Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[ExitRow]

from my SLF point of view, this seems bizarre.

If the plane is in the US, the crew should be subject to the same post crash checks as a US based crew.

I don't recall any road users getting exemptions after crashing a company car, just cos their company was based elsewhere.

Odd. The US gets to throw it's weight around on so many things, and yet in this which would seem to be a no brainer, it's not clear? :confused:

Not that I suspect alcohol or drugs were a factor in this case, but I think it's a loophole that needs fixing.

[Pinkman]

Interesting that she also made a point of saying that the "Instructor Pilot" (PNF) asserted that he was the PIC. However it is clear that the PF had longer service (years) with Asiana (so was in some sense more senior) but was the only one of the three that didnt come to Asiana through an Korean Airforce route - he did his training in Florida (so in some senses was less regarded presumably).

Interesting in that they are exploring the relationships between the three flight deck crew.

[Machaca]

JamesGV: Pilot in the left seat had 9700 hours of total flight time

Fixed it for you.

[garpal gumnut]

Thanks NZ, I assume there were 2 pilots landing the plane in the cockpit, and 4 in total on board somewhere. All I'm saying is that in Korea, South or North, you go with the majority view and are not encouraged to make decisions, outside of consensus, even if consensus is incorrect. Similar in many regions north of Australia. ps Olympus Corporation Scandal is a prime example in Japan. It mostly works for them as a society but where individual decisions are needed as in this crash, it all falls down.

[tmny]

To my understanding and interpretation of the NTSB today the pilots refused a drug and acohol test. :confused:

[jlsmith]

She said there were three in the cockpit, one not.

[Feathered]

MikeNYC wrote:
Here's the FlightAware data:
Flight Track Log ? AAR214 ? 06-Jul-2013 ? RKSI / ICN - KSFO ? FlightAware (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAR214/history/20130706/0730Z/RKSI/KSFO/tracklog)I'm curious where FlightAware got the data from, since it is much more frequent data points than many other flights at that stage of flight. Sometimes FlightAware will provide the facility (e.g. Oakland ARTCC, SoCal TRACON, etc.) for the source, which indicates that the data flowed through the National Offload Program. In this case the source is "FlightAware." Are there any other options for the data's source, e.g. ADS-B Out?

[overthewing]

I wonder why she mentioned specially about the lack of alcohol / drugs testing post-crash? She implied that this was the responsibility of the Korean authorities, and that the NTSB don't know why it wasn't carried out. Do they have suspicions about incapacitation?

I also thought she said that the PAPIs were 3 red, one white.

And two cabin crew were ejected through the hole at the back. Horrible.

[Ivanbogus]

4 reds on the PAPI, speed is low? The only thing that comes to mind is press TOGA or disconnect the freaking A/T, push the throttles forward, select flaps and Go-around !!!!!

[JPJP]

RetiredF4
What is the special difficulty about that visual approach?
Speed on short final was the problem looks like, what has it to do with the VAP?

I don't think it is particularly difficult. However, i've seen some struggle. Particularly those with a bias towards heavy automation use. An unstable final approach can begin with a rushed preparation.

1. If the approach is not in the database. Then figure out how to build it.

2. Decide what mode to use - LNAV/VNAV then IAN ? All LNAV/VNAV ? Look out the window ?

3. The recommended 1900' altitude at the bridge leaves the aircraft about 300 feet high on a 3 degree glide slope. Close to the runway. Were they hurrying to get down ?

[ExitRow]

From listening to what and how it was discussed, it didn't seem that she was implying that the crew refused a test.
If the situation is that the law doesn't require one, or empower the authorities to request one of the crew, it may be a failing in the law that they were unable to eliminate the factor from their investigation. That doesn't necessarily hint at suspicion.

I would like it clarified though.

[MountainBear]

Interesting photo of crash scene showing flight landing on runway with tail intact

Photo Du Jour: Asiana Flight 214 : SFist (http://sfist.com/2013/07/09/photo_du_jour_asiana_flight_214_lan.php)

[Back at NH]

They were high out of 4000', in V/S with -1500 in the window. So no FLCH trap.

[Feathered]

[/RIGHT]
The throttles on all Boeing North airplanes have the same force requirements to move...

What is Boeing North? Everett built aircraft?

[JamesGV]

And the PNF (confirmed PIC) now sounds more senior than "speculation".
Still, the PF has little hours on type.

And no testing. Post accident I never realized you could "refuse" ?

[tdracer]

td, what about the 'spool up' required on final?

Yes LW, the GA in the sim, or even when flight testing, rely on a 'fling' effect, being at or above speed, not below speed.

I'm not sure what you mean about the 'spool up' required on final. Approach idle is designed to meet/exceed the mandated 8 second accel time. On a normal approach, it never comes into play because with gear and landing flaps, the airplane is so draggy that maintaining airspeed and glideslope requires above idle thrust.

Yes, the guys driving when we're doing flight testing are good stick and rudder - and airspeed is generally spot on. Being 20 or 30 knots slow would certainly affect the go-around performance - short of a sim session I'm not sure how to quantify that. But, I do know that on a twin, after they push TOGA and those engines spool up, the airplane accelerates and climbs fast (I'm generally standing behind the observers seat - I make damn sure I'm hanging on to something)!
According to the reports, someone on the flight deck verbalized 'airspeed' 7 seconds prior to impact. My point is that, had they performed the go-around and firewalled the throttles then, rather than 5.5 seconds later, I doubt there would have been an impact and we wouldn't be having this discussion.

[Airbubba]

Interesting that she also made a point of saying that the "Instructor Pilot" (PNF) asserted that he was the PIC. Interesting in that they are exploring the relationships between the three flight deck crew.

I would certainly expect the instructor pilot to be PIC if the captain under training had not completed IOE (or OE as it is now called) on the Triple. At least that's how it works in the U.S. in my experience.

Maybe my previous post about possibly transitioning from a low erroneous computed FMS path to a higher real world PAPI was too technical, it seems to have disappeared.

Now it looks like the situation was the opposite, high and fast with 180 knots to 5 miles, V/S 1500 fpm down to get on the PAPI. Then A/T off (but still armed), back to idle presumably. Nose up, but power still back when the PAPI's go red...

For a non-pilot I think Debbie Hersman is doing a terrific job of explaining the findings and the technical aspects of the automation and warnings.

[flite idol]

Well Mr Learmount has come out with a video analysis on FI, "the facts so far" but for some reason has them flying an approach to 28 Right. I thought the clearance was always 28L:confused:

VIDEO: Asiana crash ? the facts so far (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/video-asiana-crash-the-facts-so-far-388082/)

[Lost in Saigon]

Still, the PF has little hours on type.



I am so sick of hearing how little B777 time the Flying Pilot had. :ugh:

It has almost nothing to do with this accident. Ever hour of every day somewhere in the world a pilot is checking out in a new aircraft type. Do you honestly think that those pilots are dangerous and likely to have an accident?

This "Inexperienced pilot" had 10,000 hours! He probably had months of B777 Classroom and Simulator experience. He was Type-Rated on the B777 and was now doing his series of Line Indoctrination flights on this new type

How much more experience do you think he needed before he should be allowed near a B777?

[Sydy]

Instructor on his first flight as such... That's a factor!

[Back at NH]

Instructor on his first flight as such... That's a factor! But still an experienced (3000hr on type) 777 pilot who you would expect not to allow such a situation to develop.

[tdracer]

What is Boeing North? Everett built aircraft?

Boeing North is 'heritage' Boeing - as vs. those made by McDonald Douglas (which are technically 'Boeing' airplanes since the merger). Basically anything that starts with a '7', err, aside from the 717 :rolleyes:.

[Sydy]

Not judging at all, but he was inexperienced as instructor.

[Lost in Saigon]

Instructor on his first flight as such... That's a factor!

Not judging at all, but he was inexperienced as instructor.

Why is that a factor? Have you ever been a training pilot? A new training pilot is likely to be very conservative. That would make an accident LESS likely.

[SeniorDispatcher]

If the plane is in the US, the crew should be subject to the same post crash checks as a US based crew.

As NTSB mentioned, U.S.-registered airlines operate under Part 121 of the FAA regs, while foreign airlines operating into the U.S. operate under Part 129 of the FAA regs. Most simply stated, Part 129 kicks things back to regs of the foreign airline's country, which may not (and often don't) mirror the FAA's regs. Under Korean regs, the crew may not have been required to submit for post-accident testing.

[ExitRow]

:
As NTSB mentioned, U.S.-registered airlines operate under Part 121 of the FAA regs, while foreign airlines operating into the U.S. operate under Part 129 of the FAA regs. Most simply stated, Part 129 kicks things back to regs of the foreign airline's country, which may not (and often don't) mirror the FAA's regs. Under Korean regs, the crew may not have been required to submit for post-accident testing.

I understand that the law may exempt that, what I meant by should is that I don't believe that this is a good idea, nor particularly logical, given that the accident location is more important than the operator's base.
I can see how from an FAA point of view, they would have an interest in having US based crews tested post-crash overseas, but I don't see that in order to get that situation they would have to give up the right to test overseas crews in the US post-crash.
I assume if there was any indication of inebriation that the police could demand a test, as opposed to some FAA regulation, correct?
Arguably, flying a servicable aircraft into a seawall in perfect weather could constitute 'reasonable suspicion' for a San Fran police officer, even just to eliminate it as a factor.

[kaikohe76]

Hi Folks,
I can make no real judgement as to the Air Asiana B777 accident at SFO.
However, I feel as a general practice throughout the whole Airline Industry, the use of Auto Pilot & other Automatic systems is overtaking the Pilot's basic ability, to fly the aeroplane. You can so easily forget some of the monitoring, when the Automatics are in control. Yes, modern aircraft are designed to make a great deal of use of all Automatic systems, but I suggest, this leads to a degredation of the old, hand flying skills. Many of the airfields I operated into, basically called for a hand flown 100% manual approach, very good practice & good fun as well.
Yes, by all means use the Automatics, they are there to help you, but No one priority, has & always will be, fly the aircraft!

[Won2Go]

If you don't want to scroll though 65 pages of opinions, thoughts and a few rather useless postings on this topic please read the detailed post #1249 by Mic Dundee.
This sums up very accurately the situation that has existed in Korea for many years and unless someone can come up with a way to change 3,000 years of what could be described as a "cultural gradient" then accidents and incidents of this nature will continue.
An airline can give their pilots CRM courses but unless the techniques given in these courses are adopted then there is little hope for change.

[MountainBear]

I assume if there was any indication of inebriation that the police could demand a test, as opposed to some FAA regulation, correct?

Since they crashed they haven't even gone through customs yet so technically the crew is not in the country legally at that exact moment so jurisdiction would fall under the INS, not the local police. I assume processing them through customs was one of the first things that was done once the emergency health issues were straightened out.

It would an interesting question as to whether the state or federal government would assert jurisdiction if any criminal charges (such as manslaughter) were to be filed. I suspect that INS would defer to the San Fran police because of their expertise but who knows...

[WillowRun 6-3]

In order to implement, and enforce (let alone enforce in anything approaching a systematic way) post-accident testing regimen on foreign-certificated air transport carrier crews, would there not need to be some emendation, or alteration or revision or amendment, to the governing international agreements, such as the Chicago Convention (1944) or others? Alternatively, consider a hypothetical in which mishaps substantially similar or parallel in their essential probable cause roots occur with significant frequency (that is, lack of hand flying, horribly botched CAVOK approach, insufficient time in type, cockpit culture of obsequiousness - some or all of these), all foreign-certificated air carriers. Would Congress pass, and would the president sign, legislation creating (or expanding, if it is said to exist already) federal jurisdiction for law enforcement purposes relative to safety of air transport operations? Staff the NTSB Go Team with federal Marshals and the civilian equivalent of Judge Advocates. Require every airport with an FAA facility to enter into a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) requiring local law enforcement to impound the crew until chain of custody testing can be federally overseen and administered. They fly into U S of A airspace, swear 'em into the union, test 'em, without fail, just like we do to our own. I could write this legislation in a week; getting it passed, and getting the president to sign it....."Priceless" --

[ExitRow]

I assume if there was any indication of inebriation that the police could demand a test, as opposed to some FAA regulation, correct?

Since they crashed they haven't even gone through customs yet so technically the crew is not in the country legally at that exact moment so jurisdiction would fall under the INS, not the local police. I assume processing them through customs was one of the first things that was done once the emergency health issues were straightened out.

It would an interesting question as to whether the state or federal government would assert jurisdiction if any criminal charges (such as manslaughter) were to be filed. I suspect that INS would defer to the San Fran police because of their expertise but who knows...

Which is precisely why I think it would be a good idea for it to be a mandatory across the board requirement regardless of where the air crew was based. Not only would it help eliminate a factor if they crew were clean, but it would avoid the risk of dramatic scenes and headlines if the cops felt that the responsibility fell to them to make it a criminal DUI type test. That would be seen as prejudicial to the investigation, as well as all the jurisdictional headaches and likely protests from the embassy at how it would all play out in the media.

And to reiterate, I'm not implying that these guys were stoned or drunk, just that in my opinion there's no good reason for exempting foreign based crews from the mandatory drug & alcohol checking.

[UAVop]

Couple of things. When I listened to the NTSB conference today, I heard that the crew did pass drug/alcohol testing, BUT were not required to as a function of the pilot licensing. They were still required to take the test, as part of landing in the US.
My take on this was that the test did take place, and it was negative for the crew.

The autothrottles were 'selected' or 'armed', but it was not known at this time if, due to other settings, if they were 'enabled'

I'm not sure what you mean about the 'spool up' required on final.

It is my understanding that according to FOQA procedures, when on landing idle, the pilot is required to momentarily spool up the engines near minima or for balked.

[JPJP]

Uavop,

I don't think you understand what FOQA means. There is no such thing as "FOQA procedures". Do you mean stabilized approach criteria ? One of the requirements for a stabilized approach is the fact that the engines are stable at whatever power setting is required to maintain VApp. At whatever altitude is precribed in the specific companies operational references.

[Airbubba]

It is my understanding that according to FOQA procedures, when on landing idle, the pilot is required to momentarily spool up the engines near minima or for balked.

According to FOQA procedures?

That's a new one on me... :confused:

[rer47]

There has been much discussion of the FlightAware track logs, including the evidently erroneous approach profile published by the New York Times.

http://www.eskimo.com/~reanier/NYT_Asiana_214_flight_path_small.png

The track logs visible on the FA web site have the time stamps truncated to the minute. In the .kml files available on the FA web site the time stamps are given to the nearest second, allowing accurate plotting of the data. Evidently the NYT profile was constructed from the truncated time stamps. The NYT graphic shows a 600-foot decrease in altitude in 9 seconds. Actually the time between these data points was 26 seconds. I have plotted the approach profile below from data in the .kml file, and have added the NTSB data points. There is a discrepancy between the FA and NTSB altitudes at about 15 seconds. It appears that whatever went wrong happened in the final 15 seconds of flight, since an earlier post shows the 6 July approach was not much different than earlier ones until this point.

http://www.eskimo.com/~reanier/Asiana_214_approach_time_small.pnghttp://www.eskimo.com/~reanier/Asiana_214_approach_time_NTSB_small.png
http://www.pprune.org/ XBIWXMAAA7DAAAOwwHHb6hkAAAZeElEQVR4nO3dPXLjRsKAYbBqrzAKnDh2z QROfQBPOds7bI0uICc+wiajC2hr77CZa3wApw7G5diJA88huCJBgiABgmgQP 93o56n69hMlSqIwJl92o9n8x3a7LQCAtfvH0jcAAJiD5ANAFiQfALIg+QCQB ckHgCxIPgBkQfIBIAuSDwBZkHwAyILkA0AWJB8AsiD5AJAFyQeALEg+AGRB8 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[AdamFrisch]

NTSB: Asiana 777 commanding pilot assumed auto-throttles were maintaining speed | Safety content from ATWOnline (http://m.atwonline.com/safety/ntsb-asiana-777-commanding-pilot-assumed-auto-throttles-were-maintaining-speed?NL=ATW-04&Issue=ATW-04_20130709_ATW-04_632&YM_RID=umiamidad%40deneals.com&YM_MID=1407665&sfvc4enews=42)

[MountainBear]

SFPD Now Leads Probe Into Whether Fire Truck Ran Over Plane Crash Victim « CBS San Francisco (http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2013/07/09/sfpd-now-probes-whether-fire-truck-ran-over-plane-crash-victim/)

Seeming to confirm my speculation a few posts up regarding jurisdiction the criminal investigation regarding whether one of the female victims was run over by a rescue firetruck has been handed off to the San Fran police department.

[Airbubba]

I don't think that is the case. I believe she explained that under FAA regs, foreign based operators crews are not required to take the test, and her enquiries indicate that they were not tested.

And conversely, U.S. carriers cannot conduct DOT mandated drug and alcohol testing of their own crews overseas in my experience. The locals in most cases can test according to their laws though.

[Winged Wombat]

Excellent thread content, sad outcome for Asiana.

I'm not a heavy jet pilot, having spent my time in P3 and Nimrod, however I am completely puzzled by some of the comments here.

My basic training started with a final approach technique of "Aimpoint, Aspect, Airspeed". A fairly simple but critical and very effective work cycle to keep the aircraft on the rails to touch down. I used it throughout my career no matter which aircraft and still use it today. We were taught that "Speed is life and more is better" and this is essentially critical for all aircraft on the final approach. Apart for more speed not necessarily being ideal for slippery jets (I understand that nuance)

Q. Is airspeed not monitored by both pilots on final, in a modern jet airliner? Surely I am wrong........:rolleyes:

[Capn Bloggs]

I was taught that you use power to stay on (or addjust to) glide slope, pitch to stay on (or adkust for) airspeed when making an approach to land. (Of course, the two work together to give you the performance you are trying to achieve. )

I was also taught that if you are low/slow on approach to landing, pulling the nose up "to get to the runway" makes your problems worse if that is all you do.
Must be a navy pilot? I have never really come to grips with why navy guys used the secondary effects of controls to land. :)

Fly it like the autopilot flies an ILS. You get low on slope, you pull the nose up. Primary effect of controls. If you then get slow or know form experience that you will get slow, put the power up. As you say, pitch and power work together, but the initial reaction is to stay on-slope with the stick, then compensate (if necessary) with the power. Stick for glideslope results in much more accuracy, as well as revealing, much quicker, windshear. If you "fell into a hole" and simply pushed the power up, especially with not much deck angle, all you'd to is go faster.

This is particularly appropriate with autothrottles; all you need to do is stay on glide/visual slope with the stick and the autothrottles will automatically adjust/power-up to maintain the speed.

Confucius say (for the left-hand seater):

"Always remember and forever take heed, left hand for glidepath and right hand for speed!"

As for that Tiptoe visual approach posted by JPJP:

http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1307/00375TIPPTOE_VIS28L.PDF

That would some thought to put in the box, especially if not given until later in the descent or not familiar with it. 1900ft at 5nm to touch, just because of Class B airspace? Get real you lot.

[West Coast]

Speaking in general terms, aircraft know well in advance if they are to expect one of the charted visuals. Usually one, sometimes two frequencies prior to being cleared for it.

[jolihokistix]

From the Guardian article quoted earlier: A second evacuation slide inflated inwards, trapping another attendant near flames. "I grabbed a knife passengers had eaten with from a cart and handed it to the co-pilot and he punctured it," Lee said. Only later at hospital did Lee realise she had broken her tailbone...

Luckily they were not using plastic cutlery. 'Nuff said.

[eswdev]

The lucky video that recorded the horrific crash of Asiana's B777 was talked about much earlier in this thread. Some comments were made about the white cloud that formed part way into the event. Someone speculated that it was sea water, but to my eye it rises after the United Airlines plane drops out of sight on the right.

Is it possible that the cloud was jet fuel escaping and atomizing, and that this early dump of the remaining fuel was an enormous stroke of luck? There was much less fire than I would have expected when the plane stopped.

My interest in modern aircraft, and their rare disasters, is prompted by my experience as a software developer. The growing sense that automation is a double-edged sword is an important perception, I believe. I also have niggling feeling that "Systems problems" are a growing threat.

[Sheep Guts]

What aircraft type had the Captain been on before his training? Not that it makes a difference.

[RobertS975]

eswdev wrote: "Is it possible that the cloud was jet fuel escaping and atomizing, and that this early dump of the remaining fuel was an enormous stroke of luck? There was much less fire than I would have expected when the plane stopped."

Not a chance they were deliberately dumping fuel. They didn't even call for more speed until 7 seconds prior to impact, and the call for a GA happened less than 2 seconds prior to impact. And obviously they could not have jettisoned enough fuel ti a few seconds to make a difference!

[eswdev]

By "dump" I mean accidental, a result of the engines breaking off, while pumps remained active at full output - if that is possible (e.g. from battery power). I can't think of any other reason for that white cloud. Another suggestion earlier was dust, but where would white dust come from?

[Lost in Saigon]

What aircraft type had the Captain been on before his training? Not that it makes a difference.

The Captain(flying pilot) in the left seat was doing his upgrade from A320 Captain to B777 Captain while the right seat Captain(non-flying pilot) was the PIC and was doing Line Indoctrination training on the pilot flying.

[LASJayhawk]

white cloud = water being kicked up by the thrust of the engines. AKA: rooster tail

[zekeigo]

Korean MLTM Aviation Act

Chapter X – Penal Provisions

Article 156 (Offense Causing Danger in Aviation)
Any person who damages or destroys an airfield, airfield facilities or navigation safety facilities or causes any danger in aviation in any other way, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years. <Amended by Act No. 5794, Feb. 5, 1999>

Article 157 (Offense Causing Danger in Flight)
(1) Any person who crashes, overthrows or destroys an aircraft in flight, shall be punished by the death penalty, imprisonment for life or for not less than five years.
(2) Any person who crashes, overthrows or destroys the aircraft in flight in committing the offense as prescribed in Article 156, shall also be punished by the punishment as referred to in paragraph (1).
Article 158 (Crime against Death or Injury by Causing of Danger to Aircraft in Flight)
Any person who caused the death of another person or injury by committing the crime as prescribed in Article 157, shall be punished by the death penalty, or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for not less than seven years.

Article 159 (Attempted Criminal)
Any person who attempted offenses as prescribed in Articles 156 and 157 (1), shall be punished.

Article 160 (Offense against Danger Causing by Negligence in Aviation)
(1) Any person who damages or destroys by negligence an aircraft, airfield, airfield facilities or navigation safety facilities, or causes any danger in aviation by other ways, or crashes or overthrows the aircraft in flight, shall be punished by imprisonment or without prison labor for not more than one year, or by a fine not exceeding twenty million won. <Amended by Act No. 4647, Dec. 27, 1993; Act No. 5794, Feb. 5, 1999>
(2) If a person commits the offense as referred to in paragraph (1) by any malpractice or severe negligence, he shall be punished by imprisonment or without prison labor for not more than three years, or by a fine not exceeding fifty million won.

[StormyKnight]

The pilot at the controls - named by Asiana as Lee Kang-Kuk - was about halfway through his training for the Boeing 777, but had led 29 flights to San Francisco on Boeing 747s in the past, according to the airline.

"To complete initial operating experience for Asiana, he's required to have 20 flights and 60 flight hours. He had completed 10 legs, and about 35 hours flying the 777," Hersman said.

However, his trainer - who told US investigators he had a total of 13,000 flying hours, 3,000 of which were in the Boeing 777 - had not flown as a trainer pilot before.


Read more: Pilot couldn't see runway before US crash | News.com.au (http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/world/pilot-couldnt-see-runway-before-us-crash/story-e6frfkui-1226677059671#ixzz2Ybi6hzAG)

[eaglespar]

What is the difference between autothrottle being armed and off?
Reading all the entries in this topic my guess is armed means
its ready to intercept the ILS to activate the autothrottle?

Second question - Why did the first responders need to throw their knives up to the flight attendents to remove the SLF seat belts? Seat belts prone to jam?

Thanks

[Sheep Guts]

Zekeigo,

With that legal deterrent as you quoted , you would think Pilot training and currency in ALL phases of flight would be a priority. It's a pity it isn't.:ugh:

You can't scare someone into being a competent pilot with legislation. They have to be trained. And sadly if they don't make the grade they need to be let go.:=

[paulftw]

What I find funny around here is the total lack of any input from any Korean pilot, want to be pilot or what ever, to add anything in defense or against standards or what happened. “ The Korean mindset bashing “ that has been going on for pages and pages; I would have thought maybe a Korean post? Looking at History, if it's a bent plane say in India, we get posts form Indians either defending the standards or against, same for accidents in Russia etc., we get the locals involved.

With no input from any one in Korea on this issue over the last 60 odd pages leaves me to think, maybe if they ignore it the problem will go away. I just find it a little strange. Maybe they can Photoshop out the bent metal at SFO and all will be forgotten over time.

[Lost in Saigon]

What is the difference between autothrottle being armed and off?
Reading all the entries in this topic my guess is armed means
its ready to intercept the ILS to activate the autothrottle?


Auto Throttle really has nothing to do with the ILS. A/T controls engine thrust to maintains speed, or rate of climb and descent in all phases of flight. Sometimes it will command idle thrust during a descent other times it will command thrust to satisfy the speed or vertical profile needed by the A/P or Flight Director.

The A/T Arm Switches are checked in the on position during the preliminary cockpit scan before engine start. (you never really dis-arm them except for unusual circumstances). A/T comes on during the Takeoff roll and generally stays on until after landing.

You can "click off" the A/T by pressing a button on the Thrust Lever but it remains armed and will come back on when you select a "vertical" mode on the autopilot. (Speed, or Vertical Nav, etc)

In flight, if you turn off the A/T arm switch on the glareshield, A/T will be turned off and will not come on again until you turn the A/T arm switch back on, and then select a vertical mode.

EDITED to correct some errors.

[StormyKnight]

Second question - Why did the first responders need to throw their knives up to the flight attendents to remove the SLF seat belts? Seat belts prone to jam?

One possible reason is that the chair frame has bent making excessive tension on the belts making it difficult/impossible to unclip or they simply couldn't get access to the buckles....

No doubt this will need to be resolved....

Possibly another example of a real-life incident over a calculated one. There was a lot of side-wards motion in this incident, perhaps that bent the seats differently than predicted as well.

[eswdev]

Apologies for continuing to talk about this. I don't think the "white cloud" was a "rooster tail" because it happened a while after the sea wall had been crossed. At a rough guess, the aircraft might have had of the order of ten or twenty tons of fuel still on board (this is a totally uneducated guess, sorry). From a quick search, I see a B777 will burn 40 tons of fuel per hour at full power, so the low pressure pumps can supply at least 2/3 of a ton per minute. It seems that this would not be enough to generate a really large cloud of fuel in the tens of seconds after the sea-wall impact, but before the astonishing semi-airborne 360 spin (the cloud occurred before this).

But the wing tanks could have been severely ruptured at the time the engines were broken off, or due to the hard landing after the tail was lost. In that case, tons of fuel would be spilt rapidly while the plane was still traveling at speed.

The above is speculation, but the remarkable fact that there was not a catastrophic fire seems worth thinking about.

[joema]

"If you turn off the A/T arm switch on the glareshield, then Auto Throttle will not come on at all until you turn the A/T arm switch back on and then select a vertical mode."

Besides A/T arm switches there's an A/T engage pushbutton. Today the NTSB said the A/T switches were armed, but did not say whether the A/T pushbutton was on.

The PF was an Airbus captain from 2005 to a few months ago. Does the Airbus A/T activate whether its A/T pushbutton is on or not? On Boeing must the A/T pushbutton always be on for A/T to work? Is it conceivable the A/T switch was off but his ingrained Airbus experience coupled with fatigue made him forget it must be on?

[clayne]

However, certainly one hand over the throttle while monitoring airspeed would guard against anything the A/T decided to do or not do...

[Lost in Saigon]

Besides A/T arm switches there's an A/T engage pushbutton. Today the NTSB said the A/T switches were armed, but did not say whether the A/T pushbutton was on.


You are right of course. I was thinking of the 767 and forgot that there are differences with the 777.

767 Mode Control Panel
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/Clipboard767_zps7117d4e8.jpg

777 Mode Control Panel
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/photo%20stuff/Photo13/Clipboard777_zpseedb59ba.jpg

[JPJP]

Lost in Saigon: During the Takeoff roll A/T comes on at 80kts and generally stays on until after landing.

Really .... Then what kind of strange magic advances the thrust levers to take off power when you press TOGA prior to the aircraft moving an inch ?

lost in Saigon: You can "click off" the A/T by pressing a button on the control wheel but it remains armed and will come back on

There is no button on the control wheel that "clicks off" the A/T.

[de facto]

So to me it would be perfectly reasonable for Asiana's bean-counters and risk assessors, to decide an appropriate response to this crash is NOT to increase training for hand-flying, but rather require ILS or other precision approaches for all operations

Theres so much:mad: that even reading 10% of the posts I end up reading this....
I guess you are not a pilot,and eventhough wouldnt you feel safer your pilots can actually fly for crying out loud???:ugh:

Maybe its time to change the blood in those long haul crews,add some DEC from airlines such as Ryan Air,Tui and others where pilots are trained to operate but also to hand fly...
Scan/flying skills is like walking,,,if you practice enough it wont go away,if you dont walk for a long time,a bit of training and your brain remembers...

There is a definite issue of pilots starting their career on a B777 and not having the skills required when automatics fail or misunderstood and try to bite you in the :mad:
Automation is a great tool to have your dinner while working but sometimes pilots need to remain pilots.

I feel sincere sadness for the crew of Asiana as I am sure they never dreamt of killing people,but some died,someone must and will be held accountable.
I hope the Airline will take the big hit,it deserves it to allow pilots on line with such poor handling or fatigue.

It is the duty of each pilot to remain skilled and the airline's to allow them to train as necessary.
It is alsomthe pilot responsability to manage his fatigue if he accepts a duty,if you cant make the approach due to fatigue,call in the other crew and decide who is alert enough to have the controls.
It is the Airline duty to make sure their TRE fail whoever is not at the level for his/her position regardless of company needs or politics.

[joema]

"Normal procedure is to turn both flight director off, then select the PNFs flight director back on. This engages basic modes of heading and vertical speed, and importantly, autothrottles engage in speed mode."

I think they said the PNF FD was on, the PF FD was off. The preceding sequence wasn't specified.

[Old Fella]

As a retired Flight Engineer I may be accused of being somewhat biased and "living in he past", however I am astounded that so many comments on this tragic and seemingly avoidable accident place so much emphasis on the Autoflight aspect. What on earth has happened when pilots loose the manual flying skills which are so essential when the autoflight system is part or totally inoperable? Does nobody monitor configuration, heights, speeds, thrust etc? I have flown into SFO on numerous occassions in B747 aircraft and it seems inconceivable to me that this approach in broad daylight was able to continue, with no apparent concern, to the point were impact was unavoidable.

This accident seems to me to be the result of nobody monitoring what was really happening. It is implied by many that the aircaft was allowed to get well below the glideslope and well below the target speeds on the approach. As some others have asked, "Why did nobody notice that the picture was wrong"?

[nitpicker330]

Joema----The only thing the investigators can now "see" on the cockpit panels are switch/lever positions ( landing lights, gear lever, speedbrake, etc ) or latched in push buttons. ( fuel pumps, ADIRU, Gen, beacon etc )

The momentary action push buttons ( such as the A/T momentary action push button ) are obviously un-powered now so you don't know.
You'd have to look at the FDR or listen to the CVR to determine that info.

[Lost in Saigon]

Lost in Saigon: During the Takeoff roll A/T comes on at 80kts and generally stays on until after landing.
Really .... Then what kind of strange magic advances the thrust levers to take off power when you press TOGA prior to the aircraft moving an inch ?

Sorry, I was confused with A/T "Hold" that comes on at 80kts. You are right of course.

Quote:
lost in Saigon: You can "click off" the A/T by pressing a button on the control wheel but it remains armed and will come back on
There is no button on the control wheel that "clicks off" the A/T.
Right again. :ouch: I forgot the A/T disconnect button is on the thrust lever and the A/P disconnect button is on the control wheel.

[Sqwak7700]

I've always cringed when people I fly with try to hand fly with the AT engaged. It works OK on takeoff for the most part, but on approach it can get quite ugly. Throw in an engine inop situation and it gets down right pear shaped.

I know the Airbus and 777 are designed so that you always hand fly with the AT engaged, but this is a recipe for disaster. It creates a really bad muscle memory and habit of forgetting about the other crucial aspect of managing your energy. This is done through your flight controls and through your thrust/power.

So either you are managing both, or you manage none. They both go hand in hand, taking one of those out is just opening the door to create bad habits - like not noticing a huge airspeed loss on short final.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not advocating technology is bad. I think Airbus and Boeing both have some great "life saving" design philosophies. I just think that a hand flown approach should be ALL hand flown - not half. You would not attempt to autoland without AT working, it all goes together hand in hand. So why would you not require the same from a human operator?

Would be great to see regulators and maybe labor unions focus a bit more on safety and take a leading roll singling out bad design philosophies before they become standard. Would make manufacturers a little more keen at changing these bad design features. I've never been a big fan of Airbus' zero feedback controls (sidestick and throttles). But Airbus will never change that despite the number of accidents and serious incidents directly or indirectly caused by this feature.

[nitpicker330]

The FO sitting in the jump seat was probably too scared to speak up about the
loss of Airspeed if he indeed even noticed it.

Lets imagine he did speak up and saved the day, how do you think the two Captains would have reacted later on? I think the FO might have been told off and probably this would have effected his career later on. So he probably saw the low Airspeed and "thought" they had it under control. :eek:

I can categorically say this wouldn't be the case in my outfit, our relief guys have spoken up in the past and indeed saved a lot of heartache...

That's what they are there for.

[dba7]

First time visitor to PPrune due to the Asiana accident.
Quick intro of myself. I'm Korean American, born in S Korea in early 1970s. I finished elementary school there and then immigrated with my parents to CA, US. First I want to make it clear I'm speaking for myself only, not Korea/Koreans/Asiana.



#1247
http://www.pprune.org/7931852-post1247.html

Yes S Korea's educational system emphasizes rote memorization partly because of old tradition like Confucianism/Asian culture. But the REAL reason imo is because of lack of fund when the system was built. You need to remember that the current govt/education/nation of S Korea was formed in 1948, destroyed during the Korean War and slowly rebuilt over the decades. In 1953, S Korea was the poorest nation on the planet. So the nation really could only afford to build the education system with the lowest cost possible, one based on rote memorization. With 1 teacher teaching a class of 60+ kids, there really is no time but simple multiple choice exams. Now I hear S Korean schools have much smaller class sizes, due to more schools (due to richer economy) and lower birthrate. They have been trying to change the culture, but it's hard, just like everywhere else.
Once an institution is built, inertia takes over, just like everywhere else.


About the comment on S Korea having no civil aircraft, yes that is true. There are various reasons, including lack of infrastructure (small nation with lots of hills so land is EXPENSIVE), national security reasons (danger of defection to N Korea, N Korean spy spying from above although Google Earth made this moot, etc), and no reason for using private aircraft for traveling. S Korea built up quite a few regional airports as a result of politicians looking for votes, only to see them become unnecessary due to high speed trains crisscrossing S Korea. Check BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | South Korea's abandoned airports (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8055957.stm)
Who knows, maybe Asiana will 'form' a flying club with a few cessnas and force their pilots to fly them. That'd be nice.


And about the low-skill pilot with thousands of hours, I'm reminded of the American pilot who was in command of Air France 447 at the time of crash. I certainly don't mean any disrespect for him but low-skill, high-hour pilots are everywhere.





#1332
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-67.html#post7932452

I think there's no Korean pilot (or wanna be pilot) responding to the Korean mindset bashing going on here because of the following:
1) a mature Korean with competent English skill with real interest in aviation would be gainfully employed (or busy studying) and thus has no time to engage in the debate, especially on a site little known in Korea. If expats/foreigners raised this issue in naver.com, then there might be more lively debate.
2) even if a Korean competent in English had the time, he would be unwilling to engage in the debate because he knows it's already a lost cause. With all the sensationalistic headlines at places like cnn.com (PILOT ONLY had 34 HOURS of EXPERIENCE!) & 60+ pages on this very forum pointing fingers at the Korean mindset, no wonder no Korean has responded. Why bother?



Lastly, if you are interested in more nuanced (real life) discussion of Korean culture/politics/education/etc that is easily accessible to non-Korean, I recommend this blog: 'ask a korea'. Just google 'ask a korean'.
(http://askakorean.********.com/) Many here may have already heard about the book 'Outliers' and the KAL story. Well, Ask-a-korean blog is a far better material for understanding how Korean mind works, imho.

He's Korean American, practicing law in DC. A great writer. Many entertaining/informative stories about Korea there. His opinions are his own.

[nitpicker330]

Ok possibly true.
1/ But the Airbus thrust levers are quit a way forward sitting in the CLB detent and not closed. His Piloting skill should have registered that fact.

2/ the other 2 Pilots can clearly see the Thrust Levers in the closed position and should have also monitored the IAS to make sure it was correct.

[LASJayhawk]

Seat Belts: I think there is an issue here too, but might best be discussed in the cabin crew forum

White smoke: Could well be 150 tons of Boeing chewing up the concrete.

To the Pilots, from an Avionics guy: I would rather be in the back, with an average pilot that is a little wary of the avionics, than a great pilot that put 100% trust in them. (I know great ones don't) These systems have become so interconnected that a fault in one system can introduce a fault in an unrelated system.

[SierraFoxtrotOscar]

paulftw: (http://www.pprune.org/members/266537-paulftw)


What I find funny around here is the total lack of any input from any Korean pilot, want to be pilot or what ever, to add anything in defense or against standards or what happened. “ The Korean mindset bashing “ that has been going on for pages and pages; I would have thought maybe a Korean post? Looking at History, if it's a bent plane say in India, we get posts form Indians either defending the standards or against, same for accidents in Russia etc., we get the locals involved.

With no input from any one in Korea on this issue over the last 60 odd pages leaves me to think, maybe if they ignore it the problem will go away. I just find it a little strange. Maybe they can Photoshop out the bent metal at SFO and all will be forgotten over time. I don't know, maybe they find some of the racist-tinged comments sprinkled throughout this thread a bit off-putting?

I'm not a pilot, nor am I in the aviation industry. I am a journo and I happened to be on duty this weekend when the plane went down. It also happened in my hometown so I have been following this case closely and stumbled on to this forum via an external link.

It took me three days to go through every single post on here. At times it was insightful and at times, it was painful.

Even though I am on the other side of the cockpit door and have none of your expertise, I do know some things that may help to steer the conversation in the right direction.

Several of you speculated about the "cultural" dynamics among the pilots and whether the instructor pilot was junior to the pilot who was flying the jet. I would like to direct your attention to the following article:

The co-pilot, Mr. Lee, born in 1967, was attempting his first 777 landing at SFO, and his ninth landing overall with that model. He had previously landed the 777 at Narita in Tokyo, London Heathrow and Los Angeles. Between 1999 and 2004, Mr. Lee landed other models of passenger planes at the same airport in San Francisco.
A Korean transport ministry spokesman said Mr. Lee had been at the controls for five hours before landing. He has 43 hours of real, non-simulated experience flying 777s, roughly the equivalent of three to four trans-Pacific flights.
Few details emerged Monday about Mr. Lee, who joined Asiana as a trainee in 1994 and gained his pilot's license in 2001. He has just under 10,000 hours of flying time.

The captain on board, Lee Jeong-min (THIS IS THE INSTRUCTOR), has a 12,387 hour flight record. Born in 1964, Mr. Lee Jeong-min has 3,220 hours of flight experience in the 777 model.


As you can see, seniority was not an issue here so perhaps we can put that speculation to rest.

[felixthecat]

Two points….of the two non operating pilots, the guy sat in the jumpseat behind the operating FO can see next to nothing of the flight instruments…his view is almost totally blocked. The guy sat on the jumpseat behind the centre console is another matter however….

If the LHS pilot was just onto the 777 from Airbus, is there a possibility that he wasn't used to the feel of the engine thrust levers moving to spool up since as far as I am aware (never having flown the Airbus) the levers are fixed so he 'may' have reverted to type at a critical moment and not even realised the engines were not doing what he thought they should have been? There is a different position and 'feel' to when the thrust levers are at idle and when they are spooled….if your not used to that difference it won't set mental alarm bells ringing.

I like the tactile feedback the thrust levers give…another situational awareness clue the Boeing gives…..If your used to it of course

[Exascot]

The FO sitting in the jump seat was probably too scared to speak up about the
loss of Airspeed if he indeed even noticed it.

Lets imagine he did speak up and saved the day, how do you think the two Captains would have reacted later on? I think the FO might have been told off and probably this would have effected his career later on. So he probably saw the low Airspeed and "thought" they had it under control.

It was incredibly unprofessional of him not to say something if he spotted it, which he should have. He claims that he couldn't see the runway which is understandable from a jump seat on late finals even if they had been on the correct profile. Therefore what else did he have to look at apart from the instruments?

This looks like a classic and massive failure of CRM.

[MarcK]

1900ft at 5nm to touch, just because of Class B airspace? Get real you lot.
The bridge is at 6nm, and if you believe in 300ft per NM, then the "correct" height at the bridge is 1800ft, not much difference. The base of class B goes to 1500 feet at 7nm and 2500ft at 10nm. The plate does say "recommended", not "required"

[nitpicker330]

Plenty of FO's around the world have sat there and said nothing while the Captain proceeded to kill them.

This should not happen in 2013 in a modern jet operated by a major carrier BUT IT DOES.

[awair]

Based on the CBS report:
NTSB: Asiana pilots say they used automatic speed controls for landing that went tragically wrong in San Francisco - CBS News (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57592947/ntsb-asiana-pilots-say-they-used-automatic-speed-controls-for-landing-that-went-tragically-wrong-in-san-franciscon/)

... which states the position of the FD [PF=on; PM=off], "Looking out of the window" may have been a contributory factor.

A scenario that I have witnessed several times, in high workload, "rushed" approaches, is that following a call for A/P disconnect & "Flight Directors Off", the PM will fail to de-select their FD, because they are cognitively overloaded (visually monitoring a (recovering?) profile, completing checklist & ATC calls).

This simple omission is rarely caught if not acted on at the time of A/P disconnect, and is alone sufficient to prevent A/Throttle wakeup.

This is how the FLCH trap works (in practise) and was well explained during training.

Just to clarify:
With both A/P & both FD off, A/T re-engages in SPD mode (with an FD left on this does't happen).
Despite the A/T switch being in the Armed position (glare-shield), the A/T may not wake-up if certain criteria are met.
Disconnecting the A/T (thrust levers) may result in A/T re-engaging.

[felixthecat]

Is there a link to yesterdays NTSB briefing somewhere? As opposed to CNN highlights…

[jetjockey696]

Pilots in Asiana crash relied on automatic equipment for airspeed

The pilots aboard the Asiana Airlines Boeing 777 that crashed in San Francisco relied on automatic equipment - an auto-throttle system - to maintain airspeed and did not realize the plane was flying too slowly until it was just 200 feet above the ground, the head of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said on Tuesday.

In her third detailed briefing on Saturday's crash that killed two Chinese passengers and injured more than 180 other people, NTSB Chairwoman Deborah Hersman also said two flight attendants were ejected from the plane after its tail hit a seawall in front of the runway and was torn off. Both were found injured but alive on the side of the runway.

Hersman said many questions remained about the incident. The South Korean airline's flight crew members were not tested for drugs or alcohol after the crash, a requirement for pilots of U.S.-based carriers involved in accidents, she said.

The accounts given to investigators by the pilots, as relayed by Hersman, confirmed information from the plane's flight data recorder that showed the plane was traveling 25 percent below its target airspeed as it came in for landing.

While she has declined to speculate on the cause of the crash, much of the information released by the NTSB suggests pilot error as a main focus of the investigation.

The pilot in charge of landing the plane on Saturday was in training on the 777 and was roughly halfway through the process, while seated next to him was a co-pilot on his first flight as an instructor. Both were experienced pilots, although they had not flown together before, Hersman said.

"At about 500 feet, he realized that they were low," Hersman told reporters, referring to the instructor pilot's account of the failed last-second attempts to avoid Saturday's disaster. "Between 500 and 200 feet, they had a lateral deviation and they were low. They were trying to correct at that point."

Referring to the instructor pilot, she said it was not until 200 feet that "he recognized the auto-throttles were not maintaining speed" and tried to abort the landing. Hersman had previously said that the plane had been at an altitude of 200 feet 16 seconds before crashing.

Three of the four pilots on board were in the cabin during the landing, although only two could see the runway, Hersman said, citing the interviews by investigators with the crew.

Hersman said an examination of the wreckage showed that the auto-throttle was "armed," but it was not clear if it had been properly engaged or had somehow failed before the plane slowed to a near-stall and hit the ground. "We need to understand a little better" how the auto-throttle is used, she said.

"They had set speed at 137 knots (158 mph), and he assumed that the auto-throttles were maintaining speed," Hersman said of the instructor pilot.

She noted that the pilots were responsible for maintaining airspeed.

"We have a flying pilot and two other pilots in the cockpit and they have a monitoring function," she said. "One of the critical things that needs to be monitored on an approach to landing is speed. So we need to understand what was going on in the cockpit and also what was going on with the aircraft."

REUTERS

[overthewing]

Is there a link to yesterdays NTSB briefing somewhere? As opposed to CNN highlights…

NTSB Briefing on Asiana Airline Plane Crash | C-SPAN (http://www.c-span.org/Events/NTSB-Briefing-on-Asiana-Airline-Plane-Crash/10737440372-3/)

[thcrozier]

This story has turned from interesting to just plain tragic for everyone involved.

[2dPilot]

The NTSB says "South Korean airliner's pilots were not tested for drugs or alcohol after the crash, because they do not fall under US regulations"

Is this true? Isn't potentially "endangering an aircraft", be it passenger or crew, accepted international law?

I'm not suggesting that there is any evidence the pilots were incapacitated in this way, but I had always assumed that all possible evidence is rigorously gathered to establish cause.

[Green Guard]

DBA7...
please do not be surprised if this kind of "TRAINED" pilots you find all over the world today.
Nothing to do with Korea or Asia. But a lot to do with "modern" way of training.
Good you mentioned Air France. Can anybody remember what Air France has CHANGED in training since last year or so?
:ooh:

[Sheep Guts]

Awair,

Airbus has had similar problems with pilots not switching off both FDs before approach etc. Airbus has now redesigned in A380 and subsequent A350 models have only 1 button FDs on/off in the middle of the Glare shield FCU panel.

But still doesn't explain dropping off the approach path and not correcting or giving it away earlier.

We're the pilots monitoring:
1. the approach path PAPI
2. Airspeed
3. Attitude
4. Runway alignment.

Even if your stabilized at 1000 feet and it all looks fine. Below 1000 feet if any of these parameters are grossly out a GO-AROUND should be accomplished, as soon as its recognized. Automatics or no automatics.
So if they weren't monitoring the approach what were they doing?
CVR may tell.
It was a SKY BLUE DAY! Tantalizing sites San Francisco Bay,:cool: one wonders.

[tech9803]

As you can see, seniority was not an issue here so perhaps we can put that speculation to rest.

"Seniority" might more comprehensively be referred to as "rank", and can encompass factors other than chronological age in a hierarchical society.

Hierarchy can have many gradations that may override a slight seniority in age. One pilot may have been with the company longer. He may have held a higher rank in the military. There may have been a socioeconomic class difference in their upbringing. Someone earlier in the thread mentioned the instructor was in a junior class to the PF at technical university.

None of which would matter in the absence of an authoritarian culture with strong social norms of unquestioning deference to those of higher stature, with the potential to impede communication.

I don't know if any of these were factors on the flight deck that day, but in any case it seems flip to point to a 3-year age difference and claim that this puts the seniority issue to rest.

[Knot Apilot]

I made this quick partial transcript of the NTSB briefing today.

Included only pertinent points for now.

Thought I'd post it here for quick reference.

Enjoy!

Video found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZZy_IC06ac


(Numbers in parentheses refer to time in video. All emphasis mine.)


Partial Paraphrased Transcript of Third Media Briefing by NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman on July 9, 2013



(3:13) POSITION OF SWITCHES AS CONFIRMED BY INVESTIGATORS



Flight Director was ON for the right seat, OFF for the left seat
Auto-throttles armed.
All 3 fire handles extended - Both engines and APU
Flaps were set to 30.
Speed-brake lever was down, indicates that it was not being used.




(5:49) INITIAL IMPACT LOCATION



When you get down to the sea wall you can identify where the first strikes took place.
First the main landing gear impacted the seawall and then the tail.



(8.55) FLIGHT CREW INTERVIEWS



3 of the 4 flight crew members interviews completed.
Information from the interviews has not yet been confirmed with flight data/CVR



(9:55) PERSONNEL IN COCKPIT AT TIME OF CRASH

3 pilots in the cockpit at time of the crash; 1 pilot seated in the cabin.

Pilot Flying seated in the left seat.
Instructor Pilot seated in the right seat.
Relief First Officer sitting in the jump seat.
Relief Captain sitting in the cabin.



(10:46) FLIGHT CREW BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

#1 PILOT FLYING [Captain Lee Kang Kuk]


9,700 total flight time, 5,000 hours as Pilot In Command.
This was his initial operating experience in the 777.
To complete initial operating experience for Asiana he is required to have 20 flights and 60 flight hours.
He had completed 10 legs and about 35 hours flying the 777; was about half way through his initial operating experience on the 777.
He was hired in 1994.
He did his initial training in Florida.
Is rated in the 737, 747, A320 and 777.
Was ground school instructor and a SIM instructor for the A320/321
He was a captain on the A320 from 2005-2013.
Immediately prior to his initial operating experience on the 777, he was a captain on the A320.



#2 INSTRUCTOR PILOT (Captain Lee Jung Min)


The instructor pilot was seated in the right seat and is also a captain.
He reported total flight time as 13,000 hours with an estimated 3,000 in the 777.
Total Pilot In Command time was about 10,000 hours.
He had been in the Korean Air Force for 10 years
He reported this was his first trip as an instructor pilot.
The instructor pilot stated he was the PIC and sitting in the right seat.
This was the first time that he and the pilot he was instructing had flown together.


#3 RELIEF FIRST OFFICER


The Relief First Officer who was sitting in the jump seat reported he had 4,600 hours flight time.
He estimated he had 900-1000 flying in the 777.
He flew F-5s and F-16s in the Korean Air Force.
He had flown to San Francisco 5 or 6 times as the Pilot Monitoring.
Suffered a cracked rib. Only one on the flight deck to be treated for injuries.


#4 RELIEF PILOT


4th pilot was the Relief Captain and was not in the cockpit for the approach.



(14:55) OBSERVATIONS FROM FLIGHT CREW (Not yet corroborated by CVR)



Approach asked them to maintain 180 knots until they were about 5 miles out.
This aircraft has a max of 160 knots to put down the landing flaps for final configuration.
The Relief First Officer, sitting in the jump seat, identified that he could not see the runway or the PAPI from his seating position and that the nose was pitched up so he could not see the runway.
Instructor Pilot stated that to the best of his recollection they were slightly high when they passed 4000 feet; they set vertical speed mode at about 1500 feet per minute.
At about 500 feet he realized that they were low; he reported seeing three red and one white on the PAPI. He told the pilot to pull back.
They had set speed at 137 knots and he assumed that the auto-throttles were maintaining speed.
Between 500 feet and 200 feet they had a lateral deviation and they were low. They were trying to correct at that point.
At 200 feet he noticed the four PAPIs were red, the airspeed was in the hatched(sp?) area on the Speed Tape. He recognized that the auto-throtles were not maintaining speed and he established a GO-AROUND Attitude.
He went to push the throttles forward but stated the other pilot had already pushed the throttles forward.


DETAILS ON THE AUTO-THROTTLES (27:11)

Auto-throttles documented in the armed position.

Q: Does 'armed' mean engaged?
A: Armed means that they are available to be engaged but depending on what mode is used, we really need to understand that a little bit better, to understand how they were used and what the expectation was for the auto-throttles.

Q: Is there a back-up system of any kind on the auto-throttles with respect to holding speed?
A: We need to gather a little bit more information and corroborate the data before we understand the issue.

She went on to state:
"But let me be very clear: The crew is required to maintain a safe aircraft. That means that they need to monitor. We have a flying pilot and we have two other pilots that are in the cockpit and they have a monitoring function. One of the very critical things that needs to be monitored on an approach to landing is speed. And so we need to understand what was going on in the cockpit and also what was going on with the aircraft."

Source: Chairman Hersman's third media briefing on Asiana flight 214 crash July 9, 2013 - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZZy_IC06ac)

[ve7pnl]

I'd like to ask some triple 7 drivers about the cockpit airflow acoustic sound difference between 140 and 105 knots. But the only triple 7 cockpit crew who have the experience to comment on the sounds heard at near sea level at 105 knots will likely be interviewed soon.

I would think that the noise difference would be obvious. However the very high AOA near "touchdown" may have resulted in the same sounds at 105 as at 140 knots. My impression was that the AF cockpit sounds might have added to the confusion by giving an impression of adequate speed when in fact the acoustic signature was due to mushing through the air instead of going where the nose was pointing.

I am wondering if the NTSB will tease some acoustic clues out of the voice recorder by comparison with other landing at normal approach speeds.

[Capn Bloggs]

The bridge is at 6nm, and if you believe in 300ft per NM, then the "correct" height at the bridge is 1800ft, not much difference. The base of class B goes to 1500 feet at 7nm and 2500ft at 10nm. The plate does say "recommended", not "required"
1/ Have a look at the location of SFO DME. Then tell me the distance to the runway when you're at 1900ft/6DME SFO.

2/ Unless you have local knowledge about the actual VFR traffic levels below, you'd be a clown to say "oh it only says recommended, let's ignore it". Why do you think the authorities put that recommendation there in the first place?

He has 43 hours of real, non-simulated experience flying 777s, roughly the equivalent of three to four trans-Pacific flights....
Few details emerged Monday about Mr. Lee, who joined Asiana as a trainee in 1994 and gained his pilot's license in 2001. He has just under 10,000 hours of flying time.

The captain on board, Lee Jeong-min (THIS IS THE INSTRUCTOR), has a 12,387 hour flight record. Born in 1964, Mr. Lee Jeong-min has 3,220 hours of flight experience in the 777 model.


As you can see, seniority was not an issue here so perhaps we can put that speculation to rest.
Sorry, you're out of your depth here. Firstly, 43 hours flying three times over the Pacific is worthless as far as experience for this approach/accident goes. Do you actually know what goes on above 10,000ft in a airliner cockpit? As far as stick and rudder skills or approach practice goes, nothing. Do some research about average flight time, numbers of total landings, numbers of landings the autoland system does, and numbers of landings each pilot does, and then the numbers of landings without ILS. You'll be surprised at how little "experience" these guys had.

As far as the seniority thing goes, I think the theories put up here are entirely reasonable.

[flyhardmo]

Bamboo 30 said
Many times seen first hand how the so called oldtimers with self professed stick and rudder skills simply disc AP and AT during descent cos the descend spd in vnav wasnt what they wanted. didnt prog in the spd in vnav of course spd is different. Simple case of not understanding the automatics and assuming auto fails.

It's called flying the :mad: aircraft (FTFA).When the automatics are not doing what you don't want them to do or can't understand what's going you you FTFA and that includes disconnecting the automatics.

Felix wrote
Two points….of the two non operating pilots, the guy sat in the jumpseat behind the operating FO can see next to nothing of the flight instruments…his view is almost totally blocked. The guy sat on the jumpseat behind the centre console is another matter however….

Almost true. From the second observers seat you can see the captains instrument panel and if you lean a bit to the left you can see the centre console including thrust levers and EFIS panel with engine indication. I spent a lot of time in that seat. If there was only one of the relief crew in the flight deck I expect that s/he was on the first observers seat with a view of everything.

To say you thought the A/T was taking care of speed does not absolve you from the responsibility of FTFA. The automatics will only do what you tell it to do.

[ve7pnl]

At last some new information about the possible cause of the accident...

Many media are now carrying a story attributed to Associated Press that includes this gem regarding KSFO:

"In a news conference Tuesday, NTSB officials didn't explain fully why the plane approached the notoriously difficult landing strip too low and slow, likely causing the crash..."

Landing strip? 28L? 200 feet wide and 11381 feet long?
Notoriously difficult? No terrain, CAVU, over water approach?

And I thought TGU was an interesting approach - but not rising to the level of being notoriously difficult.:rolleyes:

[cruisingeagle]

is it compulsory for relief pilots to be in the flt deck during the approach??

[StormyKnight]

TWO flight attendants working in the back of an Asiana Airlines Flight 214 were ejected and survived when the plane slammed into a seawall and lost its tail end during a crash landing at San Francisco's airport.
Both women were found on the runway, amid debris.

Read more: Stewards ejected, unhurt in US plane crash | News.com.au (http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/world/stewards-ejected-unhurt-in-us-plane-crash/story-e6frfkui-1226676953156#ixzz2YcdMniKa)

[FullWings]

I'd like to ask some triple 7 drivers about the cockpit airflow acoustic sound difference between 140 and 105 knots.
Sure. Most of the "airflow" noise in the cockpit comes from the air conditioning outlets. You only start to hear airspeed-related noise above c. 200kts and that's without a headset.

The main clues that things were not right would be the body angle, stick shaker and the control yoke being well back. With the FBW in normal mode, it takes a determined effort to stall a 777 as the nose-down force on the yoke is considerable: you can't trim slower than the bottom of the normal airspeed range, i.e. the top of the yellow band.

The NTSB are reporting that the P3 couldn't see the runway from the jump seat, which is something I've never experienced from that position. Certainly points towards a very high body angle.

[felixthecat]

From the 2nd observers seat you tend to be looking out the window at the rapidly approaching runway, the LHS pilots arm is in the way of instruments, the FO seat blocks forward instrument view etc….you can see next to nothing unless your actively leaning forward and left….and I speak from experience, to do it you have to force yourself and if your tired..well… That said there was only one jumpseat occupied and it would seem strange if it wasn't the central seat so its a mute point.

With regard to noise differences between 137 and 103 kts, there probably is some but not a lot. One of the first sences to go when your overloaded or at the top of the peak arousal curve is your hearing, so I would love to say I would notice the difference but in all honesty I probably wouldn't.

[amos2]

A question to all the critics here bagging the Asiana pilots for their poor flying skills. Does your criticism also apply to the Qantas pilots who did a pretty good job of stuffing up the landing at Bangkok in 99' ?

Golf anyone?

[Capn Bloggs]

The big issue is for pilots trying to get it across to the airline management that flying isn't just as simple as a course advertised by a manufacturer as part of the overall cost of buying an airliner and that any idiot can do it.
Doesn't airline management consist of at least one very senior pilot, the Chief Pilot?

Perhaps, after this, the CPs of the world may have a better chance of extracting more training dollars out of their financial masters.

[HPSOV L]

1. If autothrottle remains at idle instead of maintaining command speed when intercepting glidepath from above at a relatively low altitude you probably won't notice the rapid speed decay in time and will crash. Not you? Don't be so sure buddy. It happens real fast and recovery may not be possible. This is a pretty good reason not to disconnect the a/t.

2. Absolute nonsense about Korean pilots not speaking up. Maybe true 20 years ago but not today. No more than any other nationality anyway.

3. The 'FLCH trap' is not mentioned anywhere in any Boeing Manual. In 8000 hours of flying the 777, never in any sim in two major airlines has any instructor, Alteon, Boeing or company mentioned or demonstrated it to me. The best you could say is perhaps it could be inferred by what is not stated.

4. It is SOP in my last two airlines for the PM's Flight Director switch to be turned back on after turning off both Flight Directors for a visual approach (assuming they do not provide useful guidance).

5. On the 777 it is recommended autothrottle always used on approach unlike other types. That is SOP regardless of differing opinions and yes, it does eventually result in loss of that 'muscle memory'. Thats the way it is these days, thats how airliners are designed and its just reality.

6. At the end of the day a very experienced crew crashed an aircraft they were concentrating on flying. Sure they weren't quite stabilised blah blah but there's more to it. If there is a latent trap in the autoflight system I want to know about it so it doesn't bite me in the arse on that one time when I'm not quite on top of my game.

[WynSock]

Amos2
Yes, they were both accidents, they have that in common.

QF - Night, windy, wet, landed.
Vs
OZ - Day, dry, calm, hit seawall about 30kts below Vref.


I was trying to think of a way of describing in motoring terms, to my family, the standard of negligence displayed in this accident.

How about driving along a straight bit of a steep 2000ft high mountain road while looking under the seat for that jelly bean you lost, assuming that the car should continue safely in a straight line because the steering wheel seems pretty straight when you last saw it.

[ross_M]

To me it increasingly seems that allowing FLCH to accept flight level 000 (or similar very low numbers) is nothing sort of a serious systems-design bug.

In critical systems, if you make it possible for operators enter obviously dangerous parameter inputs, eventually they will. Either from sheer accident, ignorance, sloth or stupidity.

Unless of course, there is a legitimate use for such inputs to FLCH. I don't know. Is there?

[nitpicker330]

HPSOVL:-- so how do you explain a 777 qualified crew member current on type and a member of the crew NOT noticing their unusual attitude and low IAS?? Not to mention not noticing the thrust levers were closed...

He had nothing else to do in the jump seat other than monitor what the two buffoons were doing 2 feet in front of him.

Either he's stupid or HE DIDN'T SPEAK UP.

[HundredPercentPlease]

So, he was a very experienced A320 Captain/trainer/TRE...

Was ground school instructor and a SIM instructor for the A320/321
He was a captain on the A320 from 2005-2013.
Immediately prior to his initial operating experience on the 777, he was a captain on the A320.

On the 320 flying a visual, you would have:


Motionless thrust levers
A/T working in speed mode if your FD was off (his was)
Low energy automated audible warning ("speed speed")
Full speed/stall protection regardless of A/T armed/on/off all the way down to 100RA.


In times of high workload, the speed control and protection is very reliably looked after for you in the 320, so the speed scan becomes low priority. It would be very easy to assume the 777 was at least as "good" as the little 320, and this may in part explain why the PF was not as focussed on the speed as he should have been. Everything to the PF was in a normal and good position (for a 320).

Doesn't explain why the PNF (PM) did not spot the excursion and call it or better still intervene with a G/A.

[CaptainEmad]

From the Korea Times...my bolding.

Yoon’s remarks came amid the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was investigating the actions taken on the aircraft, including those of the pilots. Media both at home and abroad pointed fingers at the pilots, assuming that something went been wrong in the cockpit.

However, Jung Yoon-shik, a professor at Jungwon University based in Goesan, North Chungcheong Province, said that mechanical problems in the engines might have caused the crash.

“It is possible that the engines were not working properly when the plane was landing on the runway. With the malfunctioning, pilots might have failed to control the engines,” said Jung who previously worked as a pilot for Asiana.

Deborah Hersman, the chairwoman of the NTSB, told a press conference that the plane was traveling at about 106 knots at impact, “significantly slower than the target approach speed of 137 knots,” hinting that engine problems could be the reason of the crash.

Yoon said he will head for the Californian city on Tuesday afternoon, along with six family members of passengers who were onboard of Flight 214. Asiana said that Yoon will visit casualties who are being treated at seven hospitals in the city, including San Francisco General Hospital.



:confused:

I was not aware that the NTSB had hinted anything of the sort.

Saving National Face manifests itself in the Korean public media.

[fc101]

Sorry if this has been asked before, but could someone explain how the throttle logic works on the 777? (Never flown a Boeing)

From the NTSB press conference:

They had set speed at 137 knots and he assumed that the auto-throttles were maintaining speed.

Leaving out the discussion about "assuming" anything on an aircraft, how does the whole A/T, throttle position, autopilot system interact here?

I think someone has asked about similarities with the Turkish crash at Schiphol a few years back but I couldn't find an answer - I assume that the similarities are almost non-existant?

[nitpicker330]

Don't agree.

With you right hand on the Airbus thrust levers they are located forward in the CLB detent and not fully back closed.

On the 777 they should also be located about half way forward controlling normal approach thrust and not fully back closed. In addition to that you should feel them moving and this gives you more feedback ( which unfortunately the Airbus doesn't )

Even if he was confused during this complicated visual approach in CAVOK what the hell were the TC in the RHS and the FO in the jump seat doing????

No excuses I'm afraid.

[Flap 5]

Seems to be a lot of blame laid on the autothrottle / autothrust and the automatics. Having many thousands of hours on the A320 and A330 myself, where the autothrust is left on throughout the approach, we still had a good eye on the airspeed.

Relying on the automatics to the extent that this crew appear to have done is likely to result in a problem of this type at some time. An airspeed of 106knots with a flying approach speed of generally around 140knots is just ridiculous and, frankly, negligent.

[joelnthailand]

And about the low-skill pilot with thousands of hours, I'm reminded of the American pilot who was in command of Air France 447 at the time of crash. I certainly don't mean any disrespect for him but low-skill, high-hour pilots are everywhere.

No crew on that aircraft were American. They were either from Brazil or France.


http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf

[clayne]

A million excuses could be thought up for everything involving the low and slow predicament but nothing can excuse waiting until the last minute to go around when it was probably quite apparent to everyone involved in that cockpit the approach wasn't stable. I can't believe some of the posts blaming the manufacturer, airport, etc.

[nitpicker330]

I agree, the Training Captain in the RHS was supposed to be capable of a higher standard than a normal Captain. He should have been in a position to take over at all times during the flight to maintain safety. These guys have to be able to take brand new trainees on their first sectors ( possibly first ever in a jet ) and still be able to fly the Jet single Pilot if necessary.

I don't care if it was his first sector as a trainer, he should have known better and just done his job.

[probes]

to put it short and simple for a layman -
they noticed that the speed was low, but assumed the automatics will correct it. (and there may be various reasons for that assumption, technical and/or psychological, which are not clear yet).
Is that correct?

[lakedude]

"I think our Kiwi mate Offcut at post #717 is on the money. For those who have flown both the 74 and the 77 it is the most logical answer."

Yes, I thought so as well. Suninmyeyes posted similar information back in post 315...

http://www.pprune.org/7926629-post315.html

[SalNichols]

Would you mind terribly citing your source for this claim? It's important because in the evolution of mankind there are two senses that NEVER turn off, even when we're asleep: Hearing, and smell. There's a reason that bitching Betty's are aural vs visual, and it's not because hearing is the first sense to go when you're tired. It's also why your smoke alarm makes noise, instead of blinking lights. You might be a brilliant pilot, but man, you're just making stuff up here.

[NigelOnDraft]

I thought it had been established from the NTSB that VS mode was engaged not FLCH. Exactly what was not established.

The NTSB Chair is very clear about what she is passing on, and not to draw inferences beyond that.

IIRC she said that one Flt Crew member recalled, at ~4000 (?)', they were in V/S ~1500'/m. It was purely the interview recollection at one point in time from 1 person / interview.

Very different from a (theoretical/future) NTSB report aspect that the FDR revealed the ATHR mode active/engaged at the time the speed fell below target.

I think the NTSB chair is doing an excellent job is clarifying what she is saying... and I think we should do our best to honour that clarity.

[ross_M]

Air Line Pilots Association issued this statement. They don't seem to be liking NTSB's daily conferences much.

The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."

ALPA, among other things, called on the NTSB to determine if the pilots had adequate training to use onboard navigation aids for a visual approach, on a day when the primary ground-based landing aids for the strip had been turned off due to runway improvements. The union also urged the board to look at whether there were differences between what the pilots saw on their instruments, versus information subsequently downloaded from the plane's flight-data recorder.

[ross_M]

I thought it had been established from the NTSB that VS mode was engaged not FLCH.


If so, my bad. Sorry, missed that bit.

But even if so, if FLCH set to zero is potentially a likely disaster scenario (as it seems from the discussion here; perhaps not the culprit in this case.) it deserves a closer look.

[ironbutt57]

Asiana 777 pilot assumed autothrottles engaged until seconds before impact (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/asiana-777-pilot-assumed-autothrottles-engaged-until-seconds-before-impact-388103/)

There you have it.....

[Sheep Guts]

The report says the pilot had B-737 experience and his recent experience was A320. I wonder what was his 777 conversion rating an abbreviated STAR course or full length conversion. Don't know if it has any bearing, but if you coming off an Airbus onto a Boeing or vice versa a STAR or CCQ course may not be adequate. Irrespective if you have Boeing time already.

[nitpicker330]

He hadn't flown a Boeing for 8 years so he would have done a full conversion.

[bradders147]

Coming from past experience here. A Go around with thrust at idle is very different from a go around with engine stable at approach thrust. If you Go Around with idle thrust rotate like you would normally do like you have been trained you will loose even more speed as the engines take a while to spool up. This is why a lot of operators want you stable by 500 minimums including thrust stable at landing thrust, so if you do have to go around the thrust is there available. My opinion and only my opinion is that the nose went up for the G/A and the speed decayed. Then they got the stick shaker before the engines had time to spool up.

[nitpicker330]

Not what happened according to the NTSB.

Read page 69 again, a good summary there.

[Knot Apilot]

HPSOVL:-- so how do you explain a 777 qualified crew member current on type and a member of the crew NOT noticing their unusual attitude and low IAS?? Not to mention not noticing the thrust levers were closed...

He had nothing else to do in the jump seat other than monitor what the two buffoons were doing 2 feet in front of him.

Either he's stupid or HE DIDN'T SPEAK UP.

How about:
1.) They were unduly focused on the glideslope/approach.

2.) They were overly distracted by the training of the PF since this was his first landing on the 777 and they wanted him to be successful.

3.) As someone else has pointed out elsewhere in the thread, the PF may have had a case of "perfectlanding-itis" since it was his first on type and he wanted to impress his trainers.

4.) The PF may have been apprehensive/less confident since this was his first landing on type at this airport causing him more stress than usual. Also see # 3.

5.) PM may have been distracted by other things such as checklists, communication and/or the other gazillion things pilots have to worry about during approach.

6.) Landing over water may have created an illusion where they didn't notice their speed/altitude until too late.

7.) The approach was so close, that it appeared to be almost do-able until the very last seconds.

8.) THEY ALL ASSUMED THE AUTO-THROTTLE WOULD TAKE CARE OF THEIR SPEED.

9.) They were lulled into a false sense of security by clear weather; which may have also made them more hesitant to go-around, since "any pilot can land in these conditions!"

10.) THEY ALL ASSUMED THE AUTO-THROTTLE WOULD MAINTAIN SPEED

11.) It was at end of a long-haul flight.



The FO in the backseat DID notice they were too slow and called out "Speed!" 7 seconds before impact.

It took the Training Captain a precious 5 seconds to realize the auto-throttles weren't maintaining speed and he called go-around 2 seconds before crash.

Had he acted immediately to go-around, when FO called the speed issue, perhaps he could've saved it.

They did what they were suppost to do, just 10 seconds too late.

---------------------------------

Also this isn't the first time a training captain or safety pilot get distracted by their duties as trainers and it causes an accident. Although it's designed to provide an extra layer of safety, it has probably been a factor in some accidents! - Like the over-reliance on automation, it lulls you into a false since of security by thinking someone else is monitoring/taking care of things.

Same thing with the weather. Remember that statistically, most mid-air collisions occur in sunny, VFR weather! Things catch you when you least expect!

--------------------------------

To the infallible 'Super-Pilots' slagging these guys, THIS COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN YOU!

How would you feel if that one mistake or oversight - out of the countless you have made or have seen made - resulted in the deaths of two of your passengers?

I think these guys deserve our complete sympathy and support. It's a terrible tragedy all around.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Nitpicker/Flap 5,

Not looking to apportion blame (clearly) but just looking to understand how someone could get into this position.

A visual approach from a slightly high position in a 320 is flown:


A/P off, F/D off (bird on), levers in one position.


He was flying A/P off, F/D off, levers in one position.

In the 320 you would monitor airspeed carefully, to ensure IAS was above target - just to ensure idle thrust. Regain the profile at just above 500 (as they did) and then, in a 320:


The thrust levers don't move
Speed is looked after for you
You have full flight envelope protection


What I am suggesting is that it is possible, at this point, to become complacent with speed. I am not saying it is right, I am saying that it is a possible failing of modern pilots. Because the machine always works, it will work today.

So for the PF, it may have been easy to revert to 320 operating mode. His levers haven't moved (as expected), he has regained the profile at 500 thus avoiding a G/A due unstable and now he just has to guide the A/C to the touchdown markings.

Now, at around 300' it has all gone wrong. For the PF:


His right hand is indicating situation normal (for him, in 320-reverted mode) but,
He will be confused about the sagging flight path and increasing pitch.

It is at this point that it seems odd that despite the clues, none of them looked and responded to the speed issue. I have slight sympathy with the 320 captain as PF - because I can understand how he might have found himself there. I am not suggesting that he was devoid of fault, far from it, but I can understand the path. What I cannot understand is the LTC. For me, he is where the focus should be.

The CVR recording from below 600' may well provide the biggest clues, and may provide the key to ensuring this doesn't happen again.

Furthermore, some nasty A/T failures in the sim for pilots working on highly reliable, highly automated a/c may be worthwhile too. An unannunciated thrust lock at 400' with the thrust set slightly too low in a 320.... I would bet that that would catch out a good 5% of pilots, even western ones. :hmm:

[wasthatit]

At 200 feet he noticed the four PAPIs were red, the airspeed was in the hatched(sp?) area on the Speed Tape. He recognized that the auto-throtles were not maintaining speed and he established a GO-AROUND Attitude.
He went to push the throttles forward but stated the other pilot had already pushed the throttles forward.



According to the crew G/A starts at about 200 feet and at this point the throttles are forwards. Given that they are low (four reds) this means they are at around 0.7nm or 0.8nm. Even with the displaced threshold there should still have been about 20 seconds between opening the throttles and hitting the sea wall?

[USMCProbe]

The triple is, absolutely, automation done almost 100% correct. It is the easiest airliner to fly, by far, and the most intuitive for pilots coming from something other than an airbus.

The stuff up a visual approach, in visual conditions, is appalling, but I am only surprised it has taken this long. Many carriers around the world are using FOQA data recorders for punishment of their pilots. The result is the CP's and pilots are reluctant to hand fly, or turn the auto-throttles off, ever. While this may reduce the number of exceedences on a daily basis, it destroys pilot proficiency.

I flew as an airbus captain for 2 asian carriers. The 320 has an AP limit of 100 after takeoff. Both airlines I flew for,almost every single pilot I flew with turned the AP on at 100.1 feet, and turned it off at the last moment legal by SOP and FCOM on landing. Autothrust was used exclusively. I can't tell you how many landings they stuffed up in perfect weather. I probably did 15 go arounds in 4 years because my flying partner could not safely land in VMC conditions. Double that number for stuffed up approaches.

If you don't maintain your flying skills, you lose them. It is especially bad on long haul flying as you don't get many landings and takeoffs anyway.

Asiana, Air France, and the last couple of regional crashes in the US were all due to the inability to BASICALLY FLY AN AIRCRAFT.

[Capn Bloggs]

Air Line Pilots Association issued this statement. They don't seem to be liking NTSB's daily conferences much.

The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."

I agree. Joe Public is going ape about stuff they don't know anything about (like some posters here).

[tilnextime]

I can't believe some of the posts blaming the manufacturer, airport, etc.

Spend a few years investigating aviation mishaps, and you will get used to it. "The Other Guy" is a notoriously common cause of mishaps.

Sadly, the swiss cheese analogy contributes to this excusing away of human error.

This is not a statement on the cause of the Asiana mishap, but on the statements being made that led to the quoted post:

Typically most crew, weather, airport and aircraft "frailty" issues are known (or at least available) to the members of the crew prior to push back from the departure gate, and thus should be taken into account as part of their pre-flight preparations. In short, the holes in these slices of cheese are known to the crew, and those slices should be positioned to keep these holes from "lining up" before the aircraft left the ground.

[BOAC]

HundredPercentPlease - a good summary, I feel, but I would like clarification on what you say about 'normality' of throttle lever position for PF - as I understand it, the 320 levers would be well forward in the same situation with engines at or near idle?

There is, despite 'objections' from some here, a real parallel with the Turkish at AMS regarding lack of speed monitoring, and again a TC with a jumpseat pilot. As others have said, a 'trend' which needs stopping PDQ.

[fox niner]

Ok here is my 0.00001 cent's worth.

Here comes the BIG reason why the autothrottle is ON (normally) during any approach on a 777, as opposed to any older type of boeing.
The tripple is fly by wire. You don't need to trim the airplane, exept when you are changing the airspeed. So configuration changes (flaps) have no influence on your in-trim condition.
Example: config = 180kts flaps 5. You want to configure further for landing. So you ask for gear down flaps 20, and if you want to leave your speed at 180 kts, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO TRIM. All effects such as ballooning due to more flaps, are trimmed away automatically. Also, the autothrottle will help you enormously by adding more thrust due to more drag. This added thrust would normally create a pitch up effect due to the under-wing mounted engines, but.....THIS EFFECT IS ALSO TRIMMED AWAY.
If you turn off the autothrottle, you will have to add thrust youself. All your own inputs for manual thust changes are going to be trimmed away by the auto trim function. So basically YOU are flying the aircraft, and someone else( the autotrim) is trimming!!!
This is cumbersome and sort of more difficult, but not impossible. Maybe not desireable after a long haul flight though.
However.
When you turn off the pmc's this will also turn off the autotrim (and much more such as the autopilot). this is great fun because it will turn your 777 in a large 737!!
We had to do this some time ago in a type recurrent.

[HPSOV L]

Hang on a moment tillnexttime; nobody is trying to blame ”the other guy”. The more plausible posters are trying to understand all the causal factors in order to learn from the event.
I think when the flight data is collated and reproduced in a sim there will be a better understanding. Its far too simplistic to simply say they were stoopid.

[fireflybob]

The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."

Surely the release of this information in this manner is unprecedented? Is this a policy change at a political level?

If the accident had happened in the UK would AIB be issuing such statements?

[BOAC]

I did think Deborah handled the presentation well, but I agree with it being a little 'premature' since it is based only on statements and 'observations' before both CVR and FDR have been analysed (unless, of course, a 'sneak' view has been had). We must treat the 'information' released as preliminary and not jump to conclusions.

Out of interest, are the IAS's being quoted from observed data (ADSB or radar) or crew statements?

[phil gollin]

Does anyone know what the amount of lateral deviation was and any possible explanation for it ?

[nitpicker330]

Don't know but I guess it was lucky for the United 744 at the holding point that they didn't deviate left of centerline......:eek:

[RAT 5]

I've tried to read back through the whole thread and had brain ache; please forgive if these comments have been made.


I train lots of whizz-kid cadets on a lesser VNAV/LNAV Boeing. In FBS they treat it like a play station with fingers dancing over the buttons of MCP & CDU like Liberace. Sometimes they get it right, sometimes not, and then the piano playing starts again. What I then have to beat out of them is not to sit as a passneger in the cockpit and watch the A/P take them for a ride, but to engage with the a/c and cover the controls, monitor what it is doing and confirm it is what you want. If not take over with hands & feet. I wonder if PF had their hands on the thrust levers, or was sitting back unattached expecting it to handle it. If connected to the a/c surely it is a natural thing to do to shove up the power it A/T is not doing it.

Never been to SFO, but people talk of ATC imposed 'slam dunk' visual approaches. Really? Who is responsible for and in charge of the a/c. How can ATC paint a commander into a corner on a visual approach. What happened to " no can do," or "we'll turn when ready," or "need a couple of more miles."??
[LIST]People have said crews after 11 hrs flight should not be subject to pure visual approaches when tired. Does 777 not have VNAV PTH approach technology? I see from the chart that there is an approach profile with alt v distance. I assume this is in the FMC data base. You select this, plug in A/P to it and when all nice a stable about 1000' - 500' you disconnect, do a little fine tuning and land. The lack of visual guidance and trying to use a long defunct Mk.1 eyeball is not the only way. If using VNAV PTH it is possible to attack it from above, but not comfortable. You have the vertical deviation info and act accordingly well in advance. The automatics can stay in all the time. Not only do modern jet jockeys not know how to fly basically, they often do not know how to use the automatics to extricate themselves from a hole.

Please will someone put me right about VNAVPTH approaches on 777 if I'm off base with this one. I am a basic Mk.1 eyeball plot at heart, but I also know when & how to use the automatics when appropriate and necessary.

[HundredPercentPlease]

BOAC,

You are right - normal position in a 320 is a forward position. However, the absolute position is more difficult to judge (as I find as I have gone back and forth between A and B) because the 320 levers are tiny, low down and have a small travel (cf Boeing with long levers, large travel, different position).

Still would like to emphasise, not looking to remove culpability, just to understand how an experienced pilot could find themselves in this position. Only by understanding can we start to rectify. Plenty of people on here just thinking "not monitoring - their fault - carry on".

[overthewing]

I did think Deborah handled the presentation well, but I agree with it being a little 'premature' since it is based only on statements and 'observations' before both CVR and FDR have been analysed (unless, of course, a 'sneak' view has been had). We must treat the 'information' released as preliminary and not jump to conclusions.

The NTSB are pretty much revealing what they know as they find it out. I wonder if this transparency is for reasons of political/diplomatic sensitivity, because it's a foreign carrier? As in, showing the world that they're not gathering facts in silence then holing up in a room to present a doctored summary?

I also wonder if there's extra sensitivity because it's a Korean carrier, albeit South Korean? Tensions between the US and North Korea probably don't need the weight of an extra feather.

[compressor stall]

And in the same alleged delta audit report, that classic statement,

"The primary instrument in a visual approach is the window."

[crewmeal]

Sources in the country's transport ministry confirmed Bong Dong Won - who was in the cockpit jump seat - repeatedly yelled "sink rate" in the final minute before the crash, it was reported.

If the sink rate - the rate of decrease in altitude - was checked when Mr Bong raised the alarm, it may have prevented the plane from hitting the seawall as it landed at San Francisco Airport, reports said.

But the two pilots at the controls - Lee Kang Kuk and his instructor Lee Jung Min - apparently did not respond to Mr Bong's shouted warnings, the respected Joongang Daily newspaper said. This from Sky News

It's all coming out in the wash.

[Methersgate]

With all due respect to the Airline Pilots Association, the NTSB are acting as required these days - with information and speculation spilling out all over the Interthingy, not least right here on pprune, the best thing to do is to release as much information as you reasonably can, as fast as you reasonably can.

If the NTSB were to hold back, as in the "good" old days, the media and the public would turn to other, less reputable, sources.

People may not be aware just how much the timescale for information release has become compressed, thanks to "social media" - where, twenty years ago, one had a week, one now has an hour - sometimes thirty minutes.

The journo's phrase for it is "The most important Editor in any newsroom is Phil Space"...

[aa5bpilot]

First post here, after years of lurking. Mainly because I can't take it anymore. I'll start off with a rant on data analysis:

<rant>
Why is everyone plotting the Asiana flight data using time on the X axis? For example, there's post 1210 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-61.html#post7931563) - the NYT sure set a poor example. Then there's this guy on Twitter (https://twitter.com/DaveMcLauchlan/status/353693057520132096/photo/1), whose plots are also ragged and misleading because the FlightAware data he used had time truncated to 1 minute resolution. :ugh: Not pilots, presumably, because when was the last time any of us said "hmm, I'm a little high for being 2 minutes from touchdown"?? If you haven't seen it yet, this article by @FlyingProfs (http://flyingprofessors.net/what-happened-to-asiana-airlines-flight-214-2/) is one of the best data analysis pieces I've seen so far.
</rant>

Ok, so the real reason for my post is to share the result of some data wrangling of my own. @FlyingProfs showed some interesting comparisons of the speed/altitude/energy of the accident flight vs. another arrival shortly before. Their article only compares against UAL 852 which landed on the same runway about 10 minutes prior. I got curious and plotted out AAR 214 and UAL 852 arrivals from the previous several days, as well as an ANA 8 arrival just a few minutes before the incident airplane. AAR and UAL were 777-200's; ANA 8 was a 777-300. I think the results reinforce the idea that the accident flight was "out of family" compared with the other approaches.

In the charts below, the accident flight is the redline. Other AAR flights in blue, except Jul 4 in orange; UAL and ANA in green. Vertical bars are "gates" representing the San Mateo Bridge and runway threshold. The grey horizontal in the speed chart is the target Vref = 137 kts for the accident flight.

On the Quiet Bridge Visual procedure (http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1307/00375QUIETBRIDGE_VIS28LR.PDF), recommended altitude at the bridge (5 mile final) is 1900', which just about everybody hits - except AAR 214 on Jul 4 and 6. The difference between the July 4 and 6 flights is in speed - with the July 6 flight being significantly over-speed at 3-6 miles out relative to all the other flights. (Since the plots are groundspeed, some variation can be expected given differing wind conditions encountered by the different flights) It seems but for some better speed control, the Jul 4 flight could potentially have met a similar fate.

Bottom line, the arrival profile of the accident flight inside 5 miles stands out (even aside from the fact it's highlighted in red).

http://samsphotoshare.s3.amazonaws.com/Altitude_plot.jpg
http://samsphotoshare.s3.amazonaws.com/Speed_plot.jpg

This got me wondering just how unusual the accident flight profile was. The following altitude and speed scatter plots show data from the accident flight vs. 103 other B-777 flights landing at the SFO runway 28 complex over the last two weeks. I removed go-arounds as they tended to gum up the works in my quick and dirty plot setup. Note again that the speed plot shows groundspeed, so some variability would be expected for differing wind conditions over the two week period. Along similar lines, there's no guarantee that all plotted arrivals were on a visual approach vs. RNAV, LOC, etc. The glideslope shown is 3 degrees to a touchdown point 1000' beyond the threshold.

Again, it's pretty clear that Asiana 214's flight profile on July 6 was pretty unusual relative to the bulk of other flights.

https://samsphotoshare.s3.amazonaws.com/Altitude_scatter_2.jpg
http://samsphotoshare.s3.amazonaws.com/Speed_scatter.jpg

Many others have commented on how this flight profile might have arisen. I have no experience or qualifications to address that aspect, so I'll stop here and hope everyone enjoys contemplating the charts :)

(Note: All plots were sourced from FlightAware data)
Edited to fix glideslope in 3rd chart.

[Not Nightowl]

"Plenty of FO's around the world have sat there and said nothing while the Captain proceeded to kill them.

This should not happen in 2013 in a modern jet operated by a major carrier BUT IT DOES."

Sorry, couldn't find the quote button for the above...

Anyway, in today's PC world and we all know it, and nothing's done about it...some cultures let face saving, social standing, seniority and rank interfere with training and proper CRM in their flight decks to the extent where pilots will let a situation develope and let it go to it's disasterous conclusion because they're too afraid to speak up.
Unless these cultures can prove otherwise, their airlines are not safe and should be banned from the air space of responsible air transport participating nations.

[BOAC]

Does anyone know what the amount of lateral deviation was and any possible explanation for it ? - crosswind?

[aa5bpilot]

Originally Posted by phil gollin
Does anyone know what the amount of lateral deviation was and any possible explanation for it ? - crosswind?
Trying to avoid hitting the approach lights?

[felixthecat]

SalNichols…..When we are overloaded the brain cannot do anymore it is overloaded so it starts to filter. One of the first seances it filters is the sense of hearing. It can be seen in the simulator when everything is going to hell and the alarms are not cancelled even though they are blaring away in the background, the other pilot will give you an instruction and you may not even register it. It was taught to me in Human Factors during my ATPLs way back when and also demonstrated in CRM classes. I don't know the reference but Im sure someone here will….I'm not making it up…and I am far from a great pilot.

[3rd Floor]

Your statement scares me Lonewolf_50

The bolded part is what I don't "get."

I was taught that you use power to stay on (or addjust to) glide slope, pitch to stay on (or adkust for) airspeed when making an approach to land. (Of course, the two work together to give you the performance you are trying to achieve. )

Attitude for aim point
Power for speed

[Cows getting bigger]

... which appears to have failed in this scenario because someone/something didn't link attitude with power to equal performance. Treat the two in isolation and things will go wrong. :ok::ok:

[falcon900]

With all of the usual caveats about not jumping to premature conclusions, it would appear that the central hypothesis identified on the thread some time ago regarding how the airctaft came to be too low and too slow, is being supported by the facts which have emerged so far. No doubt there is much more to emerge regarding autothrottle protocols and settings, crew experience, and CRM generally, all of which will be important.
However, given that the overarching objective of everyone in the industry is to prevent accidents, the impact of the inoperative runway navigation aids needs to be given a much greater significance and scrutiny.
Does anyone think this accident would have happenned if they had been operational?
The central tenet of aviation safety is surely to remove the possibility for failure, whether it be human or mechanical. Turning off the navigation aids created the possibilty for the failure which seems to have occurred here, and surely cannot be justified other than on cost grounds.

[Agaricus bisporus]

It is interesting just how much dissention there seems to be, even among 777 pilots, about the "FLCH trap" and its ramifications.

One has to wonder just how much the vast number of complex inter-relationships between automatic systems can ever be comprehensively understood by the average pilot, and whether these relationships produced by clever automatics are simply becoming too numerous for (some) mere humans to instinctively keep track of?

[Minimbah]

Asiana Airlines crash: Stop blaming SFO?s runways and Korea?s pilots for Flight 214?s crash. (http://mobile.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/transport/2013/07/asiana_airlines_crash_stop_blaming_sfo_s_runways_and_korea_s _pilots_for.html)

[LEGAL TENDER]

A lot of posters commenting disgusted about the speculations and comments about cultural differences etc etc.
This is not an investigation thread, it's an open discussion forum and posters are entitled to an opinion. It is allowed to have an opinion on what might have caused the crash or what differences there might be between certain operators and certain others, and whether or not it's got to do with their cultural environment.
A good debate is made of contrasting opinions. To come here and say this thread is pointless, doesn't really make it more useful does it?

[twentyyearstoolate]

In response to Patrick Smiths blog I also have been an Airline Pilot since 1990, with several thousand hours flying 777's. I also have flown in Korea.

I heartily disagree with his summation of Korean safety standards and Pilot training. The cultural issue is still a Major factor in 2013. The difference between the 80's and 90's to now is not a huge improvement of training and cultural change, but incredibly good equipment supplied by Boeing and Airbus. Period.

I say this from personal experience, and really hope something changes.

[ironbutt57]

whether these relationships produced by clever automatics are simply becoming too numerous for (some) mere humans to instinctively keep track of?

I would suspect that is indeed probable, which is why stable approaches are important, to avoid high workload situations at critical moments, which is apparently what happened to these poor chaps...

[ZimmerFly]

Please do try and keep "up to speed"

Turning off the navigation aids created the possibilty for the failure which seems to have occurred here, and surely cannot be justified other than on cost grounds.

The 28L Localiser was radiating normally, the 28L Glideslope was OFF as the landing threshold is in the process of being moved to the west. PAPIs for the new threshold were working normally and providing the glideslope guidance in severe VMC.

[speed2height]

RetiredF4
The probable obvious cause of this accident seems to be non existent energy management by the crew.

The low speed was the reason for dropping low on the glidepath and for being unable to correct this situation in time. Most information for a visual approach can be found or correlated from outside visual references, speed can´t. It has to be checked with the instruments and managed properly.
There seems to be a overreliance on the AT to do this job at all times and under most circumstances. There is no excuse that the speed decay in that published amount and time was not recognized until it was too late.


Agreed but what if you pushed the thrust levers forward and there was no response from the engines? You would get an event like this or the BA777 at Heathrow.

Not saying it happened this way but it perfectly fits the flight profile.

[NamelessWonder]

From Crewmeal

Quote:
Sources in the country's transport ministry confirmed Bong Dong Won - who was in the cockpit jump seat - repeatedly yelled "sink rate" in the final minute before the crash, it was reported.

If the sink rate - the rate of decrease in altitude - was checked when Mr Bong raised the alarm, it may have prevented the plane from hitting the seawall as it landed at San Francisco Airport, reports said.

But the two pilots at the controls - Lee Kang Kuk and his instructor Lee Jung Min - apparently did not respond to Mr Bong's shouted warnings, the respected Joongang Daily newspaper said.
This from Sky News

It's all coming out in the wash. IF Sky News is reporting this correctly (that would be a first) and IF the original source is correct and IF this is backed up by the CVR, this is suggestive of several things, both positive and negative

On the positive side:
A) The FO in the jump seat was paying attention
B) He identified the issue (and would appear to have done so well before the two in front - nearly a minute earlier)
C) He had the gumption/guts/training to bring it to the attention of the two far more senior bods in front of him, as he should

On the negative side
D) His (repeated) "sink rate" warnings seem to have been uncrecognised / ignored / otherwise not acted upon for close to a minute, until the PF moved the throttles forward at 7 secs to go. (The LTC is recorded as stating that when he went to move the throttles forward, they had already been moved by the PF)
E) The LTC apparently called for go around at 1.5 seconds before impact. Quite how he thought this was going to be achieved from basically zero altitude at vRef-30 or more is quite another matter!:eek:

@aa5bpilot
interesting plots - thanks for these, not least the amount of other arrivals who were way below vref (though possibly in different conditions and, as you say this is GS, not IAS). Another caveat being, of course, that this is FA data

[Lonewolf_50]

Captain Bloggs:

That's the problem with discussing this as though pitch and power work in isolation. They don't, they work together, and always have.
P + A = performance. Not just a Navy thing.

Pitch and power together, lead with power if a correction is needed when high and fast or when low and slow.

If Hi and slow, then you'd probably want to lead with pitch, so you can trade alt for a/s and your correction may work. If low and fast, likewise not a bad idea to lead with pitch.

In either case, you'd end up with a pitch correction, and then counter correction when back on the numbers to resume profile. In either case, you may need to adjust power slightly to stay on profile.

As with anything flying, depends on the situation.

When I consider the lead time you need in a heavy, I'd guess that you have to stay well ahead of the aircraft, and lead with power by more time, if you find yourself high and fast or low and slow, which means that you need to lead the counter correction as well by some seconds as your correction gets you back toward your glide path. You still want to "catch" it rather than go through and porpise about the glide path.

Anyway, I don't think the principles differ, what differs is response time and how much you have to lead the aircraft in time to get the corrections you want to regain the profile (performance) that you are looking for.


squawk7700 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-68.html#post7932526)
So either you are managing both, or you manage none. They both go hand in hand, taking one of those out is just opening the door to create bad habits - like not noticing a huge airspeed loss on short final.
That is what I am trying to get at. Thanks for saying it better.

dba7
thanks for your polite and insightful post, error in re AF 447 crew considered. ;)

6. At the end of the day a very experienced crew crashed an aircraft they were concentrating on flying. Sure they weren't quite stabilised blah blah but there's more to it. If there is a latent trap in the autoflight system I want to know about it so it doesn't bite me in the arse on that one time when I'm not quite on top of my game.
Well said, HPSOV L
The stuff up a visual approach, in visual conditions, is appalling, but I am only surprised it has taken this long. Many carriers around the world are using FOQA data recorders for punishment of their pilots. The result is the CP's and pilots are reluctant to hand fly, or turn the auto-throttles off, ever. While this may reduce the number of exceedences on a daily basis, it destroys pilot proficiency.
This mishap isn't the only one where the above point has been raised.
Deepest respects to the poor souls who lost their lives. They will find NOTHING of any value here!
The departed will find nothing here, of any sort, being no longer among the quick and thus not able to read what's here. :sad:
3rd Floor (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-72.html#post7933032)
Is that how you fly an ILS?

If you maintain constant airspeed, your power will be what varies your glide path.
Granted, each time you adjust power you'll tend to adjust pitch to stay on speed.
Correction, counter correction.
It was my impression that the aim is to fly the final stretch of an approach at a chosen approach speed. (in the case under consideration, 137 kts).
If you mess about with using your pitch to find the aim point, you'll change your speed, won't you?

So I have to ask: do you fly with one hand or two?

Why my approach to this "scares you" mystifies me. The principles in question have been successfully putting high performance jets on carrier decks for about sixty years. They work.

They also work very well for flying an ILS or a GCA to touchdown in crap weather.

I do understand that you can lead with your nose and catch up with power. So long as one works power and attitude together, one should get to where one is aiming to land. See Squawk7700's post for a better way of putting that.

[Lost in Saigon]

Agreed but what if you pushed the thrust levers forward and there was no response from the engines? You would get an event like this or the BA777 at Heathrow.

Not saying it happened this way but it perfectly fits the flight profile.

Witnesses and the NTSB all report that it did not happen this way. Engines did power up prior to impact.

[RetiredF4]

Not saying it happened this way but it perfectly fits the flight profile.

The flight profile was botched already further out. If a step down gate like that at the bridge is already 300 feet high to a standard 3 degree glideslope (the Papis by the way have 2.85 degrees AFAIK), common sense forbids to be another 300 feet above the recommended altitude while being faster than necessary at the same time. From that point on they played "catch up".

The question is, why this visual approach in clear VMC was started that far off the ballpoint speed and vertical profile wise, that it ended short of the runway without being discontinued by the crew.

There might be technical reasons, which nobody has discovered yet, there might be factors contributing to the outcome which the findings will uncover, but for an hands on stick and throttle guy like me its hard to understand.

@Lonewolf
I'm with you on that topic, let me just add one thing: the closer the flown speed and the Vref is to the stall speed, the more this leading the correction with pitch and power is necessary.

[BOAC]

In #1409 I thought the CVR and FDR had yet to be analysed, but I see from mickjoebill at #682 they had been, so in fact the comments from Deborah do appear to be 'definitive'.

I see from a previous post by NoD that the 777 bible saysAlpha Floor is a low speed protection (in normal law) which is purely an autothrust mode. When activated, it provides TOGA thrust. As the aircraft decelerates into the alpha protection range, the Alpha Floor is activated, even if the autothrust is disengaged. Activation is roughly proportional to the rate of deceleration.

Alpha Floor is inhibited:
* below 100 feet radio Altitude,
* if autothrust unserviceable,
* following double engine failure on an A340 (or one engine out on the twins),
* following certain system/auto flight failures,
* above Mach 0.53. - no mention of 'FLCH with 0000 set'.

Memory of the 737 is fading, but why is there a suggestion that 777 min speed reversion (msr - which would have applied power when the IAS dropped below 1.3Vs) did not kick in above 100'RA? I cannot find the tabulated speeds quickly but I'm sure the speed 'disappeared' well above 100'RA. I can see absolutely no logic in disabling msr in FLCH and if it is so disabled, I would suggest a PDQ revision of this.................................

[nitpicker330]

That is for Airbus.
The 777 does not have Alpha floor.

Me shakes me head....:{

Also, for the 100th time THEY WERE NOT IN FLCH.
The NTSB said they were last in VS-1500

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

Maybe I missed this; if so, sorry. Does SFO Tower have Mode C SSR? If so, both visually and from the SSR height readout it must have been obvious that the a/c was below the G/S. I know some UK towers have an alarm system if an aircraft goes off the localiser but I don't know about G/S.

[nitpicker330]

The NTSB said in response to a reporter question that SFO ATC do not have the ability to monitor the Aircraft glide slope, that's up to the Pilots she said.

[Wizofoz]

Also, for the 100th time THEY WERE NOT IN FLCH.
The NTSB said they were last in VS-1500

Not quite- The NTSB said one of the Pilots reported they selected V/S -1500 at an earlier stage of the approach.

They have not said what mode the FDR revealed they were in at the time of the crash.

FLCH with the PFs F/D off would fit the facts very nicely.

If they were in V/S and thus the A/T was is SPD, why didn't A/T wake-up happen?

[737OPR]

Lurking around now for awhile, I've finally come to the point I have to contribute something.

All the comments about how people can't fly anymore, automation dependency, etc, etc.

When a few decades ago the first advanced autopilots where introduced they where a great tool to advance safety! Airspace became busier, airplanes more advanced. Airplanes capable of landing in extreme weather. Reading the book faith is the hunter, holy :mad:!! Those guys could really fly!! However, throughout the book, how many crashes where described? Automation has really reduced that. However, automation became so complex that accidents started to happen due to a lack of understanding the automation. Subsequently a lot of time training was spend on understanding the complex systems.

Same can be said about SOP's

Notable accidents, the airbus crash at Zurich I believe where a simple wrong push of a button led to a wrong autopilot mode and subsequent descent into terrain, or Swissair into Halifax, where sticking to SOP's delayed landing!

However, we have now come to the point where we realize there is a negative side to automation, namely dependency!!

Should we now all go back to hand flying?? Into our busy airport with much increased workloads? Will that make aviation safer?

Now, the reality of wide body flying for a major, say, you fly 700 hrs a year. Less than 10 percent of that will be flying in a terminal area where you can practice some of the flying skills, however most of that will be to major airports where you will be vectored into a busy airport with controllers you can hardly understand, hardly ever flying a standard profile, coming there once or maybe twice a year so you are also unfamiliar with the place! Is this the place to practice your manual skills after flying for 10hrs through the night? When most people on your time clock are just getting ready to wake up to go to work! As a wide body FO, I do about 35 to 40 trips a year to some of the busiest airports in the world. Should I, every time make a raw data non precision approach after a 9 to 12 hr flight just to prove I can do it. I can guarantee that that will not improve safety!!

Increase training? Every time I go to the sim, I have to satisfactory show hand flying skills, however, I'm well rested, not flying into busy airspac,e although we do practice going into all the places we fly to, using standard profiles, I can understand the ATC because it's done by a instructor from my own company, etc, etc.This does not accurately represent line flying!!

There is something to be said about increasing training, however we are now dealing with the low cost company's and passengers that demand lower and lower ticket prices! Your company can increase training all they want, but soon they will be out of business because they can't compete!

Now, coming to the mishap flight. I understand that the pilot flying was training, with 43hrs this was probably his 4 or fifth flight, probably still overwhelmed by the new aircraft and faced with a busy airport, with staccato ATC instructions and a inoperative G/S( something he probably practiced in the sim) etc, etc.

He messed up, sure enough!, but I don't think he woke up that morning thinking he was going to do a lousy job, I don't think he thought of himself of being a substandard pilot!

Just maybe, he read on here all the comments about Turkish in Amsterdam and thought, what a wankers, that will never happen to me....

As most people on here do.....

There is a trend on here as well as other boards, Turkish, Colgan, air France, professional pilots branding one another instead of asking why!!

I don't know the answer, but I do know that simply saying he was an incompetent pilot is not going to reduce this kind of accident. If it did, this wouldn't have happened after Turkish!!! Aviation has come a long way, instead of simply saying, he made a mistake, or ' pilot error' it's much more interesting asking, why did he make that mistake!

[nitpicker330]

We shall see in the course of time.

If the mode with the right F/D on was VS then unless the PF had disconnected the A/T it would have maintained thrust to keep the selected speed of 137 with SPD annunciated. ( unless the rate of descent made it impossible for the Aircraft to slow down )
It should have stopped it from going below 137 kts when later on he pulled the nose up.

If he disconnected the A/T the right F/D would have kept VS -1500 but without SPD mode. I would have thought in this case the A/T would wake up if the speed got low when he pulled the nose up??

[Aileron Drag]

You have so hit the nail on the head. Flying manually in the sim was a breeze, because you were wide awake and living on adrenaline. But for a major airport to offer only a visual approach to a dog-tired crew is dreadful. If the G/S has to be off, do it on one runway at a time, and give crews an option of doing a full ILS. The hot-shots posting here about flying with 'stick, rudder, and eyeball' can opt for the visual. Me, at the end of a 14 hour day? I'll take the ILS, please.

Regarding the PH being a bit overwhelmed by the 777, you have reminded me of my very first 777 landing. We had a 'zero hour' sim, so base-training was not needed. How the hell they got that authority is beyond me, because the flare in the sim bore no relation to the real aircraft. I made a horrible mess of that first landing, and aged the trainer in the RHS by about ten years.

Also, coming from an 'older' aircraft, the view was all wrong, since the 777 has a very low approach attitude. I feel so sorry for this guy. At least, for my own first go, I had an ILS.

[Lonewolf_50]

Aileron Drag:
Regarding the PH being a bit overwhelmed by the 777, you have reminded me of my very first 777 landing. We had a 'zero hour' sim, so base-training was not needed. How the hell they got that authority is beyond me, because the flare in the sim bore no relation to the real aircraft. I made a horrible mess of that first landing, and aged the trainer in the RHS by about ten years.
The system seems to have tried to set you up for failure there. :uhoh:

Just curious: how many times had you seen the sight picture of a landing when not at the controls in the aircraft, versus the sim? :confused: From what you shared there, it sounds like "zero" but I may be assuming too much.

[BOAC]

Looking at the ATC side of things - although it did not affect this flight - asking for '180 to 5' and expecting 3-400 ft high at that point is a bit risky!.

[md80fanatic]

"The hot-shots posting here about flying with 'stick, rudder, and eyeball' can opt for the visual. Me, at the end of a 14 hour day? I'll take the ILS, please."

I, as a fare paying passenger, will take the hot-shots then. Not a pilot here but can't really understand why your 14-hour day, (10 days a month perhaps?) filled with exciting AP monitoring and if-you're-lucky 10 minutes of actual flying time, can leave you a ragged wreck unable to safely perform the most basic of flight maneuvers in a modern FBW flight deck?

[nitpicker330]

Aileron drag---Fair enough. :ok: stabilized approaches are always the key.

BOAC--- agreed, we couldn't do 180 to 5 ( = 1500' ) in the A330 and meet company stabilized criteria.
Especially if 300' high.

[NamelessWonder]

Nitpicker said
Ok. It but it wasn't his first go in the real Aircraft, he'd done around 10 sectors already.

It will be interesting to find out on how many of those sectors he was PF!

[FlyingCyrus]

" Can anybody remember what Air France has CHANGED in training since last year or so? "

- Much more hand flying oriented sim sessions...
- SOP now very close to manufacturers policy... (AF was known, even in France, to reinvent the art of flying, not to say teaching birds how to fly :ugh:)

[Aileron Drag]

Just curious: how many times had you seen the sight picture of a landing when not at the controls in the aircraft, versus the sim? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/confused.gif From what you shared there, it sounds like "zero" but I may be assuming too much.

If I understand your question, then 'zero'. I completed the final 'base training' detail on the sim. The Base Training Captain told me when to flare, and by how much (hardly anything), which resulted in a minor crash! I was horrified. However, he assured me that was how to do it on the real aircraft. He was spot on, but the sim really put my confidence back.

My very first approach and landing in the actual aeroplane was my first sector (at night). The trainer I was with dropped me in to the deep end, alas.

I have long thought that the 'authorities' and the airline had a cozy relationship. I cannot understand how that simulator was certificated for zero-hour training. But it sure saved the airline a shed-load of money.

[kbrockman]

Just a brainfart but maybe more (certainly the bigger ones) airlines should rethink how to make best use of its pilot pool.
With today's level of automation and therefore the possibility to set up the cockpit of different sized aircraft from 1 supplier in a similar matter, aka cockpit commonality, it might not be a bad idea to make better use of these characteristics.

Long-haul pilots could be used to operate in the short-haul fleet on a regular base (eg 25% of their time) giving them ample opportunities to do a lot more T/O's and Landings and also operate into the smaller airports with more demanding conditions lower CAT runways, more basic navigation, etc... .

Today this commonality feature is not used to its full potential, FO's with too few hours land to quick in the RHS of a Long-haul wide-body, experienced long-haul pilots have to spend too much time in a perpetual state of jet lag, with too few extended breaks to be able to recuperate.

It's not going to solve every single issue because many companies operate a mixed fleet making it virtually impossible to hop from short-haul to long-haul but for many companies this could actually work.
I realize that for some pilots this sounds a lot like swearing in church (pay-rates and privileges) but if you think of it , it might not be a bad idea to be home more sometimes, and long haul careers could be started up more gradually for the youngest and least experienced FO's.

Not saying that this is the reason the 777 crashed, we won't really know what happened and why it happened until the final rapport comes out, I was just expanding on some of the comments in this thread.

[nitpicker330]

BOAC---- you can have VS mode without SPD mode if you disconnect the A/T.
Will the A/T wake up if the speed falls into the "red" army hashed area whilst in this state??? I don't remember it that well!!

[Lost in Saigon]

"The hot-shots posting here about flying with 'stick, rudder, and eyeball' can opt for the visual. Me, at the end of a 14 hour day? I'll take the ILS, please."

I, as a fare paying passenger, will take the hot-shots then. Not a pilot here but can't really understand why your 14-hour day, (10 days a month perhaps?) filled with exciting AP monitoring and if-you're-lucky 10 minutes of actual flying time, can leave you a ragged wreck unable to safely perform the most basic of flight maneuvers in a modern FBW flight deck?


Believe it or not, operating as a crew member on a long flight is VERY fatiguing. At the end of a long flight you are not as alert as you are on a short flight.

Opting for an easier to fly ILS instead of a visual approach is simply the prudent thing to do.

[BOAC]

Wondering why you said "although it did not affect this flight"? - based on the 180 to 5 being just about do-able if you allow a 500' g/a decision and decide to 're-assess' at 1000' but you are right - I now recall seeing them well over the +3-400' at 5 on one graph here, so this was destined to be a throttles closed approach all the way down. Even more reason really for the TC to call the g/a early?

[weatherdude]

Friend driving DLH long haul saying it's mandatory with them to do approaches manual thrust/manual throttle.

[3rd Floor]

3rd Floor
Is that how you fly an ILS?

If you maintain constant airspeed, your power will be what varies your glide path.
Granted, each time you adjust power you'll tend to adjust pitch to stay on speed.
Correction, counter correction.
It was my impression that the aim is to fly the final stretch of an approach at a chosen approach speed. (in the case under consideration, 137 kts).
If you mess about with using your pitch to find the aim point, you'll change your speed, won't you?

So I have to ask: do you fly with one hand or two?

Why my approach to this "scares you" mystifies me. The principles in question have been successfully putting high performance jets on carrier decks for about sixty years. They work.

They also work very well for flying an ILS or a GCA to touchdown in crap weather.

I do understand that you can lead with your nose and catch up with power. So long as one works power and attitude together, one should get to where one is aiming to land. See Squawk7700's post for a better way of putting that.

What scares me is what's being taught. I was referring to visual approaches in my original post.

You state... "If you mess about with using your pitch to find the aim point, you'll change your speed, won't you?"

Of course, however if you keep your aim point constant in the windscreen and have the correct power setting everything will be stable. What's more important? Landing on your aim point or undershooting/overshooting while maintaining the correct speed?

Of course I fly an approach with one hand on the yoke (Boeing) and the other hand on the thrust levers.

Your final statement is correct. Both work together but the basics are...
Attitude for aim point
Power for speed

Happy landings :ok:

[nitpicker330]

Wasthatit---- the NTSB reported they indeed were asked by SFO ATC to maintain 180 to 5 miles.....

[falcon900]

Please do try and keep "up to speed"

Turning off the navigation aids created the possibilty for the failure which seems to have occurred here, and surely cannot be justified other than on cost grounds.
The 28L Localiser was radiating normally, the 28L Glideslope was OFF as the landing threshold is in the process of being moved to the west. PAPIs for the new threshold were working normally and providing the glideslope guidance in severe VMC.

I am sorry Zimmerfly that you feel I am not up to speed. Glideslope seems to be pretty central to the train of events here, with the requirement to fly it manually appearing to have been beyond the crew for some reason.
Let me repeat my question: Do you believe this accident would have happenned had the navigation aids been functioning normally?

[Lonewolf_50]

md80fanatic:

part of the problem of long haul flying is the disruption of the circadian rhythm (http://www.nigms.nih.gov/Education/Factsheet_CircadianRhythms.htm).

It's an issue well known, understood and documented in the aviation community, and in the aviation safety arena.

[funfly]

737QPR, would agree an excellent post. I am a GA pilot but do understand what goes on and still have a healthy interest in heavy aviation.

I would like to put a question to you, I appreciate your comments about not wishing to 'practice' after a long flight not only because of the fatigue aspect but because the result using autosystems will be safer and more comfortable for the passengers.

However, seeing the flight profile in this particular case, as a passenger should I not assume that whoever is in control of the aircraft could cope with a situation when the flight envelope is wrong, either by correction or by aborting the procedure? This seems to me not to be the case of dealing with a dramatic emergency but of being unable to fly a very straightforward landing scenario.

This may not be the stuff when you are in the simm and the controller throws all sorts of things at you, this is a simple 'normal' landing and I would expect any professional pilot flying the aircraft I am in to be able to carry this out - am I wrong?

If the pilot was 'under instruction' and was an ignoramus like me, then the instructor surely would have hit him over the head with a spanner way before the aircraft got to this level of trouble.

[CDRW]

You know md80... really does have a point - and what he failed to mention is that on a 14hr flight, with a departure at midnight, 6 plus hours is spent lying on ones back or at worse sitting in a pax seat resting.

[BOAC]

nitpicker- as I said memories fade (and it was 737) but I'm pretty sure that with A/T 'connected' but 'armed' (SPD deselected), yes it would.

Out of interest, looking at the plots in #1418, the 4 and 6 of July well missed the 1000' 'stable' gate, and the only ones who seem to have hit it were at 1900 over the bridge and below 180.

[737OPR]

MD80fanatic,

Sorry if you can't understand the feeling! Can't blame you if you haven't been there!

It's not about the off time! It's not about how little we fly! It's simply about human psychology! Whether you fly 10 or 5 or 3 times a month, it doesn't matter! Any human being, flying throgh the night, where your clock say you should be sleeping will be fatiqued!!

But thanks for your contribution!!

[Aileron Drag]

I, as a fare paying passenger, will take the hot-shots then. Not a pilot here but can't really understand why your 14-hour day, (10 days a month perhaps?) filled with exciting AP monitoring and if-you're-lucky 10 minutes of actual flying time, can leave you a ragged wreck unable to safely perform the most basic of flight maneuvers in a modern FBW flight deck?

You are showing your ignorance, and should not comment on matters you know nothing about.

We all like to think we are 'hot-shots', and as a Training Captain I prided myself on my hand-flying ability. Every chance I got, whilst on shorthaul, I hand-flew. We all did. We were rested, and had been in bed at the right time - when it's dark.

When I moved to long-haul, the training philosophy was very different, because Chuck Yeager himself would make mistakes if he's been up for twenty hours.

You are one of those people who think we sit, bored, watching the autopilot fly us to our destination. You have no idea what goes on, on the flight-deck. There are a hundred and one things to do, monitor, and think about. Not forgetting the comfort of you lot - down the back.

And that approach was not "the most basic of maneuvers", even for a rested pilot. Any visual approach requires great concentration and judgement, and is arguably the most difficult of all approaches.

As for the ten days per month - God's teeth, I wish I'd worked for that airline. I only ever recovered from jet-lag in week two of my annual leave.

Dream on, buddy, and keep thinking the pilots are wide awake and nothing can go wrong go wronggowronggo.............

[Lord Spandex Masher]

BOAC, you're right regarding the AT. 'Speed Off' is preferred to 'AT Off' at my lot for the very reason you state. 737CL btw.

[givemewings]

You know md80... really does have a point - and what he failed to mention is that on a 14hr flight, with a departure at midnight, 6 plus hours is spent lying on ones back or at worse sitting in a pax seat resting.

You must be one of those lucky few who can fall asleep on command and sleep well. Not all are so lucky and it can often occur that you fail to sleep well before the flight, and then get disturbed in the crew rest and get maybe 3 hours of actual, REM sleep (the only restorative sleep) "catnapping" while helpful does not always alleviate the tiredness one feels on ULR ops...

Do you really fly long haul??

[md80fanatic]

To Aileron Drag: I'm a customer bud, and not a dumb one either.

Those landing aids are there not to make your job easier, but to facilitate operations in adverse conditions. You seem like you are admitting to a certain dependence on them and that is worrying to say the least. All of us have jobs to do, and all of us get tired, but we are expected to perform at a bare minimum level regardless. If not we should seek other employment.

Sorry if I appear to be stepping on toes here. My lifelong love has been aviation and I desperately tried to make your job mine, but my stomach couldn't handle being tossed about in a C172, so I elected to stay grounded, yet learn as much as I could about it from down here.

[ThePassenger]

"The hot-shots posting here about flying with 'stick, rudder, and eyeball' can opt for the visual. Me, at the end of a 14 hour day? I'll take the ILS, please."

I, as a fare paying passenger, will take the hot-shots then. Not a pilot here but can't really understand why your 14-hour day, (10 days a month perhaps?) filled with exciting AP monitoring and if-you're-lucky 10 minutes of actual flying time, can leave you a ragged wreck unable to safely perform the most basic of flight maneuvers in a modern FBW flight deck?

Now I'm not here to pick a fight, but honestly, that's a pretty ignorant approach imho.

I'm not a busy long haul traveller, I do only about 4-6 crossing the atlantic each year, still after each time getting back to Europe, I'm dead for at least 4 days, completely smashed. So I can't even imagine how the guys riding me back and forth are having it with a body clock on constant move....

Even if we of course should expect the driver to be able to maneuver the vehicle manually, ILS and other aids can't be a bad thing when needed!

I feel for all those on 214 at SFO, and I sincerely hope that whatever problem caused this crash-landing, lessons will be learned and precautions taken for future safer journeys for all of us sitting there in the back trying to get our body clocks tick straight enough to be able to work efficiently when we get to destination and back...

[737OPR]

Funfly,

Thanks for your remarks!

To answer your question: 99% of the time, things are standard! When things are standard, people tend to relax! People are very good ( according to research ) in doing, however, not so good in monitoring.

So, back to your question, yes, if something obvious happened at the end of a 8 to12hr flight, adrenaline would kick in and people would perform better.

If an engine failure would have occurred on mentioned flight, more than likely, All pilots would have been in an increased state of alertness, and the accident would not have occurred.

I can't speak of every one but my personal experience is that flying east from AMS I start my day between 4 and 8 pm. I have two little kids so usually I'm up at around 7 am. I bring the kids to school, doing some house chores, try to get a little sleep before I go to the airport. Start flying through the night and arrive at destination at about 7 to 12 AMS time. Most flight are with 3 pilots so we divide the flying time to get some sleep. Some times I sleep. Sometimes you are wide awake. In other words, you've flown through the night with max 3 hrs sleep. Having to perform a demanding task early in the morning!!

Once again, in my personal experience,going west is a little easier, since we start early in the morning and arrive late afternoon( body time), flying back you go through the night but at least you go to familiar Airport.

Hope this helps

[Aileron Drag]

MD80

Well, I'm certainly pleased that you're no customer of mine. Back seat pilots with no stomach for flying - I do not need.

Truly, you are speaking from utter ignorance. If you were as bright as you think you are you would know that humans become tired, and when they become tired they progressively require help to accomplish a complex task. Eventually, they become incapable of completing that task, but happily the law limits a pilot's hours so that the ultimate limit is not reached.

You say, "Those landing aids are there not to make your job easier, but to facilitate operations in adverse conditions." No, they're also there to make the approach easier, so that you have extra capacity to handle other matters simultaneously, or to enable you to do more work - more sectors, more hours. In Britain, Douglas Bader wrote a report allocating 'points' to different routes and airports. An available ILS carried very few points, whilst a field with no aids carried lots of points. The airline could roster pilots up to a certain number of 'points' per month. So you did more work if you went to 'easier' airfields.

I don't know what level of 'performance' is required from you in your job if you are tired, but after 39 years of flying aeroplanes, chum, I don't need lectures from passengers.

[JamesGV]

"....slightly high passing 4000"
So approx. 10 nm's out ? And out by about plus 500 feet ?

Vertical Speed set at 1,500 feet per minute.


"...at 500 feet they realized they were low (PAPI 3 Red. 1 white)"
So approx. 1 (1.5) nm's out ?

How did they not get on track before then ?

A constantly 500 feet out ? (until you lose all your energy and it's too late).

[willfly380]

The chain as i see it in reverse.

1.Did not watch the speed..all 3 pilots
2.Did not watch the profile..all 3 pilots
3.Did not call go around ..all 3 pilots
4.Did not get the ILS
4.Did not fly to SFO before in the 777
5.Did not do training before this flight
6.Did not sleep properly due to a pang of anxiety as this is first landing in sfo on a 777
7.Did not sleep properly due to a pang of anxiety as this would be the first time in RHS as a trainer.
8.Did not schedule properly, paired a absolutely new trainer on a long ocean voyage with a trainee capt. [scheduler].
9. Did not form a sop regarding training pairing [ chief of training]
10.Did not see the need for a bit more emphasis on type conversion from AB to B.[chief of training].
11. Did not ...list is endless.

throw in the tech stuff some where in between.

To call it a simple pilot error would be an ERROR.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

737OPR,

It's interesting to note then that as Korean pilots are, apparently, incredibly worried about flying a visual approach then surely their adrenaline would've been pumping and they would have been paying a bit more attention and would have been performing better.

[e195-001]

Just reading the newspaper interviews about passengers opening doors themselves and helping people out the aircraft down the slides.

Ive done Crew Training, (albeit never flown due to unknown medical reasons at the time), and part of the training was to check out the door prior to any evac, obviously checking to see if there is/was fire.

Would normal passengers think or be likely to check this first, or would the mentality be, 'Oh :mad:, get out -> Door open ->Jump'

[737OPR]

Lord spandex master,

Maybe my wording was somewhat off, but I'm sure you know what I mean!!

[Lonewolf_50]

willfly380, I may be wrong about this (and if so, whacks to the noggin accepted) but would you want to add to your list something related to the 180 @ 5 ATC call ...
"Didn't say no to the controller." One now and again has to do that.

As of the info currently available, one doesn't know what their approach planning process/brief was for the visual approach (IIRC, NOTAM for ILS was available) to the runway. With that in mind, you may be able to make the case for their desired/expected approach profile to get hurried or disrupted by accepting that ATC call, which was probalby aimed at a sequencing issue ATC was working (as they tend to do at busy airports ... ) That has the potential of putting a crew behind the aircraft, or in catch-up mode, in working to get the approach stable in time and on profile.

Granted, pilots deal with this near busy airports every day, because that is part of the business.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

737, not at all, I agree with you. But one persons engine failure could be another's visual approach (based on testimony of Korean pilots on this thread), possibly they were performing better than 'normal', scary thought, or maybe they were maxed out. Who knows.

[MPN11]

willfly380 ... To your interesting list might I add:

Had an autopilot/autothrottle system which was capable of allowing the aircraft to be driven into the ground automatically.

This has been alluded to up thread but seemed to receive little comment. I appreciate that training should eliminate the risk, but the inherent abiilty of automatic systems to do exactly the worst possible thing (minimise power, ignore airspeed and altitude) appears to be a potential factor.

[Liam Gallagher]

Thanks Offcut, nice informative posts.

Is there any reason they would not have got an EICAS "AIRSPEED LOW" warning at some stage on approach?

[aston7]

The autothrottle can support stall protection when armed and not activated. If
speed decreases to near stick shaker activation, the autothrottle automatically activates in the appropriate mode (SPD or THR REF) and advances thrust to maintain minimum maneuvering speed (approximately the top of the amber band) or the speed set in the mode control speed window, whichever is greater. The EICAS message AIRSPEED LOW displays.

Note: When the pitch mode is FLCH or TOGA, or the airplane is below 400 feet above the airport on takeoff, or below 100 feet radio altitude on approach,
the autothrottle will not automatically activate.

[MPN11]

AstonZ ... Exactly ... "if" and "will not". Thereby creating an automatic potential failure mode.

[BOAC]

aston - that looks remarkably like the Airbus system as described earlier - is that definitely 777?

[pipeliner]

Nitpicker

While your assertion (That's why all Airlines have stabilized approach criteria AND competent crews follow it.) surely sounds fine and upstanding, the facts are different. Both ASIAS (US Domestic) and STEADS (ICAO International) data and FSF studies show that between 3% and 5% of all flights engaging in air commerce experience an unstable approach. Approximately 5% of those flights actually conduct a Go Around.

While we all believe we are highly professional and can come on these boards and assert ALL COMPETENT pilots adhere to stable approach criteria, the facts are a small percentage of us, accounting for an incredibly huge number of operations every day, DON'T adhere to these policies. Hanging these guys out to dry for doing what 4% of us do every day, only because they had a bad outcome, does not lend itself to correcting the real problem.

[PURPLE PITOT]

4% of us don't crash and kill people every day.

[NigelOnDraft]

aston - that looks remarkably like the Airbus system as described earlier - is that definitely 777? I think he is describing the 777 system. Crucial diffs are:
1. 777 Thrust increases to maintain "Min Manoeuvre speed" (Airbus if it triggers goes TOGA and a bit tricky to get out of it!)
2. FLCH on 777 disables it (for whatever reason) - on Airbus no normal mode can disable it except <100R (when likely too late anyway)

The crucial aspect in aston's post I had not NB'd is that the mode also triggers the "AIRSPEED LOW" EICAS. So v-v, if in FLCH it seems you will not get the "AIRSPEED LOW" EICAS either?

[FIRESYSOK]

MD80fanatic:

1. Cannot stomach a C172 ride on a summer's day
2. CAN reliably comment from his armchair on the nuances
of flying widebodies ULH.

[Back at NH]

I think too much is being read into the fact that this was the Line Training Captain's first trip as such.

WillFly380 has questioned the wisdom of pairing a new LTC with a trainee Captain. A new LTC has to start somewhere, and a trip, not with a trainee Captain, but an experienced Captain converting to type seems as good a starting point as any. He could have had a 250hr cadet on his plate, although that may have focused his attention somewhat more. No, the answer to this quandry does not lie in the training office.

Line training issues aside, the ability of near on 25,000hrs of combined flight time crew to not notice the bleed off of 30 knots below Vref is somewhat alarming no matter what the type of approach.

The fact that the approach was not thrown away at 500 feet for not being stable is of concern. 'Hundred Percent Please', #1398, tells us

"So for the PF, it may have been easy to revert to 320 operating mode. His levers haven't moved (as expected), he has regained the profile at 500 thus avoiding a G/A due unstable and now he just has to guide the A/C to the touchdown markings."

Regaining profile at 500 with thrust at idle is not avoiding G/A as unstable. From the information released, at 500', the speed was 134kts cf a Vref of 137kts and with a downward trend so the approach was unstable on a least 2 counts. A big chance a avoiding what was to follow missed.

The auto-throttle response or lack of it, should I say, is another point of interest. Surely at 500' when they "regained the profile", an inside scan would have revealed a downward trending speed and no AT wake-up. Surely time to "push 'em up"? But no, the aircraft fell off the profile and into three reds on the PAPIs and then four reds before the crew woke up to their plight, by which time the stable door was wide open and the horse was a cloud of dust on the horizon. This on a visual approach where eyes should have been on the runway and therefore the PAPIs.

I believe the CVR will provide shed more light on this accident than the FDR.

[jolihokistix]

Meanwhile as the debate rages here, the Chosun Ilbo and the Korea Herald seem to be, perhaps quite naturally, suggesting mechanical failure:
Automatic throttle faulty in crash: pilot-The Korea Herald (http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130710001027)

[LASJayhawk]

I really really hope the I assumed go-around attitude and went to push the throttles forward is a got lost in translation kinda thing.

I mean if the EPR isn't up and you pull a lot of pitch.........

[dba7]

7 of the 12 cabin crews were KNOCKED out unconscious.

2 were ejected (not sure if they were one of the 7).

And on top of that, 2 cabin crews were pinned by escape chutes (I read TWO) that were inflated inward. Not sure if those 2 were inflated intentionally or not but the fact is 2 were inflated inward and pinned 2 cabin crews. Again not sure if these 2 were knocked out or not.

Despite these, no passenger was left behind inside.

Some passengers stated that no crew appeared and had to take matters into their own hand. Well now you know why.

[roving]

Yet according to cockpit voice recordings, Lee and his co-pilot did not say a word to one another about their increasingly dangerous situation until less than two seconds before the plane’s tail section clipped the seawall at the end of the runway, slamming the fuselage to the ground.



Asiana Airline pilots 'stayed silent until two seconds before crash' at San Francisco airport - Americas - World - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/asiana-airline-pilots-stayed-silent-until-two-seconds-before-crash-at-san-francisco-airport-8698477.html)

[suninmyeyes]

A few more comments.

Taking out the autopilot at 1600 feet was entirely appropriate for this long haul flight. Making small corrections in pitch and roll via the automatics has a lag and is not easy on a visual approach. It is easier to disconnect the autopilot and point the nose where you want it.

The 777 is a large aircraft but quite light on the ailerons and it is common for people new on type to over control a little and take a bit longer to nail the centreline.

Although we are allowed to build an approach in the FMC for approximate glide slope guidance we are not allowed to fly the approach in VNAV unless it is in the database.

In thousands of hours on the 777 and hundreds of approaches I have never flown an approach where the autothrottle has failed to maintain the Vref but then I have always been aware of the flight mode I was in. The only time I have ever disconnected the autothrottle in flight was for a TCAS RA. We are not allowed to practice autothrottle disconnected approaches in the 777 as Boeing do not recommend it. We do practice them in the simulator though.

In the scenario described with V/S of 1500 fpm the autothrottle would have maintained the speed at Vref plus 5 knots once the speed had come back to that point. So at some later stage the mode must have been changed to one where the autothrottle stayed in "hold" and maintained idle thrust. FLCH or VNAV SPD would do this. Or as has been mentioned earlier if the handling pilot is resting his hands heavily on the thrust levers this death grip could prevent the thrust levers from opening up.

The low speed warning on the Eicas would still work, even if in FLCH, but probably came at about 150 feet when with the low speed and rate of descent and with the drag of flap 30 and gear down it would have been too late to be of any use.

As in all accidents there are a number of factors. I think the most significant one and the main technical cause of this accident is failure of the autothrottle to maintain the target reference speed for as yet undetermined reasons and the failure of the operating flight crew to realise until it was too late.

[Greenlights]

Guys, I really know that the explanation of a crash is complex.
but come on...

all 3 did not check the profile, all 3 did not check the speed, all 3 did not check vertical speed, all 3 did not check high nose up attitude... what else ?

so, in this case, please tell me : what the hell are they looking at ?

Next time, they should invite a passenger (instead of another pilot) in the cockpit, he may notice something at least.

if just one automation does not work and pilot can not notice and fly the plane...well...let's pray that engineer build perfect automation since pilots are useless in the worst case ? :confused:

[Airbubba]

The fact that the approach was not thrown away at 500 feet for not being stable is of concern. 'Hundred Percent Please', #1398, tells us

Several U.S. carriers have gone to requiring stable approach criteria (not 'approaching stabilized') met by 1000 feet agl even in VMC conditions. Anybody know what the actual current policy is at Asiana?

[Mr.Bloggs]

I fly wide bodies to and from the USA. Landing off a visual at the end of a 10-11 hour flight is not easy, period. That's part of why we earn biggish salaries. US ATC do often instruct STUPID 180 to 5 requirements. I simply don't comply and slow down to approach speed by 4 miles at latest, to ensure a stable approach. English is my mother tongue, and I find the US staccato and non-standard communication difficult to understand. And they do not like to take no (negative) for an answer. Which for the Korean guys cannot have been easy. The command gradient at Asiana sounds over-steep as I have already written. And the lack of provision of a fully functioningl localizer sounds like someone at SFO and the authorities have a lot to answer for.

There has been a lot of nonsense written by people who do not fly wide bodies long-haul for a living. It is sometimes excruciatingly tiring and technically difficult. Even for the most accomplished of us. Sadly the public perception of this type of work is based on ignorance and media hype.

I am sure this accident was avoidable, whether or not the A/T was functioning. However the margins are slimmer than many of you would wish to believe.

[Knot Apilot]

Meanwhile as the debate rages here, the Chosun Ilbo and the Korea Herald seem to be, perhaps quite naturally, suggesting mechanical failure:
Automatic throttle faulty in crash: pilot-The (http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130710001027)Korea Herald (http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130710001027)

I think this is perfectly appropriate as I think the function of auto-throttle will be a major, if not THE major contributing factor in this accident.

In my opinion, auto-throttles are dangerous. Either one of the two pilots should be manually and personally in charge of the thrust levers during landing, unless doing a fully automated. All on, or all off!

7 of the 12 cabin crews were KNOCKED out unconscious.

2 were ejected (not sure if they were one of the 7).

And on top of that, 2 cabin crews were pinned by escape chutes (I read TWO) that were inflated inward. Not sure if those 2 were inflated intentionally or not but the fact is 2 were inflated inward and pinned 2 cabin crews. Again not sure if these 2 were knocked out or not.

Despite these, no passenger was left behind inside.

Some passengers stated that no crew appeared and had to take matters into their own hand. Well now you know why.

Aye. The crew acted extremely professionally and heroically here. Tremendous job. They deserve plaques!

Even the captain had a fire axe in his hand and was chopping down inflatables - he didn't dwell on any possible mistakes in the flight deck and jumped immediately to action.

[Al Symers]

Hypothesise all you want folks, until you have worked in a Korean cockpit you will never understand the weird dynamics. This is not the first accident caused by culture/political correctness, nor will it be the last.

There is no Korean term for common sense.

[TOTitan]

"And about the low-skill pilot with thousands of hours, I'm reminded of the American pilot who was in command of Air France 447 at the time of crash"

It was interesting to read a Korean-Americans outlook on this. Everything you wrote was good except this. AF 447 had an all French crew.

[aston7]

Korean FOMs (similar to KAL and Asiana) state:
Stabilized Approach Criteria


All flights shall maintain the following conditions at 1000feet HAT in IMC,

500feet HAT in VMC.

• Complete Landing Briefing, planned Landing Configuration and 'Before Landing Checklist

• Target airspeed in the tolerance and Power Setting to maintain the airspeed

• In Trim on Correct Lateral/Vertical Flight Path

• The rate of descent, not greater than 1000fpm

All above is a crosscheck procedure. If NOT STABILIZED at 500f AGL - "GO AROUD" callout from PM! If one of the parameters not within the limits - mandatory callout - "SPEED" "SPEED" "SPEED" !!!
Of course we know all this would work in a proper CRM environment.

[MountainBear]

@ aa5bpilot

Assuming that the data behind the charts is good, that is some fascinating work. Since the difference between the July 4th flight and the July 6th flight starts at 4 NM out it seems as if the NTSB would want to talk to the pilots of the July 4th flight to find out what those pilots were doing...thinking... differently than the accident flight because it seems that moment is where the accident crew got behind the airplane.

Taken holistically, what leaps out to me from those charts is that the difference between a hard landing and an accident is a game of inches, a matter of a few brief seconds. The accident crew was off but they were not off by much.

[MPN11]

Another question, from a full-career ATCO.

I understand that the airspace is complex, but who ever devised a visual approach procedure that initially places aircraft above the notional glide path and then requires a 13 (?) mile scrabble to get on glide path whilst trying slow down, configure, stabilise etc.?

[SASless]

There has been a lot of nonsense written by people who do not fly wide bodies long-haul for a living. It is sometimes excruciatingly tiring and technically difficult. Even for the most accomplished of us.

Yes.....it sure seems so! There also seems to a bit of the same quality material written by some who fly wide bodies long haul too.

Please do explain how a functioning Localizer gives one Glide Slope data will you?:ugh:

[Faire d'income]

the NTSB reported they indeed were asked by SFO ATC to maintain 180 to 5 miles

In a 777, while doing a visual, >300' high, after a long haul flight?

Add in anything else such as a full load or tailwind aloft, or a minor distraction such as a new type, and anyone would be at risk of a messy approach, in any airport.

All those pointing to a go-around as the blatantly obvious answer are of course correct. That can't be argued with in hindsight.

This will be all the brilliant desk pilots answer too.

However, put your mind back to when you are still on the first approach, following such a go-around, which of the following changes/improves?

Still a 777, still a visual, still probably the same daft ATC speed instructions, still after a long haul flight but now + a go-around. If there was a tailwind and/or a full load they won't change either. Your mind may try to persuade you that it will simply all happen again.

Before the hindsight, this weighs heavily on the mind too, especially when you are tired.

[Airbubba]

The accident crew was off but they were not off by much.

Uh, I'd say they were off by quite a lot.

Four red PAPI's and 30 knots slow on short final is not something most of us will ever encounter in our careers of international widebody flying.

[Mr.Bloggs]

A functioning localizer does not give a glide slope but allows an automated approach to be performed, albeit to a higher minimum than a Cat 1 ILS. A visual approach is rarely performed using full automation inside of 5 miles.

[deepknight]

Well below V-ref, go-around thrust asked of two powerful under-wing engines - result: major pitch up that only serves to make things worse?

[WillowRun 6-3]

Chaps (I'm legal counsel, always wanted to see my name in In the Front Office in Av Week, but that's for a different board - I posted a ton on the comments sections on the Wall St J articles on the 787 battery deal and grounding - & point of this is, I make no claim to "getting" the flight dynamics or piloting dynamics. Yes, I googled CRM & FOQA and the tech discourse on flying approaches could give some atty's FLCH Trap for lawyers (which is when a lawyer stops thinking that she or he knows it all). Anyway.)

Two comments. One, relative to dissemination of info, by NTSB chair. Agree that advent of www & social media as primary communication format(s) has greatly, make that very greatly, accelerated matters. Evidence: when NTSB released the prelim factual report on the JAL 787 batt incident at BOS, the report had links to everything- right down to the interviews of the cleaning crew who alarmed the batt burning. Imagine that level of info accessibility to the public, everywhere where there's a www connection, in the equivalent length of time after a Dutch pilot drove a '47 down the runway a bit too soon at Tenerife (yes, I read the entire report, back then, in "sole private sponsorship and independent funding status"). Sometimes a look out the info dissemination window is a good slope check too.

Second, I could not bear to read Holman Jenkins column in the Journal today. He's the cat who wants robots to fly planes, you know? Is there a thread dedicated just to his analysis?

[Etud_lAvia]

For what it's worth, I remember learning about 11 seconds as a "rule of thumb" for a high-bypass to spool up from idle to TOGA. Obviously, this will vary among engine types.

Of course, in a stabilized approach, it would almost never happen that engines reach idle, so throttle response would usually be a lot quicker.

[wiggy]

I think this is perfectly appropriate as I think the function of auto-throttle will be a major, if not THE major contributing factor in this accident.

Maybe..I think on current "evidence" crew performance will be at the top of the list (no surprise there) but.....

Once upon a time when I was converting to the 777 a wise trainer said to me " great aircraft, but because of the full time auto-throttle you really have to work at keeping the speed from your scan and watch out for the FLCH trap"....

Now he was aware of the FLCH trap, many people in this place knew of the FLCH trap (and can quote FCOM 2 chapter and verse) ..it was a "known, known", a bit like the AF pitot probes in icing.... Now that to me begs at least two questions:

1. Is the FLCH "trap" or the autothrottle "going to sleep" :bored: somehow an unavoidable characteristic of the autothrottle logic or, if it isn't

2. Shouldn't err, somebody, have had another look at the software and:or hardware?

Just asking?? Opinions, info? Please don't shoot the questioner.

[deagles007]

from: suninmyeyes
"
In the scenario described with V/S of 1500 fpm the autothrottle would have maintained the speed at Vref plus 5 knots once the speed had come back to that point. So at some later stage the mode must have been changed to one where the autothrottle stayed in "hold" and maintained idle thrust. FLCH or VNAV SPD would do this. Or as has been mentioned earlier if the handling pilot is resting his hands heavily on the thrust levers this death grip could prevent the thrust levers from opening up.
"

Exactly. Since they disabled the autopilot at 1600 ft according to Hersman/.NTSB, it would seem VNAV SPD was not active. Perhaps it was still in VNAV SPD and the pilots were confused? From the B777 Systems Summary [Automatic Flight] manual by Boeing:
With the autothrottle armed, the autothrottle automatically activates if:
-no autopilot or flight director active, or
-an autopilot or flight director is in VNAV XXX, FPA, ALT, V/S, or G/S
AND
-speed less than FMC calculated value for one second
-thrust below reference thrust
-airplane altitude above 100 feet RA on approach or airplane barometric altitude 400 ft above airport on takeoff
Note: During a descent in VNAV SPD, the autothrottle may activate in HOLD mode and will not support stall protection
In particular the last two items are of importance, if they were in VNAV SPD mode (autopilot on), then A/T would be put in HOLD mode.
Or if the CDU thinks it is in takeoff, then the 400 ft elevation may apply and autothrottle is not active . It seems that it was when below 500 ft when the speed dropped more and more below their programmed SPD (137). Also from the Boeing manual:
Autothrottle (A/T) Switch
Push - above 400 feet, with the autothrottle armed, activates the appropriate autothrottle mode for the selected AFDS pitch mode, or if no pitch mode, in the speed (SPD) mode.

[Knot Apilot]

Maybe..I think on current "evidence" crew performance will be at the top of the list (no surprise there) but.....

Once upon a time when I was converting to the 777 a wise trainer said to me " great aircraft, but because of the full time auto-throttle you really have to work at keeping the speed from your scan and watch out for the FLCH trap"....

Now he was aware of the FLCH trap, many people in this place knew of the FLCH trap (and can cope FCOM 2 chapter and verse) ..it was a "known, known".

Thank you. I completely agree about crew performance! I'm just trying to put a little balance in and perhaps find 'extenuating circumstances.' And maybe justifiable ones at that.

Also, you raise great points. The questions are:



Did the crew have the benefit of a 'wise trainer'?
Was the issue a "known-known" to them? Since, as gathered from this thread, Boeing does not address the issue in their official manuals!
Did they receive adequate training and instruction as to the performance limits of the auto-throttles?


You had a great instructor that saw the reality of automation and thought "outside-the-box". In other words, he was a real pilot! This seems to be whats sorely lacking in modern airline training in some companies.

[King on a Wing]

Quote from FCOM :

"When the pitch mode is FLCH or TOGA, or the airplane is below 400 feet above the airport on takeoff, or below 100 feet radio altitude on approach, the autothrottle will not automatically activate."

Hmmm...

[JPJP]

The bridge is at 6nm, and if you believe in 300ft per NM, then the "correct" height at the bridge is 1800ft, not much difference. The base of class B goes to 1500 feet at 7nm and 2500ft at 10nm. The plate does say "recommended", not "required"

You're almost correct. 6NM is from the SFO VOR. The VOR is located at the crossing point of the runways. Not at the threshold. So you essentially lose another mile. Therefore 1500 feet at the bridge would equate to a 3 degree glide slope.

I know it's a small point, perhaps even nitpicking. I've seen FOs cross the bridge at the 1900 foot recommended altitude and they're one dot high on the GS (when there was a glide slope). Do you think the Korean crew would see that 1900 altitude as a 'recommend' or would they consider it a restriction ? I think they'd consider the latter.

[Back at NH]

Interesting, especially since a search on Asiana fleet aircraft types do not correlate. There are no A-320 aircraft listed in their fleet. They list A-330 and future delivery of A-380 in 2014.

Besides, how could he fly an A-320 to SFO from Korea or China? The distance is almost twice as far as the aircraft range. :ugh:http://i586.photobucket.com/albums/ss304/NigelC/asiana_zpsf03cfa94.jpg (http://s586.photobucket.com/user/NigelC/media/asiana_zpsf03cfa94.jpg.html)

[RAT 5]

No answer yet to my VNAVPTH question. As the ILS was U/S I assumed a competent crew would have programmed a VNAV approach before TOD. This then would have given vertical deviation guidance. As has been said: after a long-haul tiring flight no short slam dunkers but a stable autopilot/autothrottle approach similar to an ILS = VNAVPTH. Was this done? Was the PF flying hands ON = covering the controls? Why allow ATC to suck you into a cup-de-sac you don;t want to be? Who's in charge?

The scenarios that make me nervous: I can understand some crews getting disorientated and in bad weather slamming into a hillside; but a multi crew on a clear day slamming a perfectly good a/c into the ground when looking at the crash point strikes dread into me for the future of the profession. It is happening too often and the authorities need to wake up. So do the operators and sure as hell do the pax.

[Lonewolf_50]

To follow up with wiggy and KnotAPilot:

Even if the gent newer to this type may not have had that systems knowledge embedded in his brain deeply enough (possibly having been through a "drinking with a fire hose" conversion course), his training pilot with much more experience on type would certainly be aware of that feature, would he not? And being the training pilot, would he not be aware of how that systems feature had to be accounted for when operating on the line?

Guessing here, and following what appears to be a productive line of HF and CRM thought ...

[ricfly744]

I fly wide bodies to and from the USA. Landing off a visual at the end of a 10-11 hour flight is not easy, period. That's part of why we earn biggish salaries. US ATC do often instruct STUPID 180 to 5 requirements. I simply don't comply and slow down to approach speed by 4 miles at latest, to ensure a stable approach. English is my mother tongue, and I find the US staccato and non-standard communication difficult to understand. And they do not like to take no (negative) for an answer. Which for the Korean guys cannot have been easy. The command gradient at Asiana sounds over-steep as I have already written. And the lack of provision of a fully functioningl localizer sounds like someone at SFO and the authorities have a lot to answer for.

There has been a lot of nonsense written by people who do not fly wide bodies long-haul for a living. It is sometimes excruciatingly tiring and technically difficult. Even for the most accomplished of us. Sadly the public perception of this type of work is based on ignorance and media hype.

I am sure this accident was avoidable, whether or not the A/T was functioning. However the margins are slimmer than many of you would wish to believe.:

The above, posted a page back by a wise colleague, has to be repeated as it is very true, and I agree totally. Long haul just cannot be compared with a 6 sector short haul duty, even if the second seams more trying or demanding, it may not be the case. And, US ATC is really non standard. Other places in the word can keep a good flow and manage a lot of traffic keeping a good standard. High flow is no excuse.

[joelnthailand]

Mr. Aileron Drag wrote:You have so hit the nail on the head. Flying manually in the sim was a breeze, because you were wide awake and living on adrenaline. But for a major airport to offer only a visual approach to a dog-tired crew is dreadful.
If you are telling me that ILS is always available, never fails, and is at every airport then, then a visual should never be done.
If you are saying that even flying the G/S you never ever transition to a visual landing then again, a visual should never be done.
Unfortunately - none of these are true. Competency in flying a visual approach is required. On top of that, not sure it's particularly more effort (unless one has completely lost to skill to fly the thing by hand). Also, no evidence that the folks at the wheel were anywhere near dog-tired.

[Aileron Drag]

If you are telling me that ILS is always available, never fails, and is at every airport then, then a visual should never be done.
If you are saying that even flying the G/S you never ever transition to a visual landing then again, a visual should never be done.
Unfortunately - none of these are true. Competency in flying a visual approach is required. On top of that, not sure it's particularly more effort (unless one has completely lost to skill to fly the thing by hand). Also, no evidence that the folks at the wheel were anywhere near dog-tired.

I'm saying that a crew should use every aid available if they are at the end of a longhaul flight. Yes, if it's LHR-JFK, with a quick flight time, and you've all had a good, restful couple of days off, then sure - go for the visual. But flying from London to LA in January, in continuous turbulence, when you were all up at 4am local............man, by the time (14 hours later) you are at ToD LA, you are shot, dead, knackered.

Under those conditions, you seriously think the crew would be wise to 'practice' a manual, no F/D approach? Are you Mad?

You say there is no evidence that those people were "anywhere near dog-tired".

I can only say - you must - must be a 100 hour PPL.

[Knot Apilot]

His training pilot with much more experience on type would certainly be aware of that feature, would he not? And being the training pilot, would he not be aware of how that systems feature had to be accounted for when operating on the line?

This is what we don't know yet. And I'm sure NTSB are asking the same questions.

What we DO know, based on the NTSB brief yesterday, is this:

From NTSB Brief 7/9/13:

"Instructor Pilot stated that [...] they had set speed at 137 knots and he assumed that the auto-throttles were maintaining speed.

[...]

At 200 feet [...] he recognized that the auto-throtles were not maintaining speed and he established a GO-AROUND Attitude."So the more experienced trainer pilot assumed the auto-throttles were handling the speed. (!)

[NamelessWonder]

Fraom Aileron Drag
MD80

Well, I'm certainly pleased that you're no customer of mine. Back seat pilots with no stomach for flying - I do not need.

Truly, you are speaking from utter ignorance. If you were as bright as you think you are you would know that humans become tired, and when they become tired they progressively require help to accomplish a complex task. Eventually, they become incapable of completing that task, but happily the law limits a pilot's hours so that the ultimate limit is not reached.
. . .

I don't know what level of 'performance' is required from you in your job if you are tired, but after 39 years of flying aeroplanes, chum, I don't need lectures from passengers. And that's exactly the same kind of "Command Gradient" that many have been describing as a potential cause of the issues in this incident - arrogant in the extreme - "You don't have my qualifications, therefore you cannot possibly have anything valuable to add" :ugh:

@Greenlights
all 3 did not check the profile, all 3 did not check the speed, all 3 did not check vertical speed, all 3 did not check high nose up attitude... what else ?Apart from the relief F/O, who apparently called for the entire last minute "sink rate" from the jump seat. But then I guess you didn't bother reading the whole thread did you? Guess it was "below" you!

[5LY]

An inherit shortcoming of PAPI's and VASI's is their lack of information with respect to the degree of diversion. In other words, how red is it? or how white is it? are not helpful questions. You can know that you're seeing 4 reds and know that a correction is required but they give you no information about the seriousness of your diversion or in other words, how far off from the intended path am I.

Just an observation. An element of the many which might help understand the lack of a timely response.

[c53204]

I am assuming the aircraft had no malfunctions. But as a passenger, I expect a flight crew to be able to land an aircraft visually (in suitable conditions) with no aids used on the aircraft or on the ground.

Scenario - no landing aids on the ground available and no autopilot available. Can we say that a correctly rated crew should be able to land in such a scenario? If not, then as a passenger, that scares me.

[mm43]

@ BOACthat looks remarkably like the Airbus system as described earlier - is that definitely 777?Right out of the T7 FCOM and was alluded to in Post #721 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-37.html#post7928311)

[nippysweetie]

Anyone out there had to do a sim check after being kept awake to simulate effects of a long-haul shift? I've done car simulations where alcohol was introduced and the results have stayed with me; and they weren't what I'd expected.

[Al Symers]

I wouldn't worry too much about the crew being fatigued. They would have slept most of the way across, newspapers on the windows, screens turned down, Do Not Disturb on the cockpit door, relying on the 'bing bong' of CPDLC to wake them up. It's SOP.

[Knot Apilot]

At the NTSB brief yesterday, one of the reporters asked if the auto-throttles had a back up system. I yelled at the screen: "YES, THE PILOTS!"

There needs to be a serious re-assessment of the attitude towards automation by the airline trainers on their students; with over-reliance on and even reluctance to turn it off shown by pilots involved in major incidents.

Some pilots being lulled into a flase sense of security, thinking the automation is a safety-net that will catch them if they make a mistake, or that they can trust it to handle things while they divert their attention elsewhere.

AUTOMATION IS A FALSE SAFETY-NET!

YOU, THE PILOT, IS THE SAFETY NET!

You are that last slice of the swiss cheese!

IMO, pilots should look at the automation on their plane with distrust.; as if it were HAL, the computer from the movie "2001". It is actively trying to kill you. And if you don't monitor it closely enough, it WILL kill you!

[Cows getting bigger]

So,

Slam dunk into visual which is somewhat unusual and challenging to some operators?
Fatigue and under-arousal?
Reduction in instrument aids?
Cockpit gradient, culture and wider CRM?
A rather mischievous A/T "option"?

Seems like enough holes to me.

[Lonewolf_50]

Knot, while you or I may agree on that, the competing message to pilots from some (perhaps all?) management is that the auto features fly more fuel efficiently, and therefore in a very competitive business environment those features are to be used to the max extent in order to stay in business ... or something to that effect.

Some of the folks here who have alluded to FOQA being used as a hammer by management are on to something, methinks ...