Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[ricfly744]

To all of you saying it is very basic to keep the speed, I agree. Now I ask those who did the STAR conversion from the B744 to the B777, like I recently did.
Do you think you had enough visual app and overall training in the SIM?
The colleague in the controls most likely did the STAR, and for those who do not know, it is very condensed and rushed. I only did 6 visual circuits. And it is different to turn base at 45'' and to fly a long visual final. That was not trained.
Industry is also to blame as very limited and condensed training is the norm.
B744 and T7 are very different to hand fly and takes some time to feel comfortable with the fly by wire, trimming (almost none in the T7), siting position, cockpit hight, and most important, the use of Autothrotle all the way to touchdown on the T7. This alone feels very strange in the beginning.

Someone mentioned a few pages back that Lufthansa pilots would not make similar mistakes. The Riyadh 2010 LH MD11F crash would likely have resulted in fatalities if PAX had been on board. We pilots, "even the best" can make mistakes.

Now who said a proper rest on a long training flight is evenly divided with relief pilots? have you had this experience? I had, and I say not most of the time, as there is a lot to cover and talk about, not always proper rest is taken. The pilot in question, coming from the B744, was likely having his first ETOPS training flight and had to be in seat to see and discuss all there is to it. In my recent training flights, I barely had time to eat and visit the toilet, as a lot had to be ticked from an expense list of topics. You get really exhausted.

[dies2much]

Now we have 2 examples where the PF didn't recognize that they were clearly in trouble, and didn't take appropriate action to remediate. Both flights had very experienced and well trained crews. Both aircraft are lavishly equipped with many tools specifically designed with keeping the aircraft and passengers safe.
Despite all this, these aircraft crashed.

Is it really that the aircrews are over saturated with information during these operations?
How do the other members of the flight deck crew keep quiet or refrain from acting when their lives are at risk?

Is the answer to really put the computers in charge of everything? That isn't an idea that makes me comfortable either.

[framer]

Quote:
What scares me about all this is that these are apparently 'professional' crews from ALL different cultures and backgrounds who seem incapable of keeping a perfectly airworthy aircraft in the air when faced with what amount to very very minor defects or unservicabilities.
This all comes down to bean counters who want to reduce training costs - this is then a 'customer requirement' and the training companies compress the training, the manufacturers put in more automation allowing less training. And none of these people will think that they are creating a flight safety problem they will congratulate themselves on 'keeping the company profitable'. The post cold war military and boomer generation of pilots is now at retirement and are being replaced by pilots who have only been under the bean counter regime of absolute minimum training. It is starting to apparent in the statistics. Unfortunately, the bean counters will only react when the costs of the crashes exceed the savings in training - unless someone gives them some 'guidance' first.
That is aviations greatest challenge for the next decade summed up beautifully in one short post . A real obstacle to overcoming the current situation is that the people making the safety critical decisions don't understand what flying an airliner is about. They think they do, but unless they've done it, all but a few won't get it.
Airline bosses used to be pilots, then when business folk stepped up Chief Pilots had clout and backbone and their decisions were respected. Now days they are hand picked to be compliant. So the people making the decisions aren't aware of what is required to fly an airliner day in, day out for thirty years and avoid having an incident. They are normally unaware of the frailties / limitations and biases of their own brains, the number of errors they make while driving their car or typing a letter, or how any of that applies to consistently providing safe air transport in all weather conditions.
As long as we have people at the helm with zero flying experience the problem will persist and accidents ( crashes is a more appropriate word) like Lion Air, Air France, and Asiana will increase dramatically as the older , well trained generation of pilots retire.
That's my take on it anyway.

[Ramboflyer 1]

CAT 1 , racism is rife in overseas Airlines , in your face , you cant sweep it under the carpet .
The sad thing is the guy who speaks up will maybe avoid a disaster , so you wont read about it , but mysteriously will fail his next medical and be looking for a job .
Theres no excuse for this 777 disaster but its obvious why and I dont think it will improve anything.

[StormyKnight]

I'm no expert, just an aircraft enthusiast & plane crashes interest me on a technical basis as to why they happen, but with all this automation why is there no audible &/or visual warning of low speed....

apparently this flight was below 137kts for 35 seconds.....

I can only assume the entire crew was either worried about other parameters or enjoying the view! But a warning at 10kts below a normal approach speed (determined by aircraft weight) would have brought them back into focus real quick & with plenty of time & altitude to react!

Was it only when the stick shaker acted they realized they were too slow?

Also this does not seem to be a stable approach....speed was being washed off all the way down, shouldn't it be constant throughout the final stages of landing?

Is it possible the pilot tried to fly the B777 like an A320 & there is a significant difference in flight aerodynamics in the landing configuration? i.e the 777 has more drag?

:ok: Thumbs up to the NTSB for getting the facts out very quickly & regularly.

Cheers

[galaxy flyer]

Stormy knight

My understanding from a friend who flies Boeing, there is an EICAS AIRSPEED LOW message. Along with amber and red airspeed numbers to alert pilots of the low speed condition. At some point, we have to assume that the operator put sentient pilots in the seats.

[monarols]

Lorimer, Post 1007 says:

"There's one important thing I need to add which is this. The reason I'm in this left-hand seat is because I've been doing this job longer than you. It doesn't mean that I'm incapable of making mistakes. So if you see or hear anything which you don't understand or appears to be not right, please speak up and tell me."

My company had excellent CRM training, but I still felt that it was important to give a new and maybe nervous young F/O full permission and encouragement to say something if they weren't comfortable. There is absolutely no room for pride in the flight deck; the important thing is that the day's flying is accomplished safely, and hopefully enjoyably as well.

This should be standard practice with all airlines. I don't like to use the work 'Rank", as it has caused many cockpit issues with the PNF being "Barked" at by the PF for making any remarks/suggestions/observations. The Stains Trident one springs to mind, but theres many others.

Each aircraft is now fitted with a CVR. If ANY crew member at the pointy end has been barked at for making an observation/suggestion, a report should be filed with the airline of the incident. It should be investigated THOUROGHLY and the offending PF/PNF should be reprimanded.. IMHO, there is NO room for rank in a cockpit. YOU WORK AS A TEAM.

[A Squared]

Here is an X-Plane version o the crash. X-Plane simulates physics, true flight dynamics and flight characteristics. See what you think,

I think that flight sim enthusiasts who produce silly cartoons with no basis in actual FDR data are a waste of bandwidth, that's what I think. You did ask.

[speed2height]

Pax reported a change in engine tone before impact with the sea wall, I wonder whether that was an Autothrottle wakeup or a attempt to go around. Looking at the FDR speeds with a vref of 137 the Autothrottle should have come out of hold (if for some reason it was there) and automatically applied thrust at 122kts. I think the EICAS AIRSPEED LOW would have been less than this; 1/2 way between Min Manouver and Stick Shaker.

[Best Rate]

Pardon me if this has already been mentioned, but who amongst you inserts the RW28L (or RWXX for that matter) into the fix page/s on approach to either non-precision rwys or when slop guidance unavailable (or for cross-checks) etc?? Just seems to come in handy for dist in nm x 300' for reasonable slope guidance i find... Maybe it was was in the fix page in the above-mentioned accident but not given enough credence?? Anyway, just a thought....

[Capn Bloggs]

there are only 3 basic things that the 'pilot flying' has to monitor; speed, centreline and approach. The latter is considering your approach angle to the touchdown point. We are all taught these basics from day one and they should stay with us for our whole career. Hope this helps to explain the not so complexities of landing an aeroplane. It really isn't that difficult on a nice visual day.
Oh the naivety of it all...

[win_faa]

Approach path taken by Asiana using Google Earth data...
Flightradar24-OZ214.kml (http://ge.tt/45Z3VGl/v/0?c)

[TRF4EVR]

I'm not yet convinced that I "don't get it", Bloggs. I'm not sure what the regs say in Korea, but in the US the PIC is the "final authority" for the safe conduct of the flight. If I'm insufficiently trained to land the aircraft on a huge patch of runway in near-perfect weather, it's up to me to refuse the flight, isn't it? I agree that there must be huge, systemic problems that contributed to this almost literally unbelievable failure on the part of the flight crew, and I'm 100% in favor of those problems being corrected in a rapid and draconian fashion. But the buck stops with the PIC...or he's no longer the PIC. Down that road (IMHO) lies chaos and MORE carnage, not less.

By all means, if the company culture is poisonous to turning out capable pilots, fix it, yes! But when the camel of "not my fault" finger-pointing gets its nose under the tent, where does it end? The simple fact appears to be that these guys crashed a perfectly functional aircraft trying to execute a maneuver that I used to sign off 10 hour student pilots to do solo. So, maybe there's enough blame to go around?

[framer]

Honestly, if this is the sort of thinking that's prevalent amongst pilots today, I'll take my chances with the drones. We're going to excuse our way right out of our jobs, comrades.
You miss the point. We could all very easily say " idiots....I wouldn't do that" and walk away. But the reality is ( most likely) that the pilots were not idiots and that they had good intentions and were trying very hard to do a good job. If they were put in a different environment they would most likely be as capable and competent as the next airline pilot.
So what do we need to change about the environment they were operating in? If you can answer that question you actually make an impact on flight safety rather than just on your own ego.

[misd-agin]

It's not just airspeed, centerline, and approach.

Aimpoint(trend?), alignment(trend?), airspeed(trend?), variation from projected descend path(GS,VASI,PAPI,VTI, FMC deviation from path)(trend?), sink rate(trend?), power(trend?).

Any adjustments made? Verify the trends changing due to the adjustments made. And one adjustment often changes at least one, and possibly several of the performance criteria you're monitoring.

Cycle through the scan again and again and again and again until touchdown.

[jugofpropwash]

I find it interesting (from various media accounts) that the pilot of the United flight that was waiting to take off, an 8 yr old passenger, and various spectators on the ground all thought the plane was too low - yet no one in the cockpit seemed to notice.

Why on earth would the pilot not order an immediate evacuation as soon as the plane came to rest? They crashed. Planes that have crashed tend to catch fire. So get off the plane!!! I can (maybe) understand if the order had been given to get all the uninjured people off, but to wait until help arrived for the injured - but even that doesn't seem to be the case.

Given the lack of urgency regarding an evacuation, it's hard to blame the passengers for taking their luggage with them.

If, indeed, one of the fatalities resulted from being hit by a vehicle - is there any evidence that the girl was thrown from the aircraft? Could she have gone down the slide and then been overcome by injuries/smoke/emotion and sat or laid down and then been struck?

[StormyKnight]

It's not just airspeed, centerline, and approach.

Looks like the centreline may have been on the pilots mind looking at the approach path plot...

Approach path taken by Asiana using Google Earth data...
Flightradar24-OZ214.kml (http://ge.tt/45Z3VGl/v/0?c)

He's right of the centerline till about 30 seconds out where he moves to the line but then back to the right. At the same time during this period the speed is continuing to drop below vref presumably unnoticed.

I'm really concerned that this is going to turn out to be "first landing must be perfect" itis. Especially a need to prove that you can capably fly any aircraft to your close seated peers....

After all why shouldn't the landing have been perfect given the weather conditions....this may have internally elevated the landing standard regarded as a pass/fail in his eyes....it may have delayed the TOGA too!

[Capn Bloggs]

Why on earth would the pilot not order an immediate evacuation as soon as the plane came to rest?
When did you last do a pax evac in the SIM?

[femanvate]

So many excuses being thrown around, but the bottom line here is that if a healthy airliner on a sunny day, with 11k of runway crashes, something needs to be done. A quarter billion dollars and 300 lives were at stake.
That crash would never have happened with an automated cockpit, and the move towards getting pilots out of airliners just took a huge leap. The day is coming, and like the horseless carriage opponents of yesteryear it would behoove us to accept and adapt to that fact.
Sure computers are only as good as their programming, but we are at, or close to the threshold where the overall reliability of an autopilot exceeds that of a human, and airlines and their accountants shareholders and lawyers will react accordingly.

[Toruk Macto]

Caste system or religious hierarchy , many aircraft flying around in certain countries with the guy in the right holding more power and authority than the cpt .

[sccutler]

So, you are assuming it was just an unstable approach.....being the most likely explanation because of your racial prejudices and the make up of thr crew?

That is a shameful and unfortunate accusation.

One who does not recognize the difference between differences based upon race, and differences based upon culture, might perhaps try to better educate oneself before spouting off.

[jportzer]

Why on earth would the pilot not order an immediate evacuation as soon as the plane came to rest? They crashed. Planes that have crashed tend to catch fire. So get off the plane!!! You must not be a pilot? Evacuations can and do cause injuries; you don't evacuate until you complete an assessment and verify that evacuation is a safer course of action. It would have taken a moment or two for the flight crew to realize the amount of damage to the rear section of the fuselage - by all accounts, things were much better up front. Yes it was a very hard landing but until they have gathered at least the basics they aren't going to magically know the extent of the injuries and damage.

Perhaps the following B777 evacuation checklists will help:
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/1-2010%20G-YMMM%20App%20B.pdf

As you can see the Boeing version of this doesn't have the evacuate call (step 5) until after a few other steps are completed, which will make the evaucation safer for all involved.

[pfhjvb0]

Freehills said:


"Should we compare accident rates from western Europe and Asia? Anybody?"

IATA: 2006-2012 data.

North Asia (which includes Korea) has had lower accident rates than Europe

Europe 0.32 0.29 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.00 0.15
North Asia 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.65 0.75 0.81 0.71 0.61 0.37 0.20
IATA Member Airlines 0.48 0.68 0.52 0.62 0.25 0.41 0.00

Actually, Asiana is considered part of the Asia Pacific region. North Asia is essentially China, the Chinese-controlled city states such as Hong Kong, and North Korea. See IATA - North Asia (http://www.iata.org/about/worldwide/north_asia/Pages/index.aspx)

Asia Pacific IATA accident rates are notably higher than Europe:
Asia Pacific 0.67 2.76 0.58 0.86 0.80 0.25 0.48

[jportzer]

That crash would never have happened with an automated cockpit, and the move towards getting pilots out of airliners just took a huge leap. The day is coming, and like the horseless carriage opponents of yesteryear it would behoove us to accept and adapt to that fact.I agree, I cannot understand why so many people on this thread seem to believe the problem is too much automation - to me it seems like not enough, particularly for the minimum-training regime that many people are saying is common for Asian airlines. Had the ILS been available, and an ILS-coupled autopilot been used, would the accident have occurred? No? What precision GPS approaches were available that could have been used, and why weren't they? That's just as much a question as the apparent lack of hand-flying ability.

So to me it would be perfectly reasonable for Asiana's bean-counters and risk assessors, to decide an appropriate response to this crash is NOT to increase training for hand-flying, but rather require ILS or other precision approaches for all operations. Isn't this something that could reasonably be attained in the next few years if made a priority by operators and airports? For wide-body operations at least.

Related to that, was the ILS available for 28R and could Asiana have landed there? Could an airline state to ATC that they require a precision approach, even in CAVOK conditions, if they had a policy against visual approaches? I realize there are complications as it relates to separation with parallel runways.

[bklooste]

San Franciso Plane Crash Asiana Cabin Manager Reveals What Happened (http://www.smh.com.au/world/cabin-crew-manager-hailed-a-hero-as-she-reveals-what-happened-when-plane-went-down-20130708-2pmj4.html)

Looks like a well handled evacuation , despite issues..

Also it looks like the company will come down on the pilots like a ton of bricks ( CEO already said the plane was fine) yet the organization trained them... I wouldnt be surprised to see some suicide.

re racism vs culture - I dont think its racism , racism is what you get when you work in an Asian country especially if you are black! A lot of the Australians here have worked in Asia , and there is more respect for some countries/ airlines eg Singapore and Cathay than others. KLM as has been mentioned had huge cultural issues which were a big talking point at the time .

[jugofpropwash]

No, I'm not a pilot - but I don't believe that waiting around patiently in a crashed plane waiting for it to catch fire is a prudent idea.

Granted - perhaps there needs to be some sort of command half way between "we'll wait here for them to bring the stairs" and "get out now, the plane is on fire" - in short, a command for a controlled, orderly exit.

Had the plane caught fire even just a minute or two faster, I suspect I wouldn't be the only one asking why the pilot didn't order an evacuation immediately.

[vieuphoria]

All these people sproking automation as the saving grace, just remember there is only so much a computer can do!

If everything was automated, what would happen to aircraft still in the air around KSFO after this crash?

Do you close an airport on CAVOK day because you don't have ILS?

How do automated systems handle flameouts/engine failures/FOD blown tires ETC....

Fair enough SOMETIMES pilots make mistakes, but I don't think we are any safer relying in automation.

It all comes down to AVIATE, NAVIAGATE, COMMUNICATE.

While this accident appears to be a result of human error, lets also remember the crews of US1549 and QF32 in which ALL PASSENGERS were saved as the result of crews doing what they are trained to do!

[ChrisJ800]

Any speculation as to what caused the post-crash fire?

hmmm, the starboard engine and ruptured fuel lines that broke off and ended almost adjacent to the starboard fuz. Pics here on this thread.

[Brian Abraham]

Just an observation, but find the parallels with Turkish Airlines flight 1951 of interest.

Co-pilot new to type
High and fast initially
Stalled with insufficient height to recover

That crash would never have happened with an automated cockpit, and the move towards getting pilots out of airliners just took a huge leap..... but we are at, or close to the threshold where the overall reliability of an autopilot exceeds that of a human, and airlines and their accountants shareholders and lawyers will react accordinglyIn your dreams, you'll find yourself one of the extremely few takers. let's see your computer do a Circling NDB to minimums in a thunderstorm with a failed AHRS :D:ok:

[BBK]

Does anyone have a link to the NTSB Press Conference on the 8th. I believe it was held at 1130 am local.

Make a nice change from reading that pilots should monitor airspeed and other things we pros never knew. :ugh:

[ianwood]

That crash would never have happened with an automated cockpit, and the move towards getting pilots out of airliners just took a huge leap. The day is coming, and like the horseless carriage opponents of yesteryear it would behoove us to accept and adapt to that fact.

I agree, I cannot understand why so many people on this thread seem to believe the problem is too much automation - to me it seems like not enough, particularly for the minimum-training regime that many people are saying is common for Asian airlines. Had the ILS been available, and an ILS-coupled autopilot been used, would the accident have occurred? No? What precision GPS approaches were available that could have been used, and why weren't they? That's just as much a question as the apparent lack of hand-flying ability.

As lowly SLF, it seems the aviation industry is at an inflection point. This crash might be an argument both for and against more automation. While it improves safety, reliability and ease of commercial flying, it appears to come with a cost. It would appear that some pilots get less training, forget or don't ever fully learn the basics of flying and get away with it until something like this happens. I don't think turning on ILS at every runway is the answer.

I personally don't ever want to get on a plane with a push button pilot. It leaves a giant hole in a very important piece of cheese. You can automate the hell out of planes and it's ultimately a good thing, but when something goes wrong, the pilot and the plane need to be able to "go back to basics". If the plane or the pilot can't resort to a fundamentally "manual"or "analog" mode of flying, we will see this again and again no matter how good the technology.

[MountainBear]

I agree, I cannot understand why so many people on this thread seem to believe the problem is too much automationBecause the current problem is too much automation just like in the long run the problem is too little automation. While the completely automated plane will happen one day the system is by no means ready for that to happen this decade, let alone this year or this month. There is a tremendous amount of work that needs to be accomplished first from regulations, to procedures, to testing, etc etc. Moreover, such planes will be thoroughly tested in GA or cargo operations long before they ever make it to commercial operations.

In the meantime, over-reliance on automation is a real problem right now and there is widespread (albeit not total) agreement on that point. There is much less agreement, however, as to what is to be done about such automation dependency.

If the plane or the pilot can't resort to a fundamentally "manual"or "analog" mode of flying, we will see this again and again no matter how good the technology.

This is a commonly expressed fallacy. It is erroneous because it evaluates the success of automation in light of an regulatory framework and an operating environment that was not designed for fully automated flight. The entire system has to change to accommodate fully automated flight and when it does this concern will disappear.

[clayne]

This is so typical to see some people respond with "well, I guess this means we need more automation!" which is an everythings-a-nail solution. Fly the airplane, go around. It seems neither were done and it doesn't appear like there's anything broken to fix here other than the mindsets, training, and magenta lines. Why cater to the lowest common denominator as an excuse for lack of quality in mindset and approach?

[TRF4EVR]

Some peckerwood's gotta take the beast up, and some peckerwood's gotta...land the son-of-a-bitch. And that peckerwood's called a...'pilot'

...You're mighty right.

For the remedials: The notion that any "system" will replace the human mind in the short-term future is a pure fantasy. The virtue of the human mind is that can process information in a parallel fashion...computers are and will likely always be a linear processor. Let the computers loose on GA aircraft first, see how often "The System" fails, then come back and impress us with how "pilots" have become obsolete. This accident strikes me as the perfect example of how taking human beings OUT of the equation leads to disasater. You can't program Jugdment, it's a human trait. And when you head in that direction, well...

[neville_nobody]

To the people who are spruiking automation thats is most certainly a fool errand.

QF 32/BA 38/US1549 are incidents where automation would not have done a damn thing, yet humans managed to walk some 1000 people collectively from pending death.

This accident assuming it is not a a medical issue at a critical moment will probably end up being some sort of cultural problem ultimately. Someone didnt want to say or do something at the right time to save face.

If you cannot land any plane in those sort of conditions you shouldnt be flying.

[benh57]

So many excuses being thrown around, but the bottom line here is that if a healthy airliner on a sunny day, with 11k of runway crashes, something needs to be done. A quarter billion dollars and 300 lives were at stake. Really? Well, that's debatable. From Robert Reich today:

"transportation analysts at MIT put the odds of death from air travel at two-tenths of 1 percent per 1 million departures, which they say makes flying safer than any other form of transportation, including escalators."

I say we tackle escalators first. Then cars. Then trains.

[jportzer]

QF 32/BA 38/US1549 are incidents where automation would not have done a damn thing, yet humans managed to walk some 1000 people collectively from pending death.


So wait, just because all accidents can't be avoided with increased automation, means it's a fool's errand? Do you skip wearing a seatbelt just because seatbelts can't protect you against death in all accidents? No one is arguing that automation can protect against ALL failures, we're just saying that there are SOME failures not yet protected against, that reasonably could be.

I agree with previous comments that the pilot of the future may be seen as more of a "systems administrator" - system administrators still need to take action in abnormal situations, but it will come to the point where hand flying skills are not the most critical aspect of this.

I fully agree that we are decades away from full automation. But accidents like this one will form part of the case for increased automation, not against it, in the long run.

[Capt Kremin]

The 777 is already heavily automated. The automation exists to reduce the workload in stressful situations.

Apart from fatigue issues and the need to correct a vertical offset in the profile, this sort of approach in the conditions that prevailed at the time, should not be especially taxing to any professional pilot.

All other considerations aside, I find this accident to be inexplicable. Like the AF447 accident, the Lion Air and the Turkish airlines accidents, there seems to something very insidious creeping into the world aviation scene.

At least the pilots survived this one, so they can be asked what happened. I am very intrigued as to what they may say.

[Cows getting bigger]

I think I said something about automation earlier. It appears to me that many problems occur in a 'semi-automated' mode whereby the crew loose SA regarding the division of responsibility between the pilot and the computer - "who's doing what?"

[TRF4EVR]

The logical fallacy here is that because there has been increased automation in cockpits, and accident statistics have dropped, the accident statistics must have dropped due to the increased automation. That's farsical. Correlation does not imply Causation, as even the most window-licking of students of statistics will tell you.

There's no reason that pilots flying trans-continental aircraft with hundreds of people on board shouldn't have the best of ALL possible worlds. Automation. Training. Experience. An "A" in Automation or Training doesn't render a "D" in Experience irrelevant. The automation is there to help you. The training is there to prepare you. The experience is there so that you have the basics down enough to pay attention to the other two. Why are we so willing to accept that any of us can do without any one of the three? That strikes me as the real hubris.

[ironbutt57]

there seems to something very insidious creeping into the world aviation scene.

It's already here full force...

1) fatiguing rosters

2) minimal training/proficiency on visual/manual approaches

3) possible repercussions from management in the event of discontinuing an
unstable approach and going around...

4) RE: #3 pilots aware of this and hesitant to perform manual/visual
approaches, thus reducing proficiency levels....

5) so we have many threats raising their heads here....barriers down, the holes
lined up

[andersontan]

Asiana now confirms that Trainer was 1st day on the job.. add that to the fact that trainee had only 43 hours on the 777.. what a deadly combination!! :uhoh: :\

Asiana crash: Airline says pilot trainer new to the job (http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/world/story/asiana-crash-airline-says-pilot-trainer-new-the-job-20130709)

[Gretchenfrage]

I am angry

Whatever will finally be the findings of the NTSB, how much tons of futile paper the regulators will finally print, no matter what blah-blah all the a$$-covering postholders in airlines will produce, what the all-knowing crm/had/sop instructors and TREs will scribble on the board, it will all come down to only hot air, because anything that would avert incopetent stick and rudder operators getting into a cockpit of an airliner means more money spent for safety and less in the pocket of managers.

And that today is a not-going-to-happen.

Brace for zillions of deviations from the real problem, gazillions of ‘this would not have happened in a XXXXXX’ , ‘we need more Ψ-speed, δ-pitch, ζ-moron protections and it will be all right’.

All this leaves me utterly disgusted and very angry to realise that the whole system still all too easily allows “pilots” to fly a perfectly healthy airliner into terrain on a cavok day. And the very next day another such pilot is again allowed to fly around punters with the very same limited and culture-biased assessment passed, the same dumded-down only strictly sop-automation-bound, below necessity but cheap training received.

We see them and hear them on a daily base, we all know it, we have to share the airspace with them …..

….. and nothing ever happens. The needle returns to start of the song and we all sing along like before ……

I am angry

[clayne]

$$$ > integrity

[TRF4EVR]

I'm also angry. For many of the same reasons. Basic airmanship is out the window in favor of sim-sessions and canned responses to irretrievably complex problems. The best training for flying airplanes is...flying airplanes. In the weather. With things breaking, as they do. A well trained chimpanzee could pass a checkride at any of our vaunted "sim-centers". I mean, hell, they pretty much give you the checkride while you're being "trained". Checking boxes is in, producing genuine Pilots is out.

If you haven't been genuinely afraid in an airplane...had to find your own way out, had to clench up and get on with it...please do yourself and the rest of us a favor and confine your flying to MSFS. REAL pilots are a dying breed. But at least they're not taking anyone with them.

[latetonite]

Buttscratcher.,

Even if a PAPI is mandatory "over there", I am still convinced that you should be able to make a visual approach with no outside help. If not, you are not a competent pilot.
That a 50 hr on type copilot is not capable of doing it, does not master it, I understand. I have been in Training Dept. for a few years. That said, I cannot understand that a captain, leave alone a training captain, in the left seat, let this happen.

[The_Steed]

As a lowly SLF, I have to say that reading this thread scares the living bejebus out of me if the assumptions about pilot error are correct.

To take this to a very basic level, my understanding is that the pilot crashed a perfectly serviceable plane because he (rather than the computer) had to, er, fly it?!

If that is the case, then the pilot should be locked up for a very long time - as should the people who allowed him to be there in the first place.

[Gretchenfrage]

The earlier will most probably happen, the latter never. :mad:

[NamelessWonder]

@anengineer

Would one of the moderators please explain why when I post a link to the amateur footage on the BBC News site, that post gets deleted - twice - without any explanation or comment. I'm only trying to be helpful for goodness sakePerhaps because it was posted about 10 pages back, and was already posted in its original form before that. (BBC merely reshowed edited vid of what CNN already showed in full)

@jugofpropwash

Why on earth would the pilot not order an immediate evacuation as soon as the plane came to rest? They crashed. Planes that have crashed tend to catch fire. So get off the plane!!!Dunno. Perhaps, given that he had dispensed with a large proportion of the aircraft mass (nose gear, main gear, both engines, a healthy chunk of baggage, empannage and a few unlucky pax, to name but a few) he thought it would float to the terminal . . . or maybe he was waiting for some very short steps! :sad:

Whatever it was, his purser had the time to regain her wits, enter the flight deck and check that everyone was OK after an impact hard enough to rip off everything below the fuselage and a nose-down, 270 degree pirouette that Darcey Bussell would be proud of before he had the time to conclude that getting off might be a good idea :eek:

@islandflyer

Many thanks for posting the harrowing account from the UA 747 F/O, which seems to concur with what the vid and witnesses said http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-51.html#post7930211

@bbratuse

Thanks for this. Interesting take on the possible CRM issues from the "older KAL Captain" (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-51.html#post7930223)

From the NTSB press conference yesterday, (at least I think it was!) the matter seems to be additionally complicated by the TC in the right seat having about the same amount of experience (as TC) as the trainee Captain (left seat) had on type . . . . a month was what they said.

Given that the purser has stated that there were 2 Captains and a F/O on the flight deck, it would seem that the F/O (from the relief crew) was in the jump seat behind a T/C who was himself "junior" (in your words) to the trainee Captain with 43 hours on type doing his first approach (in type) to SFO. Quite a scenario if and when the "seniority" you mention is put before proper CRM

[TRF4EVR]

What kind of "clues" are you looking for, exactly? Serious question.

[justawanab]

The Steed, while I understand your concern I, also lowly SLF, do selfishly gleen a level of comfort from this as I will be travelling in the back of a 777, on a long haul route, in a couple of months so I'm encouraged by the obvious strength and resilience that Boeing have managed to build into the airframe. I also suspect that this accident will be in the minds of everyone concerned for quite a while so, (and I know I'm pre-empting the NTSB here, but I think we're all expecting the same outcome) I doubt that anyone tasked with pointing these machines in the right direction is likely to make the same mistakes again in the forseeable future. I may however see if I can opt for an exit row seat (the extra legroom, of course), and will ensure I carry my documents with me and keep my belt extra tightly fastened throughout! :hmm:

[ayroplain]

Make a nice change from reading that pilots should monitor airspeed and other things we pros never knew.
Maybe so but, based on recent accidents, it looks like it will do no harm to send out a reminder of what you know in case you forget.

[cosmick251]

.. there is wide range of arguments, wheter handy flying should be trained more or not, you can guess about technical problems that occured and lead to this incident,... we can dicuss and have another wild guess, which (wrong?) decissions of the flight crew occured ...


From my point of view there is just thing, I am wondering about: As far as I read in the news, this final approach wasn t stable at all ... it s policy of all airlines, I do know at least, that you´ve to abort the approach, when your a/c couldn t be stabalized until the MAPt. So, that s my question number one: Why didn t this happen? GA -> another approach, RWY 28R, etc

[neville_nobody]

So wait, just because all accidents can't be avoided with increased automation, means it's a fool's errand? Do you skip wearing a seatbelt just because seatbelts can't protect you against death in all accidents? No one is arguing that automation can protect against ALL failures, we're just saying that there are SOME failures not yet protected against, that reasonably could be.

Ironically automation would not have saved these guys anyway as automation cant fly a visual approach! Nor can it fly a visual circuit. And it cant think ahead.
If I was reliant on automation I'd probably be dead now. It has nearly killed me twice.

Competant pilots and quality training is the answer......like they use to do.

[EDMJ]

As a lowly SLF, I have to say that reading this thread scares the living bejebus out of me if the assumptions about pilot error are correct.

To take this to a very basic level, my understanding is that the pilot crashed a perfectly serviceable plane because he (rather than the computer) had to, er, fly it?!

If this really turns out to be pilot error only, then it's not only enlightening for SLF's but also for lowly PPL holders.

There you are, as a private pilot, thinking that the basics or what you learn and must be able to do first, is to be able land a serviceable aircraft in benign weather conditions and with everything working.

Once you've mastered this, you start improving your knowledge and skills by doing the same thing with (simulated) failed components (e.g. airspeed indicator), and/or in inclement weather. You have then progressed to a more advanced level.

At this stage you have the feeling that you know something about flying and what it takes to do it successfully.

However, this incident has proven that you know close to nothing. In the world of heavier aircraft this doesn't count anymore, it is a completely different world and completely different aircraft and procedures with nothing in common with small aircraft.

This is confirmed by the repeated posts throughout the entire thread blaming Airbus/Boeing, finding faults or quirks with the autothrottle, blaming the airport and/or just about everything else other than what you thought was lacking basic piloting skills.

I'm humbled, and grateful to of all those who have contributed in putting me right.

[roulishollandais]

PPRuNe had already a thread to "learn" crosswind landing to licensed, qualified (!!!) pilots, now airline pilots"(???) and PIC have to use help of internet fora to learn very ordinary landing !!! How low is aviation going ? Qualifications are signed to pilots who are no more able to manage the flight, no more able to pilot aircraft -handfly or AP - Certifications are signed to aircrafts with unreadable flight laws or flamable batteries, Airlines get used to throw and destroy the plane and paxes n the forests, in the ocean, in lagon, in seawalls, proud if only someones are diing... Why is it said "expensive" to train the crews ?
Answer : with the money they only buy and buy and buy aircrafts.
It reminds me when I had to write a paper about sound pollution in international law (middle 1980's) and the french DGAC told me France and "Europe" would forbide aircrafts to land/take off with more than certain Decibels to oblig sovietic countries to buy AIRBUSes.I swore it was, and we see it has been reeched. Not only the sound is decreasing but air safety and crews' skills to sve money to spend it buying new planes.:mad:

[Indarra]

As someone employed in Tokyo, I am acutely aware of the issue of "intake seniority" which seems to have been working at cross puposes in this accident with the trainee PF having "intake seniority" over the more experieinced PM.
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-51.html#post7930223
This power of this cultural restraint is something that has to be experienced to be fully understood. At our company, staff hesitate to leave the elevator until the intake seniority has been worked out and the more senior person leaves first and the second more senior follows, and so on. When someone is promoted to company president, all those with greater intake seniority obviously must immediately retire. On Valentine's Day equivalent I have to offer my box of chocolates box around the office in terms of strict intake seniority of the females involved, so they get the pick of the best chocolates. Etc. etc.
I would suggest that at this landing at SF, PM would have felt extremely inhibited about saying anything to PF.

[The_Steed]

@Claybird

Bit harsh. I did make it quite clear that my post was based on an assumption, which I might add is the same assumption that a lot of other posters have also made in the course of this thread.

And with all due respect to you - I think you have missed my point. I don't really care if/ when a pilot hand flies an airplane. What I do care about is when a pilot does have to hand fly, he has the requisite skills to do so without crashing the plane!

[nitpicker330]

Let me see......the Training Captain watches as the trainee lets the IAS drop below VRef by a LOT with the Thrust Levers at Idle approaching the sea wall..............AND YOU THINK HE SAID NOTHING BECAUSE THE TRAINEE WAS SENIOR TO HIM.............:eek:

The mind boggles..........:rolleyes:

[Speed of Sound]

When will the aviation industry wake up and start issuing NOTAMS in normal plain English. Do you think non native with English as a second language really can get to grip with the NOTAM gobbledygook we face everyday?

Please tell me you are joking?

SFO, RWY, ILS, NAV, 28L, are all terms that are used to input data into a FMC and should be familiar to all pilots flying modern automated aircraft regardless of whether they are native English speakers or not?

[givemewings]

Points regarding checklists have already been covered, but regarding the evacuation...

The purser has been quoted as saying that it felt like "a very hard landing" and that the aircraft "swayed to the left then swayed to the right". This, to me, seems to indicate the possibility that those at the front got far less of a rough ride than those in the rear. Probably not even realising at first the tail had been lost.

FA training is to wait for assessment by the flight crew on necessity to evacuate UNLESS there is a major hull breach or self sustaining fire. In this case we know the cabin fire did not start until after the evac did- as for the hull breach as far as the purser knew it was intact. She presumably found out otherwise from her crew on moving around the aircraft. Just because the pax might feel they need to get out doesn't always mean it's safer. Sometimes that 30sec to evaluate and shut down properly may in itself save lives. Look at the R2 door. Engine right outside. Had a pax opened that it would have been game over a lot sooner if not for the crew. Even with the slide u/s. Don't be so quick to judge the timing of the evacuation, there's a lot of factors that come into play

[roving]

Given the very informative posts about what has been described here by B777 pilots as the FLCH 'trap', one of the pdf files on this link may help better understand what is being described.

http://www.smartcockpit.com/search.php?cx=partner-pub-5493771074943570%3A8801918110&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=UTF-8&q=b777&sa=Search&siteurl=www.smartcockpit.com%2F&ref=&ss=1739j1574693j4

[mkellytx]

"This reminds me of the C5 incident at McGuire AirForce base several years ago where there were multiple pilots in the cockpit and not one of them noticed that they shut down the wrong engine resulting in an inpact about a mile short of the runway.

Does everyone think that someone else is watching the ship and they just tune out?"

Platinum Flyer,

That crash was at Dover and is now part of USAF's CRM course, seen that video every six months for the 5 years I flew flight test and heard the SIB briefed briefed twice. It's not a bad accident to reference since there were a lot of senior guys with lots of time on C-5's and a few with very little time on AMP. Although, in their case they were dealing with an emergency at the time.

As for the cultural stuff ruffling so many feathers, Geert Hofstede is the Dutch researcher who came up with the Cultural Dimensions Theory (Power Distance), which is used by the military and taught in organizational studies. His work is based off of extensive research and does have some rigor behind it. That said, it is a framework and useful as a guide to understand cross-cultural behaviors, studied it in the military and in business school. Folks referencing pier reviewed literature and applying its framework aren't racist so long as they stick to the cultural aspects.

Getting back on topic, there are multiple dimensions of that framework that when combined would interact badly with the dangerous behaviors/attitudes taught in CRM. One could argue these were present in US military aviation in the 50's and 60's and contributed to the high accident rates during those years. Training changed in the late 60's early 70's and began to emphasize the CRM principles and the rates came down. Significant to commercial aviation since a lot of the pilots come with military training/background and the airlines take ques from the military.

Cheers

[Speed of Sound]

Sometimes that 30sec to evaluate and shut down properly may in itself save lives.

Every study done, has shown that a managed evacuation is ALWAYS more effective than a panicked rush to the nearest exit.

[deptrai]

Please tell me you are joking?

SFO, RWY, ILS, NAV, 28L, are all terms that are used to input data into a FMC and should be familiar to all pilots flying modern automated aircraft regardless of whether they are native English speakers or not?"PULL UP - what does it mean?".Famous last words heard on the CVR of China Southern 3456 (in Chinese).

I don't think he was joking, and maybe he has a point. Claiming that they should is not always very pragmatic. Better discuss all possible approaches to prevent accidents.

[Major Nevitt]

Just a thought but I too experienced a lack of thrust in the sim on my 777 type rating due to my hand preventing auto throttle movement. I had come from the 737 and noted at the time that the resistance required to prevent AT movement was far less than on the 737. I have never flown the 747 so cannot comment on this type. I wonder if 744's have the same "resistance" as 748's for example?

This occurrence would never prevent the ability to resolve the issue with an adequate scan/FMA awareness etc but it may cause the onset.

[compressor stall]

Nitpicker330

Let me see......the Training Captain watches as the trainee lets the IAS drop below VRef by a LOT with the Thrust Levers at Idle approaching the sea wall..............AND YOU THINK HE SAID NOTHING BECAUSE THE TRAINEE WAS SENIOR TO HIM.............


It would not surprise me in the slightest if that was the case. Even more so if the trainee was older than the training captain.

[Homebrew1]

All these people sproking automation as the saving grace, just remember there is only so much a computer can do!

If everything was automated, what would happen to aircraft still in the air around KSFO after this crash?

Do you close an airport on CAVOK day because you don't have ILS?

How do automated systems handle flameouts/engine failures/FOD blown tires ETC....

Fair enough SOMETIMES pilots make mistakes, but I don't think we are any safer relying in automation.

It all comes down to AVIATE, NAVIAGATE, COMMUNICATE.

While this accident appears to be a result of human error, lets also remember the crews of US1549 and QF32 in which ALL PASSENGERS were saved as the result of crews doing what they are trained to do!

Absolutely agree and to add (rant) further....

I'm a firm believer in keeping up the hand flying skills. I don't want to end up like the Air France A330 or the 737 trying to realign it's IRS and ending up in the ocean.

Over automation is dumbing us down and at the end of the day all of us could end up hand flying on a ****ty night due a technical let alone flying a basic visual approach on CAVOK day! Automation is helpful agreed but not at the expense of maintaining basic flying skills.

The day aeroplanes become pilotless is the day I take the boat. Most modern jets can't even maintain a vertical path in descent without pilot intervention in dynamic atmospheric conditions (intermittent over and under speeds typical on 737 and A320). Do you think a computer will do better? What about slowing up during turbulence? Can the computer see a turbulent looking cloud ahead and put the seat belt sign on and as a precaution slow up instead of plowing into it at M.80?

This accident has in no way made pilotless air transport any closer! Thats just rubbish.

[wasthatit]

This was an American made aircraft with American conceived automatics flying into an American airport following an American designed stepped procedure. The approach was being flown the American way (visually) under the direction of an American air traffic controller. Most likely the crew were trained by an American FTO to SOPs and an AFM influenced by American carriers.

Of course (as some posts would have) the only factor to be considered in this crash is Asian deference culture :ugh:

However... assuming the PM wasn't looking inside at the airspeed he must have seen four whites turn to four reds in a matter of seconds on short final and still very calmly read back "Clear to land" without a quiver in his voice. This is the bit I really can't understand!

[nitpicker330]

No it all works just fine how it is.
There is no suggestion that the crew couldn't understand the charts, indeed the NTSB have said the crew had the correct charts on display in the cockpit.

[Expressions]

Well said. Automation is supposed to aid the human beings to manage the situations safely. If the crew or managements think that automation is the ultimate solution for safety in airline business as compared to improved fundamental and basic skill flying training then we will continue to have accidents. When MBAs dictate terms for training syllabus ignoring morally correct professional pilots, all that happens is short time gains for the company, fat pay checks for the MBAs and long lasting pain, agony and loss for the crew and passengers. I do not see things improving in the near future.

[Skeleton]

Im amazed this thread is as long as it is. In the main its full of Ill informed opinion that borders on BS, scattered with constant reposts of video and weather information. On one page we even had the flight track information posted by three separate posters. Its obvious many are to busy with there FSX investigations to bother reading the thread before launching there next great theory.

[bsieker]

DoYouFly,

Here is an X-Plane version o the crash. X-Plane simulates physics, true flight dynamics and flight characteristics. See what you think, compared to the cartoon CNN has been using.

It is just as cartoonish as CNN's version. It bears absolutely no resemblance to any of the facts we know, or to the real-life video. To name just a few points: It comes in at a low pitch angle, it does not raise a wing as high as is clearly seen, it rotates the wrong way, ...

Yes, X-Plane can be a useful tool for making such visualisations, I have done this professionally before, but only if you use DFDR data for position, speed and attitude, none of which are yet publicly available.

Relying on X-plane's physics engine can only yield something useful if you know exact control inputs (rather: control surface deflections in any FBW aircraft) and the model has been validated to reflect the actual aircraft performance, even in these extreme attitudes. Hint: not even commercial full-motion simulators can do this, as no aircraft is aerodynamically tested in a cartwheel motion, except perhaps aerobatics types).

Nice to look at (or not) but bears no relation to actual events.

[Speed of Sound]

Aviation English is a combination of shortcuts, abbreviations and numeric constructions. Much of this would remain the same, even if translated into a pilot's native language, especially the Indo-European languages. The use of plain English would complicate, rather than simplify things.

The unfortunate flight crew of Asiana 214 will be interviewed in Korean and their replies translated by a competant linguist. This is because although international pilots are expected to have a certain standard of spoken English, it is unlikely to be good enough to answer a question like "How would you describe the atmosphere on the FD during the descent phase or approach briefing", unless the interviewee was a fluent English speaker.

[chksix]

I hope the NTSB does individual interviews with each crewmember and then ask them as a group with everyone in the same room. I'm sure the replies will differ a lot....

[givemewings]

Nitpicker, of course I know additional FD crew will come to the cabin and assist- AFTER duties in cockpit are complete. My point was, according to reports the purser has mentioned one pilot seated in the cabin. Everyone's been asking if only 2 were in the cockpit. Sure it could have been one of the operating crew helping at R1 but just as if not more likely to be the one seated in the cabin since presumably they'd get there before anyone in the flight deck... time will tell.

[Callsign Kilo]

The airline has informed the media that the LTC in the right hand seat was new to the position; it was his first flight as a LTC. The guy in the left had 43 hours on type.

[Toruk Macto]

Its starting to become clearer, I hope the guy in the right was not sitting hoping they would make it without having to say something to his senior but junior cpt .

[Lord Spandex Masher]

And with all due respect to you - I think you have missed my point. I don't really care if/ when a pilot hand flies an airplane. What I do care about is when a pilot does have to hand fly, he has the requisite skills to do so without crashing the plane!

I may have missed it but do you know for sure they were hand flying?

[GlueBall]

framer says:
"So what do we need to change about the environment they were operating in? If you can answer that question you actually make an impact on flight safety rather than just on your own ego."

...ensure that pilots can actually fly 100% manually, and have no aversion in disconnecting A/P & A/T at any time to maintain desired flight path profile. :ooh:

[RetiredF4]

The probable obvious cause of this accident seems to be non existent energy management by the crew.

The low speed was the reason for dropping low on the glidepath and for being unable to correct this situation in time. Most information for a visual approach can be found or correlated from outside visual references, speed can´t. It has to be checked with the instruments and managed properly.
There seems to be a overreliance on the AT to do this job at all times and under most circumstances. There is no excuse that the speed decay in that published amount and time was not recognized until it was too late.

....says an old fighter pilot

[funfly]

Im amazed this thread is as long as it is. In the main its full of Ill informed opinion that borders on BS, scattered with constant reposts of video and weather information. On one page we even had the flight track information posted by three separate posters. Its obvious many are to busy with there FSX investigations to bother reading the thread before launching there next great theory.

The more everyone talks and comments about an event such as this - even if some of the comments indicate low knowledge - the more the chance that within the flying community messages will get remembered and reflected upon.

People are concerned and people with an interest in aviation want to know. Although some posters display lack of knowledge, very few are stupid and in virtually all cases are just displaying concerns that can be answered by those who know more. Where better to ask these questions?

[Toruk Macto]

There are no stupid questions in Aviation .

[Mikehotel152]

I have read the entire thread and it shocks me that so many professional pilots are excusing the pilots of the Asiana 777 for their failure to land a perfectly serviceable aircraft in CAVOK.

Even if there were no PAPIs (and I understand there were until the crash) and no ILS, NDB, magenta line or even a little line of red buoys floating around in San Francisco Bay (!) I would expect a 777 pilot to land safely. I'd even expect a pilot rated on other Boeing types to manage the seemingly unlikely task of maintaining a visual approach at around 3 degrees with speed within acceptable tolerances.

Unless it emerges that the aircraft suffered windshear or an engine failure of some sort, these pilots do not deserve sympathy and neither do those who employed them. You cannot have incompetent people in charge of transport airplanes.

[Speed of Sound]

I hope the NTSB does individual interviews with each crewmember and then ask them as a group with everyone in the same room. I'm sure the replies will differ a lot....

Interesting idea but I'm not sure how that would serve any useful purpose in an investigation.

Although human factors will play a large part in ascertaining the reasons why this accident occurred, the NTSB is not in the business of trying to catch anyone out.

The report into Fedex 647 contained the interviews with both the PF and PM who both independently stated that both main gears touched down simultaneously, the aircraft track and heading were along the centreline and the PF used rudder to 'uncrab' prior to landing.

None of this proved to be true when the FDR data and wreckage witness marks and positions were examined. The NTSB report did not declare that the pilots had both lied to the investigation, it simply stated what the pilots had said and that the crash was most likely caused by the PF simply failing to correct before touchdown and the PM failing to act.

Ironically this was also an accident which happened on a check/training flight where the PM who was also a TC, watched their charge fly a perfectly good aircraft into the ground, although in slightly more challenging circumstances. :(

[Homebrew1]

bekolblockage post 1129,

Thats a really good video. I'm pleased to see a senior management pilot talk about maintaining hand flying skills 'click-click' 'click-click'....look out the window!

[tilnextime]

I spent too many years in mishap investigation to comment on what were the causes of the poor approach in this mishap. That's the investigating team's job. However, as to the mindset displayed by some here-

Well said. Automation is supposed to aid the human beings to manage the situations safely. If the crew or managements think that automation is the ultimate solution for safety in airline business as compared to improved fundamental and basic skill flying training then we will continue to have accidents.

YUP!

It is the PIC (not "management") who bears the ultimate responsibility for the operation of the aircraft, to include the automation. If he or she (or the crew) is not competent to oversee the "flying" done by the automation, or take over when the automation is not up to the task at hand, then he or she should not be in the cockpit as PIC. If the PIC knows, before takeoff, that a piece of the automation or an external aid is not available, then the PIC should plan the compensation before takeoff, or refuse to fly if he or his crew cannot successfully compensate. If an airport's ILS GS is O/S, their responsibility is to make that known while they take corrective action. It is the PIC's responsibility is to decide whether or not the PIC and crew are competent to fly there under those conditions. Safe flying operations are never the other guy's responsibility as long as there is a PIC who really does take command, and has one critical skill - the courage and wisdom to say, "No!".

[Capn Bloggs]

Unless it emerges that the aircraft suffered windshear or an engine failure of some sort, these pilots do not deserve sympathy and neither do those who employed them. You cannot have incompetent people in charge of transport airplanes.
Another one.

What then would you do about this incompentence, oh mighty expert?

[stallspeed]

Whatever the outcome of the crash investigation , it's going to fuel the ongoing discussion : Whether to do away with 'wetware' altogether and leave everything to a box or three full of microchips or start teaching pilots and would-be pilots the art of moving something heavier-than-air in the selfsame medium without the aid or interference of all the electronic gee-gawery..

[bklooste]

I think a group interview afterwards is a great idea.. it wont catch them out ( you need a barister and a court for that) , they will have already called each other and sorted out what needs to be said ( like the transport example) .. but it will indicate the dynamics of the group.

[Capn Bloggs]

or start teaching pilots and would-be pilots the art of moving something heavier-than-air in the selfsame medium without the aid or interference of all the electronic gee-gawery..
Wassat? Just like we used to do a few years ago?? Surely not! :ouch: :D

[CAT1]

I'm not sure why the NTSB is bothering investigating this accident, it seems all the experts here have got it all wrapped up already....evidently Koreans shouldn't be allowed to fly, it's their culture that crashed this plane and it would never happen to a western airline....oh, hang on, the French can't be trusted either. Hmmm, maybe Tenerife happened because the KLM captain was Dutch... Eastern 401? Weren't there 3 Americans on the flight-deck? AA 587? Oh dear.

More than 50 pages of drivel, wild speculation and racist innuendo, with a nice sprinkling of holier-than-thou comments from ace Western pilots, and the occasional, but sadly infrequent, bit of genuine useful information (the repeated posting of which shows that most of you aren't even reading previous posts), make this one of the worst threads I have ever read.

And for the eejit who earlier told me I should know a bit more about other cultures before I am qualified to criticise his stereotypical and bigoted views, I grew up in another culture, have worked all over the world, and presently fly for an airline that employs over 60 nationalities.

Anyway, I'll leave you all to it. Personally, I'll wait for the NTSB report and the CVR and FDR transcripts.

[Cows getting bigger]

Numpty question - does the 777 have an AOA gauge and if so, what does it present to the pilot?

[nitpicker330]

No it doesn't.

It has 2 lovely big Airspeed indicators ( speed tapes on the LCD PFD's ) and a smaller standby Airspeed indicator.

When they are working ( unlike AF447 ) you don't need AOA indications.

[Speed of Sound]

or refuse to fly if he or his crew cannot successfully compensate. If an airport's ILS GS is O/S, their responsibility is to make that known while they take corrective action. It is the PIC's responsibility is to decide whether or not the PIC and crew are competent to fly there under those conditions.

The problem with this is that the accident flight was also a training flight designed to assess the PIC's performance into SFO on a new type.

If he had declared that he didn't feel he or his crew could 'complete the mission' with the ILS U/S, he is either sent back to the sim for further training or the TC says 'What better way to learn than fly the approach for real. After all, I am there to catch any balls you may drop'

Catch 22 as Yossarian would say. :suspect:

[James7]

[QUOTE][/CDRW

Bet my last dollar the A/T was in hold mode and the thrust levers where being used as what they are always used as - hand rests. And I say this with out spite of venom - 8000 hrs in an Asian carrier gave me this observation.
QUOTE]

Agree totally, this aircraft was a glider, no one noticed the AT mode. From 500' the speed drops off rapidly to maintain the glide path. 200' would probably be the point of no return after this point the engines would not have had time to spool up given the rapidly decreasing rate of speed and already low.

The aircraft crashed due to the lack of monitoring of the AT mode. It stayed in AT hold till Toga was applied 1.5 secs prior to impact. Would have been better to have shut them down at this point and accepted the aircraft was going to crash.

Better to crash with engines off.

[nitpicker330]

James James James.....

Even if the A/T had failed or stayed at Idle any competent crew "would" notice the loss of Thrust and therefore IAS during a normal approach......

No excuses I'm afraid..

[overthewing]

It is the PIC (not "management") who bears the ultimate responsibility for the operation of the aircraft, to include the automation.

From what Deborah Hersman (NTSB) said, I think the NTSB are not clear who was the PIC. If, as others have suggested, the operational role was compromised by the social hierarchy, it may take the NTSB a while to explore the subtleties of what was happening in the cockpit.

[nitpicker330]

I don't really care who of them was PIC, one guy flies and the other watches him like a Hawk......

It's called monitoring and is a critical part of team work.

[zlin77]

Interesting to see all the discussion posted here...I have nearly 8,000 777 hours, including a considerable number with another Korean operator, I must say that observing the locals in SIM checks, a visual approach would generally stretch their abilities to the limit, normally all flying is conducted with auto thrust engaged, so with Vref+5 set it generally does a very good job at maintaining the required speed, as to how this aircraft was able (allowed to) have it's speed reduce well below the target speed is a mystery to me, were the auto throttles disconnected, either inadvertently or with intent? We will have to wait for the NTSB report.

[Aerolex]

Indeed Toruk....

One of the first things said to me when I entered the aviation industry was "It's better to ask a stupid question than it is to explain a stupid mistake". Of course if you are dead, you wouldn't have any explaining to do... :)

[320busdriver]

CAT 1 I can`t agree with you more on the great points you brought up all the holier than thou attitudes and the astronaut quality people we have on pprune:ugh:, Bottom line is human beings make mistakes but how many times have they saved the day, I for one will never step foot on a commercial airliner if there were no human beings up front :mad:- period

[JamesGV]

I think it is "slightly" unfair to claim that there are NOT "cultural issues" in play in many "operations".

Europe also has it "fair share" of those.

"IF" there were "cultural issues" at play here, ("junior" trainer new to post, "senior" trainee" and the third guy outranked and "unwilling" to comment) I'm sure the "facts" will be easily established ONCE they are reported....and not before !

Alas, "if" that is the case, then factoring "that" issue out of the cockpit hasn't worked.

And whilst it may end up that "The Koreans" are to blame, the finger thus pointed, many will not look at their own "CRM" and take heed.

[James7]

NP

Of course no excuse. However given the rate of descent earlier in the approach and the residual thrust of the engines at idle, thrust was not needed till 500'.

No one noticed the AT mode. Everyone just expected the thrust to come on. In AT hold this was never going to happen. At least on the 777 the levers move so the PF should have realised the power was not going to come up. On the Bus the levers do not move.

Stabilised approach also includes a reasonable thrust amount at a given height usually 1000' and at the latest 500'.

This aircraft crashed because it was effectively a glider and glided into the sea wall.

[nitpicker330]

That's why all Airlines have stabilized approach criteria AND competent crews follow it.

[tilnextime]

The problem with this is that the accident flight was also a training flight designed to assess the PIC's performance into SFO on a new type.

If he had declared that he didn't feel he or his crew could 'complete the mission' with the ILS U/S, he is either sent back to the sim for further training or the TC says 'What better way to learn than fly the approach for real. After all, I am there to catch any balls you may drop'

Was the PIC the one undergoing training, or was the pilot with 47 hours in the 777? Regardless of paygrade and "rank" there is only one PIC in the cockpit, and he calls the shots. How can a "PIC" be the trainee? Are you suggesting that the trainee has ultimate authority over the operation of the aircraft?

While I was not addressing this flight in particular, I think you have the cockpit roles of the crew on this flight confused.

[misd-agin]

Numpty question - does the 777 have an AOA gauge and if so, what does it present to the pilot?


AA does on the 777 and 737NG.

DL does on one, or both, of the 777 and 737NG's.


Guys don't use them for normal ops. Airspeed tape, with Vapp bug, amber foot, red/black stall tape and flap limit speed, has more information.

[stuminisprite]

firstly i am not a pilot, so please dont attack me, i do have a lot of respect for you as i know it is a very difficult job.

I am an aircraft engineer with experience in the military and civil aviation sector. One point i would like to make is i have noticed a lot of people are trying to pin blame or wanting someone held accountable. i agree that the authorities should explore all avenues to find out what actually happened, but, im sure the pilot feels quite bad enough and after reading FACTS that are coming out of all this i dont feel it can be pinned just on the pilot flying. as the old saying goes, all the holes in the swiss cheese lined up and an accident happened.

The best thing to come out of this is to try to find a way to make it extremely difficult for it to happen again. accidents will always happen and even the best pilots in the world will of had a close call at somepoint. it just happened theirs was saturday.

i wonder if a HUD setup can be incorporated into aircraft to give vital info to the flight deck windscreens in times of concentration. ie take off, landing, or emergency situations, just to aid the flight crew.

i may be way off the mark, but thought i would have my say.

[bklooste]

re the pilots.

I thought that at first especially since the company already said there was no problem with the plane and are likely not to be kind to the pilots despite the fact they are products of the companies training program ( and even included an instructor) .

On the other hand there is the parents of the girls who died .....

[Ivanbogus]

Skynews reports that according to Asiana CEO, the trainee has flown 29 times to SFO in A320?? Now, that's a little odd....

[diginagain]

i wonder if a HUD setup can be incorporated into aircraft to give vital info to the flight deck windscreens in times of concentration.If the crew couldn't see that their touchdown point was climbing up the sight-picture, I'm not certain what assistance a HUD might offer.

[757_Driver]

As per usual a load of PPrune drivel from armachair FSx'ers and grissled old ace's who think that everyone should have 20 million fast jet hours before being allowed near a passenger aircraft. BUT this accident raises 2 very very interesting questions in the phsycological area which interest me. I'm assuming these guys didn't deliberatly crash the aicraft, and all comments aside about what they should have done or should have been able to do, I want to know WHY they did what they did.

the guy flying had 10,000 hours, possibly all airbus (not verified, but that seems to be the general info floating around) so he had a huge amount of experience in an aircraft that kept speed with AT WITHOUT MOVING THE THRUST levers. We all suffer from habit reversion from time to time - I certainly do - I sometimes find myself holding hands with my oppo on the thrust reversers even 2 years after moving from an airline where the PF did the reversers to one where the PM does them. I KNOW the SOP in my airline, but that muscle memory seems to be hard wired - no harm no foul in this case, but why does the human brain do this and how can we combat it?

the TC in the other seat let someone fly a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground. This is a biggy - why? This question is often raised in training scenarios, who is really in 'charge' of the aircraft, especieally in environments, societies where seniority, social standing etc is important. This isn't the first time that 2 captains flying together have screwed up so it should be something that we can all learn from. And from a training point of view it's often the case that sitruations are allowed to progress beyond what would be normally comfortable to see what the trainee does. (i'm not a flight trainer, but I do teach / train in other areas) but this 'creeping' over the line makes it harder to draw bottom lines and react accordingly.

[falcon900]

Having been an avid follower of pprune for many years, and having followed this thread from the outset, I feel compelled to break my duck, and log in to post a comment.
Whilst I am in agreement with the general thrust of the "consensus" which seems to be emerging in relation to this incident, I am struck by the apparent willingness to overlook the implications of the runway navigation aids being inoperative. In an industry which has such an impressive safety record, and where it is the general practice to duplicate or triplicate critical systems where practicable, is it really acceptable to say "sorry, we are remodelling, hope it doesn't inconvenience customers too much?"
Whilst acknowledging the issue presented by pilots becoming over dependent on computers, there seems to be a tacit acceptance that this flight would have landed without incident had the navigation aids been operational. Given that the issue of overdependence on computers is ongoing and real, does it not follow that turning off the runway navigation aids could only result in significantly higher risk? Factor in long haul heavy traffic approaching over water at the end of a long flight, is it not a risk too far? This is not a minor airport in some third world country...
I am not seeking to excuse any inability to land manually in clear conditions, but the stone which started the ripple in the pond looks like being the decision to continue to operate the runway without its full suite of navigation aids.

[tilnextime]

as the old saying goes, all the holes in the swiss cheese lined up and an accident happened.

Contrary to common misconception, if there is one thing that mishap investigations have proven, mishaps do not just "happen". A mishap is caused. The swiss cheese does not randomly line itself up, the slices are selected and put in place with a given edge facing up. The job of the mishap investigator is to identify "causal factors" so that the next aircrew can learn from this and not put a stack of swiss cheese slices together in the same manner. A technical mishap investigation (which is what the NTSB does) is not looking to affix "blame" on any particular individual, but to identify the factors (to include individual and crew behaviors, qualifications, equipment function etc) that contributed to causing the mishap. If the mishap is the result of a given crew member not flying the aircraft properly, then the question is why, for if the why is not known, future occurrences cannot be avoided.

Eliminate undesirable causal factors, and you eliminate deleterious results.

[The Globetrotter]

i wonder if a HUD setup can be incorporated into aircraft to give vital info to the flight deck windscreens in times of concentration. ie take off, landing, or emergency situations, just to aid the flight crew.

The Embraer 170/190 series have a HUD fit option so I would assume other manufacturers can offer this?

[misd-agin]

Numpty question - does the 777 have an AOA gauge and if so, what does it present to the pilot?


AOA has marks every 5 units.

Stall margin indicator(stall)

Green arc for 'on speed'. Only visible, and accurate, with landing flaps(777 - 25/30, 737-15/30/40). So on the 737 it appears at flaps 15(landing flap setting), disappears for flaps 20/25(not AA approved landing flap setting), and reappears for flaps 30 and flaps 40.

Green arc is at the 5 unit location with landing flaps selected(3 o'clock position) (+/-). Approx. 4-6 units is the upper and lower limits of the green arc.

Upper right corner of PFD. Supposedly where BA has their radar altimeter readout.

Upper right corner of 737 HUD.

About the size of a 1 EU coin or slightly smaller than a U.S. quarter.

[overthewing]

Dumb, non-pilot question about converting to 777...

There's confusion about which type the PF had been flying up till now, but a few reports suggest 747. Assuming this was within the same airline, is conversion from 747 to 777, assuming it's not because of fleet changes, an upward career path?

[stuckgear]

This was an American made aircraft with American conceived automatics flying into an American airport following an American designed stepped procedure. The approach was being flown the American way (visually) under the direction of an American air traffic controller. Most likely the crew were trained by an American FTO to SOPs and an AFM influenced by American carriers.

Of course (as some posts would have) the only factor to be considered in this crash is Asian deference culture :ugh:


To which point, in what way was a failure evident of:

the aircraft,
the systems,
the approach procedure,
ATC

?

Oh it was an Asian crew*... So your rhetoric is called as B/S.


as per Callsign Kilo's post :

The airline has informed the media that the LTC in the right hand seat was new to the position; it was his first flight as a LTC. The guy in the left had 43 hours on type.

and to emphasise the point about various cultures by another poster (cultural variations do exist, there's been quite few studies on the subject matter):

I hope the guy in the right was not sitting hoping they would make it without having to say something to his senior but junior cpt

*Note: no blame apportioned here, *that* will be subject to the *results* of the investigation.

[Back at NH]

All flights must be stabilised by 1000 feet above airport elevation in IMC and 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC.

An approach is stabilised when all of the following criteria are met:

The aircraft is on the correct flight path;



Only small changes in heading/pitch are necessary to maintain the correct flight path;



The airspeed is not more than VREF + 20kts indicated speed and not less than VREF;



The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration;



Sink rate is no greater than 1000 feet/minute; if an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1000 feet/minute a special briefing should be conducted;



Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the minimum power for the approach as defined by the operating manual;



All briefings and checklists have been conducted;



Specific types of approach are stabilized if they also fulfil the following:

ILS approaches must be flown within one dot of the glide-slope and localizer;
a Category II or III approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band;
during a circling approach wings should be level on final when the aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport elevation; and,





Unique approach conditions or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilized approach require a special briefing.

An approach that becomes unstabilised below 1000 feet above airport elevation in IMC or 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC requires an immediate go-around.


So why was this approach not thrown away as not stabilised by the 500' VMC mark? Why was an unstabilised approach continued to a point when the mandatory go-around for unstable approach was flown from a height where recovery was impossible?

[garpal gumnut]

I'll probably get caned for this post, not being a pilot, and being Australian. I find that the culture of deference to "authority" in Asian countries leads to groupthink. The PIC in this case was a consensus not a person, between four people, none of whom could take responsibility for landing the plane. Nobody was in charge. An amalgam of experience and rank all sitting like muppets having to land the plane with their own anxious inputs at certain points, leading to disaster. It wasn't a difficult day, airport or plane. Just four pilots, none of whom was willing to take command early enough. The Cabin staff probably would have done a better job, or a sixteen year old on a computer.

[OFSO]

'Nother numpty question, how long do those 777 fans take to spool up to max thrust from idle ? I used to ride in a 737-200 cockpit long ago and if my memory serves it was around five seconds on departure.

[Non Zero]

Just four pilots, none of whom was willing to take command early enough. The Cabin staff probably would have done a better job, or a sixteen year old on a computer.

Your being Australian doesn't excuse you from shooting to the pilot community! Having said that you might be right ... but since you were so prompt to shoot try to be as prompt replying my answer

were all 4 pilots in the cockpit for landing? And I'll give an help 2 were seated in the pilot seat! What about the other 2?

[lowvaeater]

FO on 744, promoted to captain on A320, transitioned to 777.
So he has been to KSFO, and is or was familiar with the procedure.

This accident has more news coverage due to having surviver to interview (or to blame?) and it is probably easier to criticize on their flying, CRM skill for their nationality or ethics for some, hence the relatively larger discussion going on.

The A/T servo on 777 is considerably lighter than that of 747 and 737, if you happen to rest your hand on it during idle operation, the servo can have a hard time erecting the lever back up.

Regarding to skill of hand flying, don't be so quick to judge. Their A320 flies some of the more difficult visual and circling approach in the region.

I hope these explains some of the questions you guys have.

[Mimpe]

The situation looked pretty desperate between 30 and 20 secs from impact looking at the speed data.

[Dave Gittins]

There sound to be some similarities to a KAL crash at Stansted fourteen years ago. The Captains defective AI did not show the rate of roll whilst the first officer watched his funtioning AI roll through 90 up to about 150 degrees but was too afraid to question the captains authority.

After the investigation, Air Accidents Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom issued recommendations to Korean Air to revise its training program and company culture, to promote a more free atmosphere between the captain and the first officer.

Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Cargo_Flight_8509)

[Callsign Kilo]

So, thus far we have...

The NTSB stating that the speed was 'significantly' below the assigned fly speed

The NTSB stating that a go around was only executed 1.5 secs before impact

The Cabin Manager stating there were three pilots in the flightdeck at the time of the accident

NOTAMs from KSFO indicating the ILS was U/S however PAPIs were serviceable for RW28L

The weather was CAVOK and the winds were light. It was daylight.

Asiana stating there was no mechanical issue with the aircraft

Asiana stating that the LTC was conducting his first flight as an LTC, he had 3000hrs on the 777 and had landed in KFSO 33 times in this aircraft. The Captain was under training and had 43 hours on the 777. He had landed in KFSO 29 times in another type. Between then they had in excess of 10000 hours

There has been other suggestions of poor training, over reliance in automation, inexperience on type, mode confusion, tiredness, being kept high on profile by ATC. Those and what I will state below may be contributing factors?

I find it unsurprising that people are speculating that this was a cocked up visual procedure which developed into an accident due to poor airmanship. Those within the industry are well versed in the 'issues' that have emulated from flightdecks with steep authority gradients. South Korean operators have came under specific scrutiny in the past. There are numerous accidents to testify to this. This is factual.

Now there's ways of bringing this to the fore. Other methods will have you labelled as a racist, as it appears. However I for one will be completely unsurprised if the NTSB's findings suggest the same.

[Capn Bloggs]

If the crew couldn't see that their touchdown point was climbing up the sight-picture, I'm not certain what assistance a HUD might offer.
On the contrary, I would have thought watching the HUD flight path marker dropping down into the underrun/water would be far more obvious than "their TD point climbing up the sight-picture (aka windscreen)".

[Lonewolf_50]

tdracerBut this crash, along with the Air France A330, show that we still need to train pilots to fly, not just manage, the airplane.
If by "we" you mean the airline industry and regulation authorities, yes.
Every study done, has shown that a managed evacuation is ALWAYS more effective than a panicked rush to the nearest exit.
Thanks for that.
Franzl
The probable obvious cause of this accident seems to be non existent energy management by the crew. There is no excuse that the speed decay in that published amount and time was not recognized until it was too late. ....says an old fighter pilot
Didn't you read a few pages back that fighter pilots are a horrible fit for airline cockpits and CRM? ;):cool::}
FWIW, I am trying to find the right files at the "smartcockpit" site to try and understand the "FLCH trap" previously mentioned. If it's a systems issue, it's a training issue, right? ;)
One of the first things said to me when I entered the aviation industry was "It's better to ask a stupid question than it is to explain a stupid mistake". Of course if you are dead, you wouldn't have any explaining to do..
I recall about thirty years ago the semi-sarcastic observation that "it's better to die than to look bad." Our safety officer responded with:
"I've never seen a good looking corpse."

Now there's ways of bringing this to the fore.
A sub optimal way to bring such issues to the fore, in a given organization, is to have a wreck. :( Sadly, that seems to be what gets some organizations' attention where other input does not.

As we used to say in the Navy, with heavy heart as some of us got older ... the NATOPS is written in blood. (That's the operating manual/bible for a given aircraft ...)

Looks like the sanguine penmanship continues ... :{

A point on CRM and "who is doing what" from the distant past: a couple of decades ago, a crew in a squadron at our base had an engine act up during a training event. The aborted the training event (which was over the ocean) and headed for the nearest field. They came in to do an approach to a runway, rather than a helicopter pad (the bird was SH-60F) and made the approach. With split torques, you retard the bad engine to let the good engine lead. Well, for whatever reason, the PNF retarded the good engine and the bad engine led. Short final, power loss, inside HV diagram bad zone, and a nasty crash. Aircraft lost. Crew badly injured. (PIlots and aircrew).

Cause? Well, the bottom line ended up that a fairly straightforward thing (which all pilots in that squadron had done in the sim many, many times) "who was doing what" went wrong.

Apply that to this accident: a fairly straighforward event, visual approach, and the correct movement of engine power controls (be it by the automated systems or one of the pilots) went wrong.

If you look at the NTSB's pithy extract of speed versus profile, and the target speed (137 knots), at the very least the correct and timely movement of power levers went wrong. (Why will in time be explained, one hopes, by the NTSB's team).

A point that has been raised before in this thread, time and again, also needs to be answered, and that has to do with an industry-wide standard for those carrying passengers: the issue of waving off (go around) a non-stable approach in a timely fashion.

[Agaricus bisporus]

What this all began from was an unstable approach, pure and simple.

We have seen time and time again that if stable parameters are not met at the gates the operator/manufacturer sets then trouble is all too likely to ensue. And without prejudging the issue this event seems to have all the hallmarks of a mismanaged approach being continued instead of thrown away and getting further and further out of hand.

It won't take the NTSB long to figure what happened from the speed/rod/vertical profile we've all seen, the "why?" is going to be discussed for a long time.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

FWIW, I am trying to find the right files at the "smartcockpit" site to try and understand the "FLCH trap" previously mentioned. If it's a systems issue, it's a training issue, right? ;)



Essentially FLCH will give you flight idle in the descent until the AP captures the selected altitude and the AT will then revert to speed mode. If, for whatever reason, you turn off the AP and try to level off above the selected altitude the throttles will stay at idle and, therefore, your speed will continue to reduce.

[aerobat77]

Reading this thread reminds me why I don't come on here much anymore. Apart from a large number of armchair experts posting a lot of drivel

well, this is the spirit of a open anonymous aviation forum. we should understand that this here does not reflect official investigations or 777 pilots opinion but only a (partly heated ) discussion of aviation fans without any real experience on this type of AC or this particular airport .

you can call it pprune as usual.

nevertheless , respect to the victims should point anybody to be careful in quick blaming by informations based on news reports and internet knowledge.

best regards

[stuminisprite]

thats what i meant captain. if the crew are flying vfr or in bad weather then surely having critical info next to the line of sight would make life easier. any messages could also be displayed in text to correlate to instruments and audio warnings.

[wasthatit]

An approach that is unstable below 1000 feet above airport elevation in IMC or 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC requires an immediate go-around.

Would it be worth considering a 'Mode 8' for EGPWS? Something along the lines of speed VREF to VREF + n, V/S between 500 fpm 1000 fpm at 500 feet otherwise "UNSTABLE GO-AROUND". Like an RA this would be a mandatory instruction.

I wonder how many unstable approaches actually occur each year that do not result in an accident, but are close.

[GarageYears]

I've seen post after post raising a stink that the ILS was out... has it escaped everyone's attention that the flights prior to this one made it successfully to the tarmac? Unless someone thinks this was the first flight in with the nav out. :ugh:

[ross_M]

The one point that's still a bit intriguing to me is the nature of the burn. I'd love to see the report on the origins / spread of that fire.

The internal cabin photos reveal a mechanical wreck but not significantly bad fire damage. The roof OTOH.....

Was it really oxygen bottles? Or is the roof area naturally more combustible?

Assuming a fuel leak fire that wouldn't be the shape of the fire damage I'd expect. Then again, I'm no expert.

[Tee Emm]

Just because these were professional pilots qualified to operate the 777 means nothing in the context of this accident.

It matters not that the aircraft was on an unstable approach and if allowed to continue it would almost certainly lead to landing short of the runway. Which of course it did.

What does matter is the realisation that despite the best technical training available, accidents will occasionally happen where experience has shown it that in some societies, it is well nigh impossible to change years of ingrained hard wired ethnic culture...

[Lonewolf_50]

Lord Spandex:
Essentially FLCH will give you flight idle in the descent until the AP
captures the selected altitude and the AT will then revert to speed mode. If,
for whatever reason, you turn off the AP and try to level off above the selected altitude the throttles will stay at idle and, therefore, your speed will continue to reduce.
If one turns off the AP, would not one then begin to move/adjust the power levers manually as a matter of habit/training? :confused:

A couple of the posters who commented on the FLCH trap feature mentioned other modes. For my own understanding, getting a better look at the system may help.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Lonewolf, that's the trap - if you don't turn the AT off.

[suninmyeyes]

Interestingly Zlin has 8000 hours on the 777 and cannot understand why the thrust levers did not maintain the speed. I am sure he has never been in FLCH down to touchdown, quite rightly as that is not a mode you want to be in, but if you were to do that the autothrottle will not maintain speed in that mode if the pitch is manually increased to a pitch above the flight director command.

Having seen this exact scenario of getting low and slow in the 777 expertly demonstrated in the simulator a few times over the years as a warning I would like to make a few comments and explain a few points to those aviation enthusiasts who are having difficulty understanding how it can happen.

You have to have the exact combination of being too high, too fast, rate of descent reducing, speed reducing, autothrottle in hold mode. You have to simultaneously intercept the appropriate 3 degree profile from above and have the speed at Vref and decreasing at about 500 feet. At that point it looks ok as regards height and speed but it goes wrong terribly quickly. If the Asiana had had the stick shaker 20 seconds earlier they could probably have successfully gone around, 20 seconds later and they would have been on the runway having had a heavy landing.

When manually flying the 777 there are still many automatic functions helping you. For instance if you roll into a 25 degree angle of bank there is no need to increase the back pressure on the elevator. If you increase the power the nose will not pitch up. If you are flying a visual circuit you do not need to advance or retard the thrust levers manually at any stage. This is all designed to make it easier to hand fly but it does erode basic flying skills.

The NTSB comments were very much what I was expecting. It is quite difficult to crash a serviceable 777 in good weather but there is one way for a pilot inexperienced on type to do it. Start the approach high and fast in FLCH with 0000 in the alt sel. Do not conform with stabilised approach criteria at 1000 feet, Regain the visual glideslope and Vref at about 500 feet and do not change the mode. The speed and height will drop off very quickly. I think unfortunately they discovered this method.

[Lonewolf_50]

Thank you, Spandex ... a training / systems issue. :ok:

EDIT: also, thank you suninmyeyes. :ok:

[BARKINGMAD]

Best Rate: Posting # 1035. You queried whether some of us put landing rwy in fix page(s) for extra guidance?

Yes I do, everywhere I go, with/without ILS, VOR/DME, NDB and the rest, complete with range ring(s) with a pre-computed altitude to alert me to vertical deviations.

Alas, amidst all the noise in this forum topic about cultural differences and training etc, I regret to announce it was a G-registered TRE, in a G-registered 'frame, flying UK AOC rules into a UK London airport, who said not to encourage the F/Os to do that, and refused to enter the info at my request, me being the authorised captain and he being PF for that sector!

So before us westerners start throwing the merde at the other cultures, perhaps we could start by puncturing some of the arrogant ego's to be found in our own ranks?

Some of the total rubbish which apparently is thrust upon our RHS colleagues as well as LHS crew, by European training staff, needs to be flushed out of the system.

It has long been a bugbear of mine, freely admitted, that it's high time our own training staff were more closely monitored and censured if they are found to be failing to sing from the company standard hymnsheet.

One recent example is that of a new-to-type and new to flying F/O who expressed his doubts as to how to manage the NGs energy in the descent, to a very senior training captain with whom he was flying.

The reply given "you're in an airline now, this is not a training school......!" sends a chill down my spine.

And we could be exporting this sort of rubbish to the high-accident rate airlines.............................................?!?! :ugh:

[Capn Bloggs]

I am sure he has never been in FLCH down to touchdown, quite rightly as that is not a mode you want to be in, but if you were to do that the autothrottle will not maintain speed in that mode if the pitch is manually increased to a pitch above the flight director command.

It is for that reason that my (non-777) outfit prohibits use of the equivalent of FLCH when the slats are out.

[stuckgear]

Asiana Pilot Asked to Abort Landing Before Fatal Crash (http://www.asdnews.com/news-50081/&utm_source=linkedin.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=discussion-aa?goback=%2Egde_1571937_member_256207531)

The request to abort the landing was captured on the cockpit voice recorder 1.5 seconds before the plane crashed, said National Transportation Safety Board chairwoman Deborah Hersman, who is leading the probe

Asked to abort ?

1.5 seconds before impact ?

[nitpicker330]

I just watched a great interview of Sully by Bloomberg West TV on this accident.



Too Early for Blame in Air Crash, Sullenberger Says: Video - Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/video/too-early-for-blame-in-air-crash-sullenberger-says-WlPpPybhS7y1uvDYP_KVzw.html)

[nitpicker330]

Oh Stuck:---

He wasn't asking ATC.

In fact it was another Pilot in the cockpit calling for a go around. Something they should have done 15 to 30 seconds earlier.....

[transilvana]

First, my CONGRATULATIONS to Asiana214 cabin crew, they not only did an excellent job, the did the perfect evacuation by the book, 90 sec´s = everybody out. No questions on that.

Second, what happened we will see and learn from it, I´m the first one interested, but still nobody knows the chain of errors that lead to the crash. As a LTC I always have 3 extra set of eyes in my head looking around in and out, and another 3 extra set of ears for weird noises, my mind is already 15min ahead of the flight and my hands and feet are fully ready to take control if needed. It´s not nuclear physics....

[5LY]

The crash in India of an A320 in the 90's was essentially caused by a trainee in the L seat being high on approach, setting "0" in the FCU Altitude window(MCP to a Boeing driver) and raising the nose as he acquired the Glide path manually, and then flying it into the ground when the thrust didn't come up. They had left one of the Flight Dir. switches on so the A/T was at idle in order to achieve "0" Altitude as commanded. I suspect we're looking at a similar set up.

Never set "0" altitude. It's a death wish.

When you go visual, flight dir. off then at least one on to ensure A/T is in speed mode.

[Toruk Macto]

Could it have been a auto thrust off for training purposes ?

[VR-HFX]

suninmyeyes

Great explanation of the FLCH trap. This was alluded to in some earlier posts but you have summarised it beautifully.

Once demonstrated in the sim, it tends to stick.

It appears to be a very logical explanation of what happened here.

He went through the 500' gate on GS but with no energy and the arse fell out of his world as he sat there with hand on his 'airbus' throttles unperturbed.

What likely happened after that is a mix of many things but primarily inaction from the pnf for whatever reason.

The question here is if FLCH is being used by some carriers for rapid descent from a high and fast profile...why?

[ross_M]

Sounds like there ought to be a moratorium on using FLCH below a certain altitude.

Come to think of it, is there ever any utility in allowing 000 input here? Can this by fixed at the automation level by Boeing to avoid letting other idiots get themselves into this same trap?

Clearly, FLCH seems a bad hack, not really intended for this stage in the flight.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Toruk, it could have been a lot of things, but one of the most telling features is that while (poor) efforts were evidently being made to correct the flightpath it appears that nothing whatsoever was done about airspeed and as no one deliberately lets airspeed drop and drop it probably - almost certainly - follows that it just wasn't being monitored - probably by either pilot.

Why? As a feasible suggestion there were two pilots well out of their comfort zones, one a new instructor in an unfamiliar seat, the other new to type and both maxed out focussing on trying to regain a botched profile and not realising/noticing/understanding the a/t mode wasn't managing the airspeed as they both assumed it would because "it always does".

If the FLCH works like Lvl Ch in a 737 it might not be unnatural to engage it to get yourself down fast when high on profile, and if the other guy was distracted and didn't notice, didn't read his FMAs or just like the PF lost awareness of the implications of doing this then they're in the "trap".

And, as they hadn't done the correct thing about the unstable approach 1000ft earlier...

[Capn Bloggs]

The question here is if FLCH is being used by some carriers for rapid descent from a high and fast profile...why?
Because it's the "easiest" mode (if not following a VNAV profile); it provides the steepest possible descent with overspeed protection, because the auto flight system is controlling the speed with pitch attitude. In VS, the aircraft can be oversped quite easily if you put the nose too far down by selecting a VS that is too steep. To get the steepest descent in VS, you've got to fiddle too much (or use the speedbrake) to stop overspeeding.

[wasthatit]

stuckgear, sorry but I think you missed my point which was that there are many contributory factors to any accident. I was reacting to the "It was pilot's Asian culture, period. Everything else is fine." posts.
cultural variations do exist, there's been quite few studies on the subject matter
We actually agree, there *might* have been a conflict of "you can fly the darn thing can't you?" (environment) and "use the automatics. follow the rules." (operator) cultures that had a bearing here. Speculation only, no blame intended or apportioned.

[suninmyeyes]

Capn Bloggs

[QUOTE][Quote:
The question here is if FLCH is being used by some carriers for rapid descent from a high and fast profile...why?
d/QUOTE]

You beat me to it! I too use FLCH regularly as it is the best way to descend and reduce speed. It is not yet a company SOP but I personally never use it below 3000 feet.

For the benefit of non 777 pilots

Normally in descent one transitions from FLCH to a different vertical mode, normally vertical speed or VNAV or glideslope or an alt capture, all of which will allow the autothrottle to fly the target speed. However on a visual approach like this one with a continuous descent there is nothing to transition to, so no natural prompt to come out of FLCH. And if the guys are maxxed out by being too high and fast and they have taken out the autopilot but left the flight director on then this is what can happen.

[Back at NH]

So, one possible scenario is "the FLCH trap" compounded by a total disregard of the "safeguards" of the Stabilised Approach criteria?

Still leaves a huge blank in the 'Why' box. Will we ever know the 'Why', I wonder?

[VR-HFX]

Thanks Bloggsie

Absolutely. Perhaps it should become SOP before stabilised approach min height to protect the innocent.

[Teldorserious]

He got low and slow...and like many unobstructed approaches he might have wanted to bring it in flat to put it on the numbers.

Whatever the case, in these cases, I keep asking...'so what was the other pilot doing while this was going on?'.

Guys keep pushing for crew ops, crm, ect and these scenarios keep illustrating how a co-captain/copilot will just sit there and watch the other guy fly it to the scene of the accident.

[ross_M]

Still leaves a huge blank in the 'Why' box. Will we ever know the 'Why', I wonder?


On the plus side, at least the guys in the front seats are alive this time around.

Four of them too, for added measure.

[Aileron Drag]

Whilst I am in agreement with the general thrust of the "consensus" which seems to be emerging in relation to this incident, I am struck by the apparent willingness to overlook the implications of the runway navigation aids being inoperative. In an industry which has such an impressive safety record, and where it is the general practice to duplicate or triplicate critical systems where practicable, is it really acceptable to say "sorry, we are remodelling, hope it doesn't inconvenience customers too much?"
Whilst acknowledging the issue presented by pilots becoming over dependent on computers, there seems to be a tacit acceptance that this flight would have landed without incident had the navigation aids been operational. Given that the issue of overdependence on computers is ongoing and real, does it not follow that turning off the runway navigation aids could only result in significantly higher risk? Factor in long haul heavy traffic approaching over water at the end of a long flight, is it not a risk too far? This is not a minor airport in some third world country...I think falcon's point is being overlooked. I probably did as many visual approaches into US airports as I did in Africa. By definition, it was at the end of a long day's work, and sometimes in very marginal weather. JFK ATC seemed to favour an on-limits VOR approach, even with an ILS equipped runway available. They seemed to be unaware that flights coming in from Europe were being flown by very tired crews who would have appreciated as much technological help as possible. Demonstrating your hero-pilot visual approach prowess is great if you've just flown a one-hour sector, but not if you're knackered.

There were times when I thought the US were operating to third world standards.

As falcon has said, lots of points on the thread are valid. But, but, but - a place like SFO should have their aids working. It's San Francisco Airport - not Hinton-in-the-Hedges.

[camel]

so the holes all starting to line up..picking out from the more sensible posts on here...fatigue, power distance, finger trouble, FLCH etc, but no real clues how/why they were so distracted to not notice the speed decay until way too late.

Where they looking out the window at the aircraft on 28R, distracted by the f/o in the jump seat or what ?

Hopefully the CVR will reveal some answers or at least a few pointers.

[lomapaseo]

I hope the NTSB does individual interviews with each crewmember and then ask them as a group with everyone in the same room. I'm sure the replies will differ a lot....

Differences include new info from a different view of the accident

If critical differences occur all you need to do is to re-interview to re-enforce the investigators understanding. It may not be productive to mix interviews in the same room as you may subdue comments that have subjectivity in them.

In the end nothing is that factual unless it is also supportable by other means.

[Lost in Saigon]

On the plus side, at least the guys in the front seats are alive this time around.

Four of them too, for added measure.

It is starting to look like there were only two pilots up front. The other two were likely sitting in the passenger cabin or the crew rest area. There have been numerous posts saying it was normal procedure for Asiana "Heavy" crew to sit in the back for landing and takeoff.


Asiana Airlines Flight 214 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214)

The cockpit crew at the time of the accident were Captain Lee Kang-kook (Hangul: 이강국; Hanja: 李江鞠), who had 9,793 flying hours, with 43 in the 777,[30] and Captain Lee Jeong-min (Hangul: 이정민; Hanja: 李鄭閔), who had 12,387 hours of flying experience (at the time of the incident) and 3,220 with the 777.[31]

[Lorimer]

Chesley Sullenberger's response to a rather aggressive interviewer on Bloomberg demonstrates the sort of calm personality which enabled his remarkable landing on the Hudson in 2009.

Additionally, he (when allowed!) gives remarkably informative answers and neatly refuses to speculate as to blame at any point.

This interview is a very helpful addition to this discussion which will be of particular value to the layman, but with a reticence towards blame which is an example to us all.

Too Early for Blame in Air Crash, Sullenberger Says: Video - Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/video/too-early-for-blame-in-air-crash-sullenberger-says-WlPpPybhS7y1uvDYP_KVzw.html)

[500N]

Just like to agree with transilvana re the Cabin crew.

Saw the photos today of the head crew member carrying the child
on her back and the interview. Impressive all round.

[BARKINGMAD]

Some companies specifically prohibit the "disabling" of systems, for training purposes, on passenger carrying sectors.

Which doesn't prevent certain trainers from doing just that, of course........ :rolleyes:

[junebug172]

My carrier allows us to drop automation to Level 1 which is A/P and A/T off but only in day VFR.

I do make full use of that option on each and every allowable approach.

[JamesGV]

The ex Inspector General Mary Schiavo certainly has more telephone numbers in her black book than I do in mine.

Quote.

"...they commented to each other that they had lost their airspeed and that they were low"

This was seven seconds before impact she claims.

Who are the "they" ?
The "each other" makes it sound like "two".

The Purser seemed to indicate that there were "four" working the flight.
With three up front at the time of the accident.

[Feathered]

Posted by Aileron Drag:
JFK ATC seemed to favour an on-limits VOR approach, even with an ILS equipped runway available. They seemed to be unaware that flights coming in from Europe were being flown by very tired crews who would have appreciated as much technological help as possible. Demonstrating your hero-pilot visual approach prowess is great if you've just flown a one-hour sector, but not if you're knackered.
...
But, but, but - a place like SFO should have their aids working. It's San Francisco Airport - not Hinton-in-the-Hedges. Good points, and ideally all of the navaids would be working 100% of the time. But sometimes maintenance is needed, things break, or in this case the aids were being moved to a new location for runway *safety* reconfiguration.

I'm not so sure that flying a CAVU visual approach is anywhere on par with a hero pilot. The PAPI was online (until the crash debris damaged them). It would be interesting to compare other landings at on KSFO 28R recently from transoceanic flights. Have other crews been having difficulty with flying the visual approach to standards or relying on good CRM to save the day if mistakes were being made by the pilot flying?

Is it naive to think that a professional crew would have trouble flying to the runway on target speed and descent rate on a clear and cloudless day with light winds? Were there problems getting crew rest en route, including crew changes, and if so--was fatigue a safety issue?

And if something *had* gone wrong (bad weather suddenly, aircraft malfunction, runway closed requiring last moment diversion to alternate airport) what margin of safety would be left?

[Legacy Driver]

"Do you close an airport on CAVOK day because you don't have ILS?"

It seems that, in the days we find ourselves, it is going to be cheaper and easier to ensure there is never a time that ILS is inoperative without closing the airport (or find a way to close just the runway affected). The airlines are not going to start training their pilots better without a lot of force, and this looks like the cheaper and easier option.

"While this accident appears to be a result of human error, lets also remember the crews of US1549 and QF32 in which ALL PASSENGERS were saved as the result of crews doing what they are trained to do!"

True, and almost all flights land safely because the crew does its job properly. It doesn't alter the fact that the powers that be will look at this (if it turns out to be pilot error - I'm maintaining a degree of openness until the report comes out) and look for other ways to externalise the cost, such as putting it on the airports and, possibly, aircraft manufacturers.

[lomapaseo]

The one point that's still a bit intriguing to me is the nature of the burn. I'd love to see the report on the origins / spread of that fire.

The internal cabin photos reveal a mechanical wreck but not significantly bad fire damage. The roof OTOH.....

Was it really oxygen bottles? Or is the roof area naturally more combustible?

Assuming a fuel leak fire that wouldn't be the shape of the fire damage I'd expect. Then again, I'm no expert.

This is of course secondary to the cause of the accident but fits in with stuff like cabin safety, breakup locations etc. (all not easily managed due to variables)

From my view the RH engine probably caught fire from scrapping all it exterior component (fuel-oil sources) in an environment of sparks including any breaks in the engine casing. Unfortunately this fire which was visible early on was nestled against the RH fuselage where there appears to be a buckle fracture in the tube. This could now expose the interior to an ignition source. No need then to wait for the aluminum skin to be burnt through in a pool fire.

Once the interior starts to burn it looks for sources of air above the flame and makes it way to the ceiling panels inside the cabin. Smoke is your problem here, but even now it can remain localized until somebody opens a door. Then it rapidly migrates towards fresh air. That's probably the most significant part of this as to when and how the flame front spread.

Will see what the NTSB fire experts say in their final report about the timing of the fire spread vs egress of the passengers

[757_Driver]

FWIW my airline, and others I know do NOT allow the altitude window to be set lower than 1000 feet ABOVE Threshold elevation. If you are in FLCH , and have not coupled to the approach or entered a proper 'approach' mode then the aircraft will level at 1000 ft and the AT will maintain the commanded speed.

If you are still out of the park at 1000ft and need flch or similar to get in then it ain't gonna happen. go around.

And IF you are so maxed out that you loose situational awareness then its better that the 'what's it doing now' moment occurs at 1000ft with the aircraft flying off level and thrust coming up than it stalling into the sea at 100 ft.

Simples.

This seems like a classic swiss cheese accident. Removal of any one of the 'errors' both latent and on the day probably would have prevented the accident.

[MrMachfivepointfive]

Would it be worth considering a 'Mode 8' for EGPWS? Something along the lines of speed VREF to VREF + n, V/S between 500 fpm 1000 fpm at 500 feet otherwise "UNSTABLE GO-AROUND"

Yes, it definitely would be. Considering very recent experiences.

[Lost in Saigon]

This is of course secondary to the cause of the accident but fits in with stuff like cabin safety, breakup locations etc. (all not easily managed due to variables)

From my view the RH engine probably caught fire from scrapping all it exterior component (fuel-oil sources) in an environment of sparks including any breaks in the engine casing. Unfortunately this fire which was visible early on was nestled against the RH fuselage where there appears to be a buckle fracture in the tube. This could now expose the interior to an ignition source. No need then to wait for the aluminum skin to be burnt through in a pool fire.

Once the interior starts to burn it looks for sources of air above the flame and makes it way to the ceiling panels inside the cabin. Smoke is your problem here, but even now it can remain localized until somebody opens a door. Then it rapidly migrates towards fresh air. That's probably the most significant part of this as to when and how the flame front spread.

Will see what the NTSB fire experts say in their final report about the timing of the fire spread vs egress of the passengers

So, if they did not run out of fuel, how come it was not the wings (where the fuel is) that got burned, but the top of the fuselage? What is so flammable up there that could melt the aluminum skin? I am not a pilot, so forgive me if this is a stupid question.


These photos tend to support your view of how the fire spread.

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/03a_zps7f023227.jpg
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/01_zps8b40eb5f.jpg

Upper fuselage still intact
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/04_zpsac4f8d0c.jpg
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/02_zps14af4633.jpg

[ross_M]

I think falcon's point is being overlooked. I probably did as many visual approaches into US airports as I did in Africa. By definition, it was at the end of a long day's work, and sometimes in very marginal weather. JFK ATC seemed to favour an on-limits VOR approach, even with an ILS equipped runway available. They seemed to be unaware that flights coming in from Europe were being flown by very tired crews who would have appreciated as much technological help as possible.


Does the ATC have an incentive to favor a visual (when ILS is up and running).

Just curious. Is there any hidden work-load aspects that are incentivising this.

How often do crews refuse an offered visual and insist on ILS. What's the protocol: Who proposes? Who decides?

[flyhardmo]

The question here is if FLCH is being used by some carriers for rapid descent from a high and fast profile...why?

There is nothing wrong with FLCH unless you set 00000 in the MCP window. It's very useful for intercepting the GS from above however you set a min GS intercept altitude. To restrict its use below 3000' is useless especially when some airports descend you down to 1500' to intercept the GS.

For reference FLCH commands a 2 min climb or descent. Not all descents are done at idle.

An interesting note from the 777 FCOM

Note: During a descent in VNAV SPD, the autothrottle may activate in HOLD mode and will not support stall protection

With FLCH stall protection is not offered below 100' on landing.

[airjet]

an airbus would not have let the airspeed decay to that point surely boeing has a similar system on the 777?

[Airbubba]

Assuming the OZ 214 crew were indeed set up for the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 28L (posted earlier on this thread), a couple of possible gotcha's other than the FLCH trap come to mind.

If the crew forgot to set missed approach altitude in the MCP window after passing DUYET with the autothrottles on and the autopilot off in VNAV wouldn't they get an altitude capture at DA (not sure whether OZ does LPV or LNAV/VNAV)? Attempting to raise the nose to correct for a shallow approach angle would bring the throttles back to idle, right?

Also, if the aircraft altimeter setting was not correct, with a higher QNH set in the plane than actual, the VNAV path would lead to a point short of the runway with instruments showing on profile all the way down. Crossing altitudes would look fine but the RA would not cross check (at least on an LNAV/VNAV approach, I don't believe you would get the wrong path on an LPV with WAAS even with a bad baro setting).

Obviously, someone should be looking out the window on a day visual approach with CAVOK weather. :sad:

I've never flown the Triple but on other Boeings the altitude capture and wrong altimeter setting can ruin your whole day on a non-precision approach if you don't take immediate corrective action.

[galaxy flyer]

All in all, an excellent argument for hand flying proficiency and adoption of heads-up displays.

[Lost in Saigon]

an airbus would not have let the airspeed decay to that point surely boeing has a similar system on the 777?

No. On Boeing aircraft you can turn off the both the autopilot and autothrottle any time you want. The aircraft will then fly just like a Cessna 150.

[mrangar]

Excellent interview by Sullenberger - A discourse miles above the predominant "oh it's because they are Asian" nonsense that is being spouted by so many so-called professionals here.

[thcrozier]

Once they found themselves where they were and forgetting how they got there for a moment, might raising the flaps 10 degrees have at least gotten them over the wall - same as doing so got the guys at Heathrow beyond the approach lights?

[Lost in Saigon]

Once they found themselves where they were and forgetting how they got there for a moment, might raising the flaps 10 degrees have at least gotten them over the wall - same as doing so got the guys at Heathrow beyond the approach lights?

They were at Flap 30. Touching the flap lever at the speed they were at would result in an instant deep stall with NO chance for recovery.

[Methersgate]

Just by way of an observation which may explain some of the "background noise" here, how many people here attended a CRM course in the past ten years and were not told, "Korean airlines had a problem, a few years ago, but that was fixed by CRM training", or words to that effect?

That's why people keep harping on it, even if it's irrelevant in this case. The actual, unspoken, issue, is "How effective was the CRM training that I, and others, underwent?"

[steamchicken]

Why would you have a mode to descend at maximum rate to an unspecified or zero altitude? If it's called Flight Level Change, shouldn't it require that you specify the Flight Level you want to Change to?

[joema]

one possible scenario is "the FLCH trap" compounded by a total disregard of the "safeguards" of the Stabilised Approach criteria?

To this I'd add, why so slow to recognize the situation? We think PAPI was working. See attached descent timeline (previously posted).

They dropped below GS 83 sec out. 60 sec out, they're way below. 45 sec out, way below. 30 sec out, way below.

The PAPI phrase is "red on red and you're dead". Were they looking at red lights the entire time, not thinking what it means? It was a visual approach -- they had to be looking outside at least sometime.

http://joema.smugmug.com/photos/i-Br8cbkK/0/L/Asiana214SlopeGraphic-L.jpg (http://joema.smugmug.com/Photography/Misc-Graphics/30446129_L3338p#!i=2624461580&k=Br8cbkK&lb=1&s=A)

[glofish]

an airbus would not have let the airspeed decay to that point surely boeing has a similar system on the 777?

Then enlighten me how the A320 in Bangalore flew CFIT with 'Open Descent'?

I wouldn't go down the road of praising the french system too much, it has displayed a few more flaws up to today, so it might be a Pandoras box.
You can do such stunts with any machine, protections help you only to the point where they mercilessly reveal your incompetence.

[thcrozier]

Regarding the above profile, hasn't it been preliminarily established that the autopilot was disconnected at 1600 feet?

iamhives-

NTSB: Briefing Prelim Data
82 secs before impact - AP off - 1600 ft alt
73 secs - 173kts
54 secs - 149kts
34 secs - 134kts - 500 ft
16 secs - 118kts - 200 ft
8 secs - 112kts - 125 ft
3 secs - 103kts
Impact - 106kts

[LASJayhawk]

Airbubba, Pulling up the NWS-SFO station history the altimeter setting was 29.82, so if they set to 29.92 the adirus would have displayed about 90 foot high. Could be a contributing factor??

As an Avionics guy this sure seems like a "human factors" problem of epic proportions, BUT, I am not willing at this point to discount instrumentation.

Anybody know if the FDR pulls it's data for air data from the buss out of the ADIRU or out of the buss from the symbol generator to the EFIS?

[lowvaeater]

How many of us need to go back and open FCOM to refresh our memory that A/T speed protection is inhabited below 100RA during approach?

How many of us have wondered if PAPI is showing 4 whites 4 reds or 4 pinks under bright sunlight condition in some airport?

Yes problem can be fixed by overriding the lever, yes we should have distance vs altitude check.

No matter what, the human factor is there and for them, there is no escape from responsibility. Because of them, we are now more aware of the system design, do and not to do during visual approach.

[river7]

A factual SLF-question, please:

On many of the fotos one sees PAX after evacuation (meaning those apparently not injured, i.e. able to move) "calmly" standing surprisingly close to the smoking wreckage (e.g. near the wingtips, or even closer). Which seems not a good idea with a large plane in flames...

The question: Do evacuation training/procedures also cover what should happen after people have negotiated the slides?
My immediate thought ("have them run as quickly as far away as they can") does not stand second thought: They might end up e.g. on a parallel active runway or in an otherwise dangerous area, in the path of approaching emergency vehicles (!) etc.

Is there any official protocol to cover this? (I do of course realize that cabin crew will be available outside the plane only after completed evacuation, at the earliest.)
Or is anything "after the slide" the scope of the emergency services anyway?
And what might be a "safe" minimum distance in such situations?

[eaglewwit]

I do not understand why people would even fault the airport for not having the ILS fully functioning.

A pilot should be able to fly without it. Shouldn't we expect a professional pilot to be able to safely land his aircraft if THE AIRCRAFT'S NAVIGATION SYSTEM IS DOWN.

Do these guys train in the SIM for a raw data single engine hand flown approach? If the airplane is capable of doing it, then the pilot flying it ought to be capable of doing it.

[surfb777]

I agree with Lost in Saigon. I flew the 757/767/777-200 and -300 for years. All of us have been caught high and close on various visual approaches over the years. That is the time to turn off the automation and just fly it like a regular airplane. The 777-300 can be flown easily with one hand on the control wheel, and one hand on the throttles. Flying 101.

Doing this though, you have to be so far in front of the airplane that the automation will never catch up, and never should be involved. Fussing with mode changes during these high, close in visual approaches, is an invitation for trouble.

Also in play, is what frame of mind the pilots were in starting the approach. Sometimes it is better to realize that you are not in the best position mentally to perform at your peak, therefore try another approach or let the F/O fly it. Time will tell how human factors played into this accident.

[twb3]

"There are no stupid questions in Aviation "

Agreed. But there sure are some stupid answers....

[awblain]

If I remember the end of the safety briefing correctly:

Leave all your carry on belongings behind;
... Jump down the slide with your legs straight out in front of you.
After exiting, move away from the aircraft.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

so the holes all starting to line up..picking out from the more sensible posts on here...fatigue, power distance, finger trouble, FLCH etc, but no real clues how/why they were so distracted to not notice the speed decay until way too late.

Camel - fatigue, 3-4 crew op with rest facilities, sleepyness maybe, fatigue sure you know the meaning...:\

[Squawk_ident]

NTSB to Hold Third Media Briefing on Asiana Airlines Flight 214 crash in San Francisco


July 9, 2013

San Francisco –The National Transportation Safety Board will hold its third media briefing today on the investigation into the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214, in San Francisco, that occurred on May 6, 2013.

Event: Press Briefing

Date/Time: Tuesday, July 9, 2013 at 2:00 p.m. (PDT)

[michwilkers]

It's overly simplified, but seems like this is the first one I've seen that simply tried to explain how an approach operates. Not so sure about the "any pilot who has passed the exam and has a license should be able to make a visual approach" line, guessing the writer doesn't drive big jets, but at least no talk about magical cranes.

After Asiana 214, Examining the Intricacies and Perils of Landing a Modern Airliner | Autopia | Wired.com (http://www.wired.com/autopia/2013/07/asiana-214-landing/)

[Tu.114]

To me as non-777 rated guy, this approach seems a bit like a recovery from a hot-and-high arrival.

Seeing the profile and data posted by joema and thcrozier, it is apparent that the leveloff is accompagnied with a marked speed reduction from 170+ to around 150kIAS. I have seen several approaches - on other types of course - where the realization that the current flap setting allows too little drag for further speed reduction combined with a rapidly approaching stabilization gate was reacted to with exactly this pattern: pulling the nose up, thereby getting a bit above glide, to reduce speed below the gear or next flap speed, dropping the next configuration, then using the increased drag to dive back on the glide slope.

Of course, this is no reason for an accident. But it introduces a bit of instability into the approach which may be harder to catch with no cues like a glide, PAPI, VNAV patch or the like; even more so with a crew that has just completed an all-night duty.

I obviously stand to be corrected by 777-rated colleagues.

[MikeNYC]

Not so sure about the "any pilot who has passed the exam and has a license should be able to make a visual approach" line, guessing the writer doesn't drive big jets, but at least no talk about magical cranes.

Those that drive big jets once drove smaller planes earlier in their career. No pilot's first plane ever is a 777. When one starts training and earns a PPL, one has no choice of what approach to make...it's always a visual.

[Capi_Cafre']

A couple of FLCH questions from a pilot unfamiliar with the type:

1. Does the vertical mode revert to the one previously selected when FLCH is de-selected?

2. Is FLCH a click on/click off selection on the FCP or does it need to be continuously selected via a switch on the yoke?

[givemewings]

River 7, the general idea is to get them down the slide & away from the aircraft. I've flown for several airlines and all mention sending pax upwind and generally 200ft is considered a min safe distance.

Of course it's assumed most incidents will happen on airport, so by the time the CC are out themselves we should have ARFF on scene to direct. If not, that's what megaphones are for... If the emergency was anticipated then obviously we'd have time to have chosen Able Bodied Passengers briefed to assist and direct the pax to safety ("stay on the grass!" From one trainer comes to mind)

[givemewings]

Meant to add, photos of the pax taken with them between the photog and the aircraft may not give a true portrayal of distance. Also, when the first pax came off they likely only saw 'smoke' hence probably didn't feel the need to run further...

[paradoxbox]

Those that drive big jets once drove smaller planes earlier in their career. No pilot's first plane ever is a 777. When one starts training and earns a PPL, one has no choice of what approach to make...it's always a visual.

actually pilots from asia very frequently progress from company owned c172's to whatever twin and then immediately into big jets all in the space of 6-12 months. east asian airlines have some very different ideas when it comes to training progression IMO. a lot of these pilots have comparatively little stick and rudder flying experience.

[JAARule]

Might be a bit tricky flying a visual approach with 10deg nose-up body angle. If they couldn't see the runway it's no wonder they nearly missed it.

[Ian W]

Eaglewit http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-61.html#post7931616

I do not understand why people would even fault the airport for not having the ILS fully functioning.

A pilot should be able to fly without it. Shouldn't we expect a professional pilot to be able to safely land his aircraft if THE AIRCRAFT'S NAVIGATION SYSTEM IS DOWN.

Do these guys train in the SIM for a raw data single engine hand flown approach? If the airplane is capable of doing it, then the pilot flying it ought to be capable of doing it. Had the ILS GS been in service this crash would not have happened. I am sure you could land asymmetric on limited panel - so why to we need two engines for and full instruments?

There has been a lot of 'grandstanding' here on the capabilities of pilots to land with no aids. Whether you like it or not aids are used by many air carriers as the normal approach. Remove or limit their availability and you have taken away a layer of cheese.

In London Centre today they had a failure of the Conflict Alert system. Controllers should all be able to control and separate traffic without automation support.... but severe flow control was imposed due to the lack of a layer of cheese.

Whether you like it or not - that layer of cheese would have prevented this accident. Yes the pilot should be able to fly a VFR approach with no aids. But the airlines (that _you_ work for) do not allow for that. How many training flights without SLF have you done for VFR approaches?

I would expect one of the outcomes of this inquiry will be ILS should not have been OTS for so long.

[055166k]

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) (http://www.atsb.gov.au) report number AO-2011-086

[claser111]

From the data we have available looks like they were unstable on the approach and trying to recover they end up, with the thrust idle, to stall before the touchdown. Of course this is just my opinion but the question could be the following: If they were trying to recover the unstable approach, it means they knew they were unstable, if they knew, why do not perform a go around???

[JPJP]

Apologies if this has been mentioned already;

From the flights ground track it appears that they were cleared for the TIPTOE Visual to runway 28L. This charted Visual procedure is slightly unusual in some ways, and includes some holes that the uninitiated may fall into; Especially after an eleven hour flight landing at a 3:30 AM circadian time.

1. Vertical guidance is only charted at two minimum altitudes. The last of which is published due to Class B airspace. This altitude leaves you high with regard to a 3 degree glide path.

2. With the GS out of service there is no Vertical guidance associated with the approach, apart from the PAPIs.

3. In some FMS databases the TIPTOE Visual must be 'built' in the FMS.

4. The approach can be flown accurately using a combination of LVAV/VNAV followed by IAN. This method allows both vertical and lateral guidance. It also requires familiarity and or training.

It doesn't appear from the vertical track posted that the crew were following IAN or the PAPI.

Here's a link to the Charted Visual approach: http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1307/00375TIPPTOE_VIS28L.PDF

[RetiredF4]

What is the special difficulty about that visual approach?
Speed on short final was the problem looks like, what has it to do with the VAP?

[MikeNYC]

Had the ILS GS been in service this crash would not have happened. I am sure you could land asymmetric on limited panel - so why to we need two engines for and full instruments?

There has been a lot of 'grandstanding' here on the capabilities of pilots to land with no aids. Whether you like it or not aids are used by many air carriers as the normal approach. Remove or limit their availability and you have taken away a layer of cheese.

Whether you like it or not - that layer of cheese would have prevented this accident. Yes the pilot should be able to fly a VFR approach with no aids. But the airlines (that _you_ work for) do not allow for that. How many training flights without SLF have you done for VFR approaches?


The ILS being U/S was not a surprise...it was NOTAMed and it's been out of service for some time. That should have been part of the crew's briefing. Non-availability of a NAVAID isn't a layer of cheese when it's not a surprise.

If the airlines don't allow an approach without NAVAIDs, the crew shouldn't have accepted a visual.

[Machrihanish]

JPJP

2. With the GS out of service there is no Vertical guidance associated with the approach, apart from the PAPIs.

From what distance is PAPI clearly visible at that time of day, and when coming in on that touted 14 (or 17?) mile long final?

(Me too was wondering if one of those pre-prepared, charted visuals had been called for, but maybe so far no info?)

[felixthecat]

Of course its a 'layer of cheese' just because something is briefed doesn't prevent it from being a threat. Anything that is non standard is a treat, this day and age a visual approach isn't a standard approach. I am not saying that they shouldn't be able to do it just that it i not the norm and is a threat. Especially so if your tired, and in training.

[West Coast]

"Whether you like it or not - that layer of cheese would have prevented this accident"

You have now placed yourself in the same league as the aviation experts on TV that had figured out the cause before the flames were out. Making a declarative statement like that minus all the facts allows one conclusion, and it's not about the crash.
Amazing every large aircraft that lands RWY 27 at KSAN doesn't crash as well seeing as there's no GS on that runway either. KORD 14R is minus a GS as well, haven't read of anyone crashing there as well due to it.

If my small jet has the capability to build a course and slope to a runway (via the FMS) I have to believe the 777 does as well. There are ways to mitigate the threat presented by an inop ILS.

[olasek]

Question: Is there an audible signal in 777 when speed departs (say by a few kts) from Vref (provided the bug was set)? Hope some Boeing pilot chimes in since there are questions about it on another forum.

[felixthecat]

No no aural for speed deviations. Why the PNF didn't call it is another matter…..or even if it was called why it wasn't acted upon. At the moment we don't know either way just that they were slow.

The 'bug' is set via the FMC via entering the weight into the FMC and selecting the approach flap. It is also an item on the decent checklist.

[jarops]

Just wondering in this particular case when GS is out, the Crew did not built VNAV 3 degrees path to aid. Some airports I operate 777, this is quite handy for referense. But, just following this case with great interest, what is going to be official report. :confused:

[fox niner]

When the airspeed drops to top of yellow band, or lower, an aural "airspeed low" warning is generated. At least in our fleet.

[felixthecat]

Interesting…not on ours…

[seacat001]

why did the slides deploy inside the a/p

[DWS]

I've seen two versions of an answer

one version says NO AOA indication

another says AOA not needed ( inferring no such indication ?? )

So which is correct ?

Is there or is there NOT an AOA indication on 777 either measured or computer derived ?

[gsy boy]

Ifs and buts about visual approach maybe, but they were 650ft from the threshold, and 0.25nm from touchdown zone, I think a low hour PPL student would pick that up!

[cwatters]

I don't think this has been posted here before..

Stories of bravery emerge from Asiana Airlines crash | World news | guardian.co.uk (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/09/stories-bravery-asiana-airlines-crash)

Aircraft crew and emergency first responders have revealed they used knives, an axe and sheer muscle to free people trapped in the burning Boeing 777 that crashed at San Francisco airport.

The dramatic accounts on Monday helped to explain how 305 of the 307 people on board Asiana Airlines flight 214 survived when it smashed on to the runway on Saturday.

As smoke and fire engulfed the wreck pilots and attendants used knives to slice off seatbelts that tangled passengers. At least one knife came from in-flight cutlery; others were lobbed in by police officers on the runway.

A pilot used a cockpit "crash axe" to deflate an evacuation slide that had inflated inwards, pinning a colleague. Another pilot carried a wounded passenger to safety as jet fuel spurted.....

...snip....

The fire crew were astonished to discover a police officer, Jim Cunningham, inside the plane helping the evacuation without protective gear. He and a colleague had been among the first at the scene. After throwing knives to crew members aboard he went in himself. "I didn't think about it. I just knew people were trapped in there. I just thought, 'I'm kind of a tough guy, I can hold my breath if there's a lot of smoke,'" Cunningham said.


If I remember correctly 47 people have serious injuries which I think usually means broken limbs or worse, so I'm not surprised some people didn't run very far after they went down the slides.

[xcitation]

Looking at the bystander footage of the incident does anyone observe the pitch to be above normal. Clearly an early excessive nose up would exacerbate the loss of airspeed and increase AOA. Hard to tell given camera angles and distance. Before availablity of the bystander video it was already suggested that the tail strike was an indication of high pitch.

Very impressed at the structural strength of the a/c and the new improved fire retardent materials. Manufacturer did a superb job with this a/c.

[Jazz Hands]

Maybe I'm just tired, and I'm fully ready to be lambasted, but the graphic in post #1210 seems way off to me. I've plotted the NTSB data (using red) on the same scale. Am I missing something?
http://i43.tinypic.com/ndr3wo.jpg

[MikeNYC]

Maybe I'm just tired, and I'm fully ready to be lambasted, but the graphic in post #1210 seems way off to me. I've plotted the NTSB data (using red) on the same scale. Am I missing something?

That graphic in post 1210 was created using radar return data from FlightAware, and it's taken in one minute intervals. It's unlikely to be nearly as accurate as ADS-B tracks or DFDR.

[threemiles]

Mic Dundee
great post
Thank you

[HOODED]

Mic, a very enlightening if sad post. I find it balanced and well written. I just hope someone takes heed and actually start letting pilots fly rather than just be systems managers. I know it's difficult to change cultures so entrenched but this accident seems to have been waiting to happen. Frankly fare paying pax deserve much better.

[Jazz Hands]

That graphic in post 1210 was created using radar return data from FlightAware, and it's taken in one minute intervals

Can't claim I know how it was sourced, but it looks more frequent than one-minute intervals. Very misleading, too, especially the bit about the rapid drop.

[wiggy]

Is there or is there NOT an AOA indication on 777 either measured or computer derived ?
We don't have it on our fairly sizeable fleet - I suspect it might be a customer option.

[FullWings]

Looking at the bystander footage of the incident does anyone observe the pitch to be above normal.
It certainly seems that way. For a stable flap 30 landing, the attitude should be close to zero degrees relative to the horizontal, so about the same as if it were sat on the ground. Anything higher than that and the speed is slower than it should be (unless it was going-around but we know that didn't happen).

[DaveReidUK]

Very misleading, too, especially the bit about the rapid drop. Quite so, in fact the NTSB in today's briefing specifically stated that the stories circulating about a sudden increase in ROD on final approach were erroneous.

[Keylime]

When the airspeed drops to top of yellow band, or lower, an aural "airspeed low" warning is generated. At least in our fleet.

As the aircraft was high on the glide slope one possible scenario that would make sense as to why the aircraft stalled is if the crew dialed the altitude in the altitude select window on the mode control panel down and then hit FLCH to keep the thrust levers at idle. The problem with this technique is that the pitch envelope protection will not protect you if your airspeed decreases below minimum maneuvering speed(which it did in this accident). You would get the AIRSPEED LOW EICAS MESSAGE but no speed protection from the autothrottle system. One can only imagine the confusion in the cockpit as they approached the water and the thrust levers were at idle, then raise the nose to try and stretch the glide, and then at the last minute manually advancing the thrust levers. This "gotcha" referred to in posts 1209 and 1210 is a NOTE in the Boeing Systems Manual in the flight controls section under envelope protection. If they were on speed when they raised the nose they had approximately 30 knots before the aircraft would have stalled.

[daikilo]

Having seen the amateur video taken from a distance, I can see the logic of the NTSB response, however, they published data which appears to show that he was at or below stall-speed and accelerating the engines hence pitch-up. In my mind he was in the too-low energy corner. How he got there is for someone else to admit.

[Watchdog]

What I don't understand, assuming they had A/T disconnected, is why the wake up function didn't occur when A/S decayed below VLS. Further, why no crew reaction to the AIRSPEED LOW EICAS. Is it possible the crew disengaged the A/T using the ARM switches???!!! 😳😳

[archae86]

San Francisco –The National Transportation Safety Board will hold its third media briefing today on the investigation into the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214, in San Francisco, that occurred on May 6, 2013.

Event: Press Briefing

Date/Time: Tuesday, July 9, 2013 at 2:00 p.m. (PDT)
CNN is currently showing the briefing room and a "starting soon" label at this one of their streaming channels:
CNN streaming video for 7/9 briefing (http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/cvplive/cvpstream3.html)
They subject you to a 15-second or 40-second advertisement first.
At two minutes to the hour this is showing live video of the briefing room, with people milling about doing setup checks or the like. Yesterday's briefing started late.

[Lonewolf_50]

This is the part that gets me, each time I read it. I've seen various versions of this in this thread, and it makes me uncomfortable.
One can only imagine the confusion in the cockpit as they approached the water and the thrust levers were at idle, then raise the nose to try and stretch the glide, and then at the last minute manually advancing the thrust levers.
The bolded part is what I don't "get."

I was taught that you use power to stay on (or addjust to) glide slope, pitch to stay on (or adkust for) airspeed when making an approach to land. (Of course, the two work together to give you the performance you are trying to achieve. )

I was also taught that if you are low/slow on approach to landing, pulling the nose up "to get to the runway" makes your problems worse if that is all you do.

If automation and its helpful features has taught (inadvertently?) many pilots now current in various aircraft that you fly the plane by using one hand (stick), then it's a wonder more planes don't crash more often.

[MikeNYC]

Can't claim I know how it was sourced, but it looks more frequent than one-minute intervals. Very misleading, too, especially the bit about the rapid drop.

My mistake about one-minute intervals. I had previously thought the most granular information one could get from FlightAware was one-minute intervals but I was mistaken.

Here's the original source of that graphic:

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/07/us/asiana214-uneven-descent.html?ref=us

Here's the FlightAware data:

Flight Track Log ? AAR214 ? 06-Jul-2013 ? RKSI / ICN - KSFO ? FlightAware (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAR214/history/20130706/0730Z/RKSI/KSFO/tracklog)

Interestingly, there's no breakdown in "seconds"... it's assumed by whoever assembled the graphic, that if there are 5 track points at 2:27, they're equally spaced and likely 12 seconds apart each. I would guess that's a dangerous assumption.

[UAVop]

Has anyone heard or noticed if the final approach was to the original runway designated, and/or ATC changed designated runway for final?

Edit: In reference to the descent profile, I would not use flight aware data. This may or may not be from other ADSB sources.

[Easy Street]

Am I right in thinking that the most commonly-quoted reasons for retention of pilots, despite advances in automation, are that only a human can think flexibly enough to react to any unforeseen circumstance, and that only a human can continue to fly the aircraft when critical elements of automation fail? If I'm right then it follows that a pilot must have as his/her sine qua non the ability to fly (and land) the aeroplane with degraded systems, possibly in poor weather, possibly with no availability of external navigation aids, possibly with communication failures, etc etc. If these are not the first and foremost requirements, then why retain pilots at all? If 'lack of ILS' or 'elected to fly a visual approach' are even cited as contributory factors in this accident, is the piloting profession moving itself a step closer to oblivion? The human beings at the front end have to be capable of safely hand-flying the aircraft with the minimum of external assistance, which implies training and then regular proper practice (not just taking manual control of a stabilised approach on short finals) , or they will in time come to be viewed as surplus to requirements.

[tdracer]

The A/T servo on 777 is considerably lighter than that of 747 and 737, if you happen to rest your hand on it during idle operation, the servo can have a hard time erecting the lever back up.The throttles on all Boeing North airplanes have the same force requirements to move - about 2.5 lbs force at the knob. In fact, with the exception of the 787, they all use minor variations on the same friction device for throttle 'feel'. Naturally, the 747 requires twice the force to move all the throttles since it has twice as many throttles to move. The autothrottle servo has plenty of force margin to move the throttles, its the friction devices that slip - as designed - to allow manual override of the A/T. The throttle quadrant on the 747-8 is unchanged from the 747-400.

That's roughly half the force that was required on the pre-FADEC throttle cabled engines - typically about 4.5 lbs at the knob (sometimes as high as 6 lbs.).

Boeing airplanes automatically select 'approach' idle when flaps are 25 or greater. By regulation, it must take less than 8 seconds to go from approach idle to 95% of max GA thrust (in actuality it's more like 5-6 seconds). I'm not a pilot, but I've been in the flight deck for a number of flight test go-around maneuvers (typically selected at 250 AGL) - 744, 748, 757, 767, and 777. I've never seen us lose more than 50 ft after TOGA was selected. The flight test airplanes are typically pretty light, but Asiana would have been fairly light since they'd burned most of the fuel on a 10 hr flight.

[Gate_15L]

Great post Mic. Your post is one of the true gems of insight in one of the casual factors that make up this accident, out of the last 60 pages of waffle and uninformed amateur ego driven "analysis".

Your experience somewhat mirrors what I've been reading elsewhere on PPRUNE for months prior about working for Korean carriers.

[Lonewolf_50]

TD:

FWIW, if the go arounds during test were made "on speed" (or near to proper approach speed for a given day) it would be quite a different result than if one is 10, 20, or 30 knots slow when the Go Around command/action is initiated.

I suspect some interesting sim sessions could be made showing a go around decision late, low and slow, versus "in a timely fashion" for the benefit of pilots wondering how long it takes to go from falling near the ground to getting away from the ground if the Go Around decision is delayed, or too late.

[UAVop]

td, what about the 'spool up' required on final?

Yes LW, the GA in the sim, or even when flight testing, rely on a 'fling' effect, being at or above speed, not below speed.

[wasthatit]

Easy Street:

Am I right in thinking that the most commonly-quoted reasons for retention of pilots, despite advances in automation, are that only a human can think flexibly enough to react to any unforeseen circumstance, and that only a human can continue to fly the aircraft when critical elements of automation fail?Yes you are right in thinking this and on many, many occasions this fact has been demonstrated. Its just that you never read about them because the outcome is that the aircraft lands at an airport (maybe not the intended one) and everyone goes home.

What is being said about the absence of the G/S is that it removed a safety barrier. Put it another way, if you consider the (fictitious) predicate:

An accident is likely if the crew are not that skilled in visual approaches AND are new on type AND there are CRM issues AND the PM is distracted AND a steep descent is required to get on the glidepath AND vertical guidance is not available.

If any condition is removed the accident becomes significantly less likely.

Note: this is a gross simplification, just to illustrate a point

[framer]

framer says:
Quote:
"So what do we need to change about the environment they were operating in? If you can answer that question you actually make an impact on flight safety rather than just on your own ego."
...ensure that pilots can actually fly 100% manually, and have no aversion in disconnecting A/P & A/T at any time to maintain desired flight path profile.
Exactly Glueball, exactly.
So now try and convince the people running the Airlines ( accountants, lawyers etc) that we must increase our type rating sims from 6 sessions to 12 and that we must allow our pilots to fly manually on the line and that our recurrent sim sessions must involve hand flown visual approaches and circuits. Good luck.

[UAVop]

Interesting, FD off left, On right
Flaps 30

and autothrottles ON....

[Airbubba]

and autothrottles ON....

didn't she say the autothrottles were ARMED?

[ImbracableCrunk]

This may have been posted already, but the student CA was most previously on the A320. Boeing vs Airbus A/T issue?

[Lost in Saigon]

didn't she say the autothrottles were ARMED?

Yes, she did say they were ARMED, not on.

[Machaca]

NTSB: PM in right seat (training captain) saw four reds on PAPI and noticed low airspeed, assumed A/T would maintain speed.:ugh: