to maintain basic flying skills.

Lets never ever have pilots hiding behind automation again.Its a tool,nothing more.

[costalpilot]

i agree with rananim absolutely as to the cause.

the ip failed.

the airlines training department failed because they put him there.

find out how and why and make changes.

[techgeek]

FQA is an acronym for ... ?

[mangere1957]

techgeek

"FQA is an acronym for ... ?"

My WAG; Flight Quality Assessment.

Edited to add the missing h from flight.

[Desert185]

Nitpicker said:

"I do like the idea of a Shallow Boat style ramp instead of a rock wall... Not as silly as it sounds..."

I like the idea of a professional pilot who can fly a visual approach to an 11,000' runway on a CAVU day with light winds and the automation off or failed. I don't really think that is too much to ask for at this level in the aviation food chain.

[Desert185]

ExSp33db1rd said:

"I've picked up from a previous post a suggestion that the handling pilot might have had a 'mind-set' that stationary throttles with A/T engaged was OK, because he was recently from the Airbus, and so thinking that the A/T was engaged, as has been reported, stationary throttles on the Boeing that he was now flying might not have alerted him - maybe - but that again begs the question of what the I.P. was thinking ?"

Regardless of aircraft system intricacies, airspeed is performance and throttles are control. Dependency on control without referencing performance is beyond poor technique. Three "pilots" and no one is noticing airspeed trending lower?

Three dead. Many more with lifetime consequences of the their injuries. Hull loss. This isn't Sunday afternoon flying a club spam can for a burger. Someone needs to lose their jobs.

I remember an in-house audit done on Korean Air in 1998 that more than likely outlines many contributing issues related to what will be probable cause for Asiana at SFO. Maybe three deaths will be sufficient body count by bureaucratic standards to resolve the apparent issues involved. I hope so.

[twotigers]

All this is nonsense.

FLCH and A/T..

NO ONE was looking at the screen. If they had been they wouldn't have let the speed drop A/T or not.

Period.

End of story.

Even if the A/T is in on the Airbus (330 in my case) it still can't hold the speed sometimes. One needs to scan.

These guys couldn't or land or do anything.. f*cking criminal.

[Tscottme]

Legacy driver wrote:
Hence, I predict that the call will go out from the airlines for ILS to be active on every major airport, because that externalises the risk onto the airport operators. It also means that the costs are borne by someone else, and the airlines' profits (and so boards' bonuses) are safe.

I predict this will happen regardless of the outcome of the crash inquiry. The question is, what are you, as professional pilots, going to do about this to ensure that you and I are *properly* safe? Shortened: "Hey let's YOU and them fight for me."
Professional pilots have been complaining about the airline's over-reliance on automation to increase efficiency and shorten training times for a long time. Please make specific suggestions as to what pilots should do even as airlines are choosing not to listen? You want them to sacrifice a career because pilots in other airlines and other countries are not taking their responsibility seriously enough?

It's very easy to expect someone else to fall on a sword meanwhile passengers flock to airlines that sell a seat for $3 less than another.

[Coagie]

Sorry, you're right. If I'd been more careful, I wouldn't haven't truncated the last line, which was: "Just venting. I know I'm preaching to the choir." Anyway, maybe culturally challenged Korean pilots are, hopefully, on this forum now and could use things spelled out!

[220mph]

For someone who wasn't there, you sound awfully high and mighty. There was a massive debris field where that girl was lying - likely including lots of clothing and such that would do a nice job of camouflaging a young girl lying amidst the debris. Especially since airport fire fighting vehicles are designed to contain the fire-fighters within a (relatively) safe interior compartment. These aren't the fire trucks that drive down the street with guys hanging off the side.

I'm sorry - but this claim and others like it are simply not true - there was virtually NO debris in the place where the girl was run over. There was nothing to "camouflage" anything at that spot, and there is NO indication there was anyone, let alone a young girl, "lying" there. To the contrary there are several hi-rez photos showing passengers in that exact area.

Photo 1 (http://media.npr.org/assets/img/2013/07/11/214passengers2way_wide-0721a22dd2cafa3056c26f2f379fbd4197e97315.jpg)
Photo 2 (http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2013/07/09/business/09road/09road-superJumbo.jpg)
Photo 3 (http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/infocus/asiana071113/a02_RTX11J65.jpg)

These are in relatively chronological order (track individual people such as blue and white shirt). The first fire trucks had already arrived at front right side of aircraft. The next trucks per video arrived withing 20 seconds or less.

You can see the large number of people in the area to left of aircraft - exiting the slides. They show no signs or evidence that they see someone was down and hurt in the seconds between starting evacuation and when fire trucks arrived on that side of aircraft. And there are people in nearly the exact spot. Photo 3 in fact shows a backpack or bag on the ground that looks much like the one seen under the tarp, with a woman standing next to it.

There was also no fire on the left side of the aircraft at all, and initially only a beginning fire on the other side.

The video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=WczPnDDipKw)in post 1955, couple with the hi-rez photos, provide an excellent picture of what was occurring.

Addtl hi-rez photos provide more evidence:

This Photo "A" (http://bostonherald.com/sites/default/files/media/2013/07/06/APTOPIX%20San%20Francisco%20.13.jpg) appears to provide direct evidence. WARNING - appears this may be graphic at hi-resolution.

First - it provides evidence of the amount of fire vehicle travel in the area of the left side near the slides and how close that travel was.

Second, there is no backpack or luggage near tarp, as in later shots - however a pile of luggage appears to be next to red fire truck - with a single, what appears to be black/gray backpack, in front of red firetruck. This looks very similar to bag that appears next to tarp later.

Third - tire tracks show pulling up very close to aircraft and slide - considerably closer than yellow truck # 9 - and then backing out again.

Fourth - it shows the tarp lying directly over (within the footprint of) both sets (driving in, and backing out) of the tire tracks of the left side of the truck.

Last - sadly, and again a warning - a hi-resolution enlarged view of the tarp area appears to confirm the speculation - that this is the young woman who perished.

A slightly different (Photo "B") (http://ww2.hdnux.com/photos/22/56/50/4909577/3/rawImage.jpg)view of above photo "A" - note, no luggage/backpack next to tarp. And one more (Photo "C") (http://ww3.hdnux.com/photos/22/52/14/4891446/3/rawImage.jpg) different view yet.

Here is a subsequent view:(Photo "D") (http://jto.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/wn20130708a1a.jpg) ... red firetrucks are gone - note the tarp has been pulled towards the right side wheel tracks of the fire truck, and the luggage/backpack now next to the tarp (possibly holding it in place. The reason why the tarp has been pulled toward right side wheel tracks seems apparent from a zoom of Photo "A".

Another couple views of Photo "D" area. Photo "E" (http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories/plane-1_070713065754.jpg) and Photo "F" (http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2013/07/07/us/07plane_3/07plane_3-superJumbo.jpg) ... note Photo "F" well shows the large amount of movement by fire trucks around the aircraft, particularly in the left side PAX evac area ... there are numerous wheel tracks directly in the area passengers were attempting to evacuate and get away from the aircraft in.

The Youtube Video shows at appx the 3:05 mark, a fire truck moving around the nose towards left side of the aircraft. You can clearly see passengers scrambling both directions to get out of the way, followed by a puff of black exhaust from the truck. At appx 3:22 two more fire trucks enter frame at high rate of speed.

One of those - on the left side of aircraft, and the one coming around the nose, through the evac'ing PAX, proceed to rear of aircraft. The outside one turns around and heads back towards the front - stopping in front of the slides. Several responders who seem to have come on foot are seen running up slides into the aircraft.

At appx 6:10 the truck sitting by left side moves off towards nose, as the first of large group of ambulances and police respond to scene.

Appx 7:12 the fire truck turns around again and makes its way back toward left wing area. At appx 7:59 this truck begins spraying foam under the left wing area. This is the first foam applied to this side of the aircraft since the crash. It appears they only spray a single spot - the wing pylon area. Some goes over top of wing, but they immed reduce pressure to get back under the wing.

This truck remains stationary, intermittently spraying small shots of foam, until appx 10:32, when it starts moving forward and turns to right - making large circle to right and coming around to point at aircraft from a further distance. At appx 11:18 it again sprays same wing area.

The first video ends at this point. At that time it had appeared the fire on right side is largely out (just a little white smoke sporadically), people are still going in and out of the aircraft, and there is no evidence of fire inside or in roof.

As this second video opens - its apparent at least a few minutes have passed - the fire has reignited the aircraft is largely engulfed in smoke. It would appear that while the exterior fire was controlled it seems the composite hull had caught fire and burned thru the roof.

The same truck we left off with on left side at end of first video is still in position on left side after having circled right in a 360 turn.

Before the 360 degree turn it cannot have been as close to the aircraft as in Photo "D" - as it was able to make a right turn while missing the wing.

It appears the truck had moved closer in the cut between videos - pulling straight ahead towards the aircraft.

This truck was the FIRST foam applied on the left side of the aircraft - both before its 360 degree turn and after. During the initial foam application they should have had an excellent view - before any foam was applied in the area - of the location the girl was found. She would have been less than fire truck length almost straight ahead it would appear.

At appx 5:40 in 2nd video the left side truck backed away and shortly after the opposing side truck did the same, and drove off, presumably empty of foam?

It seems likely it was during this period of pulling ahead and backing out that the girl was run over.

At appx 8:01 a fire truck lined up at rear and began foaming along the length of fuselage. At about 8:40 another fire truck, from right side of aircraft, leaves - again presumably empty.

At appx 8:58 - more than 20 minutes after the crash - emergency vehicles are responding at speed to the tail section area. Survivors reported after evacuating and moving away from the aircraft they found the ejected crew near the tail section some 2000' away. They apparently had to call (http://www.sfgate.com/news/crime/article/ID-emerges-of-third-girl-to-die-of-SF-plane-crash-4663308.php) the Hwy Patrol as no help had arrived even that long after the crash!

At appx 9:40 a airport fire truck appears to have arrived back on left side of aircraft, and was again pumping foam.

At appx 10:30 local fire department is seen arriving (red trucks).

The left side truck was spraying the SIDE of the fuselage between the two forward doors. At appx 10:39 there was a small explosion at the rear forward section door as it was sprayed with foam.

The video continues but it bounces around and is not continuously focused on fuselage offering little further value.

It would seem photos 1, 2 and 3 show it highly unlikely someone was injured and lying in that spot. Way too many people passed by - someone would have stopped and helped. These were shot appx 4 minutes after impact - before all but first two fire trucks (stationed on right side near nose) arrived.

We can speculate she must have been one of the later/last people out as fire and smoke were becoming an issue.

We can see the same truck (appx 7:12 in 1st video) to first apply foam (appx 7:59) made a large 360 degree turn to come back around and be in position to apply foam a second time (appx 11:18). This truck appeared to move closer to fuselage between 11:18 when 1st video ends - and I'm guessing a minute or two later when 2nd video begins( assuming they had to change card). At appx 5:40 in 2nd video this same truck backs away apparently empty.

This truck had good view before any foam applied, was 1st to apply foam, nd continued to apply from same spot. This is pretty clearly NOT truck #9 seen next to wing in later photos "A-F" linked above (unless it had moved position from earlier).


Other notes

1. A quote (http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Girl-in-SF-plane-crash-fire-truck-probe-is-IDd-4655927.php)from the SFGate.com site:

"Ye's body was found near the front of the jet's left wing. Wang's was found near the seawall that the jumbo jet struck as it landed short of the runway."

2. And to Machacha-post 2010 - claiming the pic is not proof - here is the story link (http://bigstory.ap.org/article/third-chinese-girl-dies-injuries-sf-crash) for the picture in post 1981 above conforming the tarp was covering the girls body.

3. A side note ... the fire crews appeared entirely unable to fight the fire in the fuselage. Only one used its boom. The others seemed on able to shoot foam over the top with almost no effect.

4. Also - unless there was some other flammable material in the top of the fuselage amidships - where the fire flared up considerably about 5 minutes into the 2nd video - it would appear that composite fuselages flammability might be a concern.

[PaperTiger]

That is in no way confirmation, let alone definite.It seems a reasonable conclusion that the yellow tarp is covering a body. In the earlier photo there is something in the grass in the same position. This is before any foam was laid and, as someone noted elsewhere, the alleged tracks are already present but there is no vehicle to be seen.

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/07/09/article-2358736-1AB2240E000005DC-25_964x676.jpg

In later photos a lone fireman is positioned guarding the tarp.

[junebug172]

I read a lot of posts about how dangerous it is to fly the visual 28L into SFO. I am thus surprised that 99.9% of the time, things go well.

Oh please. There's nothing dangerous about this approach. Not even a little bit.

Man, the drama is laughable.

[Diesel8]

Nothing hard about going into SFO.

I hope there are mitigating circumstances in this accident, certainly don't hope it was simple pilot error as it sadly looks like.

[ross_M]

Would a requirement to have flying "by hand" time in cheaper trainer aircraft help any? Just curious.

Reading the past posts, one summary could be:

1. Safety etc. is pushing airlines to minimize non-automation flying time. (especially landings etc.) during line flights

2. Simulator time is either not enough, or not useful enough.

3. Many pilots are reporting a worrying lack of seat-of-pants flying time or general manual flying skills.

4. Having training time in non-revenue "big" aircraft is expensive.

Would regular, scheduled flying hours on smaller craft (jet / non jet) help any? Something like a set number of non-sim trainer flight hours every month. With or without a FI in the next seat.

Just wondering if such non-type hours would help any or be too different to make any difference. Would regular (company funded) practice on light craft be of any use?

[junebug172]

1. Safety etc. is pushing airlines to minimize non-automation flying time. (especially landings etc.) during line flights

More like liability issues. We're only allowed day VFR to fly the aircraft with no automation.

2. Simulator time is either not enough, or not useful enough.

Not enough. Even less with AQP. Its all about saving money.

3. Many pilots are reporting a worrying lack of seat-of-pants flying time or general manual flying skills.

International guys might be. I get enough flying domestically.

4. Having training time in non-revenue "big" aircraft is expensive.

Very. Fuel isn't cheap any more.

Would regular, scheduled flying hours on smaller craft (jet / non jet) help any? Something like a set number of non-sim trainer flight hours every month. With or without a FI in the next seat.

LMAO! Like I said, we can't even get extra sim time.

Just wondering if such non-type hours would help any or be too different to make any difference. Would regular (company funded) practice on light craft be of any use?

See above.

[ross_M]

LMAO! Like I said, we can't even get extra sim time.


My unsaid assumption was trainer craft time being cheaper than sim time.

Not true? I don't know.

[junebug172]

Have you seen the price of oil lately?

And no airline is going to pay for any more training than they have to.

[tilnextime]

3. Many pilots are reporting a worrying lack of seat-of-pants flying time or general manual flying skills.

International guys might be. I get enough flying domestically.

Then perhaps, if the airline has the route structure, "long haul" crew members should be given short haul assignments on a regular and continuing basis? 2 months long, one month short?

And before a debate on the complexities of such an approach (pun intended) begins, if the skill in visual approaches is perishable, but necessary, then a bit of effort overcoming "complexity" might be worthwhile. Otherwise, it's an exercise in "you can't get there from here", which solves nothing.

In an occupational field where high flying hours is regularly touted as a badge of high skill and experience, isn't it a bit embarrassing to admit that the long haul folks, usually very high hour crew, have the least recent and refreshed skill in a very basic maneuver that is a requirement for even a Sport Pilot License - a visual approach?