Nimrod Information

[nigegilb]

SAR Bloke, the requirement for TCAS, or rather the desperate need for it came directly from the front line.

I also believe a UOR for IR strobes was denied.

This is not a whinge, this is a statement, a litany of issues, of how UKAF are being sent to war on a shoe string.

Our SOP 5 years ago was lights out at all times. Check out the topography of Afg, a SAM exploded close to my ac and we were at 17000! You would be mad to light up your ac like a christmas tree. I am trying to get some actual figures on the amount of RAs in theatre. It is not pretty. The situation regarding TCAS has been described to me as "absolutely disgusting." With reference to wearing of NVGs, at the time of my near mid-air I had taken off my gogs because wearing them for up to 7 hours a night was painful. I thought we were fairly safe up at height, I was wrong. Thankfully, the AE strapped his gogs on, this was strictly not allowed, but thank God he did.

Because of a lack of TCAS, Nimrod crews are making do with ad hoc procedures, NVG look outs, use of aircraft radar etc.

It needs fixing quick. It has been described to me as the most pressing safety problem, even allowing for the fuel leak issues.

[Magnersdrinker]

Just a quickie on that Tcas, the rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above, The Nimrod does not carry that therefore its no requirement to have it fitted. I guess its handy and they would love it but I think the money is going to other things more important. there is only so much butter that can be spread about.

[Jackonicko]

"The rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above, The Nimrod does not carry that therefore its no requirement to have it fitted."

Which would infer that the R1 would have to have it......:}

[spanners123]

Magnersdrinker stated:- "The rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above, The Nimrod does not carry that therefore its no requirement to have it fitted."

The R1 is not civilian!

[EdSet100]

Nigegilb,

this aircraft is quite literally, a mid-air collision waiting to happen.


Yes, it would be if we selected the A/P on and fell asleeep. Your statement is an affront to the Nimrod crews.

Because of a lack of TCAS, Nimrod crews are making do with ad hoc procedures, NVG look outs, use of aircraft radar etc.


Use of an aircraft radar, which is one of the best, and manned by a specialist is not "ad hoc".

Get back in your box.

[davejb]

The system is mandatory under International Civil Aviation Organisation rules for all aircraft weighing more than 5700 kilos or authorised to carry more than 19 crew and passengers

It doesn't say civilian in the quote, and the AUW of an airborned Nimrod is quite likely to exceed 5700 kg....all rather assuming the article is correct., of course.

[Mr Point]

The rules state all civilian aircraft with 19 passengers or above

I think the CREW of the R1 may be offended by the implication that they are passengers. Now, on the other hand, the E3D .......:}

[nigegilb]

Correct me if I am wrong, but I understood that the Nimrod R1 does have TCAS.

[Winco]

Magners,
You wrote.....

'I think the money is going to other things more important'

Perhaps you could tell us where the money is going and what is more important than flight safety and human life please?

Thanks
The Winco

[tucumseh]

All this talk of the R1 makes me reflect on the enormous changes the advent of global communication and freedom of information has brought, and how we deal with the outdated Official Secrets Act and officialdom in general. 20 years ago the R1 was deemed not to exist. 9 years ago I mentioned it at a meeting in the context of a design issue and a Gp Capt refused to answer, saying there was no such aircraft. Now it’s openly discussed. (Of course, the picture on the front of the Torygraph during GW1 was a dead giveaway. Rumour has it MB were apoplectic).

Five years ago it would have been inconceivable that such a damning report as QinetiQ’s (discussed here) was even known to exist, never mind released for public consumption. Even more astonishing, the only redaction has been removal of individuals’ names. That is, a deliberate decision has been made to release what most would regard as highly sensitive information, and not just commercially sensitive. As usual, the MoD were too quick to sell off their research arm and create QQ, but didn’t consider for one moment how to manage the simple fact that QQ inherited a vast history of such reports and information whose ownership was now blurred.

My goodness, the MoD doesn’t half dig holes for itself. Hoisted and petard come to mind. They need to wake up and get with the programme. The world and his dog know what is wrong and how to fix it, so get to it!

[ZH875]

IIRC The R1 existed some 12 years ago, when an unknown squadron with no aircraft left RAF Wyton and took up residence at RAF Waddington as 51 Squadron with three Nimrod R1's in 1995.

[tucumseh]

“Perhaps you could tell us where the money is going and what is more important than flight safety and human life please?”


Winco, you are far too sensible my friend. You’ll never become a Director in DE&S. (And nor will I, for the same reason). The list of things deemed far more important than flight safety and human life is too voluminous to list here, but here’s a few;


IPT breakthrough jollies to plush hotels to be lectured by 18 year olds on how to “bond”.

Daily reports “up” to IPT “Management Boards” who consist almost entirely of junior staff who have never made a decision in their life, and whose only interest is the agenda item “Xmas bash”.

RAB (Random Asset Budgeting) reports to the same non-entities

Fag breaks outside in purpose built shelters designed to stop the rain putting them out.



More seriously; being seen to have a robust process is far more important than having the resource, knowledge, ability and will to actually implement it. And when the said senior staffs don’t know the difference, can’t explain what I’m talking about and have never done it, then we’re really in trouble.

[Exrigger]

tucumseh, I know this is off topic despite being about Nimrods, but I laughed when i read yours and ZH875's comments about R1s. When I was at Kinloss in 72 a large contigent of groundcrew turned up for Nimrod courses, when asked which station they are posted to (there was a couple in those days) they said RAF Wyton. So two or three of us applied, being Nimrod Q'd etc, a couple of days after our requests went through we had to report to PSF along with the SIB to answer how we knew about an aircraft that does not exist that is not going to RAF Wyton, they also interviewd the new guys on the course to find someone to string up for giving away military secrets.

When I was on 203 Sqd in Luqa an R1 landed (about 75/76) and I was asked to empty/replenish the Toilet, so duly arrived with the trolley on the back of a landrover and positioned it by the front LH side, only to find out that there was no panel. When I went up the steps, there in front of me was a operators station and no toilet, by the time it sunk in that this was not a Nimrod I knew I was being arrested and carted off for questioning. Funny old thing when I was let go and told where the Toilet was on the R1, the crew said I could carry on, I politely declined and left them to do it.

Followed by that in 1978 I was moved from the Hydraulic Bay at Wyton to 51 sqd because of that same Nimrod Q. When a report came out in a newspaper with a picture of an R1 the MOD had a D notice slapped on them and the article withdrawn.

So it is quite strange as you say how things change with regards to these sort of areas.

[Winco]

tucumseh

There has been a lot written on this forum about those of us who are no longer 'current' whether we be Aircrew or Groundcrew, and so I thought I would put the question back to one of the expert 'current' Nimrod people who made such a bold statement!

Over to you Magners

[Chugalug2]

Nigegilb,
Quote:
"this aircraft is quite literally, a mid-air collision waiting to happen."
Yes, it would be if we selected the A/P on and fell asleeep. Your statement is an affront to the Nimrod crews.
Quote:
"Because of a lack of TCAS, Nimrod crews are making do with ad hoc procedures, NVG look outs, use of aircraft radar etc."
Use of an aircraft radar, which is one of the best, and manned by a specialist is not "ad hoc".
Get back in your box.


EdSet100 I have read some blinkered views on this thread, many no doubt understandably motivated by defending their fleet, their people and most importantly NoK patiently waiting for the BOI. But for shear unprofessional ludditism yours takes the biscuit. May I offer a word to the wise, particularly if you be aircrew, get out of your box and start seeing the woods for the trees!

[SAR Bloke]

Nige,

Your quote seems to suggest confliction with civvy traffic and not coalition aircraft.

Is the civvy traffic flying in the airways flying lights out? Surely you don't need NVGs to see and avoid them?

How many civvy pilots use NVGs and would be able to see IR strobes?



'I think the money is going to other things more important'

Perhaps you could tell us where the money is going and what is more important than flight safety and human life please?


Firstly, could someone confirm that the lack of TCAS and the rejection of the UOR was based on cost and not some other factor?

Secondly, the problem comes that not all agree that lack of TCAS and IR strobes is a major flight safety issue and that human life is 'unduly' at risk. Lack of these items do not make an aircraft inherently unsafe.

Where does your quote come from? Unreported Airproxes? Not being happy without TCAS but quite happy to go with no radar? Something does not add up with this argument to me.

[nigegilb]

SAR Bloke, as I understand it, the aircraft radar is deemed non mission essential. Hence, the occasions that Nimrods are up there mixing it without the radar to spot potential collisions. I describe these procedures as ad hoc because the aircraft radar was never designed to replace TCAS, which is why the radar is not demed essential. A radar used in this way, is blind to several types of potential collision.

Going back to my incident for a moment, I too was deconflicted from coalition aircraft. However you cannot account for incompetence. The US Herc that we almost hit head on was flying at the incorrect flight level for procedural separation promulgated in spins/ATOs. The fighter controllers normally providing a radar service were being used on other higher priority missions. The "controller" I was in communication with might as well have been the cleaner, such was his lack of radar experience.

I made the point about NVGs because we had a fully compatible flight deck, the Nimrod does not. Using NVG spotters in beam windows blinded from 11 to 1 o'clock is hardly a failsafe anti-confliction procedure.

Honestly, I thought we had left all this behind in 2001/02. I am sorry, not everyone sees it the same way. But, I am not surprised, some of the responses on this thread are shocking.

I will further investigate the UOR situation and post any info on this thread.

I have to agree that Nimrod MR2 would appear to be being nursed out of service at minimum cost and with way too much associated risk.

[Fed-Up]

Ref the lack of TCAS. I have recently been operating in the Afghan/Iraq regions in the AAR role. I have to say that TCAS is a hugely positive aid to the safe operation of our aircraft in these areas that lack full ATC services.

Aircraft operating without TCAS, especially at night or poor weather, are poorly placed when trying to avoid collisions using solely the mark one eyeball.

[Chugalug2]

Fed up, thank you for your contribution and your maiden post. I hope you understand that I am not belittling it in any way when I say that I could not have imagined any professional aviator having any other view. Clearly I am wrong, for contrary views have already been expressed! At the very least that is surely a strong argument for an Airworthiness Authority that would enforce the fitting of TCAS, if for no other reason than to save people from themselves as well as saving the innocent victims of such macho foolhardiness. If the views expressed questioning Nige's campaign to get TCAS fitted to MR2 are in any way typical of attitudes on that fleet, then there is a very grave problem indeed. Kit only needs money and the will to get it fitted, changing a gung ho philosophy of "the Mk1 eyeball is all you need" takes much much more effort. I am alarmed at the revelation that basic reporting within the RAF Flight Safety system, whether via F760A or F765B, has been severely curtailed for perhaps in excess of 10 years for 'cost saving' reasons. I see a direct correlation between that and the Airworthiness deficiencies reported in this thread. I now wonder if it has not also incubated a generation of aviators who see those like myself who believe in the critical importance of a healthy and viable Flight Safety system in the RAF as mere milksops.

[Winco]

Just wanted to bring this back to where it belongs.
Also to magners where he has gone and why no reply to my earlier question?
Regards

[Da4orce]

Looks like the SoS will be making a statement to the House!


The media are invited to attend an EMBARGOED off-camera on the record
'lock-in' briefing on the findings of the Nimrod XV230 BOI on Tuesday 4
December.

DATE: Tuesday 4 December 2007
TIME: 12.15 - 15.30 (approx).
VENUE: Media Suite, MOD Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB.

The timings are as follows:

12.15 - 14.00: Media arrive and receive a redacted BOI and background material.
14.00 - 14.30: Presentation by the BOI president on the Board's findings.
14.30 - 15.15: Q&A session.
15.15 - 15.30: Comfort break.
15.30: SofS to make a statement to the House of Commons on the BOI's
findings. The statement will be relayed live to the MoD media suite.

Media who wish to attend the embargoed briefing MUST accredit in advance.


http://media.netpr.pl/notatka_89577.html

[The Swinging Monkey]

Can anyone ever recall when this has happened before? Where the MOD have invited the press and the media to discuss the findings of a BoI prior to it's release?

I find it bewildering that such a thing is going to happen, unless of course there are some really serious points that they want to 'come clean about' to the press and then announce what they are going to do to fix it all.

Magners, I am seriously worried by some of your comments mate - are you really in the RAF aor are you just pretending? The one about 'the money is going to other things more important' would be quite funny if it wasn't so true.

Roll on Monday afternoon.

TD, not much longer to wait now Sir.

[nigegilb]

TSM this is totally unprecedented. The journos have to hand over their mobile phones and are invited to a lock in. After which questions and SoS rises. I can only think the MoD are deeply worried.

Huge pat on the back to TD who has had to grieve and fight the MoD for the truth at the same time. The press attending, will listen with an open mind, but with the advantage that an awful lot of info is out there, with which they can guage some understanding before a very technical brief.

I am sorry that the BoI are not presenting before family and friends at Kinloss first. But I am not going to comment further on this decision.

[defenceheadquarters]

I can add some information about the expected announcement on Tuesday which I hope will be helpful. Apologies if this is a duplicate post - didn't seem to work the first time I tried.

The purpose of the "lock in" is to ensure that the press have all the detailed information they need but cannot report it before it is placed in the public domain via the proper channel - namely, Parliament. This is not unpredecented, and has been used when releasing the results of BOIs before.

I understand that the families will be briefed on the conclusions of the BOI in private on the morning before the Parliamentary statement, and before the press. This is also not unprecedented.

We plan to publish further information - including the BOI report itself - on the MOD website as soon as possible after the Parliamentary statement (expected 1530 Tuesday). I will post a link to that information here as soon as it is available... If someone doesn't beat me to it.

Robin Riley
Assistant Director (Bureau)
Directorate of Defence Public Relations
Ministry of Defence
www.mod.uk (http://www.mod.uk)

This was posted by the Ministry of Defence. You can find a copy at www.blogs.mod.uk (http://www.blogs.modc.uk)

[John Blakeley]

Nigel

You may find this MOD web page of interest in the light of various comments on TCAS!

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/ControllingTheSkiesIsVitalToAfghanMissionSuccess.htm

JB

[nigegilb]

I have heard that radar service is not too bad in the South, but patchy in the North. Comms also patchy, confirmed by the utter silence that met the MAYDAY call the other week. In this kind of environment it is absolutely essential to have TCAS more so than in the London TMA. Multi engine, mil aircraft operating lights out procedures with no way of coordinating avoiding action using mode "S" and TCAS/ACAS is a situation that is asking for trouble. A couple of crew members eyes glued to the skies through their gogs, trying to keep the Mighty Hunter safe over the skies of Afg?

On 31 Mar next year the state exemption runs out. Nimrods wil be flying out over International airspace West of Ireland, West of Iberia and down through the Med and on to Akr all for a bit of common sense.

But remember the mantra, "safety of our personnel is paramount." I expect the hacks will hear that line spoken a few times next week.

[Creeping Line Ahead]

TSM/Nige

I think you'll find that briefing the press under an embargo is actually normal practice. And, for the record, all of the families are being briefed in advance.

CLA

[skippedonce]

Nigegilb,

Ref your 1791, regarding the 'utter silence' in response to XV235's MAYDAY call; from where the incident occurred, they were LOS to 2 TAC Air C2 units (at Kandahar and Camp Bastion) and to the KAF ATC, all of whom constantly monitor UHF/VHF GUARD.

Rudekid suggested that 'with all the box switching that occurs, I wouldn't rule out a switch pigs either...'. While I'm not at all familiar with an MR2's cockpit/radio layout, it does seem unusual that all three ground units would fail to respond if a MAYDAY was transmitted on GUARD. Additionally, other aircraft operating in the area could/should/would also have heard and been able to acknowledge/respond.

This is not an attempt to undermine your push for TCAS, but a possible clarification for one of the elements of the XV235 puzzle.

SkippedOnce

[Tappers Dad]

defenceheadquarters

I believe the MOD posting on this Rumour network, has two connotations .

1 The MOD realize the importance of PPRuNe and have responded to criticism of the MOD by serving personnel.

2 The MOD are in damage limitation mode

Had the families not made a fuss over the last few days there were no plans for the BOI president or the Chief of Air Staff to meet the families in Kinloss as we were promised. However this has now been reviewed following pressure from the families and families will now have the opportunity to to talk to the BOI president and the Chief of Air Staff on Wednesday 5th December at Kinloss.

[nigegilb]

Great news Graham. As you are well aware, the families involved in the XV179 tragedy were given a full presentation by the BoI team at Lyneham, I also believe the AAIB specialist was present, along with a Govt Minister. They were briefed first, as a matter of priority. Sqn personnel were also keen to learn the findings. I assume Kinloss personnel will receive a full briefing by the President on the 5th as well. This is also, very important.

I fail to understand why the press are being given the red carpet treatment in London the day before. I would be grateful if the person who posted from Defence HQ would explain when this kind of briefing has been held in London in the recent past, in similar circumstances.

If the families asked for the briefing to be held in London, then, different matter.

Edited to add, TD, would you mind telling us when you learned of this briefing on the 5th? I understand from my own contacts in the media that they were briefed by the MoD on or around the 20 Nov about the presentation in London on the 4th.

[Creeping Line Ahead]

Nige

Please don't try to make something out of this. I know everyone at Kinloss is doing their best to get next week right, but dealing with over 14 different families/relatives/fiancees etc isnt easy. As far as I know, all the families are being briefed first (on the 4th and before the press) and were given a choice of location, one of which included CAS and the BOI President in London. Everyone at Kinloss is also being briefed on the 4th.

CLA

[nigegilb]

I wouldn't have made anything of it, until I found out about the cancelled BoI presentation. I will now withdraw in response to your request and in the light of the re-instatement of the briefing.

Entirely accepting, that this is a difficult time.

Regards,

Nige

[Winco]

defenceheadquarters

Robin, thank you for the explanation but with respect, when has the MOD ever gone to such lengths over releasing the results of a BoI? have never heard of such a thing, ever; and whilst things such as the Chinook loss certainly got to Parliament, I cannot ever remember such things as a 'lock in' at the MOD or a statement in the House of Commons on such a thing. If I am wrong, then I apologise unreservedly, but I would be grateful if you would enlighten us as to when this has ever occurred before please?

One thing is for sure, it has never been the case where PPrune has been used as the media for the MOD to announce things, I'm certain of that.

Clearly, some of those who stated earlier on that PPrune had no 'say' on things (or something along those lines) must now surely be feeling a little bit silly. Likewise, I think that the likes of AC Ovee, Magners Drinker, SFO and all the others that have knocked and ridiculed the rest of us on this thread for persueing the truth should come on here and say sorry.

Does anyone think for a second that we would have got this far without the likes of TD, and those of us on this forum? I think not. Does anyone think the SoS would be making a statement on the loss of an aircraft without all this public debate? Hardly.

To everyone who has fought on PPrune and elsewhere to get to the bottom of this tragedy, and to keep it in the public eye with questions, comments and sceptisism, you should all be, rightly, very proud of yourselves.

To TD and all the families. Our thoughts and prayers will be with you all next week, and I hope you find the answers to what you are looking for. I hope that someone will, at last, have the courage to stand up and be counted.

To CAS, ACAS and AOC, I hope you all find the courage to do the honourable thing gentlemen.

The Winco

[nigegilb]

Winco, the line regularly pushed out by the MoD to the great and the good of the media, is not to take pprune or arrse seriously. Anyone who knows anything about VC Pun, Headley Court, Herc XV179 ESF, Nimrod XV230 and the rest, knows different.

I take it, the MoD has now changed it's tune, and I welcome that.

[Da4orce]

Winco

Wise words but we must temper our anticipation a little, Tuesday may be the MoD making a big song and dance because they are going to report that nothing could have been done to foresee the crash or prevent it (commonly know as a white wash). I doubt that we will see that bearing in mind the actions that you refer to by TD and many ppruners in raising the profile of this incident and the fact that there is clear irrefutable evidence that the MoD could have prevented the crash.

I’m worried about Tuesday, very worried, I see no way that the Mod are going to hold their hands up and accept responsibility for what happened. They may find a low ranking RAF to take the can or god forbid blame the crew (wouldn’t be the first time).

Whatever happens Tuesday will be a long day for everyone concerned.

Oh and forget the BoI circus being unprecedented, the MOD officially posting on a rumour network that they refused to acknowledge a few months ago, that's unprecedented!

[Mick Smith]

MoD journalist lock-ins are not uncommon, unfortunately, and are usually put in place when ministers intend to make an important announcement to parliament and dont want it to leak out beforehand.

The families are being told first, which is of course the proper course, and that was always going to be the case, so there is in fact no way of stopping this leaking out.

The families were also given the date of the board of inquiry before the media, again quite properly. If you are suggesting otherwise NigeGilb pm me to let me know the details.

Frankly I wouldn't call a lock-in the red carpet treatment Nige but it is designed of course to ensure the MoD's viewpoint is put across. I am not aware of any other government ministry that acts in this Stalinist fashion.

[Tappers Dad]

Mick Smith

Is it normal for the BOI results to appear on the MOD website the same day ?

[nigegilb]

Mick, my question concerned the announced date of the 2nd BoI presentation on the 5th of December. I am aware that the families were informed of the date of the BoI on the 4th, in good time. Last I heard yesterday, the 2nd presentation had not been programmed. The families will be told first. The option being a trip to London or an individual briefing. I merely questioned why the initial BoI presentation was not taking place at Kinloss. Once again, it appears that TD has had to make his presence felt. There is an enormous advantage having the full BoI team in the same room presenting their findings. The AAIB rep also has a very big part to play. I am relieved that the BoI team and CAS will now be going to Kinloss. There are likely to be many questions people will want to ask after the presentation. It is not the same to have an individual briefing by an officer from the RAF, with the option of submitting a written question and waiting for a written reply in the post. For a while, it looked as though the families, friends and former colleagues would not be able to ask searching questions up at Kinloss, where the crew were based.

As regards the press. I have spoken to several former colleagues in recent days, who are taking the view that this looks like a damage limitation operation, from the outside.

[Mick Smith]

TD Yes it is normal for BOI reports to go on the web on the day they are announced. But the full lock-in treatment for a BOI is rare and as I say the intention of these things is to get the MoD's version into the media. I object to the things and I do wonder about their history and who decided it should happen on the first occasion. I suspect it was that wonderful man Geoff Hoon. It will not work this time with most I suspect - or at least I hope - since the truth is well and truly out there.

Nige I was aware of the arbitrary decision to cancel the briefing at Kinloss which is now thankfully back on, due to protests from a number of relatives.

My concern was the suggestion that the date of the report being published had been passed to the press before it was passed to the relatives. I certainly heard from relatives not the MoD. I just wondered if you knew of a case of a media organisation learning before the relatives. It's small beer now any way, but would have been quite wrong.

[nigegilb]

Absolutely not Mick, there is no suggestion from me that press were informed first, absolutely not.

[JFZ90]

Mick - why do you object to the "lock-in" as such?

What does it mean anyway, just that you can't leave half way through the briefing (motive being to try and be first to break the news perhaps)? Sounds like simple good manners not to do this anyway and stay and glean the whole story from the MoD perspective.

Plus it maybe just a sensible way of controlling a large group of visitors in Main Building?

[BEagle]

From today's Sunday Times:

December 2, 2007

Nimrod crash puts No 10 on spot

Michael Smith

GOVERNMENT culpability in risking servicemen’s lives will be thrust to centre stage this week by the inquiry into the causes of the RAF Nimrod explosion over Afghanistan that killed all 14 on board.

There is intense government concern over Tuesday’s RAF board of inquiry report, which is likely to raise new doubts over Gordon Brown’s support for the armed services. The aircraft, which dates from the 1960s, was flying only because its replacement was delayed until 2010 to save money and a number of warnings about the risks were ignored.

The aircraft had a history of fuel leaks in the bomb bay, caused by pressure spikes in the air-to-air refuelling system.

The inquiry believes that the catastrophic explosion, west of Kandahar, was brought about by fuel leaking into the bomb bay, where it was ignited by hot air from a fractured pipe. That led the No 7 fuel tank at the base of the starboard wing to explode.

Senior RAF officers are also implicated, because the hot air pipe was known to be a danger and could have been put out of action at no cost.

Nimrod XV230 was gathering intelligence in support of a Nato operation against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan on September 2 last year. The pilot reported a fire in the bomb bay and sent out a “pan, pan, pan” signal, the distress call one step below Mayday, before trying to land at Kandahar. He took the aircraft down 20,000ft in 90 seconds, but at 3,000ft the starboard wing exploded, followed by the rest of the aircraft.

“The really sad thing is that, from the moment the fire started, the crew were doomed,” said Nigel Gilbert, a former RAF pilot. “They had no chance of making it to Kandahar.

“The lack of safety equipment is a direct result of a culture of poor risk management that is endemic among senior officers and MoD officials and is largely driven by lack of funding.”

The MoD and senior RAF officers ignored repeated warnings of fuel leaks and fires on board the aircraft.

In August 2004 BAE Systems, the manufacturer, was asked to check to see if it would be safe to delay its replacement. BAE’s report warned that there had been 880 fires or “smoke-related incidents” on Nimrods in the past 22 years and that hot air pipes in the bomb bay were too close to the key elements of the fuel system. If a fire broke out in the bomb bay, there was no way of extinguishing it.
The report urged the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to fit a fire suppression system in the bomb bay, but the warning was ignored.

Jimmy Jones, a former RAF engineering officer who worked on the Nimrod trials, said: “If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today.”

In November 2004 a hot air pipe in the bomb bay of a Nimrod fractured as the craft came in to land at RAF Kinloss, Morayshire, blasting hot air onto the No 7 tank. An inquiry into that incident found the hot air would have been at least 50C above the spontaneous ignition point of the Nimrod’s Avtur fuel, which had begun to boil in the tank.

Disaster was averted only because the aircraft was on its way back to base. In his report on the incident, the station commander at Kinloss warned of more “unexpected failures” due to the aircraft’s age.

XV230 was one of a small number of Nimrods used to feed crucial live video of the battlefield direct to commanders in Afghanistan.

Nimrod’s air-to-air refuelling system was fitted as a quick fix in the 1982 Falklands conflict.

In March 2006 a report by QinetiQ, the defence consultants, blamed the Nimrod’s age and the “intense” way in which the aircraft were flown for what it described as a “critical” structural problem. The warning was ignored – with fatal results.

Warning signs
- August 2004 BAE Systems warns of bomb bay fires
- November 2004 Burst pipe pours hot air on fuel tank
- March 2006 QinetiQ reports fuel pipe going unfixed, situation “critical”
- September 2006 XV230 explodes over Afghanistan killing 14

[tucumseh]

The evidence is overwhelming that the MoD’s “robust airworthiness regulatory framework” isn’t actually implemented. Good processes and procedures, but then……… Part of this process is Risk Management. It’s treated the same way. You create a Risk Register, develop mitigation plans, but…….. The same attitude seeps throughout MoD. As long as you have a robust process, it’s tick tick tick in the box. There is absolutely nothing to gain from being able to actually implement the process, even if you are granted resources in the first place. Those who can do it are cast aside and are, in the words of one aircraft Director, “an embarrassment to the Department”.

I’d like to see an examination of the Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 programme here. Clearly, an obvious risk in such a programme is slippage/delay. This can be for any number of reasons, and to be fair to that team much of this can be political, or driven by changes in industry. However, and I may have mentioned this before, it is vital to consider “affected” programmes and contractors. This is the basic discipline which underpins integration, be it systems or programmatic. (And its greatest enemy is stovepiped IPTs).

If RMPA had a risk associated with slippage, the mitigation plan MUST have included what actions were necessary to keep MR2 in service. The MR2 team (not the same as RMPA, and still isn’t) would have a “wish list” of what needed doing to the MR2 to keep it in service for x years, and each individual component would have an associated timescale. This wish list would be developed with BAeS – some of their safety related recommendations have been noted here. Critically, some of these are entirely related to the airframe and/or materiel being life-ex in certain areas – the BAeS and QQ reports support this. And remember, the QQ report may be dated 2006, but it emphasises the problems have been known since at least 1995 and were the subject of previous reports. In fact, in many ways the 2006 report reads as if it was merely a confirmatory visit to Kinloss to check what, if anything, had improved in 10 years or so. Mid-90s? That’s when RMPA kicked off. Perhaps that’s what prompted the report?? If RMPA announced slippage a few months at a time, the MR2 team would, perhaps reluctantly, have to concede that little could be done and no benefit gained. But, if one huge block of slippage was suddenly announced, say 3 years, then they would have ample time to implement any changes – and those changes would have a useful life and be more easily justified. I know, in theory safety related changes shouldn’t have to worry about this, but remember the process of maintaining safety and airworthiness has been grossly underfunded for over 15 years and is considered by many to be a “waste of money”. See above comment by the Director – same attitude.

This is not being wise after the event. What I describe is routine stuff you learn to plan and implement, before being promoted into procurement, and I have no doubt the respective (unsanitised) Risk Registers (RPMA and MR2) fully record the plans and decisions. (Sanitised Registers are created to hide unpalatable risks). It is the recommendations and the decisions I’d like to examine. And precisely when slippage was (a) discovered and (b) notified. As the Sqn Ldr said to the XD, “Ah, so you haven’t been told about the 3 year slip”.

[nigegilb]

Interesting points Tuc. As ever, I had to read your post twice to understand it.

The two reasons I have heard time and again for not introducing MRA4 with adequate safety equipment are lack of time and lack of money. Much the same as your well crafted argument for XV230 being sent up there on that fateful day, without bomb bay fire protection and fuel tank protection and with no measures taken to reduce the risk of fire or fuel tank explosion.

The hole in which the RAF finds itself has resulted in life-exed aircraft being forced to carry on doing mission critical tasks. The need for the replacement aircraft is obvious. But that aircaft is also lacking basic fire protection and does not have built-in combat survivability.

If there is any redemption possible here, it will be in the findings and recommendations of the BoI on Tuesday.

Changing attitudes among serving chiefs of staff will be altogether different. For too long, they have seen it their only duty to get the mission done at any cost. I hope those days are coming to an end.

[Distant Voice]

Fuel spillage following AAR procedures, and spurious HF transmissions.

DV

[Da4orce]

Mick,

In a report of startling clarity you have described a litany of failings by this Government that has degraded the UK military to within breaking point and left its’ personnel with no confidence in their Secretary of State and Prime Minister.

Gordon Brown has shown utter contempt for UK armed forces both as Prime Minister and as Chancellor, too many chances to change direction have been missed, too many of our heroes have died at the hands of their own Government, and too many mothers grieve.

[tucumseh]

Nigel

"The two reasons I have heard time and again for not introducing MRA4 with adequate safety equipment are lack of time and lack of money".


I know this is the official line, but given the MRA4 programme kicked off when all these problems/requirements were known about, I'd say there was adequate time and opportunity to put it in the spec in the first place. (Note - MRA4 would have been specified, not subject to a URD where DEC isn't allowed to actually specify what he wants). This timeline, and the issues being known and understood, is becoming more clear with the release of the QQ report.

Sorry you needed to read my post twice, but you did understand it and agreed with me? Makes a change from my PE 2*. He understood every word when I put the same to him, but he showed me the door and slammed it behind me. Oddly enough, same day the Sqn Ldr mentioned the slippage.

[nigegilb]

Tuc,

I think we would all benefit if you occasionally used less acronyms:)!

I agreed with your post entirely, and your latest. I have been trying to change attitudes ever since I was sent to Afg in a slick. The advice not to send the slick from Herc OEU being overturned by a very senior officer at Group. He allegedly briefed the Minister something different. I tried the CoC and flagged up a host of urgent kit requirements, the Chiefs in the RAF were not interested and my Flight Commander was threatened with the sack.

Then XV179 was shot down by a bullet.

The initial response to fit a handful of ac with foam some time down the track; the rest is history.

Large ac self-protection has simply been ignored until very recently.

Ignored by people who have never been to war, or whose only experience is life in a fast jet. Tuc you are suggesting that combat survivability and ac self-protection should be at the core of the design. I could not agree more. We lost XV230 even though we learnt the hard way on the Herc fleet that fuel tanks explode. We await the BoI for the Herc that was destroyed on a strip in Iraq. I believe that too was a fuel tank explosion.

So to the future. The word from military officers in MoD is that MRA4 is an old design, procured a long time ago. Well, the design was only frozen last December. I have been told that large aircraft safety and combat survivability is now taken very seriously. So seriously that A400M OBIGGS has not been funded yet. The plan for MRA4 is to introduce it into service without FDA, OBIGGS, BBay Fire protection, under floor fire protection, probe inerting protection, dual skin AAR pipework.

I am sorry, but that is simply not good enough.

In the mean time, the MR2 boys and girls soldier on. AOC ordered them to continue AAR under his specific authority after XV230. But they have no B Bay or fuel tank protection and they take their chances of a mid air collision with no TCAS.

Someone explain to me how the MoD can claim they are learning lessons here?

I will not stop until attitudes change, and that comes from the very top.

[Chugalug2]

tuc, like Nige I struggle to understand your posts, no reflection on you, for this is all far too familiar territory for you but unfamiliar to the rest of us. All the more reason you should persevere until we all get it into out thick skulls that 'they' have failed us all, consistently and continuously, in their duty to provide airworthy aircraft to HM Armed Forces. In truth it is all in your opening line:

The evidence is overwhelming that the MoD’s “robust airworthiness regulatory framework” isn’t actually implemented.

That one simple sentence is overwhelming and devastating in its indictment of the MOD. Never mind all the acronyms (like Nige I try and fail to put words to them, whatever they stand for they have one thing in common they do not do what it says on the tin!). The only solution is to make all of them subject to external regulation by an MAA. If they fail in their statutory obligations they are brought to book, publicly and painfully. Self regulation has served us badly over the years in Law Enforcement, the Legal and Medical Professions and Financial Services. But for sheer lethal effect nothing matches aviation for devastation when it goes wrong (well OK other than Nuclear Power). Military Aviation Airworthiness Regulation in the UK has gone wrong. It needs fixing, not patching, not papering over, but root and branch fixing without delay.

[DaveyBoy]

DEC = Director Equipment Capability
FDA = Flight Deck Armour
OBIGGS = On Board Inert Gas Generator System
URD = User Requirement Document

[Donna K Babbs]

Mods,

Is there any reason why this thread has not been made sticky?

Donna

[Shack37]

Donna
That question has not been answered on the many previous occasions it has been asked or the suggestion /request put forward so don't hold your breath. The thread has been kept on page one purely by the poster's efforts and interest. By this time tomorrow there should be something more to discuss?
s37

[spanners123]

I agree with Donna K Babbs (good name!), this thread should have been made sticky long ago!

[Tappers Dad]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/7125332.stm
Monday, 3 December 2007

A worker at RAF Kinloss has revealed that technical faults still happen regularly on the Nimrod fleet, BBC Scotland has learned................

[PingDit]

According to Radio 2 news at 0100 this morning, the BOI findings are to be released today!

[Da4orce]

Further to my post #1786 it seems there have been one or two changes to the media briefing today....

The timings are as follows (these are approximate only):

12.15-13.00: Media arrive and receive a redacted BOI and background material.
Refreshments will be provided.
13.15-14.00: Presentation by the BOI president, Gp Capt Nick Sharpe, on the
Board's findings
14.00-14.30: Reading time
14.30-15.15: Q&A session with Minister for the Armed Forces Bob Ainsworth,
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of Materiel
(Air), Air Marshal Barry Thornton, and BoI President, Group Captain Nick
Sharpe.
15.15-15.30: Comfort break.
15.30: SofS to make a statement to the House of Commons on the BOI's
findings. The statement will be relayed live to the MoD media suite.

Once the Secretary of State has finished in the House of Commons, Minister
for the Armed Forces (Min (AF)) and Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) will be
available for interview.

http://media.netpr.pl/notatka_89766.html

[extpwron]

Interesting article of this mornings Today programme.

Listen again here:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/

Click on 07:09

[Da4orce]

Defence Secretary must go

[monkey2]

sat at home waiting for news:*

[RAF_Techie101]

Out of interest Da4orce, what good will that do? He'll just swap positions with some other numpty like the Secretary of Enviromental affairs or some rubbish and it'll be the same thing all over again....

[Da4orce]

RAF_Techie101

I agree with you but it's about accountability.

[Northern Circuit]

at 1530 GMT
Des is making a broadcast

http://news.bbc.co.uk/

[JOE-FBS]

I think it is live on BBC Parliament

[speeddial]

Full BoI online now

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoiNimrodMr2Xv230.htm

[defenceheadquarters]

We have now published the various documents and statements on the MOD website.

BEGINS/

The MOD has now published the report of the Board of Inquiry into the tragic loss of
Nimrod XV230 in which 14 servicemen lost their lives on 2 September 2006.

You can download a copy of the Board of Inquiry report here:
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoiNimrodMr2Xv230.htm

Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence said:

"I pay tribute to the fourteen Service personnel who lost their lives in this tragic
incident. My thoughts are with their families and friends and, indeed, the men and
women of the Armed Forces who I know feel the loss of their colleagues very deeply.

"The Board of Inquiry established the most probable cause of the fire and subsequent
loss of XV230 and in doing so identified failings for which the Ministry of Defence
must take responsibility. On behalf of the MOD and the Royal Air Force, I would like
to apologise to the House of Commons, and most of all to those who lost their lives,
and to their families. I am sorry.

"My Department has taken a number of steps to ensure that a similar accident cannot
occur again. We are learning the lessons from the accident and have already
implemented many of the recommendations of the BOI report.

"On the basis of these actions, the Chief of the Air Staff’s professional judgment is
that the Nimrod fleet is safe to fly. I have accepted his advice. I have, however,
decided to put in place a review of the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness
and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2. This review will be led by a senior Queen’s
Counsel, assisted by technical experts on aviation systems, and will examine all
relevant papers, and interview all those in a position to assist including BAE Systems
and Qinetiq.”

Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of the Air Staff said:

"The 14 brave Service personnel who died in this tragic accident behaved in an
exemplary manner during the tragic events of 2 September last year.

"The Board stated that the crew of Nimrod XV230 were faced with a series of complex
and demanding emergencies and acted throughout with calm professionalism, and did
everything possible to save their aircraft. Their families, friends and colleagues
should be very proud of them all.

"Action has been taken to prevent the reoccurrence of this accident and I would like
to reassure our service personnel and the public that this aircraft is still safe to
fly. I would like to thank the BOI team publicly for their thorough and very detailed
report. The nature of the crash made this a particularly difficult investigation.”

Due to incomplete evidence arising from the nature of the crash and its hostile
location, the Board was not able to identify with absolute certainty the cause of the
fire on Nimrod XV230.

The BOI has put forward the most likely scenario for the fire and the events and
factors which led to the loss of the aircraft. The fire most likely resulted from
escaped fuel igniting against a hot pipe in a compartment near the wing-fuselage
attachment – the No 7 tank dry bay.

The fuel probably gained access to the pipe through a gap between two types of
insulation. The fuel most likely escaped from one of two possible sources: the action
of a pressure-relief device in the main fuel tank, which led to an overflow of fuel
during Air to Air Refuelling, or a leaking fuel coupling.

Immediately following the loss of XV230 a number of measures were taken by the RAF to
ensure that a similar scenario did not occur again. These include: turning off all
possible ignition sources wherever possible, including the hot air pipe; a fleet-wide
examination of areas where flammable materials such as fuel or hydraulic fluid may be
placed in relative proximity to potential sources of ignition should a leak occur; and
increasing inspections of the area to detect any faults at as early a stage as
possible; during this process no evidence of any fleet-wide problems was identified.

The Board made 33 recommendations to ensure safety measures are formally incorporated
within Nimrod procedures. The vast majority of these have already been implemented to
ensure the safety of the Nimrod fleet and its crews.

The loss of 14 courageous Servicemen from all 3 Services is a tragedy, for the
families and for their comrades throughout the United Kingdom. The Ministry of Defence
takes seriously the duty of care it owes to its Servicemen and women, and will
consider the lessons to be learned from the sad loss of this aircraft and its crew.

The MOD has published some additional briefing material which attempts to explain the
BOI's findings in simpler language. This material does not overwrite or replace the
the BOI report:

- Timeline of events and reconstruction of events leading to the crash of Nimrod
XV230 on 02 September 2006.
- Actions Taken to Reduce Risk to Nimrod Operations.
- Overview of the Board’s findings and summary of recommendations and actions.
- Possible Contributing Factors to the Loss of Nimrod XV230

You can download a copy of this material here:
http://www.operations.mod.uk/special/Nimrod%20XV230%20-%20Additional%20Briefing.pdf

The RAF convenes a Board of Inquiry following the loss of any of its aircraft to
establish the circumstances of the loss and learn lessons to ensure, if at all
possible, that such a loss does not occur again. The Board of Inquiry consisted of 2
aircrew each with over 20 years’ experience of Nimrod operations and an engineer with
33 years’ of aircraft engineering experience.

The Department of Transport’s Air Accident Investigation Board conducted a parallel
investigation and was involved from the earliest stages. Technical experts from other
government departments and independent scientific and technical companies were also
consulted.

/ENDS

Robin Riley
Assistant Director (Bureau)
Directorate of Defence Public Relations
Ministry of Defence
This material was posted by the Ministry of Defence. You can find a copy here:
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/BoardOfInquiryPublishedIntoLossOfNimrodXv230.htm

[Lyneham Lad]

Whilst we wait with bated breath, here is one journalist's reaction to being summoned to the 'lock-in':-

One of the basic tenets of good PR is making sure you get your side of the story across. Sometimes, deluging cynical hacks with information, facts and quotes can smother a story far more effectively than a blanket of silence. It's a lesson the Ministry of Defence has only recently learned, but is now applying with a vengeance to Nimrod XV230.

That was the RAF spyplane that exploded over Afghanistan last September, killing 14 servicemen and triggering a wave of speculation about the condition of the 30-year-old Nimrods and the technical warnings that the MoD had ignored. So before the long-awaited Board of Inquiry into the crash is given to MPs this afternoon, hacks like me will be treated to a three-hour barrage of briefing and interviews with senior officer at the MoD. We're grateful, of course, but the whole thing looks a lot like someone is trying to manage bad news before it breaks.

Journalists like Mick Smith have done what we can to bring the facts about XV230 to light, but much credit goes to Graham Knight, whose son Ben was aboard the plane. Through diligent research and use of Freedom of Information laws, he has brought out many facts that are uncomfortable for the MoD. He has done much to honour Ben's memory and like the other families, deserves the truth today. Whether he gets it remains to be seen.

Posted by James Kirkup on 04 Dec 2007 at 11:24

Link to article (http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/politics/threelinewhip/dec07/howtosmotherbadnews.htm)

[nigegilb]

So, it was a fuel leak, the source of ignition was a hot air pipe, and No 7 tank blew.

Amazingly, it wasn't even a fractured pipe, the heat alone did the job.

Stunned.

[Da4orce]

Sorry doesn't f:mad:ing cut it this time Mr Brown

All the factors that led to the loss of 230 and my brother were known before the accident and not acted upon.

This government has blood on there hands.

Proud son of Graham Knight

[nigegilb]

Incompetence and arrogance, with a focus solely on achieving the mission. These peoples lives were thrown away with a casualness that is breathtaking.

[dallas]

Mr Browne said: "On behalf of the MoD and the Royal Air Force, I would like to apologise to the House of Commons, and most of all to those who lost their lives, and to their families.
Am I missing something? Why is the RAF apologising to the House?

Surely the House should be apologising to the RAF for not fighting for better funding?

[skua]

I have only got as far as para 9, but 50 mins for the arrival of CSAR only 14 nms from Kandahar airfield does not sound very reassuring, even though their services were sadly not needed.

[SaddamsLoveChild]

Skua,

Dont talk tosh mate, moving quickly into an area overwatched by the Talibs is never going to be quick, area heavily mined, other ops ongoing, you cant just disengage and leave others an exposed flank whilst you go off on another task. These things take time and they had another asset with eyes on if you read the report. Do you not think that ANY patrol Cdr knowing an aircraft had gomne down would not expedite to help. He would but not whilst exposing his own troops and adding to the possible casualty number.

Suggest you dont cloud the issue by finding fault in our own side.....unless you were part of the RCD on scene.

Back in my box now.

[Doctor Cruces]

What abunch of ar:mad:oles these tossers are, if they hadn't been penny pinching the crew would still be alive.
Don't :mad:ing apologise, Dozy Des, adequately fund the military for the jobs required and get the beancounters out of military requirement. Only the best should be good enough for our serving personnel and this just won't do.
I'm so angry I could just............
No point in voting against them where I live, a monkey with a blue rosette would get in so no point in threatening not to vote for this bunch of tossers who can't even give us a full time minister.
Doc C

[D-IFF_ident]

While the BOI process is not intended to apportion blame it would be interesting to see if the report could be used as evidence in, say, manslaughter charges. I wonder if the CPS has had sight of the report yet.

[Da4orce]

The devil is in the detail.

Mr Brown just appeared on BBC stating that the bulk of the BoI recommendations would be implemented and would go some way to addressing concerns!

[Satellite_Driver]

Recommendation 32 from the BoI:
"Consideration be given to reinstating the SO1 (Wg Cdr) engineering post in Forward at RAF Kinloss to provide senior oversight of station engineering matters."
By 'the SO1 (Wg Cdr) engineering post in Forward' this means what we used to call OC Eng Wing. Yes, it probably was a silly idea to get rid of that role, wasn't it? So much for QR 640, as beaten into us BEngOs at DSGT in the good old days.*
(*i.e. the early 1990s, before 'Lean' had been invented.)

[4mastacker]

I watched Secretary of State making his Statement on BBC Parliament and all I could feel was anger and dismay at what was said. Having followed this thread and read the very many, knowledgeable inputs, I for one, find it hard to understand why Browne's words that it was "an accident" were not followed by "waiting to happen". Whether or not the families and friends of the fallen find comfort in the Statement, I know not. If it had been my son, I would be extremely disappointed at today's announcement.

My deepest sympathies to all the relatives, friends and colleagues of our lost comrades.

[everythingbuttheboy]

4mastacker, i disagree that this was an accident waiting to happen.......

this was an accident that occurred due to a cumulative sequence of events.... the fact that the insulation around the pipe that ignited the fuel was not sufficiently adequate, was not realised/discovered, until the one day that pipe insulation became vital;the day that the fuel leaked from one of the tanks, across the airframe, and into the area where it could be ( and tragically was) ignited.... at the end of the day, the MOD has admitted resonsibility for it's part in the accident, and has committed to compensation (which I know, wont bring back loved ones), and a further investigation (probably because of the intense media coverage, helped by this forum)
As a former stacker (i presume thats what you did!), what expert knowledge, exactly, do you have in this accident. unless you are a subject matter expert(ie ex pilot, eng etc).
how much experience do you have servicing this aircraft, or actually flying it. as far as i'm concerned, the aircrew did their part, extremely professionally, right until the end, and the groundcrew, did exactly what their relevant documents and experience told them to do.. it was a tragic incident, and i do believe the media coverage has helped in terms of MOD not trying to hide things, but comments like yours, that are unsubstantiated, dont help the families, or the colleagues, friends, and loved ones to understand what happened, what is going to happen, and how the Kinloss community, and the nimrod fleet are trying to prevent this happening again.......
Its an extremely hard fact to digest, but we learn from our mistakes, and I'm sure that the bereaved families, may take some comfort from knowing that their loved ones never died in vain...... that mistakes have been rectified, (as proved with the recent aircraft diverting due to fuel leak) and that this will (hopefully) never happen again... please feel free to PM me.

[Padhist]

Before anyone goes off half cocked on this. Look at the terms of reference for the enquiry.
The usual trick is to make these terms, such that they prevent an examiner looking at the real problem.
Look at the enquiry into the Vulcan accident at London Airport on 1st october 1956.The RAF Official Enquiry was carried out in secret.
The subsequent Civil enquiry, emphasised that its terms of reference were to enquire into the quality of the GCA approach procedures at LAP.There were no existing problems. Aircraft were using these facilities all the time.
So. I do hope that this enquiry will be realistic.
Should anyone require more information on the Vulcan crash I will be happy to oblige.
At the moment I am into my 3rd medicinal apperatiff. So read this with care.

[Tappers Dad]

I would just like to thank all those who have supported me over the past year.

I will say more tomorrow.

[The Swinging Monkey]

TD
I watched you on the TV tonight mate, and simply don't know how you managed to stay so calm and controlled - respect. I have never been so disgusted and ashamed of being a Brit tonight, in light of this report.

It is an utter disgrace, and I hope that the matter goes further and finds someone culpably negligent.

everythingbuttheboy
If we had 'learned by our mistakes' as you so eloquently put it, then we would NOT have had so many near misses prior to the loss of 230, and several SINCE the loss. The fact is that the RAF DID NOT learn from it's mistakes. Thats why it happened, yet again, only a couple of weeks ago.

I hope that we get an independant body to come in a check all the aircraft over and ground them for good. Endex.

[everythingbuttheboy]

is there any other aircraft in service in the world, that has not had problems?????

flying is inherently dangerous. i'm not saying for a second that we should just accept this, and get on with it, but at the same time, accidents happen, and as long as we learn from our mistakes, at least it's a little condolence for the families...
by "near misses", i take it you're referring to problems with refuelling, and not near misses... at the time the system was introduced, it was meant as a stopgap for the falklands. yes, it was a mistake, to take the refueling system for granted and to use it on a regular basis, but hey, as i've said, people make mistakes, they're human. i'm all for ensuring that the mistakes aren't repeated: as for people being implicated..... i'm sure it will mean a lot to some of the families, others just want to make sure that these people didn't die in vain....

As for learning from its' mistakes, what about the jet that diverted last week, spot the differnce between that one, and 230.... (tell you what..... i'll give you a clue. that one landed) tragedy no 2 prevented.... i'd call that a learning process


as for grounding the fleet for good, i'd like to see you say that to the hundreds of troops on the ground who rely on the battlefield asset we provide.... but then again, your comments make it sound like you're not particularly arsed about them. its not all about us crews, its about the force as a whole. i'm not saying for a second that 14 deaths is an acceptable loss, far from it, but grounding the fleet will cause many more deaths. think before you make such all encompassing commments...its not a 767 ferrying people to and from tenerife, its a battlefield assets that is saving lives, every minute it's airborne.

[speeddial]

everythingbuttheboy,

There is not an aircraft without problems, however please tell me when a KC-135, B-52, RC-135 or C-130E, all of the Nimrod's vintage, last had a similar incident? The answer is never. At the first sign of a problem the USAF ground the fleet and spend the money needed to fix the problem, or retire the aircraft.

[everythingbuttheboy]

speeddial,
i accept your comments, but then when was any of the aircraft you mentioned, such a potent asset, and easily replaceable....
what is there, that can replace the nimrod, carry out it's job as effectively, and produce results every time.... so much so, that it's common for commanders to cancel a mission if a nimrod is unavailable.....

and please dont say predator, or any other supposed reconnaissance aircraft, that cannot ever do the job nimrods can..

yes, safety comes first, but at the moment the aircraft is safe, and wth the 4 coming in shortly (cue sarcastic remarks) its simply not viable to spend million on this a/c. just make it safe to fly, and keep it safe, until the 4 comes in.

[everythingbuttheboy]

APPARENTLY, THE USAF DON'T HAVE PROBLEMS WITH AGING AIRCRAFT

So dont bother reading on......

ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-079(II)/MP-079(II)-(SM)-$KN.pdf -


Managing the Aging Aircraft Problem
John W. Lincoln
Aeronautical Systems Center
2530 Loop Road West
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433-7101
USA


No one should be surprised there are aircraft all over the world today in a state of aging. Economic considerations demand that aircraft be operated long beyond originally identified retirement times. One reason for keeping aircraft in the inventory is that technological advances allow currently designed aircraft to effectively perform their mission for much longer than
previously possible. An aircraft, even when sold by one airline, sees extended life in another airline’s operations. In the commercial sector, new aircraft tend to be evolutionary in their designs. Consequently, they are maintained in service until they are not economically viable to
operate. The cost of new aircraft, particularly for the military, is enormous. Each new military aircraft is a revolutionary change from the previous model since the services must maintain combat effectiveness in an environment of ever-changing threats. Therefore, military aircraft stay in the inventory until they are operationally obsolete or they are no longer economically viable to operate. The USAF retired many F-4 aircraft because they were obsolete as a weapon system rather than being economically nonviable. In the case of the KC-135, the USAF plans to keep
these aircraft operational to the year 2040 since they believe it will be economical to operate them until that time. They would likely not be obsolete in the year 2040. If the USAF can maintain these aircraft operationally until 2040, their service life will be approximately 80 years. When the USAF procured these aircraft, they planned for a service life of about 20 years.

However, the economic demand to fly these aircraft longer and longer has emphasized the need to re-examine these aircraft for the possibility of WFD, corrosion damage, and loss of damage
tolerance capability through repairs. In many cases, the budgets have not allowed the modernization of maintenance facilities or the
upgrading of their information management systems. This has led to maintenance practices that are not state-of-the-art in that the use of information management has not become ingrained in the
work force.

[Chugalug2]

Everythingbuttheboy said:


this was an accident that occurred due to a cumulative sequence of events....
So with every accident. But the cumulative sequence started not in XV230, rather with a bean counter’s award winning idea more than a decade ago. The RAF Airworthiness System cost money, too much money it would seem. Paperwork was generated for every incident no matter how seemingly trivial, vast data bases were assembled, trends established, potential weaknesses identified, rectification action designed and implemented, and at the end of it all nothing to show for it except for a minor mod and an enormous bill. Why not seriously curtail the reporting side and ensure that money expended subsequently was slashed? Of course the staffs used to dedicating their lives to the provision of airworthiness would have to be made to change their ways, with disciplinary action if required, but the prize would be major financial savings. Well the prize has turned out to be a rather more bitter harvest than that. The RAF may well apologise for it has ended up destroying a Flight Safety system that was the envy of the world and finished up with aircraft fleets whose airworthiness would shame a bucket shop airline. Note please I castigate the airworthiness, not the serviceability. The two are quite separate, and for all I know XV230 was perfectly serviceable right up to the moment that a fuel leak destroyed it. So what now?
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2999441.ece (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2999441.ece) says:
Mr Browne vowed that lessons would be learned from the official Board of Inquiry report into last September's catastrophic crash, which was published today, and announced that a review would be launched into the safety of Nimrods. If it is deemed necessary, he added that a full public inquiry would follow.
AND:
The most devastating condemnation of what had gone wrong in maintaining the fleet came from Air Chief Marshal Sir Clive Loader, Commander-in-Chief Air Command.
In an attachment to the Board of Inquiry report issued today, Sir Clive said : "I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 Service personnel who were aboard, resulted from shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod."
So all we are promised is an independent review into Nimrod Safety.
ACM Loader to his credit identifies the real cause of this accident, and it is a cause that compromises not only the Nimrod Fleet, but every other one in HM Armed Forces. The full public inquiry is a sine qua non and must be tasked to identify those shortcomings and recommend the remedy. In my opinion that must be to withdraw Airworthiness Regulation from the MOD and vest it in an independent Military Airworthiness Authority.

[OmegaV6]

I think CinC's comments para 2 vindicate all those on this thread who have championed changes to RAF airworthiness procedures

God rest the guy's, lets hope their sacrifice is not in vain

[Confucius]

Will the leaning process continue? :(

[Pontius Navigator]

The VC10 as an airframe, if not a design, predates the Nimrod. Many VC10 were operated by airlines whose maintenance may not have been as stringent as the RAF procedures.

Mrs PN saw something on (or in) the news which suggested to her that an Air Marshal might be falling on his sword. Has there been any AM on (or in) the news other than CAS or CinC?

[roush]

TD

My thoughts are with you and everyone else who lost family and friends (myself included).

everythingbuttheboy,

Sorry for my obvious stupidity, but why can't the Pred/Reaper a/c do the job of the Nimrod?

[hello1]

flying is inherently dangerous. i'm not saying for a second that we should just accept this, and get on with it, but at the same time, accidents happen, and as long as we learn from our mistakes, at least it's a little condolence for the families...Flying large military aircraft is NOT inherently dangerous and accidents do NOT just happen as long as we are operating somewhere close to the tight airworthiness requirements that the MOD (says it) requires. This aircraft was not in a hazardous flight regime (ignoring the presence of the unfriendly people below), it was making routine use of the fuel system. The fleet may be old but in the real world, nobody in their right mind would seriously believe that regular incidents of fuel pishing out of an aircraft is vaguely acceptable or sensible.

Edited to add......We increase the risks inherent in aviation significantly at times by putting military aircraft into extremely demanding environments. What we must not do is confuse the very real need to take risks to get the job done - particularly on ops - with the unnecessary risks of routinely flying aircraft that should not be in the air.

[general all rounder]

Quite a lot of mudslinging in these pages is directed at senior officers and the MOD. However, the reality is that the armed forces must be accountable to a democratically elected civilian administration. Senior officers and the MOD do the government's bidding and the government is elected by the people. The bottom line is that the government makes decisions on the allocation of resources according to the priorities which it believes will get it re-elected by the people. The problem here is that we have been engaged on operations which the government believe to be 'the right thing to do' but the Treasury (and the people) would rather that tax was spent on Health, Education and pretty much anything but Defence. At the same time industrial, economic and employment interests mean that the government (Treasury) wants to retain UK defence industries and so impose additional costs on defence procurement without making any provision for those costs.

The consequence of all of this is that Defence Chiefs are required to achieve more whilst spending unnecessary amounts of money on securing future capability. Every year the spending round requires difficult decisions about what important areas of expenditure should take a cut to balance the books. Trade-offs between managing current commitments (and safety) and ensuring that the UK still has Armed Forces worth a damn in 25 years' time are made in every round. Inevitably, eventually something had to break. The British people and the Treasury need to understand that it is their priorities which caused this tragedy not MOD or military ineptitude. Hopefully, the outcome of this will be a reconciliation between our commitments and our resources; if not, the next disaster is in the pipeline.

I might add that it is for the Cabinet to provide a coherent Grand Strategy for the United Kingdom. A recent BBC documentary alleged that Cabinet Government ceased to function under the current government. If so, then it might be a good idea to re-instate it.

[Creeping Line Ahead]

OK, fair call - the RAF's airworthiness sytem has been found at fault for not picking up a design fault (hot air pipe in unprotected bay that only every needed one fuel leak on it - and no-one can guarantee a leak free jet) but how the hell did British waste-of -Space get away with fitting the pipes in the first place? Where are you now Jimmy Jones?

CLA

[N Joe]

Padhist

The "usual trick" with setting BOI TORs to avoid the real issues may have been prevalent in the 1950s but that does not mean that this is the case with this BOI. The president and members had an extraordinarily difficult task with the limited evidence and I have nothing but respect for them.

Whilst it is tempting to rush in with opinions on every detail of the BOI's report, better now to just think of the families for whom this must be an extremely difficult time.

N Joe

[Winco]

everythingbuttheboy

I notice your lack of posts on this forum and would strongly suggest that you read everything from page one onwards. You will then see that you are completely wrong in most of what you are saying.

Flying military aircraft is no more dangerous than flying any other aircraft. The only thing that makes it potentially more dangerous is the area of operation and the fact that someone may be trying to shoot you down.

XV230 did NOT crash because it was a miltary aircraft; it crashed because of a number of failings, many of which had been identified as a potential danger many many months, and possibly even years earlier. The RAF didn't learn a damned thing from those incidents, and your ridiculous comment about the one that diverted last week beggars belief! Are you for a second suggesting that diverting with a major fuel leak is OK?

Your other comment 'simply not viable to spend million on this a/c. just make it safe to fly, and keep it safe, until the 4 comes in' is a disgrace and an insult to those who perished. I don't care what it costs to make them safe to fly, £10 million or £10 billion. Until they are safe to fly, they should be grounded. Perhaps you could inform us all here what it is worth to make them safe to fly?

The fact is that the RAF took it upon itself to ignore those warnings from expert people such as BAe and QQ. Had they acted upon those recomendations and heeded the reports and further recomendations following the loss of TWA Flight 500, then I believe that we would not be having this debate now.

I am of the opinion that was an avoidable accident, and I feel that those responsible should be held to account, and by that I mean the SoS, CAS, ACAS, AOC 2Gp and Stn Cdr ISK; ALL of who knew that the aircraft had, and was having continuous problems centred around AAR and Fuel leaks.

This will not be the end of this tragedy. It is incumbant upon us all to continue to fight for safe and airworthy aircraft within the RAF, and I sincerely hope that those named above find the courage to do the honourable thing.

The Winco

[Archimedes]

Forgive me, Winco, but I'm puzzled as to why you believe the current ACAS, AOC 2 Grp and Stn Cdr ISK should resign? Since the former took up his post in April this year, AOC 2 Grp arrived there this February and Stn Cdr ISK is not the same chap as the one who was in post when the accident occurred, I presume that your call relates to events after the accident? Or do you refer to those who held the relevant posts at the time?

Forgive me for being dense :confused:

[Da4orce]

Anyone see Bob Ainsworth on Newsnight tonight claiming that the Nimrod MR2 has a fire suppression system...but not in the area of the plane where the incident occurred????????????

What the :mad:is wrong with these people, a couple of extinguishers does not constitute a fire suppression system.

Mr Ainsworth also said that the BoI had ruled out as a contributing factor [to the crash] the maintenance of the aircraft.

I should like to point Mr Ainsworth in the direction of section 32, A, (6) of the BoI report...

The Board was, thus, of the opinion that the fuel systems maintenance policy was a contributing factor in the loss of XV230.


21 accepted recommendations from 33 so that's roughly 30% of the recommendations rejected and no indication of how many of the 21 have been implemented.

Actions speak louder than words Mr Ainsworth and if you think you can say sorry and walk away your wrong.

[Chugalug2]

Trade-offs between managing current commitments (and safety) and ensuring that the UK still has Armed Forces worth a damn in 25 years' time are made in every round. Inevitably, eventually something had to break.

General AR, your instructive piece on UK constitutional practice relevant to the UK Armed Forces was flowing so well, so persuasively, until you had to get to your point, which I quote above. You then have the utter gall to blame the British people for the tragedy! If you work in the MOD then you are a part of the problem. If your work involves Airworthiness Regulation then the attitude that you express confirms far more clearly than I ever could why the MOD is unworthy of discharging that responsibility. In short, Sir, your sentiments are outrageous and you should be ashamed. By the way if you are an MOD apparatchik and feel uncertain as to what you personally should do if ordered to compromise the Airworthiness process, may I commend the posts of tucumseh on this and the 'Parliamentary Answers' threads.

[general all rounder]

You then have the utter gall to blame the British people for the tragedy!

Today, the MOD is allocated 2.4% of GDP in war time. A sensible level would be 4-6%. In the absence of 4-6% a large number of compromises have to be made and it isn't just ac safety.

The electorate sets the agenda on expenditure on the doorstep during elections. When voters start to ask politicians what they will do about the parlous state of the armed forces, then and only then will there be any more money. Until then the Treasury will put its money where the voters want it: Health, Education and Social Security.

[Chugalug2]

Like your previous post I'm tempted to ask "So what?" If your duties encompass flight safety and are being compromised by the government, the treasury, the SoS, your boss, or Old Mother Riley, whoever, what have you done about it? Have you protested, have you carried on anyway doing what should be done and damn the consequences, would you resign? Every one who serves a discreditable policy that directly undermines flight safety may one day have to live with the knowledge that an accident such as is subject of this thread resulted. Never mind whether we have armed forces worth a damn in 5 years or 25 years, that is for others. If you are responsible for Airworthiness provision now, then that is your priority. That it cannot be done within the intrigue of the MOD I do not doubt, that is why it must be removed from its control as a matter of urgency and passed to an MAA who will enforce it.

[EdSet100]

Chug,
Have a look at page 2-22 through to Page 2-24. BAe was involved in the hazard analysis. It wasn't a case of self-policing, as you seem to suggest. It would be very difficult to challenge your boss about a risk when the design authority backs him up with an "improbable" assessment.

However, I am very disappointed that someone on the Nimrod IPT didn't challenge the erroneous stated provision, by a hazard analyst, of a fire detection system in Zone 614 (the accepted seat of the fire) and the assumption that the crossfeed pipe is only used to start engines.

This isn't systemic failure or cost cutting.

At least 2 people, involved with hazard analysis, were not doing their jobs properly.

Hence the Review.

[KarlADrage]

Da4orce,

It was said during the Q&A session following the presentation of the BOI to the House, that of the 12 outstanding recommendations, eight were still under discussion, with four rejected as a result of alternative methods of dealing with the issues that they addressed having been found/accepted.

[Creeping Line Ahead]

Fair enough then, the RAF's airworthiness system has been found at fault for not identifying that a super heated pipe was in an unprotected bay and only ever needed a single fuel leak (which i assume most of us would agree is impossible to prevent) on it to ignite. What i want to know is how the hell did british waste-of-Space get away with fitting the thing in the first place?

CLA

[rock34]

skua, ref your last,

I can assure you that we moved as quickly as possible to reach the crash site. In 'just' 50 minutes, we had to be informed of what happened, find some maps of the area (14 nm = approx 30 km and that was outside of our AOR), collect extra ammunition, water, rations etc for a possible stay of up to 72 hrs in an area that was not overwatched by the Taliban, but was smack in the middle of a known Taliban position that was an objective for Op MEDUSA. We then had to get to the chinook that took us and fly there. i'm no expert on how chinooks fly to places, but it certainly isn't in a straight line, especially when there are bloody big mountains in the way. IMHO, 50 mins to do what we did was an amazing effort.

The RCD were already there when we arrived and fortunately they had armoured fighting vehicles. When they left early the next day, we were left in an exposed position surrounded by over 500 'civilians' as well as numerous unarmed Taliban who were recce'ing our positions and preparing to launch an assualt. Thats the reason we were forced to leave the area, but only after we had recovered all the bodies and whatever kit looked vaguely classified or important. If you know a way that this could be done quicker by 40 blokes, on foot, then please tell me.

RIP fellas

[downsizer]

Tappers Dad,

Would you mind clarifying your statement on the 10 O'clock new last night when you said words to the effect of Those in the air put their trust in those on the ground, and they shouldn't have

Do you mean Nimrod groundcrew and engineers?

[South Bound]

Downsizer

relax fella, TD has always been supportive of the people working at ISK.

There is no suggestion anywhere that anything the groundcrew/engineers have done is in anyway a contributory factor. The confusion arises because the SofS mentioned that there could be flaws in the maintenance procedures (not the professional way they have been carried out) as defined by higher authority, caused by any number of factors to be investigated during the next inquiry.

In this case the engineers did everything they were required to do, the argument goes that the books should have required them to do more.

Methinks the inquiry will have huge ramifications for the way the MoD approaches airworthiness in the future.

SB

[RedSquirrel83]

The BoI yesterday is devasting news, how do we all come to terms with what in Civi St would be classed as corporate man slaughter?
Mr Brownes apology and compensation can be stuck where the sun does not shine. Spend the money on new fuel system rubber seals, a proper maintenance policy and procedure or implementing any of the now eight reccommendations.

Someone needs to be made accountable! (I do understand we are all guilty re GDP % spend on defence, unfortunately I didnt understand the conseqeunces of my political apathy until it was too late)

Respect and thanks to the Canadians who were at the scene and the RAF Regiment who risked there own lives to get there, 50 mins in my mind was amazing.

The VOs have been wonderful, on call 24/7 always available, helpful - Also the techi types that helped explain the BoI need to be thanked, how they kept calm when most knew the crew well, is beyond me!

Keep safe all those still flying.

[Winco]

Archimedes

The reason why I have called for the resignation of these people is simply because they all knew about the fuel leaks and the escalating problems associated with AAR.

CAS and ACAS both knew of the problems concerning AAR and fuel leaks, (as did AOC 2 GP and Stn Cdr ISK). Any one of them could and should have said 'enough, we must fix this problem'

AOC 2Gp was DIRECTLY responsible (I am assured) for personaly authorising all AAR flights post XV230.

Stn Cdr ISK even commented on the problems and effectively 'forcast' further problems.

Couple all of that with the fact that they all knew about the BAe and QQ reports and I rest my case Sir.

This has been an unmitifgated disaster, both for the RAF, Aircrew and Groundcrew alike and more especially, for the families and friends of those lost. It is nothing short of a scandal that this occurred in the first place, and it is a greater scandal that no one yet appears to be carrying the can and doing the right and proper thing.

downsizer
I do not believe TD was refering to the groundcrew or the engineers at all. I'm pretty sure he was refering to those I mention above, and expecting them to make the correct decisions. Clearly they didn't, and the likes of TD and the other families are left behind to ponder 'what if'
I'm sure Graham himself will clarify for you exactloy what he was meaning.

The Winco

ps GAR
You forget to mention the billions of pounds that go in foreign aid each year to the likes of Sudan (the people that wanted to execute a teacher about a teddy bear called Muhammed, remember?) and all the asylum seekers, and the other 'worthy' causes.

[RedSquirrel83]

I'm sure Tappers Dad meant those in charge, the desk pilots, the people who ignored the 2004 incident recommendations, which second time around ended in tragedy, the budget holders who feel the risk to life was acceptable, no where was financial constraints mentioned in the BoI as a contributing factor?! Those on the ground who felt it was not worth spending time and money on an old plane soon to retire, fingers crossed let people risk their lives! The people with the power and budgets.

[RedSquirrel83]

Winco - 100% agree well said

[4mastacker]

Ebtb

In my book “accident waiting to happen” = “this was an accident that occurred due to a cumulative sequence of events”. Ever heard of the phrase “for want of a nail…etc”? Similar analogy in this case?

You are quite correct however, that I am a former Supplier who has no expertise in engineering or flying related tasks (unless I include my gliding and paragliding badges). I do not make comment on the engineering and flying disciplines unlike those who seek to make comment in the reverse direction. I’m not a lawyer either, so does that excuse me from sitting on a jury? No! It does not, but it does allow me to form my own opinion based on the evidence presented. Whether or not my own verdict agrees with the other eleven members of the jury is down to me! I expressed my opinion on what had preceded - if you had read the whole thread you will see two posts from me prior to the one which has so irritated you; one was a question I asked as a layman and one to acknowledge the reply from Tucumseh who had the good grace and manners not to be so dismissive of my post even though his private thoughts may have not been so kind.

Perhaps, from your lofty position above the mere mortals who inhabit this earth, you might find time to ponder on the words of Voltaire.

The BOI has delivered it’s findings, the Government has made it’s excuses and I am not making any more comment on this thread except to express my continuing sympathy to the families, relatives and friends of the fallen and congratulate them on their admirable dignity and fortitude since that awful day.

[Northern Circuit]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7128054.stm



"In an ideal world, the Nimrod would be grounded. But we don't live in an ideal world so the Nimrod will carry on flying."

Unbelievable Statement

NS

[Da4orce]

rock34

If as your post suggests you were part of the team that rushed to the scene then you are to be commended.

You and your colleagues actions ensured that, we the relatives, had the small consolation of being able to bury our dead. We all owe everybody involved in the recovery operation a debt of gratitude that we will never be able to repay.





Tappers brother.

[thunderbird7]

General allrounder said:
"The electorate sets the agenda on expenditure on the doorstep during elections. When voters start to ask politicians what they will do about the parlous state of the armed forces, then and only then will there be any more money. Until then the Treasury will put its money where the voters want it: Health, Education and Social Security."
Absoluteley bang on! This is the cause of this accident. The MR Force ( like the rest of the armed forces ) has always had a positive 'can-do' attitude. It has never been 'why can't we do this' but 'how are we going to do it with not enough crews and knackered jets!'
This has always been the case and with the exception of one excellent boss on 42, I can't ever remember squadrons saying 'no, sorry, we can't do that.' ( Cos it might affect my promotion if I say to 18Gp 'No', said the Wg Cdr ).
Unfortunately, their Airships don't seem to be able to draw a line in the sand - partly due to political manouevring and squabbling between the services for the limited pile of cash, I suspect. The message needs to start being forced back up the chain of command, loud and clear.
This tragic incident goes beyond the nitty gritty of how a Nimrod works. we can argue til we are blue in the face as to whether some sort of extinguisher in the bomb bay would have made any difference but where do you draw the line?
Its about time CDS realistically stated what can and cannot be achieved. Unfortunately, the armed forces have caught the disease of civvy street - performance targets, cost saving initiatives etc and it just doesn't work that way, especially when you are fighting 2 wars.

[Chugalug2]

EdSet100 wrote:
Chug,
Have a look at page 2-22 through to Page 2-24. BAe was involved in the hazard analysis. It wasn't a case of self-policing, as you seem to suggest. It would be very difficult to challenge your boss about a risk when the design authority backs him up with an "improbable" assessment.


There used to be an RAF retort of "Not me Chief, I'm airframes". It seems that is the line of your defence for the RAF, even the MOD. Flash news people: "Flight Safety concerns you!" Another old tag that seems to have gone the same way as the rest of the RAF as was. So the responsibility for Airworthiness does not reside with the owner/operator (MOD/RAF) but with the manufacturer (BAe)? Do you ever step back from this mad house and wonder what the hell is going on here? BAe, RAF, MOD are all either inappropriate or proven unworthy to exercise Airworthiness Authority over our military air fleets, ergo we need someone who is. The model is the CAA, the answer is an independent Military Airworthiness Authority!

[Da4orce]

This is the first battle in a long war for justice for Crew 3.

The people that failed in their responsibility to those 14 men know exactly who they are.

They have to live with the fact that their failings killed 14 good men. That must be unbearable.


It's no use saying, ''We are doing our best.'' You have got to succeed in doing what is necessary.
- Winston Churchill


The RAF/MOD did not succeed in doing what was necessary to prevent the deaths of Crew 3.

[DEL Mode]

Rant On

The MoD has a duty of care to its "employees" and those directly influenced by it's activities (civilians on the ground etc). Recent comment - Panel falls of AWACS, no risk to public, What ???????????? I would ask where is the duty of care?

Had the Nimrod incident happened in the UK I would expect the press and the public to be crying for blood. Because it happened on ops it is ok?

The current culture (probably should say policy) within UK Military Aviation is to drive out costs and manage the risks associate with an accident occurring. It is not as safe as civil aviation, policy dictates that the probability of catastrophic failure is lower than on a civil aircraft. SofS has demanded a review of the safety case for the Nimrod, AOC 2 has indicated that all of his fleets should be subject to similar reviews.

The airworthiness management chain in the UK MoD has BROKEN.

Groundcrew and aircrew have raised concerns about lean, and cost cuts.

Swiss Des needs to review the regulation of Military Aviation and start to realise that root and branch reform is needed. Military aircraft are highly complicated machines designed by people with tefal heads. How can an engineering officer really understand the implications of their decisions several years on? More to the point, where is the independence in the process to challenge their decisions.

TD's comments are 150% correct, the aircrew and groundcrew are being let down by the people on the ground - the policy makers who are doing the wrong thing in order to balance the books are letting them down.

Rant Off

Whoever the QC is that investigates the Safety Case needs to get lots of e-mails, calls, etc, asking them to look into the establishment of an independent Military Airworthiness Authority as part of the CAA. Implement Mil Part M and Mil Part 145 across all fleets and regulate it INDEPENDANTLY.

To avoid incoming, I have respect for the Engineering Branch, but suspect that the cost cutting mentality is driving them to overlook the consequences of their decisions. The risk of Corporate Manslaughter is a massive driver in making sure, as a civvie, that your engineering solution is robust. Make the wrong decision and you live with the consequences.

[charliegolf]

The General said:

The electorate sets the agenda on expenditure on the doorstep during elections

which I think is bollocks. No one has ever knocked my door, or asked me what the priorities are. The reason for that is, that I live in one of the (vast majority of) constituencies where Margaret Thatcher would win if she wore a red rosette, and said, "I'm Labour really".

They do what is cheap electorally, not what is right. End of.

CG

[Tappers Dad]

downsizer
In answer to your question "Do you mean Nimrod groundcrew and engineers".

Those that drafted the Safety Case
Those that failed to notify the Design Authority of MODs
Those that drafted the Nimrod Maintenance Policy
The lack of Fire suppression and detection equipment
Those who drafted the fuel system maintenance Policy
All those Bean Counters who knew about the leak problems on the ac and did nothing.

Oh yes and one gentleman who was asked in June 2007 prior to the recent Mayday by a Nimrod crew "A lot of people are concerned that air-to-air refuelling might have something to do with what happened at Kandahar. Are you satisfied that it's actually safe?"


SIR XXXX XXXXX "I am. It's exactly the same as the rest of the integrity of the aircraft. It has been a focus for understandable reasons and we did suspend air-to-air refuelling for a period in November. We looked at what we are doing. It is as safe as it needs to be."

We have to live with the knowledge our son was not killed by insurgents but by incompetence.

Those responsible for the failings reported in the BOI report will have to live with the knowledge that they contributed to the deaths of 14 good aviators .

Rest in peace now boys
Justice has been seen to be done, and retribution will surely follow.

[Mr Point]

Rock,

I totally agree that Skua's comments regarding the CSAR operation were at best naive.

When I read the BoI report last night, as well as thinking about the friends I lost last September, I was trying to picture the incredibly difficult task that RCD and then your (34 Sqn RAF Regt) Sqn faced. The CSAR response time was exceptionally fast and I believe that without such a reaction the BoI task would have been significantly more difficult.

Downsizer,

I think Graham was referring to facts such as, "NSC quotes the potential for fuel system leakage as Improbable", based on the mistaken idea that Zone 614 had fire detection and suppression systems. In addition, Nimrod IPT's decision not to follow the FRS manufacturer's recommendation to inspect the seals every 5 years as this would be impractical, leaves some serious questions to be answered. Who was overseeing the decision-making process?

[Vage Rot]

Yesterday at ISK we were told that flying the aircraft was a "Tolerable Risk". Tolerable for Whom?

I have always said the old girl was as safe as ever but I'm digging my way through the BOI report and would like to see the Safety Case before I decide whether to continue my career on the old lady. Whilst I am safe that the problems of XV230 have been mitigated (as I have said before) as best possible, what else is there that is known about but that we have not been told?

The Safety Case didn't exist in 2003 (when I was last at QQ). I can only guess that it's compilation by BAe was little more than a paperwork review of previous flight tests and the use of anecdotal evidence - ie it's been safe for 20 years so it's not going to hit us with any surprises now! I will know better when I track down the report and have a read.

For now, back to the BOI report with a highlighter - a long read!

[rock34]

Da4force, (edit for mongness)

Unfortunately i was there, i have several friends on the kipper fleet and was stunned when i found the wallet of one of my mates (although i can now chuckle at the 3 points and £60 fine he had on his driving licence in the wallet which he'd managed to keep quiet about!)

I'm glad you have some been able to find some consolation from our efforts - we are proud of what we did. Once we had returned to KAF and had a chat about it, not one of us said we would hesitate to do it again should the worst happen - we would want the same for us if we were in that position.


Gone but not forgotten,

Rock34

[nigegilb]

Westminster SNP Leader, Angus Robertson MP, whose Moray constituency is home to the Nimrod fleet at RAF Kinloss, has today (Monday) written to Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, to ensure that all questions about Nimrod safety are answered.

Twelve RAF personnel and two other servicemen were killed on 2 September 2006 when their Nimrod, call sign XV230, exploded shortly after mid-air refuelling.

Speaking about the Board of Inquiry and the unanswered questions Angus Robertson MP said:

“Everybody hopes that the inquiry will answer all of the relevant questions about the Nimrod which crashed in Afghanistan and help avoid a repeat of the tragedy.

“There are however, a host of unanswered questions about the safety of the ageing Nimrod fleet as a whole which the Ministry of Defence must answer.

“The MOD has to restore confidence in the wake of the tragedy and a series of safety incidents.

“I have sent Secretary of State Des Browne 15 key questions about Nimrod safety which must be answered if confidence is to be restored.”

ENDS

Contact SNP Westminster Press: 0207 219 0074

The 15 questions to Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne are as follows:

1) A BAe report in 2004 on the Nimrod MR2 fleet recommended the fitting of fire extinguishers in the bomb bay. Why was none ever fitted by the RAF despite this recommendation? Was cost saving the priority?

2) The BAe report also recommended that the RAF keep a watching brief on fuel tank protection directives in the commercial aviation sector. For the crew of XV230, a fuel tank protection system would have provided a second layer of defence from a fire on-board, potentially giving them the time to make an emergency landing. Why was this recommendation also apparently ignored - despite the fact that the RAF had already lost Hercules XV179 to a fuel tank explosion in January 2005?

3) The BAe report also highlighted the supply of hot air to the supplementary conditioning pack (SCP) as a cause for concern when it spoke of the risk of adjacent hot air pipes to fuel tanks as a source of ignition, following an incident in which this happened. Why - when stopping the use of the SCP was a no-cost safety measure - did the RAF do nothing until they lost a crew? Now, apparently, the SCP on the MR2 is no longer used - suggesting the RAF only heeded BAe's recommendation when it was too late.

4) After the more recent emergency landing by a Nimrod MR2 last month, when fuel started spraying into the bomb bay during air to air refuelling, the RAF was unable to replicate the fault on the ground - meaning that it was unable to fix it. Why was the fleet not grounded at this stage?

5) Were such faults to be discovered on a civil airliner, e.g. a lack of fire extinguishers, the fleet would be grounded. Why is it deemed acceptable for military crews to run avoidable risks on top of the major risks they already agree to run by serving on operations in a war zone? Is operational tempo driving this, and should the MoD still be allowed to regulate itself in terms of RAF aircrafts' exemption from current civil aviation standards?

6) The ageing Nimrod MR2, now 37 years old, was due to leave service a decade ago - why is its replacement, the Nimrod MRA4, not coming into service until 2011 at the earliest - was this an example of inadequate procurement? And is it deemed safe to fly the current ageing fleet in demanding and difficult conditions for another four years or is this a decision being driven by the need to save money?

7) Another maintenance report on the MR2 fleet, carried out by QinetiQ in March 2006, six months ahead of the loss of the XV230, highlighted the extent of fuel leaks on board the fleet - a known problem - and in particular on the six aircraft flying intensive schedules over Afghanistan and Iraq. The leaks, the document says, represented a "critical" structural problem - dating back at least ten years, along with problems with the seals and sealants on the pipework. The report said those leaks were made worse by air-to-air refuelling (AAR), something the Nimrod was not originally designed to do. Was this report ever acted on by the RAF and why was it deemed necessary to continue air to air refuelling, even though it was known to exacerbate the problem of fuel leaks?

(8) In Feb 2006, seven months before XV230 crashed in Afghanistan, the Government organisation QinetiQ were invited to Kinloss by the Nimrod IPT to carry out a survey of several aircraft and advise on the growing number of fuel leak problems in the Nimrod fleet. One of the aircraft involved in the survey was Nimrod XV230. In March 2006, QinetiQ produced a very detailed visit report which contained several recommendations. Can MoD advise as to which of these recommendations have been implemented, some 20 months after the report was issued? In particular the use of outdated servicing documents and tools, and the lack of shared data between civilian contractors at Kinloss with the IPT, MoD and BAE.

(9) Prior to going to the Gulf on 3rd August 2006, Nimrod XV230 underwent a new form of servicing, drawn up by the Nimrod IPT, known as equalised maintenance. The maintenance period lasted some eight weeks and was carried out by a civilian contractor at Kinloss. Prior to entering this planned maintenance programme the aircraft had just returned back from the Gulf and had nine reported fuel defects. After eight weeks on the ground the aircraft left the civilian contractor with seven of those defects unrectified. Can MoD advise why this was allowed to happen, considering that this was the first aircraft to undergo the new programme and should have been closely monitored by the IPT? Can MoD also confirm that the contract does call for a fully serviceable aircraft on completion of maintenance, or has this been missed from the contract?

(10) In August 2004, BAE Systems issued a Safety Case report covering fire/explosion hazards on Nimrod MR Mk2 and R Mk1 aircraft. The report recommended that the bomb bay fire suppression system fitted for extended range tankage role be utilised in normal operation. Failure to do so could result in an uncontrollable bomb bay fire to the point of leading to loss of an aircraft. This recommendation was rejected by MoD on the grounds that is was thought that such a system would be ineffective. Can MoD state whether this conclusion was arrived at following system trials, or was it simply arrived at through some form of paper exercise?

(11) The same report recommended that in the light of the TWA 800 in-flight fuel tank explosion, that fuel tank nitrogen inerting systems should be seriously considered for all new and in-service aircraft, to prevent the occurrence of an explosive vapour in a partially empty tank. Can MoD advise what steps have been taken that to accommodate this recommendation?

(12) It is understood that the Nimrod R Mk1 is to receive a new mission fit under "project Phoenix", this should extend its operational life to 2025. In view of the comments made in the QinetiQ report regarding possible corrosion in wing fuel tanks and the age of the aircraft, how does the MoD expect the Nimrod R airframe to last to 2025? The R and the MR are two different aircraft types, but the basic airframe/ fuel systems are the same.

(13) In a 2005 report into an incident involving a corroded super hot air pipe in the Supplementary Cooling Pack (SPC) of XV227 it was recommended that a survey was to be undertaken to determine what similar pipes (ducts) were in the same condition. It appears that it has taken two years to undertake such a survey on just two aircraft, and as yet no revised inspection programme has been initiated. At the time of XV230's accident the SPC was still being used, but was isolated on all Nimrod aircraft immediately afterwards. Can MoD advise as to who was responsible for making the decision to continue using the SPC after the XV227 accident, as clearly, from the actions taken later it was a high risk component?

(14) On the 5th Nov, this year, there was an fuel leak incident over Afghanistan involving XV235. Like many of the in-flight fuel leaks the incident happened after AAR, and AAR was suspended. In the past AAR has resumed after ground test and AAR procedures have been revised, clearly without getting to the real problem. Can MoD new procedures are now being considered by the IPT to get AAR operational, and how sure are they that they have got it right this time?

(15) AAR was introduced to the Nimrod during the Falklands dispute in order to get the aircraft from one theatre of operation to another, not to be used on a regular basis as it is being used today. Can MoD advise as to what changes were made to the Nimrod safety case for (a) using AAR for the Falklands, and (b) for today's regular use, overland?

[nigegilb]

Michael Smith, Defence Editor of the Sunday Times

It will be the anger of the families that grab the headlines over the Board of Inquiry report into last year's explosion of a Nimrod spy plane over Afghanistan, despite a concerted MoD attempt to defuse criticism that it sent 14 men to die in an aging aircraft. The families' anger is entirely justified.

Nimrod XV230 had just finished refuelling on September 2, 2006, when the pilot reported a fire in the bomb bay. He put out a mayday call and attempted to land at Kandahar air base but the No 7 fuel tank at the base of the starboard wing exploded and the aircraft fell apart.

It has always been suspected that the air-to-air refuelling system on the Nimrod MR2 was at the heart of the disaster that killed the crew of Nimrod XV230.

It was a quick fix solution fitted during the 1982 Falklands Conflict to get the aircraft to the south Atlantic to track the Argentine Navy and was never designed to be used in the intensive way in which it was used for aircraft flying over Afghanistan.

Using the system in this way had led to numerous leaks, not just of small amounts of fuel but of very large amounts, in one case close to 1,000 gallons. It was no surprise when the board of inquiry confirmed that it was to blame for the leaking fuel.

Excess pressure on the air-to-air refuelling system forced fuel to leak out either from the piping or the top of one of the tanks and flow into an empty area between the bomb bay and the No 7 fuel tank at the root of the starboard wing.

The source of ignition was also not a surprise. The board of inquiry pointed to the supplementary cooling pipe (SCP), a hot air pipe running between the bomb bay and the No 7 tank.

However the way in which the fuel caught fire was a shock. It had been believed until now that the hot air pipe must have fractured pouring out hot air at around 400 degrees Celsius - way above the spontaneous ignition point of the aircraft's Avtur fuel - and that this started the fire that destroyed XV230. The fire boiled the fuel in the No 7 tank until it exploded bringing down the aircraft.

But the board of inquiry found that part of the piping in the area next to the No 7 fuel tank on the Nimrod aircraft has no insulation on it. Fuel collecting on this pipe would have ignited in less than a minute.

This was on an aircraft which - given its age - was regularly monitored for safety and which was known to be prone to leakages of fuel. In the circumstances, it is a miracle that fuel had not come into contact with the pipe before.

Small wonder then that both Des Browne, the defence secretary, and the Chief of Air Staff Air Vice Marshal Glenn Torpy were quick to apologise profoundly to the families of those killed. That and the MoD's uncharacteristic rush to promise extensive compensation to the families were part of the MoD's damage limitation exercise, as was the announcement of a further, more extensive, inquiry by a senior Queen's Counsel barrister.

That of course neatly stops them having to answer any questions about the copious warnings that the RAF and the MoD received about the need to deal with the increasing dangers posed by continuing to fly the Nimrod MR2 on way beyond it's originally planned out-of-service date.

The questions the inquiry will need to answer, and which did not fall within the board of inquiry's remit, are:

— Why when a BAE Systems report warned as far back as August 2004 that there had been 880 fires or smoke-related incidents on board the Nimrod in just 22 years and that the SCP hot air pipe was too close to key areas of the fuel system, it was not taken out of use?

— Why it was not taken out of use in November 2004, when the pipe did fracture, pouring hot air onto the No 7 fuel tank?

— Why it was not taken out of use in September 2005, when the station commander at RAF Kinloss, the Nimrod's home base, warned that given the aircraft's age it was likely to happen again?

— Why when defence consultants QinetiQ expressed concern, just six months before the explosion, that leaks caused by the air-to-air refuelling system could not be replicated and were going unfixed, did the senior RAF officers overseeing the Nimrod fleet not suspend mid-air refuelling?

Indeed why was it only suspended last month, when another Nimrod suffered a major fuel leak during mid-air refuelling, put out a mayday distress call and made a thankfully successful emergency landing at Kandahar air base?

There has been much talk about the cost-cutting that delayed the aircraft's replacement until 2010, a date that is 15 years after its original out-of-service date. But stopping air-to-air refuelling and taking the SCP hot pipe out of use, both of which have now had to be done, cost not a single penny.

HAVE YOUR SAY
So it's official - 14 British servicemen unlawfully killed by our own government - sent into action in full knowledge of an avoidable risk. Not just content with these fourteen but an additional crew were subsequently sent into exactly the same scenario. Surely the families will not allow themselves to be bought off by taxpayers compensation. This government must surely answer fourteen court actions from fourteen bereaved families of fourteen incredibly brave young men.
Graham Tapper, Kenton, Devon, UK
Let's be clear - air-to-air refuelling has only stopped temporarily due to the latest incident not because of the Board of Enquiry report and this would be standard procedure anywhere. There is of course always a cost even if not in monetary terms. If the Nimrod can't stay on task for the required length of time in a hostile environment then the troops on the ground that rely on them are potentially at higher risk. It is very easy for the press to jump onto the proverbial bandwagon without having any expert knowledge and this saddens me and deeply affects morale of the aircrew still flying this aircraft with the utmost professionalism and dedication. My own husband and father to my baby is one of them.
Helen Crowley, Elgin, Moray

[Gainesy]

I am puzzled by the assertion in the report that it is not feasible to carry crew parachutes in the Nimrod because of a lack of space. Surely there is plenty of room?

Whether or not Crew 3 would have actually used them, given that they (I assume, though they had no option) thought an emergency landing at Kandahar was attainable, or that bailing out over hostile territory is another consideration entirely, the non-provision of crew escape means on non-pax aircraft going into harm's way smacks to me of the former V-Force arguments for not fitting rear-crew ejection seats.

Riding a burning jet down should not be the only option.

[Da4orce]

Angus Robertson MP :D

[Mr Point]

Nige,

The Board DID make reference to a fuel tank fire suppression system but concluded that this would not have saved the aircraft. They also believe that if the risk assessment of the No. 7 tank dry bay had been conducted accurately, that measured may have been taken to reduce the severity of a fire in this zone.

I was very cynical prior to the BoI release, but I believe (having read the entire report) that the report is as thorough as possible within their TORs.

Had a fire warning and suppression system been fitted in the dry tank bay, with the inclusion of fire retardant paint, the crew MAY have had precious minutes to reach Kandahar.

[nigegilb]

MrP any chance you could post the relevant passage.

Is the BoI Report implying that now the likely ignition source has been removed there is no requirement for fuel tank protection?

The likely source of ignition may have been removed but the fuel leaks keep occurring.

[RAF_Techie101]

The 7 tank Dry Bay does have firewire running through it, as part of the bomb bay firewire system - hence why the bomb bay fire warning went off.

For the record, this part of the aircraft design goes back to the original build, ie Hawker Siddely. I appreciate they were one of the founding companies OF British Aerospace, so is rather a moot point. However, just for accuracy...

[CaptainFillosan]

That and the MoD's uncharacteristic rush to promise extensive compensation to the families were part of the MoD's damage limitation exercise, as was the announcement of a further, more extensive, inquiry by a senior Queen's Counsel barrister.


Well heaven forbid that they don't use their magic ladder of compensation levels and drop themselves right it in it - again!

£1m each, at least. That's £14m total for the loss of some of the best talent the RAF had. People who would have provided their families with all they wanted when they left or retired.

It is an amount that would certainly have been well spent on the issues that were screaming to be addressed. Then the MoD and their pathetic masters might not have been in the position of paying compensation.

Now they must pay, generously and quickly. No if's and no but's - the tragedy has cost much grief and the MoD must do the decent thing.

The magnitude of this loss is incalculable.

Do it NOW!

[Mr Point]

Nige,

Sorry for the delay, it has just taken me an hour to find the reference again:

BoI Para 43 (page 2-39)

Moreover, the expert also states that neither explosive suppressive foam nor nitrogen inerting would have prevented the fire developing, or the boiling of fuel in the No 7 tank, or the subsequent explosion.

Vage,

I share your views. I was concerned before the report was published, but now I am very worried about flying in the aircraft.

[nigegilb]

Captain F, I am left scratching my head. Whilst I welcome the unprecedented grovelling apologies on offer from military "leaders" and politicians, I feel the BoI has singularly failed to explain why the RAF was so hopelessly incompetent in the run up to this crash. And has failed to explain the complacency of a smug MoD in batting away warnings my 7 year old daughter could have worked out. Sir Glenn Torpy presides over an organisation whose military airworthiness is not fit for purpose and cannot hide behind loss of resource for throwing the lives of 14 brave men away.

So why does he not accept responsibility and resign?

Surely, the setting up of one possibly two inquiries will simply kick these immensely important questions into the long grass and at the same time remove the requirement for anyone to immediately resign?

I further doubt if Labour will still be in Govt by the time a Public Inquiry has been held.

Furthermore the offer of compensation might just prevent a damaging court case where the charge of gross negligence/corporate manslaughter can be heard?

Meanwhile, the additional time delays mean that crews will continue to be sent up there without fuel tank protection should another fuel leak reach a different source of ignition.

This is damage limitation, nothing more.

[MightyHunter AGE]

Direct quote from THETIMES page 9 dated today (Dec 5)

Quote 'Mr Knight, 55, from Bridgewater in Somerset said, 'I am stunned by the report. This proves there was a catalogue of failures from shoddy maintenance to the use of air-to-air refuelling' Unquote

Oh really?

And after all the 'dont be so sensitive no-one is blaming the ground crew'.

[Safety_Helmut]

I have now read the majority of the BOI Report. It paints a picture of an organisation in disarray. I have said in several posts before on various threads that the MoD's management and assurance of safety and airworthiness is in a shambles. The Report confirms this. It also confirms that there have been several indicators which gave forewarning of this type of accident on this aircraft.

The MoD, the IPTs and the RAF are all culpable in this. There are individuals within the IPTs and the Support Groups who are culpable, they should know who they are, but actually many of them are/were not competent to hold their positions. Look at the leadership and the expertise within what was ADRP. It is simply not competent. Look at the DASC, and its Aviation Safety Review Team. The resources they had meant that each aircraft would be reviewed every 10 to 15 years. If they hadn't disbanded the team of course.


The situation is not restricted to the Nimrod IPT. The majority of the in-service aircraft IPTs had Safety Cases that would not pass scrutiny. In fact there is no formal system for scrutinising the Safety Cases of current aircraft, it is done an ad hoc basis. I know, I have read many of those Safety Cases, they were in many cases not worth the paper they were printed on. Look at the Harrier IPT, they had no Safety Case at all for quite some time. Ask a previous Harrier IPT Leader about his attitude to the Safety Case.

It is now time to seriously ask the question as to whether the MoD is fit to self regulate ? It is time to ask ourselves the unthinkable, are MoD aircraft fit (demonstrably safe and airworthy) to fly in non-segregated airspace. Have a look at the Secretary of State's policy statement on safety, look at the definition of airworthiness. The answer I would give, is that in this current state, and until proven otherwise - No !

S_H

[Wader2]

Direct quote from THETIMES page 9 dated today (Dec 5)

Quote 'Mr Knight, 55, from Bridgewater in Somerset said, .

MH AGE, I do not know what TD said, but I do know enough that a quote in a paper, even as reputable as the Times, and what someone actually said are not necessarily the same.

Also a verbal quote may not be phrased in as an exact way as a written statement.

Words such as 'policy', 'documentation', 'funding', 'resourcing' and so on might have been omitted.

[airsound]

Nige, it was kind of you not to mention that it was I who told you that there were no recommendations about fuel tank protection! It is, in fact, true that there were no recommendations, because, as Mr P's quote says, the Board's unnamed expert asserted that protection would not have prevented the explosion of tank 7. Also, that meant that, as far as I know, the subject was not mentioned at the brief - and questions afterwards were severely time-limited.

Without having expert knowledge of the dynamics of fuel explosions, I could see why the 'expert' might have said that - since this was not a case where the explosion resulted from something started within the tank, but as a result of gross overheating from outside the tank.

It was clever of Mr P to find the reference - there are 156 pages of the report, not all of them very easy reading! But should you want to check it out yourself
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoiNimrodMr2Xv230.htm

Finally, just to complete Mr P's quote, it comes in a paragraph titled
Lack of Fire Detection in No 7 Tank Dry Bay
and the sentence after Mr P's quote (the final sentence of the para) reads
The Board believes that the lack of a fire detection and suppression system within the N0 7 tank dry bay was a Contributory Factor in the loss of XV230.

airsound

[Mr Point]

RAF_Techie101,

I know that the bomb bay firewire runs through the No 7 tank dry bay but this is not dedicated fire warning for the dry bay itself. A bomb bay fire warning, by definition, indicates a bomb bay fire. Had the crew member on the periscope not seen fire, and with no other indications, the crew would have believed the warning to be spurious (albeit unusual).

A dedicated dry bay smoke detection system would give a quicker warning to the crew, buying precious seconds. The potential down side is that, unlike the underfloor bays, the area could not be viewed for confirmation.

[spanners123]

Gainesy (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=8235),
It it simply not practical to jump out of a Nimrod with a parachute, I was speaking to a current Nimrod pilot today about this subject, he stated, correctly imho, that if you did jump from a Nimrod, you would be in severe danger of getting ingested by the engines or striking the tail plane.
I must say though, there is plenty of space to store them onboard.

[kokpit]

Not directly related to this incident, but certainly pertinent to the theme………why do UK Mil aircraft not have to have the same number of fire extinguishant bottles as the aircraft has engines?

I believe civilian regs require one per engine, but that’s certainly not the case with the Hercules, at just 2. Furthermore, when the C-130J was procured, why was the opportunity not taken to fit another 2 in the stbd side? Why would you NOT want more protection, in the case of the C-130, a relatively cheap and simple mod I would suggest.

Not sure how this equates to the Nimrod, but I fail to understand the apparent disparity between civil and military requirements.

Regards,

Kokpit.

[Chugalug2]

I fail to understand the apparent disparity between civil and military requirements.
Well you and me both kokpit, though APS weight versus payload might be an issue, and as ever cost. I remember a proposed civil Herc operation in the early 70s for delivering RR RB211 engines to Lockheed being shelved because the civil Hercs could not meet BCARs. Various reasons quoted including exposed flying control runs in the roof. No idea if the civil Herc also had the Extinguisher system as fitted to military Hercs and no idea why that should be as it is. One presumes that the military Herc meets US military standards, which in turn are accepted by the MOD. To be honest I don't think that is the issue here, for whatever MOD Airworthiness Requirements might be, the scandal is that they have not been enforced. The MAA that is being called for would not enforce civil standards per se, but military ones that were traditionally enforced by the MOD, a long long time ago it would seem!

[PingDit]

Kokpit,

I believe you are refering to engine fire extinguishers. The Nimrod does indeed have adequate extinguishers for the number of engines. The extinguishers being refered to regarding the bomb bay, is the large CO2 bottle carried on board which can be manually routed to either the elevator, aileron or bomb bays in an emergency.

Ping

[spanners123]

PingDit,
It can not be directed to the bomb bay!:=

[RAF_Techie101]

For information's sake, there are 8 engine fire bottles on the Nimrod.

[camelspyyder]

TD

Is there any chance of a public apology to NLS over your "Shoddy Maintenance" quote?:=

I know it has upset the Nimrod groundcrew greatly, since :

a. It simply is not true, and

b. Was not in any way a quote from the BOI report, which I have read in full on Tuesday.

If you were misquoted by The Times, I will redirect this request to them.

CS

[EdSet100]

Mr Point

I know that the bomb bay firewire runs through the No 7 tank dry bay but this is not dedicated fire warning for the dry bay itself. A bomb bay fire warning, by definition, indicates a bomb bay fire. Had the crew member on the periscope not seen fire, and with no other indications, the crew would have believed the warning to be spurious (albeit unusual).

A dedicated dry bay smoke detection system would give a quicker warning to the crew, buying precious seconds. The potential down side is that, unlike the underfloor bays, the area could not be viewed for confirmation.

2 "points" for you:

1. Regardless of what the periscope might have revealed, the crew would still have done the drill, which includes switching off the air passing through that hot pipe. However, as the BOI report has stated, the fire became self-propagating very quickly, so the drill would not have achieved anything, except to possibly indicate a hopeless situation.

2. A smoke detector, as part of a fire protection system, would not have been fitted in the 7 Tank dry bay. Leaking Avtur would be the identified hazard, so a flame detector or firewire would be the mitigating control. Anyway, whatever would have been fitted, the crew would do the drill and operate the extinguishant, in all circumstances. A viewer would not be needed for confirmation before operating the extinguishant.

Regards
Ed Set

[kokpit]

Ping,
Sorry if I didn't make myself clear, I was indeed talking about engine fire suppresion systems, and fully appreciated that this didn't apply to the Nimrod incident.
I just wondered if it was a pertinent example of how the MoD might view safety (with respect to the C-130 at least) as opposed to how a civil operator / regulator might have done.

[davejb]

[QUOTE I was speaking to a current Nimrod pilot today about this subject, he stated, correctly imho, that if you did jump from a Nimrod, you would be in severe danger of getting ingested by the engines or striking the tail plane.[/QUOTE]

I'd accept a 'sever danger' in preference to riding a wingless aircraft from X thousand feet. It would be very difficult in many situations, no doubt about that, to complete a safe escape - but it's not as if you have a more pressing item to sort out at the time, is it?

Back in the late 70's/(very) early 80's I seem to recall being told that there'd been some handling problems on the soon to arrive MR2. The little winglet doodads on the tail were, I think, the answer to that issue - at the time the infamous 'somebody' told me that the trials crew had been provided with parachutes while that got sorted out....dunno if there's any truth to that, quite possibly just a silly story at the time.

Ultimately what is the cost of it? If the difficulties of escape mean that a single person survives and the other dozen don't, isn't that still worth doing?

Personally I think it's simply discounted by most people because for the greatest part of the aircraft's history it flew far out to sea - survival without the aircraft dinghies at 56N 20W means there's little point surviving the parachute jump.... we simply got used to figuring there's no point having a chute. (Especially in winter, and flying at MOA).

[spanners123]

camelspyyder,
Well said sir!:D

[EdSet100]

Chugalug and Kokpit,

I fail to understand the apparent disparity between civil and military requirements

My guess is that it gives the military the freedom to react to military needs. Op Corporate is a classic case of needs must regarding the AAR mod to a number of aircraft types. Right now, military jets are getting modified to deal with military need. We don't have the resources, mostly time (not money) to install safety systems.

However, once the dust has settled or when operating in a civilian environment, a more regulatory framework has to be imposed, which brings me to my reply to Chug about "nothing to do with me". I never said that the MOD/RAF are blameless. BAe are also in the queue to see the QC. Chug, you missed the point (because you were not at a briefing today): 3 separate agencies signed up to the NSC, including a purely independent civilian company. So, even with an MAA overseeing military safety, people make mistakes, regardless of the name above their door.

Regards
Ed Set

[WasNaeMe]

Back in the early 00's I can confirm that the trials crew are provided with parachutes for high risk flights (where there may be some handling problems on the soon to arrive MRA4). The little winglet doodads on the tail are, & I know, a wee bit bigger than on the MR2. So says an infamous 'somebody'. Not just a silly story at the time.

[PingDit]

Spanners,

Sorry mate, I meant Hydraulic bay - getting old/brain cells etc!:bored:

ping

[Mr Point]

Ed Set,

I think you have taken my comments out of context. They were directed in response to RAF_Techie101's comments that the No 7 tank dry bay has fire wire.

As a Nimrod crew member I am fully aware of the drills and the significance of the fire spreading to the underfloor bays and bomb bay. I was stating that firewire in the No 7 tank dry bay is NOT sufficient. This WAS clearly indicated in the BoI report.

[tucumseh]

To those who are asking, nay demanding, that Tapper’s Dad explain himself over his use of the term “maintenance”;


1. I suspect he is feeling quite worn out by the events of the past year, which have culminated in a singularly successful campaign despite the odium he has occasionally faced. A year ago he buried a son, which is life’s greatest tragedy. He has, or should have, earned the everlasting respect of everyone remotely concerned with Defence aviation for taking on the might of the MoD and bringing it to its knees. The admission that the MoD’s airworthiness processes, procedures and regulations are not IMPLEMENTED properly is a triumph. While this has been known for nearly 20 years, and was denied as recently as last week, the lies have been exposed.

2. As to the maintenance issue, by now it should be clear to anyone who reads and understands this thread that the term in this context refers to ALL technical, administrative, managerial and supervisory actions supporting the objective to retain or restore an item so that it is fit for purpose. You may argue semantics, but this holistic view is the one you should take. The BAeS and QinetiQ reports make it crystal clear that the MoD has failed in this DUTY at all levels. The Board of Inquiry report and especially the reviewing officers (with the notable exception of a former Director/Maritime and Nimrod MRA4 IPT Leader – I wonder why) have agreed.


In short, Tapper’s Dad is absolutely correct, and has been all along. Leave him in peace to recharge batteries for the next ordeal; the inquest. And be grateful that this momentous first step has been taken and Military Airworthiness is on the way to a resurrection. But there is still a lot to do.

[WasNaeMe]

Well said..
To others, a bit of latitude may I suggest. TD is not an engineer, but some-one who has struggled with the language of our world/industry since that fateful day in 2006.

[enginesuck]

Back in the late 70's/(very) early 80's I seem to recall being told that there'd been some handling problems on the soon to arrive MR2. The little winglet doodads on the tail were, I think, the answer to that issue - at the time the infamous 'somebody' told me that the trials crew had been provided with parachutes while that got sorted out....dunno if there's any truth to that, quite possibly just a silly story at the time.

The "winglet doodads" as you so eloquently put them were installed to counteract the aerodynamic forces of the AAR probe.

[Pontius Navigator]

Initially Nimrod used to wander around the longitudinal axis by almost 2 deg during an astro shot. Compared with the 0.1 degree wander in a Vulcan the Nimrod was a pig.

I believe the initial mod to increase the stability was to fit VHF aerials on the tail. Later, when the mod was formalised, the larger purpose designed strakes were fitted.

As for timinng, the strakes were fitted well after it was introduced into service and only as part of the Op Corporate AAR Mods in 1982.

[Chugalug2]

Well said tuc, I can only say "here, here" to your praise of TD. Despite the findings of the BOI, despite the admissions of the CinC, despite the SoS apologising for the MOD AND THE RAF in their failure to ensure the Airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet, some still see fit to snipe at him as an interfering civilian who knows little or nothing. Shame on them and well done TD for you have done a great service to your country, which is more than can be said for the higher echelons of the RAF and the MOD. The CAS is responsible for the scandal that is the RAF's aircraft airworthiness state. He could, and should, have resigned in protest at the savage cuts that undermined this central core of RAF effectiveness. He chose to stay, now he must go in ignominy.

EdSet100, you say that I have missed the point. With respect it is you who seem to have done so. The arrangement whereby many agencies with many acronyms share out responsibilities so that everyone is responsible, but in effect no-one is, is the very reason it must be scrapped. You say that the situation would be the same under a unity authority. When did the CAA last preside over a failure of this magnitude? It's game over I'm glad to say for MOD and chums, and time for the professionals to take over.

[nigegilb]

Just to pick up on Chug's point. I have spoken with serving Nimrod crew tonight and concern is being expressed by the fact that many of the really tough issues unearthed by the Nimrod BoI have merely been booted into the long grass. The crew I talked with are still very concerned about the airworthiness of this aircraft. In particular the use of Tank 7.

The argument for bringing Tank 7 back into use and the way it will be used has been far from convincing.

What has actually been achieved here? Missions continue. Problems concerned with not being able to use SCP continue. The BoI was far from definite about the source of the fuel leak, and the single wall pipework is still there.

The one thing that was clear from my conversations was the complete absence of leadership in the RAF, but an awful lot of arrse covering.
Here is a link to how Airbus have approached Tank Safety in in order to comply with JAR directives.

http://www.content.airbusworld.com/SITES/Customer_services/html/acrobat/fast_33_p23_33igintion.pdf

Unlike Dreamliner, A380 is not using Inerting equipment but has gone for even more built in design safety.

"Airbus will demonstrate that the ignition source prevention features are sufficient, in and of themselves, to meet the aircraft safety objectives considering a permanent flammable fuel tank environment," EASA declares. "Airbus will further demonstrate through its flammability assessment that it has further upgraded its safety level by implementing design features, which minimize heat transfers to the fuel tanks, avoiding unnecessary increases in the fuel tank flammability."

There is no center wing tank on the A380, although one could be fitted on subsequent models of the aircraft (e.g., the 800-passenger version). Moreover, the air conditioning packs on the A380 are located on the forward side of the front wing spars, with insulation. Thus located, they are not directly under any fuel tanks, which is the case on the B747 and the B737; these models have experienced three fuel tank explosions in recent years - TWA 800 involving a B747, a Philippine Air Lines (PAL) B737 at Manila, and a Thai International Airways (THA) B737 at Bangkok. All three sustained explosions of the center wing tanks.

"The A380 air conditioning packs are in the 'shoulder' of the wing," the NTSB official conceded, but on a hot day on the ground, as was the case in the Philippine Air Lines and Thai Airways explosions, the airplanes didn't have the benefit of airflow to dissipate the heat of the packs, and this also would be the case with the A380 on a hot day.

The safety board registered its objections to EASA, which rebuffed the complaints. The Europeans seem bent on issuing special conditions for the A380 that focus on three sources of ignition, and the need to minimize them: electrical arcs, friction sparks resulting from mechanical contact of rotating equipment in the fuel tank, and hot surface ignition. "The applicant should perform a Safety Assessment of the fuel system showing that the presence of an ignition source within the fuel system is Extremely Improbable [that is, 1 x 10- 9, or one in a billion flight hours] and does not result from a single failure," the EASA said.

Airbus must account for a variety of fuel pump failure modes that can cause ignition (e.g., debris lodged inside pumps, poor bonding of components to structure, etc.). It's generally conceded that a pump immersed in fuel cannot cause ignition due to any failures. Indeed, that is why so many airworthiness directives (ADs) have been issued limiting the running of in-tank pumps to a certain minimum fuel level. This ensures that fuel levels in heated tanks (those with air conditioning packs located below) with flammable ullage would never drop to a level where fuel pumps would not be immersed - no matter what the aircraft's pitch, roll or yaw attitude. Yet, knowing this, Airbus apparently is not being required to locate fuel pumps outside the fuel tanks, where they would never be "not immersed" nor exposed to in-tank heated ullage. This logical avoidance step would also allow high voltage/high current pump wiring to remain outside of the tank.

Regarding specific FAA and NTSB objections to its special conditions, EASA was pretty clear in its view:

FAA: "Flammable conditions within the [Thai and Philippines jets] would have been reached in flight after these airplanes began to climb, even if the tank had not been heated."

[The Swinging Monkey]

Well said Tuc, concur 100%.

[davejb]

Strakes copied - actually found a scrapbook with a photo I took of a pre-AAR MR2 on the Wideawake pan sans strakes, and a news cutting about the new AAR mod ... increased fin area and yaw damper mod also mentioned. I'd still vote for anything that might increase the survival options for the crews, the aircraft was never designed to operate in a high threat environment - stay safe guys.

[BEagle]

nigeglib, I was at an Airbus meeting earlier this year; the fuel system specialists were discussing potential modifications to a system - and they raised the topic of the Nimrod's single wall AAR plumbing.

They were aghast that such a lash up introduced 25 years ago was still flying in this hard-worked aircraft. It would never be accepted in any Airbus aircraft, they commented.

Tuc - I totally agree with all you have said and echo your sentiments regarding the painstaking efforts of Tapper'sDad.

[nigegilb]

MoD line on dual wall pipework is that it is more difficult to replace seals and more difficult to find the source of leaks.

SFAR 88
Airworthiness Notice 55 issued by the CAA and EASA

Bottom line (one of them)is that on modified fuel systems a lot of work / rework needs to be carried out with regards to reducing risk of fire / explosion. This is not only on old Aircraft, 4 year old BBJ are being modified IAW the directive. Operators that do not comply will have to have the Aux fuel system made inoperable.

Part of this mod is to install "dual wall" fuel pipes. At present, it is
allowable to shroud a standard rigid pipe with a larger flexible hose
type assembly, with a gland drain that can indentify the source of a
leak to within a certain distance. The hose will go.

Lord knows what the CAA would do with AAR capable airliners.

Beags do you have any gen on the AAR pipework on FSTA?

[BEagle]

nigeglib - I know little about FSTA; however, I understand that it will have neither a probe nor a 'receptacle'.

The fuel system needs little, if any, modification and the pods are fitted on the A340 engine hardpoints, with associated fuel supply.

[Mightycrewseven]

Nigeglib

I don't know how u got the questions from Mr Robertson, but I'm not sure if u or he is aware that his Q12 is factually incorrect, therefore unlikely to be answered.

Project PHOENIX has nothing to do with the Nimrod R1. I shall not comment further on this.

Regards

M7 :(

[RAF_Techie101]

I suspect he means Project HELIX, well published on the net. But I suppose you get what you ask for...

[EdSet100]

Chug,

You say that the situation would be the same under a unity authority.

No, I don't think I miss the point. Firstly, the MOD is not obliged, under law, to promulgate Safety Cases. However, because it is a good idea, we have done so. Unfortunately, the individuals involved this catalogue of errors, got it so wrong in the case of Zone 617. It doesn't matter how you dress it up, but human error in any single organisation (CAA?) is still human error. That same person would make the same mistake if he/she was working for RAF/MOD/QQ/BAe/CAA or Fred Carnos Flying Circus.

The creation of a single MAA does not stop human errors.

The NSC was not flawed in its structure which, I am confident, would mirror any structure imposed by any suggested MAA. The NSC was flawed in its judgement, which was based on poor information supplied to it. So, if the supplier of the information (BAe or IPT) is going to be the same organisation, regardless of the who does the analysis, the judgement is doomed to fail.

[Magnersdrinker]

Well said DeepGE, I totally 100% agree, People who have no idea how to operate the Nimrod are the ones that are informing the press how things are done yet nobody from the users of this aircraft can defend the aircraft, it would be nice of a few of the senior non commisioned engineers had the chance to answer some of the questions that people are concerened about rather than speculative conjuncture that appears on the net from so called ex groundcrew,serving senior officers etc etc. For many that are going to the press especially as of late saying this and that , its just pissing off the people who have to maintain Nimrod but most importantly the Guys Who Fly. They are the ones that need our 100% confidence and only crap posted in the Times about shoddy maintenance is not going to help one bit.

[spanners123]

Magnersdrinker,
from day 1 of this thread, people (experts??, maybe 20 years ago!) have been speculating about the cause of the tragic loss of 30 (Bomb bay fire suppression, fuel seeps on wings etc).
We know that aircrew/groundcrew have much respect for each other and that we are all 100% confident that every thing we do, is done 100% correctly!:ok:

[Mr Point]

DeepGE,

If it makes you feel any better, as aircrew my eyes roll uncontrollably when the name "Jimmy Jones" is mentioned. To have any credibility I believe you need to be current, or very recently current, on type as aircrew or groundcrew when commenting on aircraft specific technical issues.

That said, if flight safety is everyone's responsibility, then anyone should be free to say their piece.

[Magnersdrinker]

Jimmy Jones , I thought he played for Scotland in defence in the 60s

To me there was only 1 Nimrod pilot god and that was Big Vern, wherever he may be now please come back

[spanners123]

The trouble is, imho, is that Jimmy Jones is treated as a credible source by the folk that read the papers, watch the news etc.
Maybe he would like to visit ISK in the near future, for an update on current practices!

[Chugalug2]

Firstly, the MOD is not obliged, under law, to promulgate Safety Cases.
EdSet100, if an MAA is created to regulate UK Military Airworthiness then the MOD will be obliged, under law, to abide by its regulations. Anything less would make a mockery of the system and reduce us to the present situation. No doubt the many challenges of allowing operational commanders the tactical freedoms required by military aviation would be accommodated, but the freedom to skimp on Flight Safety funding in order to bung more money into schools and hospitals in Government marginals would be denied the SoS and his little helpers. Of course mistakes will still be made under an MAA, there will still be incidents and worse still, accidents, but with proper enforcement of Airworthiness Standards they should be fewer, with fewer casualties. The problem here is much greater than the tragedy of XV230, awful though that is, it is the destruction of the MOD based military airworthiness system. It is now just smoke and mirrors, it looks as though it is there, but it isn't, only a mirage. Everybody seems to be angry about this and for good reason, this tragedy and other recent ones were avoidable accidents. The anger of the families is palpable and justified. The anger of the guys and girls who operate and maintain the Nimrod, putting their heart and soul into its vital work, risking their lives on our behalf, only to feel overlooked by the external media hype about 'shortcomings' is natural. Both parties have been betrayed, not by the media, not by the ancient warriors (even those like me who were never on the fleet). They have been betrayed by a system that is rotten to the core. Purporting to be able to ensure the provision of Military Airworthiness it instead ensures the most dangerous commodity of all in aviation; false hope. All the titles, all the processes, all the meetings are in vain because it does not deliver the finished product, airworthy fleets. The cold cynicism with which this farrago has been perpetrated by the MOD is an indictment of the RAF's high command. Having, one hopes, fought and lost the battle to fund airworthiness, they did not do what men of honour should do, resign. Instead they clung to their jobs, their honours, their sinecure futures. Now they must leave under a shadow that they have cast themselves and good riddance, for theirs is the greatest betrayal of all, they have betrayed their own service and the loyal dedicated men and women who serve it!

[Chugalug2]

DGE I admire your loyalty which is, I'm sure, shared by most who still serve. It is not pleasant to be calling for heads in a service that I had the honour and pleasure to serve in. The RAF is in a major crisis, all the cuts, amalgamations, reorganisations, and ever more and more cuts has brought it to crisis point. It now teeters on extinction as surely as it did in Trenchard's day. He managed to keep it independent and alive in the midst of massive cutbacks. The RAF desperately needs another Trenchard. The present incumbents have shown themselves weak and ineffective. Of course this scenario was laid before they took their present posts, but it has worsened immeasurably in their tenure. They really have to go. A massive challenge awaits their successors. Military airfleets must regain their airworthiness, cuts in units and squadrons must be reversed to ensure that operational capability is not lost forever. Civilianisation of man management must be reversed, and the powers of subordinate commanders reinstated. The RAF is a fighting force, designed to go to war, to fight, and sadly at times die. It is not the uniformed branch of M&S, and no matter how worthy that plc might be, never should be. What can be learned however from 'in your face company men' is that when bidden by an independent CAA, they operate airworthy aircraft, the MOD does not.

[Fareastdriver]

Slightly off the thread but a comment on world communication.
Sitting in a bar yesterday, at 19.00 hrs Beijing time, in Shekou, Peoples Repubic of China, a chap comes up and and says.
"You're ex RAF, you might be interested in this."
With that he gave me a 10cm thick wad of A4, a copy of the proceedings of the Board if Inquiry.

[tucumseh]

"It doesn't matter how you dress it up, but human error in any single organisation (CAA?) is still human error".

True. And "an error does not become a mistake unless you refuse to fix it". (JFK)

The MoD refused. That is what this thread is about. In the CERTAIN knowledge their actions would lead to the decline in safety and airworthiness standards, the MoD refused to implement its own mandated regulations. This was NOT an omission by error; it was a deliberate decision.

This corporate and individual failure has contributed significantly to four fatal accidents since 2003 (Tornado/Patriot, Sea King, Hercules and Nimrod). If you read the BoI reports, the clear, incontrovertible linkages are there for all to see. (And if you have to ask, no answer can suffice). PRECISELY the same failures to implement process and procedures. The same underlying themes and, at a certain level, the same individuals. Not least, instructions to ignore safety and airworthiness issues, followed by disciplinary action if you didn't.

I sincerely hope the Nimrod Review has a remit which requires study of these practices, policies and decisions; and the effects. It should do. The processes and procedures are not aircraft specific, they are mandated across the MoD. They affect everyone.

On Tuesday, the press also ran a story about a Doctor who was struck off because he failed in his Duty, resulting in a mother being wrongly imprisoned for killing her child. There have been many such cases over the years, and they inevitably lead to wide ranging reviews of past cases in which the subject has been involved - and very often retrospective action. If the same legal principle is established here, natural justice dictates the good names of the Chinook pilots will be restored.

[nigegilb]

So, the best brains in the RAF have poured over the Board's findings, but have been unable to recommend any more fire protection on Nimrod, any additional protection in the wings, or dual wall protection to AAR pipework.

Mightycrewseven worries about the wording in Q12 out of 15 well worked through questions from a worried local MP who is trying to do his best for his costituents. Crewseven, I wouldn't waste your concern about this ridiculous mistake, for starters the core of the question concerned the OSD of R1 of 2025, but more importantly, the very clever response by MoD lawyers of offering to further inquiries should mean that none of those questions get answered for a very long time. Sir Glenn Torpy will be well into his retirement by then. Still, galling to think that those lawyers are paid for out of the public purse.

Where does all this leave the MRA4 program?

Well, unsurprisingly the mantra of 'We cannot accept any further delays to MRA4 in service date' has continued, so don't expect any of the protection not provided on MR2 to be fitted to its replacement.

Of course, life in the wider aviation community continues apace Just yesterday, a call has been made for cargo bay fire protection US NTSB calls for cargo aircraft fire suppression systems,

John Croft, Washington DC (05Dec07, 13:33 GMT, )

"US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials today called for all Part 121 carriers to install fire suppression systems on cargo aircraft to contain onboard fires in the cargo hold.

The outcome follows the NTSB’s investigation of a post-flight fire that destroyed a UPS Douglas DC-8 cargo aircraft at the Philadelphia International airport on 7 February 2006.

Investigators were not been able to determine the cause of the fire, other than to say it most likely started in one of three suspected cargo containers.
Contributing to the aircraft hull loss, said the Board, were inadequate certification test requirements for smoke and fire detection systems and the lack of an on-board fire suppression system.

Along with the call to install the suppression systems, the Board issued the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) six additional recommendations, including a request for “clear guidance” to operators of airports, large passenger and cargo aircraft and fractional services as to how flight crew or first responders should respond to evidence of a fire when no onboard alerts are available.

According to the NTSB, the UPS pilots had the choice of four checklists for troubleshooting a smell the first officer described as “like burning wood” when the aircraft was descending through 9,375m (31,000ft) on the approach to the Philadelphia.

“None covered what the crew was seeing,” says an investigator, adding that one of the checklists they completed brought more air into the cargo hold to fuel the fire.

The aircraft’s smoke alarms ultimately sounded at 1,088m (3,600ft) and smoke entered the cockpit just as the aircraft touched down. The crew evacuated the aircraft with no injuries. "

[Mick Smith]

DeepGE

As a current SME( Look it up if your not sure) on Nimrod MR2 I am sick to the back teeth of so called experts now appearing from the woodwork after 30 odd years of Nim Ops. If u didn't have the b"^^3 to stand-up when you where in the developement phase then shut the f%%k up now. And yes I direct this at Jimmy!!!!. Do not question how we maintain an AC you so proudly boast you put into service. No b"^^3 then no point having big b"^^3's now. Cheers Pet!!!

I may have been a bit OTT initially but I am sick of the speculation and down right falls hoods posted reference groundies on MR2. Having been an AGE and Rects controller I have seen the physical and mental effort these totally profesionall technicians apply to keeping the MR2 fleet the potent asset it is. Can somebody just reward this effort with the high level support it deserves.


I can appreciate that people at Kinloss might have been feeling under siege over the past few months but your comments about Jimmy Jones are completely out of order.

No-one who has been involved in the attempts to bring attention to this issue has ever criticised the ground crews at Kinloss. When we obtained the QinetiQ report, the STimes article specifically went out of its way to report the team's conclusions that the RAF ground crews at Kinloss were "highly committed" and working to good standards. Even before the QinetiQ report, it was always Jimmy's stance that this would of course be the case and he has always stuck to that view.

[TheSmiter]

Mick , emotions are running very high after the BoI publication. One thing is clear:

NO BLAME IS ATTACHED OR CAN BE ATTACHED TO ANY MAINTENANCE STAFF AT KINLOSS - PERIOD. CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SKILL AND WORK IS RECOGNISED FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN.

I think the feelings expressed by DeepGE, and in fact by many people at ISK, go much, much deeper than any supposed criticism of groundcrew. I'm sure that more will be heard of this in the months to come.

Magnersdrinker To me there was only 1 Nimrod pilot god and that was Big Vern, wherever he may be now please come back
A few points mate:

a. Big Vern never flew Nimrods, it was his brother.

b. Big Vern's brother is not so big now :) although even he would struggle with the new, overarching fitness regime!

c. There have been several Flight Deck Gods over the years, BV was certainly one - Kinloss is a less fun place without them and I wish they were they were back.

d. There are other, smoother, more sophisticated ciders available. Pop into the Drunken Duck (and Tescos) for one example.

e. If you're fixing my jet, please can you get to bed a bit earlier? Cheers.

[Magnersdrinker]

Smitter said

d. There are other, smoother, more sophisticated ciders available. Pop into the Drunken Duck (and Tescos) for one example.

e. If you're fixing my jet, please can you get to bed a bit earlier? Cheers.

answer to d, Magners I think is classed as sophisticated, its certainly better than Savvanah LOL ,saying that if you mix a savvanah and an elephant beer when in the DD it only results in removal of clothing. but its not classy one bit

and answer to e, if you would stop breaking it then maybe we could get to the bar early and enjoy ;)

Thanks for the info though on BV, I think he led a double life when on det , great guy nevertheless and one who always no matter looked after his guys and his groundies when away. Im sure all would agree

[Winco]

DeepGE

Whilst you may have a point about those of us that left the fleet more than 3-4 years ago being a dinosaur, the thing is that the aircraft's fuel system has NOT changed since the eintroduction of the AAR probe for Op Corporate.

Nor too has the fact that the bomb bay has no fire suppression fitted.

Now as someone who has vigerously said that the CAS and ACAS and AOC 2Gp should go, I stick by that for one simple reason.....
This accident could and should have been prevented. If you read the BoI (as I have from front to back) then you will see that it was preventable IMHO.

Who on earth undertakes to let a contract that services an aircraft such as Nimrod, but does NOT expect or enforce the contractor to fix fuel leaks?
Who ignores reports from the likes of BAe and QQ about the (quite high) risk of a fire/explosion because of no fire retardent?
Who ignores all of the other fire/smoke related incidents over the past few years (when the fleet has drawn down to a handful of frames?

The answer is....CAS, ACAS, AOC and to a lesser degree Stn Cdr ISK

Might I also point out that, following your colourful post about the groundcrew, I can find not a single reference on this forum where the groundcrew have been blamed or where it is even suggested that they are to blame. They have constantly been praised on this forum for doing a great job, with very limited resouces and under difficult conditions, not to mention with limited manpower.

Please would you stop suggesting (along with MightyHunter AGE) that we are in some way holding you responsible for what happened. On the contrary. It would appear from the report that the blame lies in the maintenance policy, and NOT the maintainers Sir!

The Winco

[Softie]

the thing is that the aircraft's fuel system has NOT changed since the introduction of the AAR probe for Op Corporate.

Winco

To prove a point, your facts are wrong. The original UOR was introduced in 1982 as a quick fix. It was completely re-engineered around 1989 under Mod 715 and, except for the probe, the design and construction bears no resemblance to the original.

[nigegilb]

I would suggest that as a direct result of over-stretch brought about by the likes of Torpy agreeing to fight on two fronts Nimrod engineers were breaching harmony requirements and forced to send people with less experience than desirable into theatre. The BoI report refers to this very thing. The recent incident report resulting in a Mayday Nimrod landing at Kandahar, referred to a new fuel coupling and the crew made a mental note of the fact that it was the first AAR flight since the new coupling. Problems with couplings increased four fold in recent years another fact in the report. Problems with procedures concerning the maintenance of these couplings are well known, And the RAF chief engineer is open minded about a coupling being responsible for the fuel leak that brought down XV230.

Lack of experience is nothing to be ashamed about. It is an inevitable result of excessive draw downs, poor morale and over-stretch.

As a direct result of the recent loss of a Herc in Afg many changes have taken place. Reflecting the lack of training opportunity and low levels of experience in the modern RAF. Take a look at a recent inquest into the Basra Puma crash. Lack of training and experience is starting to kill. It is a very big problem. If there is a shortage of manpower at ISK or a lack of experience in the engineering community, there ain't no use in denying it.

The forthcoming eng det to Akrotiri is only going to make matters worse.

[Winco]

Softie,

Thank you for that.
The UOR was indeed an 'quick fix' to get us south, but there were NO changes to the fuel gallery or system at that time (other than to allow the two AAR pipes to feed into each wing, as far as I can recall.
Didn't MOD 715 purely 'hide' the pipes that ran through the cabin? I don't recall it actually 'changing' the fuel system at all, merely 'tidying it up' a bit. However, if it did, then I will bow to your knowledge.

The Winco

[Mr Point]

Winco,

I agree that things are becoming too heated and understand that now we have answers regarding what happened last September, the next question will inevitably be "who do we blame?"

Nimrod engineers are understandably concerned about this, and unfortunate phases like "shoddy maintenance" do not help to allay their fears. I have no doubt that this statement was directed at policy rather than line engineers.

As far as comments from Jimmy Jones are concerned, I agree, in the main, with DeepGE. Although Jimmy's motives are entirely honourable, statements such as, the Nimrod, "...is being flown in conditions that are much harsher than it was designed for", even though the Nimrod has operated from the Middle East for more than 20 years, are clouding the perception of the public. In addition, his statement in the Times that, "If the MoD had acted on BAE Systems’ recommendations, those 14 crew members would still be alive today" cannot be substantiated and is conjecture. I do not remember any reports from BAe contesting the NSC.

As I have previously stated, credible technical comments can only come from those who routinely operate and service the aircraft. However, general Flight Safety issues, such as those tabled by Nige and Tuc are, in my opinion both valid and necessary for an objective argument.

[Winco]

Mr P

I do not know Jimmy Jones, although perhaps I should, as our time at ISK must have overlapped at some time.

I agree entirely with your sentiments, and again, I would in no way imply that the groundcrew are to blame at all for the loss. I do understand their concerns, but they must understand that they are not being blamed at all. It clearly statwes in the report that it is the POLICY that is (partly) to blame.

The thing about what JJ said, is that he might just be correct you know?
I'm not saying he is, but the 'facts' speak for themselves, and he may well be correct in his comments.
If the MOD had acted after the BAe report than maybe ......?
If they had acted after the QQ report then maybe ........?
If more attention had been given over the fuel leaks, then maybe .....?

I accept that we will never really factually know, but you have to say, that simply ignoring reports from so-called 'experts' is not the best way to conduct matters?
Regards
The Winco

[airsound]

mileandahalf
I’m sure Mick Smith is big enough to look after himself, but I can’t let your totally ill-founded and ill-tempered attack on him pass without comment.

You say
I reckon you should stick to journalism
I suggest that that is exactly what he is doing, with highly commendable results. Amongst the general dumbing down of the media, investigative journalists like Mick Smith are increasingly rare - and yet a free democracy like ours depends on people like Mick to keep the executive in check. He has consistently used his valuable platform at The Times to publicise and consider the often questionable behaviour of some of the senior people in the chain of command. Without his insights and revelations, I believe the Board might not have come to some of its conclusions, and it is arguable that we would not have had apologies from the Secretary of State and the Chief of the Air Staff, nor the unprecedented launching of a much broader inquiry, to say nothing of the mention of new consideration of compensation for the relatives.

You also say
You need to accept some of the responsibility for the way that the whole issue has been portrayed throughout the media
I have not spoken to Mick Smith about this - but I would be very surprised if he does not proudly accept exactly that responsibility. What other, less reputable, parts of the media do with the fruits of Mick’s valuable research is obviously not his responsibility, however.

I really don’t think, either, that slagging off Mick Smith is going to help
put something positive back into the lives of those at Kinloss.
I believe that work such as his is part of a big effort that might just help to save some of those lives in future.

airsound

[nigegilb]

Mr Softie, you gently chastise Winco for suggesting the AAR lash up is the same as the fag packet design in 82.

Would you care to comment on the admission the ACM was amended to REMOVE max refuelling pressure?

As a Nimrod SME, maybe deep GE would also care to comment?

[500days2do]

Perhaps a few more 'no' men and women would be a good future direction. In the 23 years that I served it was always apparent that 'yes' men moved onwards and upwards. Those that chose to raise complaints and refused to see the 'big picture' were isolated and then removed. If the military ethos,culture and structure is based on blind servitude, we will continue to feel loses as hard as this.

5d2d

[nigegilb]

Talk about shoot the messenger you are starting to sound deranged. Airsound was there at the BoI presentation. He was also on C4 News in front of the camera, on BBC Main News News 24, he is not afraid of anything. You received your personal briefing by the BoI team on the 5th at ISK as a direct result of Graham Knight's personal intervention.

You know what, as a direct result of Mick Smith and others raising the profile of this crash the MoD felt the need to offer interim compensation payments before an inquest. Some of the widows have been forced to go out to work because of changes to laws regarding widows' military pensions or simply a massively reduced income. Hopefully they will now have the choice of staying at home to look after their kids or simply work less.

Try thinking about that next time you open your mouth, or laptop. And before you open your mouth again, there have been 74 other deaths attributable to a lack of equipment or procedure in Afg and Iraq. Why is it that the MoD have reacted to the Nimrod tragedy in this specific way?

[EdSet100]

Would you care to comment on the admission the ACM was amended to REMOVE max refuelling pressure?


I can comment on that. All of the original information on AAR, including airborne procedures, was in the aircrew technical manual, known as the Book 1. That info related to the MOD 700 "lash up" as it has been called, and the ground refuelling limit of 50 psi was quoted in the book due to insufficient time (war on) to conduct extensive trials. 50 psi was a very safe and sensible limit, given that HDUs pumped at 55psi (AFAICR), anway.

When MOD 715 was introduced, the trials for Tristar on the AEW Nimrod were also going on. It was established, from the manufacturer, (its in the BOI report) that the max pressure in the system on the AEW was 120 psi. We then used the same AEW system as the basis for MOD 715, which was the replacement AAR system.

The aircrew flying manual (Book 3) was then amended to reflect MOD 715 and the upper limit of 120 psi was so high as to be beyond anything we would reach, so it was not published. The previous info in Book 1 was removed. I noted at the time that the pressure limit had disappeared from our manuals but I was informed by the GSU that the new system was capable of much higher pressures, because the manufacturer had said so.

You used the word, "admission" in an accusatory context. Has that word or similar terminology appeared in the BOI report?

Regards
Ed Set

[nigegilb]

Ed Set, thanks for the comprehensive reply. I am trying to get my head round the BoI conclusions. AAR pressure was thought to be insignificant below 120psi, but no studies had been carried out on the cause of surges or the cumulative effect of surges. Ground testing equipment only tests up to 50 psi and the BoI have ordered that a 50psi limit be reintroduced.

This aircraft has been plagued by pressure surges and fuel leaks in recent times, many of them impossible to re-create on the ground. I just found it hard to understand why the 50psi limit was removed in the first place, when these conditions were not able to be re-created in controlled tests.

[Roland Pulfrew]

You received your personal briefing by the BoI team on the 5th at ISK as a direct result of Graham Knight's personal intervention. Do you think CAS wanted to go up there and face the music?


And you know exactly how that he wouldn't have done this? Pure speculation on your part. Stop spouting such utter tosh!!

[nigegilb]

Fair call, removed. I was a bit annoyed when I wrote that post. For the record, there was no reason given for the BoI presentation to be cancelled.

[D-IFF_ident]

Gents, I hesitate to mention this in case it detracts from the real issues here, but do you think the practice of remaining 'in contact' after fuel transfer is complete might have an impact on the seals in the AAR system? I understand that AAR enroute to the Falklands was generally 'offload complete, disconnect', but more recently receivers, in general (as I do not have knowledge of specific procedures/techniques of relevance), tend to stay in contact after fuel transfer, thereby burning the tanker's fuel, sort of, until some relevant point in time or space. Just a thought.

[Magnersdrinker]

Just going off topic for a second , recent comments about the Nimrod not designed to fly in the hotter areas of operation it was never built for it . Surely when manufacturers design aircraft they have a broad range of high temps to low temps into consideration. If this is the case can we say the same about the Hercules,VC10 Tristar ? Are they operating in areas out of there temprature range .?
Ive lately had the chance to do some low level maratine flying and bloody hell it gets thrown about like nothing ive seen before and the aircraft is rugged to handle this kind of flying , yet as we know in the sandy regions there is no requirement to throw it about the sky so less stresses on things. Just something that I been thinking about :rolleyes:

[Mr Point]

Magners,

The manufacturers do have limits that the aircraft is tested to, but the summer temperatures in theatre often exceed these limits.

However, as you quite correctly say, other aircraft in theatre are subject to the same temperatures. Ironically, due to the current tasking, the Nimrod is having significantly less G-stress placed it than twenty years ago.

[camelspyyder]

Mr Point wrote

Ironically, due to the current tasking, the Nimrod is having significantly less stress placed on it than twenty years ago.


Which even more ironically you can't say about the crews at the moment...

CS:)

[Vage Rot]

Gents, I hesitate to mention this in case it detracts from the real issues here, but do you think the practice of remaining 'in contact' after fuel transfer is complete might have an impact on the seals in the AAR system? I understand that AAR enroute to the Falklands was generally 'offload complete, disconnect', but more recently receivers, in general (as I do not have knowledge of specific procedures/techniques of relevance), tend to stay in contact after fuel transfer, thereby burning the tanker's fuel, sort of, until some relevant point in time or space. Just a thought.

We certainly used to stay in contact after the tanks were full, indeed we used to take on fuel until it vented overboard! However, I can't remember that happening for many many years - going back to the early 90's and my Falklands Det for that one!

A perfectly accepted 'safe' procedure at the time - but who'd volunteerto do it now!!!??:=

[EdSet100]

Burning the tanker's fuel is/was done on the tanker's booster pumps only. Consequently, the pressure surges, although frequent, were always well below 50 psi. I recall pressure fluctuations (which is a more accurate description) ranging between 15 and 25 psi as we flew along together. It wasn't done for fun. Range and/or endurance was enhanced significantly. The Herc guys did the same on the S Atlantic airbridge until the tanker had to head north.

And I would add that, provided the current proceures are adhered to, the Nimrod will not now vent while remaining in contact and "burning the tanker's fuel". After all, we would be burning our own fuel from a much lower level in the tanks and replacing that fuel to that same low level (which is well below the vent pipes and blow-off valves).

Regards
Ed Set

[nigegilb]

I stated earlier that the MoD has been briefing that dual wall pipes are difficult to maintain (seals) and are more difficult to detect fuel leaks than single skin systems. I assume the last bit was said without a trace of irony. Well this is the reply I received from an experienced engineer

"No problems at all really. The maintenance would require 2 couplings, (one for the inner pipe, one for the outer) whereas on a single wall pipe you would have one. The outer pipe then has "overboard" drain points so that should the main pipe seep / weep / fail, the secondary gland drains the fuel overboard. These drains are engineered in such a way that if one is dripping then you know to within a small area where the problem lies."
I note the MoD briefing did not mention cost.

[EdSet100]

Nigegilb,
The Nimrod has a similar leak detection system in the area of the double skinned pipework in the crew cabin. Any leakage into the interspace will drip/run into a bottle below the lowest part of the pipework and operate a floatswitch with a light on the eng's panel. Immediate Actions: stop AAR. If the bottle overflows, the surplus fuel is then directed into the interspace in the fuselage tanks and is then vented overboard at the back of the fuselage. Neat system.

You probably know more than me on this subject, so I'll ask you this: is double-skinned fuel pipework mandatory only when the pipes are inside the pressure shell, i.e where the crew and pax/cargo share the same air?

If so, this will explain why MOD 715 on the Nimrod didn't double-skin throughout the bomb bay, which is outside the pressure hull.

Regards
Ed Set

[nigegilb]

Ed, with reference to CAA Regs double skinned pipework is focussed where there is a higher risk of fuel tank explosion. All the mods are contained in SFAR 88, Airworthiness Notice 55 issued by the CAA and EASA. In the case of the BBJ it concerns double skin pipes feeding the aux fuel tank. Things like proximity to conditioning packs would raise the probability of fuel fire/explosion. Operators failing to comply, (in the case of a 4 year old BBJ, kit cost $180,000 similar fitting costs), will have the aux tanks made inoperable.

Given that the Nimrod shares the same skies as all civil airliners then it would be interesting if a route could be engineered for the CAA to inspect a Nimrod on line?

[FATTER GATOR]

Been on the MR2 for longer than my first marriage and I reckon I know a thing or 2 about it but there are somethings about bomb bay fire suppression that I can't get my head around.

How exactly do you fill a VENTILATED bomb bay with fire suppressant and, more importantly, keep it there?

What sort of fire suppressant could endure in a ventilated bomb bay?

How much (of a suitable fire) suppressant would be required to fill an empty MR2 bomb bay (the largest continuous bomb bay, excluding the B52, in NATO)?

Where the f:mad:k would you put all the containers for the fire suppressant?

Perhaps a few armchair MR2 experts can shed some light on that one. Maybe Jimmy Jones could explain it to me when I meet him in a dark alley.

One further question. Can anyone tell me which prominant Nimrod 'expert' was involved in approving the Nimrod fuel system including the AAR system? You might find the answer interesting.

FG:(
(sorry I'm cross. It isn't endearing.)

[FE Hoppy]

FG,
You are the first person I think to ask this question.
I've been pondering this since it was first brought up on this thread as I don't know how all those screaming for it propose to do it.
To give you an idea of civvy regs a cargo compartment fire extinguishing system must fill 5% by volume of the compartment with extinguisher. A suppression system must the maintain 3% by volume of extinguisher. This will typically mean a high rate fire bottle followed by a low rate bottle in a sealed compartment. Those compartments certified for carriage of live animals will have a ventilation system that will shut off and isolate the compartment in case of fire. The detectors are smoke detectors not heat detectors. I know a bit about the Nimrod and don't know how you could achieve a credible bomb bay fire extinguishing system.

[Vage Rot]

One further question. Can anyone tell me which prominant Nimrod 'expert' was involved in approving the Nimrod fuel system including the AAR system? You might find the answer interesting.

Fatter me old mate!! That would be Jimmy Jones then!!

Give him a break - he's just trying to make up for his previous incompetance!
Regards - keep safe in the Sandpit

PS. tell Mrs Fatter Mk2 that dinner was tops!
Vage!

[FATTER GATOR]

Cheers mate will do!

Mrs Gator also likes to be complimented on the quality of her breakfasts:p Just ask Winston, if you can ever get past the milk float:ok:

[Mick Smith]

Vage Rot and FATTER GATOR
Quote:
Originally Posted by
One further question. Can anyone tell me which prominant Nimrod 'expert' was involved in approving the Nimrod fuel system including the AAR system? You might find the answer interesting.
Fatter me old mate!! That would be Jimmy Jones then!!

This is taking on the rather depressing aspects of a smear campaign but when is this approval supposed to have taken place?

[Sir Vical Smear]

Ah yes another talented MR2 comentator and 'campaigner'. Welcome to the fray.

2 contributors to the thread commenting on Jimmy Jones hardly consists of a smear campaign, unless you are a sensationalist journalist.:=

[Creeping Line Ahead]

SVS

Best make that 3. Given the slagging the MR2 force has had to put up with over the last year or so, any 'expert' who has blamed current ops for the loss of XV230 when what actually brought the jet down was a design fault which was present when (if I recall his media assertions correctly) that 'expert' was one of those responsible, then he should expect a good shoe-ing in return. Not that it'll bring any of those good 14 men back.

I accept that the airworthiness system has fallen down in not recognising the magnitude of the risk, but we didn't put it there!

CLA

[Mick Smith]

That really isnt an answer is it. The suggestion seems to be that Jimmy Jones was responsible for the problems with AAR experienced by the Nimrods flying over Afghanistan, even a cursory reading of the BOI - which blames a succession of changes to the system - indicates that couldnt be the case. If this palpably false claim doesnt constitute a smear, I dont know what does.

[Creeping Line Ahead]

MS

My point is that the aircarft should have been able to cope with a fuel leak, be it from AAR or a pipe or whatever. Any decent aviator or engineer will tell you that to design a bay that mixes hot air and fuel pipes with no fire suppression or mitigation is, literally, an accident waiting to happen (AAR or not). The Nimrod has been flying like that since day 1 and many of the so-called 'experts' should have spotted it. As did, in fact, the guy who drafted the safety case. Tragically, as a non-operator, he made a critical error in assuming/believing the pipes were cold when airborne.

CLA

[Mr Point]

Tragically, as a non-operator, he made a critical error in assuming/believing the pipes were cold when airborne.

This alone constitutes at the very least neglect, but to believe that the zone had fire warning and fire suppressant is utter incompetence that contributed to the death of 14 men.

[nigegilb]

CLA is wrong in assuming this problem was not spotted by designers.

"Naturally the Nimrod's designers realised that 400-degree compressed air is stuff that ought to be kept separate from essentially everything else, so the pipes are heavily insulated.

Just as naturally, the insulation is only replaced if it goes wrong; the maintenance handbook does not state how much insulation is tolerable. An experiment on a dodgy section showed the insulation was only 16 degrees cooler than the bare metal. "In some areas on other aircraft it was noted the laces have loosened and there are visible gaps between the blanket edge and the main pipe insulation, leaving exposed sections of pipe surface", said the Board."

This was a contributory factor noted by the board.

I agree with Mr P the air in this pipe fulfills a number of functions. Would CLA confirm that Nimrod is no longer operated on 2 engines because there is not enough air to start another engine if one of them fails?

[tucumseh]

All this sniping could be nipped in the bud if;

a. People actually read posts, and,
b. The BAeS and, especially, the QinetiQ report were posted on Daily Orders at Kinloss (and all air stations).

As they say, read them and weep. Then ask why such flagrant and deliberate breaches of the MoD’s airworthiness regulations were ordered, condoned, supported and covered up with lies.

Then, if you will, point fingers. My opinion is you will not, as the starting point is mere 2 Stars. And if you’ve never pinned a 2 Star to a wall because he laughed at you when you tried to highlight a critical flight safety problem, then you have no concept whatsoever of just how hard people fight to keep you and your aircraft safe. And how they are treated for trying to meet their Duty of Care. And how bloody frustrating it is that people died as a result of him walking away and doing nothing. I weep for the people who suffer because of this criminal incompetence.

Just another side of the story. We’re a team guys. Some here don’t fully understand 1st and 2nd line, others don’t understand acquisition/support. But most of us have a common goal. It is those who don’t, and make a career of it, you need to target.

[Mr Point]

Tuc,

Well said.

[nigegilb]

I was quite impressed by Des Browne's comments on Hansard. He suggested that a QC might well end up doing some finger pointing of his own. Tuc, with your knowledge, I would hope you offer your services to this gentleman.

[Mick Smith]

I entirely accept as I said earlier that the maintenance teams at Kinloss were doing their damndest and doing it well. I believe it not just because you say it here, or because having flown Crab Air too many times during my army service, it often seemed that if the slightest bloody nut was not up to scratch they wouldn't fly. I believe it because we have an independent report in the shape of the QinetiQ report of March 2006 which says it.
What I can't get my head round though is that ACM Torpy said on Tuesday that AAR was suspended without exception after last month's fuel leak during AAR because "we couldn't replicate the fault on the ground".
Strangely enough the QinetiQ report said something very similar:
"It was also suggested that RAMS cannot detect some of the leaks reported in-theatre when the aircraft return to Kinloss. This is partially explained by fuel load in tanks, climatic conditions, ineffective vacuum in tanks, etc, and Qinetiq were unable to establish a clear impression of how these non-detected leaks are addressed.”
So believing the first, I have to assume that a lot of people were saying with some degree of concern look we can't replicate this fault so we can't fix it, they clearly told the QinetiQ team exactly that. Who was it that was ignoring these concerns? And why did Torpy seem to think that the inability to replicate the fault was something new that suddenly meant AAR had to stop until it could be replicated?

[nigegilb]

I think your answer is here Mick. Torpy has had his train set taken away from him.

MoD preparing to pay Nimrod claims

Michael Evans

EDINBURGH Millions of pounds will have to be put aside to pay for compensation claims from the families of the Nimrod air crash victims, the Ministry of Defence confirmed, adding to a reported £1 billion black hole in the ministry’s finances.

Following the public acceptance of liability by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, for the death of 14 servicemen in the aircraft which exploded in Afghanistan, the families’ lawyers said that negligence had effectively been agreed. Fred Tyler, of Balfour and Manson, an Edinburgh solicitors’ firm which is handling 12 of the 14 claims, told The Times that although he had dealt with previous cases where the MoD had eventually admitted liability, it had never happened so early in the process.

The board of inquiry report into the crash said that there had been shortcomings in the way that the aircraft had been maintained.

[EdSet100]

Tec:

Then ask why such flagrant and deliberate breaches of the MoD’s airworthiness regulations were ordered, condoned, supported and covered up with lies.


Its easy to use the word, "lies" from the comfort of a screen name.

There were no lies. Yes, a safety case was ordered. Yes, it was accepted at face value (not condoned) and yes it was therefore supported. It is a fact that the analyis in the NSC was flawed and no-one spotted the errors until the BOI spotted them. One cannot lie if one doesn't know the truth.

I have to say this, unpalatable as it is, but ground engineering officers would never have spotted those errors. Why? Because they don't know everything about how the aircraft is operated. They don't need to. No air engineer was ever given the opportunity to participate in the NSC; indeed we didn't even know it existed. Had we been given sight of it, the errors would have been seen immediately. How do I know this? Because the air member of the BOI (an air eng) was the first aircrew to read the NSC and it was he who spotted the errors. I haven't asked him if I'm right about that. I just know it.

The simple fact is this: the RAF never had the opportunity to lie about the NSC. We never knew it was flawed. Hence the QC will have an abundance of people from many other agencies in the queue outside his door.

[EdSet100]

Nigegilb,

I agree with Mr P the air in this pipe fulfills a number of functions. Would CLA confirm that Nimrod is no longer operated on 2 engines because there is not enough air to start another engine if one of them fails?

Due to the Limitation Log entry of keeping that pipe closed, after all engines are ground started, we cannot air start the engines at the moment. We can windmill start them. An engine can get air from the adjacent engine for an air start but, frustratingly, the electrics that control the air start also opens up the crossfeed pipe. So, we do not shut down any engine in flight unless in an emergency, such that when an engine that is shut down will not be considered to be safe to relight it.

Before you ask, yes, we are looking at ways we could air start an engine in the event of a failure to windmill relight following a precautionary shut down.

And, yes, that pipe has had this limitation in place since 3 Sep 06.

Regards
Ed Set

[nigegilb]

Ed fella, I wasn't trying to be smart, just pointing out that the person reviewing the safety case or whatever he was doing didn't really know a lot about that pipe did he?

Also heard it is bloody hot in the aircraft now, and obviously idling engines are burning fuel all the time. Sorry, the error was a pretty big one and not one that can be brushed under the carpet.

In the light of the proposed multi million pound pay out for negligence would the chap from Whitehall who was threatening everyone with jail for OSA breaches like to come back to the thread?

[EdSet100]

NG,

Ed fella, I wasn't trying to be smart

OK. I thought it was a question that would lead onto another question.

In the light of the proposed multi million pound pay out for negligence would the chap from Whitehall who was threatening everyone with jail for OSA breaches like to come back to the thread?

I didn't read that particular threat message but, in general, I tend to agree with him. The individual(s) releasing IRs and e-mails and going on TV were spouting on about the SCP pipe and other similar pipes, leaking hot air onto fuel tanks. They also mentioned leaking wing tanks and TD, DV and Mick Smith were working on those releases as though the source(s) were whistle blowing. The fact is that they were far off the mark. We all know that wing tanks weep and seep. We were content that the hot air to cause fuel fires in the bomb bay had been removed. In fact, the source(s) contributed to poor morale, undermined the Stn Cdr, et al, and generally pi$$ed us all off. The OSA was the least of our concerns, but it will be used as the means to chase them down.

[Safety_Helmut]

Ed

It's easy to misunderstand some of the comments in this very long thread, many of them are made on the basis of what has gone before. Can I clear up a few things.

Yes, a safety case was ordered. Yes, it was accepted at face value (not condoned) and yes it was therefore supported. It is a fact that the analysis in the NSC was flawed and no-one spotted the errors until the BOI spotted them. One cannot lie if one doesn't know the truth.
Most of the Safety Cases for in-service aircraft have not been properly scrutinised, in fact, many of them are not capable of passing close scrutiny. So in all probability, no one has even looked for possible errors. This is a failing of the IPT and of the MoD's Safety and Airworthiness management system.

I have to say this, unpalatable as it is, but ground engineering officers would never have spotted those errors. Why? Because they don't know everything about how the aircraft is operated. They don't need to. No air engineer was ever given the opportunity to participate in the NSC; indeed we didn't even know it existed. Had we been given sight of it, the errors would have been seen immediately.

The type of analyses needed to build a Safety Case requires expert input from a number of sources. It needs the participation of the designer (BAES), maintenance (RAF Engineering), operators (aircrew) and other specialists as required. The whole analysis needs to be led by an experienced Safety Engineer who understands the difference between a hazard, failure and fault etc. Many people don't ! The input needs to come from experienced people, not just a desk officer on a two year tour in the IPT either. In many cases this will best come from experienced SNCOs . You don't have to worry that the specialists brought in may not fully understand the analysis process. The Safety Engineers are there for that. There are similar requirements for reviewing the Safety Case. It is not just simply a case of reading it. When a claim is made, it has to be questioned, you have to look for the evidence to support a claim, in short, it has to be justified.

Much of what I describe above will be alien to many IPTs, because they simply don't do it. They don't understand that they need to do it, and they don't understand why they need to do it. If that sounds like incompetence, then......................

The simple fact is this: the RAF never had the opportunity to lie about the NSC. We never knew it was flawed.

The IPTL is responsible for assuring himself that the aircraft has an acceptable Safety Case. Not knowing it was flawed will not be a defence in a court of law. If you have not looked for those flaws, now that would be indefensible. That will be the position that virtually all of the IPTs will be in.


S_H

[Mick Smith]

They also mentioned leaking wing tanks and TD, DV and Mick Smith were working on those releases as though the source(s) were whistle blowing. The fact is that they were far off the mark. We all know that wing tanks weep and seep.

Sorry but this is rubbish. The articles in the STimes never suggested at any point that the wing tanks were the major problem. It was always the leaks in the bomb bay that were the focus of our attention. If you are talking about the QinetiQ report, we deliberately focused on the more general and very worrying points it made about the then six aircraft flying with the EO kit and the fact that leaks occurring in the air couldnt be replicated on the ground so were going unfixed. I refer you to my earlier post on this page and the one on page 78, post 1546.

[tucumseh]

EdSet100

Your response to my post concentrates entirely on one very small part of the whole picture – the role of maintainers at Kinloss. It has been said many times here – no-one has ever pointed fingers in that direction.

Please read posts carefully. My point has always been that there are systemic failures across the MoD in the application of the processes and procedures underpinning airworthiness regulations. I have made this point repeatedly over time. The MoD have continually denied it, but the truth has been exposed.

In that context, please reflect on ACM Sir Clive Loader’s comment,

“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 service personnel who were aboard, resulted from shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.

He omits to say that the processes are not Nimrod-specific, that they apply to all aircraft. Hopefully the Review will explore this.


A remarkably similar sentiment to mine, may I suggest. I notice it is dated 2nd November 2007. Three weeks later MB were denying this very issue, in writing, on behalf of Min(AF). I have their letter in front of me, one of many over a period of years which all trot out the same mantra. “The MoD has a robust regulatory framework”. Frameworks collapse if they don’t sit on deep, stable foundations.

I am not Sir Clive Loader. Nor do MoD address their correspondence to "tucumseh".

[Follow Me Through]

Gentlemen
As ex-RAF aircrew living overseas I am extremely grateful to be able to be able to keep abreast of this sad episode. Thank you all who contribute.
After reading the BOI with interest I was dismayed to read the recomendation that voice data recorders should be installed in aircraft. The BOI into the loss of XV193 at Blair Athol in 1993 was hampered by a similar lack of voice data. Having lost colleagues in that accident imagine my dismay to read a previous BOI, following the loss of XV216 in 1971 at Pisa, the recommendation for voice data recorders to be installed. I had ignorantly thought that a BOI recommendation would be followed. It is frustrating that 36 years later we are still not doing our utmost to follow the advice of a team of experts who investigate these sorry events. I fully understand that voice data would not have prevented these accidents but any BOI deserves as much data that could be made available to assist them.
Two final thoughts - Firstly, I was impressed that the Sec of State said " I am sorry". That honesty is long overdue from this Government. Finally, my thoughts are with the families of a team of fine aviators that died doing their bit. For that I am personally grateful.
Fly Safe.

[nigegilb]

Firstly, I was impressed that the Sec of State said " I am sorry". That honesty is long overdue from this Government. Finally, my thoughts are with the families of a team of fine aviators that died doing their bit. For that I am personally grateful.

Fine words FMT, I agree and I have changed my view of Des Browne over this, he is obviously a decent man.

I am troubled by the response from Kinloss, I think some of you just don't get how serious this is. These 14 people were killed by negligence, systemic failures that resulted in one tank having been fixed but the other still overflowing due to pipes that couldn't take the gas on board quickly enough. I read the RAF Chief Engineers comments with dismay. He even had the temerity to blame the lack of incident reports on this very common problem as a reason for not fixing the other tank. A safety review had occurred on the age of the airframe, but the aircraft systems were not reviewed? The aircraft seals had not been maintained? Some were 38 years old? An aircraft goes in to get its fuel leaks fixed and is signed off with a majority of leaks still there. The words of a very experienced engineering contact

Seepage from integral tanks is fairly normal, we have ****/**** which regularly have a wet stain on the lower surface of the wing. Provided we can positively identify where the seep is originating then we can issue a tech log entry for repair at next "C" check, which could be 18 months into the future, provided that the seep does not become a weep or leak. The airframe that left equalised servicing with fuel leaks beggars belief.

The lack of training for engineers, the belief that the pipe that killed the boys was cold? The failure to shut off air to that pipe even though an aircraft was written off after a hot air leak on that very same fuel tank?

The list is endless. This is totally unprecedented, the MoD are paying up, no questions asked but senior people in the RAF are still saying this is nothing to do with the age of the aircraft.

And Sir Glenn Torpy and his sidekick AOC 2Gp insist on sending his boys up NFF fuel leaks. Not f****g Fixed, no way of testing.

This is an utter disgrace, please don't whine at the people who have campaigned,

Maybe Torpy would like to explain, why, 4 major leaks after the loss of XV230 he has finally stopped AAR. I am all ears.

[olddog]

Gentlemen (and ladies),
As a retired Nimrod pilot with over 5000 hrs on type over a period of 30+ years, split between all 3 operational Mks, I have followed this thread with interest. I knew most of the crew of XV230 as trusted professional operators. This is my first post on this thread as I prefered to await the informed findings of the BOI rather than join the speculation here.
The BOI seem to have done an excellent, unbiased job and have produced sensible, informed, findings and far reaching recommendations. I worked with the President in the past and would have expected nothing less.
This forum has degenerated into a stream of accusations and criticism of those who posted previously in good faith. None of this will help the implementation of the Boards findings or, more importantly, the healing period for the bereaved families who have behaved with courage and fortitude whilst awaiting the findings of the Board.
Those at Kinloss, and in higher authority, must now be trusted to implement the findings of the Board and continue Nimrod operations safely until the arrival of MR4 or another platform that can cover the current essential roles of the Nimrod in operational theatres. I also predict that we shall soon be needing the Nimrod as an MPA again if Russia's sabre rattling increases. If
MR4 needs to be modified as a result of the boards findings this should be done before it enters service.
Before posting further, please think. Will my post make any difference? Will it offend or hurt anyone who now needs space to get on with their lives?

[Lytham Lifeboat]

Well said old dog.
Carlsberg don't do thread replies, but if they did.....
Probably the best post in the 101 pages to date.

[Mick Smith]

Vage rot, FATTER GATOR et al.

Just to put your unjustified slur against Jimmy Jones to bed, he left the RAF in 1978, before the air-to-air refuelling system was introduced and so could not possibly have been involved in any aspect of its use.

[EdSet100]

Tec,
If I gave the impression to you and other readers that my use of "ground engineering officers" referred to OC NLS and other EngOs at Kinloss, then I apologise for a lack of clarity. I was referring to those individuals who accepted the analysis of the NSC. Anyone, regardless of organisation, branch or rank, with knowledge of the Nirmod who read the NSC and signed it off has to take some responsibility for allowing the flaws to remain. But, I do not believe there were lies. Assumptions, maybe. The QC will establish the truth.

[nigegilb]

A word of hope for the future. IMO the RAF and MoD have forfeited the privilege of self-regulation. I picked up this point off Hansard at the end of Des Browne's announcement.

Mr. Ian Liddell-Grainger (Bridgwater) (Con): The Secretary of State is aware that Europe is trying to have a military aviation authority. Will he explain why Rolls-Royce, which has been pushing the Government to accept this standard for years, has been ignored? Will the Government sign up to the European military aviation authority, to bring military aircraft in line with civil aviation? If there is a problem, what is it? Will the Minister sign up to this as soon as possible?

Des Browne: I shall consider the issue the hon. Gentleman raises. I am not in a position today to give him a detailed response, but I shall write to him on it.


Des Browne has found it within himself to do the right thing once, I urge him to do the right thing a 2nd time.

No more Nimrods dodging airliners on goggles over the skies of Afghanistan without TCAS, external airworthiness checks, the only way ahead for a military that has lost its way.

[AQAfive]

Then Jimmy Jones should not have raised his head above the parapet and made comment on the subject without current knowledge, whilst giving the impression that he did. He was wrong about the fit as have been so many other contributors to this thread. My knowledge of the AAR fit is 6 years out of date, therefore I have refrained from commenting on the many entries made by people that are clearly out of date or do not understand the system or its use.
For those who read with interest but have no knowledge of Nimrod ac or ops, I would suggest you listen to those at ISK who KNOW the systems and its uses, and pay less attention (not ignore) to those who may be involved in the process of ac engineering, but do so from afar. You would be amazed at the number of decisions made about ac at IPT's by those who have never been near the ac let alone fly in it.

[RAF_Techie101]

Well said AQAfive.

On a further JJ note, you've hit the nail on the head Nige when saying he left the RAF in 1978? Surely that makes his knowlege of the a/c and it's engineering aspects 30 years out of date...?

[EdSet100]

Jimmy Jones' first (unsolicited?) contribution to the media was his assertion that the aircraft was not designed for use in the hot climate of the Middle East and that it was required for use in the NATO theatre. He based his expertise on this subject because he was a member of the flight test team/unit that saw the aircraft into service.

Well, yes, we needed a LRMPA and the Nimrod met that need. What Jimmy Jones didn't tell us, as he surely would have known as an engineer on the test team, was that the aircraft was released into service with ground temperature limits of -26C to +45C at sea level. This was hard data that Jones would have known about. So, his statement that the jet wasn't designed for the Gulf is tosh. I would agree that it wasn't required in the Gulf but it was clearly designed to be able to operate worldwide.

Mick Smith, you have worked hard with the information you gleaned and I congratulate you for doing your job, well. It is unfortunate that your sources have been less than accurate. I blame the MoD in this respect, because of a slavish adherence to procedures that were clearly inappropriate in this case. Much of what you have been told could so easily have been clarified by controlled explanation by sanctioned MoD specialists. In this respect the MoD has shot itself in the foot and, more importantly, allowed bereaved families and relatives of current Nimrod aircrew to read and see media information that has not always been accurate. I agree that some info was accurate, but the public expects the quality media (BBC and the Times) to be better than that.


Regards
Ed Set

[nigegilb]

Ed, I can't speak of Jimmy, but if you are talking of truths what do you make of Sir Glenn Torpy's assertion on the Panorama program that the Nimrod "is as safe as it needs to be."

Neither myself nor Mick can work out what has changed from then, when the Nimrod was cleared to AAR, to today, when it is not.

And, what do you make of Sir Glenn Torpy's advice to SoSDef this week that in his professional opinion the Nimrod is airworthy?

Should we believe him, or will the Nimrod fleet get grounded some time over the coming months?

[Roland Pulfrew]

Nigegilb

At a time when we are overstretched and short of cash I cannot believe that you would seriously consider lumbering us with another EU bureaucracy!! :ugh: If nothing else all our dealings with Europe provide evidence of how to slow things down, muddy the waters, work to the lowest common denominator etc. The MAR system worked perfectly well until a shortage of cash forced us to "lean" things. If anything is to be blamed here might I suggest might I suggest it is aimed at those who introduced civilian business, profit maximising processes to the military. We do not need another EU juggernaut!! :rolleyes:

Olddog

As LL says perhaps one of the best posts in 101 pages. :D Isn't it time to lock this thread?

[nigegilb]

RP, believe me I am no great fan of european beaurocracy, but you said this,
The MAR system worked perfectly well until a shortage of cash forced us to "lean" things. It is the responsibility of the chiefs of staff to ensure funding is adequate for MAR. If they cannot do that, there is no alternative to having standards enforced by an outside agency. The Govt will soon cough up when it realises it can't continue to fight wars on the cheap.

[Chugalug2]

Isn't it time to lock this thread?
Well that is for the mods of course, but I should hope not for it is serving the causes of Military Airworthiness Regulation well. You say you do not want more bureaucracy, RP, and normally I would agree, especially those of a European hue, but far more importantly none of us want any more avoidable accidents and the associated losses that come with them. You may think that saying:

The MAR system worked perfectly well until a shortage of cash forced us to "lean" things.

is a perfectly reasonable position to take, I do not for I find it an outrageous concept and at the very core of the issue. It shows that the MOD cannot be left with Military Airworthiness Regulation, for it will simply revert to type the next time it finds itself a bit short. An MAA alongside or as a part of the CAA will ensure that it cannot. No doubt, like the CAA, it will be involved in European Airworthiness integration. So be it, the UK military will at least be operating airworthy fleets, unlike now.

[GeoIntel]

Waiting for the beer bottles and spitoons coming from the public bar I would like to congratulate olddog on bringing direction to this topic.

The Nimrod is an out of date airframe that is perpetuating 1940's technology and intelligence techniques. The time has come for the UK to stop, put down Clausewitz and look at the future direction of conflicts, and intelligence gathering from the position of a small Island nation between two powerful and diverging powers, Europe and the USA.

The future of servicing and maintenance often quoted will be like all military support functions privatized in the not so distant future. The direction of hardware will be towards easily replaced, and easily maintained equipment, based if possible on proven civilian platforms. The P-8A Poseidon is an example of the issues, and the commercial solution. Above all any platform must be scalable, capable of global sales, and global provision of spares from civilian stocks.

That aside these postings, and yes I have read them all, have mistakenly shown the Chinese and Russians that the the rank and file second guess, belittle, and ridicule their military and political leaders over a single, though regrettable incident in a military fiasco that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, and will continue for decades.

We are standing in the middle of the road, arguing about the twisted frame on a bicycle and not noticing the 18 wheeled truck bearing down on us.

Buy the report, mutter in your beer, and close this thread!

[mary_hinge]

Pilot scheme for MIL 145 (JAR 145 Equiv, EASA etc) has been kicking around as far back as 2003.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/AirSafetyandAviation/MAOS/MaintenanceApprovedOrganizationSchemeMaos.htm


Organizations involved in the maintenance of military registered aircraft or components intended to be fitted to military registered aircraft shall be approved in accordance with the provisions of Mil Part 145.
Organizations carrying out airworthiness management tasks shall be approved in accordance with the provisions of Mil Part M (sub Part G).
Organizations involved in the training of certifying staff shall be approved in accordance with Mil Part 147.Rumour is that item 2 above is causing the problem

[nigegilb]

Quote from Geointel on this thread,

No military service has any "duty of care", just to carry out the orders of politicians, and that often means innocent people suffering.

Jees, no wonder he wants to close the thread and thinks we have all gone soft.

[DEL Mode]

Mary,

The problem is that to implement this the MoD needs to let go of self regulation.

It will not. The RAF seem to consider that civil type regs will lead to the operational task suffering.

Check out dispatch rates for civil airlines.

Check out accident rates for civil airlines.

Check out operating costs for civil airlines.

Check out maintenance standards for civil airlines.

Check out training standards for civil airlines.

Notice anything different?

[GeoIntel]

nigegilb:

Nice quote!

May I be so bold as to ask you this question? Take the potential scenario of Israel striking at Iranian Nuclear facilities, the US/UK politicians order everything into the air to protect the Strait of Hormuz, which they will.

The politicians have two choices, debate the niceties of Civilian Air Safety requirements, or order the highly vulnerable maritime reconnaissance resources "As-is" into the air to protect the Oil tankers, knowing full well that many, if not all will be destroyed.

Which one do you think the politicians will choose? Which option will the military follow, to respectfully point out the engineering flaws, EU civilian requirements, and the opinion of PPRuNe, and stay on the ground, or try and keep the Strait open at all costs, regardless of losses?

Sorry in the real world stupid politicians dictate the survival of the military, which is why the military should have the best tools and intelligence for the next job, and therefore like me the best chance of becoming a Pain in the Ass for politicians when they get older.

So tell us all what is incorrect in that statement during a war?

[OilCan]

Del Mode said;

Notice anything different?
erm... yes :ok:
the operational task
:E

[airsound]

GeoIntel
I think you’re missing the point. If - when - it all kicks off, perhaps in the way you suggest
Israel striking at Iranian Nuclear facilities
of course the politicians are going to order everything into the air, single-skin leaking fuel pipes, hot bleed pipes etc, notwithstanding. And of course the boys and girls will go to war, just like they always have done.

The point is - they shouldn’t be asked to do it all the time, under less immediately urgent circumstances, in aircraft that are, and are known to be, a lot less safe than they would be if senior levels in the chain of command had done their duty.

airsound

[OilCan]

nigegilb said;
I have no prob sending up a dodgy Nimrod to do its duty for God and fellow countrymen,
really...:eek:
If Glenn Torpy turned round tomorrow and said, hey guys, the Nimrod isn't totally safe but we need you to go up and do your duty, I would have a shed load more respect for him.
..now your really taking the pi*s. :(


edited to add;

Nigegild; you fuc*ing skate, you've removed the post!!!:mad:

true colours perhaps!

If you were CDS, how much faith should/would we have? :*

[tristan23]

The 2006 QinetiQ report sought to improve the way in which Fuel Tank repair work was carried out at Kinloss. The recent AAR incident concerned fuel 'spraying' from a fuel coupling, which is a completely different issue. AAR has therefore been quite rightly suspended until the cause can be identified and is the subject of an ongoing investigation. If the fault cannot be identified, then AAR may not resume. All engineers work to commonsense rules and do not 'mis-represent' or 'whitewash' the facts - unfortunately, a lot of 'information/facts' in this forum have been distorted and sensationalised.

[nigegilb]

Tristan the BoI stated that problems with the fuel coupling increased fourfold. The crew made a point of noting that this was the first AAR sortie since the coupling had been changed. There is nothing new here. Last I checked the reason for the fuel spraying was not known. I don't know your background but

I have to take your post at face value.

What is more interesting is the response from the crew. In an aircraft that is supposed to be safe, in a bomb bay that has supposedly had all forms of ignition removed, the crew elected to Mayday to Kandahar. I learned the other day that the airfield at Kandahar can be too short in certain conditions.

Ballsy decision making, and I have total respect for the Captain.
However, I have no confidence that this aircraft is as safe as CAS assures us.

Edited for GF.

[GeoIntel]

I don't see any argument with the replies.

Politicians are a strange breed, with a very limited life span. They react in a self serving manner, which can be channeled by money and the media.

As regards mission, consider the name "Nimrod" should have been reserved for a Maritime aircraft, and never given to the "R" variants. Call them "Big Ears" or "Hertz Vacuums". Consequently the politicians can't distinguish between MR's or R's, and the UK politicians, eager to please Washington promise them "Unrealistic Expectations" to continue the myth of a Great Warrior Nation, with a seat at the Superpower table. In the meantime the world's oceans are becoming the playground for pirates, terrorists and Russian submarines, en route to China.

I would even say scrap the MR4 and buy the P8A, everyone else will. Use the money saved to develop a couple of squadrons of smaller, faster surveillance aircraft, based on existing civilian airframes that can patrol the waters around the UK, Med and Middle East. Stop looking for Soviet "Boomers" or planning to support Hong Kong and Singapore.

Yes, I believe it's time to say RIP to this thread, and open another to look ahead to future threats, future cost-effective platforms, and allow the able serving people to quietly correct the problems that caused this thread to be created. Give the politicos ideas for their speeches, not criticism of things they don't understand anyway!