Asiana flight crash at San Francisco [Archive] - Page 3

B-HKD

7th Jul 2013, 18:16

Both the PAPI for 28L and 28R were up to the moment of the crash.

1. NOTAM SFO 07/046

!SFO 07/046 SFO RWY 28L PAPI OTS WEF 1307062219
CREATED: 06 Jul 2013 22:19:00
SOURCE: KOAKYFYX

2. They were already displaced 300ft down the runway and thus matching the new 300ft displaced threshold.

3. Following the crash, 3 out of 4 lights of the 28L papi system were smashed as a result of the aircraft sliding over them.

4. The 28R PAPI system is still functioning.

Two pictures to show you the knocked over PAPI lights on 28L. (Look closely)

1. Look at the left. You can see 4 concrete bases. The one all the way to the left still has a standing PAPI light, the three on the right dont.

https://imageshack.com/a/img839/3416/2su.png

2. Look at the top of the picture. You will see the same as above.

https://imageshack.com/a/img692/6513/ze1c.png

So functioning PAPI lights, no ILS GS for either 28L/28R as per NOTAM.

Crew knew this from the very moment they left in Seoul, and had plenty of time to brief the approach.

Regardless of how they were vectored for the visual, they could always have gone around and requested a extended downwind leg on the next try. (big loss of face for a Korean crew no doubt).

These guys managed to pull off a KAL801 in Guam, during a perfect CAVOK day at SFO in a B772.

Funny how quickly people forget what was going on with the hometown rivals of Asiana....Have some things improved since then? no doubt. Is the same culture still prevalent from the top of management to the very bottom? Absolutely.

Best thing to come out of this, is that these two will never be left at the controls of a commercial aircraft again.

A Squared

7th Jul 2013, 18:20

Would be curious to know how far a final he was given, whether or not he was instructed to follow anyone and any speed restrictions that may have been issued by ATC.

Can't help you with the other, but the Flight Aware ground track indicates that they were aligned on final just southeast of the Dumbarton Bridge, which would indicate a final of a little more than 13 nm.

Captain Calamity

7th Jul 2013, 18:32

Given that this particular A/C was successfully evacuated despite people taking their luggage with them, maybe a separate thread on evacuations and luggage would be helpful?

Clearly simply wiring the locks to the seatbelt signs won't work. The general point is that if people can't access the overhead bins in an evac, and if they know this from the safety brief then perhaps they will concentrate on getting from seat to slide as quickly as possible without wasting precious seconds rescuing of their ipad and duty free.

No more from me, and thoughts with those who were unable to walk away from this.

A Squared

7th Jul 2013, 18:35

DA50driver

7th Jul 2013, 18:42

If you as professional pilot can not perform a visual approach without the aid of a loc/GS it might be time to reconsider what you do for a living. (This is aimed at the people that think visual approaches are dangerous. I make no judgement on the Asiana incident yet).

Here is how to do a visual approach:

1. Find the runway
2. Find a bug on your windshield
3. Put the bug where you want to touch down on the runway.
4. If the bug ends up short of your touchdown point pull up a little (or use trim).
5. If the bug goes past your desired touch down point push a little. (or use trim).
6. Add or remove power as required to maintain whatever speed you have decided to use.

That is it. Nothing more, nothing less.

robert f jones

7th Jul 2013, 18:44

I suggest you read many of the previous posts re the BA 777 crash at LHR. If you have previous flying experience of arriving at a major International airport, expecting all landing aids to be normal, then your comments are worth considering. I think your age is against you for that to be possible. A case as we say in the UK " fools rush in .....".

B-HKD

7th Jul 2013, 18:48

B-HKD,

Good eye on the picture. Pretty clear that the airplane did take out the PAPI. Although it doesn't necessarily demonstrate that they were operational at the time, just that they had been installed.

I think its safe to say that the date of the NOTAM gives away that the PAPI lights were operational.

Apologies if this has been brought up earlier in the thread ( I haven't the time to read all 27 pages tonight) but it strikes me as similar to the other 777 hull loss with BA in that they landed short. Were the cruise ambient temperatures conducive to fuel icing?

The BA -200ER had RR Trent 895 engines.

The OZ -200ER involved has PW4090 engines.

The Heat exchanger clogging up due to icing was a problem limited to the Trent engines. GE/PW looked into the design of their heat exchangers and confirmed it was a problem limited to RR

UAVop

7th Jul 2013, 18:48

Dont think these have been posted before in the thread. Here are some relevant NOTAMS for SFO:

SFO 06/011 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R IM OTS TIL 1308222359
SFO 06/010 SFO NAV LDA RWY 28R GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/009 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R CAT 2/3 NA WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/008 SFO RWY 28R RVRT OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/005 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28L GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/004 SFO NAV ILS RWY 28R GP OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359
SFO 06/003 SFO RWY 28R ALS OTS WEF 1306011400-1308222359

misd-agin

7th Jul 2013, 18:50

tasmin

7th Jul 2013, 18:54

Several posters have mentioned that the flight had 4 crewmembers in the cockpit.
Having deadheaded many times on ASIANA on my way to teach on the A330 in Korea, I am pretty sure that the back-up crew does not sit in the cockpit for landing and take off.

J.O.

7th Jul 2013, 18:57

There are several posts throughout this thread from pilots who have operated into SFO recently and all of them have stated that the PAPIs have been out of service on 28L and 28R for some time now.

B-HKD

7th Jul 2013, 18:57

If there were no engine or flight control malfunctions plowing an airline short of the runway, that has a double displaced threshold, is inexcusable, especially on a CAFB day.

No ILS? Laughable, and sad, to think that professional pilots need one to land.

No VASI/PAPI? Makes it tougher but not impossible or unusable.

Many ways to use the FMC to figure out distance to the runway. That should be known before you are signed off by the TRI/TRE/CKA.

Blind adherence to SOP's can be a contributing factor. Watch JFK VOR 13L on a VFR day. It's amusing and disturbing watching guys make a simple approach a CF.

:ok:

Worse even... the guys knew their beloved ILS GS would be INOP for both 28L/R from the very moment they received the dispatch brief/release to KSFO.

10+ hours to prep for a visual on a CAVOK day, and they manage to land hundreds of feet short :ugh:

As usual.. INOP ILS = CFIT for the Korean

Ian W

7th Jul 2013, 18:58

Capt. On Heat
Quote:
Remember USA is one of the very few countries in the world whereVFR approaches by commercial passenger carrying aircraft are legal.
Ian. Rubbish.

Fine name major European airport TMAs that are NOT IFR at all times

BenThere

7th Jul 2013, 19:08

Fine name major European airport TMAs that are NOT IFR at all times

A visual approach is still IFR.

freshgasflow

7th Jul 2013, 19:12

And all these years travelling cattle class, I thought the rear was the safest place to survive a crash !

BBK

7th Jul 2013, 19:25

B-HKD

You are wrong to say that the crew won't fly again. For that to be the case then they would have to be guilty of something. The report will take months to complete so it's just down to your extremely limited knowledge of the facts.

Why oh why do people on this forum feel justified in condemning the crew with no cockpit transcript, ATC Comms, flight parameters etc. Thankfully, the NTSB will not make any comment not backed by evidence. Sorry to get on my high horse but I used to write technical reports in a previous life so the thought of spouting crap before engaging brain seems alien to me. Apologies to those of you offering good points to the debate.

Gertrude the Wombat

7th Jul 2013, 19:26

Years ago I happened to be in an office when the house (3 floors) caught fire somewhere 'up there' (a flat on the top floor, as it appeared later). Everyone grabbed the papers on the desks (me, too, as that's what was going on around me) and run out. How's that explainable?
When there's an unwarned fire practice in an office I grab my distance vision glasses and my car keys, so I've got some chance of going directly home if I can't get back into the office. In an aircraft I might grab my passport and, again, glasses, but I hope that would be about it.

Bomb scares in pubs, now, that's another matter. I was in a London pub once upon a time, and we were told to evacuate immediately, bomb scare, leave drinks behind. Of course whilst we were still milling around outside closing time passed, so I never did get to finish the drink. Locals (who were no doubt more used than I to the uncivilised tenor of London life - bomb scares etc) disobeyed the instructions and took their drinks with them, and thus got to finish them, and I would next time too.

400drvr

7th Jul 2013, 19:27

Having done my fair share of visual approaches over the years I have never really liked flying them, and not for the reasons you might think. The reason I don't like them is because typically it requires low level maneuvering so that I don't piss off the home owners who decided to buy a home under the flight path to an airport that has been in it's current location for decades. It's stupid and can lead to the crash we all are aware of now. I don't know the reasons behind yesterdays crash and I'm not going to speculate as to what happened, I was not in the cockpit.

As for Korean Pilots vs the rest of us. I have flown with some pretty good drivers who happen to be Korean. They are not all inept and dependent on a straight in ILS auto pilot driven arrival. Like any pilot group you have many good ones and then one or two that may make you wonder. I'm sure most of you have flown with at least one of these guys during your careers.

Lets try to keep this and any topic a little less accusatory and try to examine what happened and what can be learned from a fellow aviator who had a really bad day.

JammedStab

7th Jul 2013, 19:33

I guess there were "cultural" issues here too ?

The flight crew and five commuting pilots riding as passengers all tossed out their luggage and Christmas gifts out the window as they were evacuating a burning aircraft, endangering the lives of those behind them.

The accident was caused by a hard landing after a visual approach. The flying pilot was not a Korean but was a US female. Anyone want to risk writing about the airmenship of the female pilots they flew with here or is this kind of liberty taboo and only allowed when speaking of non-western people ?

Fed Ex Flight 647 Airline Crash - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvqEXbMVANM)

I seem to remember reading somewhere that the pilot who crashed was an affirmative action hire who had many difficulties in flying but was kept on due to gender. Guess that policy cost FedEx a few bucks and reputation.

jehrler

7th Jul 2013, 19:38

J.O said There are several posts throughout this thread from pilots who have operated into SFO recently and all of them have stated that the PAPIs have been out of service on 28L and 28R for some time now.

Actually, of those who have said they have flown in/out of KSFO in the last day or so it is 2 saying PAPI operational and 1 saying inop. And 2 to 0 for those who explicitly describe arriving:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-4.html#post7925962

Conducted LOC approach into SFO last night, glideslope out of service for both 28R & L due construction (until August 22nd) , PAPI was working last night. Departed this morning in relatively calm winds, visual approaches were in use for the 28's.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-5.html#post7925998

Departed SFO yesterday, no VASIS, PAPIS or ILS at KSFO. Only G/S available according to NOTAMS is what's in your FMS.

It sucks, it's asking for trouble.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-23.html#post7927159

I departed SFO a few hours before this tragic accident in a heavy jet.

Our approach to SFO was 'interesting' to say the least. It was the usual, over the field and downwind at 11000 ft, full speedbrake and lots of flap to get down before the inevitable early turn to base.
Cleared for a visual on 28L maintaining own separation from an A320 joining visually on 28R.
High ROD to catch up with the ideal vertical approach path while turning final while watching the other jet.
28L LOC transmitting so followed that, back to Vref+5 early to avoid overtaking the A320 on 28R but end up alongside.
Below 1000ft the (local) A320 flying visually on the right wanders off the centreline towards us. TCAS TA goes bananas but RA inhibited below 800ft. We quickly discuss going around before he corrects back towards his centreline. Look forwards to see four whites on the PAPI's (I had been concentrating looking right at the VERY close A320 for approx 10 secs).
Reduce thrust, set 1000ft ROD, regain profile by 200ft, flare and touch down.

All this after a ten hour flight when it's past 4am on my body clock. How nice it would have been to fly a nice lazy ILS instead.

It's an accident waiting to happen, and it did.

Edited to remove week old experience.

BBK

7th Jul 2013, 19:50

I've deleted my original post as it was in response to one by B-HKD which has also been deleted.

Anyway, please please let the good guys and gals up in Washington do what they are trained for: painstakingly recreate the the events that gave rise to this tragic accident and maybe we can all learn from it.

As there is a debate about how easy it is to fly a visual approach I'll add my two penn'orth. Yes of course all commercial pilots should/must be able to perform these but they are not as easy as some of you think when you may be tired and out of practise. As a FO I could easily be landing after a month with no sectors. Also, big aircraft don't lend themselves to visual approaches if you are not in practise flying them especially somewhere like SFO where you may have been kept high and fly fully dragged up at idle thrust for an extended period.

Locked door

7th Jul 2013, 19:53

For those that are failing to understand,

Yes, commercial pilots should be capable of flying visual approaches.

Having a precision approach available adds one more slice to the Swiss cheese, helping to prevent an accident.

Had this a/c been flying a bog standard ILS, this accident probably wouldn't have happened.

If you are interested in having the safest possible airports, you supply the best possible type of approach all the time.

Much has been made of the national culture of the aircraft operators. IMVHO the national culture of the airport operators is just as big a factor. Visual approaches in heavy jets, LAHSO, Canarsie approaches. All significantly reduce safety. If somebody suggested switching off the ILS's at LHR they'd be laughed out the room.

The yanks are quick to blame pilots of a different culture, but if they had safety as a priority they'd want all pilots to have all the aids possible to be available to them.

Europeans think the Yanks are cowboys, the Yanks think Europeans are over cautious, god knows what the rest of the world thinks about both those groups.

If you don't take measures to accommodate these different cultures these accidents will continue to happen.

Edit to add, this is not meant to be a dig at American aviation, just an attempt to point out that each part of the world is 'different' when viewed from somewhere else.

LookingForAJob

7th Jul 2013, 19:58

Quote:
Originally Posted by Mimpe
I've never felt comfortable with Prof Reason's "swiss cheese safety" description. It implies that environments such as aviation and medical care are naturally benign, with multiple protections in place, all functioning to optimum. Sounds nice on paper.

Ummm, if that's your takeaway from the Swiss Cheese Model, that of a benign environment withe perfect safeguards then I know why you don't feel comfortable with it. It's because you don't understand it at all. Not even a little bit. Seriously. The inherent assumptions are that the environment is fraught with peril, and the safeguards are imperfect.

That's the whole reason he used *swiss* cheese, as opposed to cheddar because *swiss* cheese has many large holes in it. You see; those holes in the slices of cheese are metaphors for defects, flaws, sub-optimalities, to use your parlance, in the safeguards.
With you all the way A Squared. I was wondering how to put the sentiment myself and you came in just a few minutes earlier.

It's interesting how Reason's model gets dismissed by some - but it's just a model that puts sometimes abstract things into an easily understandable form. One of the real benefits of doing a quick (or detailed) risk analysis is that you start to understand what can go wrong and what there is in place that can stop it happening....and then to identify more things that we can do to reduce the risk. For many working in aviation, it's the way we work - day in and day out - and have done for years, from long before SMS was a trendy buzzword (alright, a trendy acronym). But for some others the model can help distil a whole bunch of things into some order. Use it if it's useful, don't if it isn't - but don't dismiss the model, particularly if what it's telling you is that you need to do more to mitigate the risks.

moneyhoon

7th Jul 2013, 20:01

CNN showing footage of crash now...

Ollie Onion

7th Jul 2013, 20:06

I don't care if you are Korean, Ozzie, Yank, Kiwi etc. If this is a case of a crew 'crashing' a serviceable aircraft due to the ILS being U/S and getting themselves out of shape then it is verging on criminal. At ANY point if the apporach is going wrong you have the option to throw it away and start again, it is quite frankly becoming embarrassing just how bad the standards in our profession are getting.

Of course we have to wait for the report to come out, there could be things at play here that none of us know about. And in this case I hope to god there is some 'unknown' cause for a modern jet airliner crashing and killing to passengers as pure human error would be unbelievable.

BenThere

7th Jul 2013, 20:12

My take on Korean pilots in general, formed during a week-long joint USAF exercise is that as a rule they are impeccably motivated, prepared, disciplined, and professional.

I've seen a report that the PIC on the San Francisco flight was an American female. Not confirmed.

alosaurus

7th Jul 2013, 20:18

Any fool can criticise and most fools do. Get all facts to this tragic accident then come back and say something sensible.
Those contributors involved in accident investigation are calling this right.
I don't argue with unconscious incompetents either so won't be wasting my time operating in the gutter.:bored:

Flash2001

7th Jul 2013, 20:19

Video at present on CNN shows that the aircraft bounced and was out of contact with the ground for a short distance and rotated 270 degrees or more on its yaw axis.

joelnthailand

7th Jul 2013, 20:20

Locked door is correct. Safety measures should be made to accommodate the least common denominator. Being able to do a visual landing is over-rated. Flying is nothing more than being able to plug data into a computer.

josquin

7th Jul 2013, 20:21

I guess those maligned eyewitnesses who reported a kind of cartwheel were not far off after all...

Firstpost

7th Jul 2013, 20:24

My first post here even I've been with an European flag carrier for almost three decades.
I'm a bit worried about how eager some are, and quick too, to blame the crew, the ILS (or the lack of it), and everything without a single piece of evidence. Please remember, we are meant to be professionals, balanced, thinking, and in general intelligent men and women, even though some choose to undermine their profession (in my opinion) by calling themselves "drivers".
The point is, the investigation has barely started, most of the information people are using to draw their conclusion from comes from media, TV-footage from distance and some other ambiguous sources.
Why don't we all wait for the results, and then tell our opinion?

halwise

7th Jul 2013, 20:27

Video shows plane's moment of impact - CNN.com Video (http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/us/2013/07/07/vo-plane-sf-plane-crash-on-cam.courtesy-fred-hayes.html)

Machrihanish

7th Jul 2013, 20:28

Much has been made of the national culture of the aircraft operators. IMVHO the national culture of the airport operators is just as big a factor. Visual approaches in heavy jets, LAHSO, Canarsie approaches. All significantly reduce safety. If somebody suggested switching off the ILS's at LHR they'd be laughed out the room.

Yeah, why no Tokyo-Bay-style parallel runway, why all that squeezing at SFO...

Navcant

7th Jul 2013, 20:31

Locked Door...

Do they never turn the ILS off at LHR when required for maintenance?

Airport authorities don't just switch off ILSs for the fun of it, there is always a good reason for it and coordination is done with ATC if possible.

The flip side is to not use a perfectly good 11,000 ft runway in gorgeous summer wx because the ILS is OTS. Then you have the lowered flow rate and delays to contend with.

overthewing

7th Jul 2013, 20:32

As a frequent passenger, I was startled to learn that important landing services were not available at one of the world's busiest international airports. Moreover, that these had been U/S for several weeks, and pilots had been landing heavy aircraft by doing sums in their head?

Whatever pilots may think of this, as a person who pays to be flown I consider it absolutely unacceptable. I'm paying for technology that maximises my safety, not two tired pilots trying to divide by 300.

Are there any other major airports where there's no g/s or PAPIs?

boofhead

7th Jul 2013, 20:33

From my observations after 10 years flying with Korean Air and China Airlines the pilots fear visual approaches and in general cannot fly them. Going into SFO requires special training and not all pilots are scheduled for this trip.

I did not fly the 777 but took the 744 into SFO many times. This approach is tricky and requires care, with attention to the glide path. There are restrictions that force the pilot to start a quick descent at each gate so as not to get high or fast.

Many of the pilots I flew with (and I never flew for Asiana) will not disconnect the auto pilot until around 500-300 feet when everything is set and stabilized. The auto pilot cannot make the necessary changes in glide path on such a demanding approach well enough to remain stabilized but the pilots persist because they do not trust their own skills to do it manually. Manual flying to them is using FLCH.

They are terrified of the FOQA system and know that any deviation WILL be caught and they WILL be called in to explain. Staying out of any FOQA report regime is very important to them, and for example if a descent rate of 1200 fpm is needed to arrive over the runway threshold at 50 feet, they will still try to remain at 1000 fpm to avoid the FOQA, reducing speed to make it down in time. Simply flying the airplane never enters their minds.

They get no training on visual approaches. Especially on line flights. I am amazed that they allow flights into SFO without any glide path guidance.

The FOs hardly ever get a landing and have no skills in this area. They are next to useless in seeing and alerting the pilot of any impending screw up. Especially with the rigid seniority, even if they did see something going wrong they would not offer advice, nor would the pilot take it.

If you search these forums for references to Korean (etc) pilots being unable to actually fly their airplanes, and especially unable to fly visual approaches, you will find plenty. I (and others) have been warning you about this for many years. There are many more pilots out there like this poor guy, who was given no tools or training to handle a difficult task and probably exceeded his skill levels. I do not know this pilot and never flew with him and he could be a much better pilot than I could ever hope to be, so this is surmise only.

When I worked for those carriers I got free or reduced fare tickets for my family but I never used them. I am personally amazed that we don't see these carriers destroying perfectly serviceable airplanes more often. The holes in the Korean Swiss Cheese are always lined up.

BOAC

7th Jul 2013, 20:43

Are there any other major airports where there's no g/s or PAPIs yes, when the ILS is off for maintenance - and there were PAPIs.

misd-agin

7th Jul 2013, 20:44

It will be interesting to hear UAL's observations after seeing the video.

Plectron

7th Jul 2013, 20:45

Boofhead is absolutely correct. And the Korean Airlines are not alone. One especially comes to mind with the same problem. Service Quality. Great service and clean new airplanes but what goes on up front is not for the faint of heart.

CityofFlight

7th Jul 2013, 20:47

Just hearing on the NTSB news conference that the call to do a go around happened between 1-2 seconds before impact. Thank goodness the crew are alive, because it's staggering why their speed and altitude, in relation to landing threshold, they did not initiate a go around sooner. :confused:

PAPI lights were operational.

FIRESYSOK

7th Jul 2013, 20:48

NTSB:

'Throttles were at idle....speed decayed below target....throttles advanced before impact, engines responded normally'

Telling indeed.

josquin

7th Jul 2013, 20:48

CNN carrying NTSB briefing. First information from auditioning CVR and FDR.

texasjet

7th Jul 2013, 20:50

NTSB confirmed slow on speed and shaker 4 seconds prior to impact. Go-Around called 1 second before impact. Engines spooled normally as they were impacting. Looks very damning as all other indications were okay.

Two people are dead, families are changed forever and numerous injured on a CAVU day.

Please everyone, FLY THE AIRPLANE.

Chaos81

7th Jul 2013, 20:52

Info from the NTSB press conference.

CVR: Two hour longs, good recording, cleared for visual 28L and crew confirmed, configured for approach, flaps at 30°, gear down, target speed was 137 knots, no discussion of concerns between crew, 7 seconds prior to impact one crewmember called to increase speed, stick shaker at 4 seconds prior to inpact, 1.5 sec prior to impact go around alarm/call

FDR: During approach the throttles at idle, airspeed was below target airspeed, throttle advanced a few seconds before impact, engines appeared to respond normally

aguadalte

7th Jul 2013, 20:55

Go-Around Safety Forum Jun 18th, 2013 conclusions.
An attention getter to all of us pilots.
Worthy of a careful reading.
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2325.pdf (http://www.linkedin.com/redirect?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eskybrary%2Eaero%2Fbookshelf% 2Fbooks%2F2325%2Epdf&urlhash=x3OJ&_t=tracking_disc)

josquin

7th Jul 2013, 21:03

NTSB: speed was very significantly below 137 knots, not just a few knots under.

fireflybob

7th Jul 2013, 21:06

Looks from that video and NTSB data this is a classic "getting low and slow" accident.

MountainBear

7th Jul 2013, 21:08

Whatever pilots may think of this, as a person who pays to be flown I consider it absolutely unacceptable.This is the first sane comment I have heard about the unavailability of certain ground-based equipment. It's like arguing over whether the fish escaped though the hole in the net or not. Maybe it did and maybe it didn't. The fact remains that the fisherman pays the net-maker for a hole-free net because that way he is guaranteed that the fish can't escape that way. Passengers have every right to demand to fly into an airport with all the available safety equipment working regardless of whether the pilot needs it or not; that's what they are paying for.

Safety first does not mean "safety unless the airport operator thinks it's too much bother".

overthewing

7th Jul 2013, 21:08

This still from the CNN video suggests that the plane did indeed do a 360, and may even have pirouetted on its nose?

http://www.flickr.com/photos/95609930@N04/9231929181/

Edited to add: sorry - how do I get a photo to actually appear?

threemiles

7th Jul 2013, 21:12

so why is no-one talking about similarities with british Airways crash of their 777 when there was no power increase final? iced up fuel lines thought to be probable cause. Not a hint on any network that that might explain it all. and the missing engine? Torn off by the sea wall. everyone is ignoring its loss. if the same reason would have high seriosness for Boeing 777 fleet!

Because the similarity is with the Turkish 738 crash at Amsterdam, not the BA.

Machinbird

7th Jul 2013, 21:13

For those who have not seen the video, a picture of the Pirouette:

http://home.comcast.net/~shademaker/AsianaGyration.png

bavarian-buddy

7th Jul 2013, 21:14

Big luck in this accident. During the pirouette it was very close to flipping over.:ooh:

HighSpeedAluminum

7th Jul 2013, 21:15

As I stated in post #155 A/T mode will be telling? Poorly handled visual approach (wrt AFDS, A/T) beyond stable limits and beyond the capability of this crew has to be considered.

Non Zero

7th Jul 2013, 21:16

... probably if they didn't modify the AOA for G/A they would have landed in the overrun ... at very low speed and with a very firm touch-down ... but ...

texasjet

7th Jul 2013, 21:17

Mountain Bear -

PAPI's working per NTSB. NOT the fault of that podunk, hillbilly SFO. Glideslopes are NOTAM'd out all the time for maintenance.

I would worry more about what factors led the crew to be "significantly slow."

Ivanbogus

7th Jul 2013, 21:20

Press the darn TOGA-button and GO-AROUND !

mercurydancer

7th Jul 2013, 21:21

It would be quicker to allow some passengers to take their bag . Telling them to leave their bag behind would increase the time to evacuate with the ensuing arguments or feigned no understand look .

It has now made me think that to trample over the person in the way of the exit who is getting their luggage is the right thing to do.

Locked door

7th Jul 2013, 21:22

Navcant,

No, in thirteen years of operating at LHR I have NEVER seen the ILS for an active runway OTS. All maintenance is done at night, and the active runway is switched for short term failures. LHR has CAT111 no decision on all runways, so there is a lot of redundancy to allow for failures.

Maybe I've just been lucky.

Back to topic, amazing there were so few fatalities considering what the video shows.

LD

Non Zero

7th Jul 2013, 21:22

Press the darn TOGA-button and GO-AROUND !

at 1.5 sec before impact ... it's a bit late bro!

BenThere

7th Jul 2013, 21:22

Could there be a respect issue with the FO telling the Captain to go around, thereby delaying the call until it was too late?

galaxy flyer

7th Jul 2013, 21:23

Mountain Bear & over the wing,

Exactly what is the relationship between the ILS being OTS and the crew getting significantly slow on final? The visual aid was working, an ILS cannot monitor or correct airspeed. Visual approaches are very common, probably 5 times more likely to be flown than instrument approaches, in the US anyway. Apparently, elsewhere not so much, sadly.

Passengers are paying for transportation between two points, not the airport facilities being constantly operational. Would you suggest that, on a clear day, KSFO just close and send everyone to KSEA or KLAX?

MountainBear

7th Jul 2013, 21:23

-No discussion of anomalies or concerns in cockpit until a crewmember calls out speed too low 7 seconds before impact
-Stick shaker 4 seconds prior to impactSo what happened here that three seconds elapsed and nothing seems to have been done to arrest the speed decay? The startle effect? :uhoh: Fatigue? :zzz: Did the PNF not do anything either, just call :mad: out? :}

Clearly, they knew that had issues so why didn't they fix them appropriately? That seems to be the key question now.

threemiles

7th Jul 2013, 21:24

Press the darn TOGA-button and GO-AROUND !

Too late.

Exactly same happened at Amsterdam.
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_Flight_1951)

BenThere

7th Jul 2013, 21:26

Five knots slow, half-dot low. Standard callouts everywhere I've ever worked. Could've saved them.

Non Zero

7th Jul 2013, 21:26

... but Richard Quest gained a lot of brownies after his technical report ... and here is the question for you Richard ... if you're reading around these pages ...

What are the stabilization criteria Asiana Crew must follow during a Visual Approach?

MassPPL

7th Jul 2013, 21:29

What appears to have happened just seems inconceivable.

The loss of life could have been so much worse. The CNN video shows the aircraft hit the sea wall at a very high angle of attack, the tail is torn off and the aircraft groundloops almost 360 degrees counterclockwise with the nose and left wingtip on the ground and the rear of the fuselage at an angle of what looks to me to be as high as 30 degrees. Just amazing.

galaxy flyer

7th Jul 2013, 21:29

This approach got messed up long before the 7 seconds before impact call-out.

Ivanbogus

7th Jul 2013, 21:30

I know it's too late but initiate a Go-around at the point when the PNF calls out speed is too low is not......why wait?

Flamin_Squirrel

7th Jul 2013, 21:33

Exactly what is the relationship between the ILS being OTS and the crew getting significantly slow on final?

Indeed. The ILS isn't a safety aid, it's an aid to fly to lower minimums safely; which doesn't apply here as it was VMC anyway.

skidbuggy

7th Jul 2013, 21:35

Raw Video Fred Hayes Video of Asiana Flight 214 Crash on CNN - YouTube (http://youtu.be/9Orw3rbj5MI)

Video of the mishap occurring. Looks like they were in the water long before the runway.

Slag away....

Machrihanish

7th Jul 2013, 21:39

Was there anything wrong with having no final approach slope guidance in clear sky? No because hundreds of other flights coped totally successfully.

Yes, despite hundreds of other flights coped totally successfully.

Accidents in non-prec approach environments are significantly more frequent than precision approaches.

So a more appropriate wording: 'it took just a few hundred copies for proof of a known'.

Remember. We are collecting factors contributing. This is not the moment to condemn one party and exculpate another.

caber

7th Jul 2013, 21:41

For the posters up in arms about the ils being out of service: I hope you realize not every runway in the world is equipped with them, in fact the vast majority do not have them. The ils wasn't turned off to save on the power bill or any silly reason, they are being moved to accomodate new runway thresholds. The options are either go without or close the airport. We you consider closing the airport a good idea, I suggest you carefully study your next trip as you just might be flying somewhere workout an ils even installed! Heaven forbid, sometimes the local air traffic control doesn't even have a radar system to tell us what to do!

Non Zero

7th Jul 2013, 21:49

Accidents in non-prec approach environments are significantly more frequent than precision approaches.

oh yeah ... and lets prohibit all non-ils approaches as well as all manual landings and we'll see in 20 years from now what will be the consequences ... actually ... why we do not get rid of those animals called pilots!

Automation are a must as well as manual handling skill ... and it's not nostalgia or old school ... it's just a Visual Approach were Aim-Point and Air-Speed are the basic cross-check!

MD-11F

7th Jul 2013, 21:50

Yes, commercial pilots should be capable of flying visual approaches.

Enough said.

Yes it would be great if every airport never had the G/S inop, but it shouldn't be a big deal if it is on a CAVU day. I find it funny to see comments against the airport operator. There are many parts of the world where flying can be challenging, but if the pilots need a 17 mile final with a Loc and G/S to be "safe" that is crazy. Using the logic some are posting here the flight should be grounded if the AP cannot be used to fly an autoland approach... and that's WHY we have SOME crews that find FLYING challenging.

msbbarratt

7th Jul 2013, 21:52

Whatever pilots may think of this, as a person who pays to be flown I consider it absolutely unacceptable. I'm paying for technology that maximises my safety, not two tired pilots trying to divide by 300.

I take the opposite view. As an engineer I know that technology *does not* guarantee safety, more often than not it has the opposite effect sooner or later.

And as a person who pays for a couple (or more) expensive guys to sit at the front of an airplane and fly me round the world I expect them to at least be able to put it down on the ground without requiring the assistance of anyone/anything on the ground if needs be. Afterall, there's plenty of redundancy on the plane, and I bet there's almost none on the ground.

Ok so they do use things like ILS routinely, I've no problem with that, but "routine" absolutely should not evolve into "necessary". Furthermore I won't fly with any airline that I believe doesn't share the same sentiment.

Message for such airlines; making your pilots autoland *all* the time might save a bit of cash now, but accidents like this will wipe that out in one go and might sink your business altogether. Have a heart, let the poor buggers fly planes and do us all a favour.

RodH

7th Jul 2013, 21:55

That video of Fred Hayes says it all. Gross under shoot and late attempt at recovery. How it got into that predicament is yet to be discovered .
Did the crew in the aircraft on the taxi way make any reports , they would have had a very good view of the accident ?

VinRouge

7th Jul 2013, 21:56

Afterall, there's plenty of redundancy on the plane, and I bet there's almost none on the ground.

You would be wrong.

MountainBear

7th Jul 2013, 22:00

GF writes, Exactly what is the relationship between the ILS being OTS and the crew getting significantly slow on final?It has about the same relationship as the price of tea in China. It doesn't matter whether the specific equipment at issue would have made any difference in this specific case. What matters is that the passengers are paying for equipment that works. If the equipment wasn't working then they didn't get what they paid for. No different than the fact that they are paying for pilots who don't crash their flights. Looks like the passengers didn't get that, either.

con-pilot

7th Jul 2013, 22:04

Indeed. The ILS isn't a safety aid, it's an aid to fly to lower minimums safely; which doesn't apply here as it was VMC anyway.

Very correct, ILSs and visual glide path aids, are just that, aids, not mandatory requirements for excellent VMC visual approaches.

If any airline has pilots so poorly trained and/or lack experience to the point they cannot make a visual approach and landing in perfect weather, they should be prohibited from shooting visual approaches without a full ILS and visual glide slopes backups. So send them to another airport where they can have all the aids possible, including being monitored by a PAR, where they can be ordered to go around if they can't figure it out themselves.

But even with the above, it does not address the low speed issue.

VinRouge

7th Jul 2013, 22:07

Exactly what is the relationship between the ILS being OTS and the crew getting significantly slow on final?

The very last slice of cheese preventing the accident was taken away. Now it's the job of the investigators and the national regulatory authorities to figure out why the other slices were holier than Edam. I suggest cultural attitudes and cross cockpit gradient would be a good place to start. Next would be corporate attitude to screw ups. How about reviewing your initial, line and recurrent training instead of sacking those unlucky enough to find the holes in your procedures?

Procedures can't cover everything.

texasjet

7th Jul 2013, 22:08

Mountain Bear:

I'm not sure what you're driving at with this concern about a GS being OTS. You're correct in one thing, the passengers did not get what they were paying for. The 28L G/S being OTS has nothing to do with the gross negligence of the crew.

Yup. I said it. Gross Negligence of the crew. Besides getting the darn thing airborne, this is the most basic and important maneuver - a visual approach to a landing.

FLY THE AIRPLANE

oceancrosser

7th Jul 2013, 22:08

I think the NTSB tweets NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov/) pretty much tell the pilots on this forum what happened. The "why" will come later.
Others can continue to post pages of useless noise.

con-pilot

7th Jul 2013, 22:13

I think the NTSB tweets

Yes I know, I went to their Aircraft Accident Investigators school at the FAA's Aeronautical Center.

KBPsen

7th Jul 2013, 22:15

There are a lot of comments here that illustrates how little is understood of what causes accidents.. Most in the tone of knowing better.

James7

7th Jul 2013, 22:16

Most of the luggage would have been strewn around the cabin just as easy to pick your case up and walk out the door which is what most of the passengers seemed to have done, at least it clears the aisles for the less able.

Chinese mourn Asiana jet crash deaths | ABS-CBN News (http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/focus/07/07/13/chinese-mourn-asiana-jet-crash-deaths)

Machinbird

7th Jul 2013, 22:18

The reason the aircraft hit the seawall was not due to lack of a glideslope. It hit he seawall because it had insufficient power during the final phase of the approach and got slow. You can see this in the flightaware data and in the video> (would you intentionally flare for landing over the water?)

The reason the aircraft got slow should not be hard to nail down. This post by suninmyeyes should be worth noting: http://www.pprune.org/7926629-post315.html

The NTSB is on it and we should have detailed answers soon.

All too similar to a RA-5C Vigilante ramp strike I witnessed in days gone by.

jumpseater

7th Jul 2013, 22:20

#499 MountainBear
Second, please stop bashing the passengers with the luggage. While it is obvious to arm-chair analysts that this is not proper behavior in the aftermath of an accident people do not always behave in logical ways.

I'd suggest that from survivable accident footage and images this is often 'proper and logical' behaviour to those that do pick up their stuff. it'd be interesting to see what the split is those that take nothing and those that take it all. The ease of access to your stuff is obviously a factor. Thats not going to change any time soon and hopefully airline CC training will reflect this, and ways to deal with it.

Like the earlier poster I think this aircrafts tail from the CNN vid was in the water prior to sea wall impact.

BrandonSoMD

7th Jul 2013, 22:21

Okay, after watching that video, I take back anything I thought about unreliable eyewitness testimony about a flipping-over aircraft.

From the distance people saw it, and given the lack of a tail surface to indicate "right side up", it sure looked like a roll-over. Simply a miracle it didn't do the Sioux City UA232 roll-and-explode.

Let's don't be so quick to toss out data even though people do sometimes get it wrong...

BenThere

7th Jul 2013, 22:23

One thing occurs to me, that I can sit and pass judgment, aged 62 and never had an incident or violation, but who knows what will happen on the next flight?

When I'm retired and safely out of the arena I'll pass judgment mercilessly, I'm sure. Until then, I'm glad it wasn't me, I acknowledge I haven't always been perfect, and on an occasion or two I've been lucky. And I've been covered more than once by the other guy in the cockpit.

I've got some sympathy for the Korean crew going through this ordeal. The pilot flying, I think, is responsible, and to a lesser extent, the pilot not flying. They both have hell to pay, as they should. That's how the system works. But haven't we all screwed up from time to time, but just had the luck, common sense, or help to recover in time, before it became an incident?

con-pilot

7th Jul 2013, 22:28

I've got some sympathy for the Korean crew going through this ordeal. The pilot flying, I think, is responsible, and to a lesser extent, the pilot not flying. They both have hell to pay, as they should. That's how the system works. But haven't we all screwed up from time to time, but just had the luck, common sense, or help to recover in time, before it became an incident?

I have, or did, in my 42 year career of flying, I'd be a poor liar if I said otherwise. 'There but for the grace of God, go I...'

TangoUniform

7th Jul 2013, 22:31

So with the data revealed thus far, we have a fairly accurate reason of what/how this happened. But what human factor related issues actually "caused" this...or what was said earlier, "why"? The factors unveiled will probably very difficult to fix. The companies want us to fly as much as possible using the automation, because accidents seem to only happen when humans are flying the aircraft. The down side is obvious, automation is not always available or U/S, so then the human has to take over. But skills have atrophied, gotten rusty, and put aside. There has to be a positive medium. So many human factor issues to deal with in a blog.

Look at three deadly major accidents in the past few year, Turkish 1951, AirFrance 447 and now this (probably). All due to, too much reliance on automation.

fire wall

7th Jul 2013, 22:37

Gents, the 777 has a function where by if you bring the RX waypoint to the top of the legs page 1L and engage VNAV then it will give you a 3 deg profile to that waypoint. That was option # 1.
Option #2 could have been to plug in the RNAV approach and use it for vertical guidance whilst conducting the visual approach..... what we call the Chinese glide slope on the side of the NAV display.
Option #3 could have been to look out the window and put the aiming point of 1000 ft in the bottom third of the windshield and keep it there and use the thrust to maintain a constant speed profile.

The inability to recognise a divergent approach (indisputable thru flight track v/s data) and the lack of a go around below a stabilised criteria height limit (again indisputable) is an indictment on the professionalism of the crew piloting the aircraft.

In response to BBK, I am in agreement with B-HKD. If you know anything about Korean law and their culture then these guys are toast.

fireflybob

7th Jul 2013, 22:37

What about the role and responsibility of the Operator?

All airlines place "limitations" on what pilots are permitted to do based on experience, for example, and/or even specific approaches to certain runways. One example I can think of was Corfu at night where our briefing said the PAPIS MUST be fully serviceable.

In the same vein the Operator must be satisfied that their flight crew are capable of flying different types of approach. If the Operator is not happy that (for example) it's crews are up to the task of flying a type of approach under certain conditions then such a prohibition should be applied.

It's unfair to blame it on the goalkeepers alone when it's the managers who are culpable.

FinalVectors

7th Jul 2013, 22:37

I don't think it's correct to give all the blame to the crew here before all facts are on the table.
Ofcourse the actual flying part and actions are made by the crew, but more important question should be: Why did this happen, and how can we prevent it from happening again?

A number of reasons might be leading up to the final mistakes made. As examples:
Pilot training (as mentioned before in posts)
Cockpit culture and authority (as in many previous accidents with airlines from the far east)
Airline policies and culture/"Punishment"
language barrier (Did they get stressed by something happening before final approach)
Fatigue
weather
Airport equipment

To look back to another accident, the midair in Uberlingen where the controller working ofcourse had responsibility, but he was put in that situation because of several reasons he was aware and unaware off.

The airline industry almost never had a incident/accident where only one factor is the reason, always "the Swiss cheese" theory is the reason that a accident will happen.
So people......be careful to judge to hard before all the facts are on the table:=

As for me personal I think the report will for sure give a lot of critisism to the crew/pilot flying for the technical part of this accident. But I for sure also hope they will address the important part most, and that is how did this crew end up in this mess, and how can we prevent it from happening in the future?

TRF4EVR

7th Jul 2013, 22:42

They crash a totally functional airplane trying to land in perfect weather on an 11k+ foot runway and we're arguing about who's to blame? Can you conceivably be serious?

wheelbarrow

7th Jul 2013, 22:42

I'm wondering if the crew had modified the heights on an existing approach (RNAV or LOC) to account for the displaced threshold, and screwed one or more heights somewhere while modifying the approach, and then flown the approach in LNAV/VNAV with incorrect vertical guidance. It will be interesting to see if and for how long the autopilot was engaged during the final approach.

changer

7th Jul 2013, 22:42

If they were in FLCH mode, it's possible the Autothrottles were in HOLD mode.

In this situation a 777 crew who, let's say, are highly dependent on automation, could find themselves below Target Speed

A Squared

7th Jul 2013, 22:47

I'm wondering if the crew had modified the heights on an existing approach (RNAV or LOC) to account for the displaced threshold,

Why would they modify the heights? The threshold was displaced 300 feet. That would make a differece of 15 ft on a 3 degree glideslope.

Loose rivets

7th Jul 2013, 22:49

Just watched CNN and others. A poor but workable video of the crash shows the right wing rising 40, maybe 50 degrees up, well into the slide. I couldn't tell if the fuselage lifted or if the port wing was breaking to allow that roll.

The injuries are horrific. Many patients have multiple serious injuries, many spinal injuries and many gut injuries - possibly from the belts. It's astonishing that so many people were carried clear.

DavidHoul52

7th Jul 2013, 22:51

Asian pilots
Correct Silver. Some people groups, like Asian and Arab are notorious for having favourite sons (not daughters) shuffled through training and onto the line. The low competence levels exist in about 20-25% of locals, which is 20-25% too many for safety. Africa can be worse. These people end up with commands, which is when things become dangerous. This system does not function in Westernized nations.

(You can exclude the Japs from this generalization but a whole host of ME and Far East companies spring to mind. Just ask any Western trainer and you will learn this.)

This is not a racist comment; distinguishing different groups of people by their abilities or lack of is not racism. Air safety should never be politically correct.

Don't make me laugh! Can you verify this nonsense? If this is not racist than nothing is! I only hope this poster is an airchair ranter as the last thing I would want to do is fly with a headcase like this! Totally irrelevant to this thread in any case.

con-pilot

7th Jul 2013, 22:53

aircraft was on a visual approach

Just to bring you up to speed, as this thread is getting rather long and it is perfectly understandable that you have not read it all, most of this thread is about the fact that it was a visual approach in perfect weather.

However, a few here are trying to place some or most of the blame on the fact that the ILS for 28L was OTS.

bho

7th Jul 2013, 22:55

sunny11410

7th Jul 2013, 22:59

NTSB released two pictures of the aft cabin section.

https://twitter.com/NTSB/status/354002637240270848/photo/1
https://twitter.com/NTSB/status/354002389096886272/photo/1

Ranger One

7th Jul 2013, 23:00

In response to BBK, I am in agreement with B-HKD. If you know anything about Korean law and their culture then these guys are toast.

Aye true.

But first they have to get them back from the Yanks. Two people have died on American soil; they're not likely to get them back any time soon…

Machrihanish

7th Jul 2013, 23:01

... The down side is obvious, automation is not always available or U/S, so then the human has to take over. ...
Yes, but let's note that presence of op. ILS is not the same as automation. When it is indeed, there's a policy somewhere to fly coupled whenever poss.

So, wouldn't you agree that hand-flying ILS in any weather every now and then boosts skill to fly smoother visuals wherever required.

Call their arrival wx a perfect environment... aren't OPS departments ubiquitous parts of environment as well? Maybe worth a look?

Mic Dundee

7th Jul 2013, 23:04

TachyonID

7th Jul 2013, 23:07

If you compare the (this was posted early in Post 114) the respective profiles of the descent comparing 6 July and 5 July...

Is there something missing on the ATC audio feeds? Why the rapid descent after being high over the S&M Bridge? To your point, something was way out of whack long before the 7 second mark.

nolimitholdem

7th Jul 2013, 23:14

Quote:
Asian pilots
Correct Silver. Some people groups, like Asian and Arab are notorious for having favourite sons (not daughters) shuffled through training and onto the line. The low competence levels exist in about 20-25% of locals, which is 20-25% too many for safety. Africa can be worse. These people end up with commands, which is when things become dangerous. This system does not function in Westernized nations.

(You can exclude the Japs from this generalization but a whole host of ME and Far East companies spring to mind. Just ask any Western trainer and you will learn this.)

This is not a racist comment; distinguishing different groups of people by their abilities or lack of is not racism. Air safety should never be politically correct.
Don't make me laugh! Can you verify this nonsense? If this is not racist than nothing is! I only hope this poster is an airchair ranter as the last thing I would want to do is fly with a headcase like this! Totally irrelevant to this thread in any case.

He may not have expressed it in the most delicate, PC terminology, but when you eliminate weather and from the sounds of it, mechanical malfunction from the equation, how exactly do you consider an examination of the human factors - of which culture is most certainly one - irrelevant?

Have you ever lived or flown in Asia/Africa/Middle East? I only ask because my personal experience has verified his statements regarding nepotism over merit to be completely valid.

Jimmah

7th Jul 2013, 23:17

Fire?
Not being familiar with a 777, what would have caused that intense fire? Didn't look like the fuel tanks ruptured and started the fire. Does the 777 carry LOX near the main cabin area or is there just that much flammable material in the cabin?

Aluminium itself will burn quite happily once you've applied enough heat. Especially the thin stuff the skin is made of. That kind of fire can be quite common in scenarios like these.

jugofpropwash

7th Jul 2013, 23:18

Re the photos of the inside of the cabin. Am I the only one surprised to not see fire damage or at least soot or other signs of smoke?

500N

7th Jul 2013, 23:19

Sunny

Interesting photos. Very bunched up seats.

A Squared

7th Jul 2013, 23:21

If you compare the (this was posted early in the thread) the respective profiles of the descent comparing 6 July and 5 July, you'll see these guys actually were far below the usual G/S miles out from KSFO.

Well, no. If you examine the lat/long/alt/airspeed/vs, data from Flight Aware you'll find that it shows that at about 3 miles from the threshold, they were at 1400 ft, 169 kt descending at 1380 ft/min. Now there's some question on how that data was derived, but regardless it's the same data used to construct the profices that were posted.

TachyonID

7th Jul 2013, 23:21

To your point, Tango, breakdown in automation seems to be a common theme in these incidents. However, it also seems to implicate how these flight crews coped with modest (or more than modest) problems with the usual automation regime. I agree that on a CAVOK day any pilot worth his salt is supposed to be able to put it on the numbers. It just seems like we may have pilots (Turkish @ AMS and AF447 being the most obvious examples) that can't handle erroneous readings from the machinery.

I no longer sit up front, so don't have to endure the check rides any longer, but it seems like we have cases (maybe because other accident causes have been so effectively been mitigated) in recent incidents where personnel aren't properly trained to cope with limited automation anomalies. The FDR and CVR made clear that the guy in the left seat on AF447 didn't correlate the repeated STALL! STALL! STALL! voice warnings with actually doing something other than continually pulling back on the joystick from FL41 to FL-Pancake.

You guys will have to endure it, as I'm out, but I'd expect some blowback from these accidents-- Basically the public and authorities will be asking why pilots forget to operate the controls correctly when all this automation takes a slight dump on them. That's what I see in "Colgan", "Poldercrash", AF447 and (perhaps presumptuously) Asiana 214.

ortotrotel

7th Jul 2013, 23:22

The Captain has 12,400 hours, of which 3200 are on type; the F/O has 9,800 hours and is new on type.

Is someone going to try to convince me they can't muster up a visual approach without PAPIs or VASAs?? They must have observed the approach path to hundreds of approaches, and made hundreds of visual approaches in their professional lives, in different conditions and places...?

Probably in SFO also...

con-pilot

7th Jul 2013, 23:24

But first they have to get them back from the Yanks. Two people have died on American soil; they're not likely to get them back any time soon…

Just what the hell does that have to do with this accident? Not to mention that it is not true, as soon as the autopsies are completed, the bodies will be released to the families or their official/legal representatives. As they are dealing with two young teenagers from China that were killed in an aircraft accident, it will be done very quickly, because the victims of aircraft accidents have priority.

Jabawocky

7th Jul 2013, 23:25

The last 6 rows are all compressed. :eek:

And only two killed? If you were pinned in the rear and smoke in the cabin I can't imagine........

After the video and photo's it is a stunning miracle there are not a lot more dead and injured.

Boeing in a way should be impressed with how well that stood up to the punishment it copped.

azalea

7th Jul 2013, 23:25

KSFO (San Francisco) 777 Plane Crash ATC Recording - YouTube (http://youtu.be/l0Kjf3o4KKg)

On min 2:07 you can hear the initial call by the Asiana Crew (7nms out)
On that tape above the landing clearance is missing. But for sure you can hear the clearance on other recordings.

Strangely enough on min 3:12 the Pilots reports a “short final” again? Could be that an indication of a possible confusion about the Status? Or is that part of a normal procedure to make a short final call even though Landing clearance have been given already?

Not Hiding

7th Jul 2013, 23:26

They've announced that the two who were killed were found on the runway. When watching live video of the scene I saw what appeared to be a yellow body bag and some people standing near it. I thought it couldn't be a body bag, but, maybe it was.

James7

7th Jul 2013, 23:26

Please can a 777 driver explain the A/T. Only 777 please.

Why if the A/T is engaged would the speed decay below target speed. On the Bus with FD off the the AT will follow the speed bug. On Thrust Idle open des the throttles remain at idle.

Which mode would allow the AT to go below target speed.

AT is usually always engaged.

overthewing

7th Jul 2013, 23:28

And as a person who pays for a couple (or more) expensive guys to sit at the front of an airplane and fly me round the world I expect them to at least be able to put it down on the ground without requiring the assistance of anyone/anything on the ground if needs be. Afterall, there's plenty of redundancy on the plane, and I bet there's almost none on the ground.

I agree that the pilots should have been adequately trained and capable of this apparently basic manouever. However, aviation depends on reducing the risk of anything going wrong by taking a belt-and-braces-and-more-braces-and-some-velcro approach to safety. For a major hub airport to expect all crews to compensate for lack of landing aids over a sustained period seems to me to remove a big layer of redundancy. Is this normal?

Back at NH

7th Jul 2013, 23:28

ELAC

7th Jul 2013, 23:32

Quote:
so why is no-one talking about similarities with british Airways crash of their 777 when there was no power increase final? iced up fuel lines thought to be probable cause. Not a hint on any network that that might explain it all. and the missing engine? Torn off by the sea wall. everyone is ignoring its loss. if the same reason would have high seriosness for Boeing 777 fleet!

Because the similarity is with the Turkish 738 crash at Amsterdam, not the BA.

Actually, the similarity with TK1951 is a bit limited in that the precipitating factor for that accident was an undiagnosed RA failure resulting in a change of auto thrust mode that was unrecognized by the crew, and was accompanied by a distraction from monitoring of the basic flight parameters by the PIC that the accident report suggests may be attributable to the training captain's conduct of "instruction tasks".

A more comparable accident would be IC605, an Indian Airlines A320 that crashed at Bangalore in 1990. Like this accident the situation involved an upgrade captain under-going initial line training on a new aircraft type and, as may be the case in this accident, the precipitating factor was solely a failure of the PF to comprehend the nature of the auto thrust mode that had been selected as a result of the crew's own actions (and also inaction on the part of the instructor who was PNF in that instance).

As a veteran of many years spent flying in Korea, India and other parts of Asia I can attest to the fact that visual approach procedures were infrequently practiced and often poorly executed by many of my national colleagues. This is not an accusation, simply the observation of someone with a good deal of experience working in those cockpit environments. Consider that for what it is worth in conjunction with the evidence available thus far on this event.

Another issue that is likely to become very pertinent is the nature of how "training" is conducted at a number of the Asian carriers. It is very different from the experience of training at most Western carriers. Students are expected to arrive already knowing (generally by memorization) all of the answers, and are not actively taught by their instructors. Information or discussion related to upcoming tasks is rarely, if ever, introduced and critique is generally limited to "How come you don't know ...."

In this environment students tend to remain silent about anything they don't know and will continue doing whatever they are doing, however badly, until the instructor intercedes to tell them to do something else. Frequently this intercession manifests itself in the instructor actively manipulating the controls, gear, flaps, speed brakes as he determines necessary without any other guidance than perhaps a "How come you are too high/low fast/slow ..."

It will be revealing to see what the details are of the instruction the upgrading pilot actually received from the training pilot about how to conduct a visual approach, particularly if it started out from a slam dunk. Similarly there will be a lot of questions to ask about what level of training was completed during the preceding sim and line training on visual approaches and on the inter-relationship of auto flight and auto thrust modes that can occur while conducting a visual approach. A cynic might also wonder whether the records reflect the reality, though in this case I believe the sim training would have been conducted by a reputable and accountable training organization.

Beyond all the questions regarding how the approach was conducted, perhaps the most germane question will be why the go-around was not conducted at an early enough point to avoid the accident. A preliminary collection of observations would suggest that an unrecognized deviation of airspeed was not the only parameter to have exceeded stabilized approach criteria. Before this both altitude (as a function of distance to the runway and probably via working PAPI's) and vertical speed are likely to have exceeded allowable limits per the company's SOP. Why, apparently, no call-outs and no go-around until it was far too late to do any good?

Though the company I worked for in Korea made many mistakes one thing that changed for the better during my stay was the company policy on go-arounds. Instead of being grounds for punishment it was clearly stated that a safely conducted go-around would be a "get out of jail free card" for any unintentional violations of the stabilized approach criteria. Continuing, on the contrary, would indeed bring down the full wrath of the FOQA monitoring/punishment system. My guess would be that OZ is no different in this regard and likely has a similar policy. If so, the reason why that didn't work may come down to another characteristic known to occur when things appear to be going badly wrong ... some pilots just stop actively thinking and doing and become passive observers in the face of a problem they don't know how to control.

TLB

7th Jul 2013, 23:34

Gents, the 777 has a function where by if you bring the RX waypoint to the top of the legs page 1L and engage VNAV then it will give you a 3 deg profile to that waypoint. That was option # 1.
Option #2 could have been to plug in the RNAV approach and use it for vertical guidance whilst conducting the visual approach..... what we call the Chinese glide slope on the side of the NAV display.
Option #3 could have been to look out the window and put the aiming point of 1000 ft in the bottom third of the windshield and keep it there and use the thrust to maintain a constant speed profile.

How about option #4:

- disconnect the automatics
- place one hand on the stick/controller/yoke
- place the other hand on the throttles
- visually look out the front windscreen
- cross-check your indicated air speed to maintain VRef
- land the airplane like the wings on your chest say you are capable of

chulin2208

7th Jul 2013, 23:37

ADS-B Data
By (anonymous) on Sunday, Jul 7th 2013 07:07Z

LAT,LONG,HDG,UTC,ALT,GS,VS
37.7286,-122.4901,139,6:14:56 PM,11125,256,0
37.6863,-122.4439,139,6:15:50 PM,11100,254,-128
37.6219,-122.3773,144,6:16:54 PM,11100,253,-128
37.5626,-122.3368,152,6:17:52 PM,10225,250,-1152
37.501,-122.2965,152,6:18:52 PM,9150,248,-768
37.4398,-122.2477,120,6:19:56 PM,8800,250,-1024
37.4136,-122.1699,112,6:20:54 PM,7800,249,-1152
37.4211,-122.0942,44,6:21:52 PM,6225,244,-2304
37.4816,-122.0775,327,6:22:54 PM,5050,241,-1408
37.52,-122.1406,297,6:23:52 PM,4275,219,-384
37.5477,-122.2064,297,6:24:54 PM,3400,202,-1024
37.5726,-122.2652,297,6:25:54 PM,2175,186,-1152
37.5954,-122.319,297,6:26:54 PM,1100,149,-1536
37.6123,-122.3595,297,6:27:54 PM,75,113,-384

ortotrotel

7th Jul 2013, 23:41

How about option #4:

- disconnect the automatics
- place one hand on the stick/controller/yoke
- place the other hand on the throttles
- visually look out the front windscreen
- cross-check your indicated air speed to maintain VRef
- land the airplane like the wings on your chest say you are capable of

Sorry. Too difficult. Look at the caloric cost: all those hand and eye movements, not to mention rudder inputs, PLUS the judgement required.

joelnthailand

7th Jul 2013, 23:43

They crash a totally functional airplane trying to land in perfect weather on an 11k+ foot runway and we're arguing about who's to blame? Can you conceivably be serious?
You're right. 100 % correct!

nitpicker330

7th Jul 2013, 23:49

So fast and high at 2000' and 1000' with idle thrust and they then get low and slow at the end.
This is not just an incompetent crew unable to fly their Aircraft safely.
It's also the fault of SFO airport for not having a serviceable ILS
AND the fault of ATC for slam dunk approaches......

All the holes in the Swiss cheese lined up yesterday in SFO and luckily only 2 people lost their lives because it could have been much worse.

con-pilot

7th Jul 2013, 23:54

It's also the fault of SFO airport for not having a serviceable ILS
AND the fault of ATC for slam dunk approaches......

Utter nonsense.

Union Jack

7th Jul 2013, 23:54

ortotrotel

7th Jul 2013, 23:59

They crash a totally functional airplane trying to land in perfect weather on an 11k+ foot runway and we're arguing about who's to blame? Can you conceivably be serious?

You're right. 100 % correct!

I agree. The NTSB can wrap this one in less than a week...it's all the interviews they want to have that will take the time.

Dushan

8th Jul 2013, 00:00

Just what the hell does that have to do with this accident? Not to mention that it is not true, as soon as the autopsies are completed, the bodies will be released to the families or their official/legal representatives. As they are dealing with two young teenagers from China that were killed in an aircraft accident, it will be done very quickly, because the victims of aircraft accidents have priority.

Con-pilot, I think he was referring to the crew, not the victims. Unless threa Re criminal charged laid, I think they will be allowed to return home.

Dak Man

8th Jul 2013, 00:03

Anyone posted the vid that CNN is showing?

barit1

8th Jul 2013, 00:08

Not sure if this has been posted yet - but it's hard data in a reasonable analysis: http://flyingprofessors.net/what-happened-to-asiana-airlines-flight-214-2/

The Big E

8th Jul 2013, 00:14

From Post #652 - How about option #4:
Right on the money TLB.

This is what the real stick and rudder people do, and it works in a very safe and proficient manner every time.

PPRuNe Towers

8th Jul 2013, 00:15

The link above from Barit is well worth reading

Rob

ABX

8th Jul 2013, 00:21

Actual impact and crash footage

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_QVVlJTpHw

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_QVVlJTpHw)

edmundronald

8th Jul 2013, 00:28

Apparently one of the chinese teenagers got run over by an airport vehicle.

Shutterbug

8th Jul 2013, 00:35

@barit1

Thanks for the link. Absolutely excellent presentation.

Polikarpov

8th Jul 2013, 00:37

NTSB media briefing from earlier today.

XLYeUbeyfOg

mm43

8th Jul 2013, 00:37

@ barit1

Your Flying Professors (http://flyingprofessors.net/what-happened-to-asiana-airlines-flight-214-2/) link in post #662 was and is well worth the read. Many thanks.:ok:

EEngr

8th Jul 2013, 00:39

con-pilot

8th Jul 2013, 00:41

Con-pilot, I think he was referring to the crew, not the victims. Unless threa Re criminal charged laid, I think they will be allowed to return home.

Okay, if that is the case, it didn't really read like that, but as far as I know, in the US criminal charges cannot be filed, if even then, in case of an accident until after the NTSB report comes out. So the flight crew can go home as soon as they are interviewed.

Now I could be wrong, as many years ago, there was an accident involving a Mexican crew, they left the US to go back to Mexico before they were even interviewed by the NTSB. So the law may have changed.

But, in any case, this crew on the 777 would have to be charged with a crime to keep them in the country and for criminal charges to be filed, there would have to be probable cause, from the accident report. Unless of course they have a blood/alcohol in excess of the limit. Which I do not believe is a factor here. But who knows.

TachyonID

8th Jul 2013, 00:43

This is a great (preliminary) look at the info available in the public domain-- and it reinforces the earlier question of why they were "high-and-fast" in the approach over The Bridge? With some of the cockpit CVR data available it raises the issue of how they got into a slam dunk-- it sounds like they got put into a short final? Is all the ATC audio available from their turn onto Base, all the way in?

Setright

8th Jul 2013, 00:46

''Is someone going to try to convince me they can't muster up a visual approach without PAPIs or VASAs?? ''

I think in this case, the hull resting at the end of the runway may convince you of that.

Visual anything in Asian carriers, is like Kryptonite to Superman.

Setright

8th Jul 2013, 00:51

Said, "is it normal for airports to expect pilots to be able to land without landing aids?"

Yes!

mickjoebill

8th Jul 2013, 00:56

From that posted video of the crash, it appears that the plane may have hit the surface of the water for some distance before striking the retaining wall. There is a white streak which looks like spray before the orange/brown dust cloud.

The spray could also be the effect of engine thrust on the water, perhaps more likely as there is apparently no reported damage to the approach lighting structures planted in the water.

bratschewurst

8th Jul 2013, 00:57

From that posted video of the crash, it appears that the plane may have hit the surface of the water for some distance before striking the retaining wall. There is a white streak which looks like spray before the orange/brown dust cloud.

If the plane had hit the water, wouldn't the immediate effect have been to slam the nose down? It's possible the white streak was a result of the engine thrust on the surface of the water. But the white streak seems to go for quite a distance; well past the 747 on the taxiway, which would suggest it's simply dust, as opposed to the orange/brown smoke plume.

Toruk Macto

8th Jul 2013, 00:58

If the F/O was PNF , I will be surprised if he has uttered a single word during the whole app. waiting for the report .

ipsatex

8th Jul 2013, 01:01

Intercepting a glide slope from above involves shifting from the rate of descent used to intercept to the rate of descent to maintain the glide slope. For most that is a more difficult maneuver than flying level and beginning a descent when intercepting the glide slope.

Won2Go

8th Jul 2013, 01:03

I was employed by Korean Air some years ago. As indicated by previous posters, Koreans are not able to fly visual approaches, despite simulator sessions that profess to teach them how. They are totally lost without an ILS (think back to the Korean 747 classic accident in Guam!).
On one occasion I elected to fly a visual approach to 31L in JFK instead of going to 31R, this saved a lot of taxi time after landing). I was called to the office to explain why I flew a visual approach and did not use the ILS!
FOQA data was designed to be used as a trend indicator, however Korean used it for punitive measures so it is not surprising that local pilots would take whatever measures were required to avoid exceeding the laid down parameters.

bratschewurst

8th Jul 2013, 01:03

No, in thirteen years of operating at LHR I have NEVER seen the ILS for an active runway OTS. All maintenance is done at night, and the active runway is switched for short term failures. LHR has CAT111 no decision on all runways, so there is a lot of redundancy to allow for failures.

Of course, there's be a lot fewer landings at LHR without instrument approaches. SFO in the summer (except for some mornings) is pretty much severe clear all the time.

NSEU

8th Jul 2013, 01:05

Not being familiar with a 777, what would have caused that intense fire? Didn't look like the fuel tanks ruptured and started the fire. Does the 777 carry LOX near the main cabin area or is there just that much flammable material in the cabin?

Oxygen lines to the PSUs

Even if this Korean 777 was fitted with a gaseous oxygen system and not a chemical-generated oxygen system, the lines to the PSUs should not have oxygen in them without the system being activated.

Perhaps an unfortunate combination of power and shorted wiring would do this.

barit1

8th Jul 2013, 01:06

If the plane had hit the water, wouldn't the immediate effect have been to slam the nose down? It's possible the white streak was a result of the engine thrust on the surface of the water.

Looking at the video of Sully's A320 touching down on the Hudson, it appears the engine nacelles functioned like water skis for a second or two, until one finally dug in and separated from the wing.

Castlehard

8th Jul 2013, 01:15

That removes a variable for the investigation.

b767drvr

8th Jul 2013, 01:15

>> Autothrust
Please can a 777 driver explain the A/T. Only 777 please.

Why if the A/T is engaged would the speed decay below target speed. On the Bus with FD off the the AT will follow the speed bug. On Thrust Idle open des the throttles remain at idle.

Which mode would allow the AT to go below target speed.

AT is usually always engaged.
<<

Wow... just had a mini epiphany. It would be great for a 777 pilot to chime in on the following thought...

The 757/767 auto-throttles go into THR HLD and won't "wake up" till they capture the GS when APP is armed (as I recall... don't have the systems manual handy at the moment.) If the ILS is out of service and the pilot does not select SPD on the A/T panel, the thrust levers will remain in HLD waiting for the "capture". Perhaps this small bit of automation confusion led the Asiana pilots to falsely believe the speed would be protected when in fact the thrust levers will remain at idle (waiting for the capture.) I'm wondering if the 777 has a similar auto-throttle logic?

Where I've seen this occur most is a manual descent where the pilot flying shallows his rate of descent to 100-200 VVI and airspeed decays below target because ALT CAP has not occurred (till approximately 20-50 feet above level off.) I always warn new pilots (to the fleet) to remain vigilant whenever they see THR HLD, and always mentally confirm a capture and wake up of the auto-throttles.

Just thinking out loud why the airspeed decayed so significantly (according to an initial NTSB briefing.)

SLFplatine

8th Jul 2013, 01:28

ELAC post 651:
... some pilots just stop actively thinking and doing and become passive observers in the face of a problem they don't know how to control.

Q: Deer in the headlights?

Lookleft

8th Jul 2013, 01:28

was his first landing of the type at #SFO (https://twitter.com/search?q=%23SFO&src=hash).

It could be reasonable assumed however not his first landing at SFO and also not his first landing ever!

islanderpilot

8th Jul 2013, 01:29

BenThere you say it well!

Quote: One thing occurs to me, that I can sit and pass judgment, aged 62 and never had an incident or violation, but who knows what will happen on the next flight?

When I'm retired and safely out of the arena I'll pass judgment mercilessly, I'm sure. Until then, I'm glad it wasn't me, I acknowledge I haven't always been perfect, and on an occasion or two I've been lucky. And I've been covered more than once by the other guy in the cockpit.

I've got some sympathy for the Korean crew going through this ordeal. The pilot flying, I think, is responsible, and to a lesser extent, the pilot not flying. They both have hell to pay, as they should. That's how the system works. But haven't we all screwed up from time to time, but just had the luck, common sense, or help to recover in time, before it became an incident?

I've been flying for 10 years and the majority of it in Papua New Guinea, I have many years of flying to go, at 35 I hope 30 at least. I haven't yet scratched anything and as time goes by and I gain more experience I feel I get better at what I do but I have had 1 or 2 close calls in the early years, I'm not perfect! I now know why I so rarely visit this site, many posters are infuriating with their narcissistic views of themselves. Yes this is a major screw up if initial reports are accurate but does that really make you (you know who you are) the worlds greatest aviators able to pass judgement on all others?

mickjoebill

8th Jul 2013, 01:36

"High points" of FDR from NTSB press conference.
Note NTSB said they need to validate some data, such as aircraft speed.

From cockpit voice recorder.
2 hours of voice recording.
Aircraft configured for approach, flaps 30, gear down and target speed called for 137 knots.
A call to increase speed 7 seconds before impact
Sound of stick shaker heard 4 seconds prior to impact
"Go around" called 1.5 seconds before impact
No discussion of aircraft anomalies by crew

From Flight data recorder
24 hours of recorded data, 1400 parameters captured entire flight
Throttles set at idle and airspeed slowed below target airspeed to "significantly below 137 knots we are not talking a few knots"
Throttles advanced a few seconds before impact and engines appear to respond normally.

Other
Tower controller didn't see anything wrong with approach until it hit the wall.
No reports of adverse weather.
PAPI lights were operational but damaged in crash so NOTAMed post crash.
1100 777s delivered.
169 with Pratt and Whitney
700 GE
223 with RR
Runway was 11380 in length.
Localiser was in operation
Glideslope was out of service and NOTAMed as such.
9 fire and rescue vehicles
NTSB looking at crew, cockpit and instrument configuration, passenger response, CRM, fire service response, passenger injury vis a v seat location relationship.
No similarities seen so far between this and LHR accident.
Investigators will be on scene for a week.
Too early to rule anything out as the cause.
This information are the facts and should not be reported or by media as an indication of NTSBs view of cause of accident.

PalmtreePilot74

8th Jul 2013, 01:40

I read that Lion has an SOP to disengage the auto throttles when the autopilot is disconnected and am wondering is that the SOP for the Korean carriers? Why would the auto throttles not have been engaged? Many years of flying 74s and MD-11s always using the ATs even for visuals unless it is super gusty. I don't understand how you can let an airliner get that slow on an approach...:eek:

Capn Bloggs

8th Jul 2013, 01:44

If that Few was in the wrong place, life on visual, PAPI approach could have been difficult...

DWS

8th Jul 2013, 01:45

I am not a pilot- and do not play one on TV. But I am a retired BA engineer who worked on 777 until shortly after first flight

Looking at the cnn video - and living in seattle area, the white cloud just before the hit looks more like a hydroplane roostertail of the good ole days. (** addition - IF the 777 had a tail skid that dropped with the gear, it would make a great roostertail ** )
IMHO that would explain the nose high- landing gear hitting on ground just after tail hits water, and the section aft of the pressure bulkhead being torn off by the seawall/rocks- along with some reports of debris in the water.

One photo of the landing gear shows the main landing gear beam still attached- further supporting gear slightly higher than seawall at time of impact of tail section.

I note that the break of the upper fuselage aft section on top does not appear to be at the normal production join of the aft pressure bulkhead, ((** correction most of the break of the tail cone/rudder DID occur at the production joint- and the junction of the rudder/vertical stabilizer and the fuselage may account for the tear **) to fuselage but a tear extending a few feet forward of the join between fuselage and the bulkead. The vertical split in the " middle " of the bulkhead ***may** indicate some significant sideways impact with the plane crabbing to the left.

All told, the impact loads well above ' hard landings" with most " all ?? " of the floor intact is but one indication of the amazing structural integrity of the 777 floor.

I'm sure there will be many lessons learned as to failure modes of structure.

Pucka

8th Jul 2013, 01:46

Suggest you re read Barit1 and Won2Go recent posts..very erudite and appropriate . As a long time ex bus driver and a recent convert to the 777, FLCH appears to be a real design trap that really after all this time, particularly with the ER models, should have been redisigned out of the auto system..I believe the 787 has something very similar to managed descent and open descent but in any event, a bus would have reverted to an alpha floor mode which may have salvaged the hull and pax, even at the later stage of GA application in this event.
Korean cultural dynamics MUST be scrutinised again and the whole issue of standardising, possibly via ICAO, the stabilised approach criteria, now has to be mandated. Asian carriers with large a/c do not fly visual approaches..the number 3 and 4 options never apply..it is always with an attempt to primarily 1L the RX and chinese G/s the approach via the FMS. Situational awareness is always via the "rose nav" and distance out, never by looking out of the obvious window. Traffic is always courtesy of TCAS and rarely through lookout. Min qualification Asian training is now the norm and type conversions are the thinnest courses that the bean counters sanction for the techs to design. Equally, minimum line training after minimum sims are also the norm. If the FO was handling Pilot, with 43 hours on type, i.e. less than 4 long haul sectors, it will be interesting to see what training experience the captain possessed.
SFO, particularly with arrivals from the west, is frequently a slam dunk approach with a visual over or close to the san Mateo Bridge. PAPI options are sometimes limited and in trail approaches with other aircraft close in parallel on the L or R runway, pretty much the norm. For those of us who employ old school skills and actually fly the a/c manually and visually, this is a straight forward exercise..to others, irrespective of where the cheese may be..its a challenge. I am drawn to reflect on what appears to be a cliche nowadays.."if you think training is expensive..try an accident"....

cdogg

8th Jul 2013, 02:02

I'm an emergency physician. I'm not a pilot.

Over the past several years in my profession, we have been looking to aviation for lessons about error prevention. This has been enormously valuable for us; we practice more safely now because of the things we have learned from pilots and other aviation professionals.

That's the good.

Although we in emergency medicine (and medicine generally) owe a great debt to pilots for their leadership in understanding how to make things safer, we have in my experience avoided - entirely - the racism that riddles this thread.

Yes, I know it's just a few posters, but I can't ever recall any post-mortem discussions of physician error - on anonymous online fora or otherwise - that explicitly cited the race or national origin of the doctor who screwed up as a contributing factor for the screw-up. Training systems, yes; amount of experience, yes; even "culture" in a practice environment, yes; but *race* of the doctor? Never.

If there really are a significant number of pilots who seriously think that Korean pilots as Koreans were more likely to make the errors it appears these pilots made, that's profoundly disappointing.

RingwayWrench

8th Jul 2013, 02:14

Having just watched the video footage of the accident, I can now understand how witnesses described the aircraft cartwheeling and am thoroughly astounded that there were not significantly more casualties. It is enormous testament to the quality of design that the fuselage stayed relatively intact following that sequence. The footage actually looks very similar to the crash sequence/progression at Sioux City, (obviously a far lower speed less inertia and different attitude at first impact) With regards to cause, I do not wish to, nor am I qualified to speculate, the NTSB will, in their own time provide us with a full sequence of events that led to a broken aircraft and sadly lives lost.

ironbutt57

8th Jul 2013, 02:19

why would anyone descend in FLCH without a lower altitude set in the MCP?...

Homebrew1

8th Jul 2013, 02:28

Good point pucka,

I'm fresh off 737 classic onto the Bus and visual approaches were flown AP/FD off, A/thrust off.

The bus is flown AP/FD off bird on but speed is still managed.

If this poor dude came off the bus he might have resorted to the 'Bus managed speed' mentality and neglected speed management which could have been manual thrust. Wouldn't excuse not monitoring the basics of flying.

In any case very sad for all involved.

DozyWannabe

8th Jul 2013, 02:33

It's pretty obvious at this point that there's nowhere near enough publicly available data to support a "why" analysis, even if the "how" seems fairly clear. That said, I think we should all be careful when comparing other accidents to this one.

...the Colgan Dash 8 had two qualified crew who failed to note a speed decay and once it was pointed out to them by the stall warning system, failed to do anything constructive to recover.

That's not what happened. The "speed ref" switch was (incorrectly) left in a position appropriate for icing conditions when there were none - thus the Stall Warning was triggered well before the aircraft was actually approaching stall. The crew response to the warning was inappropriate and resulted in a crash, but the real devil in the detail there was that both pilots were considerably more fatigued in real terms than they would have appeared on paper, and on top of that the F/O was evidently sick.

Company policy at the time was clearly coercive in terms of putting crew in the flight deck who were clearly at risk of impaired ability and expecting them to, for want of a better phrase, "suck it up, dig deep and be glad you have a job".

Given that, us westerners might want to do a little soul-searching regarding our own business culture before making judgement calls on others. In aviation, poor decision-making and culture outside the flight deck can be just as dangerous as inside, if not more so!

Korea + no glide slope = disaster

Check out the KIA crash at Guam.

Again, fatigue was considered a possible factor there - at least by some. That devil is lurking in the details again - namely that the Guam equipment was still broadcasting a partial signal on the ILS frequency, and the result was a false glideslope capture - which was at odds with the NOTAM. The crew did not clarify the situation with ATC, which was undoubtedly a mistake (though like Colgan forgetting to set "speed ref" properly, very much the kind of mistake that fatigue can make more likely). The last oversight was the assumption that the DME equipment was at the runway threshold when it was in fact offset some distance ahead.

One of the things I've noticed about the posts on Korean crew and airlines is that a lot of them indicate that their experience was some time ago. I can't speak of Asiana, but I do know that after KAL afflicted themselves with a woeful safety record about a decade ago they were supposed to have completely overhauled their crew training, operations and company culture. Their record has since shown a dramatic improvement as far as I know, and it'd be interesting to hear from those with experience in, say, the last 5 years.

The testing NEVER reproduced the accident conditions properly. They only managed to have engine failures using totally unrepresentative amounts of water in the test fuel system.

Interesting - but two things occur to me. The AAIB spent an inordinate amount of time and effort trying to replicate the problem, and that was the only scenario that came close to doing so. Secondly, I don't know a great deal about fluid dynamics as they apply to water and kerosene - but unless you were to build a test rig that simulated the 777's fuel tanks at full size (do they even have a building large enough to do that?), then those that do know would probably have to adjust the water:fuel ratio accordingly given the smaller volume of the test rig's tank.

It's usually the nature of experiments that it's enough to demonstrate the principle of the hypothesis when it's not possible or practical to mimic the conditions precisely - especially when there are so many variables involved. This goes all the way back to when RAE Farnborough built the giant water tank to test a Comet 1 airframe to destruction (though it should be noted that it was the other team working on the wreckage reconstruction that determined the failure point and break-up sequence first).

Greytraveler

8th Jul 2013, 02:50

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/07/07/arts/07reuters-asiana-korea.html?hp

Willit Run

8th Jul 2013, 02:51

Mr. Palmtree,

AFAIK, Boeing recommends that the auto throttles be disengaged while hand flying an approach.

At this level of ones career, we must be able to perform basic functions of flying. That includes a scan, interpretation of said indications and acting accordingly. If you can't maintain airspeed during a daylight straight-in visual approach, I would suggest that you need more training, or may want to wait a while until you master such basic skills. If you're that inexperienced, you should not be flying 290+ people in a wide body.

ensco

8th Jul 2013, 02:52

Seeing that crash video ... wow. The performance of the Boeing airframe was simply unbelievable. That alone may have saved 100s of lives.

Every Boeing employee should take pride in that.

Pucka

8th Jul 2013, 02:59

Post444 is also very apt now we know the FO was still under training on type. Was it a 2 sector day for these guys too possibly? Complacency via fatigue? Only in seat rest? Automation reliance issues..AGAIN?

Shenlin

8th Jul 2013, 03:07

it states on Cnn that the co pilot was flying the airplane from the left seat at the time of the crash ...

I have never flown in asia but i guess it is normal for whoever is flying the airplane to occupy the left hand seat ?

AerocatS2A

8th Jul 2013, 03:09

That's not what happened. The "speed ref" switch was (incorrectly) left in a position appropriate for icing conditions when there were none - thus the Stall Warning was triggered well before the aircraft was actually approaching stall. The crew response to the warning was inappropriate and resulted in a crash, but the real devil in the detail there was that both pilots were considerably more fatigued in real terms than they would have appeared on paper, and on top of that the F/O was evidently sick.
Thanks, I do know what happened but was trying to sum up for the sake of brevity.

The real devil in the detail was that the captain couldn't fly an aeroplane, never could fly an aeroplane, but had managed to scrape through numerous checks by the skin of his teeth.

413X3

8th Jul 2013, 03:21

Amazing how anyone pointing out rushing to judge entire cultures based on your personal experiences is labeled a "liberal" as if that's a bad thing? All of the greatest intellectuals of all time have been liberals. There's a reason for this.

Now back to the "culture" complaint. Tell me, why is it only certain cultures get labeled as having poor pilots? Remind me again what race the demanding and arrogant captain of the Tenerife crash was? Asian? African? Middle Eastern?

Now about the "lack of flying skills." Remind me again what race the pilots were of the Colgan Q400 crash where basic skills to maintain speed and then to recover from a stall were unknown to both pilots?

If I want, I could be ignorant and keep posting here how because of those crashes, any future crashes with white people in the pilots chairs are obviously just incapable of flying properly because of their genetics or culture. But then that would be pretty racist and ignorant, wouldn't it?

bamboo30

8th Jul 2013, 03:22

Aerocat yes of course the capt couldnt fly an aeroplane cos only you could. You re such an ace pilot. For goodness sack start bashing the crew before any comprehensive findings

femanvate

8th Jul 2013, 03:23

It's sobering to read that certain cultures produce pilots who are challenged to land a healthy plane without a full complement of helpful equipment. A sunny 11k ft runway is too hard to negotiate. Really?
Wonder if the world just took a step closer to pilotless cockpits.

DozyWannabe

8th Jul 2013, 03:24

@AerocatS2A:

That's a little harsh - he was of below average ability by all accounts, but by the very nature of the way statistics work, that's going to be true of 50% of all transport-category pilots in the world. If anything, that's an even bigger incentive to minimise other risks (such as fatigue), surely?

MassPPL

8th Jul 2013, 03:25

@cdogg

"If there really are a significant number of pilots who seriously think that Korean pilots as Koreans were more likely to make the errors it appears these pilots made, that's profoundly disappointing."

Why would you sign up just to make that comment? It adds nothing to the discussion and is pure political correctness. You have no idea what the cockpit culture and hand flying skills are like at Asiana. I don't either so I listen to the professionals who appear to be divided in their opinion.

To draw a stark contrast, your profession actively conceals individual performance data so the punters can't make an informed decision and Dr. Hodad can keep his job. If these Korean pilots were surgeons they'd be back in the operating theater tomorrow.

mickjoebill

8th Jul 2013, 03:27

Mickjoebill, have you got a link to that content?
I transcribed it from the video posted earlier.

FYSTI

8th Jul 2013, 03:27

Wonder if the world just took a step closer to pilotless cockpits.Such a contraption only serves to shift the human factor from the flight deck to the programmers suite...
The manufacturer would be solely to blame when the inevitable happened. The lawyers would never allow it.

Ranger One

8th Jul 2013, 03:29

con-pilot:

Just what the hell does that have to do with this accident? Not to mention that it is not true, as soon as the autopsies are completed, the bodies will be released to the families or their official/legal representatives. As they are dealing with two young teenagers from China that were killed in an aircraft accident, it will be done very quickly, because the victims of aircraft accidents have priority.

You misunderstand.

I was responding to a post about the legal consequences the pilots will likely face in Korea; I was referring to the likely delay in the Koreans getting their hands on the pilots, due to potential US legal proceedings happening first, since the deaths happened on US soil.

I was not referring to any delay in repatriating the bodies of the unfortunate pax.

clayne

8th Jul 2013, 03:30

The root of all this (waiting too long to make the decision to GO AROUND) is basically Lion Air 904 repeated - give or take a couple 100 feet.

Yet another cockpit crew lacking in assertiveness over the situation and inability to think outside the box quickly enough.

Loose rivets

8th Jul 2013, 03:32

If there really are a significant number of pilots who seriously think that Korean pilots as Koreans were more likely to make the errors it appears these pilots made, that's profoundly disappointing.

cdogg, that really is misinterpreting what is being said.

Some of the people criticizing the training in that particular country have first hand experience of their methods of operation. What they are saying is: Korean pilots seem to be affected by a lack of a certain type of training and day-to-day experience, not that they are inadequate in some way because they are Korean. There is a huge difference.

tartare

8th Jul 2013, 03:38

To those bemoaning the `racism' in this thread.
Some cultures have high power distance - i.e. you do not question those in charge.
Others have low power distance - you can question those in charge.
It's a fact of life - not racism.
Read the long history of how Korean cultural norms contributed indirectly to the Guam crash and many other accidents - among a host of other factors.
It's a well established scientific principle in aviation human factors - not racism at all.
From Malcolm Gladwell - certainly not a conservative, or a racist for that matter:

"Korean Air had more plane crashes than almost any other airline in the world for a period at the end of the 1990s. When we think of airline crashes, we think, Oh, they must have had old planes. They must have had badly trained pilots. No. What they were struggling with was a cultural legacy, that Korean culture is hierarchical. You are obliged to be deferential toward your elders and superiors in a way that would be unimaginable in the U.S.

But Boeing (BA, Fortune 500) and Airbus design modern, complex airplanes to be flown by two equals. That works beautifully in low-power-distance cultures [like the U.S., where hierarchies aren't as relevant]. But in cultures that have high power distance, it's very difficult.

I use the case study of a very famous plane crash in Guam of Korean Air. They're flying along, and they run into a little bit of trouble, the weather's bad. The pilot makes an error, and the co-pilot doesn't correct him. But once Korean Air figured out that their problem was cultural, they fixed it."

It's not the color of their skin we're debating about here. It's the effect of culture on human factors - an entirely different matter.

MountainBear

8th Jul 2013, 03:44

DW writes, That's a little harsh - he was of below average ability by all accounts, but by the very nature of the way statistics work, that's going to be true of 50% of all transport-category pilots in the world. If anything, that's an even bigger incentive to minimise other risks (such as fatigue), surely? Chest thumping feels so much better. The sad part is that these people are chest thumping their profession right into the dust bin of history.

If it is too expensive to keep all the navigation aids in service full time and there is no good way to save the passengers from the 50% of pilots who are always below average (except in Lake Woebegone) then the only sane solution is to go to the fully automated aircraft and kiss the piloting profession goodbye.

FTYSI writes,

Such a contraption only serves to shift the human factor from the flight deck to the programmers suite...
The manufacturer would be solely to blame when the inevitable happened. The lawyers would never allow it.
But if this chest thumping keeps up the public is going to demand it and the politicans at the end of the day will listen to the voters and not the lawyers.

fat232dog

8th Jul 2013, 03:48

http://www.pprune.org/members/107138-barit1.
A great, considered and objective analysis on a tragic set of circumstances.

Buttscratcher

8th Jul 2013, 03:49

'AFAIK, Boeing recommends that the auto throttles be disengaged while hand flying an approach.'

Not on a Tripple you don't

Offcut

8th Jul 2013, 03:51

My guess is that a hot and high approach was flown in FLCH. That is the only mode that will get you down in a hurry. If the A/P is then disconnected, the auto throttles will remain in Hold, and not "wake up". If a pilot purely concentrated on the aim point and forgot his scan, speed could easily wash off to the point of stick shaker or beyond. FLCH is a major threat in the 777 if used while hand flying and should never be used during an approach. Our SOPs require FDs off, then one back on to force AT into speed mode.

ImbracableCrunk

8th Jul 2013, 03:54

I can't speak of Asiana, but I do know that after KAL afflicted themselves with a woeful safety record about a decade ago they were supposed to have completely overhauled their crew training, operations and company culture. Their record has since shown a dramatic improvement as far as I know, and it'd be interesting to hear from those with experience in, say, the last 5 years.I was in Korea from 2009-2011 flying for a large carrier. There was a great emphasis on briefing as many things as possible and a reliance on the magenta line/FMC.

There is what we could call the "Pusan Effect." The company pushes an overly complicated visual approach at Pusan (circling approach, actually) that wrongly leads pilots to believe that all visual approaches need to be complex, white-knuckled events.

Mic Dundee

8th Jul 2013, 03:57

Wow... just had a mini epiphany. It would be great for a 777 pilot to chime in on the following thought...

The 757/767 auto-throttles go into THR HLD and won't "wake up" till they capture the GS when APP is armed (as I recall... don't have the systems manual handy at the moment.) If the ILS is out of service and the pilot does not select SPD on the A/T panel, the thrust levers will remain in HLD waiting for the "capture". Perhaps this small bit of automation confusion led the Asiana pilots to falsely believe the speed would be protected when in fact the thrust levers will remain at idle (waiting for the capture.) I'm wondering if the 777 has a similar auto-throttle logic?

Where I've seen this occur most is a manual descent where the pilot flying shallows his rate of descent to 100-200 VVI and airspeed decays below target because ALT CAP has not occurred (till approximately 20-50 feet above level off.) I always warn new pilots (to the fleet) to remain vigilant whenever they see THR HLD, and always mentally confirm a capture and wake up of the auto-throttles.

Just thinking out loud why the airspeed decayed so significantly (according to an initial NTSB briefing.)

The new generation of pilots are "Push button pilots." I see my company now reviewing this accident and saying "What can we learn from this?" Answer: Half of training will now be dedicated to relying on less automation. Up to now, RNAV RNP, etc., is the subject of the day (before). We don't do A/T landings, but I see what you're saying. We have the same THR HLD on T/O. I'm sure if we used it on landing, a Boeing, it would be the same as you're saying.

twb3

8th Jul 2013, 04:01

It is difficult for me to accept that the use of any autoflight or autothrottle mode is a good reason for the apparent failure in this case to monitor airspeed and altitude on the approach.

Likewise, the absence of a usable G/S on a CAVU day.

The automatic modes and navaids are aids. They do not replace basic airmanship.

DesiPilot

8th Jul 2013, 04:04

Everyone is saying that it was the FO who had less then 50 hours on type. What I heard on this side of the pond is that it was a trainee captain with an instructor in the flight deck.

I hope these rumors are incorrect, as this situation makes it worse than a trainee FO (the reports say that PF joined company in 1994, so there is no way he was still an FO, may be change of fleet as a captain.)

Average Fool

8th Jul 2013, 04:08

Sadly ironic that the very reason the G/S was off was to facilitate construction of an overrun/safety area for those runways.

hotnhigh

8th Jul 2013, 04:14

So in a matter of weeks we've had lion air destroy of a perfectly serviceable 738 in bali, and now a 777 seems to have come to the same terrible result. In both cases it appears basic airmanship is severely lacking.
You've really got to ask yourself wtf!
Perhaps the penny will finally drop with the bean counters when the insurance premiums come due.

Minimbah

8th Jul 2013, 04:25

More talk about the injuries here as well as an imbedded video. Some very ill people in the hospital.
Asiana Airlines pilot was training to fly jet that crashed in San Francisco - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-07/doctor-details-injuries-of-san-francisco-plane-crash-survivors/4804502)

mm43

8th Jul 2013, 04:27

A lesson that I expect no one will forget...The autothrottle can support stall protection if armed and not engaged. If speed decreases to near stick shaker activation, the autothrottle engages in the appropriate mode (SPD or THR REF) and advances thrust to maintain minimum maneuvering speed (approximately the top of the amber band) or the speed set in the mode control panel speed window, whichever is greater. The EICAS message AIRSPEED LOW is displayed.Note: When the pitch mode is FLCH or TOGA, or the airplane is below 400 feet above the airport on takeoff, or below 100 feet radio altitude on approach, the autothrottle will not automatically engage.

Mic Dundee

8th Jul 2013, 04:28

Wow DEESIDE! You have a whopping ONE post ever, and this was it?:ouch: Flat earth society. Go back into your hole!

I don't care how many hours you have chalked up 'YOU WERE NOT THERE" !!!!to make such disparaging comments re the flight crew without any knowledge of what has just occurred is beyond me.Why not wait like everybody else to get the facts instead of being a bunch of smart arses prior to knowing the facts,just like you would wish if you had been involved in such an event.

Care to rethink this? To >>>DEESIDE, answer this then, why did this cockpit crew allow the speed to decay to such an extent; and then failed to take decisive action until the Boeing 777 was less than two seconds from impact?

AerocatS2A

8th Jul 2013, 04:28

That's a little harsh - he was of below average ability by all accounts, but by the very nature of the way statistics work, that's going to be true of 50% of all transport-category pilots in the world. If anything, that's an even bigger incentive to minimise other risks (such as fatigue), surely?
Yes it was worded a bit harshly. Still I sincerely hope that he was more than just a little below average. If 50% of transport pilots in the world would pull hard and keep pulling all the way to the ground in response to the stick shaker then we are in big trouble. (You are thinking of the median by the way, the median separates one half of the data from another, the average does not necessarily do this but it does tend to given a normal bell curve.)

Aerocat yes of course the capt couldnt fly an aeroplane cos only you could. You re such an ace pilot. For goodness sack start bashing the crew before any comprehensive findings
I wasn't talking about the Asiana pilots bamboo

ironbutt57

8th Jul 2013, 04:34

So what would have been set in the MCP altitude window if indeed the approach was flown using FLCH??

MoJo WoJo

8th Jul 2013, 04:34

Asiana says pilot of crashed plane was in training (http://news.yahoo.com/asiana-says-pilot-crashed-plane-training-010133596.html)

StormyKnight

8th Jul 2013, 04:42

I found this interesting reading from 2008...
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/342579-777-flch-climb-t-going-into-hold-no-low-speed-prot.html

filejw

8th Jul 2013, 04:46

57...I would hope 1000agl but apperantly not in his case. So sad....

ironbutt57

8th Jul 2013, 04:47

Many airlines may be unknowingly discouraging manual approaches due to their own stabilized approach requirements, while necessary of course, many crews will tend to engage automatics to the highest level to avoid an unstable approach and the inevitable round of tea n bikkies in the office, hence the lack of skills when automation is not available at the expected levels

Offcut

8th Jul 2013, 05:25

No ones knows what was in the MCP window but they may have set missed approach alt, disengaged the autopilot and hand flown. Therefore no auto thrust and no flight directors commanding a level off, if they were switched on. Even off you completely misjudged the profile I can't see how the speed could get so low unless the auto throttle was either stuck in hold due to FLCH or had been manually switched off. My guess is the FLCH situation. If you had manually turned off autothrust, one would imagine you would pay a bit more attention to thrust levels. A misunderstanding of FLCH could lead to a lack of thrust quite easily. The ATHR push button on the MCP will still be illuminated indicating it is active, however it will not add thrust. As always, FMAs are king.

thcrozier

8th Jul 2013, 05:27

The amazing thing about cultural differences is that only US citizens with no experience deny they exist. The rest of the world celebrates them. As long as training ignores the nature of culture, there will be problems. As Dr. Feynman said in his appendix to the Challenger report, "nature cannot be fooled".

fdr

8th Jul 2013, 05:37

???

pardon me, but having just spent considerable time listening to otherwise competent individuals state that while V/S is an approved mode, "we don't use it...", now FLCH is dangerous, and of course, the ever present risk of VNAV... excuse me if I just cough up a bit of lung here.

AT? Helps pilots.... if the pilot is not aware of what it is doing, then you end up with issues.... (its an SA thingy...) Remember a DC10 off piste in NY? THY @ AMS etc? point is, only one item is being paid to be the pilot, that is the pilot.. not the AT.

VS mode? no protections? If there is no pilot around, possibly true (its an SA thingy...)

FLCH mode? limited protections? If there is no pilot around, possibly true (its an SA thingy...)

VNAV mode? GIGO? If there is no pilot around, possibly true (its an SA thingy...)

How about we just close the doors and all go home until the system decides that working with SA limitations of pilots, and hardening their behaviours to SA errors, and giving them the skills that they needed when they flew Piper Cubs, has some merits. (its an SA thingy...)

FWIW, the PAPI, rwy aspect & perspective all become pretty darn moot when you have to view them through the kelp bed through the upper part of the windows. It's an SA thingy, or actually something to do with internal reflection angles/partial reflection as a Quantum ElectroDynamics thingy (QED).

What will be interesting is how much of the back story of the training provided by the 3rd party gets to be aired, the ruination of the career of people trying to maintain the service providors standards, and these gallant individuals being sacrificed in no small number to aquiesce to the recidivism of the customers self indulgent training and standards program. Commercial reality at its best. Truth is a complete defence... FYI

Lions: 1, Gladiators: 0.

CrazySwiss

8th Jul 2013, 05:38

It's interesting to see that on the Asiana home page (http://us.flyasiana.com/Global/US/en/index) they are not just expressing regret, but apologising.

"We at Asiana Airlines would like express our utmost sympathy and regret for the distress experienced by the passengers of OZ flight 214 and their families as a result of this accident. We apologize most deeply."

Offcut

8th Jul 2013, 05:54

FDR, FLCH is a major threat........ When used during approach or hand flying. Look it up. In other phases of flight it is a very useful mode. Just because something is identified as a threat doesn't mean we are all incompetent muppets. No G/S is a threat. It doesn't mean that we should crash, just that the threat needs to be managed. High terrain is a threat. Crosswinds are a threat. Lack of currency is a threat. Etc etc. All everyday occurrences that are managed in various ways.

BBK

8th Jul 2013, 06:02

I strongly recommend watching the NTSB news conference that someone has linked a few pages back. Apart from stating a few facts regarding the speed just prior to impact the chairman gives an insight into the exhaustive nature of the inquiry.

She also makes the point that nothing is ruled out and that human factors will be fully assessed eg training records, CRM, operations manuals etc.

The point is the NTSB have an open mind about the crash and collect whatever data they can/need to do the job. The "culture" of the airline, if it proves to be an issue, will, I am sure be revealed if it proves to be a factor.

de facto

8th Jul 2013, 06:06

I dont see the issue of no PAPI,one would use the aiming point no??yes you may not follow the usual 3 deg without papi..and what?if you cant maintain a normal path to the touchdown area,you shouldnt be flying professionally.

Now if the AT was at fault and didnt maintain the required speed...then CLICK CLICK AT OFF and adjust the thrust manually,if you cant do that you shouldnt fly professionally.

The captain lack of reaction obviously will be scrutinized.

BBK

8th Jul 2013, 06:11

The NTSB have confirmed the PAPIs for 28L were operational at the time of the crash. They were subsequently damaged and hence NOTAM'd as inop which may have caused some confusion as to their status.

ventus45

8th Jul 2013, 06:28

sobering ............. http://www.pprune.org/4396842-post21.html

thcrozier

8th Jul 2013, 06:35

@Crazy: Unless you understand the nature of their culture, and the difficulty of interpreting meaning from one language to another, you are in no positition to evaluate the meaning of the Asiana statement. It may well be that they feel far worse about it than you can imagine, but it doesn't come through in the translation. On the other hand, you could be underestimating a lack of regard for human life. I don't know which is correct, but I do know how hard it is to convey meaning between 2 culturally different languages.

de facto

8th Jul 2013, 06:44

sobering ............. 777 FLCH in climb and a/t going into HOLD, no low speed prot

Not really,whats scary is that people in front cant do without an AT..

CrazySwiss

8th Jul 2013, 06:44

@TheCrozier - yes agreed, this is exactly why I used the word "interesting" and not more. I lived and worked in Asia for many years, so I understand something of just how complex it is to interpret across cultures.

philipat

8th Jul 2013, 06:50

Just came home and too busy to read the complete thread. But did anyone note the similarities between Asiana SFO and Lion AIr DPS? DPS 09 had a VOR but no ILS or PAPI?

LNIDA

8th Jul 2013, 06:54

Unstable approach,it stops, starts and ends there, as to the why? most who know, know.

let the NTSB do its work.

monarols

8th Jul 2013, 07:00

Yes I noticed the similarities between Lion Air DPS and this latest incident....It would be nice if airlines INSTILL in their pilots thats its OK to go around, in all cases. If the PF or PNF has ANY doubts about the stability of the approach, say 3 nm from touchdown, just go around! Pax and Aircraft saved.

I would have thought that airlines have an SOP in determining a go around. Why are these not being followed?

thcrozier

8th Jul 2013, 07:11

@Crazy: Our little exchange above is a perfect example of just how hard it is. It's apparent to me now that we were both saying the same thing.

Capt Kremin

8th Jul 2013, 07:11

jackharr

8th Jul 2013, 07:12

1542 Korean Time (0642 UTC) 8 July
Asiana Airlines feels deeply responsible for this accident and is dedicating great efforts to facilitate and support a swift and thorough investigation.

Non Zero

8th Jul 2013, 07:22

Is ICN-SFO a training route for Asiana? Has the PF 43 hours on type?

aston7

8th Jul 2013, 07:24

Agree! All you said is right, however no flight mode, no SOP would help when a 40hrs-experienced pilot decides to make a visual with 777 disconnecting AP and the AT?!? and fly manual at SFO??? (note NTSB reads very low speed and ....stick shaker before the impact). Koreans list SFO as a special airport due to terrain and traffic...

NigelOnDraft

8th Jul 2013, 07:24

....It would be nice if airlines INSTILL in their pilots thats its OK to go around, in all cases. If the PF or PNF has ANY doubts about the stability of the approach, say 3 nm from touchdown, just go around! Pax and Aircraft saved.

I would have thought that airlines have an SOP in determining a go around. Why are these not being followed?Operator I work for would dearly like to see more GAs for unstable or even marginal approaches.

Re the second point, the SOPs are there, but on occasion not followed. The reasons might vary, but I think a signifcant factor is on a "high workload" approach, the criteria / triggers / time needed to "evaluate" the situation are missed. Swiss Cheese again - little point in calling/checkng "Stable" or whatever on 95% of Approaches since these are the unimportant ones. It needs some system of an absolute trigger the crew cannot ignore / fail to notice - not easy.

BOAC

8th Jul 2013, 07:27

While Barit1s ' link does seem to be a good guess at the sequence, this is gobbledly-gook! Treat with caution? but because a 777 is a large aircraft with a large cockpit to wheel height, it would be typical to fly the approach a tad steeper than the standard glideslope.Not sure what sort of 'Flying Professors' we have here?

10002level

8th Jul 2013, 07:32

It is reported on the BBC website that the PF only had 43 hours on type and that the a/c was slow on the approach. I wonder if he was used to flying an Airbus with the autothrust left on during handflying?

framer

8th Jul 2013, 07:33

but because a 777 is a large aircraft with a large cockpit to wheel height, it would be typical to fly the approach a tad steeper than the standard glideslope.
What a load of rubbish.

probes

8th Jul 2013, 07:36

from the comments: Just one technical detail to share: "because a 777 is a large aircraft with a large cockpit to wheel height, it would be typical to fly the approach a tad steeper than the standard glideslope." I think what you meant to say is that it APPEARS to be high on glideslope when you're looking out of the cockpit windshield of a jumbo jet; the actual glidepath is (or should be, anyway) the same for any aircraft using that runway's glideslope or papi.

JAARule

8th Jul 2013, 07:40

Yes, and here's another load of complete bollocks:

1. Find the runway
2. Find a bug on your windshield
3. Put the bug where you want to touch down on the runway.
4. If the bug ends up short of your touchdown point pull up a little (or use trim).
5. If the bug goes past your desired touch down point push a little. (or use trim).
6. Add or remove power as required to maintain whatever speed you have decided to use.

On the subject of evacuations:

To the idiotic suggestion of locking the overhead bins with the seatbelt signs, we're going to start evacuating aircraft with the seatbelt signs ON now are we??

I think you'll find the SEATBELT SIGNS switch is not included in the evacuation checklist on the B777 and others.

BOAC

8th Jul 2013, 07:40

Do we know yet who was Captain and in which seat?Just one technical detail to share: - Hmm! Bordering on g-g too.

1a sound asleep

8th Jul 2013, 07:41

At the point of impact the 777 was close to stall speed and ironically this is the sole reason the plane didn't flip over completely . If they had have been going 30 knots faster its unlikely there would have been any survivors.

Too slow, too low and failure to initiate a go round when the sink rate and loss of airspeed became first evident.

I am sorry but this is private pilot stuff and is inexcusable in a multi pilot jet with ample fuel in VMC. Very sad reflection on the state of professional pilots in some companies.

nitpicker330

8th Jul 2013, 07:43

Ummmm......no, if they had been going 30kts faster they wouldn't have stalled and mushed in to the sea wall in the first place.

Also the BA 777 in LHR was way way slow ( I think almost stalled ) and it didn't flip over or lose its tail because it struck smooth level grass.

If these Asiana dopes had done the same as BA in LHR and missed the sea wall it would have ended up in the same condition as BA with 2 extra survivors.

Offcut

8th Jul 2013, 07:54

10002level,

On the 777 the auto throttles are normally left on while hand flying. You just need to ensure they are in "speed" mode. The danger is if you go from a non "speed" mode with the autopilot in and then disconnect. Now you are hand flying with the auto throttle turned on, but not operating. No drama if you know this and manually manipulate the thrust levers but this is not the normal state of affairs. If you expected the auto throttle to control your speed but it was in hold mode, and you were overwhelmed with manoeuvring the aircraft from a hot and high position, and you were new on type, and it was the end of a long haul flight.............

The holes all start to line up. Clearly an accident is not an acceptable outcome but the reasons for it are rarely as simple as "the crew stuffed up/are undertrained/incompetent ".

wasthatit

8th Jul 2013, 07:54

The NTSB have confirmed the PAPIs for 28L were operational at the time of the crash. They were subsequently damaged and hence NOTAM'd as inop which may have caused some confusion as to their status.

I am a little surprised that after such a catastrophic accident and a large charred airframe sitting at the side of the runway, that someone filed a NOTAM that the PAPI are OTS. After all they are for a runway that is going to stay closed for a significant period of time.

Presumably there was other infrastructure damage (GP antenna, met sensors, runway edge lights to say the least) but these are not NOTAM'd.

The only reason I can think of is that the PAPI form part of the overall visual picture that crews might expect to see when visually acquiring the airport?

Raven1972

8th Jul 2013, 07:55

"A senior Asiana official said the pilot was Lee Jeong-min, a veteran pilot who has spent his career with the airline. He was among four pilots on the plane who rotated on two-person shifts during the 10-hour flight, the official said"

"Lee Jung Min has flown a total of 12,387 hours, 3,220 on a 777, while Lee Kang Kuk has flown a total of 9,793 hours, 43 of which were on a 777, according to the statement.
Co-pilot Lee Kang Kuk was in the process of transitioning from flying Boeing 737 model to the 777, South Korean Transport Ministry Official Choi Jung Ho told reporters in Seoul today. The government is still investigating who had control of the plane during landing, he said."

Absolutely Fabulous

8th Jul 2013, 07:55

If the guy in the right seat was PNF, theres no doubt he didnt dare speak up to the Captain.

To late to cover up loss of face now.

Yeah typical of asians affected by authority gradient :ugh:

Just like the asian F/Os onboard the QF flight in BKK, the SW in Midway and the AA in Kingston, none of the spoke up at all :ok:

413X3

8th Jul 2013, 07:58

Those pointing the finger at Jakob Van Zanten miss the point.

After Tenerife, KLM went deeply into the circumstances of the accident, realised there was a problem with the martinet attitude of some of its Captains and came up with the prototype of today's CRM, the KHUFAC course.

So how many hull losses has KLM suffered since 1977? Zero.

That course and its successors in no small way account for the continuing improvement in world accident statistics and could be said to have saved many thousands of lives.

Every airline is one flight away from an accident. The only difference between KLM culture now and the Korean airlines seems to be the willingness to admit to the holes in their particular slice of Swiss cheese and fix them.

But the big difference is, after that crash, nobody said "white Europeans have a culture problem, and lack basic airmanship."

They said "this captain made mistakes" and stopped there.

When the Colgan Q400 went down, nobody said the American culture or lack of skills caused it, they said these particular pilots made mistakes, the end.

See the difference? When you start going into race and general "culture" of races is when people should rightly question you.