Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[CONF iture]

The low speed warning on the Eicas would still work, even if in FLCH, but probably came at about 150 feet when with the low speed and rate of descent and with the drag of flap 30 and gear down it would have been too late to be of any use.
...
On the central Eicas a low speed warning message appears with an aural warning.
What is exactly that aural message ?
NTSB has not yet mentioned anything like it on the CVR ...
Could it be inhibited due to higher priority aural message or stick shaker ?

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi JPJP,
Thanks for TipToe Visual Chart.
Therefore: at 1900 feet, the aircraft is 400 feet high, 5 miles from the runway.
Even if they were 400 feet higher than the 3 deg slope at 5nm, then their approach path is still only 3.75 degs. (Marseille Provence RW 31R has ILS GP set at 4 degs).
It should not be a problem for crews ahead of their aircraft.

[JPJP]

Lord Spandex Masher - They weren't 400 feet high. They were 400 feet above a 3 degree profile. There's a difference.

You are correct. In the sense that they are not high until they cross their stabilized approach gate. Whatever that is for Asiana.

Can we agree that the goal is to be stabilized on glide path or glideslope, at a specific altitude ? In this case, they must lose 400 feet in addition to continuing the descent towards the runway. That requires a rate of descent that is higher than normally required on a 3 degree glide path. Five miles from the end of the runway.

A normal rate of descent at Vapp is approximately 800 FPM. Traveling at over 2 miles per minute, 5 miles from the runway. If you descend at a safe rate of descent of 1000 FPM, it takes 2 minutes to lose the extra 400 feet. At this point you are now 1 mile from the end of the runway. Hopefully at 500 feet. All doable if well managed, fully configured and on speed when you cross the bridge. Even I can do it, on numerous occasions. It certainly requires greater that 1000 FPM ROD if you are still configuring and slowing.

What was their rate of descent ? Were they still slowing and configuring when they crossed the bridge 400 feet above a 3 degree glide slope ?

[JPJP]

Hi JPJP,
Thanks for TipToe Visual Chart.
Quote:
Therefore: at 1900 feet, the aircraft is 400 feet high, 5 miles from the runway.
Even if they were 400 feet higher than the 3 deg slope at 5nm, then their approach path is still only 3.75 degs. (Marseille Provence RW 31R has ILS GP set at 4 degs).
It should not be a problem for crews ahead of their aircraft.

I completely agree. None of this is an excuse for crashing an aircraft.

[olasek]

Therefore: at 1900 feet, the aircraft is 400 feet high
You keep repeating this 400 feet like a broken record. It was never 400 feet, it is actually around 230 feet when you use rigorous trigonometry, much less dramatic number.

[cwatters]

Some new pics of Asiana being hauled away. Amazing more people weren't killed.

https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B08e...it?usp=sharing

Quite a lot of seats seem to have failed where they attach to the floor, despite the forces being survivable?...or are they designed to break free?

[BOAC]

May I interrupt all this discussion about "3 degrees" to point out that despite what the TipToe chart tells you:-

a) A LOC does not have a (3 degree) glideslope

b) The VGSI are set at 3 degrees, but the RNAV arrival has a 2.85 slope, so if they were trying for that, they would see the odd red.

[Airbubba]

In this entire thread, the above is the first reference I can find to '180 at 5' and is from Post #1353 (page 68 currently), an NTSB briefing summary by Knot Apilot.

You can find the actual verbiage from Debbie Hersman's July 9, 2013 NTSB briefing here at about 15:10 in the clip:

C-SPAN (http://www.c-span.org/Events/NTSB-Briefing-on-Asiana-Airline-Plane-Crash/10737440372-3/)

The 160 knot landing flap limit cited by Ms. Hersman seems low to me, as discussed earlier, perhaps this is not correct.

[Vasco dePilot]

1. 1900ft at 5 miles is high on any 777's approach. That is a fact!
Whether the 5 mile point is 280ft above a 3deg slope or 400ft above the 300ft/mile formula used by most pilots is a moot point. The NTSB report will probably comment on that.
2. If the airplane is on the glideslope, being 43 knots above Vref at 180 knots at 5 miles might be OK. However, the combination of 280'-400' above the glideslope and 43 knots above Vref is a dilemma. Experienced 777 pilots will have skill and techniques to resolve it, however a trainee may not. When he is being supervised by a new training captain, the cheese holes are getting nicely lined up.
I invite other 777 pilots to tell us how they prefer to deal with this situation.

[nigegilb]

Couple of points about the visual into SFO. Generally speaking 28L is fairly straightforward and often given to heavies. 28R can be much more challenging because airspace restrictions and noise abatement often mean a very high initial approach path. Someone earlier mentioned that ATC always know the ac limits. I beg to differ. With the greatest respect to SFO ATC I often think they presume a Heavy can do the same thing as a 737 we can't and some times the approach to the visual is absolutely on or beyond the limits of the ac performance. Someone mentioned the last crash at SFO being 40 odd years ago. Of much more interest would be the stats on go arounds at SFO. I think they should be looked at as part of this safety review. I have never seen as many ac go around at an international airport.

A final point on speeds. Heathrow ATC are always alert to what speed you have bugged on the MCP because they can see it. Heathrow controllers routinely space ac 3-31/2 miles apart on the approach, anyone tempted to bring the speed back early ( normal to get 160 to 4 DME ) can often get a correcting call by the approach controller because he/she is working so incredibly tightly with following ac. This could well have an effect on crews operating elsewhere. I am much more relaxed taking an "overview" on speed control with US ATC because the margins generally are not as tight, but if you slowed 2nm early at LHR you could well get ATC on your back in the nicest possible way. Not sure how compelled the Asiana crew felt to comply but it is good to get this stuff into the open.

[olasek]

However, the combination of 280'-400' above the glideslope and 43 knots above Vref is a dilemma.
Clearly it was not a big dilemma for these two pilots, they not only managed to lose all the excess energy but even fell way below it.

[suninmyeyes]

CONF iture

With regard to the low airspeed warning you asked

What is exactly that aural message ?
NTSB has not yet mentioned anything like it on the CVR ...
Could it be inhibited due to higher priority aural message or stick shaker ?

It is a message on the Eicas screen accompanied by a brief beeper which gives two beeps and the yellow master cautions illuminate.

No it would not have been inhibited and occurs when airspeed is below manoeuvering speed but before the stick shaker activates. However it is not very loud compared to say the autopilot disconnect.

[Vasco dePilot]

nigegilb.
Very well said Sir.:D

[Desert185]

Ross M

Quote:
After I read so many things about a "challenging" (visual) approach for 28L at SFO I wanted to know when the last incident/accident was:
It was in 1968! with an JAL DC-8 on the ILS and hit the water 2,5 mls before the TH (quite similair to the Asiana) but without ILS.
Interesting. An uncanny similarity (Wiki excerpted):

(1) Captain Asoh was a veteran pilot with roughly 10,000 hours of flight time

(2) His first officer, Captain Joseph Hazen, had similar flight time, but little DC-8 experience.

(3) Captain Asoh attempted an automatic-coupled Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach

They were mighty lucky though (unlike our Asiana): "None of the 96 passengers or 11 crew were injured in the landing."

I only hope Asiana and the flight crew have the moral courage to use the "Asoh defence": Asoh, when asked by the NTSB about the landing, reportedly replied, "As you Americans say, I fu_ck_ed up."


And neither were listening to the American PFE who saved the day by pushing the power levers up, resulting in a slight pitch up prior to touchdown at low tide (as relayed to me by himself). I love a good PFE.

[lomapaseo]

Quite a lot of seats seem to have failed where they attach to the floor, despite the forces being survivable?...or are they designed to break free?

Like all aircraft parts they are designed not to break below a limit load.

Variations typically follow load patterns in a crash impact

Survivability has more to do with load patterns on the human body. Obviously variable after they break loose with or from a seat. It never implies all will survive

[Bob Zuruncle]

Airbubba

"The 160 knot landing flap limit cited by Ms. Hersman seems low to me, as discussed earlier, perhaps this is not correct."

She went to great pains to emphasize that this was information that came from the pilot interviews. Maybe Asiana has a policy of not selecting flaps until X knots below the limiting speed??? (whatever X may be), and perhaps that is what the pilots were relating to their interviewers.

What she actually said was..... "This information, again, came from the crew interviews. Approach asked them to maintain 180 kts until they were about about 5 miles out. This aircraft has a max 160 kts to put down the landing flaps for their final configuration."

[RoyHudd]

Non-heavy jet pilots seem determined to make their point that hot and high at 4 miles is no problem for competent crews.

WRONG!!! Unstable approaches are common and need to be managed expertly and quickly. And I am given the recipe for a hot and high approach on 1 in 4 of my ops into the USA and Canada....and Mexico and the Caribbean for that matter.

Sadly the few qualified folk seem to be outnumbered by the many who do not do the job day in, day out of operating heavy jets.

In a thread like this, the noise level of self-appointed experts is high, and the practical relevance of their input is zero.

I wouldn't voice my views on cardiac surgery or mechanical engineering on a professional website unless I WAS a professional. These arrogant SOB's see themselves differently.

Wrap up please, guys or head to the Spotters forums. :ugh:

[FO Cokebottle]

MPN11,

With all due respects Sir, I never said that it was ATC's responsibility. However, ATC are instructed on aircraft performance as part of their training.

In Amercia charts are designed to TERPS specifications. Elsewhere ICAO - Then local circumstances are considered. Not the other way around.

Hence, my post never indicated ATC was to blame.

I have always held the belief, since first venturing into USA Airspace, that ATC assumes that you, as the pilot, can be at a cleared to reference point in space at an particular altitude, speed and heading - hence, they assume you know how to fly. Where as in Europe, it is very procedural for obvious reasons.

I do not want to get into a p@#sing contest here but the obvious is the obvious.

I offer the AMS ATC instruction of when you are all set up with SPY, "xxxx direct to PAM decend to xxxx'" other than the terminal chart, please indicate where PAM is annotated on any STAR, APP PLATE or SID. yes indeed it, "only works because those in the know".

Interestingly, you contradict yourself with the statement "only works because those in the know ignore 180/5 and play 180/7".

If applying airmanship is "being in the know" which you seem to allude to some secret society, I stand guilty as charged - Sir

On QUIET BRIDGE approach at the bridge it is recommended to be at 1900' but airmanship calls for a more "gentlemanly" consideration to be at 1800' then a left side-step to align with the centre-line and, how to say this politely, and a momentary increase in loss of altitude to pick up the proper "sight picture" - having disenguaged all automation prior to the BRIDGE.

Two points to keep in perspective:

Flying is NOT a science its an ART

This accident commenced to happen at 500'

[olasek]

QUIET BRIDGE approach at the bridge it is recommended to be at 1900'
Slight correction - in all likelihood it was a TIPP TOE approach, same numbers though.

[Lonewolf_50]

Two points to keep in perspective:

Flying is NOT a science its an ART
It's both. ;)

EDIT:
OK Horatio. Have it your way.

[Horatio]

Oh dear!
Why don't all you armchair experts wait until the AIB conclusion? So much hot air from so many non qualified experts. Always the same with any any accident or incident; drives me crazy.

[FO Cokebottle]

Lonewolf_50,

LMAO....

yeap - should have added, "within the laws of physics/aerodynamics"

Sorry ;)

by the way, this was an actual instruction given to me from AMS ATC..."xxxxx direct PAM decend to xxxx, speed, as fast as you dare".

Go figure......:ok:

[Horatio]

Lone Wolf...my point is 115 pages of unadulterated crap, interspaced with some reasonable conjectures, but all are speculative and worth sod all until the official publication. As I said 'armchair experts'!

[olasek]

but all are speculative and worth sod all until the official publication
But this is the purpose of such forums - they exist to discuss things and not wait till the official reports, such wait can be very long. Snuffing out discussion would be equally extreme as 115 pages of the so called "crap". But if you want to improve your reading experience and avoid most of this 'crap' then change the forum - there are other aviation forums where participants are almost all pilots and your ratio of sensible/bad posts increase dramatically.

[OK465]

You can find the actual verbiage from Debbie Hersman's July 9, 2013 NTSB briefing here at about 15:10 in the clip:

Airbubba,

Listened again, and indeed the 'spokesbabe' was quoted correctly then in the referenced earlier post, and, as stated, it had yet to be corroborated by the CVR. Thanks. :)

Concerning the 180 at 5, as an aside, looking at some of the earlier graphs provided by an apparently meticulous HITL poster, if accurate, it appears they had difficulty slowing up to 180 at 5 if it was requested.

In the opposite vein, I once took a particular aircraft into a civilian field for an airshow static display and was asked by approach to maintain 170 to the marker.

I had to reply, "Unable.....this thing won't fly that slow". :}

Know your aircraft.

[West Coast]

nigegilb

"I am much more relaxed taking an "overview" on speed control with US ATC because the margins generally are not as tight"

Please don't be so relaxed. At certain airports (ORD regularly) separation can be as little as 2.5 miles.

[Armchair_Ace]

Royhudd,

Quote:These arrogant SOB's see themselves differently: unquote
Excuse me, Captain, please look in the mirror.

[BBK]

Bravo!!:D

I got slapped down for saying I thought SFO could be challenging. I'm no expert but I think I'm entitled to an opinion having been slam dunked pretty much every time I've come in from the north.

Re TIPP TOES, QUIET BRIDGE and the like - I don't think that's confirmed until you're at 11,000 approaching the field so that makes for another curve ball. Yes manageable of course, that's what we are paid for. The same goes for whether it's 28L or 28R. As NigeG said it is probably easier going left hand downwind although watch the terrain. Going downwind right hand it is very difficult to know when they will turn you onto base leg. I got it wrong once, admittedly when a fresh 'un, called for gear and flap and was then taken 20 miles downwind much to the amusement of the other chaps. Didn't stop reminding me the whole trip!

[Lord Spandex Masher]

1. 1900ft at 5 miles is high on any 777's approach. That is a fact!

I'm genuinely interested in this statement. Are you implying that a 777 won't cope with a 3.6/7ish glide slope?

[RetiredF4]

http://www.pprune.org/7933003-post1410.html

If this post is not only led by imagination but resembles some reality, then the Asiana flight was at 2250 feet at 5 miles (recommended is 1900 feet) and descended through 1900 feet not before 4 miles.
Same with speed, which was closer to 190 knots at 5 miles than the 180 requested by ATC and it slowed through 180 kts at around 3.5 miles.

As said before, one of the main tasks in the pointy front is managing energy.
If the approach has its traps (not saying that it is a fact though) concerning speed and altitude (higher than optimal), then there is no sense in adding extra speed and hight for grandma or who ever is important to you.

This Asiana flight flew a higher and faster profile than requested by ATC or as published by the VAP, the trap was self constructed.

Edit: i,m aware that the author used FA data and there is GS influence as well, but compared to the other flown profiles this aproach looks in shambles already at 5 miles.

[PPRuNe Towers]

Rest time till we get more information or the preliminary.

Rob

[PPRuNe Towers]

Many thanks to the PPRuNer who passed the following on. Well worth a read of this non tabloid report.

S.Korea Asked Asiana to Improve Safety 2 Months Before Crash - Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-17/south-korea-asked-asiana-to-improve-safety-2-months-before-crash.html)

Rob

[Non Zero]

From "this non tabloid report"

Asiana also pledged to adopt fatigue risk management systems and improve communication in the cockpit, Kwon said.

They actually admit they need to improve communication in the cockpit? Must non be the same Korean attitude I use to deal with!

[thcrozier]

1900ft at 5 miles is high on any 777's approach. That is a fact!
I'm genuinely interested in this statement. Are you implying that a 777 won't cope with a 3.6/7ish glide slope?

It's about 32,000 feet from the bridge to the aiming point.

Arcsine(1,900/32,000)=3.4 degrees.

Arcsine(2,250/32,000)= about 4 degrees

Can the plane do that or not?

[HazelNuts39]

Arcsine(1,900/32,000)=3.4 degrees.Simultaneously the speed must be reduced from 180 kt to 137 kt which, in terms of energy, is equivalent to 600 ft height, i.e.:

Arcsine(2,500/32,000)= 4.5 degrees.

And if you want to be stabilized by 1000 ft it is:

Arcsine(1500/12,000)=7,2 degrees.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

But only if you're fast. The original comment stated that 1900@5 was high on any approach. Is it?

[A Squared]

Simultaneously the speed must be reduced from 180 kt to 137 kt which, in terms of energy, is equivalent to 600 ft height, i.e.:

Arcsine(2,500/32,000)= 4.5 degrees.

Which only is valid if you assume no power reduction. That's not a valid assumption. An airliner passing a perfect 5 mile/3 degree FAF fully configured and on Vref is going to carry a substantial amount of thrust to stay at V ref.

[lakedude]

CNN is reporting that Asiana Airlines Flight 214 passenger Ye Mengyan died as a result of being run over.

Coroner: Asiana passenger killed by rescue vehicle, was alive at time - CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/travel/asiana-airlines-crash/index.html)

[OK465]

Simultaneously the speed must be reduced from 180 kt to 137 kt which, in terms of energy, is equivalent to 600 ft height....

HN39,

If, in fact (TBD), 180 was requested to some point (the bridge?)....

....is it the equivalent extra energy that's of real significance, or the remaining time/distance to dissipate it that is important?

I don't believe you're implying that any necessary speed reduction could not be conducted at a 3.4 degree FPA? (which is of course operationally different from flying a constant 4.5 degree FPA at a constant 137 KCAS)

Are you?

Can the plane do that or not?

It's done at least a couple of times every week in 777s from Heathrow non-stop to San Diego with no ILS GS available, a 3.5 degree PAPI and a declared LDA of 7591'.

The real question is can the pilot do it?

[HazelNuts39]

An airliner passing a perfect 5 mile/3 degree FAF fully configured and on Vref is going to carry a substantial amount of thrust to stay at V ref.
Sure, but to reduce the total energy at a rate equivalent to a flight path angle of 4.5 degrees you need to reduce the thrust and/or increase drag,

OK465,

I'm saying that if you descend at an angle of 3.4 degrees while reducing speed from 180 to 137 kt your thrust minus drag is equal to that for a 4.5 degree angle at constant speed.

[jugofpropwash]

Just a note - the girl was killed by the fire truck:

Coroner: Asiana Airline victim was alive until killed by rescue unit - CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/travel/asiana-airlines-crash/index.html?hpt=hp_c2)

[Agaricus bisporus]

Well, the ground accident doesn't surprise me one bit. I've only had to evacuate once (no nosewheel landing) and by far the most frightening thing about the whole event was standing on the runway watching a herd of fire trucks thundering towards us in a cloud of black diesel smoke - it was like watching a tsunami coming at you. Ever since I've always added suitable remarks to my crew about action to be taken after an evacuation that isn't in the ops manual.
I feel so sorry for the poor firecrew...how awful must they be feeling - as lifesavers.

Its surprising this sort of thing doesn't happen more often.

[Sawbones62]

When I was a new flight surgeon in the RCAF, 25 years ago, part of my job was to ride in the crash ambulance for the frequent crash drills and occasional crash response. It was a beefy 4x4 truck that could run over almost anything out on that big prairie airfield. Great fun, better than pilot medicals anyway.

It was drilled into me by the Base Surgeon and Fire Chief that we were to approach scenes carefully, scanning the ground despite any spectacle and using a "walker" in front of us if there was any doubt, (i.e. night, tall grass). During one night time "OpEval" the HQ staff had strewn mannequins in dark coveralls around a crash site to see if we would crush one in all the excitement.

ARFF on military airfields was pretty well staffed in those days, but I wonder how many crew were in the SFO ARFF foam trucks? FAA FAR 139:319 states the trucks need to be crewed to permit the "minimum agent discharge rates". That could just be a driver alone who can flip on the foam switch. That's just one pair of eyes.

The NFPA has a recommended a more robust ARFF staffing level, but of course that isn't required and so not followed at most civil fields I've seen.

The NTSB will look at the ARFF response, I suspect will see something about the minimal ARFF staffing at Cat B airports.

[jugofpropwash]

More info regarding the girl being hit here:

Coroner: Crash survivor was run over - SFGate (http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Coroner-Crash-survivor-was-run-over-4674928.php)

They say they have no idea how she ended up in the location where she was hit - which would appear to be between between the leading edge of the left wing and the escape slide. She had been sitting near the back of the plane with the other girl who was thrown from the plane and killed.

[bobcat4]

A Squared wrote:

An airliner passing a perfect 5 mile/3 degree FAF fully configured and on Vref is going to carry a substantial amount of thrust to stay at V ref.

How can you pass 5 mile and be fully configured when you’re instructed to be at 180 knots to 5 miles?

And... Is that 5 from threshold or 5 from DME? In SFO that's a pretty big difference. Remember, glide slope was offline and they were on a visual approach, so the crew could be using SFO VOR as DME reference instead of the terminal DME.

[A Squared]

How can you pass 5 mile and be fully configured when you’re instructed to be at 180 knots to 5 miles?

And... Is that 5 from threshold or 5 from DME? In SFO that's a pretty big difference. Remember, glide slope was offline and they were on a visual approach, so the crew could be using SFO VOR as DME reference instead of the terminal DME.

The discussion was about energy state relative to a normal 3 degree descent profile. It is only peripherally connected to the instructions which Asiana 214 may have received.

[thcrozier]

It's pretty obvious that from whatever condition it was in over the bridge, it can decelerate and descend quickly enough to put it at a speed of 103 before reaching and below the seawall, which I believe is 12 feet high.

[MU3001A]

Per NOS chart plan view note:

"1900 (for Class B Airspace) Recommended until San Mateo Bridge or SFO 6 DME"

Per text description:

"Aircraft should cross ... The San Mateo Bridge at or above 1900."

So which is it, recommended or required? And from whence does the recommendation/requirement derive?

Class B chart shows protected Class B airspace aligned with 28 L/R extends from 10,000' down to the surface out to SFO 7 NM in the region of the bridge, with adjacent Class B airspace extending from 10,000' down to 1,500' between SFO 7 and 10 NM.

[r747]

As I recall, the 250 knot restriction was introduced in the late 1960s. The 210 and 180 restrictions came a few years later, after discussions between the FAA and airlines.

I do not think there is any airspeed tolerance to speed restrictions given by Approach Control. Using the standard 3 mile in trail spacing, if the lead aircraft reduces to 170 knots and the following aircraft increases to 190 knots knots, there will be a loss of separation. I have been given a side step to another runway by Approach Control, and another time a go-around, because the preceding aircraft did not comply with the issued speed restriction.

You can be stable by 1000 ft. in a B747-400, if you establish gear down, flaps 20, and 180 knots until 5 miles. Critics will say you are using flaps for drag, but it is better than using flaps 5 until 5 miles, thereby risking an unstable approach.

[fotoguzzi]

@jugofpropwash

[Not a pilot] I can understand (I suppose) a couple of occupied seats falling out near the threshold through the large hole in the rear pressure bulkhead. I have not yet found a decent picture of the bulkhead, but I see that it's pretty broken. I understand that people easily used it as an exit when the plane came to rest.

But what other ways were there out of the plane? Through the one exit door that fell off? Was there another hole in the plane that ejected one or more passenger? Or did more people fall through the bulkhead gash much nearer to the final resting spot of the plane?

[iflytb20]

Apologies if this has been posted earlier. Pictures of the aircraft while it was being removed from the crash location.
http://leehamnews.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/asiana.pdf

[flyingchanges]

It's pretty obvious that from whatever condition it was in over the bridge, it can decelerate and descend quickly enough to put it at a speed of 103 before reaching and below the seawall, which I believe is 12 feet high.

If they had been asked to hold 210KTS until 5 miles, they would have made it...

[bubbers44]

A normal pilot would be at 137 knots and descending at 700 fpm by 500 feet. Why couldn't they? All of us Western people have had no problem with it for decades. I did it 100s of times to 28L with no glide slope. Why couldn't they?

Should we have special regulations for foreign carriers that can't do a visual approach or just not allow them into our airports until they conform to our standards? How hard is looking out the window and lining up with a runway and have a clue how it should look?

[jugofpropwash]

fotoguzzi-

My understanding is that the only seats ejected were those of the rear-most flight attendants. The passengers who were thrown out the back were not found in their seats - whether that means their belts weren't tight or whether the seats failed will be something I assume we will eventually learn.

The question remains about the other girl killed - the one hit by the vehicle. If she was ejected or otherwise exited through the rear, then either she walked or someone carried her to the position where she was struck. I'd suppose it's also possible someone could have carried her down the slide, then laid her down in what they thought was a safe place in order to go help someone else.

[thcrozier]

"Aircraft should cross ... The San Mateo Bridge at or above 1900."

So which is it, recommended or required? And from whence does the recommendation/requirement derive?


Good question. As a native English speaker and being fluent in 2 languages, the text has me confused.

As a former pilot, because I flew smaller aircraft I was always turned left base to final inside the bridge whenever VMC prevailed.

Nevertheless, has it not been established that they crossed the bridge at 2250?

[White None]

not allow them into our airports until they conform to our standards?

I'm afraid my comment on this may not be popular but if all countries adopted that approach, you may find that some US aircrew might struggle outside their homeland. Just because you have a large landmass, large economy etc does not justify riding roughshod over standard R/T, or pitching the level of expectation at those highly familiar with airport quirks. Throw a US only driver familiar and competent on his network into a busy holding scenario with Thunderstorms over Bombay and all of a sudden the roles might just reverse. As an English only speaker who has taken Heavy Jets to Europe, Asia, OZ, Middle East, NAM I can honestly say, and I am not alone in this, that it is easier to operate into some foreign language speaking ports but with careful spoken, phonetically correct, standard, (IAW signed up agreements), appropriately paced R/T, than it is into my absolute favourite nightstop, SFO. I'm not trying to be argumentative but surely the challenge should be to eradicate ANY possible contributory factors to this accident, not just focus on what MAY be the prime reason of a poorly flown (crashed) Viz Appr.
Finally, if you are going to use the phrase our standards I -> AGREE <- with you, BUT please look inwards and at ATC/Procedures as well as at us Pesky Foreigners. :ok:

[Cows getting bigger]

Should we have special regulations for foreign carriers that can't do a visual approach or just not allow them into our airports until they conform to our standards? How hard is looking out the window and lining up with a runway and have a clue how it should look?

That must be one of the most bigoted comments here so far. Maybe the rest of the world shouldn't use your airports until you can convince us that your crash rescue crews can safely attend an incident without killing the people they are meant to be saving? Or maybe we shouldn't fly 777s until we know that escape slides will not inflate inside the aircraft? (Yes, said in an antagonistic manner and by no means the way I think).

A better thing to do is look at the accident in its entirety and ensure that all lesson are learnt. FWIW, my view is that the following may need some thought and action:

Asiana training, CRM and SOPs
Boeing 777 cockpit switchery and the 'FDLC Trap'
Emergency slide deployment
Slam Dunks
ATC phraseology/terminology
Airport fire services SOPs
Runway maintenance planning

There are probably a lot more. If the only outcome of the investigation is a quick broadside at the Koreans then the NTSB will have completely failed in meeting their responsibilities.

[fox niner]

I agree, cows getting bigger.

Of course the PRIMARY NTSB recommendation will be something like:
"It is emphasized that aircrews must always monitor airspeed while flying, and always be ready to intervene in the AP system when necessary."

To me, as a pilot, this means that I will not learn anything from this crash. I have said about the same thing after the Turkish crash here in AMS.
Monitoring your airspeed -as a pilot- is sooooo basic, that it is unbelievable that there are people in a cockpit "flying" without watching their instruments! And simply letting it happen....

And then there are other symptoms/causes/contributing factors/etc. that others will learn something from. Sure, and this is also very noteworthy and necessary to investigate. But it will not have any direct influence on the way I fly airplanes.

[Tarq57]

TBH, looking at the pictures of the wreckage under removal, I think that some of the more salient lessons to come out of this one will be those to do with survival aspects.

That aircraft is severely damaged, yet apart from the area around the tail, it more or less held together. Some of the seats had concertina-d. It's little wonder there were serious injuries. It would seem to me that the impact was pretty much at the upper limit of what could be termed a survivable accident.

Hopefully some direction or recommendations will come out, particularly to do with seat integrity and overhead locker restraints.

Secondly, I'm pi$$ed at those criticizing the airport fire crew that ran over the passenger. Without wanting to second-guess the outcome of the inquiry concerning that aspect of the accident, I would not be surprised in the slightest if that event is the part of it that will indeed be termed an accident. (As in: unavoidable.)

Nobody is likely to be harder on the driver of that fire tender than the person who was driving it.

[funfly]

Looking at the pictures of the interior of the aircraft certainly puts the difficulties of evacuation into perspective. Not quite as simple as the cabin staff dance routine would suggest. :=

[Smott999]

If, as the plane rotated, she was ejected out the back while the fuselage spun away counter clockwise, leaving her to the left side in front of the wing. Might explain that no one saw her get out the slide....also perhaps she was incapacitated and unable to get up and away from the on coming vehicles...

All conjecture of course. Terribly sad.

[RobertS975]

Cows said: "A better thing to do is look at the accident in its entirety and ensure that all lesson are learnt. FWIW, my view is that the following may need some thought and action:

Asiana training, CRM and SOPs
Boeing 777 cockpit switchery and the 'FDLC Trap'
Emergency slide deployment
Slam Dunks
ATC phraseology/terminology
Airport fire services SOPs
Runway maintenance planning"

While I do not disagree that all of the above deserve attention, it still cannot explain how an experienced crew (or even an inexperienced crew) allowed their airspeed to bleed off to just over 100 kts

[fotoguzzi]

@iflybt20

[Not a pilot] Thanks. Image 11 shows better than any of the previous photographs that I had seen how people could have been ejected from that portion of the plane and remained relatively intact.

[A Squared]

It's pretty obvious that from whatever condition it was in over the bridge, it can decelerate and descend quickly enough to put it at a speed of 103 before reaching and below the seawall, which I believe is 12 feet high.

Yes.

All the discussion about glide angles, energy states, kinetic energy vs heights, etc. misses the point. Given that the flight was significantly higher than the restriction on the Charted Visual Procedure, and considerably faster than the speed restriction assigned by ATC, the fact that the plane ended up short of the threshold, lower than the runway and much slower than V-ref, demonstrates pretty conclusively that it was well within the capabilities of the airplane to slow to approach speed starting from 1900' at 5 NM and 180 knots.

[jugofpropwash]

An account of the flight attendant who was trapped by the slide - by her husband who happened to be on board:

In Asiana crash, a husband's worst nightmare (http://news.yahoo.com/asiana-crash-husbands-worst-nightmare-153709705.html)

[HazelNuts39]

it was well within the capabilities of the airplane to slow to approach speed starting from 1900' at 5 NM and 180 knots.
Sure, that's not the difficult part.

[awblain]

While important, the arrival of an ambulance on the scene of an accident can probably usually wait for a few more minutes than the arrival of a fire truck.

If there's no rescue crew there on time, then the need for a medical team is likely to be moot.

[220mph]

While important, the arrival of an ambulance on the scene of an accident can probably usually wait for a few more minutes than the arrival of a fire truck.

If there's no rescue crew there on time, then the need for a medical team is likely to be moot.

The majority of the emergency response group did not appear to arrive on site until more than 20 minutes after the crash - as can be seen in the amateur video of the incident. This is backed up by the media reports that passengers who escaped and made their way towards the approach end of the runway, who found and were attempting to care for the seriously injured passengers, had to call 911 more than 20 minutes after the crash and essentially beg for help.

By all appearances - even 20+ minutes after the crash - there was almost no no emergency response to much of the accident scene. In the video you can see a police car race past the fuselage heading towards the approach end at high speed - but if memory serves me, that was just slightly before the larger group of ambulances etc arrived there.

[poina]

It would be interesting to hear what was discussed on the approach briefing, if there was one, prior to tod.
Did the new check airman in the right seat have the trainee scroll thru the map page and point out possible speed/alt hoowahs?
Did he brief the trainee on the approach notes emphasizing dme and altitudes and the configuration which would put them in the best energy state for a stabilized app by 1000 ft?
Did he make the trainee use the sec flt plan for possible runway changes?
Did he have the trainee explain the ma procedure for their primary/sec flt plan as written in their procedures?
These would be just a few of the items, but it lets the trainee know just WHO is in command, and on this flight there was no one in that capacity.

I always felt this was essential, more so with new captains, along with saying " if I'm not happy at 1000ft. I will take control."

I agree that fatigue had a role, however rest could have been rearranged to be back in the seat 3 hours out. I'm guessing on this but I played it this way on the MD11 as we always did double crew.
Anyway, long haul with 2 crews was never as bad as 2100 hr dept for SLC-DEN-OAK-DEN-SLC arriving at 0600.

So the point of this long, boring post is the need for communication, exercising command, using all the whiz bang tools of modern aviation, and assessing the ability of the trainee, and bottom line, if you're not happy with anything then fly it yourself.

[220mph]

More info regarding the girl being hit here:

Coroner: Crash survivor was run over - SFGate

They say they have no idea how she ended up in the location where she was hit - which would appear to be between between the leading edge of the left wing and the escape slide. She had been sitting near the back of the plane with the other girl who was thrown from the plane and killed.

The question remains about the other girl killed - the one hit by the vehicle. If she was ejected or otherwise exited through the rear, then either she walked or someone carried her to the position where she was struck. I'd suppose it's also possible someone could have carried her down the slide, then laid her down in what they thought was a safe place in order to go help someone else.

Secondly, I'm pi$$ed at those criticizing the airport fire crew that ran over the passenger. Without wanting to second-guess the outcome of the inquiry concerning that aspect of the accident, I would not be surprised in the slightest if that event is the part of it that will indeed be termed an accident. (As in: unavoidable.)

If, as the plane rotated, she was ejected out the back while the fuselage spun away counter clockwise, leaving her to the left side in front of the wing. Might explain that no one saw her get out the slide....also perhaps she was incapacitated and unable to get up and away from the on coming vehicles...

All conjecture of course. Terribly sad.

I made an initial post on this here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-96.html#post7937757)...

Which led me to do a detailed review of the photo evidence and videos here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-101.html#post7939704)

I documented the time line and actions of the fire response team, primarily to look at the circumstances of the young girl's being run over. My initial gut feel when I first saw the video was that fire trucks were unorganized and were literally driving thru the escaping passengers forcing some to scramble it seemed to avoid the trucks.

What I saw initiallyprompted my much more detailed review (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-101.html#post7939704).

I gathered as much hi-rez photo evidence as possible, and then reviewed the invaluable amateur video - which captured from seconds after the airframe came to rest (even before slides were deployed) until appx 11+ minutes - in a contiguous uninterrupted block - then another many minutes sequence after a short break to apparently change SD cards.

I started out trying to determine what the evidence showed regarding the tragic situation with this young girl. By the time I was done several hours later, the incident response plan and training - the appearance of lack of organization, the failure to muster an emergency response throughout the entire scene, and the seeming complete inability to manage the fire once it got into the fuselage - had become, to me at least, another issue on top of the girls death.

In my opinion, admittedly from a layman, but with significant disaster response/emergency preparedness training ... :

(a.) it is inexcusable that this girl was run over - it could not have occurred until some 11+ minutes after the impact as:

(1)video shows no fire truck went that close to the aircraft before that, and most certainly did not approach that close to the aircraft in the direction the tire tracks over the girl showed,
(2) no foam at all was deployed for many minutes, until well after almost all pax escape activity in the area was over, and then only minimal isolated foam under the wing was deployed until more than 12+ minutes after the crash when the fuselage became engulfed in fire,
(3) the SAME fire truck was on station from minutes after the crash - in the the same vicinity as, and with an excellent view of, where the girl was run over - from before any foam was applied. The video shows this truck sat largely stationary (with a few changes of position,) with the cab within 30-50 feet away and facing the location where the girl was run over, from a few minutes after impact until it finally ran out of foam apx 17 minutes after the crash.
(4) this same truck monitored this area - to left side of aircraft, facing the left wing and rearmost forward slide - for the entire period, was the fire truck to apply the minimal targeted initial foam under the wing pylon, also was the truck that applied more significant foam after the fuselage became fully engaged, and by appearances, was also likely the truck that ran over the girl
(5) some have noted an early photo by an evac'ing PAX that seems to show some debris near where the girl was - yet later similar PAX photos show large numbers of people standing in same spot as the de-planed down the slide. If an injured young girl was there it is inconceivable to me all these people were ignoring her

(b.) the fire response appeared, to me at best, haphazard and disorganized, as:

(1) the initial trucks to arrive clearly appear to have driven thru streams of evac'ing PAX - and appear to have caused some to take action to get out of the way. This despite there being no evidence of fire on that left side of the aircraft,
(2) initial arriving trucks did not seem to have a clear plan - they got to the aircraft then some bunched up, then some drove back and forth. I understand they were likely looking for fire etc, however it would seem, with the admitted advantage of hindsight, that every truck should have a clearly delineated position, with the trucks initially ringing the aircraft.
(3) Despite the lack of fire on left side (there was no fire on left side, and no fire in the fuselage by all appearances, until something more than 12+ minutes after the crash), and passengers on the ground initially, NO truck had an outside spotter,
(4)This seems a serious safety breech. It may not have prevented the death - as once the fuselage was engulfed in flame it would probably have been deemed unsafe to have a spotter on foot outside, however had they had a spotter on the ground in the 12+ minutes before flames erupted, understanding the same truck was in roughly that same spot very near, and with good view of, the girls location, it seems unlikely she would not have been seen before the truck began the large scale foaming, more than 12 minutes after the crash.
(5) this same truck is the one that sprayed all the foam on the left side (until more than 18 or so minutes had passed when it ran out of foam) - they would have been the same truck that covered the girl in foam
(6) once the fuselage was fully engaged in fire it seemed clear the fire crews had no useful training in fighting that type fire. With fire burning thru the top of the rounded fuselage, trucks on both sides of the aircraft tried to shoot foam at top of the airframe, with almost all of it simply spraying over the top to no effect. They continued this until multiple trucks used up all their foam.
(7) each truck is equipped with an extendable boom for exactly this purpose - so they can attack the fire from above, at an angle that gets foam on the fire. Only one truck - on right side, appeared to have deployed its boom. The truck in question on the left side appeared to try to deploy their boom, but it appeared it may not have been operational as it never sprayed foam.
(8) Admittedly with hindsight again, but assuming their booms were all inoperative, the way to attack the fire to me seemed to be they had to get to rear of fuselage and spray foam along its length - which would get into the top of fuselage where fire was. After two of the trucks on opposing sides exhausted, largely wasting, their entire foam supply shooting perpendicular to the airframe one truck did position at the tail and was having more success.

You can see all this for yourself if you wish, and make your own assessment - watch the video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=WczPnDDipKw)noted in my past post (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-101.html#post7939704) on this noted above.

I think its important to realize the fire in the fuselage did not occur until more than 12+ minutes after the crash. The fire initially seen was on right side of aircraft, I'm assuming related to the engine there. This was largely under control by all appearances from the photos and videos as the 1st video ended at 11+ minutes. When 2nd video started (after presumably an SD card change) the fuselage had caught fire.

A few more things - there really wasn't "chaos" if you watch the video or look at the pics. The crew in that fire truck largely sat looking at the side of the aircraft, and simply observed for most of the first 11+ minutes.

More importantly - they had a pretty much clear view of the slide. If someone was brought down the slide and laid down there - that occurred well after most passengers were off - and the fire crew should have seen it.

Again, I believe it impossible the girl could have been there from the beginning as pics show a large number of people standing in that area during the evac. Someone would have been seen helping the girl.

The aerial and other pics show there is also almost NO debris ahead of the aircraft - on the left side or ahead of the left wing. I believe simple physics along with that evidence makes it all but impossible she was thrown there in initial crash. And other PAX and the fire crew both should have seen her in the 11+ minutes before the truck appears to have run over her.

These are simply my observations and opinions after reviewing the available evidence in some detail. They have the admitted benefit of hindsight. They may well be wrong. They are intended to be illustrative, observational and constructive and not to attack those persons involved. Other facts may emerge that offer additional insight, but there is a large body of evidence available already including a mostly continuous video of the scene.

I must admit, my informed opinion is the death of the girl does seem inexcusable to me. And I sincerely hope the fire department does a similar review and looks at how they can better respond. If that fire had occurred earlier would could have had a situation where a lot of people survived the crash only to perish in fire.

Last - I think seeing how the airframe burned raises important questions. Both this instance and the Ethiopian 777 fire showed similar traits - It seems clear a few more minutes at the Etiopian fire could have looked much like this one. Once fully engaged the Ariana fire burned strongly. It seems a review of flammability of composite airframes should be in order.

Again - please read my more detailed review (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-101.html#post7939704) which give minute by minute timeline and includes links to the photos and videos discussed.

[bubbers44]

I thought all airline pilots could do visual approaches because the windshield view makes it quite easy. How did these four on a clear day hit the rocks and nobody say anything? How can you prevent this from happening again? I have no idea unless pilots look out the window and understand where they should be. Autolands are not always available. We can't lower standards to the lowest common denominator and be efficient in ATC. Either learn how to fly all approaches, including visuals, or get out of your seat.

[Daylight Robbery]

While I do not disagree that all of the above deserve attention, it still cannot explain how an experienced crew (or even an inexperienced crew) allowed their airspeed to bleed off to just over 100 kts

I've been dispatched a number of times in a 767 with autothrottle inop. Even though the need for vigilance in modes like VS was discussed, I've still seen people get caught out and get a little slow before they've realised they had to catch the speed manually. Especially if the autopilot is in, every part of you is expecting the autothrottle to push the thrust up when the speed comes back, even if you've pre briefed.

The method at my airline - 744/767/737 - is if you handfly on approach, take the auto throttle out, so everything is back to basics and makes sense and you're not expecting anything to happen for you. Not sure about the 777, but maybe there is some merit in this line of thinking for that type, too.

[flyingchanges]

It would be interesting to hear what was discussed on the approach briefing, if there was one, prior to tod.
Did the new check airman in the right seat have the trainee scroll thru the map page and point out possible speed/alt hoowahs?
Did he brief the trainee on the approach notes emphasizing dme and altitudes and the configuration which would put them in the best energy state for a stabilized app by 1000 ft?
Did he make the trainee use the sec flt plan for possible runway changes?
Did he have the trainee explain the ma procedure for their primary/sec flt plan as written in their procedures?
These would be just a few of the items, but it lets the trainee know just WHO is in command, and on this flight there was no one in that capacity.

No amount of briefing will fix the inability to fly a visual approach.

if I'm not happy at 1000ft. I will take control

How about if I'm not happy at 1,000' we are going around. If the situation is that bad, starting over vs salvaging is a better choice.

[ksa83ai]

Thanks for the link to the pics . I think that the T7 is a very durable airframe.

[aterpster]

flying changes:

How about if I'm not happy at 1,000' we are going around. If the situation is that bad, starting over vs salvaging is a better choice.

We have yet to learn how much fuel remaining Asiana had on board when commencing the visual.

[bubbers44]

I used 500 ft because at 1,000 you can still fix it safely and try to salvage the approach. Below 500 ft you have to really be on it. They were at 100 ft a half mile out slow and not correcting. I may be a bigot but I have a reason to be if this is standard operating procedures for them. Either conform or don't come here. We don't fly like that. You shouldn't be allowed to. The United flight waiting for departure could have easily been destroyed because of their lack of airmanship. But I am a bigot so shouldn't have an opinion. Bye.

[DWS]

Untitled on Vimeo

I'll bet you fly for american ??

" children of the magenta"

well worth watching for the laypersons like myself re flying

IMO- it sounds like a preview of what happened at SFO !!

[flyingchanges]

We have yet to learn how much fuel remaining Asiana had on board when commencing the visual.

More than enough to try again.

[bubbers44]

I flew for AA but the magenta line was only a guide for me. Not what I flew. Sometimes you had to fly what ever was neccesary to do what you had to do. We could do all approaches, precision, non precision and visuals with no problem. Nobody else should have a problem either.

[bubbers44]

AA pilots I flew with were not children of magenta. We could all fly raw data NDB and VOR approaches with no magenta. One dark night I was approaching an airport in East part of Dominican Republic and was told one minute out that the VOR was out and they were doing the NDB approach so in the clouds we reconfigured and broke out at 800 ft to land with a PAPI totally down to a 1.5 degree glide slope so we knew we were low so leveled to make it right. Pilots can not let stuff like this hurt them. Just be smart and plan ahead. We asked all these questions prior to departure but got nothing from company.

[fox niner]

The 777 is flown with the autothrottle on because of the autotrim system. Power changes are trimmed away.
If you leave the a/t off, YOU fly the plane while someone ELSE is trimming.

[LeadSled]

If you leave the a/t off, YOU fly the plane while someone ELSE is trimming.

foxniner,
You sure about that? How about the pilot flying handling the thrust levers and trim, just like we have done since pitch trim was invented some time shortly after 1901?

Re. the fatalities caused by fire and rescue teams, it is some years ago that a "night survivable accident" major exercise was conducted at YSSY.

In the post exercise wash-up, one conclusion was that, had it been a real situation, a major cause of fatalities would have been the fire appliances and other RFFS vehicles hitting those already evacuated.

I would not be too quick to criticise the emergency personnel, such fatalities or injuries are possible, and the risk of same can never be zero. Getting the foam on the fire is the first priority, for all the obvious reasons.

There is nothing remotely challenging about a visual approach to runways 28 at KSFO, for a pilot of the expected competence of one flying any transport aircraft.

However, having said that, cast your minds back to the JAL DC-8 that didn't even make the threshold, but flopped in the water well short. It was subsequently determined that the aircraft had actually touched the bridge, but this did not cause the accident.

[Willit Run]

From a Boeing trip7 manual;


Autothrottle Use;
Autothrottle use is recommended during all phases of flight. When in manual
flight, autothrottle use is also recommended, however manual thrust control may
be used to maintain pilot proficiency.

[fox niner]

LeadSled:

foxniner,
You sure about that? How about the pilot flying handling the thrust levers and trim

Absolutely positive. But let me rephrase.

If you leave the a/t off, YOU fly the plane while SOMETHING else is trimming, --> the autotrim system!
Every time you change power on the underslung engines, the aircraft will retrim, if the airspeed remains the same.
This is unlike all other, older Boeing aircraft, where you have to compensate yourself for the underslung engines while flying.
If you leave the autothrottle off in a 777, it is sort of "more demanding" to manually fly the airplane, because you have to compensate for the autotrim system in a way that you have never done on another a/c type before. It is "an annoying way of flying". It can be done though. But you have to be aware of the little details.

[Cagedh]

If you leave the autothrottle off in a 777, it is sort of "more demanding" to manually fly the airplane, because you have to compensate for the autotrim system in a way that you have never done on another a/c type before. It is "an annoying way of flying". It can be done though. But you have to be aware of the little details.

I have been flying Airbus for over a decade now and I have no experience in flying the 777.

When flying the A320 with A/P off and A/T off, there's no need to trim as the computers will prevent pitch change because of in/decreasing thrust (with A/T on or off). Are you telling me that on the T7 with A/T off, there's some strange function that has the pilot manually compensating/fighting against some special auto trim function? Please explain if that's the case, because that appears to be a very strange design feature! (NOT trying to start a Airbus-Boeing war, just being curious!)

[fox niner]

Cagedh:

I have exactly 0.00 hours flight experience in an Airbus. Only Boeing. But if I understand the posting you just made, the 777 autotrim function works in a similar way as on the Airbus. It prevents pitch changes by staying in trim. This is unlike any other previous Boeing type, such as the 737,747,757,767.
Also, the autotrim function on the 777 can not be switched off. It is simply there all the time. It also does not have any modes or features. it is always there to help you or annoy you.

[Speed of Sound]

The majority of the emergency response group did not appear to arrive on site until more than 20 minutes after the crash - as can be seen in the amateur video of the incident.

What do you mean by the MAJORITY did not appear? First on the scene should be the fire trucks and if my memory serves me well, the amateur video shows the first fire trucks there in under five minutes.

I think questions need to be asked about why they failed to put out what appeared to be a small engine fire before it spread to the fuselage and at one point in that video we saw two fire trucks firing water right over the top of the fuselage at each other! :confused:

[widow18]

Observations from a humble ex-commercial pilot, many crews have landed large jets with minimal or no loss of life after loss of all engines.How would this crew have coped with that situation, instead of having a perfectly serviceable aircraft on a clear day?

[olasek]

I spoke with a firefighter that actually works a the airport and trains putting out such fires, he says that it is often impossible to completely put down such post-crash fires, you spray first lightly to help with evacuation and later to keep the fire under reasonable control but often because of the amount of stored energy in the wreck it will keep smoldering but hopefully not too violently, evacuation is top priority and the rest is secondary.

[Cagedh]

fox niner

Well, in that case I do not understand why you say ... : "If you leave the autothrottle off in a 777, it is sort of "more demanding" to manually fly the airplane, because you have to compensate for the autotrim system in a way that you have never done on another a/c type before. It is "an annoying way of flying". It can be done though. But you have to be aware of the little details"

I fly the Airbus A/P and A/T off on most of my approaches and the fact that you do not have to trim is not problem whatsoever, on the contrary. Coming off B737 before joining the airbus fleet, it took me exactly 30 seconds to get used to that!

So if you say that "the 777 autotrim function works in a similar way as on the Airbus. It prevents pitch changes by staying in trim, I then do not understand why it would be "more demanding" or "annoying" to fly the 777 manually without A/T rather then when leaving the A/T thrust on.

[Kiwiconehead]

I don't understand that either.

normal manual steam driven driving - thrust change - change in stick force - trim

autotrim - thrust change - keep poling the same because computer fixes

How is that more demanding?

[ratarsedagain]

The trim system on the 777 compensates for thrust changes, configuration changes (gear, flap & speedbrake) and turns. It won't trim for speed changes.
So it doesn't matter if the auto throttle is in or out, if you're flying it manually it'll help you by compensating for all except speed changes.

[Cagedh]

So it doesn't matter if the auto throttle is in or out, if you're flying it manually it'll help you by compensating for all except speed changes. So... As the AA guy says in the "magenta line movie (http://vimeo.com/29642656#at=0)": if the automation does not perform as expected... Click, click (A/P off) and click, click (A/T off) and fly the plane in the direction and way you won't it to go!

Should be basic stuff for ANY airline pilot!

They're all big Cessna's!

[ratarsedagain]

Never disputed taking the automatics out and putting it where you want it......I was just telling you how the trim system worked on the 777 :ugh:

[flyingchanges]

today, with 3-400 Pax on board, levelling to fine tune to a correct approach below 800', they should be sacked NOT applauded


Exactly, they should have done nothing and crashed short of the runway.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

...or, go around as the approach is not stable. You know correct approach path?!

[misd-agin]

"If you leave the autothrottle off in a 777, it is sort of "more demanding" to manually fly the airplane, because you have to compensate for the autotrim system in a way that you have never done on another a/c type before. It is "an annoying way of flying". It can be done though. But you have to be aware of the little details."


What? More demanding? The 777 flies fine, and usually better, with the A/T's off.

[PJ2]

Do we know yet whether the autothrottles were engaged and do we know what the MCP Altitude was set at?

[bobcat4]

Do we know yet whether the autothrottles were engaged and do we know what the MCP Altitude was set at?

They (NTSB) said it was “armed”. I guess it was in "hold" as it didn't wake up and that the crew didn't notice (both A/T hold and the speed decay).

Even if they were not stable on final, they would probably be saved (landed safely or able to go around) if the A/T had woke up, or they had applied sufficient thrust to maintain Vref+. I believe the primary cause of this accident is a carbon copy of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951. The interesting part is WHY…

[PJ2]

bobcat4;

I think the accident also has elements of the Air India A320 accident at Bangalore. The report, (here (http://www.fss.aero/Bangalore.pdf.)), makes very interesting remarks regarding speed awareness and the inability to assess energy until it was too late. Around page 254 is interesting reading. Remarkably, the speeds in the Air India accident are similar to the Asiana speeds immediately prior to the accident - 132kts Vref (Vls +5), speed permitted to deteriorate to 106kts, no attempt to push the thrust levers into the kitchen and beyond. Alphaprot engaged at 110ft but the engines were at idle.

We have cars that now park themselves. How long do we think it will be before a new generation of drivers won't actually be able park their car without incident?

[BARKINGMAD]

AF447 THY @ AMS LIONAIR ASIANA @ SFO.

Reams of speculation about autopilots, autothrottles, PFDs, speed tapes, AoA probes, deck angles, alpha-floor protections and all the other widgets and bells and whistles which help to make the machine safer have filled these pages.

Then the discussion of full automatics versus part automatics versus clickety click "I have control" but somehow the pilot(s) involved manage to foul up bigtime.

My copy of the UKs CHIRP still regularly features flight crews, cabin crews and engineers and ATC operators complaining about the adverse effects of the modern thrusting dynamic push for productivity and stretching and sweating the assets.

I then have to watch the arrival of the EASA FTLs which are even more corporate-friendly than their predecessors whilst having observed the abuse of CAP371 by numerous UK airlines. Not a single pilot apparently on the bunch of Eurocrat :mad:s who've dreamt up this recipe for disaster.

How wonderful it would be to have the contributory cause of these apparently inexplicable accidents shouted from the rooftops as F A T I G U E.

But that will never happen, will it? The elephant in the room will be shuffled out to the yard and those higher in the food chain responsible for such a supervisory regime will retire and sleep easy without the prospect of a corporate manslaughter charge, prison sentence and the confiscation of all their assets disturbing their corporate psychotic sleep!

So carry on discussing trivia like HOW to perform an iexplicable CFIT but on no account give these unfortunate crews the excuse of dog-tiredness where ALL of us have been during our careers. :ugh:

[Cagedh]

Never disputed taking the automatics out and putting it where you want it......I was just telling you how the trim system worked on the 777

My reply was not intended for you personally, but a little bit for 'fox niner' and for anybody else reading it. (read my previous posts and you'll understand) Sorry for the confusion.

[bubbers44]

Who cares if the AT is armed or not if you just fly the airplane and not wait for automation to make it work. Monitor what automation is doing and if you don't like it shut it all off, simple and always works. That is what we always did and never once got slow or low.

Automation was designed to reduce your work load, not fly your airplane because you can't.

[safetypee]

There have been some very narrow views on the possible contributions to this accident, predominantly blame the human.
For a different and refreshing alternative, consider the remarks in - Some Speculation. (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crm-devel/message/12455)

[md80fanatic]

For a different and refreshing alternative,

That was a difficult read, beating about the bush and all. It certainly doesn't make flying as SLF any more comforting :ooh:

[bubbers44]

STP that is all BS and you know it. They could not fly a visual approach and had all the data they needed looking out the window to do what 99.9% of pilots can do easily. Ground prox, stick shaker, 4 pilots and looking out the window didn't work for them but you think their performance crashing was acceptable? I guess for some reason lack of an airspeed scan for quite some time might have contributed to it.

The United flight waiting for take off could have been easily wiped out so why are we letting these pilots land here? We make our pilots fly properly so why let pilots from other countries with poor skills risk our airliners safety? I might be a bigot but I am asking a question about US airport safety and why we compromise safety because other countries don't have our standards. Shut them down into the US, we did before.

[richard III]

Nice one bubbers! Yes and no on that one...was american shut down from latin america when they drove a 757 into a mountain in Cali? Or eastern in La Paz?...that's a pretty cocky statement......then again why so much speculation on automatics, magentas etc? The writing has been on the wall for ages, these guys could not fly a proper visual approach....period, just look at the KAL thread in this forum, the report, if not political, will focus on company culture, skills and training, just don't want to sound racist but Koreans are better at making cars and flat screen tv's, others are better at flying...my apologies if someone feels offended, been in Asia long enough to back my comment.

[junebug172]

So... As the AA guy says in the "magenta line movie": if the automation does not perform as expected... Click, click (A/P off) and click, click (A/T off) and fly the plane in the direction and way you won't it to go!

Should be basic stuff for ANY airline pilot!

They're all big Cessna's!

For that to be true, however, a pilot must have basic stick and rudder skills. That's something not found too often with an initio pilots at foreign carriers.

These pilots are trained right into automation instead of learning the basic skills of airmanship.

[Capn Bloggs]

For a different and refreshing alternative, consider the remarks in - Some Speculation (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crm-devel/message/12455).
Not bad, except that he missed out the bit about the PAPI being available. 3x tables close-in on final is not required for jet operations because of PAPIs.

[lakedude]

these guys could not fly a proper visual approach....periodThis thread is full of comments like this one.

It seems to me that the main issue was that the crew expected the auto throttle to be working. I bet the crew could land just fine on a visual approach if the automatics were completely off and they completely understood the mode they were in. The problem was mode confusion not the inability to fly a visual approach.

Brilliant video in this post:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-118.html#post7951776

[olasek]

The problem was mode confusion not the inability to fly a visual approach.
It is irrelevant. The problem was much more basic - inability to monitor approach. This is far more basic than any mode confusion. If you think that something will work for you (like A/T) but you fail to monitor its operation it frankly puts your basic airmanship into question. Regardless if they were 'confused' or they weren't confused but A/T was say defective they still failed in their basic duties as pilots. Even if a pilot suffers from a temporary blackout and forgot what mode does what it is still his duty to monitor basic parameters like speed, altitude, etc., specially if he is on a short final. He/she can quickly 'unconfuse' himself but turning off all automatics. Bubbers44 summed it above in a single sentence quite well.

[Tarq57]

...For that to be true, however, a pilot must have basic stick and rudder skills. That's something not found too often with an initio pilots at foreign carriers.

These pilots are trained right into automation instead of learning the basic skills of airmanship.
Coming to a country not terribly far away from you, and probably not too far into the future.

Shares in shipping lines, anyone?

[wiggy]

bubbers

We make our pilots fly properly

Best not make comments like that unless you want folks to throw the likes of Colgan and Comair 5191 back at you.

Now back to the thread.

[tilnextime]

olasek

It is irrelevant. The problem was much more basic - inability to monitor approach.

At this point in time, stating that the crew had an "inability" to monitor the approach is a bit of a stretch. However, it definitely appears that they did not monitor it, nor control it. The mishap investigators' job will be to determine why the approach was not monitored or controlled. As the AA "magenta" video points out, automation can lead to bad habits and inappropriate dependency.

I investigated a number of mishaps where highly proficient pilots made horrible errors, simply by assuming the maneuver or mission being conducted was just like every one before it, and thus overlooked what most would identify (after the fact) as obvious indications that things were otherwise. As I noted back a ways, one of the most sage pieces of advice we received in flight school was, "No flight should be treated as routine until the post mission debrief." The critical thing in any mishap investigation is to learn the "why" and then get other aircrew members to avoid or deal with that "why".

I doubt this crew was presented any "surprises" in arrival and approach to SFO. Every "complicating" factor that has been thrown out (fatigue, visual approach, lack of familiarity, etc) was known (or the info readily available) before takeoff.

[LongTimeInCX]

With so many comments concerning incompetence bordering on negligence, it is interesting that the authorities have seen fit to allow them to travel/escape back to Korea. There must be a good reason for that, right??

If one compares what the authorities would do with say a cross-border Mexican long-haul truck driver, who let's say was involved in a significant, but single vehicle accident causing the deaths of multiple pedestrians, where culpable negligence seemed likely, I doubt the truck driver would be allowed to leave pending their decision on whether to press charges in relation to the deaths.

That the US have allowed the prime suspects in the Asiana crash to leave the US, would either be indicative of pressure from for example the State Dept to prevent their detention turning into a political hot potato for the current administration, or, just possibly the NTSB investigation may not have enough evidence of culpable negligence to recommend charges being brought against the Asiana crew.

It begs the question - does being incompetent, when it results in a crash and deaths, mean that crew such as this, should be held fully accountable for their woeful lack of ability and awareness, and be subject to the appropriate legal system?

IIRC, Capt Barry Woods was interrogated for 2 days before being charged, and he was not allowed to leave Korea after the Cheju incident.

Double standards anyone?

[olasek]

You got it all wrong, NTSB has no power to charge Korean pilots (or any other pilots) with anything, their role is to investigate accidents, write reports and suggest remedies, if anybody wants to charge these pilots it would have to be somebody in Korea. Since this was a foreign crew they could not even take their blood samples. Criminal prosecution of pilots after accidents is quite rare. In the US you would have to prove not just a negligence but 'criminal negligence', basic incompetence is not grounds (in the US) for criminal prosecution.

[Colocolo]

Automation was designed to reduce your work load, not fly your airplane because you can't.

The simplest and most accurate definition of automation(aircraft) I've ever heard:ok::D

[A Squared]

With so many comments concerning incompetence bordering on negligence, it is interesting that the authorities have seen fit to allow them to travel/escape back to Korea. There must be a good reason for that, right??


Sure is. It's because the US doesn't put pilots in jail for accidents, unless the accident is the result of violating the law. Even then, it has only happened once, to my knowledge.

Your assumption that this somehow proves something about the competence of the pilots is flawed from the very start.

[Wizofoz]

Autothrottle will wake up a few knots before the stall, let's say 107 kt.


In the scenario you put forward (which I think is likely what happened) Autothrottle will NOT wake up.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Wizofoz,
Autothrottle will NOT wake up.
If that was the scenario, then it's a pity that the pilots did not wake up either.
With clues like the Thrust Levers are still back at idle, and the aircraft is getting very heavy in pitch requiring trimming and pulling back on the elevator, and an usually high nose up attitude, etc.

[Wizofoz]

rudder rat

No arguments there, just pointing out a misconception re the 777 A/T system.

[zekeigo]

Stabilized approach criteria:
Aircraft fully configured for landing with all checklist completed.
Rate of descent, speed and thrust compatible to be maintained until flare over the touchdown zone.
Aligned with the runway centerline, if there is one, and with the target touchdown point insight following visual references (PAPI - VASI - etc...)
Preferably hand flying the airplane after disconnecting auto-pilot and auto-throttle.
On one of my MOT checks I was asked the EPR to be maintained during final approach. In that particular day (after mentioning the weight, density altitude and other factors affecting EPR settings) was 1.05. This case was just a gross pilot error and lack of monitoring from the other crew in the cockpit.
A perfectly airworthy aircraft flown to the ground, no excuses.
Not the first time, not the last time.
There is no magic pill to give a pilot experience and the Alteon guys are no miracle mans.
The case here is more cultural than any other thing and will take centuries to fix it.
My 0.005 cents
:cool:

[richard III]

Lake...allow me to disagree, a visual approach or any approach for that matter involves speed monitoring, basic scanning....A/T on or not. This was not a speed excursion, we are taking about 30 knots. In a cessna if your approach speed decreases 30%, you crash. The automatics in a 777 are quite straight forward, in FLCH you pitch for speed, throttles at idle....VNAV you thrust for speed throttles move to look for the window speed. I have to stand by my comment, this was about training, company culture and rusty, if existent, basic flying skills. I wouldn't even hold these guys accountable if throughout the years they were told that they were competent.

[Airbubba]

IIRC, Capt Barry Woods was interrogated for 2 days before being charged, and he was not allowed to leave Korea after the Cheju incident.

Double standards anyone?

As I recall, Barry Woods was allowed to leave SEL and went home to YVR after 'diplomatic intervention' as an article linked below puts it, with the promise that he would return. He never did return and passed away circa Y2K I believe. Seems like he was a Wardair captain who may have been bumped to FO when the carrier was bought by Canadian. In the 1990's the expat world was full of folks who went offshore to either regain a command or invent one on paper :).

It is possible that the OZ 214 pilots would also have more risk of prosecution in South Korea so I'm not sure I'd call it a double standard:

However, before leaving San Francisco on Friday, the pilots told associates they are concerned that their government intends to hit them with criminal charges for lapses in the cockpit.

Will Asiana Airlines Pilots Face Prosecution for San Francisco Crash? - Korea Real Time - WSJ (http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/07/16/will-asiana-pilots-face-charges-in-korea/)

[Speed of Sound]

I wouldn't even hold these guys accountable if throughout the years they were told that they were competent.

A very interesting point!

In an incredibly highly regulated profession such as aviation, a person is not primarily hired to fly a plane because they are a good pilot. They are hired because they have fulfilled a certain amount of regulatory criteria involving, hours flown, training modules successfully completed, written examinations passed, check rides flown, sim sessions done etc. etc.

As this is highly target-driven, an ab initio student pilot transitions psychologically from 'learning to fly' to completing an increasingly complex series of tasks which end up with yet another 'box' being ticked. When the required number of boxes have been ticked, hours have been flown, sim sessions completed the student is not so much 'able' to fly as 'allowed' to fly. After all, many driving schools don't teach you to drive, they simply teach you to pass the driving test.

Anyway, back to the original point.

Does a 'modern', qualified pilot actually really know that they can fly competently or do they simply trust the 'system' to make that judgement about them?

You often see the phrase 'only a PPL' used on this forum as a self-put down or a justification for 'not posting something very useful to the debate'. At the risk of ruffling feathers, I would suggest that a qualified PPL has as accurate an assessment of their own flying skills if not more so, than a newly-qualified or low-time First Officer on a modern jet transport. ;)

[jugofpropwash]

Vehicle that ran over girl not equipped with latest technology:
Rig that hit Asiana crash victim didn't have heat sensor installed - SFGate (http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Rig-that-hit-Asiana-crash-victim-didn-t-have-heat-4678450.php#photo-4937528)

[fireflybob]

Does a 'modern', qualified pilot actually really know that they can fly competently or do they simply trust the 'system' to make that judgement about them?

A very good question!

One would hope that any decent training system would engender the idea of self analysis and criticism.

I recall a conversation with one of my trainers in a previous company as to how shocked he was that an experienced pilot on type who had joined from another company could barely control the aircraft on one engine (twin jet) during required maneuvers.

Personally I wouldn't want to just "scrape" through any regulatory check (especially as Captain or even Training Captain) but rather excel in the basic maneuvers to a standard well above the minimum.

One wonders whether these pilots are trained to think accordingly?

[MPN11]

Personally I wouldn't want to just "scrape" through any regulatory check

Former Mil ATCO tiptoes in again … So we were posted every couple of years or so to a new unit, and then had to go through the local training to get endorsements in all [qualified] operating positions from the Unit's Local Examining Officer (LEO). in addition, the RAF ATC Examining Board would visit every year or two, pick people for up-close practical checks and, for the really lucky ones, a full Practical Knowledge check of documents and regulations which could take up to 2 hours.

My old RAF Form 5995 Certificate of Competency (like a Licensing Log Book, if you will) has pages and pages of certification - including (counting) 10 ATCEEB endorsements - including 3 as a Local Examining Officer at different Units. <pause for applause>

How much scrutiny, in that context, do Airline Captains/FOs get?

Is there an annual internal check?
Is there any external body that checks individuals, or the airline's checkers?
… or is it just down to the Company, reporting their licensing decisions to their National aviation authority?

"Quis custodes ipsos custodes", or something like that.

[misd-agin]

Carlsberg -
The speed in the MCP is set to 137kt, which includes 5 kt for the wind.
Vref is 132 kt, which is 1,3 stall speed
Stall speed is 101 kt.
Autothrottle will wake up a few knots before the stall, let's say 107 kt.

Auto throttle will not keep the speed at 137 kt in FLCH mode.





420,000 lbs, flaps 30, Vref 132. Bug 137 kts.

Stall speed is 106 kts(777 uses 1.25 Vso).




The concept of a hand on the throttles, or resting on the throttle quadrant behind the throttles, even with A/T's 'ON' and actually checking the N1's when the A/T's move is becoming a thing of the past.

But to do it on final, with speed decaying, and not catch it for so long? I don't care what automation confusion existed, from 500' until approx. 100', or less, the plane was below Vref, with throttles at idle, idle N1's, and no one did anything. That's Piloting 101, not automation 401.

[HundredPercentPlease]

MPN11,

In my last 6 monthly sim check, I had behind me a company/CAA examiner. Behind him was the company/CAA chap who checks all the examiners. And on that day, behind him, was the CAA boss man who checks the checker checker.

The dinasours on here who just close the case with "they failed to see so they are incompetent" I am so glad are not part of any investigation team. In fact, jumping to conclusions like that would cause them to fail our sim checks! We have know exactly WHY they failed to monitor, and make sure it never happens again. I have a feeling there will be sweeping changes throughout the industry.

[Speed of Sound]

Just when I thought the excuses couldn't get any more absurd...!

Click-click, click-click... aimpoint/airspeed... aimpoint/airspeed... obligatory, "Nice landing captain!"... taxi to the gate.

So are you saying they deliberately flew into that sea wall? :confused:

[PURPLE PITOT]

He's saying that they didn't fly at all!:ugh:

[HPSOV L]

I haven't seen any speculation about whether the low energy state was even recoverable from the point where it was detected. Or to put it another way; given the aircraft is at the correct speed and position at 500' (notwithstanding that the Thrust Levers were at Idle), how long is the window for detection before the situation is unrecoverable?

A few points to consider:
-It is not clear from the data available when the recovery was commenced and what technique was used (eg the TOGA switch may have been pushed sometime after recovery was attempted).
-Speed may have continued to decay after initial thrust correction.
-Recovery from at or near stick shaker involves significant altitude lost. Speed must be recovered before attempting pitch up to avoid a secondary stall.

I think the window could be as short as 15 seconds. I could be completely wrong; I bet by now many people have replicated the situation in a proper 777 simulator. How did it go?

[Chronus]

"I fear the day that technology will surpass our human interaction, the world will have a generation of idiots"
Albert Einstein ( 1879- 1955 )

If we have not already past this point, we are just about there. What lies beyond it is what I fear.

[sabenaboy]

I have a feeling there will be sweeping changes throughout the industry.

Airline pilots should still be pilots, able to hand fly their machines in all conditions.
Of course, that's just the beginning, there's so much more to the job, and the term "aircraft manager" comes to mind. But it's imperative to be more then just an "automation manager"! It has been said all ready: Automation was designed to reduce your work load, not fly your airplane because you can't.

So? What is the solution?

Every airline should actively encourage their pilots to keep their raw data handflying skills up to date. (By that I mean A/P, A/Thr and F/D's off!)

Here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/506383-how-many-sectors-do-you-handfly-2.html#post7662835) you can read how it's done in the airline I fly for!

[A Squared]

I can only speak for one branch of the military, but we had no such standard as "minimum", only "fully qualified" or "not qualified" for the duty position and flying tasks to which assigned. Whatever mission tasks a given assignment entailed, you had to be trained and evaluated to "fully qualified" to perform crewmember duties on a flight assigned such tasks, unless flying with an instructor pilot.

Uh-huh. And someplace between "fully qualified" and "not qualified" is a line. That line might be a very simple standard, or it might be a fairly complex set of standards. Regardless it exists. If you were above that line, you were "fully qualified" and if you were below that line you were "not qualified"

That line would the "minimum"

[MurphyWasRight]

HPSOV L :
I haven't seen any speculation about whether the low energy state was even recoverable from the point where it was detected. Or to put it another way; given the aircraft is at the correct speed and position at 500' (notwithstanding that the Thrust Levers were at Idle), how long is the window for detection before the situation is unrecoverable?


Interesting question, (assuming the nominal at 500' is corect), to paraphrase:
How long did it take the for the speed display to go from nominal to an -alarmingly- low value and what margin was then available from that point to recover?

A complementary question would be "what was the pilots scan rate" and given that rate for how many scans would an alarming speed value be displayed?

I am also wondering if the speed tape includes a "trend" indicator or just absolute value, "132 : dropping fast" might be more noticeable than a plain "132".

[olasek]

unless the accident is the result of violating the law. Even then, it has only happened once, to my knowledge. I think there are some prosecution once in a while, a recent case was the 2005 crash of Challenger at Teterboro, the accident uncovered the whole slew of shenanigans the operators of this flying outfit were engaged in, the judge threw a book at them.

A classic case that I recall was the sentencing to 18 months prison time of both MD-11 JAL pilots (in Japan) for causing 14 deaths in an accident that took place in 1997.

[blind pew]

In 1992 when Swissair got the Fokker 100 they had two near misses during visuals into Nice. Both around the 500ft mark during final turn when the stick shaker went off.
Before that we were taught that the auto throttle was full time unless switched off on the overhead panel.
Apparently the later 100s would automatically re engage when the gear went down.
2013 and Boeing doesn't have this feature!

[A Squared]

I think there are some prosecution once in a while, a recent case was the 2005 crash of Challenger at Teterboro, the accident uncovered the whole slew of shenanigans the operators of this flying outfit were engaged in.

Right. The *management* was convicted of fraud and other violations which came to light as a result of the accident. I relatively sure that the pilots were did not face criminal charges.

A classic case that I recall was the sentencing to 18 months of prison time of both MD-11 JAL pilots (in Japan) for causing 14 deaths in an accident that took place in 1997.

OK, that happened in *Japan* the context of my post was whether or not pilots face criminal prosecution for accidents in the United States

[HPSOV L]

MVR:

you get my point exactly:ok:

To answer your question; yes the 777 does have a speed trend arrow next to the speed tape. It is very useful.

[RAT 5]

I have been flying commercially since 70's. A mixture of singles, twins, biz-jets, tail-draggers, aeros & then needles & dials B732 on to LNAV/VNAV/EFIS/EICAS Boeings. I was trained to fly then operate an a/c. Flying was encouraged and operating also; each for the appropriate & suitable scenario.
I now train self sponsored newbies on the standard LNAV/VNAV type a/c. The syllabus covers what to do on an SOP day. It then covers standard QRH non-normals, again in an SOP environment. I try to inject a little reality into the training, if the cadets are sharp and there is time to spare: often unlikely. The training on a TQ course is very basic. There is no training on a TQ course of anything complicated. That's OK. But, the same is true on a command course. They might experience multiple QRH failures, that's all. They do not learn what to do it the automatics mis-behave. They do not practice basic aircraft control should the whizz-bang computers pack up. They do not learn the 'traps' of the automatics and their dangers. There's not a lot of 'what if' discussion. It's all too simple and uncomplicated, but that is where many accidents arise, the uncommon, the misuse of the automatics or lack of basic handling skills. Basic handling skills should be encouraged on a daily basis, but is not. The emphasis is on absolute adherence to SOP's to avoid getting anywhere near the edge of the envelope. The problem arises when circumstances, which include malfunctions- ATC- mother nature- pilot mistakes bring you towards the edge and out of your regular comfort zone. Can you handle it, can your work out what is going on and what to do about it. More often than not, no. It is a spiral, spinning down to more SFO, Bali, TSL, AF 447, etc. etc. Is there any answer from the authorities? It is happening worldwide. FAA, EASA, and the Far East authorities have a common problem, but are they opening a discussion into a coordinated solution? I don't think so. It is too much to hope the individual companies to start solving the problem as many are of he opposite philosophy. It's a sad future in the short term.

[blind pew]

Rat5
You are right...it is a problem because, generally, the authorities are incompetent..whether it is because they are watching their backsides, looking after their mates in the airlines and aircraft manufacturers or just not up to the job it is for others to decide.
Whilst the crews get the blame and the autorities do not sort out the equipement and training we will continue to have accidents which could have been avoided and often have been forecast.

[Speed of Sound]

It is too much to hope the individual companies to start solving the problem as many are of he opposite philosophy. It's a sad future in the short term.

This has to be done by regulation.

If margins are tight and the company sees this:

Automated sector: Fuel used 2,305 kg

Partially hand-flown sector: Fuel used 2,357 kg

The accountants see that 52 kg they multiply it by the number of sectors the company flies a day and decide that hand-flying costs their company £X.XX per year.

Safety arguments are dismissed by the comfort of knowing that if lack of ability to fly does cause a crash, it will likely to be the other guy's plane which will crash.

[richard III]

767....I believe it is not an excuse, what I think, SoS's point, and mine is, is that it is the system in Korea, as the underlying cause, that has to be looked at...much of asian analysis at their incidents focuses on the "what" and not the "why", easier to blame a couple of guys and save face, thus protecting the system. Point is, why two apparently qualified pilots drive a perfectly sound aircraft into the ground...they didn't do it on purpose, they "knew" they where doing the right thing, as hundreds of times before. For an insight into the Korean frame of mind is, just look at the zillion posts about KAL..what they think is the "right" frame of mind to operate a multi crew airliner is not what the rest of the world thinks....my two cents

[surfnoosa]

This is a screen shot from the Fred Hayes video
http://img580.imageshack.us/img580/1896/jtkp.png

Should the nose cone have more damage than this? Assuming the 650,000 pound plane picture above was cartwheeling?

http://cdn.scahw.com.au/cdn-1ce81cbe0f5c370/ImageVaultFiles/id_176342/cf_8/asiana-airlines-flight-214-removed-san-francisco-a.jpg

video:Asiana Airlines Crash Landing @ KSFO caught on tape by :Fred Hayes - YouTube

[Machinbird]

.....as I was diverging, noticed the thing was developing an annoying nose down tendency and discovered I was 15 knots below Vref F30. The thrust levers were at idle from a previous exercise and it happened in seconds. And I supposedly knew I was in manual thrust! Silly me.When you know how to listen to your aircraft, it will talk to you, but you have to be ready to listen and to ask questions such as, "Why am I holding so much aft pressure? or Why aren't the throttles moving?

It takes exposure to manually handling the aircraft to get this ability to sense when things are not right but it is one of the life saving skills that old timers developed that prevented many accidents.

Too bad the guy flying the Asiana had not developed the 'touch'. To my mind, a pilot who doesn't know how to sense and react to the cues is a cripple.

[RAT 5]

I just watched the Nat Geo reconstruction of the THY AMS stall crash. There was a comment from an eminent lady in USA who is an expert on human behaviour in automated environments. She declared that humans are very bad monitors of automation yet that is what a modern airline pilot needs to be. The solution is that NASA is researching new designs of automation to make the human interface more intuitive and easy. Better displays that are easier to understand; more accessible data/info, i.e. not having to page through CDU's to find the piece of info you want, but at a single touch of a button; voice activated equipment etc. etc.
This was in response to "why did the crew not realise their airspeed was decaying?" They did not know that the RA fault would cause the thrust levers to go to idle and they expected them to do that anyway as they were attacking the G.S. from above and trying to slow down. They were in monitoring mode, but not on top of it.

Well. if I'm attacking the G.S. from above and close to the runway, and trying to configure I can assure you that I am not passive and relaxed watching the needles & dials do their thing, but I am in a heightened state of alertness and making damn sure the autos are doing what I want and the a/c following suit. If it ain't then I know what to do about it and if all else fails I will disconnect and fly the sucker.

Once again the solution from the technocrats is to try and make a better human automatic interface; introduce more warning systems; make the automatics more intuitive etc. etc. No-one has suggested better flying training; better understanding of the a/c envelope; better understanding the capabilities of the automatics - their limitations and traps; better hands on skills to put the pilot back in touch with the a/c. The solution to pilots being lousy monitors and watching the automatics crash the a/c is to address the automatics rather than the pilot.
I'm sure the solution lies in a combination of both. What is certain is that there should be a lot more training of how to best use the automatics then we have now. The understanding of them which I witnessed on the line in many companies was very scant. The TQ courses and LT is focused on using the automatics to stay well inside the SOP envelope. "If you do that you are safe," is the mantra preached every prof check. Incidents happen when people are outside their comfort zone which is bounded by their knowledge envelope. A survivable incident can become an accident because the human intervened in the wrong way due to ignorance. Either ignorance of what is going on, or ignorance of what to do about it. You can make all the fancy gizmos you want to give the pilot lots of info, but they still have to know what is going on and what to do about it. SOP's can not cover all eventualities. Back to basics has to be an option.
We are debating this due to a few well published crashes. A disturbing number in such a short period; and from various cultures in various different airlines and on different types. In other words the common thread is the behaviour of the pilot. What needs to be known, to assess the extent of the problem, is how many similar incidents have been near misses and we never hear about them. Just how deep is the problem? I suspect worse than we dare imagine.
With regard to THY stall at AMS. The program said Boeing had received >2000 incident reports of faulty RA's. Numerous reports of a sudden thrust to idle. No other crashes; the pilots intervened and took over. There was no comment about why the difference. Could it have been different training qualities? Whatever; should it really mean that 1 accident out of 100's of incidents needs a rethink the whole automatic/human interface rather than address the issue purely from the human angle? The technocrats love to do it that way, perhaps a few 'old farts' in the training departments could achieve what is desired.

[Landflap]

Rat 5 " no-0ne has suggested better training" : I think, many have. I did but my post was deleted. Proper airline funded training with the result of proper airline pilot training selection will help a lot. The actual ab-initio training should include lots of handling and stick & rudder emphasis as the levels of automation and benefits are slowly introduced. Airline pilot managers should stop being brow-beaten by the bean counters and encourage handflying. We all know the level of automation we are in. Some enjoy split mode, full auto or pure manual. Doesn't matter a stuff but because of system anomoly or failure , pilots might become unsure of what George is doing. Full encouragement to knock out the autopilot, auto thrust & FLY the aircraft and then quizing the event is always the safe option.

[HundredPercentPlease]

How do you get a feeling for an aircraft by out-of-trim when you never get out of trim?
How do you expect pilots to practice manual thrust approaches when you provide them with tiny little useless sticky levers that are horrible to use (and make the SOP auto thrust every time)?
How do you expect a pilot to be cautious about the serviceability of a system when he is told it will always fail with a ding and an ECAM?
Why should a pilot be concerned about stalling, when the manufacturer states the aircraft cannot be stalled?

This accident is a demonstration of what happens when you put an Airbus pilot into a cruder machine, coupled with a few other lined up holes. I fear that the authorities will focus on those other holes (new LTC failing to do his job) and leave the problem unsolved.

In the mean time, pilots on highly automated and protected aircraft had better make it their personal responsibility to practice their basic skills. Because the SOP writers and accountants will do their best to stop you.

[HazelNuts39]

Stall speed is 106 kts(777 uses 1.25 Vso).

Since my earlier reply has been deleted: that is not correct.

Posts ghw78 (#1820) and Carlsberg (#2388) correctly state that Vref cannot be less than 1.3 Vs0.

That is in accordance with the certification basis as detailed in the B777 Type Certification Data Sheet on the FAA website.

[mross]

talking as devil's advocate - so no abuse please.

Occasionally the pilot has to intervene because the automation is not doing what the pilot expects.

How many times does the automation intervene because the pilot is not doing what the automation philosophy demands? It is probably under reported.

From my perspective the automation has lead to increased safety in the last decade and the odd exceptions do not invalidate this perception.

Most car enthusiasts have had to acknowledge that they can't repair an engine problem on the side of the road any longer due to the sheer amount of electronics under the bonnet (hood, for the cousins) even on my diesel Land Rover. But, you have to admit, modern cars are incredibly reliable, so it is a worthwhile trade.

That planes will fly without pilots within 20 years is indisputable. Driverless cars will come within ten years. And safety will improve.

[overthewing]

Should the nose cone have more damage than this?

I wondered this too. Perhaps the dust that looks to be coming from the nose as the plane pirouettes is actually coming from the nose-gear?

[PPRuNe Towers]

Hampster wheeling at max revs. Standing by for new, actual facts. Themes presently discussed can be addressed in Tech Log and Safety forums as they are now general and not specific.

Rob