Asiana flight crash at San Francisco [Archive] - Page 4

clayne

8th Jul 2013, 08:44

Machines are not infallible. They sometimes behave in unexpected ways or fail, either partially or completely. Personally I keep my hand on the thrust levers until the flaps are up after take-off & on approach from the first flap selection, regardless of whether or not the autopilot and/or the autothrottle is engaged. I also have my hand on the thrust levers when I anticipate a major thrust change in flight e.g. enroute level change or top of descent. If the thrust levers don't move to where I expect them to be, I put them there. If the autothrottle fights me, I disengage it until I have time to sort the issue out.

This.

There are so many excuses being continually made around lack of G/S, automation traps, etc. as being "contributing" factors. As another poster mentioned some pages back - all they are are factors. At the end of the day, pilots should continuously be in a feedback loop of "trust but verify." This goes for both what the PF or PNF are doing *and* what the automation is doing.

Cultural issues combined with a new generation of magenta pilots completely dependent on automation is what some of the more experienced people have been hammering on as basic points contributing to a decline in aviation safety *when things aren't perfect*. Even when they are perfect, "the auto-pilot/auto-throttle did it!" are never valid excuses.

These points are not ignorable and neither is the lack of a go around much earlier.

I find it weird how the "new(er) generation" flight crews have got the basic flying skills so poorly learned and/or miserably handled at times.

Nothing weird about it (although I know you already know this). Talk to the bean-counters/corporate overlords who are hell-bent on turning pilots into human robots. The worst part is the punitive attitude taken towards pilots who *do* think outside the box combined with the policy-based reduction in hand-flying which could save people's lives someday. I doubt we'll be seeing many more Dennis Fitch types if things continue down the road they're on.

Back at NH

8th Jul 2013, 08:45

Oddly enough my guess is from everything I have read about what was just apparently a poorly executed approach and landing, is that it would have been LESS likely to happen in IFR conditions! The crew was likely much more lax in accessing and correcting for an unstabilized approach while visually flying it than had they been flying it on instruments.

I find it weird how the "new(er) generation" flight crews have got the basic flying skills so poorly learned and/or miserably handled at times.

Surely they were in IFR conditions, just not in IMC??

bnt

8th Jul 2013, 08:49

Someone earlier linked to this story (http://news.yahoo.com/asiana-says-pilot-crashed-plane-training-010133596.html), which points out the following:
"It was Lee Kang-kook's maiden flight to the airport with the jet... He was in training. Even a veteran gets training (for a new jet)," a spokeswoman for Asiana Airlines said on Monday.
...
"(Lee Kang-kook) has a lot of experience and previously flown to San Francisco on different planes including the B747... and he was assisted by another pilot who has more experience with the 777," the spokeswoman said.
So I'm less inclined to blame a lack of type experience, not when the same pilot has significant B747 experience.

david1300

8th Jul 2013, 08:51

What a load of rubbish.
Framer:ok:, this applies to probably 80%+ of the comments here (although I am quoting you out of context, slightly).

Oh that people with nothing to add STFU:oh:, and took the time and courtesy to read the whole thread, thereby not asking questions that have already been answered; and didn't make pointless comments like speculating on similarities to BA, Lion Air, yadda yadda.

It's so abvious that there are so many real numpties posting here these days - I really miss the days of yore when there were intelligent exchanges between knowledgable people :ugh::ugh:

nitpicker330

8th Jul 2013, 08:52

He must have been under line training with a senior training Captain in the right seat?
If so then the training Captain in the right seat should not have let this develop.

If it wasn't a training flight then likewise the FO in the right seat should have spoken up and not let this develop

What the hell were the 2 relief guys in the jump seats doing?? Reading the paper??:D

nolimitholdem

8th Jul 2013, 08:55

413X3,

As a matter of fact, after the Colgan crash, the "culture" that produced the pilots involved was very much examined and discussed. As were the human factors that led to Tenerife. They VERY much admitted there were cultural problems within KLM, that accident kicked off what we now study as CRM and Human Factors. No one mentioned skin colour, you're the one doing so.

The Korean accident record is what it is, writing off 16 hulls and killing over 700 people before steps were taken to try and improve things after 1999. Sorry if facts offend you.

But most accidents have numerous things that contribute to them. In this accident I think it's safe to say weather wasn't a contributing factor. By all preliminary accounts the a/c was operating perfectly (still to be positively verified). What does that leave? Human factors. To suggest that how one makes decisions, interacts with others, isn't to some degree affected by one's cultural background, is dangerously naive. It's got nothing to do with race, quit muddying the waters.

NigelOnDraft

8th Jul 2013, 08:57

Is there a case for standardised displaced thresholds at destinations where there are no safe undershoot options, or where there are difficulties assessing height visualy ( over water)? In this instance, if the aircraft had been 2-3 feet lower, most of passengers would have been lost.

The worst case scenario has (almost) happened. I believe the lack of ILS G/S, and PAPIs being U/S earlier (but not at the accident date) is becuase SFO are moving the thresholds to give more "undershoot".

You can only do so much however, before someone ends up off the other end (maybe not SFO but somewhere shorter?) and we say "why the inset threshold" :{

MaxReheat

8th Jul 2013, 08:58

'Personally I keep my hand on the thrust levers until the flaps are up after take-off & on approach from the first flap selection, regardless of whether or not the autopilot and/or the autothrottle is engaged. I also have my hand on the thrust levers when I anticipate a major thrust change in flight e.g. enroute level change or top of descent. If the thrust levers don't move to where I expect them to be, I put them there. If the autothrottle fights me, I disengage it until I have time to sort the issue out.'

That's something termed 'airmanship' that used to be part and parcel of learning the trade but is sadly lacking in today's world of young crew who are being trained by a slightly older generation of trainers who also never took 'airmanship' on board. It really does come down to training and training standards.

Oakape

8th Jul 2013, 09:01

Even though I have seen it manifested on the line a number of times & recent accident history points to it, I am still amazed by some of what I am reading here.

Airspeed is a primary flight instrument. Those who don't monitor it when the autothrottle is engaged are only half flying the aircraft, having given control of a critical aspect of flight to the whim of the automatic flight control system. A system that has become so complex on jet transport aircraft that few understand it completely, regardless of type. Those who think this is acceptable are either inadequately trained or lazy, or both.

Machines are not infallible. They sometimes behave in unexpected ways or fail, either partially or completely. Personally I keep my hand on the thrust levers until the flaps are up after take-off & on approach from the first flap selection, regardless of whether or not the autopilot and/or the autothrottle is engaged. I also have my hand on the thrust levers when I anticipate a major thrust change in flight e.g. enroute level change or top of descent. If the thrust levers don't move to where I expect them to be, I put them there. If the autothrottle fights me, I disengage it until I have time to sort the issue out.

Jet transport aviation is a complex & serious business. Too many do not treat it with the seriousness that it demands.

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 09:06

So you see no RELEVANT similarities to Lion DPS, perhaps because DPS was a Reef as opposed to a sea wall? Perhaps you might look a little more at the details of DPS? I would be happy to revert after both investigations are complete but I think you might regret that comment. I believe that there ARE substantial similarities between these two events, especially in view of emerging SFO PIC information, also seemingly analogous to DPS. I also continue to believe that CRM remains an enormous issue with Asian Lines as a result of deeply ingrained cultural biases. AT LEAST that. The automation issues notwithstanding. I would be happy to receive your reasoned response to reject such.

In the meantime, what makes you so omnipotent to accuse other experienced posters of being Muppets? Especially when you can't even beat The Lions at home?

chip22

8th Jul 2013, 09:09

Even without a PAPI (and it was not the case) you can assess if you are on a correct glide path! I am expecting that for a 9000 hours pilot!

I would like to point out that 1 hour 9000 times does not equal 9000 hours experience. Pretty sad and pretty tyipcal nowdays....

fsfaludi

8th Jul 2013, 09:39

Bueno Hombre

8th Jul 2013, 09:40

To Nigel, post 789:
Nigel. this thing visual and also last stage runway switches , though the latter not now implicated in this case, has been going on for more than a decade at SFO.
I don't believe SFO is unable because of either practical or financial reasons , to install ILS, means to say localizer plus glideslope on all runways. Is this a noise problem or problem with the height of the San Mateo bridge?
Modern international airports have complete (means to say localizer plus glideslope) ILS landing transmitters installed for all runways that might be expected to be used.
Automatics, in the hard light of experience, have been proven to be safer.
USA dealing, as they are lbs, us gallons, degrees fahrenheit , might be seen to be backward by some of those with a more global perspective.
Separate the men from the boys, true pilots from systems operators?
Look what happen. Was that the intention?

deptrai

8th Jul 2013, 10:01

Judging by the outcome and what we know so far, cabin crew must have been doing a good job. According to the SF fire chief, the evacuation was "orderly". People were helping each other. Slides were deployed before the fire started. I'm not an armchair investigator, but it think it's safe to say that solid engineering - the 777 took a lot of punishment - and a successful evacuation saved roughly 300 lives.

ayroplain

8th Jul 2013, 10:07

The one thing that worries me about commercial aircraft accidents in recent years is the (apparent) neglect of the crew to scan their instruments on approach to land. From the first day that you climb into a C150 for training that is drummed into you. If there was only one pilot in the flight deck you could (almost) forgive such a lapse but when you have two (and in some incident flights at least three) and not one of them notices that the airspeed is not what it should be in what is probably the most important phase of any flight it makes your eyes water. Humans make mistakes but not usually all at the same time. Stall warnings and stick shakers, etc., are in place as a last resort but no professional pilots should ever reach a stage where they are required because airspeed is such a basic rule of flying any aircraft let alone a large commercial transport. And, if someone in the flight deck is undergoing training, wouldn't you, as the monitoring crew, be even more vigilant. You have to ask the question, "what else were they thinking about?" during the landing that it took precedence over a vital component.

Non Zero

8th Jul 2013, 10:09

What speed did he have with a strange AoA like that?

Well ... very low ... but looking at the different prospective

777-200 Tail Strike Pitch Attitude is approximately 12.1 degrees
777-200 (assuming 330 KLBS landing weight and sea-level) VREF 30+10 is 147 KIAS with a Final Approach Pitch Attitude of appraximately 0.0 to 1.0 degrees

For what we have seen the tail landed first so the airplane pitch attitude was more then 12.1 degrees ... more than 10 degrees difference from a normal landing attitude ...

chksix

8th Jul 2013, 10:17

A Captain is a Captain, whether in training or not, as a lowly FO you still don't tell him what to do or you'll be demoted off the airline.

This is what I gather from this thread. That hierarchical thinking is what put a lot of ships on land in my profession. :=

crewmeal

8th Jul 2013, 10:17

Sky sources saying that 2 Captains were flying the aircraft. The chief Exec saying if it is pilot error then the Captain with more experience (we presume a training Captain) will have to "shoulder some of the blame".

I'm at a loss to see how an approach like this could be screwed up so badly at the last minute.

Auto Backup

8th Jul 2013, 10:19

While accepting Polysilane's point about the unacceptability of the pax walking away from the crash with hand baggage how on earth does he/she think the cabin crew could have stopped this - taking bags away from pax at the door would created (literally) an insurmountable problem for pax following behind - better just to let them take the bags - if only to get them out of the way!

Quite frankly (after 34 years as a professional pilot - B744 Captain at the end) if I were a passenger and had the opportunity to get all my important documents off I would do the same as well - similarly I would do (and have done) in both an earthquake and two hotel fires in the past.

The pain of trying to reconstruct your life in a foreign country if all your documention is gone doesn't bear thinking about - unless it is absolutely unavoidable!!

jayteeto

8th Jul 2013, 10:23

Autobackup, naughty naughty....... but totally agreed. Logic will disappear in stressful situations for pax. Just get them off asap

Kerosene Kraut

8th Jul 2013, 10:31

Take carry on with you down the chute?
Just having everybody opening the bins to sort/search/grab their stuff might take too long for a timely evacuation of all the pax.

yssy.ymel

8th Jul 2013, 10:36

"Sorry but you don't screw up any approach at the last minute ..."

What's the tag line to "Air Crash Investigations"? An accident is the sum total of a number of factors that produce the results that we see.

In that vein, what are the current "facts"? I don't think it needs a brain surgeon to work it out.

The "Why" is the domain of the accident investigators, and from the news conference today it's not particularly difficult to work out where they are going.

The "Why of Why's" will be of particular interest - that deals with the CRM and why an aircraft in a badly stabilised approach was permitted to land by a crew who should have known better. That may be a cultural reason, and it's to be honest not unexpected given history.

I'd suggest that until that time, discussions around passenger dis-embarcation be moved somewhere else to be completely honest. Moderators?

Just my 0.001c

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 10:36

1. Hope you didn't get "Bailed-IN" in Cyprus.

2. Agreed, especially given the present day "Generosity" of Lines and Insurance Companies plus the difficulty these days of replacing Passports, Credit Cards etc., I would for sure bring my small briefcase with me. It's always under my feet in all classes when not flying up front.

3. The problem would arise when, as I'm sure happens, passengers want to bring the 20Kg Wheelie in the O/H bins with them as well. But that's their choice, given the need to get off fast.

Tallman

8th Jul 2013, 10:38

FERetd post 799:

You obviously are shooting from the hip and branding all those who disagree with you a liberal lot.

There may or may not be cultural aspects in play. However we do not know yet whether it was in play in this PARTICULAR case, just as we don't know if there were mechanical, weather or other issues in play.

So to start harping on about cultural deficiencies is called generalisation which can be construed as racist commentary. Purely by definition and nothing to do with one's political persuasion. Of course you continue to classify yourself with a generalisation as well (being white, male etc.). If I carried on in your vein I'd probably mention something about the age in which you grew up as being a factor in your oratory behaviour but how would I know :rolleyes:

hifly787

8th Jul 2013, 10:41

why cant they fly visual approaches . because they they haven't been taught by the great aviators that you are . don't tell me you're sim profile doesn't have raw data and visual flying and approaches

BOAC

8th Jul 2013, 10:44

An added possible complication in the cockpit gradient could be the seniority of the 'trainee' Captain v the 'training'. All MAY become clear through the investigation.

ventus45

8th Jul 2013, 10:46

AIAA 2000-4221
COMPUTATION OF VISCOUS FLOW FOR A BOEING 777 AIRCRAFT IN LANDING CONFIGURATION
http://people.nas.nasa.gov/~rogers/publications/aiaa2000-4221.pdf

DavidHoul52

8th Jul 2013, 10:51

Tallman - Spot on. Might not the culture of national and racial stereotyping not also be a human factor?

The Big E

8th Jul 2013, 10:55

Jet transport aviation is a complex & serious business. Too many do not
treat it with the seriousness that it demands.

Well said Oakape :ok:. The accidents which occur speak volumes in terms of lack of ability, airmanship, and competence.

PT6

8th Jul 2013, 10:57

I totally agree with John_Smith on this. If they implemented their stable approach policy(and they must have one as they are an IOSA Registered Operator) this would not have happened. They breached their own company Ops Manual procedures it seems.

Such policies are put in place to prevent this kind of accident.

This puts Asiana in a poor light in front of its stakeholders. I wonder what the insurance ramifications will be if they are found to be in breach of company procedures?

Auto Backup

8th Jul 2013, 11:05

Kerosine Kraut please join the real world!

The operating crew can tell passengers anything they like during the Safety Briefing but since the pax don't actually work for the airline concerned they will do EXACTLY what they want in any given situation - whether sensible (legal?) to your understanding or not - herd instinct simply takes over - particularly if there are a large number of non-English speaking passengers on board who may simply have not comprehended the safety briefing!

The safety briefing given before every flight is, in reality, only a set of guideline requests that, as I suspect you are well aware, a great number of passengers simply ignore while reading their paper/book/magazine.

Realistically they simply cannot be enforced - especially in a stressful or emergency situation affecting a large number of people - after all who is going to stop, discipline or sue Mr/Mrs Nameless x 250 if they decide to to take all or part of their hand luggage with them during an emergency evacuation?

When a Captain on a B767 in the early '90s I had to order an emergency evacuation at an airport in the Middle East after experiencing a severe undercarriage problem during take-off after we had burnt off a considerable anount of fuel and re-landed with one inflated operational tyre which then hugely overheated. About 45% of the passengers overall took their hand luggage with them (observably about 95% plus of the women pax took their personal handbags) and about 70% of women pax wearing high heels refused pointblank to remove them in the end the cabin crew simply gave up and concentrated on getting everyone out ASAP.

The evacuations procedures are all OK in theory in the simulator, aircraft mockup or classroom but, in my admittedly limited experience, simply didn't work in a real emergency when the cabin crew were faced with 200+ pax all of whom are in a panic all trying to fight their way out of the aircraft as quickly as possible.

Kerosene Kraut

8th Jul 2013, 11:10

So maybe we need to rethink the evacuation time limits then? 90 Seconds through half the doors with cabin luggage?

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 11:15

You are just not being realistic. Policy is one thing, The reaction of human beings is entirely another, especially when there is no penalty involved and in particular in a life threatening situation. In such a situation, people do what they will do. The smarter ones, as always, tend to push the envelope. I would.

Centaurus

8th Jul 2013, 11:15

Machines are not infallible. They sometimes behave in unexpected ways or fail,

Reminds me of a conversation I had with a Boeing instructor pilot with regards to the design philosophy of the Boeing 787. He said the 787 was designed on the basis it will be flown by incompetent pilots. Thus the sophisticated computer systems will do their best not to allow the pilot to crash. With huge orders for the 787 coming out of the Asian region you can see his point.

crewmeal

8th Jul 2013, 11:18

About 45% of the passengers overall took their hand luggage with them (observably about 95% plus of the women pax took their personal handbags) and about 70% of women pax wearing high heels refused pointblank to remove them in the end the cabin crew simply gave up and concentrated on getting everyone out ASAP.

These days I'm sure pax will stuff ipads down their trousers/bras first then evacuate. :=

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 11:18

Aussie, Aussie, Aussie!!!!

Sad. And Pathetic. You seem to suggest that Aussie Pilots are so superior to all others, especially Asians? Sheesh........

I think that the more relevant point is that ALL training procedures these days teach the use of automation and NOT how to, first, FTFP???

Auto Backup

8th Jul 2013, 11:19

Kerosine Kraut

Aircraft Evacuation Certification tests are all carried out by the manufacturer using 'semi-trained' staff who usually have had several trial runs, know which door they are assigned to exit from and, quite frankly in the event of a genuine catastrophic situation bear very little resemblence to the real world confusion of a genuine emergency evacuation!

Kerosene Kraut

8th Jul 2013, 11:22

They even put test luggage in the aisles to block easy egress.
So let's give them carry on too to jump out.
My point is: If this is the real world we'd better get prepared for it whatever it is.

PAXboy

8th Jul 2013, 11:25

Kerosene KrautSo maybe we need to rethink the evacuation time limits then? 90 Seconds through half the doors with cabin luggage? Indeed.

I have thought for 20 years that the evac times are the result of guesswork, ridiculously unreal tests and managment 'push' to get the machine approved for as many seats as possible.

I am fortunate not to have been involved in even a precautionary evac but I expect that most pax will respond as per instinct - not procedure. They will:

Head for the door they entered by
Take baggage - large and small
Not remove high heeled shoes
Obese people will obstruct others
Some will tramp over others
and the rest.

It's human nature and (in my view of PAXing for 47 years) is that no planned test can ever predict what will happen. We know what happens when events like this occur. But, as is always said, every prang is different.

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 11:26

Actually, and fortunately from your point of view, most of "The Sheeple" will do exactly what they are told. There are, however, a few who will think for themselves and make their own decisions accordingly.

SFO proved the point that present procedures seem to work fine. And I' sure that ALL the folks in F/C Class got off WITH their hand luggage. Sorry, it is what it is. And, actually, it doesn't make any difference, despite all the "Policy". The reasons for which propaganda I can fully understand.

James7

8th Jul 2013, 11:30

KK

Most of the bins would already be open, bags everywhere.

All those bleating about criminals etc, if you found your bag in the aisle with all your valuables in it you would be a darn fool to leave it behind, plus it is just blocking the escape routes.

Montrealguy

8th Jul 2013, 11:31

Reminds me of a conversation I had with a Boeing instructor pilot with regards to the design philosophy of the Boeing 787. He said the 787 was designed on the basis it will be flown by incompetent pilots. Thus the sophisticated computer systems will do their best not to allow the pilot to crash. With huge orders for the 787 coming out of the Asian region you can see his point.

That was precisely the Airbus philosophy when it created the Airbus 320. But before a pilot ends up on such an aircraft, he must first learn to fly on a "real" aircraft. Can a cadet who is hired in the right seat of an A320 at 300 hours total be considered a competent pilot several thousand hours later when the automation and protections he's had all along fail him ?

A pilot who is taught that he is flying an aircraft that cannot stall or who thinks he can always just pull fully back on the stick, add full power and hold those inputs to get himself out of a collision with terrain or a wind shear is bound to get himself in trouble when the protections that allow such manoeuvres no longer work. The companies that have highly automate aircraft such as the A320 that require that their pilots engage the autopilot right after take-off and keep it on to the flare or even do auto-lands in VFC do not do themselves a favour.

Ollie Onion

8th Jul 2013, 11:32

I don't care who is upfront of my airliner, as a bare minimum I would expect them to be competent enough to not 'stall' the bloody thing on final approach just because a navigation aid that is not even required in the weather is not functioning.

Yes there will be mitigating factors such as the 'training' taking place, but the fact that there were FOUR pilots on the flightdeck and NOT ONE of then seemed to notice the speed deteriorate to 30 - 50 kts below approach speed (according to ADSB data) is quite frankly gross negligence.

Yes we are all prone to making mistakes, this though should not preclude us as a supposedly professional group from trying to keep our standards high.

Recent events have had:

An jet airliner lost due to the loss of some speed data and a crew applying the incorrect stall recovery technique (Air France)

A turbo-prop regional airliner lost due to the crew mishandling the icing system which gave a false stall warning and resulted in the crew apllying the incorrect stall recovery technique (Coglan)

A jet airliner lost after a 'minor' radalt fault on approach to land and all THREE pilots failing to recognize the deteriorating speed profile until the onset of the stick shaker at which point the thrust levers were advanced and then allowed to automatically close back to idle, all the crew had to do was hold them up!! (Turkish)

A jet airliner lost on approach to land as the crew set up for a NPA and when at minima with NO visual reference elected to disconnect the automatics and continue in the 'hope' that the would arrive at the runway, what it resulted in was a perfect touchdown on the water.

And now finally we 'seem' to have a jet airliner lost on landing due to all four crew failing to notice or act on a deteriorating speed state until it was way way too late.

What scares me about all this is that these are apparently 'professional' crews from ALL different cultures and backgrounds who seem incapable of keeping a perfectly airworthy aircraft in the air when faced with what amount to very very minor defects or unservicabilities. It is a disgrace and a blight on the whole profession that our 'stick and rudder' skills have been so adversely affected by the accountants and safety departments in the name of safety (which is ironic) :mad:

What is more stunning is that in the Turkish / Lionair / Asiana incidents is has been just blind luck that people survived these crashes, it could have so easily been a total loss of life in all of these accidents, thank god it was not.

Rant Over.

bnt

8th Jul 2013, 11:35

SLF aside: If I was in an evacuation situation, there's no way I would leave everything behind. For example, last time I flew I had all my essentials in my jacket pockets - passport, keys, wallet, phone etc. I could have flung open the overhead locker and grabbed my jacket in 3 seconds, literally. Just grabbed it and went, not put it on till I was outside.

You might say that those three seconds could be the difference between life and death, but in the wider context of getting everyone out of the plane, it's probably not. If it comes down to three seconds, my goose is probably cooked already. Weigh that against the hassle and expense of replacing those essentials, and it's a chance I would take. I imagine women feel the same about their handbags, and would grab them too. But I agree that suitcases should be left behind - that's too much. Small & quick can be done safely.

Wannaberightseat

8th Jul 2013, 11:37

SAN FRANCISCO/SEOUL (Reuters) - The pilot of the crashed Asiana plane at San Francisco airport was still "in training" for the Boeing 777 when he attempted to land the aircraft under supervision on Saturday, the South Korean airline said.
Lee Kang-kuk, whose anglicised name was released for the first time on Monday and differed slightly from earlier usage, was the second most junior pilot of four on board the Asiana Airlines aircraft. He had 43 hours of experience flying the long-range jet, the airline said on Monday.
The plane's crew tried to abort the descent less than two seconds before it hit a seawall on the landing approach to the airport, bounced along the tarmac and burst into flames.
It was Lee's first attempt to land a 777 at San Francisco airport, although he had flown there 29 times previously on other types of aircraft, said South Korean transport ministry official Choi Seung-youn. Earlier, the ministry said he had accumulated almost 10,000 flying hours, including 43 at the controls of the 777.
Two teenage Chinese girls on their way to summer camp in the United States were killed and more than 180 injured in the crash, the first fatal accident involving the Boeing 777 since it entered service in 1995.
The Asiana flight from Seoul to San Francisco, with 16 crew and 291 passengers, included several large groups of Chinese students.
Asiana said Lee Kang-kuk, in his mid 40s, was in the pilot seat during the landing. It was not clear whether the senior pilot, Lee Jung-min, who had clocked up 3,220 hours on a Boeing 777, had tried to take over to abort the landing.
"It's a training that is common in the global aviation industry. All responsibilities lie with the instructor captain," Yoon Young-doo, the president and CEO of the airline, told a news conference on Monday at the company headquarters.
The plane crashed after the crew tried to abort the landing with less than two seconds to go, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said on Sunday.
Information collected from the plane's cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder indicated there were no signs of problems until seven seconds before impact, when the crew tried to accelerate, NTSB Chairwoman Deborah Hersman told reporters at San Francisco airport.
A stall warning, in which the cockpit controls begin to shake, activated four seconds before impact, and the crew tried to abort the landing and initiate what is known as a "go around" manoeuvre 1.5 seconds before crashing, Hersman said.
"Air speed was significantly below the target air speed" of 137 knots, she said. The throttle was set at idle as the plane approached the airport and the engines appeared to respond normally when the crew tried to gain speed in the seconds before the crash, she said.
TRAGIC TWIST
In a tragic twist, the San Francisco Fire Department said one of the Chinese teenagers may have been run over by an emergency vehicle as first responders reached the scene.
"One of the deceased did have injuries consistent with those of having been run over by a vehicle," fire department spokeswoman Mindy Talmadge said.
The two, Ye Mengyuan and Wang Linjia, were classmates and friends from the Jiangshan Middle School in Quzhou, in the prosperous eastern coastal province of Zhejiang.
They were among a group of 30 students and five teachers from the school on their way to attend a summer camp in the United States, the official Xinhua news agency said.
Ye, 16, had an easy smile, was an active member of the student council and had a passion for biology, the Beijing News reported.
"Responsible, attentive, pretty, intelligent," were the words written about her on a recent school report, it added.
Wang, a year older than Ye, was also known as a good student and was head of her class, the newspaper said. The last post on Weibo, China's Twitter-like microblogging site, simply read in English; "go".
Twelve parents, including those of Ye and Wang, were due to leave China for San Francisco on Monday, Xinhua reported. The other students in Ye and Wang's group who are well enough to travel will return to China as the rest of their trip has now been cancelled, the People's Daily said on its official microblog.
More than 30 people remained hospitalised late on Sunday. Eight were listed in critical condition, including two with paralysis from spinal injuries, hospital officials said.
The charred aircraft remained on the airport tarmac as flight operations gradually returned to normal. Three of the four runways were operating by Sunday afternoon.
Hersman said it was too early to speculate on the cause of the crash. The data recorders corroborated witness accounts and an amateur video, shown by CNN, indicating the plane came in too low, lifted its nose in an attempt to gain altitude, and then bounced violently along the tarmac after the rear of the aircraft clipped a seawall at the approach to the runway.
In reply to a question on whether the information reviewed by the NTSB showed pilot error in the crash, Hersman told reporters:
"What I will tell you is that the NTSB conducts very thorough investigations. We will not reach a determination of probable cause in the first few days that we're on an accident scene."
Asiana said mechanical failure did not appear to be a factor. Hersman confirmed that a part of the airport's instrument-landing system was offline on Saturday as part of a scheduled runway construction project, but cautioned against drawing conclusions from that.
"You do not need instruments to get into the airport," she said, noting that the weather was good at the time of the crash and the plane had been cleared for a visual approach.
SERIOUS INTERIOR DAMAGE
The flight's passengers included 141 Chinese, 77 South Koreans, 64 Americans, three Indians, three Canadians, one French, one Vietnamese and one Japanese citizen.
Pictures taken by survivors showed passengers hurrying out of the wrecked plane, some on evacuation slides. Thick smoke billowed from the fuselage and TV footage showed the aircraft gutted by fire. Much of its roof was gone.
Interior damage to the plane was extreme, Hersman said on CNN earlier on Sunday.
"You can see the devastation from the outside of the aircraft, the burn-through, the damage to the external fuselage," she said. "But what you can't see is the damage internally. That is really striking."
The NTSB released photos showing the wrecked interior cabin with oxygen masks dangling from the ceiling.
Hersman said the first emergency workers to arrive at the scene included 23 people in nine vehicles. San Francisco Mayor Ed Lee said a total of 225 first responders were involved.
"As chaotic as the site was yesterday, I think a number of miracles occurred to save many more lives," Lee said at the airport news conference. Appearing later at San Francisco General Hospital, he declined to address whether one of the Chinese teenagers may have been run over.
It was the first fatal commercial airline accident in the United States since a regional plane operated by Colgan Air crashed in New York in 2009.
Asiana, South Korea's junior carrier, has had two other fatal crashes in its 25-year history.
(Additional reporting by Gerry Shih, Alistain Barr, Sarah McBride, Ronnie Cohen, Poornima Gupta, Laila Kearney, Dan Levine, Jonathan Weber, Peter Henderson, Alex Dobuzinskis in Los Angeles, Jonathan Allen and Barbara Goldberg in New York, Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Editing by David Chance and Raju Gopalakrishnan)

llondel

8th Jul 2013, 11:46

I'd probably take with me what I had around the seat, given that it's likely to be small, but I certainly wouldn't mess around trying to get something from the overhead bin, and would be likely to be fairly rough with anyone blocking the aisle while trying to do that. I guess this is partly because I do read sites like this one and I'm an engineer by training and so am fully aware of the time-critical nature of evacuation. If someone's got a bag and is moving with the flow then let them keep it, if they're slowing things down then they should be discouraged, quickly and, if necessary, forcefully in order that everyone else can evacuate. Those who wish to take their baggage from the overhead should wait until last, and not expect the cabin crew to wait for them.

On the subject of culture, yes there are places where pointing out to a superior that he's made a mistake can be a career-limiting move and yes, it has happened. It's not just places like Korea, countries where a lot of military pilots retire and end up either directly or very quickly into the left hand seat for the national carrier can have a similar issue where the FO in the other seat is reluctant to speak up. The whole point of CRM is to encourage awareness of this problem so that captains accept input from the other side of the cockpit and so that the FO is not fearful of raising an issue. The Tenerife incident has been covered, another one is UA173 which kickstarted the United CRM programme.

James7

8th Jul 2013, 11:46

It would be an almost certainty that the AT was NOT in speed mode, once below a certain height All protections are lost. Alpha floor on the bus lost below 100'. There have been accidents attributable to this.

I would think that the PDF was flying an attitude that would be normal for the approach, it was only at the last few hundred feet that he realised he was going to land short and raised the nose. However with no auto thrust active the speed rapidly decayed. No one appeared to have noticed the AT being out of speed mode.

Speed is not so often scanned as the AT usually takes care of it.

I would like to know at exactly what point the speed started to decay. There is so much thrust at idle on these engines and I would think it was not until the last few hundred feet when the speed decayed due to the AOA being increased to make the runway. At this point things become interesting and the pilots are wondering what is happening and why no thrust. This was the point to apply TOGA as no thought is required to push the levers to TOGA.

Thr Idle open descent on the bus would be the same thing. Which is why on a visual approach FD are off.

Bearcat

8th Jul 2013, 11:52

A visual approach in severe cavok.... They get low, slow, whack the tail into the threshold, 2 deaths, multiple injuries, a perfectly serviceable aircraft written off.......I see jail time.

nitpicker330

8th Jul 2013, 11:55

Rubbish.
On approach as PF I'm continually scanning IAS ALT VS etc AND Engine thrust.
At the same time the PM when visual below 500' is calling me "plus 5 - 700" ( for eg ) all the way down thus actively monitoring and calling my IAS and Sink rate.

IAS is NOT "forgotten"

A Squared

8th Jul 2013, 11:56

AND the fault of ATC for slam dunk approaches......

SOrry nitpicker, this is just fantasy. If you look at the ads-b data provided in Post #654, you'll see that at time 6:23:52 they were aligned on final (note the heading) that lat,long is a position *14* NM from the runway threshold, and their altitude was 4275'

It's pretty tough to argue that a 14 mile final from 4300 ft is a "slam dunk"

Ian W

8th Jul 2013, 11:56

Ollie Onion http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-42.html#post7928896

What scares me about all this is that these are apparently 'professional' crews from ALL different cultures and backgrounds who seem incapable of keeping a perfectly airworthy aircraft in the air when faced with what amount to very very minor defects or unservicabilities.

This all comes down to bean counters who want to reduce training costs - this is then a 'customer requirement' and the training companies compress the training, the manufacturers put in more automation allowing less training. And none of these people will think that they are creating a flight safety problem they will congratulate themselves on 'keeping the company profitable'. The post cold war military and boomer generation of pilots is now at retirement and are being replaced by pilots who have only been under the bean counter regime of absolute minimum training. It is starting to apparent in the statistics. Unfortunately, the bean counters will only react when the costs of the crashes exceed the savings in training - unless someone gives them some 'guidance' first.

nitpicker330

8th Jul 2013, 11:58

Ok, that data came out after I commented and please forgive me but SFO is notorious for slam dunk approaches and in my outfit 747's and 777's have indeed been forced to go-around more than a few times.

FLEXPWR

8th Jul 2013, 12:03

All pilots onboard this flight have close to 10,000 hours or more. First, you can ask any long haul PICs how many hours they spend sleeping in the bunk and it still counts as flight hours in the logbook.

Well, maybe the public should know the reality of experience counted in flight hours, for lack of a better reference.

To reply to some posts racial comments that were supposedly made (and I believe most experienced folks on this forum have well explained this to be cultural rather than racial differences), the culture in this part of the world is very different from what we see as western standards.

Of course western countries also do have accidents, incidents and other mishaps, but I would like to point out one factor that seems not too well expanded here.

I have been flying as a captain on A320 for a few years now in China, and as TRI on other types in various countries in South East Asia. While I have met skilled individuals, I was surprised (still am, and the word is weak) to see what counts as experience in some of these countries.

To me, the Asiana pilot could have 30,000 hours that I would not be more impressed. Some (Asian) airlines do not allow the FO's to touch the flight controls during takeoff and landing, unless they are with an instructor, which happens twice a month at best on short haul. In one of my posts last year I had mentioned the concern of having FO's ready for upgrade (3500 hours or more) but they lack the total number of landings. They need 400 landings to get upgraded.

This means that when a pilot gets his first command of a jet liner, he/she has clocked a total of 400 landings in their whole professional career. On top of this, I have seen jumpseaters log the flight hours as well, even getting signatures on their logbook from training captains while they just sat on the jumpseat picking their nose and smoking cigarettes.

And guess what? When they have the opportunity to fly with a training captain/instructor, they will have the controls only when the conditions are near VMC, no wind, etc.

So it would be interesting to know how many landings the pilots have at the controls, and how many landings they have done in the last week or month or year, to make a more realistic picture of the proficiency/recency of a pilot.

Of course, getting an upgrade on the 777, you gotta start somewhere, and there was a time for all of us pilots where we had no experience on a new type. Nevertheless, if your experience before the new type can be traced to thousands of actual hand-flown landings, in whatever aircraft, it should definitely make a difference.

The new generation of pilots, jumping straight from flight school to a fast jet are missing not only experience, but exposure, and exposure comes with experience.

Vic777

8th Jul 2013, 12:09

Could this happen on an Airbus? Wouldn't the Airbus just go into "TOGA" and climb away?

A Squared

8th Jul 2013, 12:12

With some of the cockpit CVR data available it raises the issue of how they got into a slam dunk-- it sounds like they got put into a short final? Is all the ATC audio available from their turn onto Base, all the way in? .

Nope, not a short final. See above. Runway alignment at 14 NM and 4300 ft.

Ok, that data came out after I commented and please forgive me but SFO is notorious for slam dunk approaches and in my outfit 747's and 777's have indeed been forced to go-around more than a few times.

Fair enough, but to pick a nit myself :E the data was posted before your post. and ther had been previous posts about the flight track plot in Flight Aware showing a 13+ mile final. Ive never flown into SFO myself, but apparently they have a practice of putting you in a slam dunk, you aren't the only one to comment on this. But that seems to lead everyone to assume that ATC turned them on a short high final, which is clearly not the case. Now what happened after they were turned on final regarding altitude restrictions is to be determined, but certainty their turn onto final was neither short nor high

W2k

8th Jul 2013, 12:15

Originally posted by Vic777
Could this happen on an Airbus? Wouldn't the Airbus just go into "TOGA" and climb away?
If the command to go around is issued at 1.5 seconds before ground impact it doesn't matter who built the jet, there's no time for the engines to spool up.

James7

8th Jul 2013, 12:16

Sorry Nitpicker, I disagree, I used to get those calls in my first airline but not in 4 others I have been in, including current one. I always thought they were good SOPs. Proof is in the pudding as they say and it has happened countless times, speed Is not so often monitored as when you had your hand controlling the speed.

BOAC

8th Jul 2013, 12:21

There appears to be a worrying trend here. Taking the Turkish AMS accident and this one (while not, of course, prejudging the NTSB findings) it would seem that the performance of trainers is falling, both in attention and actions that are required.

It is my view that the industry needs to re-look at selection for the post, and whereas it has for some time been seen as a 'career move' by many, it really needs to be seen as a 'what and how can I teach' move . I have in my time seen a too relaxed and over-casual approach from some trainers, giving the impression that they are where they are and that is it and most of it is box-ticking. I think the best example for me was the BA trainer who was 're-validating' me LHS after some time away, with a carefully selected sector LGW-BIO (yes, of all choices....) with thunderstorms and variable winds who was blissfully unaware that there was an airfield brief for Captains for BIO which had to be read and watched before operating there. Interesting scenario - TC not legally able to be PIC on that detail.

So, folks, do we, and how do we change the criteria for TCs? Is there indeed a problem in the role?

EDIT: to add, there was, in fact, a major error in BA's BIO brief in those days (the video circled the wrong way!) so, tongue in cheek, was it in fact better he hadn't seen the briefing................?:)

EDIT 2: Thanks to 'macrihanish', ICAO code corrected. Why did I think it was 'BLV'?....................:{

Liam Gallagher

8th Jul 2013, 12:21

Nitpicker,

I thought the same about the famous SFO "slam dunk" and agree totally with your comments about the other pilots on the flightdeck. Watching the video of the crash, a few observations;

1. Imagine if the flight had been "paired" with another aircraft landing on 28R (as SFO like to arrange). That would have got "exciting" as he could have flown into Asiana's debris field.

2. The designers of the 777 need to take a bow. The aircraft took two massive thumps and it is amazing that all but two survived.

3. Not absolving the pilots' responsibilty to monitor speed and I don't want to get into speculation, but I wonder if the speedbrakes inadvertently remained extended during the approach.

4. Not absolving the other pilots of responsibility, but had there been an electronic glideslope available, I somehow doubt this would have happened. It is a lot easier to speak up from the back with a call "one dot low, not correcting", than "err..you look a bit low to me". Not sure if PAPIs were available, as they would have helped.

Finally, the talking heads on 'uhmerican TV are expressing concern that pilots are trained on flights with passengers. Oh dear, are they in for a shock when they learn that for most us when we land a new aircraft type for the first time, a few hundred unsuspecting people are sitting behind "enjoying the ride";)

ayroplain

8th Jul 2013, 12:22

This all comes down to bean counters who want to reduce training costs
This crash has nothing whatsoever to do with bean counters and everything to do with all of the flight crew sitting idly by and not performing the absolute basics of landing an aircraft that they WILL have been trained for from Day 1.

nitpicker330

8th Jul 2013, 12:24

James----Well it is in my Airline.
And Qantas and Dragonair and Virgin Oz.
With AND without Auto-thrust ( Auto-throttle in Boeing ) being used.

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 12:24

You mean like that brand new 738 that "Touched down" on the reef with VOR ahead of Runway 09 in DPS Bali?? Not like landing on the sea wall at SFO at all.

Either way if TOGA with AT and/or AP engaged??

nitpicker330

8th Jul 2013, 12:27

Lion Air in Denpasar was a 737-800.

And an Airbus would have done exactly the same thing under the circumstances.:eek:

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 12:33

Apologies, just came back from a long trip and tired. yes, of course, Lion DPS was a 738. But, as you note, the issue is the same. A or B the same actually wrt to TOGA with AT and AP settings/actions.

NamelessWonder

8th Jul 2013, 12:39

Ollie Onion
Yes there will be mitigating factors such as the 'training' taking place, but the fact that there were FOUR pilots on the flightdeck and NOT ONE of then seemed to notice the speed deteriorate to 30 - 50 kts below approach speed (according to ADSB data) is quite frankly gross negligence. Now, I could very well be wrong here, but having read this whole thread, I do not recall it ever being categorcially stated that all 4 flight crew were on the flight deck. On the aircraft - yes ("2 crews operating in shifts" [NTSB]), but not necessarily in the jump seats.

That doesn't detract from the "gross negligence" (should the presumed situation turn out to be the ACTUAL situation), not least that the PF (albeit new on type) has been flying 747s for a number of years, including into SFO and had a training captain as PNF (as it seems was the case).

Regarding one of the posts from a few pages back that questioned why the approach lights hadn't been "taken out" by the "tail in the water", from the debris track, it would seem the final approach was somewhat right of the centreline, which presumably also explains why the farthest left PAPI support is intact whilst the others are gone.

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 12:45

Great point. However, if YOU were in such a situation as Pilot 3 or 4, would you still be sleeping as the plane landed? Where would you most likely be?

James7

8th Jul 2013, 12:49

NP, I think it is a great call and I not heard it for 20 years now, even in V UK.

DozyWannabe

8th Jul 2013, 12:49

That was precisely the Airbus philosophy when it created the Airbus 320.

No it wasn't, or at least guarding against mistakes was only one facet of the philosophy. The press seemed to focus on that to the exclusion of all else at the time though, presumably because the resentment this fostered among some pilots made for good copy and more column inches.

NamelessWonder

8th Jul 2013, 12:55

@Philipat
However, if YOU were in such a situation as Pilot 3 or 4, would you still be sleeping as the plane landed? Where would you most likely be?

There would have to be a very good reason not to be at the "pointy" end if the option was available, which is, I believe, exactly what you were suggesting.

That doesn't mean, however, that the "spare" crew were . . . and, given all the cultural comments that have been made here, with a TC in the RHS, perhaps they would find it preferable to be elsewhere!:confused: (though if they WERE in the cabin, I doubt they'll ever do it again . . . if they get the chance!)

G-HMV

8th Jul 2013, 12:57

With regard to all the comments about people being posting racially offensive comments, aviation is not a place for semantics or political correctness. The only thing that should be considered is the truth.
It is absolute fact that social hierarchy and a steep authority gradient played a part in several major accidents in Asia and the middle east. This is NOT to say these accidents are exclusive to these places and do not happen in the west, but for the most part this lesson has already been hard learned here, and use of CRM gives FO's the conviction to challenge the thankfully rare overbearing captain.
When the social settings of a cockpit contribute to an accident you must stand up and make people aware of it. (As you should any other contributing factor) Not because of the colour of their skin or the place they live, but because the communication and teamwork of a safe cockpit does not come naturally in a culture like that. This is not a problem as a culture, but when it comes to having lives sitting behind you this is a problem. You cannot shy away from discussing and addressing and issue of SAFETY just because you don't want to offend people.

It is far too early to determine if this had ANY involvement in this particular accident, but that doesn't seem to have stopped 40 pages of wild speculation and about 3 pages worth of useful contribution. However the message should be; if there is a safety problem, there needs to proactive re-education and retraining in the aviation community. Regardless of the sensitivities of doing so.

jbsharpe

8th Jul 2013, 13:00

robertbartsch

8th Jul 2013, 13:10

CNN is now reporting that at least one and possibly two door hatches malfunctioned and which caused the inflatable escape ramps to open inside the cabin.

I cannot remember the NTSB making statements on TV this early after a crash and which seems to indict the crew for their poor performance. Apparently, as of Monday morning, the crew has yet to be interviewed by anyone.

YIKES! I suppose if this happened in France and not in the USA, the crew would be immediately arrested and held criminally liable. Maybe that is a good system.

SgtBundy

8th Jul 2013, 13:11

Being outside the industry, how does this sort of scenario fit into simulator time? I can imagine that normally sim time would be spent more on higher complexity procedures diagnosing and reacting to faults as well as more difficult scenarios (IMC etc).

Is a CAVOK manual approach something so mundane as to not be spent time in training, hence allowing for simple things like the AT setting to be in the way, or does it just come down to simply not flying the numbers?

david1300

8th Jul 2013, 13:12

So you see no RELEVANT similarities to Lion DPS, perhaps because DPS was a Reef as opposed to a sea wall? Perhaps you might look a little more at the details of DPS? ...

NOT what I said, Phil. There are some very pertinent similarities, but there have been some very inane posts that just waste space and bandwith. My complaint is not about the comparison, per se, but the inane posts that repeat the same info:ugh:.

Actually, going back and re-reading from the beginning, the mods have done a good (and often thankless) task of deleting a lot of the stuff I have complained about, so maybe I should climb down from my high horse a little.
In the meantime, what makes you so omnipotent to accuse other experienced posters of being Muppets? Especially when you can't even beat The Lions at home?
We had a (useless?) Kiwi coach for the past few years. I think he has been deliberately undermining our rugby playing skills by adding ice-slush to our fuel, causing us to come up short at critical times

But they haven't managed to clear it all, like this rubbish at post 462:
Has the crew discussed the incident with the media or is this something that will not happen?

Agaricus bisporus

8th Jul 2013, 13:17

Am unsure how the debate about the authority gradient applies when both crew are Captains and the more senior one is an instructor PNF in the RHS. Is there anything culturally that would prevent him from speaking out? Or else he was either maxed out, in the same mental A/T trap or just not wasn't paying attention?

Still, there was a case in a now defunct UK airline a few years back where the Chief Training "Captain" got a stickshaker during an intermediate stage of approach (no autothrottle) because he was beefing his stude so busily the thrust levers weren't advanced and no one noticed the sound and attitude was changing, almost incredible but it can happen.

jumpseater

8th Jul 2013, 13:18

Some European airlines I'm familiar with occasionally ask for PAPI's 'Off' approaches.

These are on training flights, i.e. no passengers on board, and I've seen it done with small/medium/heavy aircraft.

What is interesting is watching the approaches (which are VFR) to a 10000ft runway, some clearly aren't going to work, and you can see them being thrown away early, some get binned later on.

Good practice, both literally and metaphorically. :ok:

Artic flyer

8th Jul 2013, 13:32

Non precision approach , with poor airmanship performance. It’s a dejavu :

Aires B737 at San Andres Island on Aug 16th 2010
Accident: Aires B737 at San Andres Island on Aug 16th 2010, landed short of runway and broke up (http://avherald.com/h?article=42fb63a9/0000&opt=3329)

Lionair B738 at Denpasar on Apr 13th 2013
Accident: Lionair B738 at Denpasar on Apr 13th 2013, landed short of runway and came to stop in sea (http://avherald.com/h?article=460aeabb/0006&opt=3329)

Lessons to be learn:

Airports should supply the best instrument landing support .

Airports should supply the best landing aid , such as call outs when pilots fell out of the path.

Air companies and pilots should improve training and sop manuals in order to be prepared for unexpected poor landing aid, so they can use the best/safety instrument resources onboard.

Of course the pilots make mistakes, they are human.

Of course the pilots where tired, they where flying for 10 h and they are human.

tasmin

8th Jul 2013, 13:35

I believe the back-up crew in ASIANA does not occupy the jump seats during Take Off and Landing

NigelOnDraft

8th Jul 2013, 13:36

Some European airlines I'm familiar with occasionally ask for PAPI's 'Off' approaches. Pretty sure my Base Training involved that? NCE 22R had no G/S or PAPIs ~12yrs ago and we landed 767s there with a Vis Cct. 22L had PAPIs, but rarely bright enough to be any use >100'.

I've re-read Banglaore A320:
1. OPDES Mode (like FLCH) so idle, descend throught Glidepath, speed coming below VRef.
2. As PF "realises" going low applies full back stick (starts :08s)
3. This in turn triggers rise in Alpha and further IAS decreasing which then triggers Alpha Floor (at :11s) at 135'agl.
4. Pilots select TOGA 2s later (~:13s) [meaningless in Thrust terms in that Alpha Floor had done same]
5. Spool up too long to prevent accident
6. Report reckons had they selected TOGA at :08s (with start of back stick) they would have made it.

IF speculation is correct here then the sequence is similar to Bangalore, but maybe without the Alpha Floor aspect (or equivalent), but even if an Alpha Floor had been installed, it might not have been enough. Also shows that maybe with ATHR "wakeup" and Alpha Floor not operating <100R, this is not just for landing reasons, but would usually be too late anyway?

Whether Lion DPS 738 fits in we shall see?

nitpicker330

8th Jul 2013, 13:40

Well from now on maybe they should sit in the Jump seats for landing and be an active part of the crew. Who knows maybe one might have seen the thrust at idle and the speed decaying in time to alert the bozo "flying" the thing..:D

In our mob generally speaking all crew members sit in the cockpit for T/O and LDG unless other circumstances are needed. Indeed the relief crew take an active part in both pre flight and post flight setups.

Yes I know it's a 2 crew Aircraft but many hands make light work and the safety implications are blindingly obvious :ok:

TheChitterneFlyer

8th Jul 2013, 13:42

So, has the advancement of technology really made significant inroads into the monitoring of the basics i.e. speed? In my day there was a Flight Engineer and that he was the King-Pin in the monitoring of airspeed, attitude, and height; especially during the final approach phase to touchdown... even more-so during a visual approach! What was the EGPWS telling the crew to do? Was it another case of "Shut-up Gringo"?

DavidHoul52

8th Jul 2013, 13:45

With regard to all the comments about people being posting racially offensive comments, aviation is not a place for semantics or political correctness. The only thing that should be considered is the truth.
It is absolute fact that social hierarchy and a steep authority gradient played a part in several major accidents in Asia and the middle east. This is NOT to say these accidents are exclusive to these places and do not happen in the west, but for the most part this lesson has already been hard learned here, and use of CRM gives FO's the conviction to challenge the thankfully rare overbearing captain.

Sorry but I don't buy this. The only reason people started talking about "cultural" issues was that it was an Asian airline with (presumably) Asian crew. There is absolutely NO evidence at this stage that so called "cultural" factors played any kind of role at all. So why mention it? I tell you why - it's because certain people haven't yet understood that it is puerile, stupid and offensive to categorise people according to stereotypes. Recent accidents due in part to cabin seniority issues have not taken place notably with Asian crews - Polish, Russian spring to mind - there are others.

"Political correctness" is a politically loaded word, and is in fact archaic. It just means being careful to show respect to others who are different to ourselves - something most of us started learning when we were two years old. I'm not saying that cultural factors are NEVER relevant, or that accident investigators don't take them into account. But you don't "celebrate cultural diversity" by using it as stick to hit those you don't like, still less haul it out as a possible cause of an accident. Aviation is not a place for prejudiced viewpoints.

If you don't think your comments are offensive why not ask a Korean?

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 13:46

And, of course, such an incident could NEVER happen in The USA?

That's American exceptionism??

BOAC

8th Jul 2013, 13:54

I'm surprised the flight crew weren't interviewed immediately. - it is readily apparent that they had spoken to the airline fairly quickly or the CEO would not have issued his statement so soon before NTSB arrived..

Machrihanish

8th Jul 2013, 13:54

BOAC
There appears to be a worrying trend here. Taking the Turkish AMS accident and this one (while not, of course, prejudging the NTSB findings) it would seem that the performance of trainers is falling, both in attention and actions that are required.The factories are still ramping up their deliveries...

Re said sector LGW-BLV... KBLV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Air_Force_Base)?

robertbartsch
I cannot remember the NTSB making statements on TV this early after a crash and which seems to indict the crew for their poor performance.
Which is a step back in culture.

YIKES! I suppose if this happened in France and not in the USA, the crew would be immediately arrested and held criminally liable. Maybe that is a good system.
:uhoh:

Huck

8th Jul 2013, 13:56

In our mob generally speaking all crew members sit in the cockpit for T/O and LDG unless other circumstances are needed. Indeed the relief crew take an active part in both pre flight and post flight setups.

We (mostly) fly the 777F as a four-man crew. One relief FO does walk around/courier compartment/catering/hazmat, the other helps with ETOPS/MEL/clearance issues, the F/O sets up the EFB and the captain works the FMS. We can prep for a 15-hour leg in 30-40 minutes.

All four are up front for takeoff and landing. All on headsets, and RFO's do interject when necessary. A go-around can be called from any seat.

It's funny to hear about speculation regarding single-pilot ops. In our newest plane we're trending the other way....

Semaphore Sam

8th Jul 2013, 13:56

Possibly a automation modes issue? On the aircraft I instruct on, there's a trap we've known about since we started. If you are on autopilot and autothrottle, descending in FLCH (Flight Level Change) mode, the speed is controlled by pitch, and the autothrottles go to a passive mode, called "speed on elevator". If you change autopilot modes to a different pitch mode (VS, Alt Hold, etc, or if the autopilot captures another mode, like ALT CAPTURE, GS, etc), the autothrottles revert to controlling the speed ("speed on thrust" mode). HOWEVER, (this is the trap) as I said, if you are descending on autopilot and autothrottle in FLCH, AND DISCONNECT THE AUTOPILOT, the autothrottle does NOT revert to "speed on thrust". but stays in "speed on elevator". The pilot must SELECT another pitch mode, to get the autothrottles to control speed again...if not, the autothrottles stay at idle when the pilot, say, levels off and, he expects the autothrottles to advance the throttles to maintain speed. He must either control the throttles manually, or choose another pitch mode. This sounds like the classic autothrotlle TRAP we teach about on day one of FPT, and day one of simulator. It seems he was unstable on approach; if he were in FLCH, and decided to level off, he disconnects the autopilot, levels off; he expects the throttles to maintain speed with authrottle, but they stay at idle. It seems he leveled off pretty late, and may not have had time to realize his danger, concentrating on the runway, PAPI, etc, whilst the speed bled off. Purely Speculation. Does the 777 behave this way?

MD-11F

8th Jul 2013, 14:03

And, of course, such an incident could NEVER happen in The USA?

That's American exceptionism??

The point is, it used to be more common in the USA. The industry noted that it was a mistake to have a hierarchy in the cockpit that would degrade communication. That lead to CRM Crew resource management - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management)

As a result, accidents in the USA went down substantially. Other cultures that still have been unable to break down the hierarchy struggle with a higher accident rate. I've read here that FOQA data in Korea can be used against a pilot in a punitive way. If this is indeed true, then that should be addressed too.

So many in this thread are fixated on the idea of "racism" but it's really human factors we're talking about. Culture does play a role in that.

To the comment about the Colgan Air crash and the skill level of Anglo pilots, that is what lead to the new rule in the States requiring 1500 hours before a pilot can be employed in the industry. I think a better solution would have been allowing ab initio training such as the European airlines use or a program the military uses.

SalNichols

8th Jul 2013, 14:05

What I find incredibly interesting in following you guys through this thread, is that the very systems designed to DECREASE your workload appear to INCREASE your workload because FEW of you (largely dependent upon training and experience) trust the damn things...apparently for good reason.

To my mind, it puts the aircrew in the position of always flying with a student pilot; not knowing EXACTLY what he or she is going to do, you're "forced" to follow them through with light hands until you're satisfied. Thus, some of you are ready, willing, and able to intervene because you're essentially flying the plane mentally anyway; and then there are some of you for whom the workload is greatly reduced because you just accept the automation as it is because thats what you're company tells you to do. IOW, it's working until you bend it.

As an aerospace engineer and manager, I'm not sure what is scarier: automated systems that are so complex that no one understands their decision logic; automated systems that may not be completely reliable if modes selected are inappropriate for the flight regime; a cockpit and/or corporate culture that disrupts CRM; or pilots that might not have the skills to land a bloody sailplane without an ILS.

This has been VERY educational, but man, it's a bit frightening to think that I might want to ask the Captain if he or she can shoot a VFR approach when I'm boarding.

FLEXPWR

8th Jul 2013, 14:10

@DavidHoul52

I disagree with your last comment. I have flown with numerous Chinese FO's who say their love flying with expats/foreigners because they can ask questions and learn a thing or two. They do not ask ANY question during their simulator or line training when the instructor is Chinese, for fear of making the trainer lose face should he not know the answer. They will not challenge any unusual setup during flight for the same reasons, and also because of lack of experience from previous types, so they may not always recognise a situation when it arises.

But give them the chance to shine and many will do their best to please and to show they enjoy learning more tricks.

Unfortunately, the majority of them will loose this eagerness and build the so much discussed high power gradient when they turn captains. And will fly then (for the Chinese at least) only with other Chinese crew. They won't speak again English in the cockpit for the rest of their career.

You say there is no evidence of cultural differences on this event. Likewise there is no evidence that there wasn't any. Live a few years in China or Korea , go by the local rules, learn how people interact and the picture you see so well might turn out a bit different.

Of course the WHY has yet to be defined and presented by NTSB.

Either this or loss of SA of both (if they were only 2 in the cockpit) pilots simultaneously, should it be confirmed that no defects or outside elements could be thrown into the equation.

I make as many mistakes as any other pilot, or more, but especially when flying with crew from different parts of the world, I brief them to voice out anything, even if they think it may be trivial, and ask questions as much as you like. This is the cultural difference that I try to iron out a bit with my own, limited means, not because I think they should forget where they come from, but in the interest of safety.

Lonewolf_50

8th Jul 2013, 14:14

rdr: you mentioned the sun in their eyes after a long flight. Look at the time of the mishap, and the direction of the runway: west. ;)
Could there be a respect issue with the FO telling the Captain to go around, thereby delaying the call until it was too late?
If so, there's a possible culture issue, organizational at the least, and not based upon the shape of anyone's eyes. That considered, if it's two rated captains in the same airline, then why was the "A/S off by five knots" call not made sooner? That speaks to a different organizational and cultural issue.
Five knots slow, half-dot low. Standard callouts everywhere I've ever worked. Could've saved them. This approach got messed up long before the 7 seconds before impact call-out.
Scan: inside, outside, inside, outside, rinse and repeat ...
On one occasion I elected to fly a visual approach to 31L in JFK instead of going to 31R, this saved a lot of taxi time after landing). I was called to the office to explain why I flew a visual approach and did not use the ILS! FOQA data was designed to be used as a trend indicator, however Korean used it for punitive measures so it is not surprising that local pilots would take whatever measures were required to avoid exceeding the laid down parameters.
cdogg: Read the bolded part I extracted from one of the posts earlier. That addresses a matter of culture, not "race." I suggest that you learn how to read for comprehension, doctor.

What you describe in the safety arena in your own profession, and its improvement, is also a cultural shift. There is a culture in your profession and in each organization in that profession.

Safety culture in a given organization does not exist in a vacuum. The larger "host" culture will influence it. It has taken "the West" three generations of learning, and many lessons have been written in blood, regarding safety culture, organizational culture, and cockpit gradient. That is in part due to our host culture being one wherein the background conditions are there for change to take place, however clumsily. Your own profession is a fine example. If the base culture does not embrace that form of change, it is harder for the sub elements to do so. (Though as Gladwell points out, not impossible). But in the Korean Air case, there was considerable external motivation to change.

DA50driver

8th Jul 2013, 14:19

Dear JARRule,

You just exposed why accidents like this will become more and more common.

Do you even understand why?

IcePack

8th Jul 2013, 14:25

I notice that flying skills have generally degraded sine the introduction of the Q.A.R.. People don't like the phone calls from Management about busting a restrictive petty parameter. (Big Brother syndrome ) so visual approaches become unusual & so flight safety is degraded. Blame lies with the management. I wonder if this will be part of the NTSB repot?
But then that would show the FAA & other authorities in a bad light, so proberbly not.

DavidHoul52

8th Jul 2013, 14:29

@FLEXPWR

Thanks for your interesting post. Not wanting someone else to lose face is found in some asian cultures to a lesser or greater extent but I did wish to point out that reluctance of FOs to speak up in the cockpit at critical times is by no means confined to asian flight crews, is it? In the case of the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash there was likely to have even been non-pilot interference.

I do think it's much to early even to speculate about the role of this (or any kind) of cultural issue. Do we even know what the culture of this particular operator is? Cultural values can be overridden by operational values, even if the operational values are at variance to that from which most of the members come. What happens if the investigation finds that Asiana in fact takes CRM very seriously? Speculate all you like, but it it worth offending a large part of the aviation community claiming it's in the interest of "truth" even before the FDR and CVR have been opened?

Vasco dePilot

8th Jul 2013, 14:34

For those unfamiliar with the Autothrottle system on the B777, here's a quote from the Ops manual:
"With the autothrottle armed, the autothrottle automatically activates if:
• no autopilot or flightdirector active, or
• an autopilot or flightdirector is in VNAVXXX, FPA, ALT, V/S, or G/S,

and:
• speed less than an FMC calculated value for one second
• thrust below reference thrust
• airplane altitude above 100feet RA on approach, or airplane barometric altitude 400 feet above airport on takeoff.
Note: During a descent in VNAV SPD, the autothrottle may activate in HOLD mode and will not support stall protection".

overthewing

8th Jul 2013, 14:36

- it is readily apparent that they had spoken to the airline fairly quickly or the CEO would not have issued his statement so soon before NTSB arrived..

I've heard no evidence from the NTSB that they've had information from the crew. Everything that Deborah Hersman said seemed to refer to what they've acquired from CVR / FDR.

When asked by the press who was flying the plane, she said that she didn't know, but intended to know by Monday. Since that seems a fairly obvious question to ask had the pilots been interviewed, and since the NTSB can presumably tell from the FDR which side of the cockpit was doing the business on the approach, I infer that a) she hadn't spoke to the pilots or b) the pilots had not disclosed who was sitting where.

Within a couple of hours of BA38, we knew exactly who'd been flying the plane.

fourgolds

8th Jul 2013, 14:45

Just my two cents worth and maybe something investigators could consider. Criticise all you like but this happened to me when I converted from AirbusA330 to the 777. ( fortunately in the sim) it may be relevant as the trainee on this flight previously flew a320'and may well have been converting from Airbus to Boeing.

As the thrust levers on the bus do not move throughout the approach until you here " retard" , I used to rest my hands on the thrust levers. When I was converting to the 777 I did exactly the same , being a little tense during one of the sims I held the thrust levers a little tight. Therefore not allowing them to move. As we continued the approach I did not " feel" the autothrottle trying to move against my stiff grip , as I was focusing on other things( fortunately my scan.)I was effectively inhibiting the autothrottle by holding the thrust levers in a position. The next thing I noticed was the speed bleeding off below vref+5 . As l took my right hand off the thrust levers to point this out to the instructor the autothrottle immediately advanced the levers ( as I was no longer inhibiting them physically). The instructor pointed out that it was a common mistake he had seen on airbus pilots converting to Boeing. A valid learning point , learnt where it is meant to be learnt , in the sim.

Could it be that our colleague was so loaded by being hi on the approach that he like me , held the thrust levers too tight , and was unable to feel the autothrottle trying to physically override his grip. If you are not familiar with this , force. Would you recognise it ? Remember it only came up in my training as a result of a mistake.

Criticise all you,like , I am happy to share my screw ups if as an industry it helps someone , just a little bit.

FLEXPWR

8th Jul 2013, 14:48

DavidH

Ok, I'll be a bit more specific.

Cultural values come for an infinity of different reasons. Overcoming cultural values with "operational values" is al nice on paper.

I have not said the cultural background IS/WAS a cause for the accident.

You are thinking exactly like a westerner: "I can place operational value above cultural values". This is not the case in many countries. Think for a moment that westerners, as a general rule, have the freedom of speech, the freedom to say they think their president is an idiot, and the right to propest and march down the street. Westerners are born with this.

The story is very different when you consider the same situation in China as an example, but former Russia would do as well, there are many countries you can pick from. You do not protest against your government (even social media will be deleted) you do not challenge authority, only if behind closed doors with friends or family, or you might be prosecuted, harassed, or your career might take a turn for the sour. With this in the cultural background, go tell a Chinese/Korean that he/she can complain freely, and watch their reaction.

The unfortunate events in Poland where from a military flight, with military personnel. As above, you do not challenge authority for fear of undesired consequences. Again, cultural background.

To get back to our horses, I do hope they take CRM seriously, but CRM is not just on paper, it has to be explained and applied at all levels, not just in cockpits.

As a side note, the company I'm in has no CRM course, no CRM documentation, no CRM instructors, and of course no CRM accident/incident review... it is just mentionned on ops manual that good CRM should be applied while on duty... and this is one of the top 5 airlines in China.

And I don't see how I am offending anyone here, except you, maybe, feel offended that I disagree? :ooh:

ThoddyEADS

8th Jul 2013, 14:49

"Just my two cents worth and maybe something investigators could consider. Criticise all you like but this happened to me when I converted from AirbusA330 to the 777. ( fortunately in the sim) it may be relevant as the trainee on this flight previously flew a320'and may well have been converting from Airbus to Boeing."

From what I have read so far I had the impression he was in the transition from B744 to B772. But that are only my 2 cents :-).

geoheath

8th Jul 2013, 14:50

I was an investigator with CTSB. MAny years ago, one of my cases involved a Korean Air 747 that damaged the tail by over-rotating while landing at YVR. I was was shocked to learn that the pilot flying was their "Cruise pilot" and had 150 hours TOTAL TIME and 50 hours (of cruise) on type (747).

The captain decided to give him some pole time but did not monitor closely enough. Over 300 pax with a student pilot at the controls.

Romeo E.T.

8th Jul 2013, 14:54

a few pages back it was said that nothing has been heard of from the Cabin attendant side.

form other aviation forums

From NBC:

Flight attendant sensed plane was in trouble, 'felt a bang'
By Jack Chang and Youkyung Lee, Associated Press

The evacuation of Asiana flight 214 began badly.

Even before the mangled jetliner began filling with smoke, two evacuation slides on the doors inflated inside the cabin instead of outside, pinning two flight attendants to the floor.

Cabin manager Lee Yoon-hye, apparently the last person to leave the burning plane, said crew members deflated the slides with axes to rescue their colleagues, one of whom seemed to be choking beneath the weight of a slide.

It was just one of the moments of drama described Sunday by Lee of a remarkable evacuation that saved 305 of the 307 people on the plane that crashed Saturday while landing in San Francisco.

One flight attendant put a scared elementary schoolboy on her back and slid down a slide, said Lee, in the first comments by a crew member since the crash of the Boeing 777.

A pilot helped another injured flight attendant off the plane after the passengers had escaped. Lee herself worked to put out fires and usher passengers to safety despite a broken tailbone that kept her standing throughout a news briefing with mostly South Korean reporters at a San Francisco hotel. She said she didn't know how bad she was hurt until a doctor at a San Francisco hospital later treated her.

It was still unclear if the pilot's inexperience with the aircraft and airport played a role, and officials were also investigating whether the airport's or plane's equipment could have malfunctioned.

Aviation and airline officials said although the pilot had previously flown a Boeing 777 nine times - for a modest 43 hours in total - it was the first time he was landing that wide-bodied jet into San Francisco. Investigators have said he tried to abort the landing and go back up in the air after realizing he was flying too slow and too low but failed.

Lee, 40, who has nearly 20 years' experience with Asiana, said she knew seconds before impact that something was wrong with the plane.

"Right before touchdown, I felt like the plane was trying to take off. I was thinking 'what's happening?' and then I felt a bang," Lee said. "That bang felt harder than a normal landing. It was a very big shock. Afterward, there was another shock and the plane swayed to the right and to the left."

After the captain ordered an evacuation, Lee said she knew what to do. "I wasn't really thinking, but my body started carrying out the steps needed for an evacuation," Lee said. "I was only thinking about rescuing the next passenger."

When Lee saw that the plane was burning after the crash, she was calm. "I was only thinking that I should put it out quickly. I didn't have time to feel that this fire was going to hurt me," she said.

Lee said she was the last person off the plane and that she tried to approach the back of the aircraft before she left to make sure that no one was left inside. But when she moved to the back of the plane, a cloud of black, toxic smoke made it impossible. "It looked like the ceiling had fallen down," she said.

More than a third of the people onboard didn't require hospitalization, and only a small number were critically injured.
The San Francisco fire chief, Joanne Hayes-White, praised the cabin manager, who she talked to just after the evacuation.

"She was so composed I thought she had come from the terminal," Hayes-White told reporters in a clip posted to YouTube. "She wanted to make sure that everyone was off. ... She was a hero."

https://fbcdn-sphotos-d-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-prn1/q71/993897_10152012445792656_2108002782_n.jpg

Callsign Kilo

8th Jul 2013, 14:54

Scan: inside, outside, inside, outside, rinse and repeat ...

Since the thread highlights training deficiencies, I'd like to highlight the above comment as something that lends itself to very little. I'm not having a pop at the poster, however I'm having pop at the commentary which I have experienced from GA right across to simulator and line training in a commercial jet. I've heard it bellowed by line trainers and TRI/TREs for years. Having instructed myself, both in GA and in the simulator of a medium jet transport I have come to the conclusion that the pattering of 'outside, inside' means shag all to bloggs who, in general, hasn't the foggiest what he's meant to be scanning. It's one of these terms that are banded about at a critical flight phase when trainee capacity is close to if not at it's edge. I've even witnessed an instructor being asked what he meant by his 'outside, inside' repeat to fade during an IPC debrief. The answer was rewarded with the most staggering amount of B.S. I have ever heard in aviation training.

BBK

8th Jul 2013, 14:55

Four golds

Excellent post. Thanks for being so candid. That's the type of post that adds to the debate. A potential gotcha I'd never have thought of. That's the type of minute detail that the NTSB will look for.

Flexpwr

You're describing a Chinese airline and this one was from Korea. Sorry I don't get the connection. If I follow your "logic" the culture in BA is the same as AF as LH etc etc.

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 14:58

Sorry, CC just reading in here now, noticed this CNN is now reporting that at least one and possibly two door hatches malfunctioned and which caused the inflatable escape ramps to open inside the cabin.

Was pretty clear to me from the early pics that the L4 door was off when they stopped, not much you can do except get them to jump I suppose. It has been suggested elsewhere (not confirmed of course) that this may be where the 2 fatalities occurred if not via the hole in the pressure bulkhead- though I wonder about the latter since presumably the galley is fwd of that location?

As for luggage, it's rightly been pointed out that trying to stop it could potentially waste more time than it is worth. Of course as a pax I would actively discourage the people in front of me from doing so. I cannot recall the incident at present but during one evac an FA was qukes it oted as saying luggage was piling up at the exit as it was taken off the pax so they started lobbing it out of the door and away from the slide... however you then risk hurting those who have already left.

Time to re-look at cabin baggage limits methinks! A statement from one of the OZ214 pax mentioned luggage falling over the pax on impact. Thinking of some of the bags I see on a regular basis, does not make me like the odds in an impact. Time to email safety department again I think...

There's a photo doing the rounds of social media showing the FAs assisting pax on ground, one is clearly seen lying on the ground, any word on the condition of the crew? One news reporter made a comment that makes it seem he thinks the injured pax floated off by themselves and had nothing to do with FA J Kim carrying them out on her back! Tsk tsk media make me sick sometimes...

Edit: thanks for the update on the CC. Nice to see them getting some recognition, many of the media seem to be lagging in that department

GobonaStick

8th Jul 2013, 15:00

Aviation is not a place for prejudiced viewpoints.

Yet the sweeping statements about the "media" all being idiots, that journalists are not to be trusted, that "bean counters" are only interested in saving costs, all continue here in abundance... :ugh:

DozyWannabe

8th Jul 2013, 15:00

As an aerospace engineer and manager, I'm not sure what is scarier: automated systems that are so complex that no one understands their decision logic; automated systems that may not be completely reliable if modes selected are inappropriate for the flight regime...

As a software engineer (albeit not aero/realtime) whose degree course included several modules where civil FBW specification, design and testing were examined in detail*, I can tell you that your first point is invariably a misconception brought about by misunderstandings and stereotyping - in fact both automation/flight management tools and FBW systems were and are designed to be as transparent as possible, with pilot engineers having final sign-off on the latter. Of course mistakes are made and assumptions proven wrong - but that's true of any engineering discipline you care to name. As someone quite rightly said earlier, the technologies are flight *aids* and nothing more. Just as the wonderfully powerful CAD/design packages make the process of aero engineering far smoother, but don't allow a designer to ignore or forget the basic principles of aerodynamics, materials, loads etc.

Also, inappropriate modes for certain phases of flight long pre-date digital technology in the flight deck.

* - and as an aviation nerd, I couldn't help but continue to follow up and maintain an interest in the following years!

I wonder if this will be part of the NTSB repot?
But then that would show the FAA & other authorities in a bad light, so proberbly not.

Hmm... In fact, the NTSB is one of the few big-name investigation agencies that pulls no punches when it comes to holding the regulator to account. Civil service agencies like our own AAIB tend to be more matter-of-fact.

@fourgolds - Most of the reports I've read so far indicate that his previous type was the B744.

@GobOnAStick - While even seasoned journalists are decrying the decline in standards of their profession in today's hyper-commercial world, I don't think I'd go as far as to tar all of them with the idiot brush. That said, due to the specialised nature of the technical side of aviation reporters do tend to make glaring errors more often than not.

DavidHoul52

8th Jul 2013, 15:05

FLEXPWR

If you'd put it like that in the beginning it would have made a lot more sense and a lot more acceptable.

I think you'll find that a number of Asians in this thread have expressed dismay at the zeroing in on Asians by a small group of posters, not your post in particular.

Zapatas Blood

8th Jul 2013, 15:11

Many Asian airlines have a steep cockpit gradient as a result of national culture but it doesn’t end there. The Asian carriers I have worked for have many problems arising for social norms that have resulted in accidents such as:

Decision making based on fear of repercussion leading to hesitation to go round.
Passing sub standard crew in sim checks to avoid loss of face.
Total lack of curiosity resulting in no interest to learn beyond basic type training.
Unwillingness to rapidly adapt to change in a fluid situation.

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 15:12

Gob, that would be because so far, the majority of journalists/media/wiki experts have proven themselves to be so with yes, idiotic statements about aviation that could be rectified with a 60-sec Google search. Personally I said "sometimes" but when it comes to aviation it is actually most of the time when there is an accident/incident.

epc

8th Jul 2013, 15:16

1) When the French pilots put an Airbus in level flight into a stall and then flew it into the ocean, I don't recall anyone here making the general proclamation that "French pilots can't fly."

2) The PF on the Asiana flight was the junior pilot in type conversion training, and he was under the supervision of the trainer sitting on the right side, so here there is no issue of "Asian FO's not able to speak up against the captain." If the PF did anything stupid, there would be no hesitation by the trainer to speak up and do something about it.

It seems we have an issue here for basic airmanship, which have come up in the AF accident (European), the Colgan accident (American), and maybe now the Asiana accident. Some people here love to talk about crappy Asian pilots who can't stand to lose face. Is that really helpful? I don't think so.

To the people here who say, "there is no place for being PC in air safety," I ask, really, how is focusing on ethnicity helping air safety?

PlatinumFlyer

8th Jul 2013, 15:19

Today's Wall Street Journal states that there were 4 pilots in to cockpit at the time of the incident, the two flying, a 'relief' pilot, and a fourth they 'could not confirm was working'.

This reminds me of the C5 incident at McGuire AirForce base several years ago where there were multiple pilots in the cockpit and not one of them noticed that they shut down the wrong engine resulting in an inpact about a mile short of the runway.

Does everyone think that someone else is watching the ship and they just tune out?

VR-HFX

8th Jul 2013, 15:20

I am guessing that the NTSB will find very little on the CVR until the last few seconds. It's a cultural thing...stunned mullets don't talk.

ECAM_Actions

8th Jul 2013, 15:21

If the pilot was converting from Airbus, and he had indeed held the throttles too tight preventing their motion, I have to ask why the engine parameters and airspeed were apparently skipped from his scan?

I also have a major safety recommendation for Boeing:

* If the autothrottle commands a power setting, and it detects the throttles have failed to move for more than 2 seconds, chime an alert STUCK THROTTLE

Just my 2 cents.

BOAC

8th Jul 2013, 15:23

I am guessing that the NTSB will find very little on the CVR until the last few seconds. It's a cultural thingy. - I suspect the approach briefing will be of interest?

bratschewurst

8th Jul 2013, 15:25

Very sad indeed, poor girl survives being ejected from a ground spinning aircraft only to be run over by someone else not looking out the window.

I wonder if visibility might have been an issue; it's not hard to imagine one of the emergency vehicles driving into a smoke cloud and hitting someone who was unconscious.

old-timer

8th Jul 2013, 15:31

Valuable post four golds & fully concur with yourself & BBK - it's so useful for details like that to be shared from real life experience, you can't beat experience nor buy it - experience has to be earned - very good to share it.

777Yank

8th Jul 2013, 15:36

Just a few observations from a commercial pilot with many hours in the 777 and 737:

-There are similarities with the Lion Air crash and the SFO disaster. I think both accidents could have avoided with proper use of the VNAV (they are virtually identical on the 777 and 737).

-I've seen 777 and 737 crews screw up non-precision approaches because they never practice them. Remember the Guam accident? Have we learned nothing?

-VNAV (even on a base turn to a visual approach) is a great tool for a constant rate descent.

-At my airline, you are required to use all navigation aids, even in VFR conditions. Why would not you use VNAV as an aid for a stabilized approach?

DavidHoul52

8th Jul 2013, 15:41

I wonder if visibility might have been an issue; it's not hard to imagine one of the emergency vehicles driving into a smoke cloud and hitting someone who was unconscious.

The other girl didn't survive either?

AnQrKa

8th Jul 2013, 15:42

"When the French pilots put an Airbus in level flight into a stall and then flew it into the ocean, I don't recall anyone here making the general proclamation that "French pilots can't fly."

No, but AF had suffered some critical failures that have caught many a clever Airbus pilot out in the sim.

This 777 accident may well turn out to be a perfectly serviceable aircraft crashing on a CAVOK day.

Should we compare accident rates from western Europe and Asia? Anybody

geoheath

8th Jul 2013, 15:42

The NTSB Chair who is heading the 214 investigation and the official NTSB spokes person, has no expertise regarding aircraft, aviation, or investigations. She is a political appointee who was an intern for some US congressman, and then a paid employee. She lists her qualifications to head the National TRANSPOTATION SAFETY Board as having a drivers license. She says she is the the nation’s most visionary and passionate safety leader. Who knew the job was so easy!

FROM THE NTSB Website:

NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman is recognized as one of the nation's most visionary and passionate safety leaders who advocates for safety across all modes of transportation. Among her many initiatives, Chairman Hersman has focused attention and actions on distracted driving, child passenger safety, and helping accident victims and their families. She emphasizes the NTSB's role as "the conscience and the compass of the transportation industry." Previously, Hersman was a senior advisor to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation from 1999-2004 and served as Staff Director and Senior Legislative Aide to West Virginia Congressman Bob Wise from 1992-1999.

Chairman Hersman received B.A. degrees in Political Science and International Studies from Virginia Tech, and an M.S. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University. She holds a commercial driver's license (with passenger, school bus, and air brake endorsements) as well as a motorcycle endorsement. (she got the commercial license AFTER getting the job)

MoJo WoJo

8th Jul 2013, 15:44

With 43 hours of time more attention needs to be brought towards the non-flying pilot who MUST have been a Line Check Airman! Were the relief pilots sitting on the jumpseats (more eyes)?

VR-HFX

8th Jul 2013, 15:44

777 Yank

Spot on.

Or just simply half the airspeed and add a zero...oops...what airspeed.

From the graphs, he missed the glideslope from above...forgiveable...but picked it up again from below and lost it for reasons he ...and all the others on the flightdeck couldn't work out??

I'm sorry but this is looking like all the spectators to this accident sat idly by and did nothing. That is what I find perplexing.

Sam Bee

8th Jul 2013, 15:50

worldpilot

8th Jul 2013, 15:50

Spectators indeed. :ok:

I'm wondering what the other pilots were actually doing during the approach phase.

Enjoying the scenery perhaps. But even that should have alerted the crew about the impending danger (low altitude).

Case One

8th Jul 2013, 15:56

Thanks fourgolds, as someone about to go from A to B I'll store that one away.

Now back to another 500 or so posts telling us about the three times table or assuming all companies work like theirs etc. :ugh:

oldchina

8th Jul 2013, 16:02

AnQrKa: if you're referring to AF447, what were those failures (plural)? That plane would have remained perfectly flyable if the pilots had followed procedures.

BOAC

8th Jul 2013, 16:06

If the pilot was converting from Airbus, and he had indeed held the throttles too tight preventing their motion - for this poster and others on about 'Scarebus' throttles - all over the internet is the fact the PF was converting from a BOEING 747.

So label this interesting but irrelevant.

UAVop

8th Jul 2013, 16:15

The NTSB Chair who is heading the 214 investigation and the official NTSB spokes person, has no expertise regarding aircraft, aviation, or investigations.

She did a hell of a job with the 787 battery investigative hearing.

aerolearner

8th Jul 2013, 16:17

@geoheath
The NTSB Chair who is heading the 214 investigation

She is not heading the investigation

NTSB LAUNCHING TEAM TO INVESTIGATE BOEING 777 CRASH IN SAN FRANCISCO

July, 6, 2013

WASHINGTON – The National Transportation Safety Board is launching a full go-team to San Francisco, Calif., to investigate today’s crash involving Asiana Airlines Flight 214, a Boeing 777. The crash occurred while the aircraft was landing at San Francisco International Airport.

NTSB Senior Aviation Accident Investigator Bill English will serve as investigator-in-charge. NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman is accompanying the team and will serve as the principal spokesman.

VR-HFX

8th Jul 2013, 16:19

I think our Kiwi mate Offcut at post #717 is on the money. For those who have flown both the 74 and the 77 it is the most logical answer.

My guess is that a hot and high approach was flown in FLCH. That is the only mode that will get you down in a hurry. If the A/P is then disconnected, the auto throttles will remain in Hold, and not "wake up". If a pilot purely concentrated on the aim point and forgot his scan, speed could easily wash off to the point of stick shaker or beyond. FLCH is a major threat in the 777 if used while hand flying and should never be used during an approach. Our SOPs require FDs off, then one back on to force AT into speed mode.

There may have been speed brakes involved but that does not change the basic scenario...airpseed bleed is corrected by gripping the handles and moving them forward.Noone did that until 1.5 seconds before impact.

So when the PF finally picked up the GS from below he was out of inertia. The fact no-one else in the cockpit was awake at that specific moment is the most interesting conundrum.

KOLDO

8th Jul 2013, 16:32

I agree 100%. But let me explain why I think all this happens.
Aviation today is ruled by lots of factors, lets say, pax comfort, economy, and the like…
The common rule is use of automation, which is good, but I think we all became rusty because we are not allow to fly manually, or to do visual approaches more often, of course weather and workload permitting.
The punitive culture spreads worldwide, so to avoid unnecessary visits to the office, people choice is automation all the time. Don't forget the use of flight data.
Even more important is the so called "training", which has turned more into evaluation. Good old days when we all had in the classroom real human pilots or engineers, the old good transparency projector, and so…today, it is a self service DVD, and some carriers are proud to say "no spoon fed here".
More food for though, be aware next crew is waiting outside the sim, so guys, no more time to repeat.
About the flight deck gradient, sorry to disagree with other guys, but it is a fact, the company culture is something more than what we see in the website or in a brochure.
And it is even worse if you mix it. That's what happens nowadays with lots of pilots working abroad.

obgraham

8th Jul 2013, 16:45

official NTSB spokes person, has no expertise regarding aircraft, aviation, or investigations. Despite her annoying voice characteristics, she did an excellent job handling the press conference.

Investigating the incident's cause and presenting the results to the media are not the same skill.

geoheath

8th Jul 2013, 16:46

Thank you for the correction. It is as you have written.

RAT 5

8th Jul 2013, 16:48

Not only that, but I've flown for an airline with a 'highly regarded training department' but for years, every 6 months, the LPC failures were the same at the same airport using the same approaches. I've no idea what the partial pass/failure rate was, but it did not seem very taxing. I also once was a TC for an airline, in a different country to my birth, and in my naivety in the first 6 months of conducting prof checks, while trying to raise standards above that of a flying club, I failed a crew. They were rostered the next day to fly. the consternation, shock horror, disbelief, etc. etc. not to mention the outrage of a crewing dept with an under crewed airline, nearly caused me to seek refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy. My scalp was saved by the new C.P. who agreed with the assessment. However, among the other trainers and pilots there was the belief that crews in this airline did not fail prof checks.
Today, IMHO, I suspect many tests are set to satisfy the legal minimum requirement of manoeuvres and in such a way as to avoid as many failures as possible. Cynical; ya betcha.

Agaricus bisporus

8th Jul 2013, 16:49

With respect, there is no suggestion, let alone evidence that she was alive when (and if) run over. That is purely an assumption, and as the other one ejected was dead and considering the circumstances probably not a very sound one.

Let's not allow assumptions to run away with us.

MoJo WoJo

8th Jul 2013, 16:51

"WHO'S FLYING THE SHIP!!!"
Appears during this KSFO approach to landing the answer sadly is NOBODY!

fourgolds

8th Jul 2013, 17:02

I only saw the article on Aviation News | Aviation Industry & Airline Statistics | flightglobal.com (http://www.flightglobal.com) that he had flown b737,747 and A320. Have not seen the info that the last type flown was 747.

I also merely shared an experience that I had. I by no means said that is what occured. One also has to be open to the possibility that in a stressfull situation human beings ( pilots) can resort to what is most familiar to them. For example after 5000+ hrs on the 777 I still occasionally have an airbus thought process whilst flying it ! Especially when really fatigued , ie I resort to the first jet I learned on .Its happens very rarely now but occured a lot during the first 1000 or so hours .Fortunately it's a duh moment and I realise , duh that's the other airplane! I promise I am not alone , I have seen other ex airbus guys make similar mistakes or have similar duh moments.

On the cultural side of things , I have read Malcolm Gladwells , " outliers" simply a fantastic read. The short article " the ethnic theory of plane crashes" is superbly researched and presented. Also if you have ever wandered why most of the worlds best team sportsmen are born in January or February , this book will make some amazing revelations. Anyway don't mean a thread drift. I do think the cause of the accident will be determined fairly quickly as they have the data. Sadly I expect to see something like this on the report, " the Pilot had flown 92 hours in the last 28 days and was legal in accordance with flight time regulations and deemed not to be fatigued by the airlines fatigue monitoring computer system and the law. So fatigue has been ruled out as a contributing factor. That's a whole different can of worms.

ManaAdaSystem

8th Jul 2013, 17:07

JW411

8th Jul 2013, 17:07

I have refrained from commenting up until now.

I was inspired by the account of the difficulties faced by Lee Yoon-Hye and her cabin staff in evacuating this badly damaged aircraft so successfully.

One of my cabin staff forgot to disarm 1 Door L on my DC-10 one day at Toronto and the slide inflated inside the jetway. The meeters and greeters were only saved by the bend in the jetway. They are pretty big when they inflate.

To have two huge slides inflate inside the cabin (trapping two of your team in the process) and still get 300-odd passengers out with fire breaking out around you is a truly remarkable achievement.

Regardless of what went on with those sitting in front in the window seats, the cabin crew did a remarkable job and should be congratulated.

NEWYEAR

8th Jul 2013, 17:07

Could anyone confirm if:

-There were 4 people in cockpit.
-3 of them were Captains with "10.000 hours in total" (the three together)
-It was a training flight.
-Pilots tried a G.A

rgbrock1

8th Jul 2013, 17:10

FWIW:

The former chairman of the U.S. NTSB, Peter Goelz, stated to the media that it was obvious, to him anyway, that the flight deck 'crew was not paying attention' and that the accident is 'inexcusable'.

Pretty harsh words coming from someone of that stature. And especially considering the investigation into the cause of the accident is far from finished. One would think someone like Mr. Goelz would know better.

overthewing

8th Jul 2013, 17:10

The NTSB Chair who is heading the 214 investigation and the official NTSB spokes person, has no expertise regarding aircraft, aviation, or investigations.

She's acting as a spokesperson, and I thought she did an excellent job of managing the Sunday press conference - giving the media technical information plus layperson-type explanation without dumbing it down or sounding patronising. She repeated each press inquiry for the benefit of others, summing up the question concisely and being clear what the parameters of her answer were. I'm planning to copy her technique next time I'm in front of a crowd!

Jazz Hands

8th Jul 2013, 17:31

The NTSB Chair who is heading the 214 investigation and the official NTSB spokesperson, has no expertise regarding aircraft, aviation, or investigations

Doesn't stop any of the 'experts' here chiming in. At least she isn't self-appointed. :hmm:

Agaricus bisporus

8th Jul 2013, 17:36

Am unsure how the debate about the authority gradient applies when both crew are Captains and the more senior one is an instructor PNF in the RHS. Is there anything culturally that would prevent him from speaking out?

Just how does the much discussed cultural difficulty apply here, because all the previous posts on this subject that is every single one of them, assume a FO in the RHS and a Capt in the left. Which just isn't the case here.

So what does the Capt under training/ line training instructor dynamic mean here?

aguadalte

8th Jul 2013, 17:38

Can you descend with FLCH without selecting a lower level on your ALT select window? (Sorry, not familiar with Boeing acronyms)

If so, what is the minimum selected altitude? MDA?

and finally, if and when, reaching the MDA, doesn't the Auto Throttle "awake"?

tsgas

8th Jul 2013, 17:52

The aviation profession has ignored basic "stick and rudder" skills for far too long and and are finding out the hard way ,that it is as important to safety, as well as all the other pilot skills and training.

Too much automation and too few skilled airmen makes for unnecessary fatalities IMHO.

I do not pretend to know the cause of this accident but I do know there will be many more until the industry decides to change it's ways.

epc

8th Jul 2013, 18:07

2) The PF on the Asiana flight was the junior pilot in type conversion training, and he was under the supervision of the trainer sitting on the right side, so here there is no issue of "Asian FO's not able to speak up against the captain." If the PF did anything stupid, there would be no hesitation by the trainer to speak up and do something about it.
Are you saing the PF did nothing stupid on this flight?

No, I was saying that the issue of hierarchical culture inhibiting the FO from speaking up against the captain does not exist in this situation. The junior was flying the plane under the supervision of the senior. The senior, the training captain, will not feel any inhibition in speaking up when or if he observes the junior, the trainee and the PF, doing something stupid.

eaglewwit

8th Jul 2013, 18:12

She's acting as a spokesperson, and I thought she did an excellent job of managing the Sunday press conference - giving the media technical information plus layperson-type explanation without dumbing it down or sounding patronising. She repeated each press inquiry for the benefit of others, summing up the question concisely and being clear what the parameters of her answer were. I'm planning to copy her technique next time I'm in front of a crowd!

That's great, she should have been hired as a spokesperson.

NOT THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE NTSB.

fotoguzzi

8th Jul 2013, 18:17

[Not a pilot] Seven seconds from impact an "increase speed" command was given and not a "go-around" command. Had they cleared the sea wall could they have gotten the nose down enough to avoid the kind of landing experienced by Turkish Air 1951 in Schiphol?

My question is (if we allow that they thought they had adequate speed) whether it is likely that they thought the landing could be salvaged with the nose-up attitude they had, the non-standard descent path, and relatively long runway.

NigelOnDraft

8th Jul 2013, 18:19

That's great, she should have been hired as a spokesperson.
NOT THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE NTSB. So what qualifications do you think the Chairperson should have?

Tommytoyz

8th Jul 2013, 18:19

Accidents like this and AF447 make me think that either 1) built in automation needs to increase, to where pilots are never expected nor need to hand fly or 2) severely redress pilot training and proficiency standards.

ross_M

8th Jul 2013, 18:20

To have two huge slides inflate inside the cabin

Do we know why this internal inflation may have happened? Is this a technical malfunction? Probably precipitated by crash damage.

Or a human error by someone manually inflating the slide.

BigScott666

8th Jul 2013, 18:27

If you are that low and steering around approach lights....the outcome can only get worse if you continue...A go-around should have been accomplished long before that point

alanis

8th Jul 2013, 18:28

paxrune

8th Jul 2013, 18:32

Begins in two minutes or less

Live event from KIRO 7 Eyewitness News | www.kirotv.com (http://www.kirotv.com/s/news/live-event/)

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 18:32

IIRC the slides on the 777 use a gas bottle inflation, normally the slide pack needs to drop over the door sill a certain distance to pull the pin on the bottle and thus inflate. But it is possible that impact/damage could set one off in the cabin.

IF the doors were opened with an obstruction outside, then it could send the slide into the cabin, however in THIS particular case it seems it happened while crew were still seated (I would guess at one of the impacts) Any mention of which doors? I don't think it would be L4 as that door can clearly be seen detached from the aircraft- however that slide could well have inflated as the door was pulled from the aircraft- but I don't see one or evidence that there was one from the (admittedly grainy) pictures

Normally, manual inflation can only be done once the door is open, via backup manual inflation handle located on the door sill (only visible when the door is open with slide deployed )

eaglewwit

8th Jul 2013, 18:34

I would prefer she have some technical knowledge in the area. Otherwise she will eventually end up sounding like the media and making stupid statements, and even worse making stupid decisions.

Greek God

8th Jul 2013, 18:37

As is usual with these events the amount of BS spouted in 45 odd pages is breathtaking however, it is still worth trawling through for the gems hidden within.
The Flight Deck dynamic is a complex thing especially if viewed through foreign eyes and while striving for complete openness and the ability to understand, learn and disseminate information and cause, sadly there will be organisations who lag behind others. The whole CRM ideology should be applied here to the multinational arena to understand rather than criticise cultural differences.

One aspect not discussed is the dynamic of two experienced Captains operating together albeit in a training / trainee role. Especially pertinent is the fact the trainee had significant time on another type. It is all too easy to revert to type in stressful situations and what is most familiar - the 3 weeks in the sim and 9 sectors on a new type or the X thousand hours over many years on something different? It is not clear which type the PF had transitioned from so I am unsure of any flight mode foibles or differences but I retrained from B to A and can personally vouch as to the speed decay rate of a heavy airliner when it is levelled in full landing config. My mistake? Confusing A/T function! 2 months after conversion was kept hot and high on approach but still 10 miles out so I disconnected everything levelled, slowed, configured then descended to capture the glide at Vapp, work done AP and AT engaged, sat back and watched my handiwork go to ratxxx! However the TL were still at idle & the ABus needs the thrust levers to be in the Climb detent and won't engage from idle unlike the Boeing. Speed decay was rapid and spool up took forever! TOGA and a GA saved the day but if this had occurred at 500ft as opposed to 2300 ft it could have been another story. The stabilised approach criteria are there for a reason!
Quite what the trainer was doing I have no idea but again what was the FD environment like with two Capts? we shall have wait and see.

It's my belief that's what happened here and the question has to be why no GA off what is a clearly unstable approach. That was the last slice of emmental.
On the 737 one element of the 500ft stable call was thrust spooled up to approach setting, (that element is missing from the AB but is still in my consideration) is the 777 similar?

It's also the reason that anytime I am manually flying now I do so completely ie with both AP and AT off - all in or all out!

ross_M

8th Jul 2013, 18:41

IIRC the slides on the 777 use a gas bottle inflation, normally the slide pack needs to drop over the door sill a certain distance to pull the pin on the bottle and thus inflate. But it is possible that impact/damage could set one off in the cabin.

Interesting.

Anyone know of other incidents of internal slide inflation?

Sounds like a pretty dangerous failure mode for multiple reasons.

archae86

8th Jul 2013, 18:43

CNN is streaming today's press briefing live at:
CNN July 8 11:30 a.m. PDT briefing (http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/cvplive/cvpstream2.html)

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 18:44

Well by possible I mean it is within the realms of possibility, not that it is very likely. I am sure they have tested for this kind of thing. I've read of a couple but usually that was the result of crew opening an armed door into a jetway or catering truck and the slide deflecting back into the cabin.

ETA: When you think about the kind of impact forces seen in the video, I suppose it would be possible for a gas bottle pin to be forced out. The slide pack cover is some kind of plastic or composite which is easily removable for maintenance and on some types so that you can exchange slide packs between doors. Hence the "Do Not Sit" graphics on them. So if one did inflate it likely wouldn't take much to force off that cover on the door bustle and go inwards.

robertbartsch

8th Jul 2013, 18:45

gerago

8th Jul 2013, 18:46

Just adding to speculative theories but I had been almost caught out in the sim once in a SFO slam dunk scenario...high and fast on base, so we had speedbrakes deployed full, then 3/4 way where we left it there as we completed the checks. Got onto 3degrees flight path at 500' AGL, but despite the more than normal setting, the aircraft just sank like a rock as we decrabbed due to a stiff crosswind. Went around and then noticed that the speedbrakes were still 3/4 deployed!!! Oops, double oops!

Oopsy daisy...we were overwhelmed by the slam dunk approach and also the anal procedures by the airline which required the PM to set runway heading, mouthing off " general call outs " to ensure correct runways as there were 2 parallel strips, ATC calls. Somehow we missed the EICAS warnings about speedbrakes. Well, that workload overload for you!

Non Zero

8th Jul 2013, 18:49

Can you descend with FLCH without selecting a lower level on your ALT select window? (Sorry, not familiar with Boeing acronyms)

Yes you can ... disconnecting the A/P and disregarding all the visual and aural caution!
Would you use FLCH for any approaches? BIG NO

If so, what is the minimum selected altitude? MDA?

NO FLCH for approach. But theoretically with the A/P engaged and pressing FLCH the Auto-throttle mode goes in THR reference and the FMA shows THR FLCH SPD with the speed window open and maintaining the current speed you have at the moment you pressed the FLCH switch.

And selecting the MDA in FLCH doesn't really make sense.

and finally, if and when, reaching the MDA, doesn't the Auto Throttle "awake"

If you use FCLH (which is not good for approaches) and you selected the MDA in the MCP the Auto-throttle system will maintain the selected speed in the MCP.

ManaAdaSystem

8th Jul 2013, 18:54

The senior, the training captain, will not feel any inhibition in speaking up when or if he observes the junior, the trainee and the PF, doing something stupid.

Yet he did not do so in this situation. He let the trainee crash the aircraft.
Being an instructor does not automatically put him above the trainee. If, for instance, both of them have a military background, and the trainee held a higher rank back then, it could affect the dynamics in this cockpit.

pattern_is_full

8th Jul 2013, 18:54

RE escape slide inflation

One inflated in flight in the tail of an MD-81 being used by Barack Obama during the 2008 campaign. In the tail cone rather than the cabin, but intefrered with pitch control cables.

Obama campaign plane's emergency is detailed - Los Angeles Times (http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/11/nation/na-obama-plane11)

As to the qualifications of the NTSB chief - well, it IS called the National Transportation Safety Board, not the National Aviation Safety Board.

It investigates accidents and safety issues in all branches of transportation - rail, bus, truck, car, boat. With briefs for pipelines and hazardous material transport as well.

Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/reports.html)

ross_M

8th Jul 2013, 19:03

GarageYears

8th Jul 2013, 19:04

82 secs before impact - AP off - 1600 ft alt
73 secs - 173kts
54 secs - 149kts
34 secs - 134kts - 500 ft
16 secs - 118kts - 200 ft
8 secs - 112kts - 125 ft
3 secs - 103kts
Impact - 106kts

lomapaseo

8th Jul 2013, 19:05

Almost 1000 posts (not counted many deleted) and I have waited to add my own.

No use in even commenting in the first days since we are overrun with newbies (less than 500 posts) expressing subjective opinions.

I find it absolutely worthless to assign any kind of blame including personal characteristics, nationalities, affiliations, or airline culture before the NTSB has released any facts to support.

If we think this is pilot error than let's stick to training standards and CRM.

I'm not much interested in finding fault with things (like the airport, MELs etc.) when they are perfectly legal (pilot know thy machine !)

Of course I'm still open to hidden system failure should they turn up. But for heavens sake stop these posts with assignment of blame before the investigation is finished. :ugh:

Non Zero

8th Jul 2013, 19:07

82 secs before impact - AP off - 1600 ft alt
73 secs - 173kts
54 secs - 149kts
34 secs - 134kts - 500 ft
16 secs - 118kts - 200 ft
8 secs - 112kts - 125 ft
3 secs - 103kts
Impact - 106kts

And in which position were the Auto-Throttle switches? And was the A/T on?

canyonblue737

8th Jul 2013, 19:09

A/T had to be off, they were idle the whole time till 8 seconds when the NTSB says the throttles were advanced. She said the autopilot was disconnected at 1700 ft over 80 seconds prior to landing but doesn't reference the A/T, but aircraft behavior indicates A/T was not on, clearly that would be a data point in the FDR and referenced.

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 19:09

Ross, I suppose that could be a consideration however on newer aircraft not all slide packs are stowed inside the cabin. On the 777-300 The LR3 slides are in the wing/body fairing and thus could not deploy into the cabin. However, then you have the potential for there to be damage to that area rendering the slide ramp U/S.

The same goes for the MLR3 and the upper deck slides on the A380. The MLR3 are in the wing/body fairing and the upper deck slides deploy from hatches below the doors. I guess they have the room for this in the A380, but to do it on all doors of a single deck widebody probably would present its own space issues (eg cargo hold in the way etc)

Apologies for the slight drift, maybe we can take this to Tech.... :O

GarageYears

8th Jul 2013, 19:09

And in which position were the Auto-Throttle switches? And was the A/T on?

This was not stated, except that thrust was demanded at 7 secs before impact and the engines were at 50% at impact.

iamhives

8th Jul 2013, 19:11

Jus to add to the data related by Garage years - she stated that engine thrust was @50% @3 seconds out (at 103kts)

NTSB: Briefing Prelim Data
82 secs before impact - AP off - 1600 ft alt
73 secs - 173kts
54 secs - 149kts
34 secs - 134kts - 500 ft
16 secs - 118kts - 200 ft
8 secs - 112kts - 125 ft
3 secs - 103kts
Impact - 106kts

Doors to Automatic

8th Jul 2013, 19:11

My "real" airline flying experience amounts to two hours' circuit training in a 737-800 Level D simulator shared with a colleague. Whilst he was flying he momentarily took his eye off the ball whilst turning final and the speed gradually decayed to around 135 kts (VREF 141kts). I was scanning the speed and announced "watch your speed!" - power applied; end of story.

Now if two duffers with zero experience can manage it (in the middle of the night) why can't an experienced crew with three or four captains on board!

We can sit and pontificate about airline procedures, no ILS, PAPI switched off etc etc for another 50 pages but the fact is this aircraft should not have been stacked on a beautiful clear day with little wind!

ross_M

8th Jul 2013, 19:17

Now if two duffers with zero experience can manage it (in the middle of the night) why can't an experienced crew with three or four captains on board!

Because you only tried it once. Probabilities.

If you and your duffer mate had run, say, 5000 sim sessions can you confidently say never would that mistake have gone undetected?

Or, if 5000 similar to you people had been put on a sim would none have committed this blunder.

One point, often unappreciated, is that when you put in as many repeat events as in commercial aviation, even relative low probability "stupid" errors are almost a certainty. Given enough time.

archae86

8th Jul 2013, 19:18

This was not stated, except that thrust was demanded at 7 secs before impact and the engines were at 50% at impact.
My transcription from the same portion differs slightly. I heard her say that throttle increase started at impact -8 seconds, and that "50% power" was reached at impact -3 seconds--which was the moment of minimum recorded airspeed before impact.

To add a tiny bit of my armchair analysis--it appears that considerable nose up elevator was applied roughly simultaneous with the throttle push--as the speed decays much more rapidly than previously before beginning to increase. Also the tail cone and other parts being left behind on the sea wall and the video suggest very substantial nose up attitude at the moment of impact.

[edit: I see that the 50% point matter was posted while I was typing]

JamesGV

8th Jul 2013, 19:33

There ya go (if its true).

"Asiana Airlines told the media that Lee Kang-Kook, the pilot in charge of landing the plane, had flown 9,700 hours in an Airbus A320"

PHOTOS: NTSB releases harrowing images from inside the crashed Asiana Airlines Boeing 777 ~ The Aviation Writer (http://www.theaviationwriter.com/2013/07/photos-asiana-airlines-crash-1245.html)

That's "if" it's true.

And they're all having a ganders out of the window...as the speed bleeds off.

Bearcat

8th Jul 2013, 19:36

At 125ft they were 25kts below their fly speed of 137kts. WTF? :D well done fellas, you'll never be let near the front of an airplane again.

henra

8th Jul 2013, 19:45

At 125ft they were 25kts below their fly speed of 137kts. WTF? :D well done fellas, you'll never be let near the front of an airplane again.

Even more fascinating is the time they spent below that Speed.
More than a whopping 35s apparantly not a single one of 4 ATPL rated pilots in the front office noticing they were to slow !? :confused:
CVR might be more enlightening than FDR.

Doors to Automatic

8th Jul 2013, 19:48

Ross M - I respectfully disagree. The point I was making was that even with virtually no flying experience I was still scanning the speed. Rest assured if I had 290 people behind me I would be glued to that ASI! That is because the basic scan (especially speed) is fundamental to any sort of flying.

What these "pilots" were doing was akin to driving down the Motorway at 100mph with your eyes closeed. It is absolutely unfathomable how they managed to get themselves into this position. For at least 30 seconds before the crash they were below VREF. This isn't CFIT at night, landing short in fog or even touching down halfway along the runway and going off the end. I don't think I have ever seen an accident which should have been more avoidable. Words fail me!

1stspotter

8th Jul 2013, 20:08

Interesting to mention that flight Asiana 214 on July 5, so the day before the crashed one, make a go around at SFO. Same flightnumber, same aircraft. The reason is unknown to me.
See a picture of the flightpath registered by flightaware
http://s22.postimg.org/4negv3zyp/AAR214_July5_GA.gif

deSitter

8th Jul 2013, 20:10

It's so easy to throw blame around. I'm sure the pilots pooched this one. But one has to have a little sympathy. If I screw up, people don't die. We forget what a huge responsibility transport pilots have..

The woman who pooched it on FedEx 647 died this year of a stroke. Only 54. Here's her obituary. That smiling face may not have been that of a stick-and-rudder natural, but she was probably a really decent person.

Obituary Notices : The Suburban Times (http://www.thesubtimes.com/obituary-notices-619/)

Maybe the hiring process needs to be more rigorous.

JimNtexas

8th Jul 2013, 20:11

To those bemoaning the `racism' in this thread.
Some cultures have high power distance - i.e. you do not question those in charge.
Others have low power distance - you can question those in charge.
It's a fact of life - not racism.
Read the long history of how Korean cultural norms contributed indirectly to the Guam crash and many other accidents - among a host of other factors.
It's a well established scientific principle in aviation human factors - not racism at all.
From Malcolm Gladwell - certainly not a conservative, or a racist for that matter:

I was a mere Navigator, but I did spend a year on a Korean Air Force base (NOT a USAF base in Korea, a ROKAF base) working daily with my Korean counterparts.

This 'power distance' difference between the USAF and ROKAF was huge.

Just to give you one example, years ago I was a bombing range controller back when the USAF had range control towers.

I was a junior Captain navigator. One day a two star general showed up in a flight of F-4s. He fouled his first low angle bomb pass for a low pullout, but I just warned him, since I was a bit intimated. He fouled his second LAB pass so I called the foul.

He then did a low angle strafe and fouled again. I ordered him to hold high and dry, as we had a 'two strikes and you're out' rule.

As that flight left I called my Squadron Commander and told him that I had fouled a General Officer off the range. The CC said "good job".

I never heard another word about it.

Fast forward a few years and some USAF technicians are working on camera equipment on a controlled ROKAF range. A ROKAF general officer shows up in an F-4 30 minutes early and wants to strafe.

The ROKAF range control told the USAF guys who are very near the strafe targets to "take cover" and the ROKAF general rolled in for his strafing runs.

That was the most extreme example I saw, but it was clear to me that in matters large or small the ROKAF officers were extremely reluctant to pass any sort of bad news to the boss, and would never, ever, directly contradict a senior officer. They told me that it was very important to them that their boss never lose face, and that they knew that as an American I couldn't really understand the whole concept of 'face' as it was practiced in their service.

Capi_Cafre'

8th Jul 2013, 20:18

No use in even commenting in the first days since we are overrun with newbies (less than 500 posts) expressing subjective opinions.
Actually, most of the specious blather on this topic seems to be coming from those whose post counts show a true affinity for it.

Lonewolf_50

8th Jul 2013, 20:18

Callsign Kilo:
Fair criticism of the sound byte: as posted it was not a specific scan pattern but a general scan habit taught to us all way back when we started. There is indeed a bit more to it than "inside, outside", since what one is supposed to be checking for (and correcting for) inside and outide is an integral part of a given scan pattern. Slap to the wrist accepted. :)

Onceapilot

8th Jul 2013, 20:24

I refer to my post #346. A config corelated audio "low speed" type of warning is the only way to avoid low speed on approach, poor scan related, mishaps. The stick-shaker does not protect this, nothing else does either when ATS or A/T are disconnected.
Aviators learned long ago that "speed is life".

taildrag

8th Jul 2013, 20:26

Good points. Can those familiar with SFO tell us whether "slam dunk" visual approaches are common there? I can see how a pilot making his first SFO landing after a long flight, concerned with being evaluated, possibly not having practiced such g/s US approaches in the sim, could be caught out by the factors you mentioned.
Flight International had a lengthy article years ago about Asian culture. It's possible that played a role here too.
We'll see.

clayne

8th Jul 2013, 20:43

Am unsure how the debate about the authority gradient applies when both crew are Captains and the more senior one is an instructor PNF in the RHS. Is there anything culturally that would prevent him from speaking out?

YES.

High context vs low context, i.e. "face." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_and_low_context_cultures)
Typically different perception of authority when it comes to captain vs F/O as compared to Western airlines.
Lack of assertive CRM as a result.

clayne

8th Jul 2013, 20:44

Of course the pilots where tired, they where flying for 10 h and they are human.

Sorry, disagree. What's the relief crew there for?

Shutterbug

8th Jul 2013, 20:53

This _must_ be the interview several news articles are referring to, but it doesn't even seem to be the same interview to me:

??? ???, "?? ??? ?? ?? ??" / YTN - YouTube

If you don't speak Korean, don't bother with the link. It's all in Korean, no subs no translations. This is the Cabin Manager Lee Yoonhye's interview to the press in Korean. Here are the highlights that I haven't seen in any article:

Immediately after the crash she went to the cockpit, asked if everyone was okay. Affirmative. She then asked the captain, "Shall we evacuate?" The captain replied, "Please wait." Ms. Lee said there were two captains and one F/O in the cockpit, and _one_ captain outside the cockpit at landing. She refers to captains by their Korean titles Kijang, the F/O as Bukijang...

She made 3 PA's asking the pax to please remain calm... captain comes on the PA and gives orders to commence evacuation.... Ms. Lee pops L1 door and slide and commences evacuation of that section... she realized one of the crew is trapped at the R1 but decides to evacuate pax first and then attempt to free her colleague... the captain who had been in the cabin with the crew has grabbed the crash ax and rushes to R1 to deflate the slide and liberate the trapped crew.

Ms. Lee makes her way to L2 to assist with evacuation... some comments about the chaos and Chinese pax unable to understand their instructions...
observes R2 slide has also inflated and trapped the cabin attendant's leg. The cabin attendant has been crying for help while the pax are scrambling to evacuate. Ms. Lee locates one of the meal knives and stabs the slide to deflate it. Asks colleagues to rescue the trapped crew and help her out the aircraft.

Ms. Lee rushes down to L3 to check on the status of the evacuation there and starts to see smoke and fire in HJK seats sections. She locates a BCF and gets it to the F/O and asks him to put out the fire as she scrambles back to L2.... lot of miscellaneous comments about the chaos throughout the cabin, Chinese pax being unable to understand the crew's instructions... her yelling at pax to leave their bags and get out... few observations on her crew assisting pax out... even as smoke and fire began to get out of control she rushed back and forth through the aircraft until she felt the aircraft had been completely evacuated. She evacuated last.

Apologies for any errors. Don't take my word for any of this. Grab a Korean friend and have them go over her statement. Sorry, it's PPrune... best I could do on short notice.

ZBBYLW

8th Jul 2013, 21:10

Do Asiana relief crews sit in the flight deck or sit back in First Class on landing. I heard it may be the later... May want to change that policy, it seems there were already 2 passengers sitting in 0A and 0B maybe having someone in the flight deck with a touch more assertiveness may be a wise move.

Would the FAA ever consider having an approved pilot list. Frankly if the FO at certain companies or from different cultures don't want to be an assertive PNF perhaps having specially trained pilots who have to demonstrate to an FAA checker CRM skills, the ability to fly a visual approach with no magic and instrument approaches down to CAT I mins without AP or A/THR from say 10,000 feet? Perhaps only letting pilots with these types of certifications into US airspace would be a good start. It should not be a requirement but frankly it is looking like the private sector is letting the ball drop.

It would not be like insurance companies of years back allowing only western pilots fly, but instead allowing only those pilots who are successful in an "aircraft handling" course fly into the USA. You could have ops spec for international airlines who don't need to meet this extra standard (LH, BA, AC, CX etc..) based on a very good pass rate early in the program with regular audits showing that during LOFTs etc these companies are still maintaining proficient at flying.

Just a thought, I fly for an airline that encourages AP and A/THR off "when appropriate" in fact it's in our Ops Manual stating that it is encouraged. In my case the Airbus flies wonderfully with the magic off and with a bit of practice I find you can fly more accurately or smoother than the AP in certain situations by thinking ahead of the plane and anticipating various things. To read what has allegedly happened on board the Asiana flight deck makes me wonder if these guys took the joke "Computer Monitor" too seriously and forgot that they get paid the big bucks to be pilots.

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 21:11

Wow.

That she made the PAs fits in with a passenger statement on CNN that the crew were asking for calm.. iirc he mentioned that the pax didn't want to stay seated so it's possible the ones at the back were pretty much starting to evacuate by the time the captain gave the purser the go ahead. Still, amazing that she managed to get around the aircraft to check on her crew on keep her head. Certainly she earnt her money that day!

Interesting that the pax ignored the trapped CC... I don't know if I could leave a CC there especially if I were on my way past anyway. Then again I consider any CC my colleague whether my airline or not.

Didn't someone post earlier that the NTSB were waiting to interview the crew? If so isn't it poor form on the part of the airline to let them speak to media first? I thought that was a huge no no

roving

8th Jul 2013, 21:12

NEW YORK (CNNMoney)

Asiana Airlines will likely end up paying hundreds of millions of dollars to passengers of its flight that crashed in San Francisco on Saturday, according to a leading aviation law expert.

"I don't think there's a claim out there worth less than $1 million. Many will be worth multi-millions," said Arthur Wolk, one of the top personal injury attorneys specializing in air crashes. The Philadelphia-based Wolk said that, as of Monday, he had not been retained by any of the passengers or their families.

The crash, the first fatal airline crash in the United States in nearly four years, occurred Saturday when the Boeing 777 jet attempting to land clipped the end of runway. There were 182 people hospitalized with injuries ranging from severe scrapes to paralysis.

Wolk said even the 123 passengers on the plane who escaped without any physical injuries are likely to see seven-figure settlements from the airline and its insurance carriers due to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Asiana passengers likely to get millions of dollars - Jul. 8, 2013 (http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/08/news/companies/asiana-passengers/index.html?source=yahoo_quote)

Boneman

8th Jul 2013, 21:24

Sorry, disagree. What's the relief crew there for?

Have you ever flown international before?

Crossing multiple time zones and landing in a different hemisphere from where you departed has a very negative effect on your circadian rhythm. Having a "relief crew" does not necessarily mean you will get adequate or quality rest, if any. You could (and will) be landing when your body tells you, you should be sleeping. You see the sun rise when you feel like it is time to go to bed. It is something we all encounter flying flag operations, but we do the best to mitigate the negative consequences. Fatigue is a contributing factor in this accident.

NamelessWonder

8th Jul 2013, 21:27

Cannot see it, says 'not available in your territory'...is it a different version of the crash as it was shown in cnn yesterday? thanks

Same footage as before, but edited (on the BBC vid)

From the CSD/Purser (See Shutterbug's post above)

Ms. Lee said there were two captains and one F/O in the cockpit, and _one_ captain outside the cockpit at landing.

So, the PF, the PNF (TC) and one FO in the cockpit, with the Captain from the second crew outside would seem to be the crew configuration at landing.

oceancrosser

8th Jul 2013, 21:28

CNN; NTSB says, as of Monday 3PM EST, that they have not interviewed the crew. Apparently, they are waiting for Korean authorities to assist.

I lived in Korea for 3 years. Nearly all Koreans speak English fairly well.

Unfortunately, not many Korean pilots appear to be part of "nearly all Koreans" judging by r/t skills.

glad rag

8th Jul 2013, 21:33

The thing you got to ask yourself, would the same be ever led to happen on BA or Lufthansa.

It says a lot about the airline when two idiots upfront can't even tell they are way below the approach speed on landing, they shouldn't even be flying a Cessna and deserve everything they get if what is reported to be the case is true. I'm sure some pax in the back who have 0 flying hours would have known something was going wrong by the way a slow approach speed/attitude feels, its not rocket science wether your flying a 777 or a C150.... http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/363645-turkish-airliner-crashes-schiphol.html

:uhoh:

Speed of Sound

8th Jul 2013, 21:35

Interesting to mention that flight Asiana 214 on July 5, so the day before the crashed one, make a go around at SFO.

It might be an interesting exercise to trawl back through the FlightAware database for the weeks since the ILS was U/S.

I have already made the point that despite the "cultural/training" issues, at least 20 previous Flight 214s have landed without incident at SFO. If any more of them are GAs it may back up the charge that some of these pilots are not particularly skilled at hand flying visual approaches (obviously depending on the reason for the GAs), but it would also however knock on the head the idea that these pilots 'don't do' go arounds.

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 21:47

Apologies if this has already been posted... but it's hard to keep up with all the posts

Read more: Plane crash survivors describe horror (http://www.smh.com.au/world/cabin-crew-passengers-recall-crash-horror-20130708-2pmj4.html#ixzz2YUcq3HRd[/quote)]

Siglo

8th Jul 2013, 21:53

Severe break down on both parts - As pilot flying you are expected to be able to visually fly a serviceable aircraft down to the runway and land safely in the designated touchdown zone, instrument assisted is a bonus! If you can't get the basics right what are you doing there!? As pilot monitoring in a 2 crew environment you are there to advise the pilot flying of any deviations; whether that's glide slope/localiser deviations from an ILS or height checks on a LOC only or VOR approach.. How did these guys manage to hit the ground so short!?

Having relief crew in the cockpit for landing should be a bonus and they should obviously call out anything they see that isn't right!! Why do so many airlines stipulate that on long haul flights all 4/3 crew members must be in the cockpit for takeoff and landing!? This accident could have been a lot worse and if it was all to 'save face' then anyone who won't speak up about deviations in flight path purely to save face shouldn't be there in the first place! Do they not have CRM training at Asiana??

Shutterbug

8th Jul 2013, 21:58

@givemewings #978

I want to reiterate... this is from her statement at the aforementioned briefing. I've already heard another eyewitness account from a pax who stated her relatives had seen the FA trapped by the slide and attempted to help her and according to her _they_ were the ones who were able to free her from the R2 slide. Obviously can't have both events. Also haven't seen Asiana state 3 of the cockpit crew were "captains," but she referred to them as "kijang," I'm just translating her statement.

nigegilb

8th Jul 2013, 21:58

Since June it has been something of a lottery as to whether or not PAPIs are available to 28L/28R. Be very interested if anyone has a copy of the SFO Notam for July 6 prior to the accident. I can't recall seeing them operative since the current airfield works have been underway. Looking at the flight aware data this was a steep approach that coincided with a 3 deg flight path @ around 500 feet, only to go below the glide path at this point. I am struggling to comprehend how the crew would ignore four reds at this point, so, until the crew confirm the PAPIs were functioning, doubts remain. Perhaps someone better versed than myself can explain the acceptability of the situation at SFO given that FAA are signed up to these agreements?

This is the requirement as explained by FAA and attached to its recent capital improvement program RE PAPI installation;

Core Initiative: Visual

Navaids(N04.01-00) (CIP#:N04.01-00)

This program supports the procurement, installation, and commissioning of Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) systems and Runway End Identification Light (REIL) systems. A PAPI provides visual approach glide slope information to pilots and enables them to make a stabilized descent with a safe margin of approach clearance over obstructions.

These are the ICAO internationally agreed requirements;

ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 Aerodrome Design and Operations

5.3.5 Visual approach slope indicator systems

Application

5.3.5.1 A visual approach slope indicator system shall be provided to serve the approach to a runway whether or not the runway is served by other visual approach aids or by non-visual aids, where one or more of the following conditions exist:

a) the runway is used by turbojet or other aeroplanes with similar approach guidance requirements;

b) the pilot of any type of aeroplane may have difficulty in judging the approach due to:

1) inadequate visual guidance such as is experienced during an approach over water or featureless terrain by day or in the absence of sufficient extraneous lights in the approach area by night, or

2) misleading information such as is produced by deceptive surrounding terrain or runway slopes;

c) the presence of objects in the approach area may involve serious hazard if an aeroplane descends below the normal approach path, particularly if there are no non-visual or other visual aids to give warning of such objects;

d) physical conditions at either end of the runway present a serious hazard in the event of an aeroplane undershooting or overrunning the runway; and

e) terrain or prevalent meteorological conditions are such that the aeroplane may be subjected to unusual turbulence during approach.

Note.C Guidance on the priority of installation of visual approach slope indicator systems is contained in Attachment A, Section 12.

5.3.5.2 The standard visual approach slope indicator systems shall consist of the following:
a) T-VASIS and AT-VASIS conforming to the specifications contained in 5.3.5.6 to 5.3.5.22 inclusive;

85

b) PAPI and APAPI systems conforming to the specifications contained in 5.3.5.23 to 5.3.5.40 inclusive; as shown in Figure 5-12.

5.3.5.3 P API, T-V ASIS or A T-V ASIS shall be provided where the code number is 3 or 4 when one or more of the conditions specified in 5.3.5.1 exist.

5.3.5.4 PAPI or APAPI shall be provided where the code number is 1 or 2 when one or more of the conditions specified in 5.3.5.1 exist.

5.3.5.5 Where a runway threshold is temporarily displaced from the normal position and one or more of the conditions specified in 5.3.5.1 exist, a P API shall be provided except that where the code number is 1 or 2 an AP API may be provided.

con-pilot

8th Jul 2013, 21:59

Fatigue is a contributing factor in this accident.

Yes, but a minor one really, unless they did not receive adequate rest prior to departing on this flight. I don't think that this information has been released yet.

givemewings

8th Jul 2013, 22:02

Shutterbug, true. They could be talking about the two different locations, as well. Or, the relatives were assisting before the purser arrived at the door. I'm sure it's easy for memories to get mixed up and adding in time compression as well... Well, that someone went to help him/her makes me happier at least, you'd hope there'd at least be one or two out of a group who would.

RobertS975

8th Jul 2013, 22:02

Back in the late 90s, Delta stop codesharing with KE and at KE's invitation, did an exhaustive analysis of the practices and culture at the carrier. I believe that the findings worked, because they have been accident free since as far as I know.

http://www.flight.org/blog/download/airline-safety/korean_airlines_safety_audit_report.pdf

Green Guard

8th Jul 2013, 22:12

The thing you got to ask yourself, would the same be ever led to happen on BA or Lufthansa.

BA and LH ? We can not tell if it would, but we can certainly tell you IT DID happen to both of them. LH B747 somewhere in South Africa and BA on Trident after T/O ?

Speed of Sound

8th Jul 2013, 22:13

Unfortunately, not many Korean pilots appear to be part of "nearly all Koreans" judging by r/t skills.

I assume they are waiting for 'Korean Authorities to assist' as it is likely that they will be interviewed in their native tongue.

taildrag

8th Jul 2013, 22:26

Dozywannabe,

The engineering in modern airplanes, as well as the software technology, is truly amazing.

Nevertheless, "traps" like those recognized elsewhere in this forum (for instance, in differences between autothrust lever engagement and movement between Airbus and Boeing) are becoming better known as operational experience increases.

Years ago, I attended an aviation psychology symposium at Ohio State University, when "FBW" and automation by Airbus was still in the development stages, and FBW was still markedly controversial.

One of the speakers said that the software was very complex, having to contend with untold combinations of conditions (such as which warnings to inhibit on the takeoff role, to prohibit rejected takeoffs for non-critical events). Inevitably,he speculated, automation would act "unreasonably" and cause problems in some unforeseeable situations.

Keep alert. Expect the unexpected. Your turn could come tomorrow.:confused:

Shutterbug

8th Jul 2013, 22:27

@givemewings

I agree with an aforementioned comment... is it really wise to roll out crew and give statements to the press? But look at it from Asiana's point-of-view... they may realize they have a serious problem on their hands and are trying to spin the heroism of the cabin crew to take away from the crash. Then again... to me her statement really only indicts them... _she_ asks the captain if they should commence an evacuation... he tells her to wait. Excuse my French... but wtf?! Wait for what? Had that cabin erupted in smoke or fire earlier than it did crucial seconds would have been lost while the captain was sorting out his playbook. It's beyond me. And the press. Are they listening to this? I haven't read this in one single press release. Instead they focus on the FA who is in tears... why was she crying. Who gives a f*ck. Plane just crashed, Cabin Manager asks captain shall we start the evac, captain says please wait. Isn't THAT the story?

I guess I'm just not cut out to be a journo. Can't see the story angle through the story.

HKATER

8th Jul 2013, 22:30

Dear All, I find the similarities with a China Airlines Flight 140 which crashed whilst attempting to land at Nagoya Airport in Japan in 1994 disturbing. I know we shouldn't rush to judgment, but you can't help getting the feeling that we have seen this before. It was the second worst air crash in Japan and resulted in that Airline being banned from flying to Japan for 10 years. If it is found to be pilot error in this case, then I suppose it is the price we pay for being human....

tdracer

8th Jul 2013, 22:32

Lots of good comments (and some not so good).

I'd like to clear up a few misconceptions I noticed going through the 50 pages.

It was posted that the Rolls Royce engine control (in the BA Heathrow accident) and the PW4000 engine control are both made by Goodrich (the implication that they both might have the same s/w error) Not true - the Trent 800 engine control was done by Lucas - now part of Goodrich. The PW4000 engine controls were done by Hamilton Standard (now Hamilton Sundstrand).
I was involved in the BA Heathrow investigation - there was a huge amount of data from the QAR and Flight Data Recorders - the fuel metering valves on both engines were commanded to open, the position feedback indicated the metering valves opened, but the fuel flow didn't increase. The only way that could happen was if the fuel flow was obstructed upstream of the fuel control.

The 777 'pressure vessel' is pretty much all aluminum (aside of course from the windows) - the main deck floor is largely composite, as is the vertical tail. As to how the 787 might hold up in a similar accident - the FAA had concerns regarding how a composite fuselage would hold up. They made Boeing do 'drop tests' of fuselage barrel sections to show they provided crash protection equivalent to an aluminum structure. Of course, we won't really know how a 787 will hold up in a similar crash until a 787 is involved in a similar crash - hopefully we'll be waiting a long, long time for that to happen.

While there is always risk that pilots will become too dependent on the technology, it's hard to argue with the results. Each generation of new airplanes has gotten safer - with the 777 arguably the best so far (A380, 787, and 747-8 haven't been out there long enough to be statistically significant). But this crash, along with the Air France A330, show that we still need to train pilots to fly, not just manage, the airplane.

4468

8th Jul 2013, 22:35

BA and LH ? We can not tell if it would, but we can certainly tell you IT DID happen to both of them. LH B747 somewhere in South Africa and BA on Trident after T/O ?
Just a point of order if I may?

BA's Trident accident at Staines occurred in June of 1972. In that year people may also remember the miner's strike, parliament's vote to join the 'Common Market', and the fact Nixon was president of the US!

As that was 41 years ago it must also have been around about the time the trainee of the Asiana a/c was born. Give or take a couple of years.

Not exactly recent.

UAVop

8th Jul 2013, 22:35

Be very interested if anyone has a copy of the SFO Notam for July 6 prior to the accident.

Ref post #535

SFO 06/011 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R IM OTS TIL 1308222359
SFO 06/010 SFO NAV LDA RWY 28R GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/009 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R CAT 2/3 NA WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/008 SFO RWY 28R RVRT OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/005 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28L GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/004 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/003 SFO RWY 28R ALS OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359

UAVop

8th Jul 2013, 22:40

It may also be pertinent to note that just recently, SFO changed approach ops, approach procedure with a new closely spaced parallel runway operation to reduce spacing between aircraft.
There is a striking similarity between this incident and the Bali incident.

Homebrew1

8th Jul 2013, 22:41

777yank Just a few observations from a commercial pilot with many hours in the 777 and 737:

-There are similarities with the Lion Air crash and the SFO disaster. I think both accidents could have avoided with proper use of the VNAV (they are virtually identical on the 777 and 737).

-I've seen 777 and 737 crews screw up non-precision approaches because they never practice them. Remember the Guam accident? Have we learned nothing?

-VNAV (even on a base turn to a visual approach) is a great tool for a constant rate descent.

-At my airline, you are required to use all navigation aids, even in VFR conditions. Why would not you use VNAV as an aid for a stabilized approach?

Unfortunately the way I see it, VNAV is one of the key drivers in the reduction in basic 'hand flying' skills. It's too easy and comfortable and you don't need to use your brain.....much.

Without jumping to conclusions, maybe this wouldn't have happened if he had flown a few more visual approaches and was comfortable hand flying the aircraft (I acknowledge VNAV has it's place but not at the expense of basic hand flying skills).

hifly787

8th Jul 2013, 22:43

onion
fully agree with you . notwithstanding incredible advances in aircraft technology
the extent of pilot stupidity cannot be understood.

JamesGV

8th Jul 2013, 22:47

Out

!SFO 07/046 SFO Runway 28L Precision Approach Path Indicator Out of Service Effective from 1307062219 CREATED: 06 JUL 2013 22:19:00

Closed

!SFO 07/047 SFO Runway 10R/28L Closed Effective from 1307062309 CREATED: 06 JUL 2013 23:09:00

My "time" might be out ?

DozyWannabe

8th Jul 2013, 22:53

Years ago, I attended an aviation psychology symposium at Ohio State University, when "FBW" and automation by Airbus was still in the development stages, and FBW was still markedly controversial.

One of the speakers said that the software was very complex, having to contend with untold combinations of conditions (such as which warnings to inhibit on the takeoff role, to prohibit rejected takeoffs for non-critical events). Inevitably,he speculated, automation would act "unreasonably" and cause problems in some unforeseeable situations.

Funnily enough, my old Prof. (who is sadly no longer with us) was very much of that mindset. In fact he was an out-and-out sceptic for years, and being a specialist in software reliability a lot of people took him seriously. A visit to Toulouse:

Report on visit to Airbus Industrie - 28-29th Jan. 1993 (http://www.kls2.com/cgi-bin/arcfetch?db=sci.aeronautics.airliners&id=%[email protected]%3E)

ended up softening his attitude slightly, but he'd never sanction being complacent about the subject.

The long and the short of it though, is that a lot of those worries were unfounded. Difference in thrust lever/throttle behaviour between Airbus and other types is a mere conversion issue (there is no such thing as a 'standard flight deck'), and Airbus never designed the automation hardware. That task went to Honeywell - incidentally the same people who made FMS units for Boeing. :)

Speed of Sound

8th Jul 2013, 23:04

Unfortunately the way I see it, VNAV is one of the key drivers in the reduction in basic 'hand flying' skills. It's too easy and comfortable and you don't need to use your brain.....much.

I think the point 777yank was making was that given the situation the PF found himself in on the day, regardless of the reasons why he ended up there, VNAV was available to him as an aid to resolving the situation without killing two people and injuring many others. :(

ExSp33db1rd

8th Jul 2013, 23:05

Sorry, disagree. What's the relief crew there for?

So that you get 3 tired crewpersons instead of only 2 !

These days I'm sure pax will stuff ipads down their trousers/bras first then
evacuate.

Not a problem for women - who all seem to have a mobile phone permanently welded to their right paw anyway ( just who are they always talking to ? ) Mind you, if I was deleyed by one texting as she went down the chute, I might just commit a felony. ( want to bet it didn't happen, enough of them turned around and started taking photographs, which proves that their mobile phones weren't too far away ? )

A Squared

8th Jul 2013, 23:11

!SFO 07/046 SFO Runway 28L Precision Approach Path Indicator Out of Service Effective from 1307062219 CREATED: 06 JUL 2013 22:19:00

As has been pointed out a number of times previously, that NOTAM was effective a couple hours after the crash and resulted from the 777 sliding over the PAPI. destroying it.

The NTSB has stated that the PAPI was operational prior to being wiped out by the crash.

DoYouFly

8th Jul 2013, 23:17

Here is an X-Plane version o the crash. X-Plane simulates physics, true flight dynamics and flight characteristics. See what you think, compared to the cartoon CNN has been using.

Asiana Boeing 777 Crash Animation with X-Plane - YouTube

Xshongololo

8th Jul 2013, 23:17

Quote:
Be very interested if anyone has a copy of the SFO Notam for July 6 prior to the accident.
Ref post #535

SFO 06/011 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R IM OTS TIL 1308222359
SFO 06/010 SFO NAV LDA RWY 28R GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/009 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R CAT 2/3 NA WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/008 SFO RWY 28R RVRT OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/005 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28L GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/004 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/003 SFO RWY 28R ALS OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359

When will the aviation industry wake up and start issuing NOTAMS in normal plain English. Do you think non native with English as a second language really can get to grip with the NOTAM gobbledygook we face everyday?

If this accident investigation concludes that basic flying skills were the biggest contributor to this accident it should be a huge wake up call for this industry.
This type of accident will statistically increase as basic flying skills are reduced due to the airline cadet transition straight to complex jet population increases.

Lorimer

8th Jul 2013, 23:19

Harking back to the comments on observation of an aircraft's flightpath and speed, if I ever had a pilot on the jump seat, I would always give them a headset and ask them to be my 3rd pair of eyes and ears. On at least 2 occasions this 3rd, supplementary pilot helped to sort out a couple of unclear ATC transmissions.

Also, if I flew with a new F/O, straight out of Line Training, once I'd completed my departure brief I would say:

"There's one important thing I need to add which is this. The reason I'm in this left-hand seat is because I've been doing this job longer than you. It doesn't mean that I'm incapable of making mistakes. So if you see or hear anything which you don't understand or appears to be not right, please speak up and tell me."

My company had excellent CRM training, but I still felt that it was important to give a new and maybe nervous young F/O full permission and encouragement to say something if they weren't comfortable. There is absolutely no room for pride in the flight deck; the important thing is that the day's flying is accomplished safely, and hopefully enjoyably as well.

And back to the posts on unserviceable ILS at LHR, I do remember a day, maybe 15 years ago, when the ILS for 09L was out and pilots were invited to make NDB approaches. What ATC had not appreciated was that company policy of some airlines was for the approach to be flown at approach speed from the final descent point. Some 10 miles at maybe a Vref of 125 knots rather than 160 knots, sure slowed the landing rate down! I seem to remember that the 4 holds were well used that day!

nigegilb

8th Jul 2013, 23:25

Definition Operational;

Fit for proper functioning; ready for use

JamesGV

8th Jul 2013, 23:28

A Squared.

I thought as much.

CAT1

8th Jul 2013, 23:40

Reading this thread reminds me why I don't come on here much anymore. Apart from a large number of armchair experts posting a lot of drivel, it seems the majority have made up their mind this accident was caused by pilot error, and a sizeable majority of them that this is most likely because the crew were all Korean. It may indeed have been pilot error, but until the CVR and FDR have been analysed no one knows what really happened.

Personally I find it pretty unlikely that a speed 18 knots below Vref 16 seconds before impact (plus the resulting high attitude) would have not elicited a reaction from the handling pilot, ie pushing the throttles forward, or failing that a reaction from the pilot in the right-hand seat (who after all was a training captain, who, by job description, is expected, and expects to have to be to be, more vigilant than a line captain). If the relief crew were also on the flight-deck then the idea that they would just sit there and let the operating crew crash the aircraft is even more absurd. I find it highly unlikely that the auto-throttle would have been disconnected, it's standard practice to have it always engaged, and it would have woken up long before impact if those speeds quoted are accurate.

It seems all the "experts" here have it all worked out. As a current B777 skipper, I am very interested in knowing what caused this accident, but, personally, I'll wait for more information before jumping to conclusions. But hey, if it turns out they screwed the pooch (which btw I am not discounting as a possibility), you can all have a good sneer and say you told me so.

slacktide

8th Jul 2013, 23:48

It was posted that the Rolls Royce engine control (in the BA Heathrow accident) and the PW4000 engine control are both made by Goodrich (the implication that they both might have the same s/w error) Not true - the Trent 800 engine control was done by Lucas - now part of Goodrich. The PW4000 engine controls were done by Hamilton Standard (now Hamilton Sundstrand).Nitpicking, but... Both Goodrich ( Heritage BFGoodrich Aerospace as well as the Rohr and Lucas divisions) and Hamilton Sundstrand are now owned by United Technologies... who also own Pratt.

Our Company | UTC Aerospace Systems (http://utcaerospacesystems.com/Company/Pages/company.aspx)

Capt Fathom

8th Jul 2013, 23:53

Over 1000 posts. There can't possibly be anything else left to speculate over!

Island-Flyer

9th Jul 2013, 00:07

Apologies if this has been posted. I receieved this from a friend of mine who got it as part of a distribution from one of the cockpit crew of the UA 747. I don't personally know tha UA relief FO but apparently permission had been granted to distribute this email freely.

Here is an email from a United crew holding short of the runway as the Asiana B-777 approached:

On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned.

JamesGV

9th Jul 2013, 00:09

CRM don't forget...which people do.
With a capital "C".

All credit to the "lead" in the back.
She seems to have done a fantastic job given the tough situation.

CDRW

9th Jul 2013, 00:10

Ref the third or fourth crew members in the flight deck - is it a safer operation to have a the extra crew members in the flight deck? If the answer is yes then it must be less safe to operate with the standard two pilots and if airlines are concerned about flight safety then surely they would operate with three pilots - as it is safer?? Hell if three pilots makes it safer then 4 pilots makes it still safer!!

Modern airliners are two pilot operations - not three or four - the extra crew members are there to extend duty time.

With out having trawled through all the pages I wonder what mode they where in on final descent - if they where high and they where in FLCH mode - the Auto thrust would be in HLD . From what I can remember about this mode is that as the speed goes below the selected speed the A/T remains in Hld and will allow the speed to decay.

tartare

9th Jul 2013, 00:14

JimNTexas - v. good insight on power distance, gradient in the Korean Air Force - major factor in some of the national carrier's human factor problems around the time of Guam - because of their hiring of ex military pilots.
Which brings to mind another point - which delinks the issue of authority gradients from race.
There is a type of pilot that more enlightened airlines will look at very carefully before hiring - particularly from a CRM, human factors point of view.
These pilots are prone to over confidence, aggression, making very rapid decisions by themselves with no consultation or checking with others.
Sometimes - they are flat out obnoxious and cocky.
The organisations they work for are hierarchical, often (but not always) with a steep authority gradient.
They sometimes find it difficult to integrate into multi engine, multi-crew air transport operations.
And they come in all skin colours, and speak many different languages.
They're called fighter pilots.
Who knows whether authority gradients will be an issue here - but it's interesting nonetheless.

Yankee Whisky

9th Jul 2013, 00:15

Can anyone explain what, if anything, the other pilot's function is during an approach to landing ? I understand PF must have had a guy in the other seat monitoring the parameters and why in hell did this guy not take over in time to avert entering into slower than normal approach speed and height ! The clues were all there ! Instructors earn their living taking over well before a student exceeds the aircraft's limitations ! Was it cockpit culture or laissez faire familiarity?:bored:

bbratuse

9th Jul 2013, 00:15

let my try to shed some light on possible CRM issue in this terrible accident based on insider information I got yesterday although I do not work for Asiana (I work for KAL in training department as instructor..)

I discussed the crash with one of the older KAL captains who is my colleague in training department and who knew the crew and immediately he pointed out that main issue might be that left seat pilot PF Mr.Lee,Kang Kook was senior to instructor doing PM duties from right seat....by senior I mean they both are graduates from Korea Aerospace University and PF Mr.Lee was senior class in University to instructor...

People not familiar how Korean society works will say "so what?" but people working and living in Korea will say: "Ahhh that explains why instructor allowed for situation to deteriorate that bad that it became unrecoverable.."

You must understand that seniority pretty much determines everything in Korean society interpersonal relationships.. be it by university class seniority,Air Force class seniority or simply by age

Working here now for 3 years I heard million times Koreans saying "ohh I can not say anything he is my senior in Air Force..or University.." or even if one Korean pilot is introducing me to the other usually first sentence is "this is Mr...so and so he is my senior/junior from so and so"..

So general talk here among instructors is that could be one of the crucial factors in this freak accident...Being here longer time and seeing how things are done between seniors and juniors in cockpit (example: if cpt is Air Force class junior to FO, FO is the boss in cockpit no doubt about it..an same applies to Aerospace University graduates) I agree that this can be the case.

Also to mention that seniority "issue" is MUCH more pronounced if 2 pilots are graduates of same organization such as it was in this case.

Anyways...we shall see what has really happened when CVR transcript becomes available but kind of explains mystery (at least to me) of late instructor reaction to unstable approach..