Nimrod Information [Archive] - Page 9

Chugalug2

7th Dec 2007, 23:08

GeoIntel wrote:

The politicians have two choices, debate the niceties of Civilian Air Safety requirements, or order the highly vulnerable maritime reconnaissance resources "As-is" into the air to protect the Oil tankers, knowing full well that many, if not all will be destroyed......
So tell us all what is incorrect in that statement during a war?

Far be it from me to suggest that you are being deliberately obtuse, GeoIntel, but are you? Even in my safe featherbedded cuddly cold war days the CinC, etc, had the option to throw the book out of the window and declare Operational Conditions. Of course he would have to justify it if he had done, else he might simply declare a State of Emergency to fly in a plane load of earth for his roses. Would never happen of course, but you'll catch my drift. It seems that one has to dot the i's and cross the t's these days. The military point of airworthiness in particular, and Flight Safety in general, is Force Preservation, ie not losing Tornados, Chinooks, Hercules, Nimrods etc, and their crews to avoidable accidents but preserving them for throwing at the enemy if needs be. XV230 came down without any input from the enemy, all that was needed was the Gross Negligence (familiar phrase?) of the MOD. That is endemic, cannot be quietly 'fixed', but needs root and branch reform and the creation of an independent MAA, well away from the MOD.

GeoIntel

8th Dec 2007, 05:28

Exrigger:

You make a very good point, and as it was pointed out in discussions this evening we don't know if the P8 will perform as promised. Better conserve what you have, just in case the salesman can't deliver.

Chugalug2:

Far too many sophisticated computers working on political, military and terrorism scenarios around the world, past, present and future to be obtuse. Just want the upcoming draconian military cutbacks to not leave us in the same situation as before WWII. Maybe it's time to stop looking at the "Big Picture" and move to a quiet corner of Florida. When the ship hit's the iceberg it'll be on the evening news, after the Britney Spears story.

DEL Mode

8th Dec 2007, 07:28

OilCan,

That is the exact point. What was the operational task that prevented the Nimrod MR2 being maintained and operated to an equivalent civil standard. It has been established by the BOI that the "as maintained" configuration was not safe.

I would ask the critics on here to clarify what is the difference between an operational task and a civil sector. Both require the aircraft to depart at the planned time. In fact as the civil sector will have financial implications to the owner, and they do not have spare frames, I would suggest the pressure to acheive the "operational task" is greater. The difference is proper investment in maintenance is mandated.

I would suggest that most modern warfare requires pre-planned sorties as part of packages, and the concept of running to the aircraft, mid maintenance, because the bad guys are coming is bo**ocks.

The bottom line is that to meet the operational task, the correct funding needs to be available, and independent oversight of standards and practises needs to carry a big stick.

Papa Whisky Alpha

8th Dec 2007, 09:16

CHUGALUG2

"earth for rose. It wouldn't happen"

Were you also in Aden in the early sixties?

DEL Mode

8th Dec 2007, 09:34

I would happily start a thread about the implementation of civil airwirthiness standards to military aviation (something which is currenty happening to the RAF), but you seem to be missing the point.
The future of the RAF lies in accepting the change, dare I say embracing the change.
The Mil Part M and Mil Part 145 could easily be rolled out in a way that industry is a provider of such services and the military component is aircrew, ala Hertz or Avis etc (other good rental companies are out there too).
The perceived reluctance in the RAF to accept change of this nature cannot be overlooked. Lets face it why did the Nimrod crash? Becuase the safety interlocks in the process were overlooked for operational reasons. Had this been highlighted, yes. Therefore the aircraft nor the crew should have been put in that situation.
Is the individual who approved that decision going to face the consequences?
Is the purpose of ending the thread so that we will not have to see the obvious changes needed, is that not the same as ignoring the QQ or BAES report?
The only reason that the MoD was forced to think about these events was due to the efforts of TD and others, maybe it is time to see this through to the end state.
In my eyes that is military aircraft that are safe for those who fly in them and those that have to live with them flying overhead (but not the talitubbies).

Distant Voice

8th Dec 2007, 09:44

EdSet100: Not sure where you got your data from, but I will assume it is correct until I get the RTS document. However, for your information temperatures in Basra and Seed tend to be higher at certain times of the year than +45, with high humidity. A little warmer than Findhorn. Of course, with regards to AAR system, this was never trials tested at any temperture. When I say "trials tested", I mean controlled trials, the Boscombe Down way, not simple functional tests.

DV

Exrigger

8th Dec 2007, 10:02

DV I cannot state how other aircraft are tested but this is what the MRA4 went through, if it is of interest:

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida - The new BAE Systems Nimrod MRA4 has touched down at Eglin Air Force base in Florida, USA after its first transatlantic flight.
During a six week visit the aircraft, which is taking part in its first deployment outside of Europe, will be subjected to rigorous environmental trials, undergoing a series of intensive tests in extreme temperatures, ranging from -40OC to +45 OC.
Trials are being undertaken at the McKinley Climatic Laboratory, owned by the US Department of Defense and operated on a 24/7 basis by BAE Systems. Its main test chamber is the largest facility of its kind in the world. During testing, Nimrod MRA4 will be positioned on jacks and chained to the ground while its engines are run, to create the optimum conditions for work being carried out.
Using the McKinley Climatic Laboratory allows testing of Nimrod MRA4 systems at any temperature, simply by programming a computer. Conditions ranging from the bitter cold of Alaska to hot dry desert heat of Arizona or anything in between can be simulated. Engineers will also be running simulations of day/night cycles as well as testing under high humidity and solar radiation conditions.
Joe Harland, Managing Director of the Nimrod MRA4 programme at BAE Systems states: ““This is by far the most challenging deployment Nimrod MRA4 has undertaken. Our key objective is to demonstrate to our customer, the UK MoD, the maturity and reliability of the MRA4 at extremes of temperature.”

Green Flash

8th Dec 2007, 10:21

nigegilb

Please clear out your inbox! ta.

sprucemoose

8th Dec 2007, 10:34

Next Monday's edition of Flight International has as its poll question for the week: "Should the RAF ground its remaining Nimrods?" If anyone is interested in registering their vote they can do so now via the flightglobal.com website:

http://www.flightglobal.com/home/default.aspx

There's only a yes or no option, but it's a chance for PPRuNers to get their views across. The magazine's comment page will also include some views on the loss of XV230.

Moose

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

8th Dec 2007, 10:39

Exrigger; at last, someone being positive about the new aeroplane (forget the '50s design bollox).

I can quite understand why everyone is giving CAS rocks for the capability he's been told to make the best of. What I can't understand is why CDL isn't getting a hard time for the capability he's supposed to give to CAS. CDL has General's pips on his shoulder. Shouldn't he be earning them?

Magnersdrinker

8th Dec 2007, 13:07

Somebody said

"AAR has therefore been quite rightly suspended until the cause can be identified and is the subject of an ongoing investigation. If the fault cannot be identified, then AAR may not resume. All engineers work to commonsense rules and do not 'mis-represent' or 'whitewash' the facts - unfortunately, a lot of 'information/facts' in this forum have been distorted and sensationalised."

Just to clarify a wee bit on that , checks are carried out to the relevent AP which as you know is our bible to working on aircraft. Also extra things are checked if you have a sound knowledge of the system. If no fault can be reproduced to what the given AP says then its handed up the chain for somebody higher than the engineers who do the job to make a decision. I just like to clarify this , if some people who are not familiar with the RAF , this is how decisions are based. Dont want you all to think us techies have the power to decide everything :ok: in other words somebody with a bigger wage packet makes the call then and may ask for further checks to be carried out

OilCan

8th Dec 2007, 13:26

del mode, you said;
I would ask the critics on here to clarify what is the difference between an operational task and a civil sector. Both require the aircraft to depart at the planned time. In fact as the civil sector will have financial implications to the owner, and they do not have spare frames, I would suggest the pressure to acheive the "operational task" is greater.
:eek:
On behalf of the guys on the ground doing the shooting and getting shot at, I'm speechless. :(
:ugh::ugh::ugh:

OilCan

8th Dec 2007, 13:38

A shame that such an erudite publication as 'Flight International' should ask such a 'Sun' -esq question.

"Should the RAF ground its remaining Nimrods?"

Perhaps a suitable supplementary question should be;

"Do you?;"
a) Know nothing
b) Know a little
c) Know a lot

:cool:

DEL Mode

8th Dec 2007, 14:54

Point is you cannot answer the question.

Both parties require the air asset to be in the right place at the right time.

Civil achieves this requirement safely, military fails to (statistics prove that).

Until this argument is accepted, the military will not move forward.

Additionally I would suggest that it cannot be argued that civil airframes are less complex than military due to modern avionics systems and fly by wire systems, and the need to satisfy an independant auditor.

The key difference is that civil pay for safety and reliability.

Please do not beleive for one minute that I do not accept the criticallity of air assets to those on the ground, however I suspect that the value of the RAF engineering organisation within this equation is being pushed out.

If I hire a car from Hertz, I do not worry about the service history or maintenance of the vehicle it is a given, that is what I pay the contractor to do.

Generating trully servicable assets can be acheived without blue suits. If you do not beleive that, or recognise the need for change, I would suggest that it will be imposed on you.

Distant Voice

8th Dec 2007, 15:56

RAF Techie101: I must say I had to laugh when you said JJ's knowledge was 30 years out of date. I have read the BoI report with all the systems explained in some detail, and nothing has changed to the basic system in 38 years. As an example, the BoI reports explains how max fuel loading is achieved on the ground, by reducing bowser pressure towards the end of the fuelling. Gosh, is this something new, or has it been going on for 38 years. We use to get 84k doing this.

The fuel system on Nimrod is not rocket science.

DV

Safeware

8th Dec 2007, 16:25

Del Mode,
Safeware/Mile and Half, et al,

....... you seem to be missing the point.

'Scuse me, but what point do you think I'm missing?

sw

Distant Voice

8th Dec 2007, 16:30

tristran23: You claim that the 2006 QinetiQ report "sought to improve the way fuel tank repairs were carried out at Kinloss". Sorry, but this is just the cover story. QinetiQ were called in by IPT because the situation at Kinloss had gone critical and there was a risk that Gulf operations would be seriously effected. Their report, when it was issued was very critical, not of the enginers at Kinloss, but of the system they work under. It also issued several observation/recommendations regading the serious conditions of wing tanks. For more details, see Mick Smith's posting #1546, dated 14th Nov 2007

I can not understand why this report was never considered by the BoI. Also, I can not understand how Des Browne, the CAS and the Stn Cmdr can claim that a new report has been issued by QinetiQ stating that the fuel system is safe. Nothing that has been done recently can negate the recommendations of the 2006 report. Furthermore, any new report by QinetiQ claiming that all is well, has lost its credibility with the events of 5th Nov involving XV235.

By the way, I have it on good authority that the 2006 QinetiQ report was uncovered by the man himself; Jimmy Jones. Not bad for a none current old-timer. I guess if you put your head obove the parapet, you may get shot at, but you do get a clearer picture of what is happening in the world around you.

DV

Distant Voice

8th Dec 2007, 16:48

mileandhalf: You have lost me. (your last posting was changed for me). What part of the QinetiQ report is "ill-founded and incorrect/incomplete information"? The trouble is you are afraid to accept the truth. Go ahead "Charge for the guns".

DV

OilCan

8th Dec 2007, 17:30

Point is you cannot answer the question.

Point is, without full knowledge of, and full responsibility for, the operational tasking, then neither can you.

Generating trully servicable assets can be acheived without blue suits.

No sh*t Sherlock! :rolleyes: ....and just as susceptible to errors/oversights.

I'd be interested to know what 'statistics' you refer to? :suspect:
- and please don't give me that "880 fires" crap. :yuk:

Lets be clear, it is the fractionalisation of the RAFs Engineering support and the corresponding disolution of responsibility that is the real issue here.

Contracted or not, ye get what ye pay for.

Tappers Dad

8th Dec 2007, 17:34

You may not like it, but the facts are the RAF and MOD have accepted responsibility for the loss of XV230 and with it the death of my son and 13 other brave men.

As I said on 3rd March 2007, 08:16 Post
"All it takes is a "FEW GOOD MEN" to stand up and say NO enough is enough as they have with the Herc crash and the TRUTH will come out about the Nimrod XV 230 explosion ."

Jimmy Jones is one of those few good men to stand up and be counted, so is Nigel Gilbert, so is Mick Smith, and there are many on here that have supported me and provided me with vital information.

To all these 'good men', myself and Ben's mum are extremely grateful for their support and thank them immensely.

I am at a loss to understand those of you that want to keep defending the RAF and MOD regarding the tragic loss of XV230 and all those good men, when those at the top have admitted responsibility and liability!

DEL Mode

8th Dec 2007, 17:46

Sorry Safeware - I stand corrected on my earlier post and have edited to suit.

I see no further value posting on a thread where the only basis for sound airworthiness management is whether the RAF can find aircrew willing to fly the aircraft.

The MoD have won the argument.

Mick Smith

8th Dec 2007, 17:49

TD thanks. There is no-one on this thread who is not desperately sorry for your loss and for the loss of the other 13 good men.

To the rest of you: Jesus can you guys not stop bickering. Everyone wants the best out of this sorry mess. Why keep sniping at each other?

For what its worth, IMHO as an obvious and self-admitted non engineer current or otherwise, the point Oilcan makes is one of the most important things to come out of the QinetiQ report and one I hammered earlier in the thread posting mentioned by DV.

Lets be clear, it is the fractionalisation of the RAFs Engineering support and the corresponding disolution of responsibility that is the real issue here.

Spot on. This is the most worrying thing in the supposedly irrelevant QinetiQ report. Does anyone here seriously doubt that if the Nimrod Support Group had been an RAF engineering team there would not have been any question of the IPT not knowing the full extent of the leak problem, and the RAMS not being told that their APs were out of date? You dont have to be an engineer current or otherwise to work that one out.

OilCan

8th Dec 2007, 17:49

Del Mode also said;

If I hire a car from Hertz, I do not worry about the service history or maintenance of the vehicle it is a given, that is what I pay the contractor to do.

...and neither do they care for the purpose and/or success of your venture....as long as they get it back. :p

Mr Point

8th Dec 2007, 18:04

Distant Voice: nothing has changed to the basic system in 38 years

You mean apart from the AAR system!

I don't believe that anyone is having a go at Jimmy Jones for being concerned with the safety of the Nimrod; in fact this is to be highly commended. But I strongly disagree with his absolute comments such as, "If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today".

If you appear in the media as an expert, you need to be an expert. Having left the RAF before the AAR system was fitted to the Nimrod, in my opinion, leaves huge holes in Jimmy's technical knowledge and experience.

Mick Smith

8th Dec 2007, 18:12

Mr Point
You can disagree with it, strongly or otherwise, but as I recall it did say that the SCP was too close to key parts of the fuel system.

Mr Point

8th Dec 2007, 19:05

Mick,

I was not aware that BAe had warned the RAF not to use the SCP prior to September 2006.

OilCan

8th Dec 2007, 19:07

Mick

it will remain conjecture as to whether this thread had any bearing on the final outcome - yet to be determined.

What I am certain of, through personal knowledge, is the integrity and professionalism of the members of the BoI, and that their findings would have been just as thorough and comprehensive. Further, I am also certain that the response from the knowledgable and experienced crews (air & ground), as well as the families, would have been just as questioning and ultimatley would have forced equally far reaching consequences.

It may have taken longer, but we would have started with the known facts rather than some of the wild and inaccurate speculation we've been subjected to.

What is debatable, is whether we needed to go through such public damning, mud slinging and ridicule which has caused so much pain and anguish to so many people, especially to those who still have a job to do - obvious perhaps, but we have always had a vested interest. :rolleyes:

Make no mistake, the fall out from this will be wide ranging, and will not be Nimrod specific, but it will not guarantee such accidents will not occur in the future, - only hindsight can do that.

Cheers
OilCan

Mick Smith

8th Dec 2007, 19:49

Oilcan
I am not at all sure I would even want to suggest that anything on this thread or indeed published in the media had an effect on the BOI. To be honest, I would hope it did not, and I have no reason to think it did. Indeed the strange lack of any mention of the serious leaks that occurred in theatre in October, November and December 2006, even if only somehow to discount them as a possible source of the fuel for the fire, and the complete dismissal of the QinetiQ report of March 2006 suggests that it had no effect at all. What I am sure is that much of what was described as speculation was merely reporting of fact, as in this leaked report says that, or this report obtained under Freedom of Information legislation says this. I am also certain that no-one involved in the various arguments on either side of this debate had anything but the best of intentions in what they did or didn't do.

Tappers Dad

8th Dec 2007, 19:56

The SCP damage to Nimrod XV??? has been assessed as Category One. The damage to the starboard spar has not been formally assessed.

This damage (Enclosure 1) to XV??? comprised of heat damage to:
a. The starboard rear spar at the fuselage joint post attachment point.
b. The starboard mainplane lower skin.
c. The forward face of No 7 Fuel Tank starboard and leaking FRS couplings due to seal damage.
d. The SCP duct, duct fairing and associated assemblies.
e. The aileron output cables and associated pulley.
f. The flap interconnecting cables.
g. Various wiring looms adjacent to the failed duct.

The lack of a maintenance policy allowed the corrosion within the duct to go undetected until failure occurred. The lack of a maintenance policy was a contributory factor.

However, the possible implications of a failure in some other sections of the bleed air system are mitigated by the presence of hot air leak warning systems.
There is no hot airleak warning system for the ruptured duct or the cross-bleed air duct as it passes through the bomb bay.

40. It was noted that:
a. The unreliability of the Mission System Recorder may have led to valuable evidence being lost.

This incident also highlights that it is particularly important that all who are involved in operating ageing aircraft be aware of the potential for failure in areas not previously subject to inspection regimes.

If you have read the BOI report this may all sound familar No its not XV230 its the report on XV227 22 November 2004,

Mr Point

8th Dec 2007, 20:18

Graham and Mick,

There is little doubt that had action been taken by the RAF following the SCP hot pipe damage to XV227, Ben and the rest of Crew 3 would still be here. My point is that, as far as I am aware, BAe did not recommend isolating the SCP, they recommended bomb bay fire suppression be considered. If their recommendation had been implemented the outcome would, sadly, have been the same.

Jimmy Jones asserted that if BAe's advice had been heeded by the RAF the accident would not have happened. Unless BAe also recommended fire protection for the No. 7 tank dry bay, or isolation of the SCP, the accident would still have happened.

Nevertheless, the RAF could have prevented the accident and are guilty of negligence.

Oldlae

8th Dec 2007, 22:56

I hesitate to enter this thread but to give me some street cred I am a Halton graduate servicing Victor B1, Canberra B(I)8 and Whirlwind Mk10 helicopters during my 12 years RAF service. I then spent 30 years in civvy street on helicopters, but most importantly an aircraft is an aircraft and the same principles apply to each machine. During my career I was a Flight Safety Engineer working closely with the AAIB at Farnborough and I know that those gifted guys do not dofferntiate between types of aircraft, airworthiness is airworthiness, they usually refer to expericenced licensed engineers if they require specialised knowledged of the type should this arise during their investigations. The civilian engineering system (used) to rely on Licensed Engineers to maintain standards laid down by the CAA, this meant that in practical terms that there was no higher authority to determine an aircraft's airworthiness except the manufacturer, I am not aware of anyone going to the manufacurer to overturn a decision of a LAE.
The loss of XV230 appears to be a techical disaster.
TD, sloppy maintenance was not the problem, it would appear that sloppy engineering was at fault. A maintenance engineer/fitter is only concerned with keeping the aircraft to a standard laid down by their superiors the engineering branch, in accordance with their maintenance procedures. A fuel leak was reported to be not being able to be reproduced on the ground, this suggests that the fault only happened in the air with all the expected flexing of the aircraft distorting the fuel couplings alloowing fuel to escape. If this happened in a civil aircraft the AAR system would be filled with a dye and flown for a post flight inspection to determine which seal leaked. As this was not apparently carried out it suggests that it was not possible to blank off the system to enable the test.
I understand that the AAR was devised to cater for aircraft flying to the Falklands some 25 years ago, a major modification in CAA parlance. Any aircraft modification that is to be installed should have a maintenencde policy, devised by the design engineers which should cate foe troubleshooting of the system. This should have ben sorted out post-Falklands.
AS for inspecting FRS seals by dismantling the couplings, the RAF were right injudging that this would cause more problems when they were reassembled, in my experience. We used to use the chalk spray from the Ardrox 996 crack test kit to determine between to likely faulty seals. If this not feasible because of so many leaks being the norm is incredible.

Magnersdrinker

9th Dec 2007, 00:06

OK Mrpoint what in your view should have the RAF done to prevent this.

I can say what happened in the XV227 incident had no bearing on what happened on 230. Yes I do agree if the system was LIMed then there would be a probable no ignition source. I dont think anyone had any idea that this would have happened and its unfair to put blame for that, if this could have been prevented then it would have been. The TWA 747 incident many years back if people could have spotted that as a danger then things may have been so different today.

Please feel free to correct me if im wrong and Im sure I will be told I drink too much cider and bullied by a bunch of people who have no idea how we work and how Nimrods operate,but as we speak every single aircraft in the world has an apparent danger that nobody can predict or what if situation. 737 was a good one on that aicraft investigation program on Sky, 2 were lost due to freeze up of a servo valve in the rudder actuator, Nobody could predict that would happen yet it did. If we lived in a perfect world we would not be here chatting right now.

Winco

9th Dec 2007, 08:06

Magners,

If what you are now saying is to be believed, then it would appear that the Nimrod fleet have even more problems than we thought.

But you let yourself down somewhat with your conclusion of the 737 incident and the rudder actuator servo valve. What do you think happened AFTER the servo valve was identified? Do you think that the NTSB said 'OK, we know what the problem was, but what the heck?' Do you think they ignored the problem? or maybe they informed all operators of the problem and enforced them into a replacement? Which one do you think they went for?

TWA flight 500 was brought down by an explosion in a fuel tank that was empty of fuel but not fumes. A single hot-air/ignition source caused the explosion and the loss olf all on board. So what did the authorities do? Did they ignore that maybe? Of course not.

I agree that both of the problems you highlight were not spotted earlier, but the fact remains that when they WERE identified, they were acted upon immediately. You have to say that if the RAF/MOD had acted, would 230/227 have happened?

Maybe, be I doubt it.

The Winco

Wigan Warrior

9th Dec 2007, 09:02

http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/NIMROD-XV-230-FLYING-LEVEL-12-BY-10-PHOTO_W0QQitemZ230200096584QQihZ013QQcategoryZ86955QQssPageN ameZWDVWQQrdZ1QQcmdZViewItem

OilCan

9th Dec 2007, 10:45

Magners, Winco

Please do a little more research re the 737 rudder 'hard overs' and the TWA 800 fuel tank explosion. :=

Neither resulted in the grounding of the fleets, both occured several times over a period of years before corrective action was initiated, and there are many who are not fully convinced that they have been fully resolved. :eek:

No system/legislation/procedures is/are perfect.

edited to add; that said, ours was better than it is now. :(

Magnersdrinker

9th Dec 2007, 11:00

Winco (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=138331)
Over 150 posts! About time I clicked here (http://www.pprune.org/ptorder/ptorder.htm) and ordered a Personal Title.

Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Back in Geordie Land
Age: 52
Posts: 162

Magners,

If what you are now saying is to be believed, then it would appear that the Nimrod fleet have even more problems than we thought.

But you let yourself down somewhat with your conclusion of the 737 incident and the rudder actuator servo valve. What do you think happened AFTER the servo valve was identified? Do you think that the NTSB said 'OK, we know what the problem was, but what the heck?' Do you think they ignored the problem? or maybe they informed all operators of the problem and enforced them into a replacement? Which one do you think they went for?

TWA flight 500 was brought down by an explosion in a fuel tank that was empty of fuel but not fumes. A single hot-air/ignition source caused the explosion and the loss olf all on board. So what did the authorities do? Did they ignore that maybe? Of course not.

Winco

To start I did not in any way say there was a problem with the fleet, I am on about the 27 incident where the pipe failed which was duly replaced, the SCP in the 30 accident was noted as an ignition source, 2 different things completely.
Yes the 737 incident after it took a few losses and 1 lucky escape they found the fault. My only point im trying to make in these situations as well as many other type accidents, is the fact that nobody could see these things happeing. As for remedial action on both the accidents was carried out i cant answer that, but what im highlighting as I will repeat once more, nobody could have predicted this would happen. I think thats why they call them accidents.

Tappers Dad

9th Dec 2007, 11:54

XV227
RECOMMENDATIONS
39. It is recommended that:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.

XV230
(6) Conclusions
b Thus the board was of the opinion that the hot air system's maintainence policy was a contributary factor in the loss of XV230

Magnersdrinker..... 2 different things completely.

I don't think so

Distant Voice

9th Dec 2007, 13:22

Well said TD, let us get back to the basics. We are still waiting for the results of the BAE SCP duct survey and subsequent maintenance recommendations, some 3 years after the incident.

DV

EdSet100

9th Dec 2007, 18:21

Mr Point,

There is little doubt that had action been taken by the RAF following the SCP hot pipe damage to XV227, Ben and the rest of Crew 3 would still be here.

No, no, no, that is not correct. The fault with 227 was a duct failure. Mr Point you must check your facts before you come out with bold statements like that.

Following 227's incident, the only logical action, in addition to those carried out, that could also have been taken, if it was believed that the duct would leak again, was to fit hot gas leak detectors next to the duct in the most likely places that it would leak (ie by joints). It took 20 years of low level (salty) air erosion to burst its way through from the inside. Another failure of that nature will not happen again in the lifetime of the MR2. If a joint leaks, well, that could only be due to human factors.

Unless you wish to challenge the BOI's findings, the SCP duct on 230 was not leaking. The SCP duct was simply extremely hot. Oh, just to put closure on this side issue, the crossfeed duct in the 7 Tank dry bay is surrounded by leak detectors which are connected to a big red light, right next to the AAR panel, so please do not even think it was leaking.

Regards
Ed Sett

The Swinging Monkey

9th Dec 2007, 18:25

Magners drinker

What you are failing to understand is that when the problems on the TWA flight and the 737 aircraft were identified, then action was taken immediately.

That was NOT the case with the Nimrod fuel tank/leak problems. You say that the incidents were not related, but I would have to disagree with you. The evidence strongly suggests that there was a link. I suppose there is a likelihood that they were exactly the same fault/failing. But to say that 227 had no bearing on 230 is not correct, because you don't know that!

Either way, the MOD chose to do nothing, and we all know the rest don't we.

TSM

Magnersdrinker

9th Dec 2007, 18:56

thanks for explaining it a bit better Edset , he said exactley what point im trying to put across. maybe we on diffrent wavelengths here and reading this wrong.
As im trying to say the 737 incident and the TWA , all im trying to get across is nobody could have forseen what happened. The case with 30 I dont think IMO we could have seen that happening. Thats the whole point im trying to get over. There has never been a reported incident like this because the XV227 incident was down to a ruptured pipe which may I add had no fuel involved. According to the board the SCP was a contributary factor yes as the fuel touched it and it was a possible source of ignition. that is the reason they have put it as a factor.
You guys have to stop comparing the two incidents, they are totally different, or maybe I am not explaining it well in an engineering point of view. Either way draw your own conclusions. It just seems that people who dont work on the aircraft have sentenced the Nimrod to the grave without anyone actually defending it.

as they say

crack on .....

Mick Smith

9th Dec 2007, 19:18

Now I am confused EdSet. While the board certainly ruled out a repeat of the XV227 incident, the talk of the absence of a hot air leak seems very firm given that the board rests its findings on a series of probabilities and said on Para 38, pages 2-27 and 2-28:
"Nonetheless, the board concluded that while a large hot air leak was unlikely, a small leak could have caused the necessary disruption [to a part of the fuel system] but would have needed a considerable time to do so."
It went on to say:
"The Board concluded that a leak of engine bleed air could have caused disruption to the fuel system, either to a fuel coupling on the refuel pipe work or to a seal on the front face of No 7 tank, leading to a fuel leak when AAR pressurised the system, thus, such a fault is a possible cause of XV230's fire and, thus, of the loss of the aircraft."

Did they not know about the leak warning system or would it just not have detected a small leak?

DaveyBoy

9th Dec 2007, 19:36

To add to the good stuff that Magnersdrinker is trying to explain, I think one subtlety that was lost in the quotes above are the fact that the XV230 BoI's comments were related to the insulation of the hot air system's ducts, and not the ducts themselves. The few sentences before the bit quoted above were:

The Board believes that a lack of guidance on the allowable condition for hot air pipe insulation contributed to its gradual deterioration in some areas and that gaps between different types of insulation provided points of weakness in the system, making it possible for fuel to touch bare pipe metal at operating temperatures in excess of 400C. Thus, the Board was of the opinion that the hot air system's maintenance policy was a Contributory Factor in the loss of XV230.

So, they're not suggesting that there was a problem with ducts rupturing to allow hot air leaks there -- their point is that problems with insulation around the healthy, intact pipes could allow fuel to touch bare pipe metal. This is different from the quote about XV227:

a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.

since that is talking about problems with the ducts themselves rupturing and allowing hot air leaks.

Had the accidents happened the other way round and both BoIs commented on the maintenance of the hot air system, there would have been a link since a hot air leak would also be an ignition source that could start a fire if fuel had leaked nearby. But they didn't and, as with Magners, I therefore can't relate the recent comment about insulation allowing the intact bare pipes to be an ignition source with the older comment about the pipes failing, and allowing hot air to leak.

enginesuck

9th Dec 2007, 19:56

Hmmm what leak detection system are we talking about here??? Have i missed something. ?

EdSet100

9th Dec 2007, 20:25

Did they not know about the leak warning system or would it just not have detected a small leak?

It would not have detected a small gas leak which, by its very nature, would not rupture a fuel pipe, but might damage a seal within a coupling and create a small fuel leak, which then plays onto the hot pipe. The BOI has stated this in the report, but this possibility is disregarded as the most probable cause because the amount of fuel from a coupling would be smaller than blow-off or complete coupling failure and it would evaporate before it came into contact with the pipe for the required period for auto-ignition at 400 degrees (approx 1 minute).

Its all in the report.

Someone asked "what leak detectors?". I was referring to 5 hot gas leak detectors as descriptive terms for non Nimrod folk, to describe the Centre Section Overheat detectors, in that zone, set at 230 degrees.

Regards
Ed Sett

EdSet100

9th Dec 2007, 20:45

Further to my last message, the thrust of my comment to Mr Point was that no action by the RAF in respect to the SCP failure on 227 would have avoided the events on 230, and I still stand by that remark. If the brand new SCP pipe leaked, it would have been through human error, not policy failure. Besides, the SCP pipe is at the bottom of the bay and IMHO a leak from it would not reach up to the fuel pipes with sufficient energy to damage seals inside couplings. It is my opinion that the possible small hot gas leak referred to in the BOI would be from the crossfeed pipe, which is very close to the fuel pipes.

Ed Sett

Tappers Dad

9th Dec 2007, 21:06

When the families were briefed about the BOi they were given a document titled Families Brief here is just one page of it. It may answer a few questions.

http://www.benknight.co.uk/images/BOI 1.jpg

tucumseh

9th Dec 2007, 21:41

My reading of this is that MoD admitted liability because of Sir Clive Loader’s comment in the report that the MoD’s airworthiness regulations were not applied properly.

Instead of arguing over the finer design points of the fuel and other systems – a line which the MoD would gladly see their detractors tie themselves up in knots over - would it not be better to concentrate on the area where MoD is known to have weaknesses?

I, for one, am concerned that the BoI seemingly had such a narrow remit that it did not explore this area. Browne’s statement to the House would, I believe, have been very different had Sir Clive not said what he did.

This is not the only BoI report by any means which has alluded to such dereliction of duty. But it is the first to spell it out. Sea King ASaC. Tornado / Patriot. Both reports share one thing in common. They are particularly damning about aircraft systems, both safety related, which have clearly not been tested, installed, trialed, evaluated or introduced properly. On Sea King, it was a strobe light which the pilot had to switch off in darkness because he couldn’t see, leaving him with no forward anti collision light. (The aircraft collided almost head on). On Tornado, the IFF failure warnings were not integrated properly so the crew did not have the proper indication of system failure. (They were shot down due to misidentification). In both cases, one would expect the BoI to explore this further. They didn’t, yet the issues jump out at you. Note – they condemned a system as “unfit for purpose” but didn’t explore the evidence as to why it was fitted, removed (why?), and fitted again (why?). Nor did the Coroner. Why?? So many obvious questions but it would seem the political imperative was to prevent probing questions.

Different systems to Nimrod, but the root cause is the same. Poor application of mandated airworthiness regulations. Other similarities? Well, look at the people in MoD who ruled airworthiness, risk management, configuration control and safety were, effectively, optional. And that’s just accidents since 2003. The most casual examination of Chinook / Mull reveals precisely the same problems. So, that’s a 14 year period of neglect, at least.

Finally, I think it vitally important that the Review announced by Browne is not staffed by the people I mention, or their bagmen. It must be seen to be truly independent. The starting point is Sir Clive’s statement – the airworthiness process as not been applied properly. They must look back to understand why not, and must not confine themselves to Nimrod, as the processes apply to all aircraft and equipment. They must not be allowed to trot out the old “water under the bridge” rubbish. They were told long ago that there was a dam further downstream that was about to be breached. It was.

GeoIntel

9th Dec 2007, 23:48

Excuse my lack of understanding here, maybe I am completely wrong, but if the maritime surveillance of Europe is so important to the EU, as many reports indicate, shouldn't there be EU funding to bring these aircraft up to the relevant safety standard?

As the RAF is protecting NATO, and the EU could MoD request EU funds to cover all the modifications mentioned during this thread. Or are these funds only for Parks, Palaces and Monuments.

Mr Point

10th Dec 2007, 10:14

EdSet,

I am fully aware that the XV227 incident was as a result of duct failure. My point is that the first recommendation of the XV227 incident reports was:

RECOMMENDATIONS

39. It is recommended that:

a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.

Had a comprehensive maintenance policy been adopted following the 2004 incident involving ducting failure, it is likely that the insulation condition would have been included in the review.

This is NOT a challenge to the BoI findings, merely an echo:

XV230 BoI: 65 Recommendations

a. Policy.

(1) The Nimrod Maintenance Policy is reviewed to ensure that maintenance procedures reflect the increasing age of the aircraft.

I appreciate that hindsight is always 20/20, but risk assessments must be thorough.

TheSmiter

10th Dec 2007, 11:21

tucumseh - your analysis of the root cause of this tragic incident, and indeed the systemic weakness inherent in the military regulatory and procurement organisations, has been spot on throughout the life of this thread. Your insight into these arcane bodies is such that I'm surprised you don't have a fleet of black omegas parked outside your door.

To clarify a point in your previous post:

Instead of arguing over the finer design points of the fuel and other systems – a line which the MoD would gladly see their detractors tie themselves up in knots over - would it not be better to concentrate on the area where MoD is known to have weaknesses?

I, for one, am concerned that the BoI seemingly had such a narrow remit that it did not explore this area.

As I understand it, the remit of any BoI is to find out the causal factors behind an accident, but post Mull / Chinook, not to apportion blame. This BoI, which could well be the watershed for future inquiries, has taken 15 months of painstaking analysis to come up with a highly credible explanantion for the loss of 30. I believe that SoS has announced a further review, conducted by a QC, to seek answers and apportion blame where necessary for the failings that you have already highlighted to the Prune community.

While I welcome this review wholeheartedly, I understand the QC has been given a very tight timeline (3 months) to report. I may not be seeing the big picture, but that seems a mighty short time to conduct a holistic review of the systems and personnel that you have articulated to us over the last few months, tuc? What do you think?

Chugalug2

10th Dec 2007, 11:55

TS, I too should like to commend tucumseh's post. May I suggest that those minded to go on posting contrary views as to the arrangement of various widgets and flanges in the MR2 read that post again, indeed reread tuc's previous posts on this thread. He deals with the MOD woods, rather than contentious RAF trees. It seems to me that is where the thread should be concentrating, especially given, as tuc reminds us, the CinC's comments on the BOI's findings.
As to the review, I would hope that the QC is minded to call for a full Public Inquiry, and thus break out of any constraints placed on him to contain collateral damage to the MOD.

airsound

10th Dec 2007, 12:17

Mr Smiter Sir, you say
I understand the QC has been given a very tight timeline (3 months) to report.
Do you have any other details, such as who the QC is, where and how the inquiry will operate, who it will accept input from, etc?

airsound

nigegilb

10th Dec 2007, 12:29

Apologies to several posters who have been trying to PM. I have cleared my in box, please re-send.

Regards,

Nige

TheSmiter

10th Dec 2007, 12:53

airsound

Do you have any other details, such as who the QC is, where and how the inquiry will operate, who it will accept input from, etc?

ref yr last, regrettably no to all the above - although I agree that would be very useful info to have. I was hoping someone on here could let us all know - TD or nigegilb perhaps?

All I know is that his remit is wide ranging and he will be kicking down doors - I look forward to the final report, whether thru this QC or via a full Public Inquiry. Either way, 'the noise', as Gordy puts it, is not going to die down.

nigegilb

10th Dec 2007, 12:58

I would agree with the above. Remaining tight tipped for the minute, but genuinely know nothing about QC. 3 months is a good thing in my opinion. Also coincides with the start of the Herc Inquest. The noise is only gonna get louder folks.

tucumseh

10th Dec 2007, 14:19

Smiter & Chug

Thank you. However, I do not regard myself as a “whistleblower”. Every single fact I mention here is available, or can be gleaned from, open source material or papers obtained under the Freedom of Information and Data Protection Acts. I’ve often wondered why on earth they release such damning evidence. Is it arrogance or ignorance? The QQ report is a typical example. It is a catalogue of breaches of the regulations. Admittedly, often you have to dig deep, collate, understand linkages and apply decades of training, but it’s all there.

This is the tragedy here. Sir Clive’s assertion that airworthiness regulations have not been implemented properly is NOT A REVELATION. I look forward to the QC asking why the likes of CDP and various Mins(AF) have steadfastly supported those who regard it as optional, while ruling against those who stand firm and seek to implement. In fact, galaxies of “Stars” know about this and have turned a blind eye. In a way, I admire their consistency over many years, through many reorganisations and changes in postholders, but they’ve backed the wrong horse and it’s time to rescind these rulings and rigorously enforce the regulations. And I hope they don’t take the easy option and pick on someone in the Nimrod IPT. This has been going on so long, it is systemic and people are no longer required to have the basic core competencies needed to manage attaining, or maintaining, airworthiness. Quite literally, they make it up as they go along.

Chugalug2

10th Dec 2007, 14:30

And I hope they don’t take the easy option and pick on someone in the Nimrod IPT.

Once again tuc leads where others like me merely follow. Of course you are right, the blame game is not the essence of Flight Safety, rather it is to avoid further accidents. It seems to me that the root cause of so many recent tragedies has been the failure of the system that was supposed to prevent them, ie that of UK Military Airworthiness regulatory enforcement. That is what is fundamentally to blame and what must be fundamentally changed. Again I call for the establishment of an independent Military Airworthiness Authority. Better that avoidable accidents are avoided than sacrificial goats are offered for slaughter, however those goat-herds who ensured that the grazing was low cost but devastating should be brought to book!

Distant Voice

10th Dec 2007, 16:09

Following the incident with XV227 the damaged duct section was replaced on all Nimrods. I understand that this took almost a year to complete because ducts had to be manufactured for each aircraft. Can anyone tell me if the replacement was "like for like", or was the new duct different in design? I ask the question because photographs show the damage duct as being covered with mental braiding whilst the replacement appears to be covered in fabric.

DV

EdSet100

10th Dec 2007, 22:51

Mr Point,

Any maintenance policy for the SCP and other similar ducts would have concentrated on mitigation against duct failure due to internal corrosion, because that was what caused that incident. No policy would have been implemented to specifically reduce the temperature of the air inside or outside the duct, because the air temperature at that location is what it is, due to operation of the system. Anyway, lets say that they had, co-incidentally, decided to fit new and better insulation around the duct. It still would not have stopped the leaking fuel (from wherever it came) from coming into contact with the either the hot pipe directly or the insulation. Here is something that you probably don't know (its not in the BOI report): The source of the hot air in the SCP duct is the exit of the HP compressor, known as P3/T3. At sea level, at 100% power, T3 on an engine test bed has been recorded at 500 degrees. The BOI conducted ground tests on installed engines (as per the report) to establish the likely temperature of the SCP duct during the AAR sequence on 230. Due to a lack of ram air on the ground, the SCP pre-cooler overheated with only 90% power and the duct temp at the SCP elbow was recorded at 400 degrees at that time. At 90% power, the engine is just coming into its designed power range, so Ts and Ps, although very high, are far from maximum. This concurs with the previously mentioned test bed figures. At 20,000 ft, (OAT -25 ish) during the AAR sequence, the record shows that the engines were almost at max power, so T3 would have been much closer to 500 degrees, with a reduction factor to account for the lower OAT. Then we can reduce the temperature on the outside of the brand new insulation and assume no gaps in it due to a clever way of having static insulation on a fixed pipe with a seemless connection to insulation on a bellows pipe. The existing insulation has been recorded to drop the temperature by 16 degrees, so we'll work on more than that, say 30 degrees. The bottom line is that the outside of any new insulation, with the engines close to max power, is still going to exceed 400 degrees, IMHO.

So, it would be incorrect to say that any new maintenance policy implemented as a result of 227's incident would have prevented the fire. I would agree that it might have done so, but that is not what you said at the outset. There were definitely failures in other areas of maintenance policy and, if you want to bang a drum, have a look at the BOI's comments about the NSC and fuel coupling failure trend analysis. These 2 failures are at the heart of the matter.

Regards
Ed Sett

EdSet100

10th Dec 2007, 22:57

DV, my understanding, looking at the existing ducts and photos is that it was a like for like replacement of insulation. Most likely it was the same insulation that went back on, provided it wasn't obviously damaged. After all, there was no new maintenance policy to do anything other than replace the duct and the joint seals.

Distant Voice

11th Dec 2007, 09:15

EdSet100; You could be right. It is just that photographs that I have of XV227, immediately after the incident, do not show any material "cladding" around the pipe.

Also, with reference to Mr Points comments, the XV227 recommendations ask for a maintenance and lifing policy for the damaged and similar ducts. Whilst we can all agree that it is most unlikely that the damaged duct will fail again during the life of the Nimrod, we should be concerned about the others. Lets face it, if a section of your car exhaust fails due to aging, then there it a good chance that other sections are in a similar condition. That is why BAE were asked to carry out a survey back in 2005, which is still outstanding.

DV

Distant Voice

11th Dec 2007, 14:43

Can someone explain how fuel being expelled from No 1 tank blow off can get up into No 7 tank dry area?

DV

airsound

11th Dec 2007, 14:57

DV
According to the MoD briefing, the vent from the No 1 tank blow-off is on the side of the fuselage in a direct line (of airflow) forward of the 7 tank dry bay.

airsound

Distant Voice

11th Dec 2007, 15:05

airsound; Yes I have read that, and I have seen photos of the blow off in relation to the SCP external ducting (the likely source of ignition), but how does the fuel get up, in a sufficient quantity, to the dry bay?

It is not the dry bay that is in the direct air flow, it is the SCP external ducting

DV

John Blakeley

11th Dec 2007, 15:07

DV,
Not a Nimrod specialist, but if I understood the Press Briefing correctly the fuel can track back down the fuselage from the No 1 tank blow-off valve when it operates, and enter the gaps in the fairings and panels by the 7 tank dry bay and alongside the main hot air pipe to the SCP. Given this the fuel can then come into contact with the gap between the two types of insulation, which the BOI found on most aircraft, where the hot air pipe is not protected and hence fuel touching bare metal at approximately 400 degrees C can catch fire. The insulating material would hold the fuel in once it reached there. I think most people were convinced this was the source of ignition, but even the BOI recognised that the fuel could also have come from elsewhere eg a fuel pipe coupling. If it was the no 1 tank blow off valve it is surprising to me that it has not happened before in 20+ years of AAR, however, I am sure a Nimrod expert will correct any mis-conceptions I may have or any mis-use of terminology!
JB

airsound

11th Dec 2007, 15:14

DV & JB

Perhaps I should have prefaced my remarks by saying that I am in no way a Nimrod expert.

However, what I gathered at the briefing accords with what JB says - and of course you're right DV, the dry bay is not itself protruding into the air flow in the way that the SCP external ducting is.

What did strike me as a bit odd is the supposition that any blow-off from the No 1 tank should last for long enough and contain sufficient fuel to maintain a fire of such proportions. Any thoughts?

airsound

Distant Voice

11th Dec 2007, 15:19

Thanks John, I have read all that. If you look at Diagram 14, which is a photograph of No1 tank blow off valve, you can only see the SCP (external) ducting in the direct air flow. What vent, scoop or joint encourages the fuel to go up in to No.7 tank dry bay?

DV

Mr Point

11th Dec 2007, 15:29

EdSet,

I agree that there is no certainty that a comprehensive maintenance review following the XV227 incident would have prevented the fire on XV230. In my early post I did not say that this would be the case, although I concede that I believed it was likely.

I would be very interest to find out how often, both prior to and following September 2006, there has been fuel or traces of fuel found in the No 7 tank dry bay. I find it hard to believe, as John Blakeley has stated, that this is the first time that fuel has entered this bay, or another bay that is close to a hot air pipe on the aircraft. As you know, even before 2003, AAR had been conducted on an occasional basis in a fairly wide range of temperatures.

Tappers Dad

11th Dec 2007, 15:36

BOI 2-31

An average of 9 AAR sorties for the fleet between 1993-2005.Then in 2006 18 AAR sorties, 9 of which XV2230 did, 7 of which were in Aug 2006 why XV230 and not any of the other ac in theatre ????

Distant Voice

11th Dec 2007, 15:40

I am sure the events of 5th November (XV235) must have tilted the scales towards a leaking coupling. It must also cast doubt on QinetiQ, who according to Des Browne, the CAS and the Stn Cmdr, "has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirm that, in the light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate"

DV

Distant Voice

11th Dec 2007, 15:44

TD.

And the next highest was XV235 (remenber that one)

DV

camelspyyder

11th Dec 2007, 16:16

An average of 9 AAR sorties for the fleet between 1993-2005.Then in 2006 18 AAR sorties, 9 of which XV230 did, 7 of which were in Aug 2006 why XV230 and not any of the other ac in theatre ????

It may well have been the only aircraft available for a prolonged period.

Just because ISK had more than 1 frame in theatre, it is not neccessarily true that all are mission capable on any given day
Also the other(s) may well have been at a different location where AAR support was not required.

CS

Mad_Mark

11th Dec 2007, 18:08

why XV230 and not any of the other ac in theatre ????

BOI Report, page 2-2, para 3... "The ground crew servicing XV230 in theatre reported that it had been a particularly serviceable aircraft."

XV230 probably had more AAR sorties clocked up than the other jets purely because it was serviceable more than those other jets in theatre, and therefore available for more sorties than those other jets. Also, as CS said above, the other jets in theatre may have been elsewhere doing other jobs that did not require AAR.

MadMark!!! :mad:

Biggus

11th Dec 2007, 18:27

Sorry, I fully admit I haven't read every comment since page 92, so this might already have been mentioned, but.........

Has nobody else noticed the contents of Annex A to the BOI report - Diary of Action.

According to this diary the final report was presented to the AOC on Fri 20 April, but it was only released on 3 December. So it took the BOI 7.5 months to complete its analysis, and it then took another 7.5 months for the report to go through the Stn Cdr, AOC, AMM and CinC. Is it just me, or does this seem excessive. Nearly 2 months per senior officer?

Given the high profile nature of the report, the speculation taking place before its publication, and the desire of the families involved to achieve closure, I would have thought there would have been a degree of urgency involved, indeed as there should be in any BOI. Or am I being totally naive about what is actually involved in the process?

nigegilb

11th Dec 2007, 18:39

Biggus, worse still, there have been 4 major fuel leaks since the crash and they were not mentioned, (not considered?) by the BoI.

Worse, I understand that the crew who Maydayed into Kandahar were not aware of the contents of the BoI either. So, Sir Glenn had the info all that time but the crews didn't.

I guess he was only following protocol but christ, we are at war!

John Blakeley

12th Dec 2007, 07:32

Biggus,

I do not know why MOD stopped the timeline on 20 Apr, but if you look at Part 2A to the BOI which follows from the main BOI page 2-51 the AOC 2 Group re-convened the Board on 24 May for further work - there is, confusingly, a second set of pages 2-1 to 2-6 and a further Annex A dealing with fuel leak statistics. No date is given for the end of this additional work, but they quote a date of June for one of their references.

Hope this helps.

JB

Distant Voice

12th Dec 2007, 10:02

EdSet100 you stated, earlier

The existing insulation has been recorded to drop the temperature by 16 degrees C

Actually the report states "One experiment conducted by the board on an area of compressed [damaged implied] insulation indicated only a 16 degree difference between an exposed section of hot air pipe and the exterior of the insulated blanket"

What the board should have done was measure the temperture difference on an undamaged section of piping, as well, so that a comparison could be made.

DV

Distant Voice

12th Dec 2007, 10:06

JB. The second part of the report was completed on 25th July 2007 (see date on Annex A to Part 2A)

DV

John Blakeley

12th Dec 2007, 10:57

DV

Well spotted. Obviously a lateral thinker - I just looked at the blank date box!

JB

Safety_Helmut

13th Dec 2007, 09:18

Point B. Nim IPT are also doing their best,
What makes you think that ?

Did you have any dealings with them on safety and airworthiness prior to the loss of XV230 ?

S_H

tristan23

13th Dec 2007, 19:25

EdSet, when fuel 'blows off' during AAR, the quantity of fuel can be considerable - depends upon how quickly aircrew notice and stop receiving. This fuel can track all over the aircraft and get into panels and compartments. Since 30, 'blow offs' have been reported and this event is better understood; hence, the revised AAR procedures post 30. Before 30, there were no incident reports to highlight that 'blow off' was happening.
NB: Routine AAR was suspended after 30. Authority given for operationally essential AAR under Service Deviation. Since 35, operational AAR also suspended - until they figure out why, what looks like a perfectly serviceable coupling, leaked during airborne AAR but does not leak during AAR behind a Tristar on the ground.

Tappers Dad

14th Dec 2007, 08:04

We have been given the 14th January 2008 for the Pre-Inquest into the loss of XV230. Considering how long it takes usually to get an Inquest started its good news.

Mick Smith

14th Dec 2007, 12:11

Written statement by Des Browne today.

I told the House on 4 December that, following the board of inquiry’s report about the loss of Nimrod XV230, I would establish an independent review by a senior Queen’s counsel into a range of broader issues which were outside the scope of the BOI’s investigation. I am now able to set out the details of that review.

The review will be conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC. Mr. Haddon-Cave has wide experience of aviation and safety matters, having been instructed in all the major aviation and marine inquiries in England in the last 20 years. His report will be published in fall [sic], subject to considerations of operational security, together with my response to it.

The terms of reference for the review are as follows:

In the light of the board of inquiry report:

to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;

to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;

to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;

and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.

Appropriate technical expertise will be made available to the reviewer. The reviewer will be able to recommend a public inquiry if he considers this necessary.

The review will have the full support of the Ministry of Defence. All relevant papers will be made available and everyone who can assist the review will be instructed to do so. In order to encourage openness, evidence given during the course of the review will not be used in disciplinary proceedings against the individual who gave it unless there is evidence of gross misconduct. The MOD will also provide Mr. Haddon-Cave, at his request, with a secretariat for the review.

BAE Systems and QinetiQ have confirmed that Mr. Haddon-Cave will have their full co-operation. The MOD and the companies are committed to ensuring that the review has available to it all the technical expertise that it will require. I would expect any other companies whose assistance may be required to follow suit.

Mr. Haddon-Cave will ensure that the families are kept informed of the progress of the review.

It is of the utmost importance that an authoritative and independent analysis is conducted of the background circumstances to the loss of Nimrod XV230. The task which Mr. Haddon-Cave has undertaken will be complex but I have asked him to ensure that information that would assist our understanding of this tragic loss is published without undue delay.

Safeware

14th Dec 2007, 16:50

to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases

Shouldn't that really be about the implementation of the process?

sw

Biggus

14th Dec 2007, 18:41

tristan23

So what is 'routine AAR', as opposed to 'operationally essential AAR'?

Depending on how you define it, it is possible that no Nimrod AAR was suspended after 230 and it all continued, albeit under Service Deviation!

Tappers Dad

14th Dec 2007, 19:09

Biggus
It is possible that no Nimrod AAR was suspended after 230 and it all continued, albeit under Service Deviation!

Yes they did AAR on the 4th Sept 2006 just two days after the crash and continued to get fuel leaks following AAR. I have a number of SFS stating this.

tristan23

14th Dec 2007, 19:54

As stated (no speculation) - AAR carried out since 30 has been authorised by the Theatre Commander under Service Deviation for missions deemed operationally essential. Only other person able to specifically authorise AAR is AOC 2 Gp. Those with access can read the SD.

Papa Whisky Alpha

14th Dec 2007, 21:16

What information have you received? I have heard nothing as yet.

tucumseh

14th Dec 2007, 22:07

The terms of reference for the review are as follows:

In the light of the board of inquiry report:

to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;

to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;

to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;

and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.

Safeware is right. The processes exist and are robust. It’s implementation that’s lacking. And the processes, procedures and regulations apply to all aircraft, not just Nimrod.

I hope Mr Haddon-Cave has already seen through this and sought clarification……………

Forgive me, but the cynic in me says;

It has already been established, in the QQ report and elsewhere, that little historical documentation can be found in MoD’s Nimrod records. This could because (a) they have been destroyed, (b) lost or (c) hidden. Another ploy is to deny their existence in the first place. This worked on another accident mentioned here (or at least the claim doesn’t seem to have been challenged even though someone else produced the evidence that “didn’t exist”).

Who will the QC ask? The two Nimrod IPTs? They were only formed relatively recently. Who will he ask about records from 1979 to 1999? The last Director/Maritime in MoD(PE)? At least he is available – he made his position clear in the BoI report – most, if not all, his predecessors and their immediate superiors are retired which, apparently, precludes them from being interviewed.

DPA? Safety and airworthiness are optional. Disagree? Disciplinary action. Simple matter of record.

What about AMSO / AML? (DLO’s predecessors in the Air domain, 1991 to establishment of DLO). Well, their policy was clear. Thou shalt not address safety issues, or maintain the build standard in general, which includes safety / airworthiness. (Read the QQ report, it spells out the evidence). But I’m sure retired Directors General Support Management will offer to explain decisions. (If there is anyone left who remembers names. Try the boards in Bazelgette Pavilion foyer).

DLO? Oh Dear.

DE&S? They simply agree with previous rulings and have “nothing more to add”.

Minister for the Armed Forces? He’s advised by all the above to agree with previous decisions and also has “nothing more to add”.

(Well I hope Mr Haddon-Cave invites them to “add”).

And all the while the Corporate Memory (a requirement for airworthiness) is being eroded; nay, actively ditched.

One positive is that personnel records should remain. The people who were disciplined for refusing to ignore safety and airworthiness are well known. What, those records disappeared as well? Hopefully someone kept their own.

Conjecture? Yes, some of it. The rest is in writing.

Here’s my suggested starter for ten (as it’s always the starting point for any requirement – and airworthiness and safety should be requirements). When was the last time a sponsor or user ASKED for airworthiness or safety to be maintained? You think that’s a silly question? If you don’t ask, you don’t get. (And even if you ask, there’s no guarantee the BCs will give). If, one year, you don’t get, you create an immediate gap in the airworthiness and safety audit trails. And the next year, the BCs say “You didn’t need it last year, so you’re not getting it this year or next”. A manageable “gap” becomes an unbridgeable chasm. Now, that’s absolutely nothing to do with the Nimrod IPTs directly (although their embedded Requirement Managers should be interested) and I doubt very much if there is anyone in the IPTs who remember. The process I describe is mandated by PUS (but rejected by just about everyone else in authority). It’s called “making materiel and financial provision”. Wait a minute, just checking my dairies. Ah, here we are. 29th Jan 1998. “Of no concern to MoD(PE)”. (Nimrod 2 Star). What?

DaveyBoy

14th Dec 2007, 22:31

Just to clarify, the flight on 4 Sep 06 did not involve AAR.

Magnersdrinker

14th Dec 2007, 23:37

If you were a captain of an aircraft, after a terrible accident and seen freinds and comrades that aint with you anymore, what would you do as a captain with the right to say no or yes we fly.He is given all the information thats available from both ground and air and in this instance from people further up the chain that kind of knew what had happened. Its a big call but as a captain of an aircraft im sure he/she has taken all things into consideration and opted to take the aircraft. People that here not in military this is not a sweet comfy chair we all live in sometimes people make a call cause lives depend on it. Its what you do in the military and im sure if the Captains of each flight after 30 did not want to take the jet then they have that option of saying no as a collective.

On the flip side I have seen 2 pilots say no and stick up for there rights, they have effectively lost there career.fear to talk is a bad thing when you have the prospect of loosing what may be an important promotion. I guess thats what makes a good pilot , that i will never know

spanners123

15th Dec 2007, 00:57

Magners,
too many people offer an opinion (often with no knowledge), but the guys who operate the mighty hunter know what is sh:mad:e and what is to be valued.

Rememeber, opinions are like ars:mad:les, every one has one!!:ok:

Tappers Dad

15th Dec 2007, 07:38

DaveyBoy
Just to clarify, the flight on 4 Sep 06 did not involve AAR.

XV255 had fuel leak problems post AAR on 3rd Sept 2006. So I am afraid
you are wrong DaveyBoy.
http://www.benknight.co.uk/images/postAAR1.jpg
Magnersdrinker & spanners123
The RAF & MOD threw in the towel and said it was their fault, so why are you still trying to defend their actions.

Biggus

15th Dec 2007, 08:32

mileandahalf

First of all I see that nobody actually answered my question as to what is routine AAR, as opposed to what is operationally essential!

I was not attempting to speculate, but if no Nimrod AAR is deemed routine then none was suspended post 230. I know, please don't attempt to deny it, that Nimrod AAR has taken place more than once in the UK FIR since the loss of 230.

No doubt this was deemed 'operationally essential' in terms of training up crews pre deployment. Were other options considered for the short term post 230, like keeping a small pool of pilots/engs AAR current by in theatre flying who then regularly rotate and fly with standard crews to supplement them for AAR missions, thus avoiding the need for AAR training flights in the UK FIR - hard on the small pool of individuals, but reducing uneccessary risk. Or deploying an AARI to the Gulf. Both of these options were probably possible, albeit a pain. Or was it just a case of doing things as they have always been done?

I can fully accept that it is 'operationally essential' that a Nimrod crew about to deploy needs to be capable of carrying out missions involving AAR. However, is it operationally essential for the pilot and eng of that particular crew to be AAR capable, or simply that they carry an AAR qualified/current pilot and eng for such missions? If the latter is feasible how can it be achieved while minimising the need for currency/qualification AAR sorties in the UK.

Writing that only 'operationally essential' AAR be conducted is fairly easy, how this was then implimented will say much of the mindset of the organisations involved.

TheSmiter

15th Dec 2007, 10:12

As Chugulug said a few posts ago

He deals with the MOD woods, rather than contentious RAF trees. It seems to me that is where the thread should be concentrating, especially given, as tuc reminds us, the CinC's comments on the BOI's findings.

This whole sorry episode is entering a new phase, and, although tucumseh has already posted the upcoming review's ToR's, here is the whole statement from Des Browne as reported in Hansard 13th Dec - it may answer a few questions or promote further discussion.

I told the House on 4 December that, following the board of inquiry's report about the loss of Nimrod XV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XV)230, I would establish an independent review by a senior Queen's counsel into a range of broader issues which were outside the scope of the BOI's investigation. I am now able to set out the details of that review.
The review will be conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC (http://www.theyworkforyou.com/glossary/?gl=139). Mr. Haddon-Cave has wide experience of aviation and safety matters, having been instructed in all the major aviation and marine inquiries in England in the last 20 years. His report will be published in fall, subject to considerations of operational security, together with my response to it.
The terms of reference for the review are as follows:
In the light of the board of inquiry report:
to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MR)2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
to assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State (http://www.theyworkforyou.com/glossary/?gl=23) as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim reports.
Appropriate technical expertise will be made available to the reviewer. The reviewer will be able to recommend a public inquiry if he considers this necessary.
The review will have the full support of the Ministry of Defence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Defence). All relevant papers will be made available and everyone who can assist the review will be instructed to do so. In order to encourage openness, evidence given during the course of the review will not be used in disciplinary proceedings against the individual who gave it unless there is evidence of gross misconduct. The MOD (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MOD) will also provide Mr. Haddon-Cave, at his request, with a secretariat for the review.
BAE Systems and QinetiQ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QinetiQ) have confirmed that Mr. Haddon-Cave will have their full co-operation. The MOD and the companies are committed to ensuring that the review has available to it all the technical expertise that it will require. I would expect any other companies whose assistance may be required to follow suit.
Mr. Haddon-Cave will ensure that the families are kept informed of the progress of the review.
It is of the utmost importance that an authoritative and independent analysis is conducted of the background circumstances to the loss of Nimrod XV230. The task which Mr. Haddon-Cave has undertaken will be complex but I have asked him to ensure that information that would assist our understanding of this tragic loss is published without undue delay.

Your honour, I call Mr Tucumseh as first witness.

Magnersdrinker

15th Dec 2007, 11:15

I not defending the MOD TD, I just try and defend the people that work on them and have to fly them. So much has been said and I only here to try and clarify the engineering points and correct peoples thoughts. I know way have any problems with your determination and will to find what you need to know .

Biggus

15th Dec 2007, 11:36

mileandahalf

I do not wish to get into a slanging match, or 'defend' my post, and I appreciate your staying within security caveats.

However,.......you said some of what I said is 'incorrect', well I feel I should point out that the only "fact" I stated was that Nimrod AAR had taken place in the UK FIR since the loss of XV230. Everything else I said was a mixture of questions and suggestions for how things could have been conducted. I'm not sure how questions and suggestions can be 'incorrect', inappropriate, impractical, irrelevant are possible ways of describing them, but incorrect?

EdSet100

15th Dec 2007, 12:05

A question has been asked about routine and operational AAR. By its very nature all AAR is operational, except where it is for training only. So, there is no such thing as "routine" AAR. AAR training does not need fuel transfer to occur, thus all aircrew can be trained without actually refuelling, per sec. Mandatory "minimum time in contact" requirements are achievable with dry prods, although some fuel does travel down the hose and into the receiver. However, once the receiver's pipes are full, the volume of which which will vary from type to type, no more fuel transfer will occur unless the receiver opens a refuel valve. This is standard knowledge among aircrew familiar with AAR.

A question has been asked about how the blown-off fuel can travel up to the 7 Tank dry bay. The answer is this: the dry bay boundaries, for the want of a better term, are arranged like this: the front wall is the rear spar. The rear wall is the front wall of the 7 tank. The top is the wing fillet panel and the bottom is the panel that is mainly flat but is curved at its inner rear corner to provide a fairing for the front portion of the SCP pipe. The BOI suspects that fuel would probably have travelled along the bomb bay skirt from the No 1 tank blow off outlet and run into the gap between the front edge of the dry bay lower panel and come into contact with the hot SCP pipe and auto-ignited. The non-drained panel's ribbed sections can hold approx 300ml of fluid (in this case fuel). Once a small amount of the fuel has ignited the remaining portion of the 300ml then also ignites and creates a very strong fire which rises straight up inside the bay and plays onto the 7 tank pipework and the 7 tank wall as well. The pipe seals would have been the first components to fail and then we have more fuel to keep the fire self-propagating.

It doesn't take a lot of blow-off in this scenario.

Blow-off occurs when the tank over-pressures (not necessarily overfills), but if it is fuel that pushes the blow-off valve open, the size of the blow-off valve plate increases in diameter when open and it therefore requires a lower pressure to keep it open, thus ensuring that the valve does not cycle open/shut/open/shut, etc. It simply remains open until it is no longer covered by the fuel in the tank. The valve sits on the top of a stack pipe in the tank, so the blown off fuel exits at the bottom of the tank. This is usually achieved only by stopping the refuel of the tank.

The BOI has determined that the design of the No 1 tank is not compatible with the flow rates that can be achieved during AAR, thus blow-off is very likely and a lot of fuel will escape towards the SCP fairing, which only serves to make the auto-ignition easier.

Regards
Ed Sett

DaveyBoy

15th Dec 2007, 12:17

TD - With the greatest of respect, I was on that flight on 4 Sep 06 and I would have noticed if we'd refuelled in the air!

You'll probably find that the fault on 255 was only reported on 3 Sep either because that's when a thorough check was carried out on all the aircraft following the events of the previous day, or it occurred during ground refuelling, and it was merely noted that the airframe had been carrying out AAR a few days before.

camelspyyder

15th Dec 2007, 12:22

TD. I was on board too on 4 Sep 06. This was absolutely the first sortie post-accident. 255 did not fly on the 3rd

CS

Biggus

15th Dec 2007, 12:59

So let me get this straight, and I am not trying to put words in anyone's mouth!

Post 230 Nimrod AAR was suspended, apart from 'operationally essential' AAR which continued under Service Deviation. However, EdSet100 says all AAR is operational by definition. Which implies to me that phrases such as '....non operationally AAR is suspended....' are actually pretty meaningless and little more than a token effort to be seen to be doing something.

Have I got that wrong, and I must point out that this is my personal interpretation of what has been said by a variety of people. I may adding up 2 and 2 and getting 5!

DaveyBoy

15th Dec 2007, 13:25

As mileandahalf said, you won't get full explanations on a public forum such as this, but the phrase is not meaningless and less tanking has been carried out in the last 15 months than would have been were it not for 230.

dodgysootie

15th Dec 2007, 13:41

XV255 had fuel leak problems post AAR on 3rd Sept 2006. So I am afraid
you are wrong DaveyBoy.

Magnersdrinker & spanners123
The RAF & MOD threw in the towel and said it was their fault, so why are you still trying to defend their actions

TD.
Just to clarify, the fracture of the 5 tank refuel pipe was definately found during a ground refuel. This I know as FACT as I found it. Also the date on the bottom right of the form you scanned in seems a bit suspect, surely it should read march 2007.
RIP CXX/3.
DS

Magnersdrinker

15th Dec 2007, 16:37

DS

As i posted further up the thread matey im not defending the MOD Im just defending the people that work with the Nimrod and try to give a realistic point of view.

BTW im not sitting across from you tonight at the Xmas doo , your red wine habits cost me a lot of money lol

Shack37

15th Dec 2007, 16:49

MD
Surely Magners has the advantage over red wine volumetrically even if not so colourful. Hatchets buried and a fine festive night to you all.
s37

Chugalug2

16th Dec 2007, 16:28

Tucumseh wrote about the forthcoming review:

“to examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case completed in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;…”

Safeware is right. The processes exist and are robust. It’s implementation that’s lacking. And the processes, procedures and regulations apply to all aircraft, not just Nimrod.

Well you know that tuc, safeware obviously does, and now that you have spelled it out so do I, the MOD does for it composed it, The Smiter does:

This whole sorry episode is entering a new phase, and, although tucumseh has already posted the upcoming review's ToR'
And as tuc says:

I hope Mr Haddon-Cave has already seen through this and sought clarification……………

Which leaves just about every one else, with a few honourable exceptions, that post on this thread. As tuc tells us, the processes that are to be reviewed are robust and have worked well enough in the past. The implementation, which may well not be reviewed, almost certainly not fully, has proved to be lacking any robustness whatsoever. The result has been needless accidents that needlessly cost lives. This is not the clever script of ‘Yes Minister’, with Sir Humphrey running rings around a hapless stooge, but the total failure of the UK Military Airworthiness provision system. That has been tacitly admitted by the MOD and the RAF. We are fortunate to have someone as experienced and knowledgeable as tucumseh to tell us how this has happened, how long for, and what must be done to regain this protection for our aircrew and aircraft. The reaction from those who post here has been in the main compete indifference, with a preference for indulging in “Yes you did, no I didn’t” yahboo instead. This review, and hopefully a subsequent Public Inquiry, may be the only hope to right this glaring deficiency in the UK military air fleets. If the individuals who identify themselves as being professionally concerned, by posting here, with the causes and implications of the tragedy that is the subject of this thread have nothing to say on this issue, then who should have?
If you support tuc’s testimony, then say so. If you disagree with him then say so, for at least therein lies dialogue. If you do not understand fully what he says, then say so, for the labyrinthine beast that is the MOD is complex and devious, often by design, and he will no doubt try to make the explanation ‘pilot proof’ in his patient way. Flight Safety concerns you! That means not turning your back on what you do not wish to hear. Get angry with me, get angry with tuc, better still support what he says, but say something for God’s sake!

Da4orce

16th Dec 2007, 17:34

As always Tucumseh has shown and understanding and knowledge of the wider issues at play here.

Everyone in the RAF should have a vested interest in ensuring that this QC inquiry and the more imminent Coroners Inquest is robust and transparent. Also that they are able to establish exactly how and where the process of airworthiness has been degraded and that it is made a matter of public record how, where and why these failures have occurred.

Charles Haddon-Cave QC is clearly very experienced in his field and I’m sure will see beyond the façade of MoD policy on airworthiness. The foundation of any investigation of this nature is establishing what should happen. Are there are policies/procedures? How are these disseminated/updated, are they implemented properly? If not why not? Are the people responsible for the policies and procedures aware that they are not been implemented? Etc etc…

On a slightly different point and without wishing to re-open old wounds here the BoI documentation is very clear that the problem is 'maintenance policy' not 'maintenance implementation'.

Chugalug2

16th Dec 2007, 18:52

As always Tucumseh has shown and understanding and knowledge of the wider issues at play here.

Thank you for your positive response, Da4orce, for where you lead others will hopefully follow. Your last point is salutary for I feel that too much energy has been expended here on that non-contentious issue.

Distant Voice

16th Dec 2007, 19:01

Da4orce; The Air Member for Materiel (the RAF's most senior engineer) stated in his comments regarding deteriorated insolation "The correct procedure on finding damage would therefore be for a concession to be sought; clearly this has not been happening. In this respect this was a maintenance, rather than a maintenance policy shortcoming"

DV

EdSet100

16th Dec 2007, 19:20

"The correct procedure on finding damage would therefore be for a concession to be sought

I hope he (AMM) read (received a good brief on) the maintenance schedules before he wrote that. Finding damage can only occur if the tradesman is scheduled to examine the component. We cannot rely on the men choosing where to look for damage. We have maintenance schedules to meet that specific need.

However, we know from a previous Flight Safety Report that there is no maintenance policy for the SCP ducts, so I guess there is no examination policy for the insulation either, but I'm just guessing.

Chugalug2

16th Dec 2007, 19:26

To follow up my last post and to respond to Distant Voice, I turn as ever to tucumseh, for at post 1920 (thread page 96) he says:

2. As to the maintenance issue, by now it should be clear to anyone who reads and understands this thread that the term in this context refers to ALL technical, administrative, managerial and supervisory actions supporting the objective to retain or restore an item so that it is fit for purpose. You may argue semantics, but this holistic view is the one you should take. The BAeS and QinetiQ reports make it crystal clear that the MoD has failed in this DUTY at all levels. The Board of Inquiry report and especially the reviewing officers (with the notable exception of a former Director/Maritime and Nimrod MRA4 IPT Leader – I wonder why) have agreed.

Perhaps 'non-contentious' is too much to assign to any issue on this thread, perhaps I should have said "authoritatively dealt with already". The point is surely that airworthiness provision or the lack of it is the issue here, not servicing

nigegilb

16th Dec 2007, 19:35

Ed, can you set me right on something. The BoI pointed out that a damaged section of duct insulation only reduced the temperature of the bare metal by 16deg. Do you know how much of a reduction the insulation was supposed to provide? And would this have prevented auto-ignition?

Distant Voice

16th Dec 2007, 19:55

nigegilb; As I understand the report, auto ignition came about because of the lack of insulation at the V-coupling (aft of the elbow). So temp reduction due to insulation problems did not come into it in the end.

One would have thought that when this section of piping was replaced, as it was after XV227 incident, the instruction should have been given for the insulation blanket to cover the exposed clamp.

Perhaps someone involved in the replacement programme can comment on this

DV

EdSet100

16th Dec 2007, 22:00

DV has answered the question well. I would add that there can only be conjecture about the thickness of the insulation and the size of the gap in the vicinity of the V band clamp on XV230.

NG, I don't know, as a fact, what the temperature reduction is with a brand new insulation shroud. I've seen them, in good condition on other jets, and IMHO they are not designed to protect the equipment around a pipe with 400 C air pushed through it for hours on end. To be accurate, though, the engines are normally at about 90% while the SCP is used (duct air temp will be approx 300C). There will be an occasional increase to climb power (95%). When the pipe was originally designed it's sole purpose was for use as a crossfeed air start pipe. The SCP was then added with the introduction of MR2, then the empty refuel pipes (they were sucked empty before the days of AAR) in the area of the hot pipe were pressurised in flight during AAR. As aircrew, I unwittingly trusted other folk (engineering policymakers) to keep an eye on the the safety of all this.

As a matter of interest, we actually breath the air in that pipe and other similar ducts. There are no biological or chemical filters between the engine compressors and my lungs. Should there be a safety case for this???

Magnersdrinker

16th Dec 2007, 22:07

I like your last point Ed Set , you should try sitting under an engine at max throttle and adjust the conditioning regulator LOL The vibration that shakes your internal organs as well as the crap the system throws out also the constant burning of the hands trying to check for leaks in the piping. There is no saftey procedures for this even though I dont think it can be doing the body any good. Saying that im still alive so far :ok:

spanners123

16th Dec 2007, 22:19

EdSet,
The air you breathe is taken from a low pressure tapping from the ECU, there are no filters on the system and as far as I recall, in over 20 years of aircraft maint, none of the a/c I have worked on have had filters fitted either.
You should never experience any unpleasant odours as the tapping is before the combustion chamber.
Cheers:ok:

nigegilb

16th Dec 2007, 22:46

Ed, I seem to recall reading that the Tri-Jet is the fastest tanker, requiring higher power settings for Nimrod to keep up. Would the figure of 94% be about right, thus giving the 400 deg+ temp in the pipework?

Also, and I believe this is not uncommon, the Nimrod uses engine air to actually dump fuel in an emergency. This positive air pressure is used directly in the fuel tanks. I am a pilot with very limited engineering knowledge, but is there any concern about this procedure? Where is this air tapped from?

Apologies if I am going off track a bit and also if my techy bits aren't quite right.

Finally, with a temp reduction of only 16 deg, surely the auto-ignition could have occurred anywhere the fuel was in contact with the damaged insulation?

I am not specifically referring to XV230, if you see what I mean.

EdSet100

16th Dec 2007, 23:27

Spanners,
The air that I breath comes from the 12th stage of the HP comp. To get there it passes over the oil metering pump in the intake bullet. When engine a/icing is selected on, some of the 12th stage air is routed forward and then through small pipes inside the bullet before entering the LP comp and it occasionally induces oil out from the metering pump. This air/oil mix then ends up at the 12th stage and centifugal force throws it down the HP air outlets and it eventually gets up my nose. Then we have the cold air units with their syringe full of oil in the system as well.....

NG,
Ed, I seem to recall reading that the Tri-Jet is the fastest tanker, requiring higher power settings for Nimrod to keep up. Would the figure of 94% be about right, thus giving the 400 deg+ temp in the pipework?

Yes, as the BOI confirmed, XV230's engines were somewhere between 94% and 99% at the end of the bracket, so at least 400C would have been in the pipes. Perhaps, much higher.

Also, and I believe this is not uncommon, the Nimrod uses engine air to actually dump fuel in an emergency. This positive air pressure is used directly in the fuel tanks. I am a pilot with very limited engineering knowledge, but is there any concern about this procedure? Where is this air tapped from?

The air comes from the engine LP comps. It is reduced to a much lower pressure, with most air bled overboard, before it gets into the tanks. The vent system comes under spring relief pressure at 2.5 psi and backed up by the (in)famous blow-off valves if the vent valves fail. So, the fuel pressure in the dump lines/refuel lines, is very low and does not cause us any concerns. However, a loose coupling is a loose coupling and fuel without any pressure will leak through it. But, we are quite content that the lads are making sure that the couplings are not loose.

Finally, with a temp reduction of only 16 deg, surely the auto-ignition could have occurred anywhere the fuel was in contact with the damaged insulation?

Well, it is conjecture to say how much reduction is achieved by brand new, or very old, insulation. IMHO, regardless of the thickness, if the pipe has more than 400C air in it, the insulation wouldn't stop auto-ignition if the fuel is able to remain on top of it for a minute or two.

Regards
Ed Sett

spanners123

16th Dec 2007, 23:50

Edset,
You are correct, the air is taken from the HP comp, thats what happens when I think at this time of night!:oh:

tucumseh

17th Dec 2007, 08:13

EdSet100

“As aircrew, I unwittingly trusted other folk (engineering policymakers) to keep an eye on the safety of all this”.

Quite right too. This is one area I hope the review studies.

They should ask why non-engineers are permitted to make sometimes crucial engineering decisions. It’s not unusual for an engineering project manager to spend half his time running around over-ruling decisions made by unqualified superiors.

Also, and I can only speak from personal experience, it is now nearly 20 years since a Service Engineering Authority (an IPT function nowadays) first approached me (as a PE project manager) and asked me to write a new maintenance policy for a system, as they no longer had the expertise.

There’s so much wrong with the above you could write a book. Two simple sentences contain a host of fundamental breaches of airworthiness regulations. The Service EAs used to be self reliant, with PE a fallback. A viable fallback, as PMs had to have been there and done it before promotion. But when you come to rely on the fallback, and the latter’s boss announces he doesn’t want engineers in PM posts, then the fallback becomes Industry. They, too, offloaded engineering posts and many are now employed on a consultancy basis. Consultants, by their nature, are transients. Where is the continuity of expertise today? (The Corporate knowledge which is itself a fundamental airworthiness requirement). Where is the recruitment ground for MoD project engineers who understand military aviation? Sold off, that’s where. Lining the pockets of shareholders, when we should be more concerned with stakeholders. (i.e. YOU). Like I said before, these are not revelations. Predictable, predicted and ignored.

enginesuck

17th Dec 2007, 13:56

Chugalug2

18th Dec 2007, 10:00

Mike Jenvey, thank you for responding to my 'call to arms'. Yes, you are quite right to attribute tucumseh with a special knowledge of what goes wrong in the implementation of Airworthiness provision, and even more importantly a willingness to reveal what he knows on this forum, subject to the OSA and what is already in the public domain but not spelled out. What makes him do it? I suspect he is driven by his training, engineers must surely be able to empathise with his fury at seeing all the processes designed to make aircraft safe being subverted by ignorance (ie those not so trained) and worse still malevolence (those in authority who ride roughshod over any like him who try to enforce airworthiness protection into military aircraft and their systems). How has it come to such a dreadful pass? As ever the reason is simple, good men (and women) were unwilling to stand up and stop it. Why was it done? Who knows, ostensibly to save money one supposes, in a ministry renowned for its wastefulness the one process where slashing expenditure has an immediate sting in the tail was not a wise move. These are not wise people, they are ignorant single minded bullies and should have no power over such vital work which must be removed into the safe qualified hands of a dedicated independent authority established for the purpose.
What Mr Haddon-Cave, or for that matter tucumseh himself, does is entirely up to them. What is important here and now is what each of us on this thread does. If you are convinced, as I am, that further preoccupation with the minutiae of the MOD structure for airworthiness enforcement is pointless, because that structure is now completely dysfunctional, then what is to be done? I feel that we are in the position of having tried to diagnose the random and seemingly pattern less malfunctioning of an undercarriage actuating ram. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't, and sometimes it starts but then stops. Others it seems have been preoccupied with flying control faults, similarly random, yet others with a variety of other bizarre symptoms. One person then questions if the right hydraulic fluid was ever used, or a cheaper but incorrect one. Do you go on concentrating on the undercarriage fault, or take seriously this latest contribution and check it out? Now I know my analogy can be shot down with ease, but I hope that what I am trying to say is understood. We, that is aviation professionals (well ex in my case) of whatever persuasion, tend to go deeply into things to discover what is wrong. In this case what is wrong is the thing itself, ie the system or rather the way in which it has become subverted. As I have said before forget the trees, look at the woods.
So to get back to my query, what is to be done? PPRuNe is powerful, especially when it talks about what is dearest to its heart. If Flight Safety isn’t just that, I do not know what is. So we should pick up on the theme that tucumseh espouses, contributing anything in our knowledge that supports his stance, calling individually for the total reform of this blighted system, supporting the call for an independent MAA, in short speak out! Is this the right thread on which to do that? I would say yes. This tragedy seems to have finally caused pennies to drop in the minds of those who should have been alert all along to this farrago, if any good is to come out of it then this is surely it. We owe much to those who perished in XV230, the very least we can do is to strive with all our might to ensure that preventable accidents like this, and far to many others within the military air fleets, are avoided in future by reinvigorating the process of military airworthiness provision, ie by creating an MAA.

Distant Voice

18th Dec 2007, 15:20

Does anyone know if cables for the Wescam camera pass through No.7 dray bay?

DV

airsound

19th Dec 2007, 19:17

Does any of this sound familiar?
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the......Program’s history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval....., subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, ....... Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization’s rules.
Well, apart from the spelling, we might hope that this, or something not dissimilar, would be part of the executive summary that Mr Haddon-Cave QC will present as part of his inquiry.

Actually, it's from the Executive Summary of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, after the 2003 destruction of the Shuttle Columbia on re-entry. I recommend a glance
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html

airsound

Safeware

19th Dec 2007, 20:02

Airsound et al,
If you want to read more about this kind of thing, may I also commend Nancy Leveson's book "SAFEWARE: SYSTEM SAFETY AND COMPUTERS" or look at her website http://sunnyday.mit.edu/
and from the papers section http://sunnyday.mit.edu/papers.html#org:

Technical and Managerial Factors in the NASA Challenger and Columbia Losses: Looking Forward to the Future by Nancy Leveson, in Handelsman and Kleinman (editors), Controveries in Science and Technology (to appear) , University of Wisconsin Press, 2007. (DOC )

This essay examines the technical and organizational factors leading to the Challenger and Columbia accidents and what we can learn from them. While accidents are often described in terms of a chain of directly related events leading to a loss, examining this event chain does not explain why the events themselves occurred. In fact, accidents are better conceived as complex processes involving indirect and non-linear interactions among people, societal and organizational structures, engineering activities, and physical system components. They are rarely the result of a chance occurrence of random events, but usually result from the migration of a system (organization) toward a state of high risk where almost any deviation will result in a loss. Understanding enough about the Challenger and Columbia accidents to prevent future ones, therefore, requires not only determining what was wrong at the time of the losses, but also why the high standards of the Apollo program deteriorated over time and allowed the conditions cited by the Rogers Commission as the root causes of the Challenger loss and why the fixes instituted after Challenger became ineffective over time, i.e., why the manned space program has a tendency to migrate to states of such high risk and poor decision-making processes that an accident becomes almost inevitable.

NEW:
What System Safety Engineering can Learn from the Columbia Accident by Nancy Leveson and Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Int. Conference of the System Safety Society, Providence Rhode Island, August 2004. (PDF )
Many of the dysfunctionalities in the system safety program at NASA contributing to the Columbia accident can be seen in other groups and industries. This paper summarizes some of the lessons we can all learn from this tragedy. While there were many factors involved in the loss of the Columbia Space Shuttle, this paper concentrates on the role of system safety engineering and what can be learned about effective (and ineffective) safety efforts.

sw

Chugalug2

20th Dec 2007, 09:25

airsound and Safeware, I really cannot see the relevance of citing NASA's safety record when considering that of the RAF. In NASA's case a self regulating authority, faced with the horrific deaths of Grissom, White and Chaffee in a ground training accident preparing for the Apollo 1 mission, produced a safety regime whereby all future Apollo missions , including the ill-fated Apollo 13, were conducted without further loss of life. Having attained such an enviable record, thanks to training and financial investment, standards later slipped due to a combination of managerial pressure and financial cutbacks, culminating in the losses of Challenger (Smith, Scobee, McNair, Onizuka, McAuliffe, Jarvis and Resnik) and of Columbia (Brown, Husband, Clark, Chawla, Anderson, McCool and Ramon).
In contrast the RAF, under a self regulating authority, faced with the horrific training accidents of the early jet era produced a Flight Safety regime whereby such accidents were greatly reduced. Having attained such an enviable record, thanks to training and financial investment, standards later slipped, due to a combination of managerial pressure and financial cutbacks, culminating in....oh wait, I think I can see where you are going with this...

airsound

20th Dec 2007, 17:59

I understand that facilities for the Inquiry are being set up in Whitehall, but probably won’t be up & running until after Christmas. But then there will be a website and means of getting in touch for interested parties. Also, I believe that Mr H-C will be familiarising himself with PPRuNe.

So I guess it’d be best not to get in touch with him until perhaps the new year - but I do believe that once the site is up, he’ll be happy to hear from people who have something significant to say.

airsound

Safeware

20th Dec 2007, 22:29

Chug, :ok:

When an organisation with a good safety management system, properly managed and resourced, goes through a period where the rationale for setting up the safety management system is forgotten about, it sees "safety" as having no added value. If the safety culture is then cut to save costs, it isn't the suits doing the cutting that pay the price. As they say, if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident.

sw

Tappers Dad

21st Dec 2007, 08:14

Thanks for the information airsound. Needless to say I will be on the website once it has been set up, I have plenty to say. Although I am busy preparing for the pre-inquest at present.

Chugalug2

22nd Dec 2007, 12:46

Safeware wrote:

When an organisation with a good safety management system, properly managed and resourced, goes through a period where the rationale for setting up the safety management system is forgotten about, it sees "safety" as having no added value

And Bingo, at last we see the woods for what they are. The reason that self regulation always fails us in the end is because it is essentially self serving. The NASA safety regime enforced after Apollo1 was just that. The whole programme, indeed NASA itself, was under threat and the answer was a total redesign of the vehicle, procedures, and the programme itself. Once all that was done, the task was essentially achieved. Safety for its own sake was not, per se, the point and other priorities, principally financial, replaced its supremacy. Without flogging the point to death an almost identical sequence occurred in the case of the RAF, its onset being the early post war accident rate of Meteors etc. The point of RAF Flight Safety is not safety for its own sake (for which it is often derided) but Force Preservation, ie to reduce avoidable losses of aircraft and crews so that they are available for operational use. Thus it is a management function, thus it can be and has been supplanted by other priorities, hence the present crisis. This is thus an unstable and dysfunctional system. It must be reformed, in particular the regulation of military aircraft airworthiness must be removed to a Military Airworthiness Authority. Operating unairworthy aircraft is not macho, it is reckless and irresponsible, no matter who does it and it has to be prevented.

Safety_Helmut

23rd Dec 2007, 22:25

When an organisation with a good safety management system, properly managed and resourced, goes through a period where the rationale for setting up the safety management system is forgotten about, it sees "safety" as having no added value. If the safety culture is then cut to save costs, it isn't the suits doing the cutting that pay the price. As they say, if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident.

Sorry Safeware, but this is bull****. You make it sound like a long period of safe operations has somehow caused complacency. A period where the rationale for having a SMS is for forgotten about ? But every year the SofS makes the statement about being at least as safe as the civil world etc etc, that's not forgetting or seeing safety as having no added value. Safety Culture is not something you can talk about cutting, it can be lost or broken, but you can't decide to cut your safety culture safety culture by say 50%.

This is an organisation that has wilfully and systematically gone down the route of underfunding safety and airworthiness. This is an organisation that has not been able to achieve that SofS safety objective for many years.

As for your previous claims that the MoD's processes are adequate, and that it is only the implementation that is failing. Sorry mate, have to disagree, it's an effing shambles. It needs taking apart and rebuilding, the people, the processes, everything. Nothing less is now acceptable.

Safety_Helmut

Safeware

23rd Dec 2007, 22:54

S_H,
Ok, maybe the use of the words "culture" and "cut" together wasn't quite right, but if you take the parallels of NASA and the MOD, I would say that in both cases, the underfunding that you correctly refer to had /has had (delete as appropriate) a negative on all aspects - competence, prioritisation, process improvement, oversight etc etc. As a result, I would say that the culture would certainly be lost. This would also produce the "wilful and systematic" effect you refer to.

As for things being an "effing shambles", maybe that is how you see it. But I think that if the processes and procedures in place were followed, then the situation with Chinook, Herc and Nimrod (at least, as I'm sure we both could cite other examples) would not have arisen. It is pretty clear what should be done, and obvious what hasn't. Whether or not the process needs improving is slightly different from not bothering with the process at all.

As a starting point, I'd be happier if people read, understood and implemented the existing systems, but do share how you think it should be rebuilt?

sw

ps, As for the SofS statement, he may make it, but do you think he knows how it should be achieved, or if those acting on his immediate behalf really take on board what it means, or how they are to be held accountable? The MOD "targets" for safety are meaningless (and I don't mean probability targets).

tucumseh

24th Dec 2007, 06:59

S-H & Safeware

I don’t think you’re too far apart, despite emotive words.

“Safety Culture is not something you can talk about cutting, it can be lost or broken, but you can't decide to cut your safety culture safety culture by say 50%”.

Funny you mention 50%. That is precisely the financial cut our Director demanded to the annual spend on maintaining safety and airworthiness. He was argued down to 28% but we took that hit 3 years running. I would say that if you slash funding like that, on processes and procedures which are mostly not volume related (i.e. they cost the same regardless of how many aircraft you have) then (a) you are way past your level of competence, and (b) you are encouraging a culture whereby safety and airworthiness are seen as optional.

Couple that with his oft-stated assertion that people who worked in this field were “the rump end of MoD(PE)”, and you have a recipe for disaster. Effectively he is saying, “Take that career path and you’re going nowhere”. Anyone who understands the application of these processes and procedures knows that the effect is not immediately apparent – it takes years. Time for him, and those like him, to move onwards and upwards.

I happen to think the processes and procedures are robust. They work if funded and applied properly. What is lacking is a process whereby the application is verified. It no longer exists because of the above cuts.

tucumseh

24th Dec 2007, 08:44

Sorry, perhaps what I said didn’t quite come across as intended.

I don’t believe a simple injection of funding can correct all that is wrong. We passed that point in about 1993. There are so many other things that are encouraged, condoned and applied that are fundamental breaches of the airworthiness regulations. Among them;

The delegation process. There is a basic lack of audit trail when people who themselves are unqualified and inexperienced are permitted to delegate airworthiness responsibility.

As above, the people who are delegated are often untrained and have a very simplistic view of safety and airworthiness. It used to be more or less impossible to have delegation without having previously worked your way back through the procurement cycle. That is, repaired/maintained the aircraft or equipment, been a line supervisor, QA, an Engineering Authority or similar, a project manager and so on. Not necessarily all of them, but you get the idea. Now it’s a two day seminar, if that (which is, of course, half their c.v.).

Non-engineers are permitted to make technical decisions, and over-rule design decisions.

Configuration milestones (Critical Design Reviews, Functional Audits and the like) are waived, especially by non-engineers. These serve a number of purposes, the common denominator being safety.

Contracts can be paid off before completion, bearing in mind that very often the final (waived) milestone is verification of safety and/or airworthiness.

And, of course, it has been ruled that attempting to apply the main process whose aim is to prevent all the above through robust scrutiny, is a disciplinary offence.

All confirmed under FoI. The people in MoD who make these self serving decisions refuse to change their minds, and must be over-ruled from on high. I hope the QC’s review digs this deep, but on the face of it his remit will have to change somewhat.

Distant Voice

24th Dec 2007, 09:38

Does anyone know if the investigation into the 5th Nov incident, involving XV235, has been completed?

Have we resumed AAR yet?

DV

Da4orce

24th Dec 2007, 10:36

Dv,

Not sure on that point.

I do have more FOI information, as soon as it becomes available on the MOD disclosure log I will place a link to it. Not a great deal of interest really other than an SFS relating to XV250 on or around 31.10.06:

Post AAR sortie, evidence of fuel leak in area of 6 tank during after flight servicing, on investigation fuel found puddled in the rear hinge fairing. During refuel, fuel was evident in the 6 tank inter-space drains, suspect 6 tank 3 cell leak, further invest required.

Interestingly it goes on to state:

This is the third AC with fuel leak issues post AAR sorties.

Safety_Helmut

24th Dec 2007, 19:51

Tuc/SW

My negative views on the safety and airworthiness process are based on many years of seeing people and organisations make unjustified assumptions. The processes we are talking about, eg Def Stan 00-56 and JSP553, have for many years been maintained and updated by people who are quite frankly, incompetent. Now, if we accept that they haven't been properly applied by IPTs etc, then they haven't been proven.

There are numerous examples of where the guidance is either poor, misleading, ambiguous or non-existent. I go back to my statement, that it is a shambles. Nothing less than a complete dismantling of the current system and rebuilding an appropriate system is acceptable.

Merry Christmas

Safety_Helmut

tucumseh

24th Dec 2007, 20:35

S-H

I take your point. My own experience is that, whatever the state of said standards – and I accept some are awful - the difficulty is getting people to apply them in the first place. I don’t know what half-baked half-day seminar they’re taught at, but in the late 90s I suddenly heard a lot of people saying “They’re not mandatory, so we don’t have to bother” (with safety, airworthiness, configuration control etc). Like I said, it’s been ruled a disciplinary offence to insist on applying what are mandated regulations. When this is the case, it’s perhaps little wonder the people who know the answers aren’t drawn to the job of maintaining these standards.

Have a peaceful Xmas and my thoughts will be with all the Servicemen and their families.

Skipness One Echo

24th Dec 2007, 20:43

Hi chaps, hopefully not drifting too far does anyone know if BAE ever submitted a tender for a new build Nimrod airframe rather than rebuilding the current ones.
The reason I ask is that looking at this photo, the aircraft really looks like a very worn out airframe.
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/1308890/L/
Surely to God, it has become prohibitively expensive doing this rebuild rehash and a proper 21st century built structure would have actually been cheaper?
Reminds of the VC10 K4 that was built from the ground up after 17 years in the rain and lasted in service for under 6 years......

betty swallox

24th Dec 2007, 20:51

For God's sake...

EdSet100

24th Dec 2007, 21:08

All of the old MR2 fuselages are extensively examined for corrosion and fatigue, etc. There are areas of it that were expected, at the outset, to need replacing. There have been few big surprises. I believe that the pre-transformation condition of the fuselage shells are one of the (few?) success stories in the MRA4 air vehicle programme. Although the Nimrod fleet might be 35 years old the aircraft have each only flown an average of 17,000 hours, which is less than 10 hours per week, which is a ridiculously low flying rate. Even then, its pressurized for less than half its flying time (although lately, the shell has been pressurized more often).

Regards
Ed Set

EngAl

24th Dec 2007, 21:14

The last time I saw a sad sight like that, it was Valiants being removed from Gaydon on Queen Marys in early 65!

EdSet100

24th Dec 2007, 21:21

Looking more closely at the photo, I believe its an MRA4 fuselage.

MOA

24th Dec 2007, 21:33

So, skippy, to your trained eye, what exactly is worn out on the airframe?

Tappers Dad

24th Dec 2007, 21:57

Christmas… that magic blanket that wraps itself about us, that something so intangible that it is like a fragrance. It may weave a spell of nostalgia. Christmas may be a day of feasting, or of prayer, but always it will be a day of remembrance -- a day in which we think of everything we have ever loved.

RIP boys

Augusta E. Rundel

Yeller_Gait

25th Dec 2007, 00:08

Ed,

XV246 came down from Kinloss to Waddington several months ago, and was taken to Woodford last week. I am surprised that there have not been any pictures posted of it leaving Waddington as there were a load of spotters around to watch the Antonov arrive/depart.

Y_G

ANW

25th Dec 2007, 09:23

Might be more appropriate under a new thread, but now it has been mentioned here .........

Check these Nimrod and Antonov photos

AN124 web site (http://www.edendale.co.uk/124/WFD.5.html)
Nimrod web site (http://www.edendale.co.uk/ANW/WFD.801.5.html)

........... now off to the farm to chase the turkey.

Skipness One Echo

25th Dec 2007, 13:24

My trained eye can't tell if it is worn out but I'm fairly certain a new build fuselage would be a safer option than taking apart a heavily modified Comet 4 structure and trying to fly it for another thirty years......

However if BAE says that's a good idea then great. I used to work for them when they had great ideas like the Jetstream 41 and the world beating engineering joke that was the ATP. Let's not forget the world class 146 program and er......yes that's about it really.

N---MRA4

25th Dec 2007, 18:15

Slightly off topic here but this is the AN124 landing and departing @Woodford on the 19/12/2007

Simon Lowe shot the landing ( from the side) , unloading and takeoff. I shot the head on landing from the Poynton end of the runway and together we present
http://www.flightlevel350.com/Aircraft_Antonov_An-124-Airline_Antonov_Aviation_Video-9755.html

Hope you enjoy.

Merry Christmas

Ian

Secretsooty

25th Dec 2007, 21:30

Skipness One Echo, your post seems to suggest that the current MR2 is a heavily modified Comet-4 airframe...... All MR2's currently in service were built new from modified Comet jigs, none are original Comet fuselages. There were 2 test and development Nimrods back in the early days that were indeed converted Comets, but they have long, long since gone. One of them didn't even have the bomb-bay pannier added.

As for new-build MR4's.... I was told a story that when the Nimrod 2000 project (as it was originally known - shows just how much it's really slipped, eh?) was in the early stages and a number was finally decided upon for aircraft, that had the MOD taken another 3 aircraft they could have had brand new build airframes at the same unit cost per 'frame! Now, I don't remember the numbers but I think it was 21 ordered but 24 was the magic number for BAe to make new ones. That would have potentially opened the doors for export orders........ :ugh:

The current fuselages entering the MR4 conversion programme are undergoing extensive NDT testing within all the fuselage skin joints and so far all is as expected. Not perfect, but ok, was the quote I was given by one of the NDT inspectors.

Safeware

26th Dec 2007, 11:06

S_HThere are numerous examples of where the guidance is either poor, misleading, ambiguous or non-existent
ok, I'll grant you that, but to the extent that the whole system needs rebuild?

Certainly within 00-56, the non-MOD safety community has something to answer for in its development .Def Stan 00-56 and JSP553, have for many years been maintained and updated by people who are quite frankly, incompetent. So do you include The Professor in that?

I think that competent people can make the current system work, and can identify the weaknesses in it such that it can be improved. The trouble is getting that over to those a) who need to hear it and b) who aren't competent.

sw

Distant Voice

2nd Jan 2008, 08:27

The Swinging Monkey

2nd Jan 2008, 08:53

Having been at Waddo when XV246 was being packaged up for the flight to Woodford, I was surprised at the state of the fuselage. It had considerable corrosion throughout and there was evidence of heat exposure at both wing roots. This might have been quite normal of course, however....

I cannot help thinking that it must be easier, quicker and cheaper (and safer??) to start with a brand new build for both the fuselage and the wings etc.Therefore, can anyone explain why the air force (and BAe) went for such a 'hotch potch' decision to refurbish a (very) old airframe/fuselage and stick 'new' wings onto it?

Happy New Year to All
TSM

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

2nd Jan 2008, 10:37

I think para 2 to Serial 2187 gives a fair clue to the reasoning.

TheSmiter

2nd Jan 2008, 10:53

Happy New Year TSM

can anyone explain why the air force (and BAe) went for such a 'hotch potch' decision to refurbish a (very) old airframe/fuselage and stick 'new' wings onto it?

As usual I'm probably missing the Big Picture, but could it possibly have been anything to do with the 'much cheapness, squire' tender price?

Never mind, when it all goes pete tong, at least we know there's plenty of these hanging around - and fully acclimatised for the desert. Bonus! :sad:

http://www.combatreform2.com/a4skyhawksatdavismonthanafb.jpg

The Swinging Monkey

2nd Jan 2008, 12:30

TheSmiter,

And a happy new year to you Sir!

I am sure there was a big element of 'cheapness' in the decision, and of course this Air Force will ALWAYS choose the cheapest option (never mind quality/expected life of item blah) cheapest is best!!

However, I am still surprised that it is cheaper to modify what they've got rarther than build new from scratch. Maybe as the numbers of freamews needed were so pitifully small, it wasn't worth setting up a new jig for them eh?

I'm sure one of our MR4 friends will enlighten us though.
Kind regards
TSM

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

2nd Jan 2008, 13:40

The last sentence in your para 3 sums it up well. Even using the de Havilland way of jigging a fuselage, it would be very expensive and add to that the new pressings for the formers. Even machining them out of billet by CNC wouldn't be cheap on a small production run.

TheSmiter

2nd Jan 2008, 13:59

TSM warmest regards to all at Waddo from ISK

The whole sorry saga of Nimrod2000 / MRA4 will probably merit a book of its own in years to come, however to precis from Naval-technology.com

In December 1996, BAE Systems were awarded a £2bn contract for the remanufacturing of 21 Nimrod MR mk2 aircraft to the new Nimrod MRA4 (Nimrod 2000) specification including new mission, sensor and avionics systems. In February 2002, the UK Ministry of Defence reduced this number to 18 aircraft, citing a perceived reduction in the submarine threat. In July 2004, the UK Ministry of Defence announced that this number was to be further reduced to 12 aircraft .........

IIRC there were not many in the maritime operating community in the 90's who thought that rebuilding Norman was the best way forward (other than the obvious 4 puffs are better than 2 fans variety) I think the simplistic argument at the time was that, if buying a new car, you wouldn't re-engine and digitize your knackered old Morris Minor, especially as those Morris Minors were all bespoke vehicles with different dimensions! As I say, simplistic, but even aircrew can follow that logic - however economics and political expediency overruled common sense and here we are, 11, yes ELEVEN years later still with no operational aircraft!

I do applaud the tenacity and ingenuity of all at Warton to try and make this jet work against all the odds but, as tucumseh so patiently and eloquently explains, those odds are mighty high. Meanwhile those responsible sit happily, perhaps polishing their new gongs (Dimmer Switch, I wasn't including you! BTW Happy New Year to you and Mrs Switch)while the current breed of aircrew and groundcrew coax the MR2 into the air and hope that it lasts for the next few years without any further dramas.

It may have been the cheapest bottom line option, but in the long term?

Secretsooty

2nd Jan 2008, 14:04

If my memory serves me right, was there not a considerable restraint placed on the original tendering process, in that any replacement had to fit into the existing hangarage?
Beggars belief, we could have had a really good brand-new aircraft to do the job, but for the fact that they (the budget holders) wouldn't factor in an extra £5M (a guess on my part) for new-build hangars!!!! :ugh::ugh:

Jackonicko

2nd Jan 2008, 14:16

Presumably the loss of '230 led to the need to put '246 into the programme?

Wasn't she supposed to be a 'spareframe' and bounce bird for 51?

Was she really unflyable - even for a one off to Woodford - or was an An-124 delivery economically preferable?

Headstone

2nd Jan 2008, 16:31

Here we go again.
How many times must this thread drift off of 230 and into - shall we bash MRA4 and Waste of Space even though we know nothing, have no facts but do know a mate who knows somebody and who may have said something but will spout figures and numbers with no reference to where they came from.
How many times must it be said...
The Nimrod in service is NOT a refurbished Comet
The MRA4 is not an MR2 fuselage with a couple of new wings and new engines.
It has been suggested that the airframe sent to BAE, presumably for conversion, is worn out. Can anyone point to the bits that are worn out or corroded on the pictured airframe and then say which parts are being reused?
As to the idea of buying P3s from the desert. Well the P3 fleet was grounded yet again just before Xmas and if those in the desert are so inviting why don't the US refurb them instead of very costly repairs to the existing fleet?

TheSmiter

2nd Jan 2008, 17:18

Happy New Year to you Headstone

Please, lets resolve this year not to descend into acrimony :)

I believe this drift started because someone had some superb video of the lumbering Russian beast coming into Woodford with 46 in its belly. As to the relevance of MRA4 to the loss of 230 - well, it could be argued that had we had the one, as advertised and on time, we wouldn't be debating the other. As to why we didn't - I can't answer that, I'm not an expert. I just believe what I'm told - correction, believed. If there had been transparency in the whole project then more people would have had faith in it. The intent was obviously there at the start - I can't be the only one who remembers the regular MRA4 Newsletters - they didn't last long, did they?

However, to answer your other points :

The Nimrod in service is NOT a refurbished Comet
AGREED

The MRA4 is not an MR2 fuselage with a couple of new wings and new engines.

OK you may have lost me on that one, but I'm prepared to be enlightened

It has been suggested that the airframe sent to BAE, presumably for conversion, is worn out.
Quite prepared to believe the airframe experts on this one - they (the fuselages!) are spring chickens compared to other aircraft of a similar vintage.

As to the idea of buying P3s from the desert.
:rolleyes: Obviously mate, your hangover precluded you from noticing the banter caption winking in the background! I'll let you off that one!

My pot of cynicism overflowed long ago.

We'll either get 'some' MRA4's sometime in the future ........
or NOTHING. I'm quite prepared to accept either option from this Govt.

Tappers Dad

2nd Jan 2008, 17:57

Headstone
Can anyone point to the bits that are worn out or corroded on the pictured airframe and then say which parts are being reused?
23rd Febuary 2006
STI/NIMROD/899
Fuselage; Skin Lap Joints-Cracking

http://www.benknight.co.uk/images/cracking.jpg

Krystal n chips

2nd Jan 2008, 18:17

TSM
I have just read your post re XV246 with "considerable interest" to say the least. I have to say that your opening paragraph is, lamentably, rather misleading.

You say you were at Waddo when the a/c was being packaged...fine..but then refer to the extensive corrosion on the fuselage. I have to say this was not the case sir.

There was evidence of exfoliation at the frame adjacent to the Air Eng's panel...minor...but other than that, the overall condition was excellent. A testimony in fact to the original build.

The reason I know this is that I was a participant in this excercise, well a bit more than a participant actually, and would thus be interested to learn how and when ( given the restrictions we imposed on access to the site ) you were able to make such a detailed assessment please. True, the working hours were 0700 / 1900 Mon-Thurs and 1500 on Friday, and we did allow numerous people to visit, but I am intrigued as to how you determined the "extensive corrosion" you speak of. I can only assume we would have met at some point and possibly you may care to PM me as to when in this case?.

There was some evidence of corrosion elsewhere on the airframe, but this was clearly visible prior to the detailed strip.

And finally, as an aside, my personal thanks to all those whom I met at Waddo and who made the event both interesting and enjoyable. It was a pleasure meeting you all......with one exception that is ! ( not you TSM btw whoever you may be ).

The Swinging Monkey

2nd Jan 2008, 20:55

KnC

The last time I saw 246 was the day before it left Waddo, and I stand by what I said in my earlier post. Whether the corrosion was because it had stood outside for a time I don't know, but there was considerable corrosion.

I can only liken it to when we, as aircrew, used to go over to the NMSU at ISK and see the state of the jets when they removed the skin from the fuselage - it was shocking! as anyone who witnessed it would confirm.

XV246 wasn't as bad as that, but there was widespread corrosion.

I notice you didn't comment on the scortch marks at the wing roots? Do you agree with me on that point at least?

If I ever get to understand how to put pictures on here, then I'll post a couple and let others make their own judgement. In the meantime, if you look at the link to some of the other pictures, you'll see what I mean

http://www.edendale.co.uk/ANW/WFD.801.5.11.html

Regards
TSM

Krystal n chips

2nd Jan 2008, 21:33

TSM,

So you saw 246 when she was parked, overnight, at the Run bay adjacent to the Flying club.......yet you made reference to the "extensive corrosion"....I have to say that, as somebody who witnessed and overviewed the strip first hand, both internally and externally, there was relatively little corrosion other than on the areas I have mentioned. Consequently, the aircraft had not been exposed to the elements in the way you infer other than in it's former operational role of course. Believe me TSM, we all had a damn good look at the structure as we stripped the a/c....and there was a wealth of engineering experience on the team I assure you.

I will reiterate therefore that, the internal and indeed external structure was not, as you say, extensively corroded. With regard to the wing box section which you display, again, a close inspection will reveal that the level of corrosion you imply to be present, simply wasn't. You may be interested to learn that, when the wings were cut off,the state of the internal structure was as sound as when it was constructed, as was the PRC.

In this instance TSM, whilst I am normally in agreement with your posts, I have to say you are mistaken in your perceptions.

EdSet100

3rd Jan 2008, 02:35

However, I am still surprised that it is cheaper to modify what they've got rarther than build new from scratch.

I was told, many years ago, that the reason for keeping the same fuselage and wingplan (although the wings are made of new materials) is to avoid airworthiness certification of a new design within contemporary legislation. ie. in terms of aerodynamics, it is no more than a modification of an existing aircraft. Yes, the politicians and BAe execs will say its a new aircraft with new systems, but its still the same old design/shape and it will be a Nimrod, but this time a later mark.

If it had a new fuselage and new wings it would, by law (so I was told), be a new design and, as such, the longitudinal stability problem caused by the modification would not exist, because an aircraft designer would not have drawn up such a piece of sh....

We reap what we sow...

Thats how I understand it.

Ed Sett

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

3rd Jan 2008, 10:25

Bearing in mind how emotional this Thread can get, wouldn't direct discussion over the MK4 be more appropriate to, say;

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=248710&page=2&highlight=nimrod+trials

(all the others seem to have been locked)?

speeddial

4th Jan 2008, 11:53

KnC,

Genuine question - why wasn't XV246 simply flown from Waddington to Woodford before being stripped down? Why go through all the pain and expense of stripping it at Waddington, then getting an An-124 to fly it to Woodford?

Krystal n chips

4th Jan 2008, 12:32

Speedial,

Thank you for the question. In all honesty, I really do not know the answer as to why.

Nimrod Liney

4th Jan 2008, 23:46

When 46 arrived at Waddington, all the Engines, including the APU, were returned to manufacture.
Without these Anti Deteriation Runs could not be carried out so the servicability of major flight systems could not be assesed and she was preped for storage
A few minor and major components, difficult to demand anymore, were removed to service the R1 fleet.
(On a light note The right hand stone guard on XW665 was 46s)

And it was deamed Cheaper and quicker by the RAF to Strip and Fly it in an Antonov, than Detach a team from kinloss to basiclly rebuild the Aircraft, bear in mind the R1 groundcrew are not authrized to work on MR2s

enginesuck

5th Jan 2008, 07:27

bear in mind the R1 groundcrew are not authrized to work on MR2s

I think youll find that they are - the Q course you do at Kinloss is a MR2 and R1
Q

Distant Voice

5th Jan 2008, 07:46

Can we get back to XV230? Any takers yet for post #2189?

DV

Nimrod Liney

5th Jan 2008, 14:25

Ok,
But they have the Q but they are not Authorized or Current, the Q does not give Authorization to work on the Aircraft, the relavent OC Eng or SEngO gives the Auth

buoy15

5th Jan 2008, 22:11

Monkey, get a grip
Alloy don't rust - it corrodes - and it looks like talc
The "rust" YOU see at the wing root is accumulations of tank seal, grease, hydraulic oil, fuel etc - it's hard and brown and smells like old aeroplanes and ----old aeroplanes - it's distinctive
Woodford don't do strip downs - they do re-builds That's why they're done before delivery - Doh!
OK anoraks!
Keeping the fuselage with full NDT saves 37 certifications which means we only have to check the wings, engines and gear - however, comma, without certification of the tube, yous is fecked - clever eh! Doh! Means we get the jet in the air earlier! - Doh!
I witnessed the strip downs and NDTs at Poole in the early days and as I said in an earlier post the tubes are built well above spec - like brick sh*thouses - and are good for another 30 years
It's easier to smash up a TSR2 jig than build one - ask Dennis Heally and his Commie labour mates- Hah! Feeling better already :D

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

6th Jan 2008, 00:15

buoy15. Serious question and genuinely interested; what happens at Poole and by who?

spanners123

6th Jan 2008, 00:23

I can not speak for buoy15, but the Nimrod was originally stripped at Hurn Airport, which is in Bournemouth, Poole is the adjoining town, to the west.
When I read his post, I wondered where in Poole they could have done that!

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

6th Jan 2008, 01:46

Ah! Not FR who put a year plus delay in the programme in the first place?

Total aside but College of Air Traffic Control, Poole, would have a certain ring to it.

The Swinging Monkey

6th Jan 2008, 10:11

buoy15

Thank you so much for that, but I don't ever recall mentioning 'rust' at all, only corrosion. Of course you're quit right, in that when alloy corrodes it forms a powder residue, (just like the stuff that covered most of the XV246 airframe actually when it was at Waddo!)

As for your comment regarding certification, I think that probably answers most peoples questions about why we didn't go for a 'new' aircraft. Is it fair to assume therefore that by 'modifying' existing airframes, it has negated the need for BAes to do a 'full certification' of the aircraft? hmmm, how interesting. I wonder where the cut off line is between a 'new build' (as keeps getting banded about for the MR4) and a 'mod' to an existing airframe?

It sounds like a very good (cheap) deal for BAe and a pretty pi$$ poor deal for the customer, especially with the well-documented fiasco of the differences with each frame/wing assembly. I suppose that all the MR4's will now be a bit of a 'hotch potch' affair will they?

Lastly, if this now means that you guys get your new jet earlier - how long do you think it would have taken had BAe had NOT gone for the 'cheap mod' option?? This decade possibly?

TSM

Krystal n chips

6th Jan 2008, 12:47

TSM,

Why, please, do you persist in the fallacy there was "powder residue" etc covering the airframe ?.

Let me put this as politely as I can. I was involved with that airframe from mid October until Dec. I know every inch of it....it was part of my job and responsibility to do so....and I therefore feel justified in refuting your comments, based on 30+ years as an engineer, mil and civil, there was "excessive corrosion" when, for your benefit, there was not. The airframe was in very good condition overall as I have said and the patches of corrosion that were found, were small. Show me an aircraft of this era that doesn't have any corrosion by the way

The Nimrod topic is an emotive issue, for obvious reasons, however your assertation regarding the corrosion is misleading and erroneous. If you would care to post the photographs you say you took, and then identify the form of corrosion you say was present, please, please do. Possibly myself and the 15 other members on the team missed this ?

If not, may I respectfully suggest you adhere to a well known RAF expression and wind your neck in, sir.

enginesuck

6th Jan 2008, 13:30

Hes got you there me old fruit !

EdSet100

7th Jan 2008, 23:32

The BOI report makes reference (2-34) to the fact that following a number of sorties, prior to the XV230 accident, fuel was seen dripping from the bomb bay and there was evidence of fuel in No.1 blow-off exit pipe. Also, a limitation was placed on the the amount of fuel held in No.1 tank at 15K. Does anyone, who was out there, know how these defects were carried (ADF/Lims) and who signed them off?

PM your comments if you wish.

DV

The BOI indicates that the concensus of opinion in theatre was that the No1 tank blow-off valve had operated during AAR. Blow-off occurs due to the rate of fuel flowing into the associated tank exceeding the rate of the air ventilating out of the tank. Pressure will build up and the blow-off valve will open to relief that pressure. The valve sits at the top of the tank and is assumed to be in the space occupied by the top 125 gallons (1000 lbs) of fuel. If a blow-off valve has operated at a high fuel level it is not recognised as a malfunction of the Nimrod fuel system. In fact, it can be argued that the Nimrod is working very well and protecting itself from a ruptured tank. Therefore, unless the blow off valve is suspected of operating early, it is not regarded as a system defect and no fault can be justifiably raised, deferred or signed off.

The cause of the imbalance between fuel flow in, and air flow out, can be attributed to one or more of the following factors: operator technique, fuel pump rates, refuelling rates in other tanks (this will effect the input into the blown-off tank and the demands on the central ventilation system) and in the case of fuel blow-off the most likely cause would be aircraft attitude and turbulent movement. Its quite possible for the blow-off valve to react to air pressure alone, and that would not be problematic (escaping air is not a hazard), but fuel escaping is another matter. So, by agreement between the aircrew, it was decided to attempt to obviate No1 Tank fuel blow-off by trying to ensure that the valve did not immerse in fuel during AAR. Hence the tank was not in-flight refuelled above 15K. The BOI report indicates that 120/3 was briefed on this slight and very sensible amendment to the procedure. The fact that the revised procedures, after the crash, now encompasses a reduced target quantity in the No1 tank is a solid endorsement of their decision.

Ed Sett

Distant Voice

8th Jan 2008, 07:14

Edset100: Many thanks for that very detailed reply. I understand though that the tank had still blown-off on an earlier flight with a reduced tank loading of 15K, and it must be assumed that F.S Davies stuck to 15K on the day of the accident. Would that not indicate that there was a fault with the system? The Board also suggest, in their report, that the Blow-off "phenomena" was an unusal event, requiring several conditions to come into play at the same time. Yet it would seem that XV230 had at least three blow-off events in about two weeks.

You also said that "Unless the blow-off is suspected of operating earlier it is not regarded as a system defect" But in the boards report it states that on an earlier flight "The air engineer subsequently noticed that, during AAR, the No1 tank appeared to reach full at an indicated 15K of fuel............might provoke the blow-off vave to operate" Does that not suggest that there was something wrong? Do we know if the 15K limitation applied to other aicraft in the Gulf at the time, or just XV230?

I fully understand your explaination for blow-off associated with refuel rates and air venting, but that simply blows of air, not fuel.

DV

Distant Voice

9th Jan 2008, 07:51

Does anyone know if we have re-started AAR with Nimrod yet? Also, what was the outcome of XV235 (5th Nov incident)?

DV

Yashin

9th Jan 2008, 08:30

"For God's sake..."

Betty Swallox.................. I could not agree more! Have any of these MRA4 "experts" ever seen the aircraft? Have they ever been in it or actually know anything about it?

It is not just an MR2 with new wings and engines! It is a totally different animal and they should have changed the bloody name.

Incidentally..............

T45
Astute
Typhoon
Bowman
ASTOR

All late. As Ben Elton used to say "Double seat, double seat, got to get a double seat" :8

Da4orce

9th Jan 2008, 08:37

DV, is the venting described in this report another description of the 'blow-off' events described?

http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nimrodreport2.pdf

Tristar crew reported that the level of venting from the rear of the aircraft was similar to that of a fuel dump.

nigegilb

9th Jan 2008, 11:41

Nimrod Aircraft

Mr. George Howarth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects the review into the Nimrod conducted by Mr. Charles Haddon-Cave QC to be published. [176269]

7 Jan 2008 : Column 53W
Des Browne: I have nothing to add to the written ministerial statement I made in the House on 13 December 2007, Official Report, column 50WS. It is too early to speculate on a possible timescale for publication.

Distant Voice

9th Jan 2008, 15:50

Da4orce: Having read the full Air Incident report the impression that I get is that it was not a blow-off. Why?

(1) No.1 tank was well below 15K at the time. In fact it never went above 14.5K (I assume you are thinking of the type of blow-off mentioned in BOI report)

(2) Fuel appeared to be coming from the bomb bay, and the post flight check supports that by the amount fuel in that area.

(3) Initial testing suggests that the problem was associated with fuel line couplings.

(4) There were high pressure surges during re-fuelling (up to 80 psi)

(5) There was no evidence of any fuel in the blow-off valve.

The report implies that it was difficult to replicate fuel fault conditions on the ground, which is something that came across in the QinetiQ report.

There should be a follow up report, so someone should be able to complete the story.

I suppose this could, quite easily been another XV230, had the fuel found a source of ingnition (The SCP was cleared for use)

DV

EdSet100

9th Jan 2008, 22:02

DV,
I'm impressed with your knowledge. However, I must correct your last sentence. On the date of that incident (Nov 06), the SCP was not cleared for use. It is important for everyone, with any interest in the accident, to know that not one single Nimrod has flown with its SCP cleared for use since the loss of XV230. Other system limitations and prohibitions have also been in place since the accident, thus making the aircraft completely safe to fly and to conduct AAR.

Ed Sett

Da4orce

9th Jan 2008, 22:12

Thanks DV for the explanation.

Edset your post suggests that the SCP was/is the only source of ignition on the Nimrod.

By way of clarification and not meaning to question your knowledge can you confirm my above statment is correct? Is there no way that fuel can be ignited without the use of the SCP? Presumably a post 230 fire risk assessment supports this?

EdSet100

9th Jan 2008, 23:31

Combustion analysis carried out by a QinetiQ scientist, on behalf of the BOI team, has confirmed that high altitude fuel ignition by electricity is impossible without High Energy sparks. This leaves only pure heat as the cause of the ignition. The only heat source near to fuel pipes and tanks in a Nimrod are the engines (with fire extinguishers) and hot air pipes. All hot air pipes that are not in the immediate vicinity (and therefore protected by the fire extinguishers), have not been in airborne use since 2 Sep 06. This includes the SCP, the pipe that supplies it and the bomb bay heating system. It is considered that the bomb bay heating system pipes do not carry air hot enough to ignite any fuel playing onto them, so that system might be brought back into service.

There was a comprehensive post-accident fuel system fire hazard analysis carried out by QQ in 2007. It confirms that, with the limitations put in place within days of the accident, there is sufficient mitigation against a fire caused by a fuel system leak. To quote someone, " The Nimrod is as safe as it needs to be". He was correct.

It is the simple fact that the RAF was able to mitigate against the cause of a fuel fire within days of the accident by procedure alone (and was therefore capable of doing so before the accident, but didn't, for reasons yet to be established) that the S of S had no choice but to say sorry and offer compensation. We knew, with our radical and far-reaching limitations, that we had eliminated all possible causes, although we didn't know the probable point of ignition until the BOI reported its findings.

Ed

Winco

10th Jan 2008, 08:04

EdSet100,

Thank you for your explanation.

May I ask you if there is any possibiliy (albeit a remote one) that fuel leaking from inside the bomb bay (or at least partly 'originating' from there) could migrate out side of the fuselage and into the engines exhaust stream?

And if it could, is there any possibility that it could be ignited by the jet eflux as it vapourises into the atmosphere? (almost like the F-111 fuel dump system)

Thank you
The Winco

enginesuck

10th Jan 2008, 09:16

Winco,

As to your previous post, not a chance. Firstly the fuel would have to overcome the air moving over the airframe at x Hundred Knots and also overcome gravity as the Engines exhaust is above the bomb bay. Secondly On start up of the Spey 250 there is large amounts of fuel vapour present at the exhaust, And I have never witnessed it combusting.

Hope this helps.

EdSet100

10th Jan 2008, 10:42

Winco,
To add to enginesuck's answer, yes, fuel has been known to migrate along the underside of the wings or the fuselage, but only the fuel streaming on the wing skin underneath the jet pipes will flow off into the jet efflux. Fuel on the outside of the fuselage originating from the bomb bay would have to travel upwards and outwards to reach the underside of the jet pipes. This would have to occur within the very thin boundary layer of air under the relative airflow, which means that the amount of fuel in that layer would have to be very small and go against gravity to get up under the jet pipes. Any large leak would be caught in the RAF and disappear.

I have heard of fuel lightly spraying into the jet efflux due to fuel leaks. None of those incidents resulted in a fire in the jet efflux.

The F-111 uses its reheat system to start the fire, which naturally projects rearwards into the RAF. When the pilot selects DUMP, he simply adds fuel to an existing fire.

Hope this helps

Ed Sett

Winco

10th Jan 2008, 11:21

Thank you Ed,

I read somewhere in the accident report about the fuel migrating to outside of the skin and along the fuselage, and whilst I can see that the direction of the fuel travel would be against gravity and airflow, I was more interested in the remote possibility of fuel getting into the jet eflux during AAR when, the aircrafts attitude is 'nose up' (if I remember correctly) and the various wake turbulances and vortexs generated from the tanker can cause unusual airflows and currents?

Thanks for the explanation.

The Winco

EdSet100

10th Jan 2008, 11:43

I read somewhere in the accident report about the fuel migrating to outside of the skin and along the fuselage,

Yes, that was an explanation of one of the probable causes of fuel getting onto the very hot SCP pipe. Fuel could have exited the No1 Tank blow-off valve, which is on the stbd fuselage just under the wing joint, and run down the side of the fuselage and then into the area of the SCP pipe. Combustion analysis has proved that the small amount of fuel (300ml) that could have been retained in that area up against the SCP pipe, would have been sufficient to start a fire big enough to damage the No7 tank fuel pipes (above the SCP pipe) that would then add more fuel to the fire.

Ed

Distant Voice

10th Jan 2008, 13:30

EdSet100: Yes you are 100% correct about the SCP being disconnected at the time of the XV260 incident in Nov 2006. I had overlooked that fact. However, I am not sure that you are correct to say safe to fly and conduct AAR With all the restrictions and pre-flight test in place, we still have an incident like the one on 5th Nov 2007.

I do share your concerns that action to isolate the SCP immediately after the crash was too late for XV230. The question to be asked, is why was the system reactivated after the XV227 incident?

Perhaps you can suggest how fuel from No.1 blow-off, could migrate upwards to No.7 tank dry bay.

Finally, do you have a date for the QQ hazard report, as it does not appear to be mentioned in the BOI report. I note that in the BAE hazard report, power supplies are mentioned as possible ignition sourses.

Many thanks for the information supplied so far.

DV

Safety_Helmut

10th Jan 2008, 13:57

DV, look at more of EdSett's comment, I would guarantee that no one will sign to say that the aicraft is completely safe !

thus making the aircraft completely safe to fly and to conduct AAR

This may seem like splitting hairs, but people have to understand the reality of the situation, and the reality is that nothing is completely safe. The objective should be set in terms of an acceptable level of safety, and there are various ways of doing this if you look at different industries.

Regards

S_H

Vage Rot

10th Jan 2008, 16:48

I do share your concerns that action to isolate the SCP immediately after the crash was too late for XV230. The question to be asked, is why was the system reactivated after the XV227 incident?

DV,

The 227 incident was caused by a ruptured SCP pipe. All of those pipes on the other frames were replaced following that incident, thus eliminating the possibility of it happening again. So, the SCP was re-introduced as it was believed safe to operate again. The question that should be asked is why was the hazard of the 1 tank blow off being in proximity to the pipe not noted earlier?

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, this is an aicraft that was built decades ago, in a different safety regime. The designers missed the hazard, A&AEE missed the hazard, the Ground Engineers missed the hazard, us aircrew missed the hazard. Indeed, 25 years of AAR never highlighted the hazard until 230. So, let's not be too hasty pointing the finger of guilt at any one person.

Distant Voice

10th Jan 2008, 17:09

Sorry Vage Rot the section of piping replaced after the XV227 incident was a very small section of a network of suspect piping, associated with the SCP. That is why a survey of other pipes was requested. Someone jumped before the true state of SCP system was known. I am prepared to point my finger at who ever made that call.

DV

EdSet100

11th Jan 2008, 01:30

I accept that I shouldn't have said "completely" safe. I meant to indicate that the Nimrod should not (now) be viewed, in safety terms, in a different light to any other aircraft.

The incident on 5 Nov is subject to an ongoing investigation and I will not comment.

The question to be asked, is why was the system reactivated after the XV227 incident?

The fault with the SCP duct on 227 was a duct failure. That particular fault was addressed and recommendations were made to examine other similar ducts, for the same symptoms. No-one considered that a perfect set of SCP pipes, and the pipes supplying the SCP, that carry air at 400C would get covered with fuel. That was a different scenario to the burst duct. So, the SCP was cleared for unrestricted use once it had been repaired.

Perhaps you can suggest how fuel from No.1 blow-off, could migrate upwards to No.7 tank dry bay.

Diagrams that you might have seen tend to indicate that the 7 Tank dry bay doesn't extend to the bottom of the wing root. The bay floor is actually the underwing panel that shrouds the SCP pipe. Therefore, the fuel didn't need to migrate upwards. It simply flowed rearwards and passed through the small gap between the front edge of the panel and the airframe.

Finally, do you have a date for the QQ hazard report, as it does not appear to be mentioned in the BOI report. I note that in the BAE hazard report, power supplies are mentioned as possible ignition sources.

I understand that QQ was commissioned by the IPT to carry out the study in Apr 07. It was not commissioned by the BOI. I believe the BOI had already seen the flawed Nimrod Safety Case and, as required by their Terms of Reference, reported their findings to the IPT. The IPT then commissioned QQ to conduct the hazard analysis. The report was eventually submitted to the IPT in Sep 07.

I note that in the BAE hazard report, power supplies are mentioned as possible ignition sources.

I haven't seen that report, so I can't really comment. However the QQ combustion analysis would address those "possible" sources. Taking your words verbatim, BAe might have suggested that power supplies could possibly cause electrical fires, or possibly cause fuel fires. Well, yes, it was possible until proven otherwise. I believe that subsequently the QQ combustion report proved otherwise in respect of the fuel fire scenario.

Someone jumped before the true state of SCP system was known. I am prepared to point my finger at who ever made that call.

I think thats a little bit unfair. Even if all of the similar pipes had been replaced with the SCP pipes, even as a precaution, the fact is that all of those pipes and the SCP would have been operating on 230 on that day. Indeed, it can be argued that changing the pipes would create possibilities of introducing leakage at the disturbed joints. So, IMHO the condition of the pipes was not contributory. However, it is disappointing that the recommendation to form a maintenance policy for the SCP and other similar ducts has taken so long to be decided on. Some of those similar ducts run very close to fuel tanks. Fortunately, none of those similar ducts are currently pressurised in flight.

Ed

Distant Voice

11th Jan 2008, 13:44

EdSet100: You state
The IPT then commisioned QQ to conduct the hazard analysis. The report was eventually submitted to the IPT in Sep 07

Does this new hazard analysis negate the complete BAE systems hazard analysis of 2004, and which IPT approved in Feb 05? Or does it only address the problems in the dry bay area?

I think we have got to remember that the BOI only "suggested" that the fuel source was the blow-off, it could equally have been caused by a leaking coupling (and we have had many of those). They also suggest the probem could have been caused by a small hole in a hot air pipe, which in turn damaged a fuel line. (very much like XV227). It is also worth reading Air Member for Materiel's comments in the BoI report.
Prohibiting use of the SCP removes this ignition source but we must not allow ourselves to be convinced that consideration of other potential sources of ignition can therefore be excluded
Whilst we still have problems with fuel in the bomb bay post AAR, I can not see how we can consider the aircraft safe.

Once again, many thanks for your very informative comments

DV

EdSet100

11th Jan 2008, 17:38

Once again, many thanks for your very informative comments

No problem. I don't think I'm breaking any rules in discussing and amplifying info already in the public domain. Although some of it should not have been released.

Does this new hazard analysis negate the complete BAE systems hazard analysis of 2004, and which IPT approved in Feb 05? Or does it only address the problems in the dry bay area?

Good question, and I'm sure its one that the QC will be posing in due course. Its the most accurate analysis we have at the moment and if it differs from any previous analyzes on points of fact, it has to override them in those particular matters. It covered all aspects of the Nimrod fuel system.

They also suggest the problem could have been caused by a small hole in a hot air pipe, which in turn damaged a fuel line. (very much like XV227).

The SCP and the other pipes in that zone are surrounded by heat sensors, specifically designed and located to detect hot air leaks. So, the BOI rightly surmised that any hot air leak would have been below the detection threshold (235C), because the engineer did not mention an overheat warning. Such a small leak would have to have played directly onto a fuel coupling (it would never have burned through a metal pipe) such that the coupling failed and the fuel then played onto the pipe. Its a series of events that are less likely than a simple coupling leak (for any reason) or a blow-off. However, its a scenario that can't be discounted. I should add that a number of the "similar" pipes, as referred to in the 227 incident, on other aircraft have since been checked for deterioration and none has been found showing any potential to fail.

It is also worth reading Air Member for Materiel's comments in the BoI report.

Quote:
Prohibiting use of the SCP removes this ignition source but we must not allow ourselves to be convinced that consideration of other potential sources of ignition can therefore be excluded.

Whilst we still have problems with fuel in the bomb bay post AAR, I can not see how we can consider the aircraft safe.

Well, the BOI used the term, "probable cause". That leaves the door open for anyone to add the quoted comment. However, I place my personal trust, and I recommend it to other aircrew, in the QQ combustion analysis sponsored by the BOI. It provides us with the confidence that fuel leaks in the bomb bay are not dangerous in the absence of very hot surfaces. I'm not suggesting that the crews should ignore fuel leaks, but we need to be confident in that particular analysis, respect our ground crew's efforts to prevent the leaks and rely on our training to deal with them if they occur. We have well-practised procedures to stop every single fuel pipe leak on a Nimrod.

Ed

BEagle

13th Jan 2008, 08:38

From The Sunday Times
January 13, 2008
Air-pipe failures add to spy plane safety fears

Michael Smith
CONCERNS over the safety of the RAF’s Nimrod spy planes have increased after it emerged that hot-air pipes in the aircraft’s engines could fail at any time.

The pipes failed during “low pressure tests”, according to a report by the plane’s manufacturer, BAE Systems.

The company had warned previously that the pipes were close to fuel lines and that if they failed in the air they would be likely to start a fire, leading to a “catastrophic” incident.

The new safety fears come a month after Des Browne, the defence secretary, apologised to the families of 14 servicemen killed when their Nimrod, XV230, caught fire over Afghanistan.

BAE’s report on the tests says 14 hot-air pipes it was sent to check already had cracks in them and eight were seriously corroded.

The report, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, does not appear to have been seen by the board of inquiry into the loss of Nimrod XV230, which published its damning report last month.

One of the hot-air pipes that was already cracked was part of the system on XV230. It was a junction pipe leading to the hot-air pipe that set fire to leaking fuel. This caused the explosion that destroyed the plane.

Jimmy Jones, a former RAF Nimrod engineering officer, said it was “extremely unlikely” the board would not have mentioned a crack in this area if it had known about it.

The board’s report also refers to the BAE pipe tests as if they are continuing, when in fact BAE’s findings were published last February, months before the inquiry came to an end.

Leaks in pipes from engines are worrying as most fuel leaks on the Nimrod are from the wing tanks around the engines.

“It is highly questionable whether Nimrod should be flying with potential hot-air leaks in the wing tanks,” Jones said.

The Ministry of Defence said it did not want to preempt an inquiry into the safety of the Nimrod fleet, but some hot-air piping had been isolated.

enginesuck

13th Jan 2008, 10:25

Now normally Michael Smiths article seem fairly technically accurate, but this is really really wide of the mark as far as i can see. Hot air pipes in the engines???
Maybe he is refering to air offtake pipes ? As for air offtake pipes being close to fuel pipes, name me one modern gas turbine engine with which this isn't the case. And as for Jimmy bloody Jones, where exactly are these hot air leaks in the wing tanks? Buffoon.

Mick Smith

13th Jan 2008, 10:57

enginesuck

The article should have said pipes in the engine bay areas. Similarly, the Jimmy Jones quote has for some reason been completely distorted during the production process by the idiotic removal of the word “areas”. :ugh:

What he actually said was: “It is highly questionable as to whether Nimrod should now be flying with potentially hot air leaks in the wing tank areas." My apologies to him for that.

The part numbers for the pipes that failed were:
6M4E131A/1, described in the report as: “HP Air, Inner Engine LH” and
6M4E147A (7800), described as “Anti-icing duct, inner engine”.
The proof pressure given in the report was 575psi. Both were tested using water and failed at 100psi, which the report describes thus:

“Duct 10 (Part No 6M4E131A/1) and Duct 25 (Part No 6M4E147A) both leaked water through the bellows area at low pressure (<100psi).”

There is more detail here:
http://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2008/01/new-safety-fear.html

Distant Voice

13th Jan 2008, 11:41

enginesuck: I think you are missing the point. Here was a study conducted by BAE at the request of IPT, following the XV227 SCP duct incident, that never got to the BOI.

DV

Tappers Dad

13th Jan 2008, 11:48

Thank you Mick Smith & DV, I will raise the question of this report with the Coroner at the Pre-Inquest tomorrow

EdSet100

13th Jan 2008, 12:34

It is a fact of aviation life that engines need fuel and those same engines produce very hot air for other systems. So, it is inevitable that we will have a cocktail of ingredients for a fire, on most aircraft types worldwide, in engine compartments. So, we install fire warning and extinguishant systems. We have hot gas leak detectors in those compartments and we have aircrew trained to deal with these situations. The Nimrod includes all of these measures.

The pipes in question are either subject to the above safety measures or they are not now in use while airborne.

The cracked junction by the SCP, specifically mentioned in the BAe report, is monitored by a hot gas leak detector. There are 5 detectors in that area. The BOI were fully aware of the possibility of a duct failure in the area of the fire and didn't need to see the report anyway. It would only have confirmed their findings.

Mick, I admire your tenacity in this sublect, but we must be aware that tests and studies of this nature are very narrow in their scope and they set out to address only the questions that are posed by the sponsor. The wider issue of what happens to the aircraft when a pipe leaks is not within the scope of that BAe report and it cannot be used as the sole arbiter of aircraft safety. It is a quantum leap in logical thought to suggest that an air pipe failure (which I guess the report suggests is not unlikely) in a Nimrod engine bay will cause a catastrophe and therefore makes the aircraft unsafe. Of course, the ducts will leak/fail. We will know about it immediately and we are well prepared to deal it.

Ed Sett

Distant Voice

13th Jan 2008, 18:23

EdSet100; Once again many thanks for your very open and honest comments. They generate heathy depate.

You say
The cracked junction by the SCP, specifically mentioned in the BAe report, is monitored by a hot air leak detector. There are 5 detectors in the area. The BoI were fully aware of the posibility of a duct failure in the area of the fire and did not need to see the report anyway. It would only have confirmed their findings.

Can I remind you of what the BoI said about this junction in their report.
The junction (in the starboard side of the bomb bay) is immediately below the entrance from the bomb bay to the starboard No.7 tank dry bay

The Board considered the possibility that a leak from the system could have disrupted part of the fuelsystem prio to AAR.

It is possible, however, that a smaller hot air laek fromthe cross feed pipe could have degraded a part of the fuel system

Nonetheless, the Board concluded that, while a large hot air leak was unlikely, a small leak could have caused the necessary disruption

There is no mention of "The Board is aware of the a possible duct failure in this area". Also, if as you say, the Board was aware the possibility, then it has to be assumed that IPT were aware of it when the system was reactivated. If that is the case, then they played with people's lives. You may have 5 detectors, but by the time you could have done anything you had an uncontrolled fire.

I also suggest that you read the BAe Harzard report, which highlights the threat in the engine bay areas from hot air.

DV

Distant Voice

14th Jan 2008, 16:34

EdSet100: As a follow-on from my last posting, I note that in para 29 of the Flight Safety Investigation Report for XV227 it states
There is no hot air leak warning system for the ruptured duct or the cross-bleed air duct as it passes through the bomb bay

So the BOI did need the BAE duct report.

DV

Softie

14th Jan 2008, 18:18

A coroner refused today to return 'highly sensitive' secret documents handed to him in error by the Ministry of Defence. Oxfordshire assistant deputy coroner Andrew Walker was given the papers as he prepared for an inquest into the death of 14 servicemen when a Nimrod spy plane crashed over Afghanistan in September 2006.

See Daily Mail online report http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/dmstandard/article.html?in_article_id=508168&in_page_id=1766

Da4orce

14th Jan 2008, 20:26

An MOD blunder that may actually be of some benefit .....

A coroner refused today to return secret documents handed to him in error by the Ministry of Defence.

David Evans, acting for the Ministry of Defence at a pre-inquest hearing at the Oxford Coroner's Court, said the two documents should not have been released to the coroner.

He asked Mr Walker to send the documents back, unread, and said the MoD was "confident" that permission to return a modified version, with certain confidential information removed, would be granted.

But Mr Walker replied: "My concern is that if I surrender these documents, I am not going to see them again.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/dmstandard/article.html?in_article_id=508168&in_page_id=1216

tucumseh

14th Jan 2008, 20:48

Well done, Mr Walker. There have been far too many instances of BoIs and the Coroners not being given sight of crucial evidence.

Tappers Dad

19th Jan 2008, 07:52

Not reported in the newspapers was that I held up a copy of JSP 553 Military Airworthiness Regulations in the Coroners court. I asked the Coroner if he had been given a copy by the MOD. He said he hadn't and asked the MOD lawyer why he hadn't had a copy ,to which he said he hadn't given him a copy because he didn't think it was relevant to the case. The Coroner disagreed and ordered copies for all the families.

The full inquest starts May 6th for 3 weeks.

nigegilb

19th Jan 2008, 08:27

Graham what you have done is truly inspirational. The only way to take on the MoD/Govt is through the Court system. Coroners like Mr Walker show that there are still fully functioning, independent and fearless aspects to our democracy, untainted by issues of sham secrecy and political heavy handedness.

People like Mr Walker, assure me that I am not yet living in a semi-stalinist state.

They don't like it up 'em.

tucumseh

19th Jan 2008, 09:08

So, in summary and in chronological order;

• Previous BoIs – Airworthiness regs are not implemented properly

• Ingram – Airworthiness regs are implemented properly

• Nimrod BoI report / ACM Sir Clive Loader – Airworthiness regs are not implemented properly

• MoD – Airworthiness regs are not relevant

Well, at least they’re consistent with their deceit, contempt and criminal negligence.

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

19th Jan 2008, 09:33

Mick Smith. It's interesting to see that NATO Codification is alive and well and not foremost in Air logistics.

ORAC

19th Jan 2008, 09:44

Jane's: UK considers alternatives to Nimrod R.1 upgrade (http://www.janes.com/news/defence/air/jdw/jdw080118_1_n.shtml)

Safety concerns have prompted moves to significantly reorganise UK plans to upgrade Royal Air Force (RAF) British Aerospace Nimrod R.1 electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering aircraft and to start efforts to find an alternative platform.

The loss of a RAF Nimrod MR.2 maritime patrol aircraft - which has the same airframe as the R.1 variant - in a mid-air fire over Afghanistan in September 2006 was subsequently linked by investigators to safety problems with the aircraft's fuel systems. Jane's understands that this has forced the UK to think again about the GBP400 million (USD786 million) Project Helix to sustain the three-strong Nimrod R.1 fleet in service until 2025.

UK military sources have told Jane's that alternative platforms are now being considered and proposals have been made in the current defence spending round to secure additional funding to allow the Helix mission system to be installed in a different airframe.

Following a competition against Lockheed Martin, US company L-3 Communications was selected in April 2007 to upgrade the Nimrod R.1s and was awarded a GBP11 million assessment contract by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD).

In a tightly worded statement an MoD spokeswoman moved away from the commitment to upgrade the R.1s. She told Jane's that the MoD was "currently assessing a range of options and it is too early to get into details.

nigegilb

19th Jan 2008, 11:11

Mike, relatives/families do not need legal representation in these inquests, they are non-adversarial, did you not realise that?

Mention the word malfeasance a few more times and just watch the reaction.

nigegilb

19th Jan 2008, 15:39

Interesting example, there are other parallels to Matty Hull's case, TD is aware of them, I won't state them here, but the potential for blood on the MoD carpet is a very real possibility.

Poor air worthiness procedures are central to this case, ignorance or malfeasance? The MoD spend too much on their own commercial legal representation for it to be ignorance......

airsound

21st Jan 2008, 17:13

Don't normally read the (print) Torygraph much, but happened to do so today - and fascinated to find this small piece:
Fears over the safety of RAF Nimrods has (sic) led air chiefs to consider halting a £400million contract to upgrade the aircraft, it was reported yesterday (Sunday).
There is speculation that the entire Nimrod MR2 fleet could go out of service by the next decade as a result of problems, blamed on fuel leaks, that led to a mid-air explosion over Afghanistan and the loss of 14 lives in 2006.

Surprised not to have heard about this here first. Anyone any ideas where this comes from, and whether there's anything in it?

airsound

Since posting this, have tracked down the (unbyelined) writer of the piece, Thomas Harding, Def Correspondent, who says it came from a piece by Tim Ripley of Janes. On consulting that, find that it refers only to Nimrod R1s - a fact not mentioned in the Torygraph piece.

So, it's all covered in the UK considers alternatives to Nimrod R.1 upgrade thread. D'oh

Distant Voice

22nd Jan 2008, 17:40

Can anyone tell me the new fuel contents limit for No 1 tank, in order to prevent blow-off?

DV

EdSet100

24th Jan 2008, 17:21

10,000 Lbs during AAR. Normal max contents: 16,000 Lbs

Ed Sett

Distant Voice

24th Jan 2008, 18:28

10,000 lbs during AAR

Have you resumed AAR?

DV

fergineer

24th Jan 2008, 18:51

DV You asked a question......You got an answer......You are now trying to make something out of the answer, you are sounding like a reporter looking for a story......There are probably still limitations on the Nimrod for dropping Mk1C buoys but that dont mean that they still drop them. Be happy that people are still answering your questions just dont push your luck with it.

Distant Voice

24th Jan 2008, 21:07

Who pulled your chain, fergineer. I am not a reporter, and I am not looking for a story. I simply posted a follow-up question to someone I respect. Your remarks were uncalled for.

DV

spanners123

24th Jan 2008, 21:16

Which is why a lot of his questions don't answered that often!
Maybe explaining why the info is required may help!:ugh:

buoy15

24th Jan 2008, 23:04

Errm? - DV, I trust you know where No1 tank is situated don't you?

fergineer

25th Jan 2008, 02:29

DV I never said you were a reporter just that you were beginning to sound like one......Spanners123 is correct that your answers are not being answered by many because they may not know what you intend to use the answers for. Secure as they are with their names are some people may guess their real identities causing untold problems for them. Cut the guys some slack and you may get more information. My remarks are just that MY remarks....you can take them or leave them.

tucumseh

25th Jan 2008, 07:02

While I understand the reluctance of people to been seen to supply answers to DV, it must be obvious that he and others are, effectively, acting as investigative journalists simply because MoD has been caught, yet again, lying and withholding vital evidence in a case where deaths could have been avoided.

I don’t apologise for repeating myself here. What has been uncovered, by asking these questions, are not revelations. It is well known in the MoD that, for nearly two decades, the implementation of airworthiness regulations has been systematically underfunded, to the point where senior staffs have ruled it is effectively optional. But this fact, and all the evidence underpinning it, has been kept in-house fairly successfully by MoD. And people – your colleagues – have demonstrably died because of it. The facts are now being exposed to those who have most to lose – their lives.

DV, TD and others here have, through asking pointed questions, exposed this gross and criminal abrogation of duty. Sometimes the question goes down a rabbit hole, but others have culminated in Mr Browne’s admission to the House last month that MoD was liable. I say again – read the QQ and BAeS reports and ask yourself if you would treat your pushbike this way, never mind an aeroplane.

I’d like to be a fly on certain walls in Whitehall as other parts of MoD continue to flatly deny there is a problem, but I’m sure the Coroner will lean toward Mr Browne’s admission when considering this disconnect. This is important – they must not be allowed, yet again, to dismiss this as an isolated case. What I find interesting, and this is purely from a personal perspective, is something that happened in mid-December. For no apparent reason, a key note opening address at a routine briefing (albeit on a large programme) was to be made by a certain person who is well known for treating airworthiness as an option of last resort (and had no knowledge of the subject matter). I thought, you’re a brave man, Q&A should be entertaining. Lo and behold, there followed a table thumping session extolling the virtues of these mandated processes, procedures and regulations which he’d spent 10 years rejecting out of hand. I have no doubt whatsoever that this change of tack was a direct result of the BoI report and Browne’s statement. While this is no comfort to bereaved families (not just Nimrod), I think safety will feature heavily in his domain from now on. I look forward to others following suite. Better still, sack them anyway.

Please, DV’s questions and TD’s quest are prompting very tangible changes in MoD, for the better. Be glad, for the song has no ending.

nigegilb

25th Jan 2008, 07:58

I support what Tuc is saying here. In many ways answering questions directly is far more effective than obfuscating. Ed set's contribution should also be acknowledged. It was the complete lack of a flow of info about Nimrod that added to the problems of those affected by this tragedy. He has set me right on more than one occasion and I thank him for that. However, the fact that MoD lawyers did not think airworthiness regs were anything to do with this case should be setting off alarm bells.

Agreeing to pay compensation ahead of the Inquest was good news and I suspect something to do with all the pressure and unearthing of facts in the long wait for the BoI. More good news shortly to come from the Herc Inquest, again possibly to do with the high profile generated.

Like I said before, they don't like it up 'em.

OmegaV6

25th Jan 2008, 08:38

Whilst I accept and support the comments of tucumseh and nigeglib, I find the arrogance of comments like this distasteful.

Who pulled your chain, fergineer. I am not a reporter, and I am not looking for a story. I simply posted a follow-up question to someone I respect. Your remarks were uncalled for.

Every comment, and the reason for it, is open to debate, and EVERYONE is entitled to an opinion.... not just a select few.

Tappers Dad

25th Jan 2008, 09:19

Defence Standard 00-970 PART 1 SECTION 9 - MILITARY SPECIFIC SYSTEMS

9.5.15 Fuel pipes shall not run through:
a. passenger,
b. crew,
c. cargo or
d. baggage compartments,
nor in hazardous proximity to:
e. hot air ducts,
f. electrical wiring and
g. electrically operated equipment contained in bays
unless they are without couplings and adequately
protected against potential sources of ignition and
damage.
Any space between a pipe and its protection shall be adequately vented and drained.
Such protection would involve the use of a design that contains the fuel in the event of leakage from the fuel pipes,however caused, and subsequently vents the fuel into a
suitable drain system.
Typical examples of such a design are double-skinned/walled, jacketed or shrouded.
Whenever lagging is used in compartments in which pipes,tanks or equipment containing flammable fluids are installed, suitable precautions shall be taken to prevent the wetting of the lagging by flammable fluids as a result of normal operation, damage, failures of the equipment or leakages from joints or unions.

nav attacking

25th Jan 2008, 09:43

I guess the MOD broke most of those recomendations with the nimrod at some time or another then. Well found TD. However, when was that document written and is it still valid?

Ed Set

One of your previous replies stated that the SCP ducting had some sort of heat/fire detection system. This was clearly not the case on XV227, I am sure that the only fire detection system would be the in the bomb bay. We had no warnings of the potential danger we were in at the time. If I remember correctly the only indications we had on the aircraft was a problem with the SCP dropping out. As result we continued to operate the aircraft on one conditioning system. The first we new about the problem was on landing when the Crew Chief reported a missing panel. Reports at the time suggested that the fuel in the 7 tank would have been near to boiling due to the hot air leak we were still operating the crossfeed air in those days.

There but for the grace of god....

c-bert

25th Jan 2008, 10:12

Def Stan 00-970 Part 1, Section 9 is current and at Iss 5, Amdt 1 dated 04/12/2007.

Safety_Helmut

25th Jan 2008, 10:43

and available for all to read at http://www.dstan.mod.uk

Tappers Dad

25th Jan 2008, 14:05

Def-Stan 00-970 Part 5 has not yet been published.

DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5
SECTION 5
5.2 FUEL SYSTEMS

5.2.87 No vent or drainage provision may end at
any point:
(a) Where the discharge of fuel from the vent
outlet would constitute a fire hazard.
(b) From which fumes could enter personnel
compartments.
5.2.129 Fuel or vapour shall not enter any part of
the aeroplane as a result of fuel jettisoning

EdSet100

25th Jan 2008, 15:26

Nav Attacking:

Ed Set

One of your previous replies stated that the SCP ducting had some sort of heat/fire detection system.

I doubt very much that I would have written that. I would have written that the crossfeed duct had overheat detectors around it. The crossfeed air duct supplies air to the SCP shut off valve. It is not a part of the SCP.

DV, I cannot answer your question asking if we are currently conducting AAR. Its a capability matter and I'm NOt sure that I can discuss it publicly.

Chugalug2

25th Jan 2008, 15:28

Just as tucumseh and nigegilb try to point out the whole tree or trees, rather than the in depth study of a particular branch which a technical review tends to as in the case of this thread, might I take the opportunity yet again to direct attention at the entire wood? The cavalier way that the MOD has treated its airworthiness obligations over the last few decades is instanced not only in this thread, and the aircraft type to which it refers, but in numerous others, the subjects of accidents and other types on this Forum. Whether the MOD and its apparatchiks are covering their tracks and are rearranging the deck chairs into orderly rows now is bye the bye. They have shown by their actions, by their neglect and by their sheer deception that they are not to be trusted with such awesome responsibility. That those who dedicate their lives to the pursuit of technical excellence and the provision of proper airworthiness standards have been betrayed is galling, but they at least may live to savour their bitterness. What is absolutely appalling is the knowledge that there have been avoidable fatal accidents suffered by military aircraft because airworthiness standards have not been enforced by the airworthiness authority, ie the MOD. I repeat my claim that it is a contradiction in terms to have the same authority responsible for Airworthiness Regulation as well as Operational Control. Self regulation is a nonsense wherever it occurs. Can anyone instance a case where it serves anyone other than the ‘self’ in question? In the case of Airworthiness, self regulation is a disaster which has been visited on too many loved ones. Surely now enough is enough? Military Airworthiness Authority must be removed from the MOD into the hands of a separate and independent Military Airworthiness Authority, along the lines of the CAA. Leave it with the MOD and more compromises, more cover-ups, more expediency, more accidents, more deaths will follow. This is a scandal that must be addressed!