Nimrod Information

[tucumseh]

For those unfamiliar with the tome, Def Stan 00-970 is the Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft, and is complemented by JSP 553 Military Airworthiness Regulations and other standards.

While it is true that close inspection of most aircraft would reveal breaches of 00-970 – especially in Service Engineered Modifications (part of the reason we have SEMs is that Design Authorities won’t underwrite designs which don’t conform, so by definition many are unsafe or don’t work) – the most disturbing thing in my experience lies in certain long-standing rulings by MoD concerning the implementation of these standards (which of course is the point ACM Sir Clive Loader made in the BoI report), for example;

• They may be treated as optional, in doing so rendering the aircraft or system unfit for purpose.
• One may be instructed NOT to apply them, upon which refusing to ignore them becomes a disciplinary offence.
• It is sufficient for a system to be physically, but not functionally, safe.

And so on……… These are not temporary aberrations or isolated cases of insanity – they are consistent and quite deliberate rulings made or reiterated, to my knowledge, every year since 1998. They prove (to me) that ACM Loader’s statement is not a revelation. The Sea King ASaC BoI report detailed specific failures with regard to 00-970, condemning the design and implementation of a system as “unfit for purpose” (bullet 1). The Tornado/Patriot report clearly referred to (lack of) design features which were blatant breaches but, deliberately or otherwise, didn’t discuss them so those unfamiliar with the requirements wouldn’t necessarily realise the seriousness of the breach, which rendered the aircraft functionally unsafe (bullet 3). All of this is open source, but you have to be reasonably familiar with 00-970 and 553 to draw my conclusions.

[Distant Voice]

"QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in the light of measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate"

Well, Mr Browne and Stn Cmdr, if the report is that good why is it impossible for the families of the lost crew to get a copy of it?

DV

[Mick Smith]

I think you know the answer to that one DV. Given the original Qinetiq report, it is impossible to see how Qinetiq could possibly have made that statement in quite the way it was portrayed by the Scottish, sorry Defence Secretary, to MPs.

[Magnersdrinker]

QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in the light of measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate

Interesting words they have said DV, the last few lines "in light measures taken since the crash" , many that read that will asume the system was unsafe before the crash. I know and others that operate type know it was as safe as we could have checked but Joe bloggs in public can pick that up the other way.
Without reading this report I best not say no more but wording could have been better.

[Distant Voice]

Hi again, Magnersdrinker, haven't heard from you for a while. You say
many that read this will assume the system was unsafe before the crash
They are right, that's why we had a crash. What many would like to know now is how safe is it at present. Whilst MoD refuse to release documents such as the 2007 QinetiQ report, that Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr boast about, and the combustion analysis report, there has to be doubts. As Mick Smith points out it is doubtful that QinetiQ gave the general fuel system a clean bill of health in Sept 2007 after their critical report of 2007. I suspect that the study report covers a selected section of the fuel system in the bomb bay, and contains several conditional statements.

DV

[The Swinging Monkey]

Magners,

There is little doubt that the system was NOT safe before the loss of 230, hence the accident.
Perhaps that is one of the reasons why AAR has been stopped (probably for good) by all Nimrods.

TSM

[Distant Voice]

SM. The strange thing about AAR, is that it was not stopped until after the XV235 incident on 5th Nov. Yet according to Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr the QinetiQ report of Sept 2007 claims the fuel system is safe (with AAR), which can not be correct. This is why many of us have doubts as to what is stated in this protected report.

DV

[tucumseh]

DV & MS

I believe your assessments to be correct. It is highly unlikely MoD / Nimrod IPT have staffed the numerous requirements, gathered funding together, let and delivered contracts and embodied/implemented all that would necessary to correct/ameliorate/mitigate the vast catalogue of risks and breaches of airworthiness regulations and requirements outlined by QinetiQ in their original report.


Whoever is briefing Browne is playing with peoples lives. Undoubtedly, Browne knows this. Remember the crux of the matter. ACM Sir Clive Loader stated that airworthiness regs were not implemented properly, by no means the first time this has been noted in a BoI report. Nor was it the first time it had been declared direct to Ministers – they are on record as denying it time after time, even in the face of irrefutable evidence, a fact which I hope comes out at the forthcoming QC’s review. All quiet on that front BTW – still not answering correspondence 3 months after Browne’s announcement.

[nigegilb]

DV, XV235 was splashed all over the BBC News schedules it was a massive event. I believe the Govt/MoD responded to public/media pressure.

Not the first time either.

[Distant Voice]

I understand that the families returned from another pre-inquest meeting last Friday with a pile of reports and documents supplied by MoD. However, missing from the pile were two important reports (yes, you have guessed them), the QinetiQ report referred to by Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr, and the QinetiQ combustion report. I wonder why?

Let's try this for size. The combustion report does not, as reported by Stn Cmdr, "provide compelling evidence that leaves little doubt that the cross feed or the SCP pipe assembly was the probable source of ignition". It simply states that, based on the little inforamtion available, the source identified by the BOI could be a source. And, the famous Des Browne QinetiQ report, does not state that the Nimrod fuel system, in total, is safe, it simply focusses on those sections identified in the BOI report, with conditions. It does not clear the items metioned in the 2006 report, nor does it clear the AAR system.

DV

[Mad_Mark]

I think we should save the tax-payers the expense of holding a formal inquest and let you PPRuNe experts do the job instead :rolleyes:

MadMark!!! :mad:

[Mr-Burns]

Well said Mad Mark :D

You should change your name to 'Incredibly Sensible Mark'.

Theres just not enough experts on here for my liking.

[Distant Voice]

I think we should save the tax-payers the expense of holding a formal inquest

MoD would just love that. MM you should realise that much of the information, currently held by the Coroner and the QC, came to light because of the digging carried out by folks on pprune. And that digging will continue until all the truth is revealed.

DV

[nigegilb]

DV has been sniped at throughout this process. If anyone as any doubt about the influence that concerned individuals can have over the Inquest Process then take a look at the forthcoming Herc Inquest.

One particular report that will be examined next month was denied access to the Defence Committee. The existence of the report would not have been known to the Investigator without the direct intervention of concerned individuals. Power indeed.

DV, the most important thing is that families and friends come away from the process knowing that a detailed examination of all available evidence has taken place. You can either contribute to such a process or snipe from the sidelines. I believe you will be vindicated in the end and I also believe this thread has been a tower of influence in the whole procedure.

[Chugalug2]

Mad Mark:

I think we should save the tax-payers the expense of holding a formal inquest and let you PPRuNe experts do the job instead

Mr-Burns:

Well said Mad Mark

Having followed the Hercules 'Parliamentary' thread as well as this one I have been impressed by the stark contrast between the two. Whereas the former consisted of a resolute campaign (that succeeded) to compel the MOD to put right an identified deficiency in the airworthiness of that type, the latter has been anything but that. I commend Distant Voice, Tappers Dad, NigeGilb, tucumseh et al who have striven to have the facts come out. I despair at those who see that effort as unwelcome interference and disloyalty (to Swiss Des presumably). Time perhaps for the RAF emblem to transmogrify from Eagle to Ostrich?

[Distant Voice]

Chugalug2 and Nig; Many thanks for your support. The task would be much easier if more people came forward.

DV

[EdSet100]

Some answers to your questions and comments:

DV:if the report is that good why is it impossible for the families of the lost crew to get a copy of it?

Why would they want a copy of it? Has any member of the families (TD?) requested a copy? Its post-accident business, anyway. The measures taken fall in line with the recommendations of the BOI, they are recognised by QQ to provide the required safety standard and thus, tacitly, support the statement that there were shortcomings in the airworthiness of the aircraft.

DV:What many would like to know now is how safe is it at present.
Who are these, "many" ? The only "many" who need to know about Nimrod safety, today, are the current crews, their families and the groundcrew. Do not believe that you are asking this on our behalf. If we had concerns, we have the means to find the answers, without resorting to pprune. Retired folk, politicians, journos, etc, who believe they have a genuine need to know about the Nimrod should address their queries anywhere but here. The SoS said sorry. Do you all really believe that he wants to risk saying it again in the future? He said that the QQ report says it is safe, so the "many" should be content with that.

TSMThere is little doubt that the system was NOT safe before the loss of 230, hence the accident. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why AAR has been stopped (probably for good) by all Nimrods.

AAR was stopped due to an incident which made national news.

DV:SM. The strange thing about AAR, is that it was not stopped until after the XV235 incident on 5th Nov. Yet according to Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr the QinetiQ report of Sept 2007 claims the fuel system is safe (with AAR), which can not be correct. This is why many of us have doubts as to what is stated in this protected report.

The SoS and the Stn Cdr are both 100% correct. A flight safety report, analysing the events surrounding the incident involving XV235, will soon be distributed within the MOD I guess that under the FOI you can ask for a copy. I expect it to be very enlightening for some ppruners. Once published, the grown ups will read it, digest it and then make a decision to continue, or not, with AAR. Thats why we do these investigations; to ensure safety while being effective.

DV:Let's try this for size. The combustion report does not, as reported by Stn Cmdr, "provide compelling evidence that leaves little doubt that the cross feed or the SCP pipe assembly was the probable source of ignition". It simply states that, based on the little inforamtion available, the source identified by the BOI could be a source. And, the famous Des Browne QinetiQ report, does not state that the Nimrod fuel system, in total, is safe, it simply focusses on those sections identified in the BOI report, with conditions. It does not clear the items metioned in the 2006 report, nor does it clear the AAR system.

I think your statement needs some analysis. The combustion report focussed on what makes fuel ignite. It did not say what started the fire on XV230. It reported that fuel will ignite at a certain (very high) temp after a specific time. It ruled out electricity at high altitudes. The report provided data for the BOI to chew over. When taken into account with all possible causes of a fuel fire on a Nimrod in the 7 tank dry bay, the report provided the basis for compelling evidence that the fire was PROBABLY caused by a hot pipe. There is only one set of hot pipes in that area. The Stn Cdr's statement was spot on. You mentioned the QQ report as though you have read it and, if so, your interpretation is erroneous. I have read it. It covered the complete fuel system, including AAR (which is part of the refuelling system and does not get a separate heading). It took into account the measures implemented after the crash and, taking those those measures into account, QQ gave the Nimrod fuel system a clean bill of health in late 2007. There is not an overall judgmental statement in the report which states, "The Nimrod fuel system is safe". It is a series of questions and answers about each and every pipe and component in the fuel system and those other system components in the vicinity. Every answer is graded from very safe to unsafe and the liklihood of failures/leaks ocurring. Standard hazard analysis. Not one answer led to an unacceptable risk. Therefore, without an overall summary, it can be easily determined that the aircraft is now as safe as it needs to be. We knew it was safe from 4 Sep onwards, anyway, but the IPT had to prove it through a third party. It is safer now than it has ever been before.

DV:MoD would just love that. MM you should realise that much of the information, currently held by the Coroner and the QC, came to light because of the digging carried out by folks on pprune.
I'm sorry, DV, but that is absolutely wrong. The 3 officers on the BOI dug much deeper than anyone here, or in their bereaved family home, would ever have thought possible. Its those officers, and they alone, who researched the safety aspects, asked the questions, sponsored the trials and tests, produced the evidence and wrapped it up in such a damming and comprehensive manner that the SoS never had any alternative but to say sorry. FOI requests from the families and press about irrelevant, nebulous and trivial matters were nothing but friction in the search for the real answers.

Nigegilb:I also believe this thread has been a tower of influence in the whole procedure.
After the publication of their report I asked each member of the BOI if pprune has been influencial in their deliberations. They were too polite to laugh. Yes, they have read this discussion and I'm certain they will continue to read it occasionally, but not to find inspiration or steers, rather to find out what might have been leaked out of their office. They are pleased that nothing went in or out of their domain. Yes, believe it or not, they got the probable answers without the help of pprune, in the slightest.

Chug:
Having followed the Hercules 'Parliamentary' thread as well as this one I have been impressed by the stark contrast between the two. Whereas the former consisted of a resolute campaign (that succeeded) to compel the MOD to put right an identified deficiency in the airworthiness of that type, the latter has been anything but that.
The 2 issues are very different: one was to push for a safety system commonly used in an aircraft type that obviously needs it. I have no detailed knowledge of that particular issue, but I do know it is not the same. Yes, you can quote "airworthiness" as the common thread, but you guys are pushing for the aircraft to be grounded or radically modified, heads to roll, new government authorities, etc. In fact I don't think anyone who has read the tirade from you all, has a clear idea of what you want.

DV:
The task would be much easier if more people came forward.

What task? This is nothing more than a personal crusade based on rumour and flawed thinking. The QC and the Coroner are the only people with a task to achieve. People will not come forward to give you, DV and other ppruners, "the smoking gun" evidence you desire, because there is no such gun.

We leave the QC and the Coroner to review our sad and disasterous recent history, but we must now move forward. Despite sniping from pprune, we have a safe aircraft.

Regards
Ed Sett

[cooheed]

Top post Ed Sett:D:D

[spanners123]

A well thought out post EdSet100, :D:D:D

[tucumseh]

EdSet100

I think it right to point out, again, that this and other fatal accidents would, in all likelihood, not have occurred if mandated airworthiness regulations and requirements had been implemented properly.

Yes, the BoI may have came to their conclusions independently, but never forget the comprehensive list of senior staffs who, over a period of nearly 20 years, have been told this time and time again. Not just on Nimrod, but across the board. I applaud the BoI members, but they did not discover anything new, as the MoD would have us believe. When I say “senior staffs” I mean 2 Star and above, up to and including Ministers for the Armed Forces. All denied it, even AFTER BoIs had reported it. Ingram denied it 9 months AFTER XV230 crashed. I hope the person who drafted his response is quaking.

You said the BoI members were “too polite to laugh”. I would expect nothing more, but well recall a 2 Star laughing in my face when I advised him, in 2001, to have a specific aircraft system checked for functional safety due to the risk of friendly fire. He didn’t. Two dead. Avoidable. B@stard. THAT is what some here are trying to prevent happening again.

[nigegilb]

Ed Set, as ever a comprehensive and compelling post. However, on one point I think you are wrong. You state that the members of the BoI were not influenced by this thread indeed you suggest the mere thought is laughable.

I do not agree. Can you provide any other example of a BoI report that failed to address specific shortcomings that instead were handed to a QC? That QC has the power to call a Public Inquiry, can you name any other accident report that has been subject to a Public Inquiry?

I have no doubt that the BoI Members were being absolutely straight with you. I also have absolutely no doubt that the SoS and his "spinners" had their hands all over the report. Not a single difficult question answered on the day.

Furthermore, compensation in principle has been agreed as a result of airworthiness issues before the verdict of the Inquest. Can you also name any other example in the last 6 years?

Ed Set, you are kidding yourself if you think the mountain of publicity and unearthing of facts had no influence.

One final question which I hope you can help me with. Days after the tragedy it was deemed "operationally essential" to carry on with AAR sorties.



How so, if no AAR sorties have been carried out since Nov?

[Tappers Dad]

EdSet100

Has any member of the families (TD?) requested a copy?

Yes more than one family

AAR was stopped due to an incident which made national news

Yes who broke the news ? Not the RAF

The 3 officers on the BOI dug much deeper than anyone here.

Sorry, where in the BOI do they mention the BAE report issued 28th Febuary 2007 on the Hot Air Ducting . It states the tested 35 ducts
Two of which failed proof pressure loading,
Corrosionn was present in the majority of Ducts,
Cracks in the weld beads of 14 Ducts

No mention of this report in the BOI, well perhaps as you are pals with the BOI you can ask them why. I asked one of them and they couldn't answer me and it was in earshot of the press he just said I don't think I should be talking to you and skulked off..

[nigegilb]

256,897, 1/4 of a million hits. And you think this thread has had no influence?

[Tappers Dad]

Even the MOD posted on here nige along with an MP and numerous media parties.

It's a pity the BOI haven't taken any notice of Pprune perhaps they may then have mentioned in their findings the Fuel leak issues mentioned in the leaked emails.

[Magnersdrinker]

Distant Voice (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=171556)

Hi again, Magnersdrinker, haven't heard from you for a while. You say
Quote:
many that read this will assume the system was unsafe before the crash
They are right, that's why we had a crash. What many would like to know now is how safe is it at present. Whilst MoD refuse to release documents such as the 2007 QinetiQ report, that Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr boast about, and the combustion analysis report, there has to be doubts. As Mick Smith points out it is doubtful that QinetiQ gave the general fuel system a clean bill of health in Sept 2007 after their critical report of 2007. I suspect that the study report covers a selected section of the fuel system in the bomb bay, and contains several conditional statements.

DV


Well if its any consolation these documents/reports are not shared with the engineers who fix these things. We just get appropriate checks , RTIs etc. I have to admit the amount of checks and things as of late are mounting up and its hitting us at the most and thats man power wise. I wont go into detail as Im not in position to say that but what is frustrating , its easy to introduce these many checks but this added with normal day to day maint as well as a jet that aint young anymore it would be great for a few more techies with afew years experience.

[Magnersdrinker]

nigegilb (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=135332)

How so, if no AAR sorties have been carried out since Nov?

Well Brize Norton have not been able to produce a serviceable VC10 since then !!! ;)

Good question though and I guess like everything now the MOD is fearfull of another incident.Anything Nimrod related now gets splashed across the press. Flying is and always will be a dangerous thing and no matter how much you wrap an aircraft in bubble wrap incidents/accidents will always happen. For all we know the AAR has stopped on Nimrod because of Operational requirement and the need. there are many new platforms in the theatre now that do the job , changes in planning , are you 100% sure they stopped AAR just cause of XV235? Provide that evidence and I will 100% believe you.

[nigegilb]

MD, no idea pal, but having flown bog rolls in the daylight into Kabul for supposed "op necessity" reasons, I always believed there was another way.

Safe to say, nobody will ever know what difference a few dissenting voices made!

You make a very serious point though, what changed besides the bad publicity? Maybe it was too much risk for some very high flying careers....

[Magnersdrinker]

Nige I just hopefully trying to point out to people that maybe its coincedence. I cannot say for certain they stopped AAR cause of the XV235 incident but most get impression on the Prune thats the case, we still do AAR refuelling training that i know as we have to checks on probe etc etc . So if we still doing live AAR sorties for crew training then there is no reason why Nimrod has stopped in the hotter regions,with as you know reduced a/c (hope thats public info :bored:).
Maybe its just the start of the running down of Nim tempo in the region ? I cant answer that , only the big cheeses that run the military can say answer that i guess !

[EdSet100]

Tuc:
I think it right to point out, again, that this and other fatal accidents would, in all likelihood, not have occurred if mandated airworthiness regulations and requirements had been implemented properly.

I completely agree. The airworthiness of the Nimrod before 2 Sep 07 has been found wanting and no-one can disagree with that point. I also agree with your 2nd paragraph. I wasn't aware that Adam Ingram had made such a bold statement. Regarding decisions made at the top, I'm certain that everyone who has a stake in Nimrod (and other aircraft) safety, since 2 Sep 07 is not now being as obstructive as the guy you mentioned in your 3rd para.

Nigegilb:
Can you provide any other example of a BoI report that failed to address specific shortcomings that instead were handed to a QC?
No. But, I believe this is the first case of 2 non-governmental organisations being cited by a BOI as authors of a flawed safety case: BAe and the independant civilian firm who checked BAe's work. The SoS cannot stand up in the HoC and blame them outright , so he has called in a QC to ask the appropriate questions and apportion blame.

Nigegilb:
Furthermore, compensation in principle has been agreed as a result of airworthiness issues before the verdict of the Inquest. Can you also name any other example in the last 6 years?

No. But, the contents of the BOI report, with unqualified support from CinC Air Command has clearly identified a gigantic cock-up, without attribution at this stage, in the relationship between the RAF and BAe that led to the loss of an aircraft owned by the MOD. Therefore, as owners and operators of the Nimrod, the MOD has no choice but to pay out compensation. The QC's investigation might find cause for BAe and the civilian company to compensate the MOD for failing to provide an accurate safety case, that in turn led the MOD and its crews into believing that the Nimrod was safe.

Nigegilb:Ed Set, you are kidding yourself if you think the mountain of publicity and unearthing of facts had no influence.

Publicity brought pressure to bring closure. Regarding the un-earthing of facts: well, interesting discussions about irrelevant wing fuel leaks abound, but no-one here mentioned the possibility of a No 1 tank blow-off valve or a hot SCP/crossfeed pipe (leaking pipes were discussed) or a leaking fuel coupling before the end of Apr last year, which was when the BOI had completed its investigations. No-one here discussed the concept of remedial maintenance versus preventative maintenance on fuel couplings; a very central issue that the BOI painstakingly researched. Yes, sure, pprune "un-earthed facts", but they were either irrelevant or well behind the progress of the BOI team. Look at the date they adjourned and look at what had been discussed here before then. They only re-convened to analyse fuel leak rates per hour rather than per year. The BOI members are highly respected officers from our own front line, While they didn't speak out of turn, they were not invisible either and casual discussions about pprune's supposed influence were not unusual. I can tell you, for a fact, that they were not influenced by anything written here. They didn't need steers from pprune. If they did, they deserve to have their flying cats taken off them. So, no, I'm not kidding myself.

Nigegilb: One final question which I hope you can help me with. Days after the tragedy it was deemed "operationally essential" to carry on with AAR sorties.

How so, if no AAR sorties have been carried out since Nov?
There was a temporary suspension in Oct/Nov 06 which was reversed once the details of the incident(s) were quickly analysed and found to be acceptable. Then, we had the diversion into Kandahar, with all the national news that it attracted. Unlikethe previous suspension, a formal investigation was required. Furthermore, unlike Sep 06, Nimrod AAR was not pivotal, operationally. The RAF had to be seen to investigate the incident. It was deemed sensible, pending the investigation, to suspend AAR because it would not be consistent with the raison d'etre for the investigation and the operational imperative is not there at the moment. I'm aware that the investigation is very thorough, hence the protracted period of non-AAR. Once the investigation is complete, the air staff will make a decision....

TD:
AAR was stopped due to an incident which made national news

Yes who broke the news ? Not the RAF

Indeed. More friction in our attempts to fight this war.

TD:
Sorry, where in the BOI do they mention the BAE report issued 28th Febuary 2007 on the Hot Air Ducting . It states the tested 35 ducts
Two of which failed proof pressure loading,
Corrosionn was present in the majority of Ducts,
Cracks in the weld beads of 14 Ducts

That was a report about hot air pipes inside the engine compartments; nowhere near the seat of the fire. The engine compartments have hot air leak detectors, a fire detection and extinguishing system and therefore contain the necessary level of mitigation against an unacceptable risk. The BOI was not there to review the safety of the aircraft as a whole. It's task was to find out where the fire was and what most likely caused it. You have been given a copy of their Terms of Reference. Hot air pipes in the engine compartments, leaking or otherwise, are totally irrelevant to their work, so your question to the member was outside his terms of reference.

TD:he just said I don't think I should be talking to you and skulked off..
That is a most ungracious comment. The work that he and his colleagues, alone put in has resulted in the SoS apologising to you and offering compensation.

Nigegilb:
256,897, 1/4 of a million hits. And you think this thread has had no influence?
There is a difference between casual interest and influence.

TD:
Even the MOD posted on here nige along with an MP and numerous media parties.

It's a pity the BOI haven't taken any notice of Pprune perhaps they may then have mentioned in their findings the Fuel leak issues mentioned in the leaked emails.

The MOD has used this site to announce events, not to gain information. Once again, the fuel leaks mentioned in the leaked e-mails were outside the scope of the BOI. Anyway, as you have been told many times, all aircraft around the world, leak (seep) fuel from their wing tanks. Its not a problem.

Regards
Ed Sett

[nigegilb]

"One of the SDs says that if operationally essential and if no other alternatives exist then the aircraft can tank, albeit with AOC 2 Gp permission."

Ed Set XV 235 was tanking under the above SD, it deemed operationally essential. Now you are saying it is not deemed operationally essential. Are you referring to today or Nov 6? If so, is that why Nimrod has not returned to operationally essential AAR duties?

The fact is, that whilst the BoI may have written the report in Apr07, the Captain of XV235 had absolutely no idea that his aircraft was not considered a fire risk when that incident happened. A Mayday into Kandahar ensued because his own Air Staff had not deemed it necessary to inform the crews of the essential contents of the BoI report. Indeed, you state that within 3 or 4 days of the tragedy Nimrod was considered safe. I would describe it as a failure of leadership.

"My perspective is that he knew, at that time, what caused the crash (Panorama 4 June, BOI diary cease work in Apr). He knew there was no fire in the bomb bay, he knew that XV227's SCP pipe blow out (the subject of the program) was irrelevant to AAR. He knew that pipe coupling leaks would probably continue but he also knew that there is no ignition source in the bomb bay or anywhere where refuel pipes route, for that matter. Basically, he had all the info. He was careful to talk about AAR in the present tense, "is safe". "As it needs to be" means that we are operating on the edge of safety, not in a comfort zone. So, if a fuel leak occurs during AAR, we might suffer other effects, but we will not burn and die.

I'm just pi$$ed off that no-one officially told us that info, and it eventually led to a fear-factor crew declaring an emergency and rushing into land.
Everyone at Kinloss understands why the crew reacted in the way they did but we all now know that they were not in the same situation that our perished colleagues were in. Shame on our leaders, I say."

[tucumseh]

EdSet100

Thank you for your acknowledgment. I think everyone here is like-minded on the real, underlying issue – its people who count and those at the top charged with implementing the regulations have abrogated their responsibilities to a criminal extent. I would not tar those of us at lower echelons with the same brush, however there are clearly those in PE/DPA/DLO over the years who have taken the ambivalence of senior staffs toward airworthiness as a benchmark, and just haven’t bothered. Especially when they saw what happened to people who disobeyed instructions to ignore airworthiness.



Nigel

To expand on the timeline.

BoI report prepared April 2007.

Ingram - June 2007 – Airworthiness regs are implemented properly.

Ainsworth – August 2007 - Ditto

Airs Staffs - November 2007 – Ditto

I’d say they were in complete denial over a very long period. I’d also say those who drafted Ministerial responses were incompetent and/or deliberately misled Ministers. Given MoD have been told all this repeatedly over a number of years, I’d say both. But, within a week a colossal penny dropped and Browne made his statement to the House. Someone, somewhere, clearly pointed out the significance of ACM Loader’s statement and it hit the fan.

[Tappers Dad]

EdSet100

"That was a report about hot air pipes inside the engine compartments;"

Wrong, I suggest you look at page 11 of the report and get YOUR facts right.

http://www.benknight.co.uk/images/ducts.jpg

[nigegilb]

Tuc, in the case of the Herc fleet, I am sure that Ingram was deliberately lied to by a very senior RAF Officer. In fact there were several witnesses.

I read Ed Sets reasoning for the unprecedented actions after the Nimrod BoI was published. I am still of the opinion that political expedients were the main drivers. Browne needed to take the sting out of the situation, he apologized and announced a review. Something the Brown Govt has been doing almost continuously for months. Check out the following statement by Browne in response to intense and difficult questions by Gerald Howarth on the day the BoI was published.

"I did not recognise the circumstances that informed the hon. Gentleman’s first question, but that may be a failing on my part. As with several questions that he poses, I am sure that he accepts that it falls squarely in the remit of the review that I have announced today. Those questions are entitled to an answer. They cannot be answered by the BOI and should be answered by a process of independent investigation, and I have therefore set up the review. The questions will be passed on directly to the principal reviewer when he is appointed. Indeed, any other questions that Opposition Front Benchers identify as needing to be asked should be fed into the process in due course."

How very convenient. Ministers of the Crown have undoubtedly misled the British public. This review could still bite the Govt in the arrse.

[Distant Voice]

Well EdSet100 you have had a great deal say. So let me comment on some of the things you have said.

Your understanding of the combustion report is WRONG. I suggest you read pages 3, 46 and 47, and then ask yourself why the recommendations are not mentioned in the BoI report.

Your understanding of the BAE duct report is WRONG. For the reason already pointed out by Tapper's Dad. If the BOI received the same information as you have posted, then it is no wonder they did not look at it. But they should have known after the XV227 incident

Your understanding of the 2006 QinetiQ report is WRONG. This was not an "interesting discussion about irrelevant fuel leaks", it was about mismanagement of information, outdated documentation, the inability to find faults back at base and undertake recommendations. These observations by QinetiQ were of the whole system.

Your understanding of what this forum achieved is WRONG. The Panorama programme was born out of this forum, and that programme discussed hot air pipes and couplings. Also, the 2006 QinetiQ report addresses remedial versus preventative maintenance, and recommends a change from the former to the latter.

Your understanding of why the Board re-conviened is WRONG. The board re-conviened for the six reasons stated in the report. And, one of the reasons starts with the phrase " in the light of new information.."

Your understanding of why myself and the families want a copy of the 2007 QinetiQ is WRONG. It is because, in the light of other evidence the statement made by Des Browne does not ring true. The families were told they would receive a copy on 5th Dec, and they are still waiting. If it is as straightforward as you make out, where is the problem? I would like to remind you that airworthiness is not just about the safety of the people who fly, but also the safety of the people who are being flown over. And right now we are asking the questions. Just answer these questions, if in Sept 2007 QinetiQ gave the impression that all was well, do you not question the validity of the report when a fuel line/coupling failed in Nov on XV235? If the report does not state the "Nimrod fuel system is safe", who attached that tag to it - IPT?

There is more that I could say, but I see little point. I am sure you will continue to defend the IPT/MOD/RAF line long after the QC has reported. I was told once by my old boss at Boscombe Down, that if a person gets one thing WRONG in a report/statement then you may as well toss the whole thing out of the window. Sorry but I have counted at least six


DV

[shona beattie]

Ed Set 100, just to let you know the majority of the families want all the documentation and are reading it cover to cover.

[Mick Smith]

EdSet100 said:

But, the contents of the BOI report, with unqualified support from CinC Air Command has clearly identified a gigantic cock-up, without attribution at this stage, in the relationship between the RAF and BAe that led to the loss of an aircraft owned by the MOD. Therefore, as owners and operators of the Nimrod, the MOD has no choice but to pay out compensation. The QC's investigation might find cause for BAe and the civilian company to compensate the MOD for failing to provide an accurate safety case, that in turn led the MOD and its crews into believing that the Nimrod was safe.


Sorry Ed, it is simply wrong to blame the BAE Systems safety case, which included the following very clear caveat:

In view of this, together with the fact that all realistically enacted or genuine conflict and classified operational role conditions tend to differ substantially in nature and conditions, that the nature of new ones is difficult to predict, and that the extent of any reduction in safety levels during conflicts/realistic training exercises may remain classified (ie not made available to the ADA), the safety case, as prepared by the ADA, can only reasonably consider safety levels under routine peacetime conditions of operation. That is, routine patrol, search and rescue and routine training missions. Accepting this, it must remain the sole responsibility of the MoD to determine any level of tolerability of any reduction in safety levels deemed necessary when operating under realistically enacted or genuine emergency/conflict or classified role conditions.

Anyone who tries to sue BAE Systems for something that happened over Afghanistan will therefore be wasting their money.

[Vage Rot]

I have spoken with that crew captain. He too is mighty pi$$ed off that he was denied information that might have calmed him down.

Nige, I work with that Captain and whilst his decision may not have been as rushed in different circumstances, he was certainly not pi$$ed off. I suggest you talk to him again and get the facts right from the horses mouth before posting on here.

That said, it would seem that info was available that should have been released to the front line sooner, not just wrt this incident, but for general handling of the aircraft. Until the BOI reported, we all thought 230 had had a bomb bay fire!!

[nigegilb]

VR, I never reveal my sources, as I did not speak to the skipper direct I have removed the reference from my post.

Regards,

Nige

[Safety_Helmut]

Mick

You have picked up on a very significant point, one which I have raised several times on various threads on pprune. The MoD has a whole suite of Safety Cases which only cover peacetime operations. I spent several years both writing and reviewing MoD aviation related safety cases, and this is a major failing. The MoD has committed virtually all of its aircraft types, apart from training aircraft, to operations either in Afghanistan or Iraq, yet virtually all have peacetime safety cases. The guidance provided to IPTs is clear though. Safety Cases are to cover ALL operational scenarios, peacetime, training, and the catch all of Crisis, Tension and War. The guidance for this is clear to anyone who can read, and is provided in Defence Standard 00-56, JSP 553 and POSMS, three of the key safety management and airworthiness publications.

The simple fact of the matter is, that in many cases, the MoD simply does not have Safety Cases for the manner in which it operates many of its aircraft. And before anyone shouts me down on this, remember, a Safety Case must be based on the manner and the environment in which a system is used.

Of course, the Safety Case is not a legal requirement. However, it is the manner in which the MoD has chosen to demonstrate satisfaction of other legal obligations. It is an approach that is widely used in many industries and is well understood by those same industries. That is not the case generally in the MoD.

Responsibility for the aircraft Safety Case rests with the IPT Leader. Yes, the IPTL can bring in a third party to develop and maintain the Safety Case, but the responsibility for it rests with the him. It is written, in black and white, in JSP553.

I only have Change 3 of JSP553 to hand, but can’t imagine that this part has changed that much:
2.58 The IPTL is to ensure that the Contractor’s Safety Case is independently assessed. The objective of independent assessment is to overcome possible conflicts of interest and oversights that may arise from the use of a single organisation. The level of independence should be commensurate with the anticipated level of safety risk, ranging from an independent organisation for the most critical systems to an independent person for the least critical.


Does anyone on here know which independent organisation has reviewed the Nimrod Safety Case ?

S_H

[tucumseh]

S-H

Spot on, as usual.

The words used by BAeS, as quoted by MS, are fairly standard. They are NOT used as an industry “get out” but, in my experience, as a firm reminder that the MoD’s own actions are lacking. BAeS may be the Aircraft Design Authority, but the caveat is always that they, and the suppliers of what they call “vendor equipment” (avionics etc), must be under continual contract cover to maintain the Build Standard, which includes safety. If these contracts don’t exist, or are not properly funded or implemented, then the inevitable result is serial breaches of the airworthiness regs and an incomplete audit trail. A simple fact – they are not funded properly and in many cases contracts don’t exist. (This, in part, is what ACM Loader refers to in the BoI report). The MoD don’t deny this but, incredibly, state that RAF Wyton has the facility to do the necessary work. This is a blatant lie – if this were the case Wyton would be the biggest air station in the world and Huntingdon a city of half a million defence workers. Oh, and prior to 1993 it was RAF Swanton Morley who had this capability. Norwich must be a ghost town. Utter b@lls, but that is the nonsense they trot out as they dig ever deeper holes for themselves.

I know Boscombe have continually hit this problem over a long period. They fulfil their obligations and deliver MAR recommendations which may say “It’s physically safe, but when put to its intended use (warfighting) it is functionally unsafe”. Typically, this is written by a serving officer who understands the real need, and doesn’t for one minute contemplate a peacetime only scenario. Corrective action takes money and slips the programme. Pressure is brought to bear at a higher (administrative) level, and the peacetime rule S-H mentions is trotted out. The beancounter mentality prevails, the contracts are paid-off and the aircraft offered to the User for Release to Service. He’s caught between a rock and a hard place. Sign the RTS knowing the aircraft is not fit for purpose, or demand corrective action and incur the wrath of his bosses by delaying introduction. I know many suspect this, or something very close, is what happened on Chinook. And the Boscome officer? He returns to unit to fly that very aircraft and always at the back of his mind is the FACT that he KNOWS the aircraft is unfit for purpose. If he’s lucky, and there are some here who know exactly what I’m talking about, he can have a quiet word in a project manager’s ear; one who is prepared to ignore higher instruction and make the aircraft safe. But, this only fixes one aircraft type. What if the same problem exists in other aircraft? A different management chain is involved who object to being advised they have a problem, and do nothing. Unfortunately, as with the Tornado/Patriot accident, the result can be tragic.

This is precisely why the QC’s remit must include all aircraft, not just Nimrod. He must be allowed to assess the entire process, not just as it was applied to Nimrod in a given period.

[Safeware]

tuc,

As you discuss, the exclusion isn't really an industry get out, but it can feel that way when you are trying to provide RTS recs! The key is to realise it is because industry don't know how it is really going to be used from the moment they hand the ac over. The words from Mick's post are actually quite sound, and somewhat better than a brief "this report covers the training mission defined in X" as I've seen.

An issue that I had to overcome was reminding the RTSA that their safety case had to cover operations, as required by JSP 553. It's amazing how many people that you would expect to know the contents of 553 don't really understand it.

sw

[Safety_Helmut]

They are NOT used as an industry “get out” but, in my experience, as a firm reminder that the MoD’s own actions are lacking.
the exclusion isn't really an industry get out
Hmmmm.......?

There are many systems aboard an aircraft which only have an operational or combat use, so I think to say that industry do not understand how the kit is used does not tell the full story.

It is certainly my experience that these words are used by both industry and MoD as a get out.

S_H

[Safeware]

S_H,There are many systems aboard an aircraft which only have an operational or combat use, so I think to say that industry do not understand how the kit is used does not tell the full story.
Agree completely, but what they are trying to get out of is quantifying the risk in a situation where the bad guys are biting back.

An outrageous example of this that I came across was a safety argument that (basically) said the risk of releasing the wrong weapon was eliminated because only one weapon would be carried on the aircraft at a time! This was based on the peacetime assertion that because weapons sorties are training missions carried out on ranges, only one weapon would need to be carried. :\

sw

[EdSet100]

Before I reply to some comments made in response to my last post, I would ask you to look at the time of day that I posted it. It was late and from home, where I don't have all the docs to hand. There was an element of memory testing in my message, and some of my refrences to documents were erroneous. So, where required, I have included apologies.

Nigegilb:
Ed Set XV 235 was tanking under the above SD, it deemed operationally essential. Now you are saying it is not deemed operationally essential. Are you referring to today or Nov 6? If so, is that why Nimrod has not returned to operationally essential AAR duties?

My understanding of the sequence of events and decisions is that the "suspend AAR" decision was taken immediately after the incident due to the nature and contents as written, of the incident report. I don't know the operational effect of that suspension, but I believe it was determined to be secondary to the suspension. Within days, an investigation was ordered and we still await its outcome. In the meantime we have been informed that the existing lack of operational capability by the Nimrod has been addressed. I recognise your quote and I still stand by it. Despite the criticism of leadership, the technical aspect, ie "it is as safe as it needs to be" still stands. I re-iterate that its in the present tense. I believe the report is at its final stage. I haven't read it, but the rumour is that CAS's words remain correct: the Nimrod is safe enough for AAR. But, there is a growing feeling that due to intrusive media and public pressure, the technical factor in the decision may be overruled for political reasons. However, growing media and public attention to the troops taking fire on the ground may encourage the politicians to provide those lads with the best surveillance support the RAF has to offer. Its being held back at the moment for no good technical reason.

TD:
"That was a report about hot air pipes inside the engine compartments;"

Wrong, I suggest you look at page 11 of the report and get YOUR facts right.

My apology for wrongly saying that the report only contained data about engine compartments.

Underlying my reply to you are these two facts:

1. Part of the crossfeed pipe and the initial section of the SCP are in the bomb bay (as the diagram shows), but the BOI established that there was no fire, at all, within the bomb bay. Therefore, any possibility of duct failures within the bomb bay that might cause fires, while of some interest, was outside the BOI's terms of reference, because those ducts were in an area that didn't catch fire, therefore they could not have caused the fire. Analysis of duct failures within the bomb bay would have been nugatory and time wasting; particularly with bereaved families demanding answers.

2. The ducts that are in the area of the fire are surrounded by 5 leak detectors, set at 235C. There was no warning of a duct leak (the warning light is right next to the AAR control panel and would have been obvious and reported on intercom; it wasn't). So, any air leak that could have caused the fire would have been at a relatively low temperature and played straight onto an adjacent fuel pipe coupling (seal). This scenario was recognised as a possibility by the BOI. They did not need to check the BAe report; it was an obvious (though small) possibility from the outset and reported as such.

I re-iterate my answer that the BOI did not check that BAe report because it was either outside their Terms of Reference or it was not needed.

I find it intrigueing that you are critical of the BOI process and the officers who worked tirelessly to produce a document so damming that the SoS had no altermative but to stand up in the HoC and apologise to you and the other families, together with an unconditional offer of compensation.

DV:
Well EdSet100 you have had a great deal say. So let me comment on some of the things you have said.

I can only post once a day at the moment, so I have bunched up the comments together with my replies, and I do so again. You have said I am wrong on 7 points.

I have not read the combustion report. I am only re-iterating my understanding of the BOI's analysis of the report in the areas relevant to the accident. You have quoted specific pages, so please quote the relevant passages, in order for me to see where, in your view, I am wrong.

I don't know if the BOI received or read the BAe duct report but I hope my above answer to TD goes some way to explaining why it was not mentioned by the BOI.

Your understanding of the 2006 QinetiQ report is WRONG. This was not an "interesting discussion about irrelevant fuel leaks", it was about mismanagement of information, outdated documentation, the inability to find faults back at base and undertake recommendations. These observations by QinetiQ were of the whole system.

I didn't mention the 2006 QQ report. I don't question its accuracy, but I do question its relevance to the accident. Anyway, I simply wrote what you have quoted above and within our pprune discussion there was nothing that was discussed or un-earthed here that the BOI team was not already aware of. I cannot believe that pprune led the BOI team to the QQ report.

Your understanding of what this forum achieved is WRONG. The Panorama programme was born out of this forum, and that programme discussed hot air pipes and couplings. Also, the 2006 QinetiQ report addresses remedial versus preventative maintenance, and recommends a change from the former to the latter.


Pprune, Panorama, Timesonline and RAF servicemen who should know better, might have caught the public's interest, but the fact of the matter is that no SoS will stand up in the HoC, say "sorry", and offer compensation, based on the "evidence" of the aforesaid media. He will be guided only by the officials within his dept, and in this case it was the compelling evidence provided by the RAF BOI, CinC and, I guess, the approval of the MOD legal eagles.

Your understanding of why the Board re-conviened is WRONG. The board re-conviened for the six reasons stated in the report. And, one of the reasons starts with the phrase " in the light of new information.."

Yes, agreed. I don't why I wrote that throwaway comment from memory. It wasn't needed in the context I was writing at the time. However, I've checked out what the "...new information" was. Its in the BOI report on page 2 of Part 2A and the new info obviously came from the IPT or higher up the engineering chain (certainly not from any ppruner, panorama or timesonline because its defensive not aggresive). It clarifies how the RAF performed a mandatory review of failure trends to support its use of corrective maintenance.

Your understanding of why myself and the families want a copy of the 2007 QinetiQ is WRONG.
And I still don't understand why the families are interested, now, in post accident matters. The MOD/RAF has done its best, through the BOI to explain, to the best of their abilities, what happened to XV230, together with any pre-accident factors that were relevant. Consequently, a formal and public apology with an unconditional offer of compensation has been given. Its not my place to say whether or not or this is satisfactory to the families, but I cannot understand how a report, post accident, examining revised procedures can change what the SoS has said and done. The report is restricted and it would appear that someone has decided, since the BOI day, that it cannot be put into the public domain. Thats my guess.

I am sure you will continue to defend the IPT/MOD/RAF line long after the QC has reported. I was told once by my old boss at Boscombe Down, that if a person gets one thing WRONG in a report/statement then you may as well toss the whole thing out of the window. Sorry but I have counted at least six


I'm not defending anyone. Like you, I prefer the truth. I have severely criticised the leaders for their slavish adherence to BOI protocol. I counted only 1 factual error in my previous message and I have acceded to your correction. If I don't understand something, that doesn't make me wrong. The other "wrong" points are a matter of opinion. You started this discussion many months ago and you have submitted many questions (recently I have given some thorough and correct technical answers) and messages. I will not check back in your contributions for errors. I'm sure there are one or two there, but I do not want to risk the need to toss all of your statements out of the window ;-) We all make mistakes.

Yet another late night......

[Safety_Helmut]

Ed Sett

I have read your posts with interest. I don't agree with some of your views, but the infromation you have contributed has been very useful.

This I must comment on though:
I still don't understand why the families are interested, now, in post accident matters.
Everyone connected with RAF/RN/Army aviation should take an interest in this, because the MoD has failed over many years to properly follow up recommendations of Boards of Inquiry. Notice I say follow up. I would not expect all recommendations to be implemented, it's not always practicable. But it is not unreasonable to expect to see them properly followed up.

It would be very interesting to look into BoI recommendations of say the last 30 years, and look at how many later accidents/incidents could be linked to not implementing the said recommendations.

S_H

[nigegilb]

Ed Set,

Thanks for taking the time. It is curious that AAR has not been re-instated. Maybe CAS has blown his credibility among the wider audience. Maybe it is not as safe as we have been led to believe. I struggle to understand what the difference is between this serious leak and the ones that have preceded it that didn't warrant this scrutiny. Ground testing has never been able to re-create the environmental conditions in-flight but the Nimrod was given a clean bill of health to continue every time til Nov. If we somehow contributed to that pressure here on this thread, then the Chiefs should ask themselves how they got themselves into a situation where an ageing airframe was chosen to have the very latest battlefield technology bolted on.
I heard the other day that one option on the table is to cancel Nimrod MRA4 even at this late stage. All rather extraordinary wouldn't you agree?

Time for a change?

Certainly hope the high ups review the handling of this case. I would recommend more honesty and more transparency straight away. A restricted document is not difficult to get round. I am not convinced lessons have been learnt here.

[tucumseh]

S-H

“It is certainly my experience that these words are used by both industry and MoD as a get out”.


If I could clarify what I said, because I don’t think you’re actually disagreeing with me.

It is important to establish contractual boundaries of responsibility. On a whole aircraft, there are typically 3 components – MoD, the Aircraft Design Authority and Equipment / Sub-System Design Authorities/Custodians.

The words quoted are simply the standard way of expressing that boundary from the ADA or DA/DC viewpoint. It is not abrogation of responsibility or trying to “get out”, it is an indication of a deeper understanding which is almost entirely lost on the MoD.
Most companies are happy to accept responsibility but they must be paid a fair and reasonable price, under a suitable contract which clearly states their responsibilities and articulates the control boundaries. It is the responsibility of the MoD (and seldom as low as IPT level as they don’t control everything in their aircraft) to ensure there are no gaps at these control boundaries. In practice, this is usually a 2 Star.

Admittedly, some companies flagrantly abrogate their responsibility, even when contracted properly, but the PE/DPA Nimrod 2 Star, CDP and successive Mins(AF) said that was ok, so I’m sure it is. Hopefully the QC will disagree. This is a simple thing to fix.

The procedures for exercising such seamless control over a design, and maintaining that design, are laid down in a Def Stan which the MoD have been trying to scrap for 13 years. It has not been updated for 17 years (Jan 91) and has largely fallen into disuse. A “waste of money” apparently. And because it is not applied properly - here we go again – there are gaping holes in airworthiness audit trails. This is the point made here many times and in various BoI reports involving fatalities – the procedures/processes/regulations are relatively robust (although some are outdated) but they are not implemented properly. This is a DELIBERATE MoD decision, therefore Companies MUST protect themselves in a legal sense.

In short, companies have a vested interest in their product being seen to be safe. MoD policy and practice militate against this.

I’m sorry for the detail, which I know many here understand, but I feel it important to make these distinctions. Things are coming to a head and fingers will be pointed. Some already point them at BAeS. I have read the various official reports which are available and, very clearly, BAeS and vendors have not been under contract to ensure a seamless audit trail. Also, and the QC’s remit is worded this way, the term “RAF” is used when it should be “MoD” and even “Government”. Having read, for example, the main QinetiQ report mentioned here, there are a few things the RAF could have done better, but the underlying problems are central. There is a danger of a cheap and nasty “fix” for Nimrod but the same thing happening again on other aircraft. Nimrod is not the first, it’s the one that has brought matters to a head.

[Distant Voice]

Ed Sett; You say,
..but the BOI established that there was no fire, at all, within the bomb bay. Therefore, any possibility of duct failures within the bomb bay that might cause fires, while of some interest, was outside the BOI terms of reference

Have you really thought about what you have said there. You imply that prior to the BOI being set up, it was already established that there had been no fire in the bomb. So, the BOI was directed (by terms of reference) to ignore bomb bay items as a source and/or cause of the fire. Also, if you read my postings #2246 and 2247 you will be reminded of what the BOI said about hot air leaks in the bomb bay area. They make reference to the BAE duct study, but appear to be under the impression that no report was available. Whoever, gave them this impression mislead them.

DV

[tucumseh]

Mileandahalf

I agree the thread should stick to verifiable facts, and not speculate or sling mud.

The stage we are at now is pre-inquest and pre-QC review.

Some indisputable facts are;


ACM Loader stated (reiterated) that airworthiness regs are not applied properly. This prompted SoS to admit liability and order the review.

In doing so, SoS disagreed with his junior Ministers who, after the accident, are on record as stating the regs ARE implemented properly.

The relevant MoD(PE) / DPA 2 Star ruled, in writing, that implementing these regs is optional, and seeking to implement a specific part of them is a disciplinary offence.

CDP upheld this ruling, in writing. As did above Junior Ministers.

All the above documents are either personal letters, obtained under FoI or published on the MoD website. Nowhere do I mention RAF or BAeS. I’ll let the QC sort that lot out. MoD won’t.

[Chugalug2]

Although the this thread is driven with the best of intentions, it is now a real yawn, and a bit of an annoying one at that.

Speak for yourself, mileandahalf, as I for one feel as tuc infers, that the state of airworthiness provision for UK military aircraft is at last being brought to a head in the aftermath of this tragic accident. I find it instructive that a common denominator in so many failures in this respect would appear to be the actions not of politicians, nor even of senior civil servants but of senior serving officers (2* and above). My conviction that the regulation of UK military airworthiness should be taken out of such hands and transferred to a separate, stand alone and independent Military Airworthiness Authority grows ever stronger. Peoples lives are of infinitely greater import than the reputations and career prospects of senior officers, however differently they may see it.

[EdSet100]

Safety Helmut,
Yes, good point. I can understand why the families would want to see the BOI recommendations implemented. I suppose it could be of some comfort to them to know that unsafe systems are made safe and that other families, in the future, will not suffer losses due to another similar accident.

Regards
Ed Sett

[EdSet100]

DV,
I'm not trying to score points, but your reply is worth further discussion:
You imply that prior to the BOI being set up, it was already established that there had been no fire in the bomb.
If I gave you that impression then, sorry, it was not my intention. What I was trying to indicate was that the BOI inspected the damage to the airframe at the crash site and noted the lack of any evidence of fire in the bomb bay (which was confirmed by specialists). Therefore, there was no purpose in investigating or analysing fault trends associated with any components (hot air ducts, hydraulic pipes and electrical wiring) in the bomb bay. It was outside their terms of reference to expand their analysis of the airframe beyond the location of the fire and the possible causes in that location.

Also, if you read my postings #2246 and 2247 you will be reminded of what the BOI said about hot air leaks in the bomb bay area. They make reference to the BAE duct study, but appear to be under the impression that no report was available. Whoever, gave them this impression mislead them.

The only reference to the duct study in the BOI report (that I could find) is in their review of XV227's incident, where they state that when the study is complete, it will be used to derive a lifing policy. They probably didn't have any significant interest in 227's incident because 230's SCP duct had been replaced (we must assume it didn't fail). The only outstanding business from 227's report was the checking of similar ducts (ie the crosfeed duct), but the lack of evidence of a fire in the bomb bay or the lack of a red light to indicate an air leak in the 7 tank dry bay, meant that no similar duct suffered a large failure. So, it didn't matter what the duct report would say; it wouldn't add to the evidence. However, the BOI team recognised that, regardless of the duct report, a small leak below the threshold for a warning was a possibility. A report is not needed in order to take that view. So, I can only speculate that they were on the dist list for the duct report but they chose not to take it into evidence, for the reasons I have just given. You speculate that they were misled, I speculate that they weren't. I think we should leave it at that.

DV, you are interested in Nimrod safety post-accident, so the duct report has some value in its own right. Even if the report had said that the crossfeed duct is riddled with holes, we actually stopped pressurizing it after engine start on the ground on the 4 Sep 07. It has not been charged with air in flight since the accident. It will never again be charged with air in flight unless we make a major mod to the jet. Therefore, belated as it was, the duct report is only of academic interest today. Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident. Its a sobering thought.

[EdSet100]

Nigegilb,
Thanks for taking the time. It is curious that AAR has not been re-instated. Maybe CAS has blown his credibility among the wider audience. Maybe it is not as safe as we have been led to believe. I struggle to understand what the difference is between this serious leak and the ones that have preceded it that didn't warrant this scrutiny.
This crutiny is caused by a number of factors, least significant is the fuel leak itself. Firstly, a high value asset made an unplanned landing in a dodgy place. That fact alone is not very signifant, either. However, the 2 events combined to produce a unique incident that should never have reached the eyes and ears of the public, regardless of why it happened. Consequently, the adverse publicity brought politicians into the arena and the RAF effectively lost control of the situation. We now have a comprehensive report about to be completed. I believe it will make interesting reading. Based on the BOI report, the limitations on air system use and the revised AAR procedures, I believe the Nimrod design and age will not be factors and this might be key to the decision to do AAR in the future. But, it seems it will be a political decision to continue, or not, with AAR, anyway.

[The Swinging Monkey]

Ed,

Can I just ask you one simple question please?.......
Why oh why, in the light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, do you still keep defending this government, RAF, MOD whoever about this accident?

The facts are pretty conclusive as far as I'm concerned.

I, and many of my mates, lost a lot of bloody good friends in 230. We nearly lost a load more friends in 235. At what point do you put your hands up and say 'you know what? The RAF/MOD whoever screwed up big time, and are doing their utmost to cover their ar$es'

Please take a look at the big picture and stop all this rubbish about niff-naff. An aircraft crashed and the crew were killed. Should it have crashed? NO. Could it have been prevented? YES Were the problems know about? YES. Has there been an attempted cover up? YOU BET YOUR LIFE THERE HAS.

You are clearly a knowledgeable guy, but I think that you have now become obsessed with trying to defend an incident which is indefencible.
TSM

[Tappers Dad]

EdSet100

"Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident."

When do you think they started this report ? The week before?
NO The incident happened 22nd November 2004 and it took them almost three years to get around to coming out with this report, a fact that I will personally make clear to the Coroner.

[EdSet100]

TD:
EdSet100

"Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident."

When do you think they started this report ? The week before?
NO The incident happened 22nd November 2004 and it took them almost three years to get around to coming out with this report, a fact that I will personally make clear to the Coroner.

It is very important that you do so. One of the Stn Cdr's very intuitive recommendations in the XV227 flight safety report was that all other pipes similar to the SCP burst duct should be analysed for internal corrosion, etc, and a maintenance policy implemented. You should ask your lawyer to ask the IPTL, at the inquest, on what date did the IPT formally request/commission the recommended study. If it was after the 2 Sep 06, it could be reasonably argued, by some (you and your lawyer?), that the IPT never intended to act on the recommendation, but that the crash forced them to do so....and...why did it take so long to produce the report...and.... if they had received the report before 2 Sep 06, what actions would they have taken as a consequence of the report? We have clearly proven that we can fly with all similar ducts in the crossfeed system shut off, so it would not have been operationally impossible for us to do so, in light of that report alone while they fixed the problems. I would be very interested, as I'm sure you would be, how the IPTL would respond to these questions.

Although you and I have some common ground in this particular aspect, I have to stress that the report, in respect to crossfeed and SCP duct leaks, is now somewhat irrelevant to Nimrod safety today. All of those pipes are now shut down, and have been since 4 Sep 06, which was probably the first date that the Nimrod MR2 ever conducted AAR, safely.

Good luck.

Regards
Ed Sett

[EdSet100]

TSM:
Can I just ask you one simple question please?.......
Why oh why, in the light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, do you still keep defending this government, RAF, MOD whoever about this accident?

The facts are pretty conclusive as far as I'm concerned.


Presumably you have read the CinC's remarks in the BOI Report. He was careful not to attribute blame to any organisation that contributed to the Safety Case, which he lambasted as follows:

"Most critically, this accident indicates that the NSC was wrong in its assessment.....that the hazard was ...improbable. This flawed NSC was further compounded by...."

"most critically" means that the NSC is pivotal to what happened. He wrote that, knowing who the contibutors to the NSC are. The documents are in evidence. Earlier in the BOI report we are informed that the NSC, as a living document, lies in the joint "ownership" of the RAF and BAe, with an independant check carried out by a third organistion. All 3 organisations were very active in the process. Therefore, the SoS owes it to the RAF, BAe and the 3rd party, to ask a QC to unravel the workings of the NSC and apportion blame where it lies. You have to ask yourself, if you have any interest, why would the SoS for Defence ask a QC to do this, if all the blame rests within his own department. You might not like him, but he ain't stupid. He has been well briefed.

I'm not defending the RAF against reasoned and accurate criticism. In some aspects, we have made some huge blunders: not checking the accuracy of a safety case, using a corrective maintenance policy without an appropriate trend analysis system to enable a quality review of the policy, not acting quickly to a Stn Cdr's recommendation to check hot air pipes (see above) and, finally, leaders slavishly adhering to BOI protocol, such that crucial information, that would later assist a crew faced with a fuel leak, was not released earlier.

Regards
Ed Sett

[Mick Smith]

I'm not defending the RAF against reasoned and accurate criticism. In some aspects, we have made some huge blunders... and, finally, leaders slavishly adhering to BOI protocol, such that crucial information, that would later assist a crew faced with a fuel leak, was not released earlier.


EdSet100. First I would join the praise of your attitude which I suspect involves a good deal of patience on your part. You will of course know the crew involved in the 235 incident and will no doubt have discussed it all with them but I'm not sure that I, in the same circumstances they were in, would have been prepared to rest on the board's say-so even if I had been told there was no fire in the bomb bay.

The big hole in the post-accident reporting here is that 235 incident and the reaction to it.

The board had already made its conclusions on the source of fuel before that incident occurred. But the board admited it wasn't actually sure, and couldnt be sure, that the fuel that caught fire overflowed from the Number One tank and passed along the the outside of the aircraft. It says this is what it sees as the most likely option, but not the only possibility.

The supposedly irrelevant QinetiQ report of March 2006 was tasked to look at the wing tank leaks (which everyone accepts were irrelevant). But it cast its net much wider and said that there were a number of leaks happening over Afghanistan that could not be recreated on the ground.

I was at the press briefing in December when CAS said AAR had been suspended following the 235 incident because the leak which happened then couldnt be recreated on the ground, yet we have a supposedly irrelevant QQ report 20 months earlier saying just that and no suspension of AAR. You had to be there to see the look of consternation on CAS's face when I pointed this out to CAS. He was clearly unaware of this.

You also in one of your recent posts said you couldnt understand why relatives were still so concerned following the SoS apology. (I dont subscribe to your view that he was calling in a QC because he knew the MoD is not to blame, I'm afraid it cannot escape its blame. Inquiries have been New Labour's standing way of sidestepping blame, as in Hutton, Butler etc.)

But leaving that aside, the reason so many people, not just relatives, are still so concerned, is because they fear that the true lessons havent been learned and therefore at some point something could go badly wrong again. For the relatives, it's too late to stop their own grief, they just don't want it to happen to anyone else.

[The Swinging Monkey]

Ed,

As always, thank you for your explanation.
At the end of the day however, we must never lose sight of the fact that an aircraft was lost uneccessarily IMHO and the opinion of many others, and that is not only a tragedy, but a disgrace to the RAF, MOD and this nation.

The problem(s) were well known about by a great many people at the top, and they all chose to ignore them, and the warning signs which were as clear as a bell. After all, who in their right mind would simply choose to ignore a QiQ report and a BAe report?

Why did they choose to do nothing? Well, I can think of no other reason whatsoever, other than money, or rather lack of it. From the very top down, as we all know, everyone is doing their level best to shield the person above them from bad news (it might affect their next promotion after all!) They don't want to be the bearer of bad news, and so it goes on. Sadly, in this case, the unthinkable happened and the likes of TD and many others are left to pick up the pieces and face the consequences.

You say 'why would the SoS for Defence ask a QC to do this, if all the blame rests within his own department' well, I should have thought that was obvious really Ed. The further and wider you can spread the smelly stuff, then the less and less of it falls on your lap! I am not suggesting for a moment that the QC appointed by the government (hmmm!) will not do a thorough job, but after the Hutton inquiry, I doubt if many have much faith.
And lets face it, if 100% of the blame currently lies with you, then initiating one of these fancy inquiries can only make it better for you can't it? If this government (MOD) can offload any of the blame, then they will gladly do so, and drag as many others into the frame with them as possible

We shall wait and see.

TSM

[Magnersdrinker]

Well why dont we ground the Nimrod tommorow if that makes people feel any better, that is what people want is it not. Close the airbase at Kinloss, make redundent the couple of thousand aircrew and ground staff or post them on.a few hundred civvy staff will become redundent but no matter the area is the poorest county in the whole UK, a few hundred jobs wont matter the main thing is a few people will be happy with this.
SAR can be handed over to the herc fleet they can easily provide the UKs cover which is one of the largest areas in the whole world, many fishermen will be happy at least they have an aircraft designed to carry cargo looking for them on a bleak winters night and some guy can lob out a dingy out the back.
Other aircraft can provide counter terrorism survelliance and coordination and a lot more other things that people do not know. God forbid if London attacks were to happen again, who is going to fly overhead and coordinate things. I guess we would have to buy some new aircraft to provide survelliance and eavsdropping to prevent any home attacks that may happen.

Or does the military fly what it has got , make it as safe as possible spend some cash to keep it going on till a replacement is available. I guess there will be a risk like all fleet ac that another accident can happen.

2 options open to the MOD, remove it now or fly it.

[The Swinging Monkey]

Magners,

I think you have had a bit too much of your tipple!

"Well why dont we ground the Nimrod tommorow if that makes people feel any better, that is what people want is it not."
NO, that is not what we are saying ultimately.

"Other aircraft can provide counter terrorism survelliance and coordination and a lot more other things that people do not know. God forbid if London attacks were to happen again, who is going to fly overhead and coordinate things. I guess we would have to buy some new aircraft to provide survelliance and eavsdropping to prevent any home attacks that may happen." YES, other aircraft can! but lack of £££ will force us to keep Nimrod

"Or does the military fly what it has got , make it as safe as possible spend some cash to keep it going on till a replacement is available."
YES, that is what we MUST do, MAKE IT AS SAFE AS POSSIBLE! (NOT as safe as necessary as CAS said)

TSM

[davejb]

FWIW,
YES, other aircraft can! but lack of £££ will force us to keep Nimrod
Actually, Ninrod is bloody good at the many roles it performs, and for a significant period of time it performed a wide variety of tasks without AAR capability - sorties in excess of 10 hrs unrefulled have proved quite long enough for most tasks over the decades. I doubt the RAF could do any better than (pipe dream) having a couple of dozen brand new Nimrods handed over as a birthday present at 120's upcoming bash, so 'force us to keep Nimrod' seems rather harsh.

Unfortunately some of the mods to the aircraft haven't been properly thought out...a bit of an understatement, of course. Nobody seems to have looked at how changes to the original design might age or interact with each other.

Good men died as a result, I'll happily attend the public floggings when it's decided who was responsible.


Personally I also think Edsett has done quite a good job of passing details along, for which I'd like to thank him, I think it's unfair to suggest he's an apologist for the RAF. Tucumseh has also provided an insight I didn't previously have, similar thanks to that gent.

[Magnersdrinker]

Well say what you want TSM i can actually say I said them words a sober judge.

Ill say my last words then leave as I have had enough of trying to explain my thoughts to no avail, like many fellow engineers they have tried to give there bit but like most have said to me its like banging a brick head off a wall and I will do the same now and hang my typing fingers up in this thread.

Like a few posts before somebody said this thread is now laborious pointless and why we still go on about it, The BOI has happened and the answers for those concerned have been given, the MOD has apoligised , the families involved have been given a financial reward which in no way will bring back what they have lost but if we were given that chance to turn back the clock im sure the MOD would be the first to take that offer up.
What now, what else are people pushing for, that I cannot understand, since the accident the measures put in place now make the jet impossible to fly because of the maint checks that are required before flight, never in my career have i seen so many checks/inspections required, so in my view the MOD is doing its duty to ensure safety to its best. Many dont see that but as an engineer I like 100 others have the task of ensuring this every time an aircraft gets airborne.

I just wish to say after XV230 accident , many of us never had the option to speak about what happened, to this day people dealed with it in different ways but for many like myself coming on here and trying to find an answer is all that was available, the only way to discuss it and maybe try and find some reason why. Now i just see this as thread for us all to come on and think we know things more than others ,a way to try and think we know it all (im guilty of that and ive now realised I dont) , so much bickering and how one person knows more than others its getting boring and the same old, but I guess as a UK citizen we are known now for just moaning about life and how rubbish everything is , its what we do best.

I just want to wish all the want more info good luck on there quest, I for one am giving the magners a miss and moving on to strongbow.

God bless all

MD signing off ...............

[The Swinging Monkey]

davejb

Perhaps saying 'force to keep Nimrod' was the wrong way of putting it, I should have said 'forced to keep MR2s'

Without doubt, Nimrod has been an outstanding success, and like many others, I have several thousand flying hours in them. But that is not a reason to try and keep them forever. A new Nimrod? Yes, I am sure that it would be just as successful as the first ones, but it must encompass modern, up-to-date safety systems, and that is my biggest gripe.

Magners, you shouldn't take things too much to heart. You are as entitled to post on here as much as anyone. The fact that some of us don't agree with some of what you said is part and parcel to being a 'PPuner!' Some will always be more experienced than others, but they are still entitled to speak up. So, please don't go forever, and certainly don't swap over to that Strongbow! Then I'll know you have had too much of the 'other stuff'

TSM

[tucumseh]

Davejb

Good post. You said;

“Unfortunately some of the mods to the aircraft haven't been properly thought out...a bit of an understatement, of course. Nobody seems to have looked at how changes to the original design might age or interact with each other.

Good men died as a result, I'll happily attend the public floggings when it's decided who was responsible”.


This is precisely what we talk about when discussing PHYSICAL and FUNCTIONAL safety. A system may be safe in isolation, but unsafe when integrated (or not, as the case may be) into the aircraft. When integrated, it may be safe in one aircraft type, but not another. It may be safe in one aircraft tail number, but not another in the same fleet (partly because of ill conceived SEMs, especially Role Mods). This is why Configuration Control is so important. And, as Safeware says, very often the Safety Case doesn’t reflect the in-use configurations.

However, this is just my opinion (supported by ALL the MoD’s mandated procedures and regulations). It was NOT, however, the opinion of the various 2 Stars and above I mention, who were happy with an attitude “It works on the bench, so we’ll just stick it in the aircraft and walk away without testing/trialling”. I do hope this comes out at the inquest and during the review. All they have to do is read Public Accounts Committee reports and ask what action was taken.

[airsound]

I've finally found out the contact details for the Nimrod Inquiry, under the independent counsel, Charles Haddon-Cave QC. Actually it's called the Nimrod Review, not Inquiry. It's being set up at the MoD, and its Secretary is an MoD civil servant, Darren Beck.

The website is there, but there's nothing on it yet. Darren Beck tells me it will be up and running within the next week or so.

The Nimrod Review
Level 1, Zone C,
St. Georges Court
2-12 Bloomsbury Way
London
WC1A 2HB

Telephone: 020 7305 2130
Fax: 020 7305 4031

Email: [email protected]
Website: www.nimrod-review.org.uk


airsound

[Distant Voice]

It is now over 14 weeks since the families requested a copy of the QinetiQ report which, it is claimed, gives the Nimrod fuel system the "all clear". But MoD still dance around trying to find reasons why it can not be released. Come on MoD, if you read this, what sort of message does that send out? Perhaps it does not exist, or its conclusions do not support the Des Browne claim.

DV

[30mRad]

I clicked on the link, on post #2347 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=3971839&postcount=2347) by Airsound, to the Nimrod Review website. A few weeks ago it just had "Awaiting Content" on all the sections on the page, but when I checked today it comes up with some random 1-2-3 Register page?! WTFO?! Could it be that the MOD/Govt is willing to pay to register the web-page...imagine my surprise at the incompetence!

Anyone with any ideas??

[BYALPHAINDIA]

Somewhere in a whitehall file it will say..... The Government has a duty of care to it's RAF by providing the necessary finance, equipment, people, and most importantly health & safety.

And in my book if all these procedures were adhered to then we would not have lost that Nimrod??:sad::(

The Government is not producing this.:=

[tucumseh]

I’m slightly cynical about this review.

It’s 14 weeks since I contacted the QC. No reply. I know others have had a little more success. We’ll see.

I’ve said this before, but I don’t like his remit. It’s very narrow. It talks in terms of “RAF” and “Nimrod IPT”. The well known problems with APPLYING the airworthiness regulations are pan-MoD. In fact, they have long since been elevated above MoD and notified to Ministers. Ingram specifically denied there was a problem, in writing, before the crash. MoD need only point to this approval and support. PUS was told 12 years ago (in a report which has been destroyed by the authors, but luckily retained by the sponsor). The QC needs a wider remit, as it would be possible for him to satisfy it by speaking to very few people, most of whom could just say “isolated case” or “happened under a different regime”. The usual, in fact.

WHO will speak to him, and HOW will he find those who know the truth? I don’t like an AVM being attached to his team. I suspect he may be the filter, to stop those who actually know the background getting to the QC. This is common practice. And the chosen few are of course “briefed” to make sure they are aware of the party line (and career path). The “risks” are actively prevented from coming forward, and if they try to submit a written report it seldom reaches the intended recipient. This applies to BoIs as well. We continually see the odium faced by those who step forward. Sqn Ldr Burke is the classic example.

Browne has reassured us that staff will be immune from disciplinary action, unless guilty of “gross misconduct”. But what is “gross misconduct”? MoD won’t say. I don’t know, and the issue is blurred by the long standing rulings by Browne’s junior Ministers, CDP, a DG who was in charge of Nimrod MRA4, an AVM charged with maintaining safety and airworthiness; and others. Their consistent ruling, over at least 16 years, is that it is an offence to refuse to lie about components of airworthiness, but not an offence to instruct one to lie. The only difference in opinion was over punishment. Some said sacking, others formal warning. Do I know of people who have, knowing they will be punished, ignored these or similar issues and abrogated their responsibility by lying or walking away; or advised colleagues to lie, to avoid punishment? Yes. And then people died. Need I say more?

I sincerely hope Mr Hadden-Cave is his own man. I hope he jumps all over the first attempt to “guide” him. And I can’t wait to see what he recommends on MRA4.

[Chugalug2]

Not so much cynical as realistic I'd say, Tucumseh. This thread is waiting for a QC's review, the Chinook one is waiting for the SoS's review, and the Hercules one for a Coroner's inquiry that the government openly wishes to nobble. Delay and obfuscation are the weapons of choice for this incompetent and disreputable gang. What goes around comes around, the more these contemptible politicos treat decent people with contempt the more they will rue the day. Will you give in to them? Will anyone? As WSC said, "Let them do their worst, and we will do our best!".

[Da4orce]

Noticed this in the telegraph yesterday:


Two thirds of the Royal Air Force's Nimrod spy planes are not fit for purpose, the Ministry of Defence has admitted.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/03/24/nmilitary324.xml

[spanners123]

Da4orce,
Can you define 'fit for purpose', because depending on the definition, the creditability of the article is in question?
Are they fit to fly, or only fit to carry out certain missions?
Thanks

[tucumseh]

Asked to define “Quality”, most engineers will have been taught to reply “fit for purpose”, as measured against a defined requirement and specification. It means both generally (in simple terms an aircraft must be able to fly) and specifically (it must be able to carry out its stated roles) – safely and underpinned by correct application of all the safety and airworthiness process, procedures and regulations described at length in this thread.

Browne and Ainsworth (and before him, Ingram), and their respective advisors, are at loggerheads over this (having given contrasting answers to the same questions regarding the above). How they must be hoping the QC’s review recommends cancellation of MRA4.

[EdSet100]

This is an old chestnut. When you discount aircraft that are undergoing servicing, waiting to undergo servicing (and cannot be flown in the meantime due to hours in the log) and other aircraft set aside from normal flying due to trial and test equipment on board, you are not left with many.

The only stat worth pursuing or monitoring, in any fleet of airframes, is the number (percentage) of aircraft that are not available due to rectification. Even then you need to be more specific about rectification. As I write, I am quite certain that a jet is having a black box (associated with its mission, not its airworthiness) replaced, or waiting for the replacement. While this routine repair is going on, the aircraft is not available because of the open entry in the maintenance log. Most of these routine faults do not have any real effect on the aircraft's availability to fly. Clearly there will also be other faults that are unsafe to take airborne, but most of them are repairable within hours (tyre worn outside limits, fuel coupling leak, generator fault) and while they make the aircraft unavailable while they are being fixed, they are not having any effect on the flying programme because the aircraft is also receiving routine servicing simultaneously. Its common throughout the world as a front line system.

Where it becomes serious is when the defects cannot be fixed within a day (or so) and the aircraft has to come off the front line and wait for spares, manpower or space in a hangar, etc. Its not that the aircraft is necessarily in a dangerous condition; it just need some increasingly scarce resources. Today, at a guess, I think there is less than 30% of the whole fleet that meets this narrow category, and its the only category that really matters to the planners because we cannot plan for it, airframe by airframe. Add to that category the previously mentioned reasons for unavailablity and we get to the two thirds unavailability.

[Da4orce]

Spanners123

Can you define 'fit for purpose', because depending on the definition, the creditability of the article is in question?

In answer my definition is:- having due consideration for the defined role and purpose of the aircraft is it fit to perform that role as effectively and safely as is reasonable. Next question, what is reasonable?

I think what is interesting about this article is how stark a reminder it is that simply by rephrasing the same information you can change the whole context of a statement:

One in three RAF planes not fit for use.

or

Two thirds of the Royal Air Force's Nimrod spy planes are not fit for purpose.

Fit for use and fit for purpose are very different things so from a qualitative aspect i would agree that the articles value is negligible. What it does do however is serve to keep this very emotive incident in the public arena, the exact place where many in the RAF, MOD and the government do not want the issue to be.

[spanners123]

Da4orce,

Thanks for well balanced reply, of which I agree with all of the points!:ok:

[Distant Voice]

Ed Set100; Here we go again, defending the the "undefendable". I suppose as a planner you know all about that.

DV

[Jackonicko]

Ed

Simple question. What level of availability was guaranteed under NISC, and is it being achieved? Is this availability 'from depth' or a more meaningful 'availability for flying'? Is the contractor being penalised for any shortfall?

[EdSet100]

DV, I'm not defending the undefensible. I completely concur with the BOI's findings which, quite rightly, concentrate on a specific aspect of the Nimrod's design, maintenance and operation. It is a fact that, in that specific area (fuel and hot pipes in close proximity), the airworthiness of the aircraft was catestrophically lacking. That was undefensible and I do not defend that failure.

My earlier contribution tonight was critical of the headline statistic. When the stats are analysed, and we take out irrelevant data, we get the true picture, which probably doesn't sell newspapers.

Jacko,
I believe the contractors are fulfilling their contractual output from scheduled servicings. The front line, with the usual rate of daily repairs, is meeting its commitment to training and operations. We have a number of aircraft awaiting repair in the depth area due to a lack of resources. 10 years ago, these aircraft would have been fixed within days. Its a sign of the times, exacerbated by the fleet's most protracted and demanding tasking, ever.

[tucumseh]

The question is not so much whether the contractor is meeting the contractual requirements (which is of course important), but whether the materiel and financial provisioning (an “HQ” task) was, and remains, commensurate with the planned usage of the aircraft and all its components, support infrastructure, training, personnel etc etc.

In broad terms, these are called “Support Parameters” and it is the responsibility of the respective IPTs to ensure and demonstrate they are met. Critically, if insufficient provision has been requested or made by the Customers, the IPT MUST “renegotiate” the support parameters with them, thus redefining their task and agreeing what is possible within the provision available to them. From EdSett’s reply it would seem quite a lot is lacking in this (mandated) process. The same principle applies to, say, the aircraft. We talked of “fit for purpose”. If that purpose (or role) has changed, one would expect a new or updated Aircraft Specification and complementary (Whole Aircraft) Safety Case. I’ll leave it to others to say if the Nimrod MR2 roles have changed in recent years but as the designator remains “MR2” it would appear not.

This is nothing new; it applies to most aircraft and equipment and has done for years. In fact, the 3 Services have long since stopped making such provision routinely, despite it being a mandated requirement by PUS, the Chief Accounting Officer. In simple terms, if you don’t ask, you don’t get. If you don’t ask, don’t complain if you don’t have. If you don’t ask, you get what you got last year (if you’re lucky), regardless of the fact that your flying rate has quadrupled. If you ask, but don’t get, the liability rests above you. In this context “you” is at 2 Star level, but the principle applies from the bottom to top. For example, if you don’t have the test equipment to verify a repair, the repair is not complete and you push the problem upwards. A JENGO (or whoever) may issue a concession, but must also continue to push upwards and advise of the risk he has taken; and so on. It’s called an audit trail (and I assume one exists for Nimrod).

By addressing the problem at this level, or above, you get to the nub of the problem. Not to is to risk, YET AGAIN, focusing too narrowly on a specific component of Nimrod and missing the big picture. I cannot emphasise enough that ACM Loader’s comment (that the airworthiness regs were not implemented) was NOT a revelation; it is common knowledge and, because the most senior staffs have been warned about the risks on many occasions, it is effectively policy. Elsewhere this past week there is a thread about the Sea King AEW crash five years ago. The BoI report, issued later that year, reported PRECISELY the same thing. The Tornado/Patriot report alluded to it; they refrained from overt criticism but the meaning was crystal clear. Not only that, the BoI reports are almost word for word what he had been advised to the relevant 2 Star YEARS BEFORE. And, as I have said, this got to Ministerial level long before XV230 crashed. He denied there was a problem. Wrong.

[Distant Voice]

Ed Set, you said,
My earlier contribution was critical of headline static. When stats are analysed, and we take out the irrelevant data, we get the true picture, which probably does not sell papers

So let us look at the bottom line stat (achieved sorties against planned sorties) for a period of time, last year:

12th to 18th March. 21 planned, 11 achieved
19th to 25th March. 18 planned, 9 achieved
26th March to 1st April. 21 planned, 6 achieved
2nd to 8th April. 16 planned, 11 achieved.

Maximum number of aircraft available during that period was 3. Is that OK for the press?

Jacko, Ref your "simple question" regarding NISC. We have been told the following:

(1) "Under NISC, from a fleet of 21, 12 were required each day".

(2) "With NISC 2, from a reduced fleet of 16 Nimrod MR2 aircraft,10 aircraft will be available each day, a huge proportional increase in efficiency".

(3) "NISC 3 is planned for April 2007 and gets us to full availability of the aicraft and all its systems".


DV

[davejb]

DV,
Forgive me if I'm misinterpreting here, but it sounds to me like you are trying to say that the Nimrod isn't fit for purpose, because it only met X number of taskings out of Y. Edsett appears to be saying that the aircraft are unfit inasmuch as there are faults to be rectified, whilst Tuc chips in with, as ever, a wider view of the problem - which extends beyond the kipper fleet, and probably covers everything in service.

A lack of spares, and trained manpower (or, more accurately, a dearth of trained manpower hours - ie enough trained people, for long enough) prevent aircraft being serviceable on any given day - that doesn't mean the Nimrod is unfit for purpose, it means that thanks to reductions in manning and spares that there are a number of aircraft that aren't operational, but10-15 years ago would have been. That's what happens when you don't give a monkey's about retention of skilled tradesmen, don't maintain an adequate stores backup, and figure it saves cash to civilianise outfits.

DV - you come across as determined to argue with Ed, and equally determined to tar him as an apologist for the RAF, whilst anything to do with the Nimrod is necessarily evil. I doubt you will find many actual crew members who agree with this demonisation. I'm ex-crew, but find Ed's posts informative rather than apologist. Having sat through several 'of course it's safe lads' chats in that past, only to find the same problem recurring in flight, I can assure you I am far from inclined to accept bland assurances of airworthiness. (Bahamas Mama, anyone?)

The aircraft certainly has problems, that have largely arisen through ill considered and thoroughly badly assessed modifications, and a stunning degree of inability to see how one change might impact on another - it's a far cry from that to deciding that the basic aircraft is palpably unsafe. As I've said, I've been on the thing when some decidedly unsafe things occurred, a number of times, and there's a world of difference between RAF bull**** when the problem is identified, and the sort you get when it isn't.

Your earnest desire to see justice served is admirable, but you are in danger of undermining your aim by exaggerating much smaller problems... the jet is not unsafe just because it couldn't fly the flypro. It's still a blody good aircraft, it's just a great shame that something equally as good at the job - but newer - hasn't arrived yet.

Dave

[OilCan]

DV,

...and your bottom line stat
12th to 18th March. 21 planned, 11 achieved
19th to 25th March. 18 planned, 9 achieved
26th March to 1st April. 21 planned, 6 achieved
2nd to 8th April. 16 planned, 11 achieved.

says more about over ambitious planning with extremely scarce resourses than safe/unsafe.

IIRC, your stats are correct ref the max available at 3, but I also recall the average availability over the period, - and it wasn't 2. :ooh:

Can I refer you to an earlier post;
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2982118&postcount=28

Result; 3 sorties planned (from 1 A/c), 0 achieved.

OK, perhaps a little artistic licence (but not much), point is, it was nothing to do with safe/unsafe :rolleyes:


davejb

Ah, Bahama Mama, XV229 - remember it well. :\

Difference between then and now? (Apart from more Ac, more crews, greater experience, better dets, more support, better supply etc.) - no internet. :p

[davejb]

Difference then and now... okay on internet (but only just - we had AOL, Compuserve etc) - the rest I'd actually say amounted to
1) Money
2) Something like integrity - there's some indefinable point in the past where people stopped being willing to resign over principle/do things because they're the right thing to do. The last one I actually recall was OC 206 during the Falklands, went on to become AOSNI or similar, and resigned, (at least this is what he told a few of us one quiet morning) because he'd figured his voice would carry some weight once he reached air rank, and had just found out it didn't - so there wasn't any point carrying on. His name escapes me (although I think he was a Dave for some reason...had an AFC from '82....)

Didn't serve under him myself, I was under a later style of management on 924 Sqn in time for the Bahamas Mama. (Being a pleb I got to enjoy the same experience over the Hebrides - no posh island havens whenever my turn for a scare came due - they div'd to Nassau, we landed at Lossie <sigh>).

[Small Spinner]

davejb,

OC 206 was Dave Emerson, diamond bloke:D, and as you said he left because he was fed up being told off for telling the troops how is was, rather than being 'on message' from his lordships.:ugh:

[davejb]

Ta,
I didn't work for him, but encountered him quite a lot, and it was plain to see that he was well regarded.

In flight? Did a taceval sortie once with no rations - the Nav had a packet of M&Ms that were religiously rationed out, and there was plenty of water for those who appreciated the zesty taste of swimming pools. Longest damn flight I was ever on, time being relative....Is that serious though, canx sorties for in flight? Surely not! (It's not April 1 yet...)

Get Mick Muttit in to explain how they did it on Shacklebombers - dropping off the junior siggie (whilst on night circuits) to nip to the chippy...

Dave

[Mad_Mark]

Ahh, Mick M - one of the nicest blokes you could ever meet. Anyone know if he is still with us?

MadMark!!! :mad:

[EdSet100]

Regarding the issue of planning to fail: As I'm sure most of us know, the aircrew are allocated a number of flying hrs per year to achieve high operational standards (trg sorties) and contribute to operational tasking. Within that allocation is a minimum flying rate, per individual, to maintain basic currency. In recent times we have struggled to maintain currency in some skills, at home, due to a lack of available aircraft (for the reasons I have outlined elsewhere). It is not acceptable for the planners to look out of the window and assume that the few serviceable jets they see are not sufficient to meet our needs. If they don't plan and we don't fly, we will not produce the evidence of imbalance between resources and needs. The planners must continue to schedule the crews to fly, as they always have, knowing that there is a likelihood of failure. We then have the evidence that we are out of balance and we can then get the ears and eyes of the air staff. If we didn't plan to fail, we would not have augmented NLS with civilian tradesmen, nor would we have been given some respite from some of the op tasking.

DV, I am not a planner. I simply fly, with confidence, on whatever jet I'm given. I do like to think that I have a balanced view of the bigger picture, when I arrive in Ops, at oh god almighty hrs, to find out that the flight has been scrubbed due to a lack of airframes. This routine situation is almost certainly due to a lack of resources to repair a number of routine faults that many years ago would have been fixed within hours, rather than the days that it takes now. Engineering resources make up the pinch point at Kinloss, not airworthiness. Fortunately, in recent months we have recognised this problem and we have brought some balance back to resources and needs.

If you want to discuss Nimrod airworthiness issues you should concentrate on pre Sep 06, where there is plenty of material. However, the BOI has covered that ground with a fine tooth comb, so there is nothing left to discuss anyway....

Regards
Ed Sett

[Da4orce]

Nobody in the RAF or the MoD could find a copy of the airworthiness requirements for the version of the aircraft that caught fire

"There no longer exists an in-depth knowledge of working on the Nimrod aircraft," the QinetiQ report said.

At Kinloss, there have been examples of poor practice or human errors occurring which might otherwise have been avoided.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3736289.ece

[tucumseh]

Yes, a pretty damning summary of MoD policy and practice this past 16 years or so. I hope the multi-Stars who were specifically warned of the consequences are asked why they chose to ignore the warnings.


Nobody in the RAF or the MoD could find a copy of the airworthiness requirements for the version of the aircraft that caught fire

I'd say what they couldn't find was a documented audit trail that demonstrated that the mandated airworthiness requirements / regs were actually implemented properly. Not surprising, given the sheer weight of evidence that they weren't. The requirements themselves are there for all to see and any agreed deviation from them should be documented. (Notwithstanding the above multi-Stars' rulings that they are optional and can be ignored).

[Da4orce]

Tucumseh wrote:

I hope the multi-Stars who were specifically warned of the consequences are asked why they chose to ignore the warnings.

Hopefully they will have to do exactly that in May, assuming that the Coroner can identify them and call them to account.

[tucumseh]

Hopefully they will have to do exactly that in May, assuming that the Coroner can identify them and call them to account.


I imagine the fact that the records with their signatures at the bottom have gone missing is a small stumbling block, but the MoD have tried that before on a slightly less recent crash while forgetting that there are many potential sources for such information.

But look at the problem in simple terms. While the original airworthiness audit trail has apparently gone cold, what was achieved and delivered had to form the basis for MAINTAINING airworthiness, as opposed to ATTAINING.

WHO was responsible for maintaining the build standard(s). They would know what their baseline was. If they didn’t have a baseline to maintain, how could they accept the task when transferred from the procurers? How could they (both) bring the design Under Ministry Control? The Def Stan has a form with a checklist they MUST complete. Tick missing? Walk away. So, for example, if you want the 2 Stars name for most of the last 15 years or so, you go to Bazelgette Pavilion at Wyton and look at the name boards in the foyer. I don’t know them all by any means, but will never forget the one who threatened to sack me for daring to insist mandated regs should be implemented.

We’ve established that MRA4 should also form part of the equation, because it is a modification to MR2. Same idea, go to Abbey Wood. Look for the word “Air” in the titles. Neither he nor his staff could begin to think about what is now called MRA4 without first establishing that the current in-service build standard is (a) known and (b) either maintained or recoverable. (One has to be realistic, and it is ALWAYS the first item in the risk register to assume legacy kit is not supported properly and those responsible won’t support YOU. This may be acceptable for the TV in the crew room, but not for an aircraft fuel system). They couldn’t contract BAeS without establishing their position and level of risk they were facing, and BAeS would be mad to accept a contract on that basis (although I concede it would be attractively lucrative as they’d spot the blank cheques a mile off). Come to think of it………….

And so on. I’d just work back through the baselines until I came to the point where someone didn’t say “It’s what I inherited” but found the instruction to “Slash funding, don’t bother about maintaining airworthiness”. But I’d start with BAeS. They MUST know when their MoD contracting moved from “Full” to “Limited” (defined in the relevant Def Stan but its self explanatory). Ask these questions of ANY equipment Design Authority or Custodian.