Nimrod Information [Archive] - Page 6

Chugalug2

1st Nov 2007, 14:20

cm74, I will try to answer your questions, in the same order. My answers are merely that, ie merely mine. Others may/do differ no doubt.
1.The thread is just that, its desired outcome will be in the individual minds of those who contribute or only read it. For my part I agree with Nigegilb and others who call for independent military airworthiness regulation rather than the self regulation that exists. I believe that alone would save lives. If our arguments advance that case I would be content.
2. Then either the BoI or the posters or both will have got it wrong. It is more likely that the BoI findings will be so restricted by the remit that considerations of Airworthiness Regulation/Provision will not be covered. A case of woods and trees. We have to urge for the inclusion of those woods into their findings, or the MOD will once again renege on its duty of care by using the absence of such consideration to duck the issue
3. Of course the wishes and views of NoK have an effect on those who post on this forum. We are all conscious of the tragedy that lies behind this thread and of the broken lives left in its wake. Many of us have experienced the loss of comrades in this or other accidents. I genuinely believe that we are united in the wish to prevent such tragedy in the future, that is to reduce future avoidable accidents. How we get there is the bone of contention of course, and the subject of much of the debate.

The Swinging Monkey

1st Nov 2007, 14:32

CM74,

The desired outcome is for the truth.

Unfortuantely, those of us who have been (or were in) for a bit are concerned at the length of time this BoI is taking and it is making us suspicious of the 'the findings' and thus the outcome.

The problem the BoI has, together with the RAF, MOD and ultimately the government, is that there are numerous cases and examples of incidents where concern has been raised over the lack of adequate fire suppression systems, whether it be in the Bomb Bay or in a fuel tank of Nimrod and other aircraft (C-130?? - say no more)

The 'nanny state' culture we now live in, makes it law for people to be accountable when things go wrong. The Clapham Rail disaster is a point in question, where some management were charged, I understand, with culpable manslaughter. The MOD is no different. It too has a duty of care to servicemen and women, and to uphold that law, and the longer this BoI goes on, it only adds fuel to the argumant that perhaps things are being 'doctored' to suit various departments and or individuals who may just be feeling the strain.

It matters not what is written here as far as the BoI outcome is (or should be) concerned, however, the outstanding efforts of people like Graham Knight to get to the bottom of things and to try and understand the inner workings of the MOD - RAF - Industry is raising some potentially embarrassing points and questions. And I would say that some of the speculation is not 'wild' at all, but is based on facts alone.

TD
Graham, once again Sir, you command my utmost respect for your unstinting efforts to get to the bottom of this utter tragedy. Stick with, Tapper and the rest of the guys deserve nothing less.

TSM

Mad_Mark

1st Nov 2007, 14:56

TD,

Yes I did post those words in a reply to TSM, however, I immediately felt that all that would be achieved would be a a possible flaming by those taking them out of context. It appears that my reason for removing that post has been justified.

As you rightly quote, my words were "media speculation fuelled by possibly miss-leading facts/rumours". As you can see, I acknowledged that the media speculation was fuelled by facts. I also feel that some of the information, especially in the Panorama programme, was rumour. Hence why I said it was fuelled by both.

Also, there are facts and there are facts. The Nimrod suffers from fuel leaks FACT
A vast majority of those fuel leaks are nothing more than slight seeps FACT
The media are quick to headline the number of fuel leaks reported but give no mention of exactly what is classed as a leak and what percentage of all those reported were acceptable FACT
Much of what has been posted on here is pure rumour and speculation - and in response to your last post ("Rumours ? Everything I have said I have written documented proof of"), I did not say that what you had posted was rumourFACT
A post stating that a rib 7 fuel leak resulted in fuel pooling in the bomb bay is pure rumour and is bollox FACT
Other families saying that all the media coverage only brings back the pain when THEY are trying to grieve in their own way FACT
Several posters on here know SFA about the Nimrod, but spout off like experts FACT

As someone that flies in the Nimrod I applaud you for trying to raise important issues, such as the need for bomb bay and fuel tank fire suppressant systems - I may be very grateful one day.

As someone that had several friends on board I understand your pain. But I am also fully aware and understand the pain that all this is causing to the families of those others that were lost. All I asked was that speculations, facts and rumours are kept out of the media until you know the BOI results and whether or not their findings need to be challenged. Although the recent Sky News reports did contain facts they did not report ALL the facts and were, hence, very misleading. The day that story aired I saw more people at Kinloss that were hacked off with the report than those in support of it - because they knew the rest of the facts. FACT

MadMark!!! :mad:

p.s. In the post I deleted I replied to TSM comment about other families having the choice to not read this forum. My comment was that I agree, but they do not have the same choice about media reports without having to avoid the news or papers in toto. My post was about the media reporting, not about this forum.

[Edited for spolling mistokes]

Tappers Dad

1st Nov 2007, 15:28

cm74

And what happens if the BoI conclusions differ from those reached through the genuine research/wild speculation carried carried out by PPRuNe'rs on this thread?

Some of those who are content to wait I wonder what they are waiting to hear .
Does anyone think the BOI is going to say there was no Bomb Bay fire ?

We know why it exploded the RAF told all the families,an uncontrollable Bomb Bay fire broke out. The events leading up to the explosion are not fully known but the result was the same .
Was it Fuel. hydraulic fluid,was the ignition caused by Kapton wiring or the SPC or because of AAR I don't know and don't profess to know

I am going to sound like a cracked record but;
1..There was a Bomb Bay fire on board XV230 FACT
2..BAE recommended in 2004 that is a fire should break out in the Bomb Bay of a Nimrod it would result in the loss of the ac. UNLESS they followed the recommendations and fitted a fire suppressant system FACT

Had a fire suppressant system been fitted 14 good men may still be alive, they just needed 3 mins in which to land .

Some people have said he is just a grieving father wanting to blame someone.

Do they know me No do they know my background No.
My grandfather was a magistrate, my brother until recently was a magistrate one of my surviving sons is a counter fraud investigator.
People used to reading though piles of document ,people who know the law.

nigegilb

1st Nov 2007, 15:41

Furthermore TD, changes to AAR procedures failed to prevent subsequent massive fuel migrations during AAR Ops and such was overriding Op Tempo AAR Ops were authorised hours after the crash.

I agree with you, the lack of bomb bay fire suppressant is the key here.
I would add, that contrary to what some people have written in this thread it is perfectly possible to provide bomb bay fire protection on Nimrod, for normal ops.

The fact that RAF changed AAR procedures in an attempt to reduce the possibility of pressure spikes during AAR and also restricted the use of certain fuel tanks on board, speaks for itself.

The counter argument for not fitting fuel tank protection to C130s was the absence of official requests making their way up the CoC.

TD has discovered that BAe, no less, requested that Nimrod be given bomb bay fire protection. This is hugely significant.

An explanation needs to be given in the BoI for the rush to continue AAR and the failure to provide adequate bomb bay protection and fuel tank protection.

Da4orce

1st Nov 2007, 15:48

TD has discovered that BAe, no less, requested that Nimrod be given bomb bay fire protection. This is hugely significant.

Indeed, as is the fact that BAE went on to quantify that by listing numerous faults that could lead to an uncontrollable fire and also stating that a Nimrod crew had no way of extinguishing such a fire.

The BAE systems report listed the faults that would lead to a fire, the results and the solutions. This is what the RAF / MOD must be held to account over.

cm74

1st Nov 2007, 15:58

Is the BAe report available? It may be that I missed a link from an earlier post.

OilCan

1st Nov 2007, 16:02

TD said
I took the NHS to court and won because they had failed to do a risk assesment on my job and I was attacked and almost killed.
I was a health and Safety rep for 15 years before I had to leave the NHS as a result of the attack.
...hmmm...:confused:
the rest was
Do they know me No do they know my background No.
My grandfather was a magistrate, my brother until recently was a magistrate one of my surviving sons is a counter fraud investigator.
People used to reading though piles of document ,people who know the law.

Da4orce

1st Nov 2007, 16:03

It was made available to my father in reponse to a FoI request.

Initially the request was rejected on the basis that the report was commercially sensitive, then someone had a change of heart and supplied it!

I will let you draw your own conclusions a to the reason for the change of heart.

Da4orce

1st Nov 2007, 16:19

i should add that it's not just one document, it's numerous documents all of which are very legnthy.

What I have read of them makes for very sombre reading indeed, I'm sure that they will be mentioned a great deal more in the coming weeks and months as we move from the BoI into the Coronors Inquest.

MightyHunter AGE

1st Nov 2007, 17:47

Mad Mark said

Also, there are facts and there are facts. The Nimrod suffers from fuel leaks FACT
A vast majority of those fuel leaks are nothing more than slight seeps FACT
The media are quick to headline the number of fuel leaks reported but give no mention of exactly what is classed as a leak and what percentage of all those reported were acceptable FACT
Much of what has been posted on here is pure rumour and speculation - and in response to your last post ("Rumours ? Everything I have said I have written documented proof of"), I did not say that what you had posted was rumourFACT
A post stating that a rib 7 fuel leak resulted in fuel pooling in the bomb bay is pure rumour and is bollox FACT
Other families saying that all the media coverage only brings back the pain when THEY are trying to grieve in their own way FACT
Several posters on here now SFA about the Nimrod, but spout off like experts FACT

As someone that flies in the Nimrod I applaud you for trying to raise important issues, such as the need for bomb bay and fuel tank fire suppressant systems - I may be very grateful one day.

As someone that had several friends on board I understand your pain. But I am also fully aware and understand the pain that all this is causing to the families of those others that were lost. All I asked was that speculations, facts and rumours are kept out of the media until you know the BOI results and whether or not their findings need to be challenged. Although the recent Sky News reports did contain facts they did not report ALL the facts and were, hence, very misleading.

The day that story aired I saw more people at Kinloss that were hacked off with the report than those in support of it - because they knew the rest of the facts. FACT

MadMark!!! :mad:

Here here!
An eliquently put post.

(Oh that hurt)

Laboratoryqueen

1st Nov 2007, 18:14

I do not want to appear disrespectful, this is not my intention now or ever.

TD, you are a grieving father and this crusade which you have set yourself upon has all come about because of the loss of your son. I am sure that at points over the years your son would have made comments to you about frustration towards problems on the fleet, and yet no fight took place back then to ensure the safety of the crew who flew on them, or to protect the morale and emotional stability of all those who work on the Nimrod line, or to protect are own.

I was aware of my loved ones frustration, and yet he still had the confidence to step on board the Nimrod, he had the confidence in the ground crews abilities. They must all have had that same confidence or they would not have flown the Nimrod for so many years. If not for the accident, they would still be choosing to fly and still showing that same confidence, I share his confidence.

It has been said to me in this thread several times, that if I do not want to see or hear the speculation then to simply not use this forum, if it was contained to a rumour network then that would be a possibility, however, the speculation has been a constant appearance in the media, newspapers, television, radio ect. It has been an impossible feat to keep it away, it is this which has caused the calls to cease the speculation.

Some people here may believe that what they say is in no way specualtion to the cause or events, however, when someone is so emotionally involved in a tragic event such as this, any opinion given from an experienced person may be conceived as being based on fact.

Yes we have been told of a bomb bay fire, we have been informed of a fuel leak, this was done so right at the start, what none of us know is why. I wait for the BOI because I am only interested in fact, never in what could have been. The "could have beens" are for my nightmares only but have no part in my reality.

The reality is that 14 men died that day, they are not the first to have died and they have not been the last, none of them, no matter what, will be coming back, nothing can bring them back. If anything can be used to help prevent more deaths, it will only be points based on fact.

Headstone

2nd Nov 2007, 15:24

TD, unfortunately for you in your quest to find the truth you may end up using information from this RUMOUR forum when you have been at pains to present facts. A lot of people can post on this forum with varying degrees of knowledge and so comments can be varying from copperbottomed, to crew room chat to a Mate in the workshop told me variety. I beg you to consider all the information you use and get advice as to it's accuracy from someone who knows.

The comment at post 1249 made a comment on the ditching of XW666 and the BOI....
one of the points that came out of that BoI was a weight restriction to be placed on the back end crew as a result of a seat detaching from the floor on impact.....

may be a point you would wish to use to show that BOIs do not act on reccomendations.

I have a copy of this BOI, along with many other BOIs, in front of me.

Conclusions of the board, part2, para 56 contains the recommendations. There is no comment whatsoever on the placing of a weight restriction on the crew.
Part 56r does say that "The applicability, to military aircrew, of the airman weight factor used in current rear seat stress tests be determined." So not that crews should be lighter but that the weight used in seat stress tests should be looked at again. Probably ought to be raised as RAF rear crew are generally bigger now than in 1960s when the seat tests were initially carried out. A small point but if you were to quote incorrect statements in one part then they will use it to rubbish all your statements.

There may have been internal Sqn or other reports about rear crew weight and other instructions but it was not in the BOI so it is false to say a recommendation was not taken up.

As always I wish you the best in finding out the truth.

BEagle

2nd Nov 2007, 15:51

IIRC, there were also recommendations made for the protection of all crews in ME aircraft in the Accident Report which concerned the Nimrod accident causes by massive birdstrike at Kinloss.

Were these acted upon?

No.

Exrigger

2nd Nov 2007, 17:01

BEagle you mentioned:

IIRC, there were also recommendations made for the protection of all crews in ME aircraft in the Accident Report which concerned the Nimrod accident causes by massive birdstrike at Kinloss.

What form of recommendation and protection would provide 'protection of all crews in ME aircraft' that a BOI could/would recommend be applied to an aircraft to protect all crews from a multiple birdstrike. I realise this is off topic slightly, but I was just puzzled.

jan66

2nd Nov 2007, 18:42

well said labqueen and mad mark,..all any of us want is the truth,but it seems that TD uses the media to air his views at a time when others wish to greive in private.
all i am asking is for this media speculation to stop for the sake of the other families invloved,even i wont talk about it on here but this network seems the place where everyone is talking.
wait for the BOI,then ask the questions.

chappie

2nd Nov 2007, 22:34

i hope for all of your sakes that the BoI comes soon and IS truthful and all recommendations come about without incessant pressure from any of you. sadly i have been on both sides of the arguement, i have been saddened and shocked, distressed and distraught at seeing my loved ones face on the news or spoken about in other formats. sometimes, that has been becuase of me. there is nothing that will bring back our loved ones...ever. BUT we know how soul destroying the loss of our loved ones is, but as much as we want the truth, indeed have a right to the truth, the thought of sitting back and letting others potentially be out at a risk they need/should not be and the thought of anyone else going through the living hell we endure is sometimes enough of a drive to try and find out what the hell is happening. lab queen, you really gave me food for thought with your post re the confidence of your loved one. i am sad to say through experience though that yes the BoI does end up at least putting an end to the nightmare scenarios that run through your head,but it opens another box of demons. it also does not mean that by any long shot that you have the answers...or as someone said a step towards the coroners court. i'm still waiting and it will be 3 yrs b4 we actually get to the inquest.
we are united as were our loved ones in death. we must all stick together. i wish i could help to take the pain away. i wish i could make it better, but i'm afraid this is it.
sending you all hugs. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Laboratoryqueen

2nd Nov 2007, 23:15

I do not want for anyone to have to face the loss of a loved one, and if that can be prevented by providing the correct safety measures and equipment for our forces, it is something which I will back 100%, I have always had and always will have the utmost respect for our forces and for the work they do.

A call for an end to the speculation in the media is not saying that nothing should be done to give them what is required, it is purely and simply that no changes can be brought about without having the facts to back it up. Once the BOI has been presented then questions may be asked as then and only then, can they be informed questions and with a direction to aim for.

Until the BOI, we don't know what needs to be asked or what needs to be addressed.

I have a fantastic VO, a man who has tried to prepare me as best he can to face each and every obstacle along this tragic journey. He's not just my VO, he was also a good friend to my lost one, he flew with him and shared many memories with him. I know he, and many men such as him, I'd chance to say most if not all at ISK or who work with the Nimrods, want to know the true facts and want to know that this can and will be prevented from happening again. We all have an interest in the outcome.

Please remember that while we all want to know why our men died, why we feel so empty and alone and why so many children cry, we are grieving for those lost and we all wish to do so in our own way.

theotherhalf

3rd Nov 2007, 09:20

Lab Queen
I too know my loved ones wishes. All he ever wanted was to fly on the plane he chose. His attitude toward it was one of great affection and he had great confidence in its capabilities as well as knowing its shortfalls, and of the crew. He would have been horrified by all the dreadful comments that are made - after all they were warm living human beings and sometimes it seems thay have been reduced to nothing more than subjects in a discussion of technical value.
For those of us left behind, we close our doors at night and we have no one to discuss the days events with, or share the childrens knocks and joys, or even just cuddle up to at night. Shopping without them is such a nightmare, it sounds silly but choosing for one and/or the kids is isolating and I find those who have someone to go home to and do all of those things simply don't understand the misery of being alone.
Whatever you think of the BoI, it is the first step and to dismiss before it has arrived is a fools way forward. All arguments must have a basis and only an idiot will presume to know more than the experts, especially before publication.
Strength comes in many different ways, through courage, through fighting, through getting to the end of each day. We need to be together and yet at a time when we need each other most there are those who will split asunder. Don't let it happen. God Bless
Much love
TOH

WasNaeMe

3rd Nov 2007, 11:06

Forum Rules
………“The Professional Pilots Rumour Network (PPRuNe) is a community of professional pilots and people who work in aviation, both experienced and inexperienced. Your behaviour here, and ours, can be summed up in four words: “Mi casa, su casa” (my house is your house).
The PPRuNe Forums are a place where it's okay to be yourself as long as you always act with respect for your fellow members as well as PPRuNe staff. Our goal will be to treat our members as we would wish to be treated. In return, we ask that you act here as you would if you were face to face with the other members. You are not expected to leave your personality at the door. There are going to be topics and discussions that will have heated debates. Please think before you post and re-read what you type before you post it. Keep your comments limited to the debate at hand and do not make this a personal issue between you and another member.
There is tremendous diversity in age, race, gender, language, location (worldwide). There will be a lot of varying opinions on different subjects. We're all human beings and we're all drawn to this site because we have a common bond as pilots, cabin crew, air traffic controllers, engineers, technicians or just interested parties………..”

Maybe some will see me as being a tad insensitive here but I reserve that right.

If some are not happy with people contacting the press & the press reporting of perceived issues why make the request not to do so on pprune?

Free speech and debate is allowed in this country, as is the right to speculate and discuss. In all but a few instances this is done respectfully on pprune and I would venture to suggest, by persons with not a little experience of HM Royal Air Force and it’s idiosyncrasies.

There have been 3 threads majoring on the subject of XV230:
Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences) (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=242005&highlight=Nimrod)
Nimrod plane crash in Afghanistan - Condolences thread (no tech or update info) (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=241983&highlight=Nimrod)
Nimrod Information / Panorama Mon 4th June (Merged) (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=274149)

Perhaps it would have been better if there were only 2, however, there are 3. Why seek to fetter one because of what the national press decides to report?

Don’t get me wrong here…. I have the utmost sympathy with those left grieving and my heart goes out to you… but the debate will & must continue.

As for the BOI….. Whatever the BOI report will be questioned, quite possibly ad infinitum because of the very nature of the system & the way they are convened. How many AAIB reports get lambasted?

cm74

3rd Nov 2007, 13:26

Wasnaeme

As long as you're ok eh fella? Even "free-speech" has its limits.

Chugalug2

3rd Nov 2007, 13:55

WasNaeMe wrote:
How many AAIB reports get lambasted?

Very few, and a telling point. Of course, AAIB reports are part of an independent Airworthiness system, BOI reports are not.

chappie

3rd Nov 2007, 19:28

the other half, i totally and wholeheartedly agree that we must all stick together. we are still members of the military family and must draw strength from each other and give strength to each other.

i may be bereaved through a losing someone so very special through a different crash, but my door is always open, my shoulder always ready to cry on. i extend that to jan66 and of course lab queen you already know that. you will be in my thoughts when the BoI comes. i just hope for your sake it is soon.

take lots of care. i am so very sorry for your loss and pain. if you wish PM me and i will give you my email.

lots of cyber hugs:\

WasNaeMe

3rd Nov 2007, 20:06

Poacher & Gamekeeper?
Lunatics looking after asylum?

Mr Point

3rd Nov 2007, 21:28

Lab Queen,

I understand completely that the speculation over the cause of the crash is not helpful and that this thread may not help the greiving process. However, it exists primarily to answer two questions:

a. Why did XV230 crash? This is needed for closure, although it will not change the past and is based on a fair amount of speculation (a great deal of which is inaccurate). The BoI SHOULD provide the facts and comprehensive recommendations, but with political pressure this MAY not be the case.

b. Can the risk be reduced? This is incredibly important for the safety of current and future Nimrod crews. I am certain that raising the profile of the case will make it more difficult for the MoD to ignore the fact that modifications need to be made to the MR2 and MRA4 to reduce the risk to crews.

Laboratoryqueen

3rd Nov 2007, 22:10

Mr Point

You say this thread is here to answer these two questions

a. Why did XV230 crash? This is needed for closure, although it will not change the past and is based on a fair amount of speculation (a great deal of which is inaccurate). The BoI SHOULD provide the facts and comprehensive recommendations, but with political pressure this MAY not be the case.

b. Can the risk be reduced? This is incredibly important for the safety of current and future Nimrod crews. I am certain that raising the profile of the case will make it more difficult for the MoD to ignore the fact that modifications need to be made to the MR2 and MRA4 to reduce the risk to crews.

Lets see then, with regards to question a, can anybody here say without doubt or heresay, guessing or speculation exactly what happened on board XV230 on september 2nd 2006 to cause the explosion. Yes there was a bomb bay fire, yes there was a fuel leak, how many of you were actually there and actually do know to be able to give a fully informed answer as to exactly why. It is only speculation otherwise.

With regards to b, that can not be answered until (a) has an answer as we do not know exactly what has to be changed to reduce those risks.

With any incident there will always be speculation, to involve the media in this actually takes the attention away from the real meaning behind what happened, especially when some things have been misleading. Remember the story of the boy who cried wolf, this may have the same effect, when there are so many ideas and guesswork going on, and so many of them hitting the media, the true facts of what happened can be overshadowed by what is false.

As I have said repeatedly, if you want change, you need the facts.

To answer the point made by another about why ask on pprune, simply because I choose not to approach the media, as the majority of the families involved have also chosen, I respect my families privacy and the other families privacy while they grieve, I also choose not to give my identity here as I have been made aware the media do use this site.

Now let me be blunt. If it were you who was blown to bits, how would you feel about knowing your family and loved ones are having all the details spread through the media. Turn on the TV, pick up a newspaper, turn on the radio, and then think if this was you, would you want your children, wife, mother, sisters or brothers hearing so many details. It's not just the plane, there were real men on board with real families and real lives now reduced to this.

Mr Point

4th Nov 2007, 01:46

Laboratoryqueen:If it were you who was blown to bits, how would you feel about knowing your family and loved ones are having all the details spread through the media

If I had been on the aircraft I would not like my family to see the media coverage. However, I would be far more upset if there was another crash that could have been prevented.

The media are not providing a service to anyone involved with the crash, they have their own goals and objectives, but raising the profile of the accident makes it much more difficult for the MOD to ignore the fact that the Nimrod MR2 needs fire protection in the bomb bay.

Kinloss has suffered enough, the families have suffered enough, and hopefully the BoI will provide suitable recommendations that will be adopted by the RAF to prevent other families feeling your pain. Unfortunately, history has shown the system to be left wanting in the past.

Laboratoryqueen

4th Nov 2007, 01:39

I do see your point and I do agree with it, which is why I have been saying that yes changes do need to be made but we do need to give the BOI a chance and to then ask the correct questions after the hearing, then we have the correct direction.

cm74

4th Nov 2007, 09:49

Mr Point.

Who asked you to take up the fight for answers on behalf of the families and the crews in Kinloss?

Another one for the "I'll do whatever I please and sod everyone else" list eh? NO respect whatsoever.

:ugh:

Mr Point

4th Nov 2007, 10:18

cm74: Who asked you to take up the fight for answers on behalf of the families and the crews in Kinloss?

Why not read the content of a post before commenting? Who exactly said that I was fighting for answers on behalf of the families and the crews in Kinloss? :ugh: I was trying to explain to Lab Queen that there is good reason to raise the profile of this incident.

Which category do you come under: family or Kinloss crew?

cm74

4th Nov 2007, 10:24

The point is, Mr Point, that they are trying to ask you to have some respect for their wishes.

Do I need to belong to either of those groups?

Mr Point

4th Nov 2007, 16:47

I understand that, but the wishes of current Nimrod crews also need to be respected, not least those who were operational in 1995 when two other aircraft were lost.:(

cm74

4th Nov 2007, 17:02

Well, Mr Point, I don't want you standing up for me. I'll wait to see what the BoI says, then consider what is written.

I'd lay odds that the majority of current Nimrod crewman would rather wait.

Thankyou.

Distant Voice

4th Nov 2007, 18:51

For god sake, you guys, have you read Mick Smith's web page today? Stop playing around with little talk and get back to my thread.

DV

Gaiscioch

4th Nov 2007, 19:04

cm74...

It would appear you have rather a large chip on your shoulder... May I ask who asked you to carry it?.......... I would venture no-one.

Anyone for DV.....?

cm74

4th Nov 2007, 19:10

No chip.....just astounded at the attitudes of some.

Are you just looking for a rise?

:zzz:

Gaiscioch

4th Nov 2007, 19:33

A tad confrontational don't you think?

It would appear, like myself, that you are a relative newcomer to this discussion......... It would also appear that you have little or nothing to add to the debate.......

(ps... For the hard of noticing... one of which you seem to be a member... a debate which has been ongoing for quite some time...)..

Distant Voice

4th Nov 2007, 19:41

As the "founder member" of this thread can you fairies get off and let the real folk get back to the debate.

Distant Voioce

tucumseh

4th Nov 2007, 20:18

From Mr Smith’s blog, mentioned above……

“Civilian contractors at RAF Kinloss were not only not required to pass on the substantial information they had on the leaks and how to deal with them to the Integrated Project Team which oversees how the Nimrod fleets is run, they were not required to tell the RAF technicians working on the aircraft at Kinloss that the Air Publications they were working to were out-of-date and of "little, if any, value"”

This is not news, it’s been known for many years that MoD largely withdrew funding to routinely update tech pubs (just in time for the Chinook Mk2 pubs to be out of date at the time of the Mull crash). Maintaining Tech Pubs is a fundamental part of MoD airworthiness REGULATIONS. The MoD never actually denies it doesn’t maintain them, merely saying “we have robust airworthiness processes and procedures”. They do indeed, but they don’t implement them – a rather crucial omission and typical of their deceit.

It’s part of the process called “maintaining the build standard”. There are 17 core components, of which tech pubs is one. Fail to comply and you almost certainly break the airworthiness audit trail. If the Nimrod IPT don’t know exactly what I’m talking about, that’s incompetence. If they do know, it’s criminal. But, this affects everyone, not just Nimrod. Just because we have 2*s who think it’s a waste of money doesn’t mean they’re right. The quicker it’s fixed, the quicker a significant risk is mitigated.

Laboratoryqueen

4th Nov 2007, 21:09

I've got a very simple question to ask.

It's been 14 months since the accident, there has been numerous articles in the press, endless debates and constant speculation into what may have been the cause throughtout this time, even a panorama programme dedicated to the problems on the fleet and what "could have been" a contributing factor etc.

Has any of this actually brought about any changes with regards to saftey procedures, or even come close to bringing change and increasing safety?

Gaiscioch

4th Nov 2007, 21:16

Not yet......
However, it will be interesting to see what the BOI come up with.... Not all that important a fix then.......

Laboratoryqueen

4th Nov 2007, 21:26

Thank you

So I take it then that the requests from the family members and from those who are associated with the Nimrod, to await the facts presented by the BOI, and that speculation into the events have no sway towards changes, are actually justified.

Wg Co Bingo Handjob

4th Nov 2007, 21:35

Tucumseh.

Do you know if the Nimrod publications are out of date? Speculation again. Rather a sweeping statement without any knowledge to state that the Nimrod IPT is incompetent/negligent without any knowledge?

The report from QQ that Michael Smith refers to did this relate to XV230 or another aircraft in the fleet. Is there direct read across to all airframes, has an audit been carried out on all fuel tanks by QQ?

Mr Smith refers to six aircraft with the EO fit is this the current number? If he cannot get the simple facts right how can anyone trust any of the other speculation/facts in his blog/articles?

Jimmy Jones appears to have been involved in the original trials of the MR1 does he have any current knowledge of the aircraft and the fits. Does he have any relevant/current knowledge of the AAR fit?

Continued speculation is hurting the family members of CXX/3. Why not wait and see what the BoI has to say. If anything predjudices there efforts it is surely they must be wrong because I've got this report culture that has built up on this thread. I doubt that all the FOI requests and leaks allow a comprehensive picture to have been developed.

As ever condolences to the bereaved. I hope that you get the full story as soon as possible but few can no your grief and i am sorry to even post this and add to your problems.

Gaiscioch

4th Nov 2007, 21:49

I believe there have been no substantive changes (a few procedural changes excepted..) to MR2 post XV230, neither have there been any changes to the design of MRA4.

If the BOI come up with any change recommendations, I for one (as a UK taxpayer) will want to know why it’s taken over 14 months (to date) to decide that changes are necessary (that’s 14 months of flying to date (& more tomorrow) without any changes…)).

Laboratoryqueen

4th Nov 2007, 22:01

I'm going to do a bit of speculating of my own on this.

Could it possibly be that no changes have been brought about because it is not yet known exactly what changes need to be brought about, what the cause of the accident was, what caused the fuel leak, why there was a bomb bay fire. Could it be that they are themselves awaiting the findings of the BOI before it could be possible to effect any change. Afterall to change something you have to know exactly what needs to be done.

All comes back to having the actual facts.

There is a huge difference between "i think" or "I guess" this is what happened and "I know". The one you listen to is the one who knows.

Mick Smith

4th Nov 2007, 23:00

Mr Smith refers to six aircraft with the EO fit is this the current number? If he cannot get the simple facts right how can anyone trust any of the other speculation/facts in his blog/articles?

The QinetiQ report was carried out six months before XV230 exploded and refers to the situation at that time. Yes the QinetiQ team did include XV230 in their report. They also included three other aircraft in their report, all of them with the EO fit, and said the other two were in theatre so could not be covered. QinetiQ highlighted that the main problem was with those EO aircraft.

The article in today's Sunday Times is not based on speculation. It is a straightforward report of what a very damning QinetiQ report said. The blog simply refers to that. Nothing I have written since the initial accident has been based on speculation. The MoD uses that word as a smokescreen to deflect criticism. But facts do not turn into speculation just because a board of inquiry has yet to report.

Official reports, be they serious fault signals, air incident reports, BAE Systems reports, or QinetiQ reports are just that. They were certainly not speculation. For the most part they were written before the explosion and they were certainly all factual and all damning or they would not have been reportable. They are of course merely snapshots, part of an overall picture. They of course cannot be taken, on their own or collectively, as some sort of quasi-board of inquiry.

But as Tucumseh has indicated, there is damning evidence in the QinetiQ report of serious problems which have implications not just for the Nimrod fleets but across the RAF, and which, whether or not they contributed to the explosion, should be made public.

Everyone would like the BOI report to be published ASAP. But it is not the media's job to keep quiet when evidence of something going wrong emerges. As for whether or not it has helped, on at least two occasions, the board of inquiry has put back its report following information emerging in the media. That can only be because that information was not taken into account by someone contributing to the report.

I entirely understand why relatives and friends of those who died feel unhappy reading reports that refer to the incident. I have not at any point forgotten that 14 real people died, leaving behind partners, parents and children for whom I have the utmost sympathy, a fact that is clearly indicated in my blogs. But their sorrow is no reason why highly damning information like that reported by the QinetiQ team should not be made public.

For those who want to make their own choice to read the article to which the blog refers, it is here:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2786304.ece

phanphix

5th Nov 2007, 00:21

Mr Smith wrote:

"on at least two occasions, the board of inquiry has put back its report following information emerging in the media."

How on earth do you know that? Are you more intimately involved with the BOI proceedings than those involved with the Nimrod or even those that know the BOI members, or are you just speculating on this point as you do on most things? If you have hard evidence present it otherwise keep quiet.

I also read your article today and it frustrated me to the extent that I put a blog on your website which read:

"As a Nimrod engineer, I have seen the QinetiQ report. The way this newspaper article has sensationalised the matter and linked it to the loss of XV230 is shameful. The points made have all been taken completely out of context from the report especially the alleged ‘critical problem with structural integrity’ which is grossly misrepresented. The report was initiated to improve aircraft availability not from safety concerns as these were never compromised by the wing leaks in question. XV230 was one of the platforms assessed but this has no linkage to the accident whatsoever. We are working hard to make Nimrod as safe as it can be in difficult operational times and this is a challenge with difficult decisions having to be made. These articles divert valuable efforts onto unnecessary issues and distress many of the families. Jimmy Jones, ‘the so called expert’ has no credibility at Kinloss and Michael Smith is sensationalising a serious issue for his own ends. STOP NOW AND AWAIT THE BOI.

I note this blog has not been reproduced on your Times Website but I am not surprised by this!

I am sure as a result of this my first ever post onto PPrune, and it is likely to be my last, and that I will undoubtedly be vilified by some quarters on this forum. However, I too want the truth both for the families and to ensure safety of air and ground crews undertaking a difficult job. I want the families to find closure, however difficult that path may be but I do have faith in the BOI as I know the members to be men of integrity and even if they are not experts in all matters to do with accidents they are supported where they need to be.

I know PPrune is a rumour forum and clearly you can speculate on here all you want, albeit you should respect the families who have asked repeatedly for restraint. However, when that speculation extends to National reporting it both further distresses families and diverts efforts from key issues; this should stop now.

tucumseh

5th Nov 2007, 07:13

Bingo Handjob

You asked me;

"Do you know if the Nimrod publications are out of date?"

Yes. I've formally complained about it. The point I made above is that most Tech Pubs are not unique to one aircraft. Yes, the Nimrod MR2 has a suite of unique pubs for the airframe etc, but an awful lot of the aircraft equipment is common to other types. The failure to maintain a single equipment AP can adversely affect many aircraft.

This is compounded by the stovepiping in the MoD. I have managed programmes where, as part of risk reduction, I've had the aircraft data set assessed for currency (which really annoys people). Invariably it's grossly out of date, by years, not months (that's why they were annoyed, they were found out). Tough **** I say, they don't sign for airworthiness. But, I am only given funding to update MY pubs. And MY equipment. (And only if I ask for it and make a good enough case, which is where experience and competence in IPTs comes in. If you don't know to ask, or what to ask, you don't get). If other aircraft are affected (i.e. their equipment is out of date or lacks functionality because the pubs were outdated) all I can do is advise the other IPTs, as the process in not a centralised function anymore. Invariably they don't do anything, so different aircraft will be carrying the same equipment, but at different build standards. This matters little on a one off basis for Class C and D mods, but does (by definition) for Class A and B. The cumulative effect can be disastrous, particularly in a system of systems.

You will also appreciate that equipment at grossly different build standards, yet bearing the same NATO Stock No, can and does migrate between aircraft types. I've seen other countries complain about our aircraft lacking important functionality and interoperability precisely because of this. And in an aircraft like Nimrod it is entirely possible for crew stations to have different functionality for this reason. Come to think of it, that's what they were complaining about..... And then there's the simulators/RCTs etc. Very often they are ignored altogether. Stovepiped again. And so on. Not a big deal in isolation you may think, but just occasionally the cumulative effect and years of neglect causes events to conspire against you.

I'd go further and say that the risk classification matrix used to assess safety case risks and hazards (Criticality vs Probability) should be reassessed. It assumes a constant - that the build standard is maintained. This is NOT a constant - it is highly variable, and I would hazard a guess that some risks currently classed as "B" would change to "A". That is, given the outcome is "Catastrophic" should the event occur, you would only need to raise the probability from "Remote" to "Occasional" for the clasification to change from B to A. And that is defined as unacceptable, intolerable and should lead to grounding. When the fleet was 30+, one loss may be tolerable, barely. But when it happens in a fleet of 12, does this perception change? I'm not privvy to the flying rate but I'd definitely ask the question.

May I recommend you glance at this. Dated 1998, it is fair warning of the problem to MoD (if they needed it).

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmpubacc/300/30003.htm

In it, there are references to various aircraft which, in a management sense (i.e. same people involved) are closely related to Nimrod. That is, management sets the tone. Any decision affects a wide range of aircraft and equipment. And one of the decisions was - there is no need to maintain the build standard, which includes safety. CDP is asked a very specific question on the general subject (Configuration Control) - see "Cost of Modifications" section. He was, shall we say, economical with the truth; made possible in part by the question being too specific. And, as ever, the Committee doesn't follow up to see if his promises were met.

Sorry for the length of reply, but this is a very complex subject, and one often ignored.

Mick Smith

5th Nov 2007, 09:53

Phanphix

"on at least two occasions, the board of inquiry has put back its report following information emerging in the media."

How on earth do you know that? Are you more intimately involved with the BOI proceedings than those involved with the Nimrod or even those that know the BOI members, or are you just speculating on this point as you do on most things? If you have hard evidence present it otherwise keep quiet.

I know the board of inquiry has put back its findings on two separate occasions because that has been confirmed by the MoD. I can say when it happened but I cannot of course say why.

But that this happened on each occasion directly after information emerged in the media is not in doubt and if you go back a few pages to the emails released by Tapper's Dad you will find him being blamed by one of your colleagues at Kinloss for delaying the report.

I assume that the response you quoted is a post at the end of the TimesOnline article since it is not awaiting moderation on my blog. I'm sorry it hasnt been put up there but were I you I should not assume that this is some sort of conspiracy. I've posted politely on numerous occasions at the end of articles on football and never managed to get one published. They all have to be moderated and I doubt this is done on either a 24-hour or a full-time basis. Please feel free to put it on my blog ref-ed by DV and Tucumseh.

http://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2007/11/nimrod-report-i.html

I can guarantee it will go up - I moderate it myself - and it will have more longevity there than at the end of an article that has already been swallowed up by the next day's news.

Laboratoryqueen

5th Nov 2007, 18:16

If you look at everything which has been discussed, be it in the media or in this thread, it becomes obvious that this is not just speculation about what may or may not have taken place on board XV230 to cause the explosion, it is about who is accountable, who is to blame.

Comments have been made that the RAF are to blame, this does make me question who exactly that would be. The RAF are not a single minded entity, the RAF is made up of individuals. Is there a need to have someone stand before us, someone to shout at, scream at, vent all the frustration and grief on, to be able to have someone to actually look upon and to demand why, why our loved ones died.

Personally I feel this was a tragic accident, my reason for this, because I have 100% confidence in the ground crew. I do not believe they would be aware of any fault and allow the plane to fly. I have 100% confidence in the captain, as I do not believe he would sign for the plane if he thought there was a fault. I have 100% confidence in all the crews abilities. I do not believe for one second any of them would have allowed XV230 to fly, knowing or even suspecting it may end lives.

I have not yet seen or heard anything to lower my confidence, I have not yet heard anything which holds exact factual evidence, up to date evidence with regards to XV230. Up to now all which has been stated has not been in direct relation to XV230 on the date of her final flight and a great deal is an attempt to find accountability.

nigegilb

5th Nov 2007, 18:43

The great thing about this site, is that everyone is entitled to an opinion.
If I thought the RAF would have insisted on every Herc being sent into theatre with fuel tank protection I never would have started the Herc thread.

If I thought the RAF would insist on Nimrod getting bomb bay fire protection and fuel tank protection I would never have posted on this thread.

As for accountability, in the case of the Hercules it came down to a culture. A "can do" culture from aircrew right the way up to CAS and Defence Ministers. A willingness to take risks with other peoples lives, a willingness to take risks with one's own life. Believe me, I have been there. I have no reason to believe this culture does not exist throughout the AF, it is what we are admired for. It is also an achilles heal

Don't expect objectiveness from the guys in the thick of it, from people with no money to spend, or from Chiefs of Staff with a whole host of problems and pressures to deal with.

We need more independence both in the make up of the BoI and the way RAF engineering is regulated.

The great thing about this site is that we are free to express an opinion.

Chugalug2

5th Nov 2007, 19:38

Don't expect objectiveness from the guys in the thick of it, from people with no money to spend, or from Chiefs of Staff with a whole host of problems and pressures to deal with

With due respect, Nige, I would differ. I do expect objectiveness from Chiefs of Staff and would expect them to give way to others if they find themselves unable to express it.

We need more independence both in the make up of the BoI and the way RAF engineering is regulated.

Amen to that. IMHO it can only happen if Military Airworthiness Regulation is removed from the MOD to an independent authority, per the CAA. Cracked record? More like an endless tape that has to be on continuous play until the penny drops.

theotherhalf

5th Nov 2007, 19:44

The great thing about this site is that we are free to express an opinion. Really!
It seems freedom of opinion is only acceptable if it ties in with others views. I remember the Hercules debate well. There was certainly very little freedom of expression there and this one is heading the same way. Or can't I express that view as it does not tie in with others feelings. The unpleasantness voiced on the Herc site and the language that often accompanied the vilification of others was disgusting. I hope against hope that this doesn't happen here. More families have become involved on this thread, what greater insult than to use the same attitude.
Whilst everyone squabbles about who is right and wrong - let us remember that our guys live and die to afford us this freedom. It should not be squandered.
By all means debate, discuss, philosophise, pass comment, but please please don't belittle other peoples views. No one is perfect, everyone feels they are right and we only have that right because of the sacrifice of others.
At what point do we accept an objective view as being objective, at any given time a decision is made that person feels he is being objective.
When joining up, when getting married, when flying , when driving - each decision is objective at the time but can be construed in another way later. We must give all our service men and women respect in as much as they make each decision to the best of their ability otherwise we will end up questioning every single thing ever done.
Life would not be worth living if that were the case. And life IS for living, the best way we can, making decisions we hope and believe are best for us, take that away and there is no point in life at all.

nigegilb

5th Nov 2007, 20:43

Chug,

It all comes down to an attitude to risk, be it the guys and girls on the front line, or the Chiefs of Staff in control. This is what a highly experienced Nimrod pilot, in a position of influence thought of AOC 2 Gp's decision to continue AAR Ops last year.

" Worst part has been the release of info. We've not heard a dicky bird then suddenly the ACC in the Gulf wants us airborne and tanker capable again. One of the SDs says that if operationally essential and if no other alternatives exist then the aircraft can tank, albeit with AOC 2 Gp permission. So, we had a jet AARing over Kandahar 4 days after the accident!! Unbelievable. I can't see how that could ever possibly be considered to be good risk management. The Staish here wanted to get airborne on the Tuesday after the crash as a flag waving exercise for the press and RAF! Why not tell the ACC to back off and wait until we had a better idea of what happened and what we could do about it. AOC 2 Gp should have fired it up STC and through them into PJHQ that we needed to be patient and make sure we were not going to put another Nimrod unnecessarily at risk. We should have told the press the same thing and they would have gone away happy."

Maybe you are right Chug, the Chiefs have their eyes wide open when they make decisions, it is just that they have a different attitude to risk management. In the end, the Nimrod pilot was right, the huge fuel migrations continued, thankfully with no further loss of life.

The problem with risk, is that it is impossible to do anything risk free. Politicians twist this and use the argument to justify sending British troops to war under-equipped to do the task in hand. Hence, the siren call for more independence to prevent things going wrong and more independence when investigating when things have gone wrong. The BoI reporting chain goes to the Station Commander, then to AOC 2 Gp for his comments and upwards from there. The make-up of the BoI often includes colleagues and superior officers in the same world. I am not doubting integrity here, I am just trying to explain why I believe more independence is required. The Herc BoI, completely failed to explain why foam was not on that aircraft. I hope that the Nimrod BoI will at least explain why XV230 did not have fire protection in the bomb bay. The flimsy reason that has been offered so far, under FOI request cuts absolutely no ice.

There has been much criticism of speculation on this thread. For what it's worth the decision to carry on tanking regardless, will be severely tested when the BoI is published.

Distant Voice

6th Nov 2007, 08:02

Do we pressure test the AAR fuel lines on the ground? And if so, at what pressure?

DV

SirPeterHardingsLovechild

6th Nov 2007, 08:48

Good question, some more

Is there a system in place to ensure these checks are carried out at scheduled intervals, on component replacement, and/or before an AAR sortie?

Has this requirement been properly identified, investigated, and documented in the Nimrod Air Publications?

Is there sufficient serviceable test equipment to carry out these checks, at base, and in theatre?

Is in theatre Engineering Authority allowed to waive this requirement due to 'Operational Requirement' ?

Is it possible that the 'can do' attitude of the overworked, undermanned, demoralised engineers could lead to short cuts being taken, in a misplaced attitude of getting the job done?

Is it possible that personnel would give false testimony to a BoI?

SPHLC (Not on Nimrods)

Wg Co Bingo Handjob

6th Nov 2007, 08:53

Biggus

6th Nov 2007, 09:00

Mick Smith

'.......I know the board of inquiry has put back its findings on two separate occasions because that has been confirmed by the MoD. I can say when it happened but I cannot of course say why......'

Do you/MoD mean that the board has put back its findings, or that the publication date of the report has been put back. The two things are very different. After the 3-4 man board has finished its report it goes into the senior officer/politician/MoD lawyer loop - which, considering the high profile nature of this report, may (and I say may) be where the delays have occurred.

Just because the publication of the report has been delayed at least twice it does not automatically mean the board has been reconsidering it's findings!

tucumseh

6th Nov 2007, 11:37

"Is it possible that personnel would give false testimony to a BoI?"

The answer is "yes" but the more likely scenario, and one which clearly occurred in the two Boards of Inquiry I mentioned above, is;

a. The Board don't ask the correct question
b. They don't follow up or dig deeper when the answer is clearly rubbish
c. "Witnesses" know what the correct question is and withhold relevant information
d. Information/records go "missing"
e. The existence of such records is denied in the first place

Why else would a supposedly knowledgeable BoI, who can order staff to seek out answers, release a report stating that, for example, a system which they note as a likely cause of the crash is unfit for purpose and doesn't remotely comply with airworthiness regulations, but not ask questions like "Why was it fitted", "By whom?", "Was it trialled properly?", "Did the ADA appraise it (as it was a Service Engineered Mod)?", "Were pilot training and operating procedures updated?" and so on. Not to ask ANY of these questions is negligence. Or collusion.

But, worse, when all of the questions ARE answered after the BoI report is issued, and are entered into the official record, why were they not addressed at the inquests?

I concede not all BoI are conducted this way, perhaps very few, but the common denominator (to me) seems to be the protection of senior people who were forewarned but did nothing. It was, essentially, performance (in these cases, safety) being knowingly traded out - and one should ask why, given time and cost were not factors in either case.

Distant Voice

6th Nov 2007, 11:41

WCB Handjob: Perhaps you can answer my question. Do we pressure test the AAR pipes and joints? and if we do, to what pressure?

DV

RAF_Techie101

6th Nov 2007, 12:04

All fuel lines, pipes, joints, seals and anything connected to them are checked at 50 PSI, whenever required.

Distant Voice

6th Nov 2007, 12:51

101: Many thanks for that information.

DV

SirPeterHardingsLovechild

6th Nov 2007, 19:41

DV, if Techie101 had answered your question he would deserve your thanks. But his general statement is rubbish.

All fuel lines, pipes, joints, seals and anything connected to them are checked at 50 PSI, whenever required.

However, with respect to the refuel pipes and AAR pipes, they can be tested to 50 psi.

Handjob

Yes there is. Happy now.
YES
YES
NO
Definitely not
Wouldn't think so but you'll believe what ever suits your agenda irrespective of the truth.

I already knew the answers to my questions (you failed the quiz) Its just my way of steering this thread away from integral fuel tank leaks, and towards where the clues are pointing.

No hard feelings.

Distant Voice

6th Nov 2007, 20:26

Sir Peter, you seem to be a nice chap, but I am missing your point. I asked a question on the pressure testing of AAR fuel lines, because I am aware that during AAR pressures of 80 psi have been recorded. A simple "yes we do test" was not good enough, I wanted to know to what level. Now I know; 30 psi lower that that experienced in flight.

By the way according to the QinetiQ report, AP are not up to date.

DV

SirPeterHardingsLovechild

6th Nov 2007, 20:37

Okay, as far as I know, we get up a ladder and fit a special adapter to the refuel probe, which then takes the coupling from a fuel truck. Delivery pressure from the fuel truck would be 50 psi. And only if the tanks are shut, other wise there would be no back pressure.

I stand to be corrected here, but that's the gist of it, there's not much more we could do.

Wg Co Bingo Handjob

6th Nov 2007, 21:35

If the tank cocks are shut then 50 psi is the instantaneous px in the system and is checked. If you carry our replacement of any component do you carrry out MPxx-xx yes, does this involve this check yes. Is this routinely carried out before AAR sorties, yes. Can this be waived? No. Is this routinely carried out at a certain calendar periodicity? yes. Do Groundcrew pay lip service to this check? No but if you can prove otherwise then I would be surprised and definitely disappointed. Do people lie to BoI my conscience is clear and having a quiz that you don't know the answer to proves you to be a fool and not a knave. Best of luck with Bienvinida Sir Pete.

Oh yes the equipment is available at isk and any responsible sooty would have the kit available at a detached location chin chin old boy.

Distant Voice

7th Nov 2007, 06:23

SO Wg Co and Sir Peter; Where does this put in-flight surges of 80psi in terms of safety. I might add that this figure was recorded after the AAR SOP's had been modified to allow a 1485 lbs "headroom" in No1 tank. This change, of course, was introduced after the XV230 accident.

DV

SirPeterHardingsLovechild

7th Nov 2007, 08:51

You raise an interesting point there, DV. Pressure testing a system to 50 psi that is known to surge to 80 psi would appear to be an oversight. Way above my pay grade, maybe Tucumseh will help you out there.

Your statement leads me to draw two conclusions (from a distance)

That the people at Kinloss are looking at either an AAR pipe failure, or No1 tank failing to shut off during AAR and developing a major leak.

You still need an ignition source. To those of us in the business, fuel leaks are common, and aviation fuel doesn't burn that easily. I can't imagine that the BoI will identify an ignition source.

I expect the BoI will be 30 pages long, but the only certainty is that -

'After AAR, a catastrophic fire in the bomb bay resulted in the loss of the aircraft'

I'm retiring from this thread to wait for the BoI

SPHLC

Distant Voice

7th Nov 2007, 09:25

Sir Peter: Thank you for your input. Yes I understand your point about the limitations of ground testing, coupled with this is the fact that aircraft sit on the ground at +40 and refuel at -40, would hate to be a coupling seal under those conditions

DV

nigegilb

7th Nov 2007, 09:36

The point is and this will be of some comfort, the groundcrew are doing everything they can to test out this equipment. This is supposition but it does explain a few points. And we are not talking about a straight fuel leak here, but atomised fuel. (The other theory is hot air). But I agree, how is the BoI supposed to figure it out? Just get some bomb bay fire protection sorted, quick. And fit fuel tank protection for good measure.

"However, we had heard that the fire was at the starboard wing root area of the ac.

Now, there is a fuel pipe in that area which is used in AAR to refuel one of the internal fuselage tanks. Further, on inspection of another ac in theatre a small hole was found in the pipe. The pipe is welded to several brackets which are themselves attached to the supporting rib wall and the hole was close to one of the welds.

It is not uncommon for there to be pressure spikes during the refuelling process as refuel valves are closed elsewhere during the process. It is possible that repeated pressure spikes or repeated applications of normal pressure during either ground refuelling or AAR might have lead to the weakening of the weld and the subsequent hole. Atomised fuel could then escape into the space. What is missing, however, is an ignition source and that is a bit of a stumper.

If we assume that somehow ignition took place it is conceivable that the fire could then heat a fuel tank that is positioned in the wing root area, and this may have led to the explosion.

What is interesting to ponder is that the same airframes are generally being used for the Gulf theatre due to their fit. These few frames would be used in AAR more frequently than the other ac in the fleet. This argument might also be backed up by the fact that the fuel pipe hole was found in another Gulf ac in theatre."

I would just like to add that a whole year has gone by since I was given the above information. A whole year when crews have experienced huge fuel migrations, without any bomb bay fire or fuel tank protection. Absolutely no requests are in the system for the MR2 or MRA4.

"How can this possibly be called good risk management."

Edited for reasons that will become apparent.

Fiona Mackie

7th Nov 2007, 14:18

Hello. I'm a researcher for BBC News. I've spoken to Danny Fyne and he's approved this post.

In anticipation of reporting the conclusions of the Board of Inquiry into the crash of XV230 for our main news outlets, we are keen to pick up on some of the posts about the Mk2 and MRA4 and to see if there are any recently serving or serving aircrew willing to talk to us.

We're also particularly interested in comments about the refurbishments being made to the MK4 and whether they are sufficient? If you have any relevant first hand experience or knowledge of the Mk2, RMk1 & MRA4 or have information and insight which we should be aware of, please get in touch by email or telephone.

Any correspondence will be entirely off the record and in strictest confidence. My contact details are
[email protected]. Or 07841 054936.

However, any comments posted on this thread will also be considered subject to verification.

Thanks very much.
Fiona Mackie

Da4orce

7th Nov 2007, 15:38

To all those with a blinding faith in the BoI and MOD see below the words of Rose Gentle:

Mrs Gentle said she was appalled by the way the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had behaved.
"They have lied and covered up,"

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/7082689.stm

To those who believe there couldn't be another 230 and that everything is being done to prevent it:

XV255-SFS raised 4 Sept 06 for Stbd Rib 1 pipe Assy caused by failure of a weld that resulted in a high pressure fuel leak during refuel of No.5 tank.

The detection of a cracked pipe on a 3rd aircraft on 4 Sept 06 is well known to the IPT and this matter was addressed by UTI, RTI and F760 action as part of the initial reaction to the aircraft [XV230] crash.

But hey those of you who have your eyes closed see nothing wrong, my advice is sit down before you open them!

Laboratoryqueen

7th Nov 2007, 15:42

Da4orce

My eyes are not closed but I will remain to wait the findings of the BOI.

Your constant lack of respect towards the majority of the families who have asked for restraint in the speculation, who have asked for the cease to media involvement and to give us some respect during our times of grief, I find utterly disgusting.

You sir, are a dildo

Da4orce

7th Nov 2007, 15:45

Thank you for you intellectual input Lab Queen, since I have not posted for the last 3 pages of this thread and it has continued without my input I'm not sure why you single me out for such abuse.

Laboratoryqueen

7th Nov 2007, 15:54

It is for your comments about having our eyes closed and advising us to sit down, you attempt to belittle those who wish to await the factual findings. Maybe it is not us who are blinkered, maybe we see much more than you give credit for

tucumseh

7th Nov 2007, 15:56

Sir Peter

Thank you for your faith in me (!) but it’s not my trade, so can’t even comment on the fuel pressure issue. I would just repeat observations made before.

It is quite common for MoD to introduce design changes by Service Engineered Mod. The original justification process underpinning SEMs has long since been overtaken by one factor – quick and cheap. But often in the rush for cheapness, proper testing and trials are ignored and maintainers are not provided with the wherewithal to verify any repairs to the mod. It is long standing policy not to buy spares to support aircraft mods and, as test equipment and tech pubs are dealt with at the same time via the same process, they often suffer a swell. This scenario will be instantly recognisable to any maintainer here, and the abuse of the SEM system is a major standing risk. (The same applies to UORs). They have their place.

Also noted elsewhere is cable chaffing being a common ignition source. When considering this in conjunction with tolerance build-up, maintainers will again know that the relative position of same cables/looms between tail numbers can vary enormously. From what I know of the Nimrod, with the mainplanes being essentially handmade and no two being identical, this tolerance build-up may be significant. I have also seen major defence contractors make the howler no 1st year apprentice should make – insert negative tolerances in cable/loom drawings. (Not suggesting this is the cause, just illustrating a point). This is a very difficult area to manage and record under the Configuration Control process. I know other aircraft where dimensional differences between production runs are known, and recorded as call-ups in the GA. This info is used to, where necessary and as far as possible, ensure no materiel is manufactured which cannot be fitted; but it’s not always possible. This of course is insignificant compared to MoD’s long standing practice of denying funding to routinely maintain configuration control, which breaches their own airworthiness regulations. This kind of contradiction disturbs me.

I mentioned this the other day, in response to Bingo Handjob. Did anyone read the report by the Select Committee on Public Accounts? CDP was asked to confirm Configuration Control would be maintained on a specific aircraft. (A very good leading question, and one should ask what prompted it. My guess is Mull of Kintyre). He said yes. What wasn’t said was that the same CDP also ruled that a project manager could be formally disciplined for refusing to proceed to contract when no provision was included for Configuration Control, or other components of airworthiness. OK, it was a few years ago, but various Ministers of State have consistently upheld his ruling. And been kind enough to confirm it under FoI. Now, that’s something that really disturbs me.

RedSquirrel83

7th Nov 2007, 16:26

Lab Queen

You have no right to speak on behalf of the majority of families (of which I am a member of one and friend of others)

If you are disgusted by those families that are involved with the media including your own family (Panorama). It is very simple to be selective about what you watch on TV, listen to on the radio and the publications you read. With regard to rumours it is even easier not to log on to this type of website! There is far more to life than TV, radio, papers and the internet.

I do not wish to be involved with the media but understand and resepct those who do, it appears to me those involved want to get to the truth and to ensure the safety of the rest of our friends and family still flying Nimrods.

Laboratoryqueen

7th Nov 2007, 16:49

Redsquirrel83

My family were not involved with panorama and have not been involved with the media.

You may see from this thread alone that several family members, from different families have posted to ask for the speculation to end, and for the media involvement to end.

Yes we do want the truth, but as has been pointed out by other people here, this is a rumour network, what is said on here about the accident, can only be classed as rumour, and yet is enters the press and is written as if fact. It is the BOI which will give actual facts about what happened that day.

It is not a simple process of being selective what is viewed on television or read in the papers, when there are times it is splashed across all avenues.

It has also been stated that the speculation has proved fruitless, no changes have been made down to speculation alone, which does prove the point that it is only facts which may do this.

We all wish to know this will not happen again, but speculation, bringing that speculation into the media, whereby a lot of it has, afterwards, been found to be misleading, is not helpful in any respect.

Da4orce

7th Nov 2007, 17:00

An RAF Nimrod flying over southern Afghanistan put out a Mayday call and made an emergency landing at Kandahar air base on Monday after crew found fuel pouring into the bomb bay.

The aircraft was in the middle of refuelling when the crew discovered what several sources described as "a major fuel leak" in the bomb bay. The pilot immediately declared an emergency and broke off refuelling.

It is a repeat of an incident in September last year, when an RAF Nimrod exploded over Kandahar province killing all 14 on board. The board of inquiry into that incident has yet to report but that Nimrod, tail number XV230, had just refuelled in mid-air and the board's initial findings blamed pressure from the air-to-air refuelling system for forcing a serious leak.

The Ministry of Defence said today that nobody on board had been hurt in the latest incident. Air-to-air refuelling had been suspended "as a precautionary measure" but the fleet had not been grounded.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article2826702.ece

:mad: Thank god they got back safe.

MOA

7th Nov 2007, 17:04

I have prevented myself from posting on this thread for as long as possible but I feel I need to air a few issues that have been eating away at me for a while.

The MRA4 is not merely a refurbished MR2, it is a new aircraft, a fact that has been lost to a few in the MOD over the years. Reading some of these posts it appears that a few posters are making this mistake too. To complain that no changes have been made to the MRA4 design due to perceived flaws with the MR2 design is fundamentally wrong. It's similar to complaining that no changes have been made to the Tristar design following a report into the MR2 system - it's irrelevant as they are 2 different aircraft; as for MRA4 and MR2.

The core design for the MRA4 was frozen years ago and the Key User Requirements were defined and contracted to. These did not include bomb bay and fuel tank fire suppression. To insist that the MOD is negligent in not incorporating these changes into the MRA4 design at this stage are lacking any appreciation of the work involved to get these changes incorporated. My opinion (and just that) is that it would add at least a year onto the project if not more. What mitigation is there to keep flying the MR2s for extra years compared to the benefit of bomb bay fire fuel tank fire suppression? The probability of these happening have already been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable and so should not happen within the lifetime of the aircraft. Other key areas of the design result in a catastrophic failure of the aircraft with possible loss of life however these, through engineering analysis and industry best practice, have also been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable withous further engineering. As stated in previous posts, to reduce the risks to nothing would prevent flying, if not life in general, from taking place at all.

What I am trying to convey is leave the MRA4 out of this debate. If you want to question the MOD policy on heavy aircraft equipment and upgrade procurement then start a new thread.

Distant Voice

7th Nov 2007, 17:10

Da4orce: In your reference to the 255 SFS you are linking together two parts of the report, as though they appear in the same paragraph. They do not.

I have already asked the question regarding IPT knowing about it in my posts around #928. I got some sharp answers back.

DV

Da4orce

7th Nov 2007, 17:19

Noted and post ammended accordingly.

5206

7th Nov 2007, 19:28

While I note LabQueen et al's concerns over grieving - I know how personal a process it is - I would be wary of the mantra that the BOI is going to establish the facts about what happened on the day. Without access to all the bits of the aircraft, IMHO it is highly unlikely that they will positively identify the final cause of the accident. However, what a number of others here are talking about isn't the last few moments, but the last months and years, and the events that may have built up to the accident.

5206

nigegilb

7th Nov 2007, 20:15

Tonight's Timesonline;

RAF Nimrod puts out Mayday call after 'major fuel leak'

We could be issuing condolences tonight for another crew who could have been killed in the same place. I believe 12 months is worth the price to pay to provide proper protection for Nimrod crews.

MRA4 design frozen or otherwise?

"Nige,
'a double skin system'?

It's never too late to design whatever, However, the MRA4 design was frozen as of last December. Any changes will only be at the customers request(& funding). Realistically it won't happen given the current situation re funding and bearing in mind there is no requirement to qualify the AAR system at this time.

...The AAR system on MRA4 is the retained MR2 system. That means what the MR2 has, MRA4 will have also. That said, there are some differences, mainly where that fuel enters tanks in the Bomb Bay.

The AAR system will not be qualified on delivery. It has to be available ready to use at short notice.

The system does carry fuel though, and it is pressurised (& yes we have had the odd leak during ground refuel).....As I said, there is no design for foam in tanks (neither Flight Deck Armour funnily enough). It will only go on MRA4 at the request of the customer.

..........I can confirm that there is no intention to fit foam to MRA4 fuel tanks (unless the 'customer' requests (& comes up with the funding for) it...).

The aircraft is designed to a customer specification.

The specification doesn't call for foam in tanks..........

......As to the fire in the starboard wing root...............
Sorry on that one.... all I can say is that there was an uncontrolable fire reported in the Bomb Bay, and......... In my opinion... , any such fire may have involved Tank7 (the closest fuel tank to the rear of the Bomb Bay which would explain a 'wing' explosion). A fire involving tank 5 & 6 would have surely led to a 'tail' explosion....

Footnote, Herc Ks are a bit tired and close to OSD but every single one now has foam in the fuel tanks. If you are so concerned about the state of MR2 why aren't you calling for bomb bay fire protection and fuel tank protection in MR2?

Distant Voice

7th Nov 2007, 21:12

nigegilb: Well said. Sorry MoD and IPT, three strikes and you are out.
Who is now prepared to sign-off an a/c, according to any new IPT directive, and say "this is safe to fly". And what captain is prepared to accept any aircraft cleared under a new IPT directive.

Come on guys, now is the time to say "I don't sign" and "I don't fly"

DV

MOA

7th Nov 2007, 21:28

Nige,

I had no intention of patronising people and if that is how it came across then I apologise. However, your sources are correct and incorrect. There was an aspiration to freeze the MRA4 design late last year (PA X) and any changes defined as delta PA X to be frozen, as you say, in December. However, this has not stopped the changes. The current roll control circuit has yet to be fully defined to alleviate current handling quality issues and will probably not be until the end of the year.

To state that the AAR system is the same as MR2 is too simplistic. Yes the probe is retained but the rest of the AAR SOVs, fuel system, pumps etc which intrinsically control the fuel flow and distribution (USMS computers control valve sequencing) are so far removed from MR2 as to not even try to compare them. It is how the system copes to fuel flow fluctuations and what it does with the fuel that merits investigation and therefore to compare MR2 and MRA4 AAR systems as one is flawed.

'The AAR system will not be qualified on delivery. It has to be available ready to use at short notice.' - The AAR will not be qualified, period. Not only because the system will not be tested, but because the aircraft engines will not be cleared for wake penetration behind large aircraft. It will have no evidence to support RTS, therefore will not be cleared.

Flight deck armour has always been an aspiration but there is no funding. MR2 armour was fitted under a UOR in short order and this does not preclude the same happening for MRA4 following ISD (2010). It is easier to get funding in the current climate for a UOR post ISD than to contract BAe to change the specification.

My reference to project timeline extensions was poor, what I am trying to point out is how long will people want to wait for these modifications (the list could be endless) whilst the MR2 is forced to still fly as there is still an operational requirement to fulfil, that is all.

Safety_Helmut

7th Nov 2007, 21:33

We seem to be forgetting that these aircraft were never designed to the current levels of Safety as per decreed in JSP550 srs ..These are legacy aircraft and hence it is up to the individual platform to declare their own levels and get stakeholder buy in.
WRONG !
JSP 553 and Def Stan 00-56 cannot lay down hard and fast levels of safety, the RAF operates such a wide diversity of equipment. Guidance is taken but the Operator and the Technical Authority set the targets and measure against them. These levels set the policy for management of risks with any significant hazards assigned to the appropriate owner.
WRONG AGAIN ! The JSP553 is a mess and the people responsible for it are largely incompetent. Def Stan 00-56 has NEVER sought to lay down hard and fast levels of safety, NEVER ! Read the standard, both issue 2 and issue 4, if you still don't understand drop me a PM, and I will explain it for you.

JSP 553 is a Regulation but if they regulate on something that cannot be achievable, an alternative may be justified and authorised for use.
Agree wholeheartedly with Chug on this. r supwoods, please tell me you have nothing and have never had anything to do with the regulation of airworthiness ?

MOA

Given your obvious lack of understanding of safety engineering, I suggest you prevent yourself from posting for a little while longer.

I sympathise with family and friends who are not happy with the specualtion, it is not helped by those who post whilst knowing so little. Unfortunately many of those who know and understand so little are often the people making the decisions. Try to understand the real underlying theme, read the posts of Tucumseh, Chugalug, Safeware, The Swinging Monkey, Nigegilb and myself, we are people who understand the system and where it is failing. Military Aviation Regualtion is failing, it is a broken system. For those who have read and studied major accident reports such as Herald of Free Enterprise, Piper Alpha, Clapham Rail Crash, Challenger and many more, the organisational failings reported are shockingly similar.

Safety_Helmut

MOA

7th Nov 2007, 22:03

Safety,

I could have tried to illustrate my point by talking about fault tree analysis, conditioning factors, HRIs etc but that would have been lost to most people. The analysis was blunt but trying to highlight a point that all could understand.

I am not suggesting that MOD aircraft regulation is not faultless, only that bringing MRA4 into the argument because of the tragic loss of 230 is fundamentally flawed.

nigegilb

7th Nov 2007, 22:19

MOA I am not just saying the MoD is negligent, I am saying it is criminally negligent.

"3 strikes and you are out."

Sounds good to me.

As for Nimrod IPT, I would liken it to the Greenback, sinking in value by the day.

RedSquirrel83

7th Nov 2007, 22:19

5206

100% agree!

Chugalug2

7th Nov 2007, 22:37

An RAF Nimrod flying over southern Afghanistan put out a Mayday call and made an emergency landing at Kandahar air base on Monday after crew found fuel pouring into the bomb bay.

Thank God, for in truth who else is there to thank for this deliverance, other than the crew themselves? While the MOD's lawyers are forever rearranging the deck-chairs, and the BOI postponed repeatedly, what we all dreaded, what we all feared, so very very nearly happened again. If the Chief of the Metropolitan Police is finding his position threatened after Stockwell, surely the Chief of the Air Staff must also now be reviewing his position. As has been said, the system of airworthiness of the aircraft of his Air Force has become a broken system, dysfunctional and inherently dangerous, and all on his watch. There has to be massive reform before we can once again have confidence in it. Item 1 on the agenda should be the resignation of the CAS. It is not his fault, it is his responsibility, and in that he has failed those under him.

nigegilb

7th Nov 2007, 22:40

Well said Chug,

AOC 2Gp, they were tanking under your express orders, BYE BYE,

BOI is rapidly becoming an irrelevance, overtaken by events, pathetic.

I would imagine, a fair few people with a stake in this are bewildered tonight. Who can blame them?

The Swinging Monkey

7th Nov 2007, 23:56

LabQueen,

Please, for the sake of your own sanity, stop looking at PPrune!

Its a simple as that. Don't come on here, lambasting everyone who has passed a comment or made a suggestion and being rude to some of them. You are out of order madam.

We have all made it abundantly clear that you and the others have our deepest sympathy and condolences, and many of us share in your grief to a greater or lesser degree, but I fail to see why you constantly inflict pain upon yourself by reading what's posted here.

You have made your point, and expressed your wishes; clearly that isn't going to happen, so I think that would be best for you now to just not log on here anymore.

Kind regards

TSM

nigegilb

8th Nov 2007, 05:41

Can anyone with a bit of insight explain why it is that MRA4 is being belatedly rushed into service with little in the way of combat/fire protection, to fulfill a surveillance role, when ASTOR is already in service and as fas as I understand, actually designed for the job?

Better still, why is the MR2, being forced to carry out dangerous AAR Ops just because it has a TV camera and a radio on board when ASTOR is in service?

I assume in service does not mean combat ready, but does anyone have an idea when this aircraft will be able to be deployed?

getsometimein

8th Nov 2007, 06:29

Not true really, ASTOR cant do the job the MR2 does and visa-versa. It could be argued that there isn't any other platform that can do what the MR2 is capable of.

ASTOR is a way off being deployed yet as it will take a while for aircrews/groundcrews to get to know the plane. Maybe next year if we are lucky, but again, it wont replace the MR2.

nigegilb

8th Nov 2007, 07:01

If that is the case, MR2 is uniquely capable of doing the Afg job, then there is even more reason to give this airframe more protection.

camelspyyder

8th Nov 2007, 08:00

I dont know about bomb bay protection... it could do with some security protection!!!

There are more information leaks than fuel leaks out of the Nimrod fleet these days.

CS;)

Epimetheus

8th Nov 2007, 08:03

cm74

8th Nov 2007, 08:26

dont know about bomb bay protection... it could do with some security protection!!!

There are more information leaks than fuel leaks out of the Nimrod fleet these days.

Agreed CS, isn't it wierd that The Times got the news first? Gosh they are quick off the mark eh?

How does Mr Smith get his scoop so soon? Did the MoD make an announcement?

GalleyTeapot

8th Nov 2007, 08:46

"Can anyone with a bit of insight explain why it is that MRA4 is being belatedly rushed into service with little in the way of combat/fire protection"

MRA4 is hardly being "rushed into service", its over 10 years late and still a long way from being delivered, operationally capable etc etc

nigegilb

8th Nov 2007, 11:45

GT, depends which way you look at it. It is already 10 years late, so what is another year, if it is safer to enter service a little later than the revised plan.

You have heard the point of view across the floor. "let's UOR some Flight Deck Armour after it enters service."

MRA4 is being "belatedly rushed into service," that is why I used the word belated. Planned testing has been reduced and any modification that would delay entry is simply not being considered. Any of the IPT lot posting here should take a look across the Atlantic and see how the Americans do it. Survivability is built into the core design. It is incoherent and dangerous to do otherwise.

"BAe are being pressured to get MRA4 into service pronto because the RAF need the capability... (with a corresponding reduction in development testing no less.... & which part of the world is MRA4 is destined for.....?

Without armour or fuel tank protection..."

speeddial

8th Nov 2007, 13:18

ASTOR is SAR whereas Nimrod is EO.

Magnersdrinker

8th Nov 2007, 14:23

Nige

As you probably are aware the current MR2 has a Armour fit in place, but with operating altitudes blah blah there is no requirement for an aircraft with the job its doing to have any fitted they are well out of reach of small arms.
Anyway i thought this discussion was about that fatefull day and armour or not had no bearing on what happened!!
Bomb bay suppresion systems, yes maybe things would have turned out diffrent if there had been, but there wasnt and we will see if the BOI finds that an issue in the report.Personally i dont think it would have made one bit of diffrence, you are looking at Rib 1 area and not the bomb bay(close though) but i dont like to speculate ,the proffesionals are on the job and they will find out what happened.they have far more facts than us speculators !!
With the MRA4 having the potential to carry Air to Ground weapons (possability) it would be prudent to have something in place.Im sure with all that has happened there will be recomendations by the BOI ,again that will be down to the user and the cost of implementing improvements.

Chugalug2

8th Nov 2007, 14:35

Im sure with all that has happened there will be recomendations by the BOI ,again that will be down to the user and the cost of implementing improvements
Exactly, and therein lies the problem. Can you imagine such a comment on the Civil Aviation forum after, for instance, the BA Manchester 737 tragedy? Such mods concerning airworthiness are too important to be left to the whim of the MOD.

nigegilb

8th Nov 2007, 14:45

Cheers Magner, great name btw. This thread ebbs and flows, my interest is mainly to work for more built in survivability and protection for our aircraft.

I am of the aircrew generation who sat on coils of chain, FDA is a subject close to my heart.

Mags, just a thought about the Mayday aircraft on Monday, which performed an emergency landing following an emergency descent into Kandahar airfield.

Kandahar is hot, hot, hot, at the moment and will continue to be. Civilian food/water supply convoys heading for coalition bases are being attacked on a regular basis, ANA, and local friendlies are being killed at a rate of 60 or so a month. A few weeks a go a coalition helo was shot down by a combined attack, RPG and Generation 2 SAM. The point is, you never know when you are going to need FDA. Give me the choice and I would take it every time. Suggesting to UOR FDA after service entry just serves to underline the inability of the RAF to demand proper funding to achieve decent aircraft protection.

It wasn't a great feeling to be sitting on a flak jacket watching the tracer aimed in my general direction. Replacing an aircraft that has FDA with one that does not is not an indication of a coherent strategy. I thought we had left those dark days behind.

Nobody here needs reminding what a single round can do to a fuel tank and yet this aircraft has no prospect of fuel tank protection, neither does it's replacement. Whereas I will probably be flying an airliner with it in 3 or 4 years time. It's a funny old world.

Edited to add an apology to MOA. Sorry not in best mood today.

Laboratoryqueen

8th Nov 2007, 18:43

Da4orce, I would like to apologise to you for calling you a dildo, it was wrong of me and was done so purely in response to your comments of having my eyes shut etc. Normally your comment wouldn't have elicited a response such as that from me, however, I have received several accusations from posting members here, that, 1) I must not care about the death of my loved one because I am not seeking answers, 2) With my calls for speculation to cease I must be trying to help in a cover up of the events that day and several choice terms and phrases used towards me. To take that out upon you was wrong of me, I am sorry.

The Swinging Monkey, thank you for your concern over my health, and if the matter was simply to refrain from logging onto pprune, then yes I woud be in agreement with you, however the matter isn't pprune, I and the other family members who have posted here have asked for the media involvement to end as that isn't something which can be easily avoided. It's not the same as avoiding switching on to Eastenders, not when it is in several newspapers, being discussed by the public, on the news, and television programmes dedicated to the event, and being advertised for that fact.

I do not claim to be speaking for the majority of families, I am the appointed spokesperson for my family alone, not for any other family. When I have made comment about the majority of families requesting an end to the speculation and to await the BOI, this is solely indicating and pointing out the fact that several other family members have posted here asking the same as I do.

I am not entirely blinkered to the fact that the BOI will give all answers and all facts of what may or may not have happened that day. I know that this will not be feasibly possible, they have not been able to gain safe access to the crash site or to be able to examine the remains of 230, however I do believe they will be able to take the information they have, events leading up to the crash, information from the black boxes and other relevant information they will have aquired to make an informed explanation, even if that may be an inconclusive one. It will certainly not have been an easy task for the board in this investigation, I think they deserve to be given a chance to present those findings.

Tappers Dad, Sir, the calls for an end to media speculation are not in any shape or form a personal attack on you or your family, they are simply a request to respect and allow those who wish for peace in a time of grief, you are entitled to your way of grieving as are we. I do wish you and your family well, and I do hope you find peace in your grief.

Pontius Navigator

8th Nov 2007, 19:56

Could one of the more informed contributors here answer the following:

If the Times report is true about an alleged incident on Monday, and if the nature of this alleged incident is considered to be related to the findings (to date)of the BOI on 230, then could this delay the BOI on 230 should the BOI teamwish to inspect/investigate this latest alleged incident? Or is the BOI regarded as a separate and closed matter to the one airframe, the accident and its in-service history?

As no one has answered your question may I speculate.

The BOI on 230 will indeed be a separate matter to the one airframe (note the wording) however it is extremely probably that the latest incident will be used by the 230 BOI. There will most likely be a separate BOI for the latest incident.

My reasoning for the 230 BOI using the latest aircraft is that they will undoubtedly have looked at other Nimrods to gain an understanding of all the possible points of failure. An actual failure will possibly help them identify the most probable points of failure on 230.

Magnersdrinker

9th Nov 2007, 00:32

"The point is, you never know when you are going to need FDA. Give me the choice and I would take it every time. Suggesting to UOR FDA after service entry just serves to underline the inability of the RAF to demand proper funding to achieve decent aircraft protection."

Yep 100% agree in this ideal world these systems should be in place, i too have sat flying into Basrah with fully body armour on (the days before armour fits,glaring at the wescam screen in hope that you never see a flash from the ground). I guess the bottom line is to have permanaent fixtures in place costs money , with the MR2 fleet on a rundown and they are doing there best to provide these kind of makeshift protection features that is feasably possible (a balance of cost with practicality). I would like to think the MR4 will have permanant fixtures in place,wether or not the MR4 will do the same as the MR2 we will never know.
I think the basic line is things like this are expensive to modify and fit , do you think the user at present has this funds available to do it , we all think not, its down to goverment providing the best for the guys fighting and this government will not do that. They are the sole ones responsible for all and they have that duty of care, but when it comes to budgets and funding ... i need say no more

Epimetheus

9th Nov 2007, 08:13

PN,
Thanks for your informed thoughts. You confirmed my suspicion that the BOI could use any recent info considered relevant from the alleged incident of earlier this week. And if this did extend the BOI publication, one hopes that it would be accepted by all as beneficial (while recognising the need for urgency for the families) because new info could be pertinent in the absence of detailed info from the XV230 crash site, should there be any common themes between the 2 aircraft. I trust my text is suitably non-speculatory.

Pontius Navigator

9th Nov 2007, 08:16

new info could be pertinent in the absence of detailed info from the XV230 crash site, should there be any common themes between the 2 aircraft. I trust my text is suitably non-speculatory.

Exactly. .

nigegilb

9th Nov 2007, 08:48

I have read the Incident report of XV235 Mayday on monday that performed an emergency landing and ground evacuation at Kandahar airfield.

There has been much criticism of the RAF CoC and Procedure in recent weeks. I just wanted to take this opportunity to publically acknowledge the cool professionalism of crew XV235, in a very scary situation. We should never lose sight of real bravery being performed on a daily basis in Iraq and Afg.

Well done fellas, for getting everyone on the ground in one piece, I hope you had a cool beer in hand, quick time.

Mick Smith

9th Nov 2007, 10:16

A report on the incident, including the difficulties in raising a response to the Mayday call, is now on the TimesOnline website, along with the air incident report itself.

News report here

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article2839484.ece

air incident report here

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2839607.ece

spanners123

9th Nov 2007, 10:25

Should incident reports be available on the Internet? Are they not classified documents?

Safety_Helmut

9th Nov 2007, 10:53

Do you want the link to the website of a national daily newspaper removed ?

Perhaps you should address your query to the Editor of The Times !

S_H

spanners123

9th Nov 2007, 11:02

S_H
If incident reports are classified restricted or above then yes, it should be removed IMHO.
At least The Times, this time, has not published the names, ranks and telephone numbers of those involved this time.

Chugalug2

9th Nov 2007, 11:05

I thoroughly and unreservedly endorse Nigegilb's sentiments. Well done each and every one of XV235's crew. You obviously had no illusions about the risks involved in the duty for which you were tasked. With the courage and professionalism shown by all our Armed Forces in theatre you planned in detail how you would deal with what you hoped wouldn't happen. It did, and your response as a crew saved the day. What happens elsewhere as a result of mercifully only an incident rather than an accident is for the RAF higher command and the MOD. If they do not take this as a very belated wake up call then their negligence knows no bounds. As for yourselves I trust that you are now recovered to a place of cool beers that can be enjoyed with well earned fervour!

Mick Smith

9th Nov 2007, 11:41

Just an add to the TimesOnline link to the air incident report. As a result of a technical issue the second page wasn't there until 1230 so if you read it before then you might want to revisit.

FATTER GATOR

9th Nov 2007, 12:49

It needs to be to determined if the law has been broken with regard to the release of information in this manner.

If it has, find the person(s) responsible, prosecute them, punish them and throw them out of the RAF.

At least the Times online had the common decency to remove the names this time.

Winco

9th Nov 2007, 15:07

I too would wish to offer my sincere congratulations and relief to the crew involved in this latest incident. One can only guess at how they must have felt when this occurred and they have my utmost admiration for their professionalism in safely getting the aircraft on the ground.

On a different note, many of you will be aware of some of the stick I took earlier in this thread regarding my comments concerning the safety of modern airliners, and in particular my concerns about safety matters relating to the MRA4 aircraft.

In light of this latest incident, would those of you responsible care to re consider your opinions? After all, if the incident report is to be believed (and why shouldn't it be?) then this particular aircraft had been fitted recently with a new coupling, and this was the first occasion for AAR post fitting. How could it have gone so wrong??

So, MightyHunterAge, the wee short chap (MRA4 test pilot?) and all the others, who have been somewhat quiet since the incident, what do you think now? Would you honestly still be happy to fly in a Nimrod????

On a wider issue, the MR2 incidents add even further weight to the need for Bomb Bay and fuel tank protection, both on the existing MR2s but especially in MRA4 which will replace them. Has the RAF not learned anything from the tragedy of 230 and the very close calls of the other incidents? It seems to me, to be criminally negligent to simply ignore what has happened, and what is clearly still happening!

CAS.
Glenn, it is time for you to do the honourable thing Sir, and resign! You are a very nice chap, and you and I have met on several occasions, but the time has come for you to throw in your towel. But before you do that, there is one thing that you could do to retrieve some of your credibility and leave the RAF on 'a high'........GROUND ALL NIMRODS!
Yes, ground the entire fleet, then go along to Mr brown at No 10 and tell him what you have done, and why you have done it (because they are now unsafe) make a public statement to that effect, and then announce your resignation. That will be the bravest thing you could possibly do Sir, and would make you a true leader.

To all Nimrod crews, keep safe guys and girls and above all else, put yourselves first. Even as a retired Wg Cdr, I am thoroughly ashamed at the way the whole Nimrod fiasco is being handled, it is appalling. AOC 2 Gp should be hanging his head in shame, and be thanking God that this latest incident didn't end in another disaster. He too should consider his position.

I and my fellow Civilian Pilots salute your courage and commitment, I only wish that the hierarchy of this pathetic Air Force did so also.

The Winco

nigegilb

9th Nov 2007, 15:14

I recognise the quiet bravery and professionalism that has been an enduring quality in the Royal Air Force over the years. Prior to the flight, the first since an FRS coupling change, the Captain and crew member had taken the time to locate the new coupling and obviously made a mental note of the possibility of its failure in flight. This cool, methodical approach in the planning of this mission gives a clue to the way Nimrod crews must be thinking.

The refuel was carried out IAW the revised procedure reducing the possibility of a pressure spike. The Carter pump was turned on after contact and fuel pressure did not exceed 35 psi. The fuel spray was spotted almost immediately. Almost as though the crew were expecting it. The breakaway and VFR descent carried out with speed but I can't help but imagine what the crew were going through in that descent. On landing the TAC crew smelled fuel and a ground evacuation was ordered.

20 minutes later an inspection was carried out, revealing that the bomb bay heating mixing chamber cladding was soaked with fuel, the fuel had even reached the roof of the bomb bay.

Of course the fuel ground testing procedures could not replicate the environmental conditions. It has never been able to.

We have reached a new low in the modern Royal Air Force. AoC 2Gp, CAS, send Nimrod crews up on a Wing and a Prayer. Our crews carry out missions expecting things to go wrong. How on earth did we get to this situation?

Please don't shoot the messenger. They must be very brave and very desperate to get the word out from the front line.

I salute you.

BOZ Pod

9th Nov 2007, 15:19

Fattor Gator you certainly have a point ref the leak (IR) however, that is for the future, lets focus on the crews in theatre and at home and most importantly the fact that another crew could have just been lost!

Save your highly passionate words for making sure this does not happen again.

Mick Smith

9th Nov 2007, 16:01

Mondays incident now running as lead on BBC TV News 24

rab-k

9th Nov 2007, 16:36

Link to today's headlines:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7087223.stm

Al R

9th Nov 2007, 17:02

2 arses need to be kicked very soundly here.

1. CAS

2. The w:mad:nker behind this..

"The crew's log, leaked to the BBC, reported the bomb bay doors "to be wet with fuel".

I am as sick and tired of this constant stream of seditious whining, as I am the criminal incompetence of those in charge.

Had Enough 77

9th Nov 2007, 17:13

How can the CAS, AOC 2Gp and Stn Cdr seriously continue this path of wanton neglect. They must really not give a dam anymore, are they all apethetic and coasting along until they get their fat pension?

If that aircraft had been destroyed, god forbid, what do you think the response would be? Would they ground the fleet or would they just carry on as usual making all the same promises as they did before. How many aircraft have to be lost before something is done. I realy do not want to attend any more funerals of my friends.

Chugalug2

9th Nov 2007, 17:41

2 arses need to be kicked very soundly here.

I am afraid that we are way past arse kicking as a solution to this endemic failure of the RAF to provide airworthy aircraft for its crews Al, but things do indeed need to happen:

1. The CAS should go before he is pushed. His position is untenable.
2. The fleet should be grounded, its job done as best it can be by others, at the very least until the BoI report is published and acted upon.
3. An independent inquiry be instituted immediately to urgently investigate Military Airworthiness Regulation in the UK, with a view to a total and fundamental reform of the system.

As to kicking the arses of those who have allowed this into the open, I can only say that I wish I was equipped with such moral courage. At the very least they may have saved the next crew detailed for AR, more likely they would have set in chain the means of turning around the destruction of the provision of RAF Flight Safety by the bean counters, uniformed and civilian, who have starved it of money. The Times which broke this story has a long record of revealing such logistical scandals, for it was they, was it not, who shone light on the ineptitude of supplying kit unfit for purpose to another British Expeditionary Force, in the Crimea? No doubt Victorian voices were raised then against them, though perhaps in a rather more genteel way!

Sgt.Slabber

9th Nov 2007, 17:52

Had Enough 77

You forgot to mention the "objects": McBroon, McBroone and McDar!ing. They are as culpable in this sorry affair as any.

Al R

9th Nov 2007, 17:55

Chuggers,

I am TOTALLY against helping the media like this because they do nothing constructive with the matter, rather than fill a space on the internet with it, before moving on to talking about Amy Winehouse or something else.

Those with the issue should get the sqn Commanding Officer behind the gunsheds and tell him that if he hasn't got the balls to resign over something as critical as this, then his face is going to get some percussion adjustment and pronto. Then, the sqn COs need to go to the AOC en masse and get him behind the gunshed. THEN let the facts come out. If they can mitigate why they've done nothing, then fine. If they can't, then they need to have the balls to do a John Selwyn Gummer and invite their families onboard for a week of AAR refuelling jollies at 30,000 feet.

This isn't rocket science. We are playing with people's lives here. If manslaughter or cuplable or corporate homocide can be proved, then fine. Lets get the bastards on trial. Des broone too. But there is a difference between the USS Caine and RAF Kinloss. I hope. We go down this route at our peril.

jayteeto

9th Nov 2007, 18:06

Throughout my career the services walked 'close to the line', sometimes straying over what was acceptable. However, although the Chinook fiasco was bad, this seems like criminal activity from the people in power!! Sometimes in life, however painful the consequences, you have to say that enough is enough, is now that time? Service personnel know the job is risky and are acting bravely every day on operations. Going without the basic kit to do the job is just NOT ACCEPTABLE. Forget your career aspirations and LEAD your people, even if it means telling the ministry the truth. These are real people you are using to climb the ladder, support them as they support you.

Vox Populi

9th Nov 2007, 18:34

AI R:
2 arses need to be kicked very soundly here.
1. CAS
2. The wnker behind this..
"The crew's log, leaked to the BBC, reported the bomb bay doors "to be wet with fuel".
I am as sick and tired of this constant stream of seditious whining, as I am the criminal incompetence of those in charge.
It looks to me as if this press leak might save lives.
The MOD have an abomnible record at dealing with such matters...keeping it secret and telling service men and women to stop whining and get on with it, despite the dangers is their usual modus operandi. Only when it becomes an issue that might actually cost someone a job (rather than a life) do things get done. Good luck to the brave person who risked their own career to get this into the public domain.
VP

Al R

9th Nov 2007, 18:35

Jay said: Forget your career aspirations and LEAD your people, even if it means telling the ministry the truth. These are real people you are using to climb the ladder, support them as they support you.

Well said.

If CAS went now, citing his position as impossible due to having no money, no support and no faith in his boss, it would make him a hero forever. If he grips on, with white fingernails, and then goes (or even if he doesn't go) he is doomed forever. Peter DlB is persona non grata in Hereford lets not forget.

The argument that others would be too scared to take up his fallen baton is moot. I would rather we are lead by a succession of punchy 1 or 2 stars who are prepared to resign on matters of principle and integrity (remember that?) than by a series of 3 or 4 stars who only have eyes for the top of the greasy pole having got so close.

Al R

9th Nov 2007, 18:58

Vox said: It looks to me as if this press leak might save lives.

The MOD have an abomnible record at dealing with such matters...keeping it secret and telling service men and women to stop whining and get on with it, despite the dangers is their usual modus operandi. Only when it becomes an issue that might actually cost someone a job (rather than a life) do things get done. Good luck to the brave person who risked their own career to get this into the public domain.
VP

I agree with most of that too. But if you back brief the media like this, without full clout, co-ordination and sustained conviction, all that happens is that MoD handlers only brief the official line and things move on. All that will have happened too, is that you afford succour to those who will whince about this today, but who will wake up in post tomorrow, and be able to breathe a little easier and feeling a little stronger.. because they're still there (see Ian Blair). You mark my words. This will achieve nothing, other than undermine the principle of military discipline, and muddy the water. For instance, this has clearly been actioned by someone in authority and insight. Who is he/she now, to pass judgement on others on matters of military discipline? There are far better ways of achieving the aim.

And those who need a little fortitude, or who have forgotten about what they are paid to do, or who they are paid to lead, then I suggest they listen to Frank? In the meantime, leaking to the media (yes, its an awful allusion) is pointless unless you are prepared to go the whole 9 yards and go public with what you've got and be prepared to do time.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKAxnB6Ap4o

Mr Point

9th Nov 2007, 19:22

An MoD spokesman added: "As always the safety of our crews remains paramount."

...and this has been displayed by the MoD in the following way...errm.....well...nearly had it....no it's gone.

Mick Smith

9th Nov 2007, 19:55

I am TOTALLY against helping the media like this because they do nothing constructive with the matter

Why precisely do you think you are having this discussion Al? You say you are sick of the w:mad:ers who leak this material. You say you wouldnt involve the media. The tragic reality of a society that has been taught by the politicians to look for continual tax cuts is that only people risking their careers to get the media involved has any hope of alerting the public to the issue, thereby putting pressure on the politicians.

Do you seriously think this is an issue the public shouldnt know about? As for Amy f:mad:ing Whitehouse, I frankly wouldnt know how to write about her, I barely know who she is. You want to take out a petition to get the media to concentrate on serious subjects like this, and ignore Amy f:mad:ing Whitehouse I will sign it a million times and back it all the way but sadly it wont make a jot of difference.

Take a look on the newspaper websites at the most popular pages, a sex murder in Italy and the McCanns. Were I you, I would just be grateful that people were prepared to alert the media and a few - far too few - parts of the media responded, so there could be a proper discussion of why we are putting the lives of our forces needlessly at risk.

Rant over, sorry but I've sat back and heard enough whining about the media, usually for so-called speculation when in fact the vast majority has been legitimate and accurate reporting of official reports written by the RAF or in the most recent case by QinetiQ, a large proportion of which has not actually been leaked but obtained as a result of perfectly legitimate freedom of information requests.

nigegilb

9th Nov 2007, 20:19

I have just watched the 2100 News 24 Bulletin, Nimrod leading and this time there was a report on the follow up IR. I sense elements of the Nimrod fleet are at the end of their tether.

The BBC report referred to the post XV230 procedure of monitoring the bomb bay during AAR looking for fuel leaks. So, Glenn Torpy says there is nothing connecting these leaks but they think it a good idea to look down a periscope in the bomb bay. Well, this could well have saved the lives of the crew.

How many times do we have to call for enhanced fire/tank protection?
Who cares about a career when you might wind up dead on your next sortie because some bean counter didn't want to spend the money and your own CoC was too weak to demand it?

""Asked if he thought that air-to-air refuelling was safe, Sir Glenn Torpy told Panorama: "It's exactly the same as the rest of the integrity of the aircraft. It has been a focus for understandable reasons and we did suspend air-to-air refuelling for a period in November. We are looking at what we're doing. It is as safe as it needs to be."
He admitted to being "very concerned" about the number of fuel leaks. But he added: "That's why we've made sure we analysed every single incident. There are no underlying themes."'

Pontius Navigator

9th Nov 2007, 20:25

to get the media involved has any hope of alerting the public to the issue, thereby putting pressure on the politicians.

. . .

be grateful that people were prepared to alert the media and a few - far too few - parts of the media responded,

Many posters here may be too young to remember when the newspaper of first call in the morning was the Daily Express. If we wanted to know what was going on in the '60s the Express was always the first to publish accurate information. Just two words - Chapman Pincher.

And where did he get his information? Straight from the horse's mouth. I went into the bar of the RAF Club in 1971. My escort at the time pointed to the assembled throng in the bar at lunchtime. He said that journalists outnumbered RAF officers from the MOD at more than 2:1.

The only difference now is that the internet enables leaks from further away.

Lyneham Lad

9th Nov 2007, 20:27

Well said, Mr Smith.

If the only way of putting pressure on the Government and MOD is via the media, then so be it and more power to their elbow. The Government/MOD spin machine can only be countered by the media - how else is the true voice of the the situation to be aired? Apart from General Dannat, who from the MOD has publicly put pressure on Downing St? CAS? Weasel words.

Sadly, the ethos of cowtowing (sp?) to the politicians seems to be so endemic and so embedded even down to Group and Station level that the leaking of an Incident Report becomes a vital tool in an effort to prevent further unnecessary loss of life.

When the crew of an aircraft find it necessary to take special action during what should be a routine procedure in order to safeguard their own lives, then we should salute their bravery and dedication to duty whilst vigorously castigating via all possible means those cowards who knowingly put them in such a position.

LL

Al R

9th Nov 2007, 20:47

Dear Mike,

With the greatest of respect, this discussion has no bearing at all on their decision making. And I know why I’m reading about this, and I know why I won’t be, next week. We demand constant news.. it changes every hour, we NEED something new because we check every hour. And soon, we’ll be reading something new, and then what?

And you misunderstand me. It IS an issue that the public needs to know about, but it is not going to happen because someone has allowed it to filter out like this. You won’t put politicians under any pressure with one shots like this. Consider how Brown bore the pressure of the Lisbon EU referendum. I’m aware of the shortcomings of the media. But it doesn’t make my points any less valid. Bottom line is, the media doesn’t care. If you go to the media appealing to them to make it a story, you'll get nowhere.

On the other hand, if you have a serving officer challenge the issue of Crown Immunity and name Brown and CAS as respondents in a civil matter concerning flight safety and the deaths of a number or unnamed servicemen, you might have the basis of a story. Let them grow it.. incentivise them to investigate and break something new, 'exciting' and prolonged. You have to fight smart and use the media against itself to get anywhere.

Ask yourself.. Fusilier Gentle died because the EPM eqpt was locked up yards from where he died. Matty Hull died because of a cock up. Who gives a flying f:mad:ck about that now? Do you?? I don't see you going off about the army system, in fact.. I don't see anyone going off on one about Fus. Gentle today, because the media has moved on to Nimrod.. its another MoD story, and there'll be another one next week too.

Dear Lyneham Lad,

Yup, read my above.. but you don't do that by leaking one shots as in this incident.

Edit: Reference my last, don't use an officer, use an LAC who's PVR'd because he's had enough and he's got youthful integrity and a sense of morality. Yup, the CAS vs the LAC. Keep it tight, allow no meeja access and I get first dibs at the film rights. Bootiful. :rolleyes:

nigegilb

9th Nov 2007, 21:07

AI R, whilst I think I understand your anger, I believe you are wrong. I cannot be certain, but the clue is in the delay in the report of the BoI.

Let's wait and see the recommendations. The RAF and MOD desperately need to drag back some credibility and the future of self-regulation could well be at stake.

I would not be surprised if we win the argument at the eleventh hour.

Al R

9th Nov 2007, 21:28

I have absolutely no doubt that something dramatic will happen, none whatsoever. The issue is one of maintaining credibility, a sense of self determination, and regaining control, you watch.

I am not a g'ment patsy, far from it.. I watched Henry Allingham tonight on N24 and felt humbled by the sacrifice bought about because men couldn't get along with other men. This goes beyond the stupidity of what our men and women are going through, this is something completely different. Its awful. But I stand by my points.

As an aside, Charles Wheeler has become one of our greatest broadcasters and commentators.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Allingham

Mr Point

9th Nov 2007, 21:28

I totally agree that the Media, as a body, are not genuinely interested in Nimrods or the crew of XV230. However, there are a number of journalists who have real concerns about the current situation, and the state of the Armed Forces in general.

The recent media coverage has caused concern for a number of people, including some of crew 3's next-of-kin, but is it better to have a drip feed of political pressure through the media, or none at all?

Al R

9th Nov 2007, 21:31

The niche journalists do not have the ears of enough people of importance, thats the problem. Lers face it.. its just another MoD cock up story, and hey, we're lose hundreds of men at the moment, right?

A drip drip feed of info is counterproductive. Here today, gone tomorrow.

tucumseh

9th Nov 2007, 21:32

“If you have a serving officer challenge the issue of Crown Immunity…..”

Forgive me if I’ve misconstrued, but I didn’t think we had Crown Immunity anymore on airworthiness matters. Those who had airworthiness delegation were packed off to refresher courses following the issue of DCI GEN 89 on 26th March 1993.

These courses were so hastily cobbled together they only served to highlight the complete lack of unified and consistent policy, which exists to this day. The “tutors” knew all the theory, but very few had any practical experience of the obstacles placed in the way of those charged with attaining and maintaining airworthiness. Then, and now, the MoD mantra was “We have a robust regulatory framework”. Maybe so, but they don’t provide funds to actually implement it. That is; it is one thing to achieve safety and airworthiness on a new aircraft, but quite a different thing to maintain it through life.

Today, we heard the MoD spokesperson say “As always the safety of our crews remains paramount”. I’d love to be a fly on the wall in certain offices, given long standing and freely available MoD rulings that mandated Airworthiness Regulations can be ignored and, in fact, it is a disciplinary offence to insist on the provision of funding to maintain airworthiness before entering into a contract.

Of course, if Min(AF) wants to change his ruling………. And if PUS would care to offer his thoughts on those above him who disagree with his mandated policies……..

chappie

9th Nov 2007, 22:09

tucumseh, regards the words of the MoD spokesman...the safety of our crews is of paramount importance etc....what can i say???!!! same old words, different crash, different s***storm!
they traipse out the same old words and think we don't notice and by doing so alongside their actions reveal their thoughts on the personnel of the armed forces...nothing.however, the reality is that the news today is tomorrows chip paper.sad but true. it matters to us but those it doesn't affect tend to have forgotten about it the next day.

well done to the crew of the nimrod for staying safe.

keep the faith:ok:

grousehunter

9th Nov 2007, 22:55

What has happened this week makes me shudder. My friends have yet again been put in a position that they did not bring upon themselves. We all know that we have a certain amount of risk that we will be subjected too. But this arises from where we operate our given platforms. The MR2 operates in a theatre where it can be in very grave danger. Fine, i get paid for that. But I hope that someone has ensured that I can complete my task without the platform I am in becoming the very thing I have to fight.

I love the MR2, the crews, and the jobs that we complete all the time. Most of which we complete without any acknowledgment. I want to be able to support my colleagues on the ground and complete the multitude of other tasks that this aircraft and the skilled operators can achieve.

This week we could have witnessed another crash.

This has to stop.

I applaud all on this thread who want to get to the truth, and for those who want us to stop, then this week has been a wake up call.

Good work lads, hope the beers have been good this week.:D

The Swinging Monkey

9th Nov 2007, 23:10

Al R

Whilst I would agree that disclosing an IR to the media is not the proper thing to do, it has proved to us all here that there WAS yet another incident concerning an MR2, AAR and a fuel leak.

Had we not had the IR leaked, then someone would have eventually told a friend of a friend etc. and it would be on here as another 'hey, I heard there was another Nimrod incident blah......can anyone confirm it?'

So yes, leaking classified info isn't ideal and I don't agree with it, but in this case I think that it was understandable and probably inevitable that it was going to get out, and the IR is proof of events.

I fail to see why no one, CAS especially, has NOT had the ba££s to do the correct thing and resign and go public about the matter. I would think that after his sad display on the Panorama programme, CAS has backed himself into a corner with comments such as 'they are as safe as they need to be' and there will clearly be some difficult questions ahead for him.

I also think that it is now bordering on criminal neglegence and incompetance to allow further Nimrod operations. The lives of our servicemen and women are too valuable to allow this to continue. CAS and AOC 2Gp should be ashamed at what has happened and what is still happening with the Nimrod fleet, and if they cannot, then they are clearly not fit to hold office - their judgement has been found to be seriously lacking.

So, go now CAS and AOC 2Gp and maybe even ISK Stn Cdr. You have all had the ability to call a halt to this, and you have failed. Shame on you.

Fantastic efforts by the crew, and I'm just delighted that I won't be having to attend even more funerals of dear friends (for the time being at least) Well done guys and girls.

TSM

AC Ovee

9th Nov 2007, 23:15

So, MightyHunterAge, the wee short chap (MRA4 test pilot?) and all the others, who have been somewhat quiet since the incident, what do you think now? Would you honestly still be happy to fly in a Nimrod????

Yes, I would. And yes, I would do AAR. Why? Because AAR in a Nimrod is no more dangerous than AAR in any other aircraft. XV230 experienced a fuel fire due to any one of a number of causes, and I know that ALL of those causes have since been identified and mitigated. XV235 suffered ONLY a fuel leak. Yes, it sprayed into the bomb bay, but it would never have become a fire because there was nothing in there to ignite it. AVTUR and air (even at the correct ratio) will only ignite with an enormous amount of heat to create the chemnical process known as oxidization (fire). Sufficient heat is supplied by either a small spark with a lot energy which is only achieved by HE ignitors (there are none in the bomb bay) or sustained heat energy created by a hot surface (air pipe), and there are none in the bomb bay, now.

Those who know what a Mayday means will form the impression that the crew were in imminent danger. They were not. They never were. However, in fairness to them, they were scared and feared for their lives. Why? Because the situation was very similar to XV230 and no-one has yet told them (BOI report) why it was actually very different. It is because of this lack of crucual info that they did what they did and they, my friends and colleagues, did it well.

The underlying reason for the crew's decision to divert off task lies not with the aircraft. It lies with those who have not released the findings of the senior officers on the BOI.

Seldomfitforpurpose

9th Nov 2007, 23:23

"Yes, I would. And yes, I would do AAR."

Not sure if you are aircrew but I do wonder if you are very brave or very stupid. you decide :(

AC Ovee

9th Nov 2007, 23:31

And on what basis do you ask that question? Whatever your answer is, mine is that I am neither.

grousehunter

9th Nov 2007, 23:33

AC OVee "those who know what a Mayday means will form the impression that the crew were in imminent danger. They were not. They never were."

Cause you were there.

Get a grip fella.

:ugh:

Gaiscioch

9th Nov 2007, 23:45

Errrm, have I got news for you big boy…….
Either you are not a pilot or should not be….. & with an attitude like that (CRM) I would love to fly with you ... NOT!

andrewn

10th Nov 2007, 00:09

This is my first post after quite a few years of reading pprune and I should point out that I am a civvy ("Joe Public" no less) with little first hand knowledge of current mil ops; however I think this thread and the accompanying media coverage warrants some comment. Firstly, I sympathise enormously with TD and others close to the crew of XV230 who simply want to know the truth - at times, just through pprune, I feel as though I have shared your grief. Secondly, glad the crew on Monday got down safely. To get to the matter at hand I feel the issue here is all about risk management, i.e. judging what is and is not an acceptable risk. Flying an aircraft into a "hot" area with the knowledge that you have taken all possible measures to mitigate any risk (intel brief, defensive aids, sortie profile, etc) is one thing; doing that with the knowledge that the aircraft could explode during AR due to a known deficiency is completely different.

In my life in civvy street my employer has a responsibility to take all necessary measures to ensure that I am not exposed to undue risk; in the case of Nimrod crews it appears to me that the RAF has not taken this responsibility seriously enough. I don't profess to know enough about the technicalities to comment in detail but I know if I (or a loved one) was Nimrod aircrew I would be very uneasy about the current "just get on with it" mentality that seems to prevail in the upper echelons of your management.

To all the crews - the British public do appreciate your ongoing efforts and unswerving dedication to the cause.

Fly Safe.

DaveyBoy

10th Nov 2007, 01:23

AC Ovee: forgive me if I am misinterpreting your comments, but you seem to be giving the impression that:

a. You have read the BoI report or at least have knowledge of its contents.

b. You believe that, if the crew knew what you knew, even with fuel spraying into the bomb bay, they should not have diverted but should have remained on task or returned to their airfield of departure.

Is that really what you meant?

getsometimein

10th Nov 2007, 06:52

So if the Nimrod takes on 40k lbs of fuel in a single AAR, then even 5% of that leaking into the bomb bay would add up to 2k lbs of fuel sloshing around in there. You can knob off if you think im flying around with 2k lbs of fuel waiting for an ignition source to pitch up.

nigegilb

10th Nov 2007, 07:12

If you could smell fuel on an aircraft would you stick around?

I suspect you would end up talking to yourself AC Ovee.

Dream on.

Al R

10th Nov 2007, 07:16

Potential daft question here, but treat me gently.

Lets assume that fuel is sloshing around in the bay, would expelling it by opening the bay doors help? I know that it wouldn't stop the leak and as you descend, you only add more air to the equation, but would getting rid of a lying pool of fuel serve any benefit? And would instantly expelling the fuel source as it leaked into the area help? Or would the mere physical act of opening the doors create a possible ignition source?

Pontius Navigator

10th Nov 2007, 07:41

Al R, it all depends on the aerodynamics.

Certainly fuel pooling on the bottom of the bombbay doors, ie the join, will either seep out or flow out if the doors are open. Where it goes after that would be a guess. It would be quite possible for it to flow up the fuselage within the boundary layer.

With the doors open the inside surfaces of the doors would propbably get a good airing. The bombbay itself and it cabin floor may be untouched by the airflow. Where the additional air flow drives the fuel however would be unknown.

May be there has been an assessment and a decision that opening the doors may cause more problems than they solve.

Mr Point

10th Nov 2007, 07:55

DEL Mode

10th Nov 2007, 08:08

AlR,

AvTur by itself will not ignite.

It is the vapour that ignites.

Leaving it to pool and give off vapour, in the vacinity of an ignition source is dangerous.

Dumping it via the bomb bay, and allowing it to spray (and vapourise) in the vacinity of the engine exhaust could be equally spectacular.

Quess the answer is to get down PDQ.

I think AC Ovee should be an MoD spokesman or morale officer, well informed person that they be.

andgo

10th Nov 2007, 08:47

I have an idea.
lets blame the crew for the leak, decide they were wrong to divert, making us happy in the knowledge that AAR is totaly safe and carry on again. W:mad:NKERS!!!

To the crew involved. Well done.:ok:

Vage Rot

10th Nov 2007, 08:55

Gentlemen, I hate to wade in with my 2 penny worth but:

No matter what you argue, there is still a job to be done and not enough of anything else available with which to do it. So, is it acceptable to ground the fleet and sacrifice the lives of some Squaddies who are depending on us?:=Shame on you!

Remember - flying is a little more risky than sitting in an office.:rolleyes:
Military flying carrys more risk than going on holiday in a 737.:rolleyes:
Military flying in war carrys yet more risk and commanders accept more risk.:ugh:

I still fly the mighty Rod and have recently returned from theatre - where we flew a fair few AAR trips. I would still continue to do so - albeit with a little concern - but then again, departing from an airfield in a hostile country used to give me more of a 50P-5p feeling.

I'm not saying that there isn't anything wrong with the aircraft - there may well be. However, there may well be faults with the new A3XX that nobody will know about until an accident. The revised procedures post 230 almost certainly saved 235 and her crew. That gives me at least a little confidence, moreover, knowing the guys on the BOI personally, I know that their integrity would not hide any pressing issues simply to wait for the issue of the report.

If we as aircrew are concerned then vote with our feet - I for one love flying and will stay. To the others who fly and whinge, I say if you are that concerned then refuse to fly, and accept the consequences, or leave. If I ever reach that level of concern then I will leave also!

To the families and friends of 230, we have not forgotten our friends (and I've been in this game long enough to know and have flowm with nearly all of them), we are simply doing our best with what we have. We can't stop that to wait for new kit but we expect our government to sort out our new kit in f**king short order.

Retires and waits for the tirade!!

cm74

10th Nov 2007, 08:59

No tirade from this c/s Vage. I'm with you on this one.

:ok:

nigegilb

10th Nov 2007, 09:06

Most people recognise there is a balance of risk to achieve. 14 months have passed, time enough to cobble together fire protection in the bomb bay and fuel tank protection in the wing. The missions could continue as before.

Where I disagree with you, is that the balance of risk is skewed so far this aircraft is no longer deserving of the phrase "safe to fly". You state that the new procedures saved the crew. Not quite. As you well know, the new procedures are designed to prevent an over-pressure leading to a fuel leak. I have read the follow-up report. The max pressure reached with the carter pump on was 45psi. Now then, ground testing equipment takes the pressure to 50psi and it was unable to replicate the leak. The crew were saved, because as part of the post XV230 procedure a crew member was stationed to look for leaks in the bomb bay. You miss the point that the leak still occurred. Meaning the RAF are stumped. I have still not heard of a definitive on the cause of ignition for XV230 and I have been looking at some pictures of the Nimrod bomb bay this morning.

Either get the protective systems on board, or cease flying AAR.

Can an ASTOR brain come back to the thread and explain in simple terms why it cannot do the Nimrod job? Obviously, opsec uppermost. I am hearing it is has an awesome capability.

Finally we are part of a coalition, why not ask for help?

Joe Black

10th Nov 2007, 09:34

Nigegilb, I think it may have been stated earlier but the ASTOR has the SAR capability whereas the rod is EO and also has an excellent comms capability. In theory the ASTOR(sentinel) could provide a service but I'd imagine EO would be the preference.

Chugalug2

10th Nov 2007, 09:36

No matter what you argue, there is still a job to be done and not enough of anything else available with which to do it. So, is it acceptable to ground the fleet and sacrifice the lives of some Squaddies who are depending on us?:=Shame on you!

Far be it from me a civvie who has flown those safe 737s, and is even safer now, retired, to counter the words of someone on type in theatre only too aware of the importance of the vital work being done by the MR2s. But the shame should fall not on those like me who call for the grounding of this fleet until it is made safe, but on those in command who knew it to be unsafe, have done nothing to change that, and kept it flying at an ever more demanding rate. These charming polite old men have failed in their responsibilities to their subordinates, in particular their crews. There are always alternatives, there are alternatives here, the problem is they would cost money, and even more seriously they would cost face. I can say without hesitation that had this scenario unfolded in the 60s/70s the fleet would be grounded, not just no AR, grounded. This should happen now. That there is a war and even more lives are put at risk if this task is not flown merely points up the gross negligence (familiar phrase?) of the RAF higher command. Shame on them! :=

nigegilb

10th Nov 2007, 09:39

Vage shames us for not thinking about the squaddies on the ground. Thought I would post this from arrse, for the "squaddie" perspective. BTW they don't always like being referred to as squaddies, depends a lot on who is saying it.

Apologies for the fruity language.

"My points:

1. They should NOT have to fly ancient aircraft (VC10 - Nimrod - TriStar)
2. They should NOT have to fly aircraft that are POSSIBLY UNSAFE.

Can anyone imagine our revolting government supporting an airline proposing to go on flying 'dodgy' aircraft?

Penalties for the guys on the ground, but would a majority of our soldiers tell the RAF to go on flying the sodding old Nimrod? In jest, of course they would; but in reality most of the 'Tommies' I know would 'see to' the men ordering the sagging old beast to fly on.

Thanks Bliar, you cnut; thanks also to you 'Bottler' - will you take your next 'long-haul' journies in Nimrods? No, I thought not, you disgusting sh1t !"

BEagle

10th Nov 2007, 09:40

AAR for the Nimrod is a force multiplier, not a force enabler (for example, as it was for the Muharraq Tornados in Gulf War 1 tasked on long range attack sorties).

If Nimrod AAR is as dangerous as it certainly now appears, then you will need more Nimrods to cover the same period as a single AAR-supported aircraft.

Which means a lot more money thrown at fixing and upgrading the Nimrod fleet to the 'special' fit needed in Afghanistan.

Suck it in and cough up, Fat Gordon!

Vage Rot

10th Nov 2007, 09:46

The crew were saved, because as part of the post XV230 procedure a crew member was stationed to look for leaks in the bomb bay.
True but also:
You miss the point that the leak still occurred. Meaning the RAF are stumped. I have still not heard of a definitive on the cause of ignition for XV230
True also but - any possible sources of ignition inside the bomb bay have been removed since 230 - but apart from all these other measures imposed post 230, i agree that nothing has been done!!:ugh:
As I said before, I'm not saying there isn't a leak problem :rolleyes:- just that everything possible has been done to mitigate the risk of a subsequent fire. And yes, I was on board the ac quoted in one of the other 2 IRs from last Nov/Dec.
This is my last post on this subject as, in my mind it has deteriorated far enough. However, as i said before, the only way to stress major concern is for those who are not happy to vote with their feet - come to think of it, I might even get another whacking big FRI then!!:D [just thought I'd better point out aircrew sarcasm to those who post on here!]

AC Ovee

10th Nov 2007, 10:07

AC Ovee,

So apart from:

* Possible fire and explosion if an ignition source is present
* Noxious fumes
* Unstable load
* Reduction in available fuel

...there would be no reason for the crew to be concerned

The above comments appear to represent most of the views that disagree with mine, so I'll answer them.

Fuel and ignition. As aircrew we, and our leaders, always consider the effects of the next failure. ie if fuel leaks on a hot engine will the engine catch fire? yes, so we make sure that we have sufficient extinguishant available because we can never guarrantee that fuel will never leak onto a hot engine. That same principle of considering what could happen next with a fuel leak in the nimrod bomb bay, since Sep 06, has been very carefully thought through by specialists who know what it takes to ignite AVTUR, and it is not easily achieved. No-one ever said that fuel will never again leak in a Nimrod bomb bay. If the Nimrod leadership has any belief that there is any possibility of a fire developing (the next failure) with a fuel leak in the bomb bay, there is no way that we would be AARing (or indeed routine flying) if that were the case. We cannot guarrantee no leakage. No-one operating any aircraft in any organisation in the World can do that.

Do you believe that the leaders are that reckless?

There were no noxious fumes in the cabin while the aircraft was airborne. It was pressurized so the fuel vapours would not have entered the cabin. Shortly after landing, the fans at the back of the cabin drew the fumes up into the cabin from the bomb bay through an open valve near to the leak and dumped the fumes overboard at the back. That is the route that the air takes while on the Nimrod is on the ground.

Unstable load? The aircraft weighs more than 100,000 lbs. The unregulated movement of a few pounds is not going to change anything.

Reduction in available fuel: when it was first observed, the leak could have been in either a feed pipe or a refuel pipe. Stopping the AAR was clearly correct and that action would indicate if the leak was in the refuel pipes. The leak did abate after disconnect, and because it was therefore in a refuel pipe, the tanks had enough fuel to take the aircaft to its planned destination. There is no way that the crew would ever be without enough fuel to go home. If the leak had been in a feed pipe, we have a drill to stop it. Again, there would have been enough fuel on board to go to the destination. In either case, if there was insufficient fuel to go to the destination, for whatever reason, and that was the only concern, the crew had Kandahar a few miles away to use as an en route diversion in a routine manner.

Should they have been concerned? Yes, because they are human and they read the critical opinions on pprune and Timesonline and they lost some friends last year and no-one has yet told them why, and not everyone on the crew fully understands the logical and very careful thoughts of their leaders (my first answer above). On the day the aircraft was light enough for an immediate, safety first, landing at a friendly airfield. To continue with the AAR while the pipe was seen to be leaking would have been reckless. To stop the leak and contine to the destination with some residual fuel in the bay was an option (and it has happened many times before), but the crew are human. I don't believe I have been critical of their actions. I do believe that I have brought some balance to this dicussion about leadership and duty of care.

Mr Point

10th Nov 2007, 10:25

Vage Rot: I say if you are that concerned then refuse to fly, and accept the consequences

This is the attitude that the politicians admire - let's not make the aircraft safer, let's just back the aircrew into a corner! With mortgages to pay, kids to support and no topcover from senior officers, it leaves personnel taking risks that they feel very uncomforable with.

Vage Rot: ...any possible sources of ignition inside the bomb bay have been removed since 230

Does this mean that there is now no chance of a future bomb bay fire?

AC Ovee,

You appear to have knowledge of the ignition source that caused the loss of XV230. If this ignition source has now been removed, please enlighten us as to what caused the fire.

nacluv

10th Nov 2007, 10:30

I fear to post on this thread, however I am adding my thoughts on Al_R's question regarding opening the bay doors to dispose of fuel leaking in there.

I would say that it depends on by what means the bomb bay doors are actuated. If they are operated by hydraulics, cables, levers, etc, then I can't see any problem.

However, if they are operated by electric motors, and if the motors are located in the bay itself, and if the motors are not insulated or isolated from the air space in the bomb bay, then that could make a difference. Any electric motor sparks when it is running - between the commutator and brushes. So there could be a potential ignition source, as long as all the above condition are met.

Techies will no doubt put me straight with the facts.

Brain Potter

10th Nov 2007, 10:58

AC Ovee,

The incident report shows that extensive investigation was carried out on XV235 whilst on the ground at Kandahar. On completion of this work the ac was released only for a ferry flight to the DOB, for further investigation.

This would seem to indicate that the engineering authority, IPT and ADA were not as confident as you that the event was quite so benign.

From a CRM perspective, it would be fascinating to hear a tape of a Nimrod captain proposing to continue the sortie under such circumstances.

AC Ovee

10th Nov 2007, 13:03

Nigegilb:
time enough to cobble together fire protection in the bomb bay

No, not at all. A great deal of research into the types and methods of extinguishing any fire in any area of the bay would have had to be carried out. Then it would need design drawings and consent and then manufacture and finally fitting and testing, etc. With the best will in the World, it would never have happpened in 15 months. Even at the time of the rejected Qinetiq proposal a few years ago, the MR2 would have out of service before any big system like that could have been installed upon that recommendation. My own view is that it is an impossible concept anyway, but its only my view (like yours I guess), so it carries no weight.

nigegilb

10th Nov 2007, 16:33

I am sure you are aware that the MR2 is fitted with fire extinguishant when flying with long range tanks in the bomb bay. The precedent is there. BAe recommended it in 2004, how much time do you want?

I understand the arguments about increased volume and leakage rates when the tanks aren't there, but it can't be beyond the wit of an RAF engineer to come up with a workable design to see the aircraft out.

The time to design it for MRA4 is now. But it has not been requested by the customer.

Of course, safety is of personnel is of paramount importance.

Da4orce

10th Nov 2007, 16:38

AC Ovee a detailed answer but I have a 'what if' for you.

What if the jet had been at an extended range from Kandahar when it was discovered that fuel was spraying into the bomb bay.

Given that there is apparently no longer an ignition source within the bomb bay (presumably due to the isolation of the SCP?) we perhaps would not have seen an explosion but it is possible is it not that the jet would not have had sufficient fuel to make it back to a safe airfield?

Would we still be talking about a near tragedy or would we have another memorial thread?

enginesuck

10th Nov 2007, 16:52

Da4orce,
Im not aircrew but im pretty sure that there is always enough fuel left for a diversion..You see there are always 'what ifs?' in avaition. What if the tanker goes u/s? .... what if the probe breaks due to turbulance....?

Joe Black

10th Nov 2007, 18:16

This wouldn't be a problem as prior to the AAR, the ac would have had enough fuel to RTB inc div fuel etc. I believe the fuel that leaked was indeed fuel that was taken from the tanker and not what the ac had prior to AAR. Hope that makes sense. JB

santiago15

10th Nov 2007, 19:01

nigegilb

because as part of the post XV230 procedure a crew member was stationed to look for leaks in the bomb bay

That is factually incorrect; there is no formal requirement to monitor the bomb bay during AAR.

AC Ovee

Fuel and ignition. As aircrew we, and our leaders, always consider the effects of the next failure. ie if fuel leaks on a hot engine will the engine catch fire? yes, so we make sure that we have sufficient extinguishant available because we can never guarrantee that fuel will never leak onto a hot engine. That same principle of considering what could happen next with a fuel leak in the nimrod bomb bay, since Sep 06, has been very carefully thought through by specialists who know what it takes to ignite AVTUR, and it is not easily achieved. No-one ever said that fuel will never again leak in a Nimrod bomb bay. If the Nimrod leadership has any belief that there is any possibility of a fire developing (the next failure) with a fuel leak in the bomb bay, there is no way that we would be AARing (or indeed routine flying) if that were the case. We cannot guarrantee no leakage. No-one operating any aircraft in any organisation in the World can do that.

Do you believe that the leaders are that reckless?

There were no noxious fumes in the cabin while the aircraft was airborne. It was pressurized so the fuel vapours would not have entered the cabin. Shortly after landing, the fans at the back of the cabin drew the fumes up into the cabin from the bomb bay through an open valve near to the leak and dumped the fumes overboard at the back. That is the route that the air takes while on the Nimrod is on the ground.

Unstable load? The aircraft weighs more than 100,000 lbs. The unregulated movement of a few pounds is not going to change anything.

Reduction in available fuel: when it was first observed, the leak could have been in either a feed pipe or a refuel pipe. Stopping the AAR was clearly correct and that action would indicate if the leak was in the refuel pipes. The leak did abate after disconnect, and because it was therefore in a refuel pipe, the tanks had enough fuel to take the aircaft to its planned destination. There is no way that the crew would ever be without enough fuel to go home. If the leak had been in a feed pipe, we have a drill to stop it. Again, there would have been enough fuel on board to go to the destination. In either case, if there was insufficient fuel to go to the destination, for whatever reason, and that was the only concern, the crew had Kandahar a few miles away to use as an en route diversion in a routine manner.

Should they have been concerned? Yes, because they are human and they read the critical opinions on pprune and Timesonline and they lost some friends last year and no-one has yet told them why, and not everyone on the crew fully understands the logical and very careful thoughts of their leaders (my first answer above). On the day the aircraft was light enough for an immediate, safety first, landing at a friendly airfield. To continue with the AAR while the pipe was seen to be leaking would have been reckless. To stop the leak and contine to the destination with some residual fuel in the bay was an option (and it has happened many times before), but the crew are human. I don't believe I have been critical of their actions. I do believe that I have brought some balance to this dicussion about leadership and duty of care.

Nice post :D

RAF_Techie101

10th Nov 2007, 19:08

Bomb bay fuel tanks haven't been fitted in decades, and never will be. All the tanks were scrapped years ago when the aircraft were fitted with AAR.

Would fire protection be of any use? Doubtful - with a static air pressure in the bomb bay itself and a dynamic air flow on the outside, anything gaseous or liquid that enters the bomb bay will more than likely be sucked out fairly sharpish - it is not a completely sealed unit. This includes fuel and vapours. Would extuinguishant be effective enough in that situation? If they fire in XV230 was large enough to bring the aircraft down, then I doubt there would be any amount of fire extuinguishant short of that foam stuff used in Demoliton Man that could successfully put it out.

Chugalug2

10th Nov 2007, 19:26

We cannot guarantee no leakage. No-one operating any aircraft in any organisation in the World can do that.

At the risk of probing too deep, neither can you guarantee no ignition! By ground testing the AR system and over pressurising it at that, it would seem that consistently no leaks resulted, but as you say that did not guarantee no leakage, indeed it occurred, and seemingly in some abundance. A classic case of 'ground tested and found serviceable'? By the same token by removing obvious sources of ignition from the bomb bay you can't guarantee no source of ignition! Yet with all this known, AR continued and even now there seems to be a nudge, a wink, that a mayday and immediate diversion was a bit OTT. This can do, push on, culture is the antithesis of what prudent operation should mean. Having called for the CAS's resignation, the grounding of the fleet until it is made airworthy, and an independent inquiry into Military Airworthiness Regulation, I was content to hold my peace but:

Nice post :D Today 19:16

referring to the top quote could not go uncontested I'm afraid.

BlackadderIA

10th Nov 2007, 19:39

Can an ASTOR brain come back to the thread and explain in simple terms why it cannot do the Nimrod job? Obviously, opsec uppermost. I am hearing it is has an awesome capability.Different roles - ASTOR tracks moving objects just like JSTARS (but with much reduced pie-carrying capacity due to MOD scrimping on airframe choice). The SAR image it takes is intended for general identification of those objects, these would then be passed to other platforms such as Watchkeeper for a more detailed look.

The MR2 is basically acting as a big Predator/Watchkeeper, using the MX-15 turret to keep an eye on the bad guys just like the US do with pred but with considerably more risk and much poorer access to Vegas.

The bit of kit MOD intends to do this job in the future is either Pred B or the new King Air 350ER's (also fitted with MX-15 - again with minimal pie-lift capacity).

Magnersdrinker

10th Nov 2007, 19:56

AC
Yes, I would. And yes, I would do AAR. Why? Because AAR in a Nimrod is no more dangerous than AAR in any other aircraft. XV230 experienced a fuel fire due to any one of a number of causes, and I know that ALL of those causes have since been identified and mitigated. XV235 suffered ONLY a fuel leak. Yes, it sprayed into the bomb bay, but it would never have become a fire because there was nothing in there to ignite it. AVTUR and air (even at the correct ratio) will only ignite with an enormous amount of heat to create the chemnical process known as oxidization (fire). Sufficient heat is supplied by either a small spark with a lot energy which is only achieved by HE ignitors (there are none in the bomb bay) or sustained heat energy created by a hot surface (air pipe), and there are none in the bomb bay, now.

Those who know what a Mayday means will form the impression that the crew were in imminent danger. They were not. They never were. However, in fairness to them, they were scared and feared for their lives. Why? Because the situation was very similar to XV230 and no-one has yet told them (BOI report) why it was actually very different. It is because of this lack of crucual info that they did what they did and they, my friends and colleagues, did it well.

The underlying reason for the crew's decision to divert off task lies not with the aircraft. It lies with those who have not released the findings of the senior officers on the BOI.

Spot On A/C as myself a non aircrew dude but an engineer with many years on type perfect words indeed. As for people asking questions about ignition etc there is nothing in the BB now to cause a spark if you wish to call it that. As engineers and aircrew, the people that ask silly questions like you must have inside info on the BOI , its utter rubbish, if you work directly on the aircraft we have a knowledge of the systems and what if possablities. We cannot disclose information as much as we would love to as I for one value my job too much to give out information before the BOI do there thing (nobody on this thread has any idea what they know). When that is done then the questions will be answered.

dodgysootie

10th Nov 2007, 20:11

Nigegilb.
Would fire protection in the bomb bay be of any use? NOT IF THE FIRE SOURCE WAS NOT IN THE BOMB BAY!!! Bomb bay firewire may well give a warning, but it doesn't necessarily mean (on the MR2) thats where the source of the fire is / WAS !!
DS

Magnersdrinker

10th Nov 2007, 21:08

DS

I cant find any firewire being in the bomb bay !!! Maybe there is!! i cant say ive noticed ever :/ damm shows how much i know

Dink Dang Doo ;o)

edit. firewire only has a small current i believe anyway , surely it cant produce high ignition sparks :/

dodgysootie

10th Nov 2007, 21:57

QUOTE "DS
I cant find any firewire being in the bomb bay !!! Maybe there is!! i cant say ive noticed ever :/ damm shows how much i know
Dink Dang Doo ;o)
edit. firewire only has a small current i believe anyway , surely it cant produce high ignition sparks :/"...

Magnersdrinker, you've obviously been drinking magners. Of course there is firewire in the Bomb bay and if you read my previous post PROPERLY you would see that I was not at all implying that Firewire would be a source of ignition.
DS

JackHowe

10th Nov 2007, 22:27

The ASTOR is to be known as Sentinel R1 in RAF service. The first production aircraft was delivered to Raytheon in February 2002 for integration of the ASTOR system.
The first ground station vehicle was delivered in October 2002. The first ASTOR Sentinel aircraft made its maiden flight in May 2004, the second in July 2005.
The first Sentinel R1 aircraft was delivered to the RAF in June 2007. The remaining aircraft are scheduled for delivery by the end of 2007. Operational deployment is expected by the end of 2008.
from:- http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/astor/

It is obvious (from the above) that ASTOR is not a current option (even if it was role-competent) as it won't be operational until 'end of 2008'.
Question:- Does it really take twelve to eighteen months to go from system delivery to operational deployment?

Charlie Luncher

10th Nov 2007, 22:42

Vage come on now you know that all the experts on here know better than you, remember they have left and are much smarter now. What is next lets use E3s or even UAV to replace the old girl?? Why do coalition troops ask for me in my ageing LRMPA to cover them when they have all the toys to choose from?? I am sure it is not for my good looks wit and charm.:ugh::ugh:
I have asked for restraint and consideration on this post but no you just cannot help yourselves. So when and if we meet I will ignore your calls for restraint, take your frustration with your lack of promotion or importance to another cause or shall we have to wait until something other than a Chinook/Herc/Nimrod is lost.
To the dudes at ISK keep the faith brothers and sisters, hopefully will catch up in a month halaal non-pork sausage side.:hmm:
Charlie sends

Magnersdrinker

10th Nov 2007, 23:46

Magnersdrinker, you've obviously been drinking magners. Of course there is firewire in the Bomb bay and if you read my previous post PROPERLY you would see that I was not at all implying that Firewire would be a source of ignition.
DS

Sorry DS , Im just not with it at the moment , work is difficult with all thats going on. Ok i just got it , FW down the main pannier side before the bomb doors all the way down , you can tell im not a leccy !!! 17 years on type and ive just realised , but again that just shows not everyone knows all.

Im gonna go back now lick my wounds and sip some more magners and come monday night ill look again and reassure myself im not mad !!!

Seldomfitforpurpose

10th Nov 2007, 23:52

Magnersdrinker

11th Nov 2007, 00:05

After 20 years flying I fully accept my job has plenty of risk attached to it and when flying on Op's that risk is exacerbated but unless my eyes deceive me there are folk posting on here that advocate the fact that up to two tons of aviation fuel sloshing round a bomb bay is nothing to be concerned about, in fact not even worthy of a Mayday Call :eek:

Can someone please clear this up for me?

Well I know for fact that there was not 2 tons of fuel rolling about the bomb bay. People blowing things out of proportion. If 2 tons of fuel were in the bomb bay then there is severe major issues, its impossible for that to happen . The bomb bay is not air tight , with airflow and the usual low pressure high pressure it would be sucked out . One thing that not many are aware of is the keel drain system , when a major hyd component is changed there is a tendency like all AC for all hyd oil to leak when changing a component, when component is replaced the system is replenished and thats it . But all the oil has to sit somewhere, in the nimrod case the keels, when in flight and pressurized the excess hyd oil gets blown out into the bomb bay and into the keel drains bottles, sometimes the pipe into the bottle pops out (no major drama) and that can give the impression of leaks, think of the length of a Nimrod by about 1 inch high, thats a lot of fluid plus water ingress blah. Ok its not going to smell of fuel but that drains can kick out a lot of residual hyd fluid. in this case unlikely at 20k ft plus that would already have been done !! But its common things like this that can get mistaken

tucumseh

11th Nov 2007, 01:55

Chug said……….

“By ground testing the AR system and over pressurising it at that, it would seem that consistently no leaks resulted, but as you say that did not guarantee no leakage, indeed it occurred, and seemingly in some abundance. A classic case of 'ground tested and found serviceable'?”

I recall similar discussions some while back on the Mull thread. This very simplistic attitude in the MoD toward diagnosis, testing, repair (including verifying the repair, which many like to conveniently regard as a separate issue) led to a single damaged LRU being recovered from the Chinook, “tested” in glorious isolation by the contractor using highly dubious and unvalidated methodology – and as a result of that test the MoD declared the entire navigation system serviceable in the minutes prior to the impact. Also, and related to another fatal example, MoD insisted that it was sufficient to bench test IFF systems in the factory and accept the result as evidence of airworthiness, without further testing, when integrated (or not, as the case may be) into the aircraft and other systems.

These are not leaps of faith. They are the depths of incompetence.

This is NOT an indictment on maintainers. Those who read this know that I am fully aware of the different roles – engineering set the standards, QA ensure they are met by production (which includes inspection). But if engineering (in this case the IPT and DEC, representing the higher echelons of the MoD and Government) do not make materiel and financial provision to provide maintainers with the necessary tools (up to date APs, test equipment, spares etc) then maintainers cannot be held liable. In days gone by, if any of these tools were missing or not to the correct standard, QA snagged it and work stopped pending corrective action. The fact that probably less than 1% of IPT staff have the vaguest notion of what I’m talking about IS an indictment. If they don’t understand, how on earth can they, (a) calculate and (b) seek, proper materiel and financial provision in the first place? This is not just me saying this – the MoD’s own auditors have long been critical of the dismantling of these vital competencies and processes; which are simply regurgitated in the QinetiQ report mentioned here.

I can just about see where the MoD is coming from – they are associating the leaks with AAR, so stopping that mitigates the risks back to an ALARP level. But go back to the risk classification matrix I mentioned earlier. With this most recent event, do you think the probability of occurrence is still “remote”, or has it been raised one level to “occasional” (and therefore, to Class A)? As the good book says, “Class A risks represent an unacceptable level of risk, which can only be tolerated under truly exceptional circumstances”. And what constitutes “truly exceptional” is not decided on the whim of a lowly IPTL – the deciding factor is the political imperative.

John Blakeley

11th Nov 2007, 08:39

As a consultant I have been working with the BBC on the Nimrod story for some time now, and the news items you saw on Friday night had been planned long before the latest incident. However, the latest incident and the detailed Incident Report meant that even as the fuller story was being prepared the detail and emphasis were changing to reflect the more immediate story, and although I was disappointed that some of the points we had ready to be made were not able to be used, I think the BBC did a very good job on this story, particularly on the fuller version on Radio 4 PM. Although as always it is no longer on the front pages today I can assure you that the story and MOD’s reaction are continuing, and will continue to be, very closely monitored for future news items. (I am not under contract to the BBC or their spokesman – so the above reflects my personal opinion.)

Had there been sufficient air time to put everything we had together (probably needing a documentary rather than a news item) then as well as picking up on the QinetiQ report we would have included the 765B on XV227 in November 2004. Go to http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nimrodreport.pdf to see the complete report and read the Stn Cdr’s comments in particular. As the QinetiQ report points out as well, bomb bay fuel leaks are not the only problem and had this aircraft (227) been airborne for just a few minutes longer you would be reading an accident report – the photographs were included in the Panorama programme. I wonder how many more unmonitored, and indeed unmonitorable areas of corrosion there are and how many apply to MR4 where, if the Independent story is right, previously unknown corrosion has been found on the re-used fuselage – perhaps another contributor knows about this.

It has been mentioned here already but we were also going to refer to the BAES report (obtained under FOI) of their Fire/Explosion Hazard Assessment for the Mk 2 and RMk1 dated August 2004 ie two years before the accident. I have only seen two pages of the Executive Summary so I hope I am not quoting anything out of its full context, but the BAES Report as well as identifying six areas of potential Human Risk Index Category B occurrences including an uncontrollable bomb bay fire (but assumed to be munitions rather than fuel based) suggested several areas where the IPT needed to consider palliative action – these included:

• A recommendation that MOD consider utilising the extended range tankage role fit fire detection (and) suppression system in normal operations (their emphasis).
• A change of hydraulic couplings from alloy to stainless steel to reflect current standards and best practice
• MOD to consider the possibility of retro-fitting a nitrogen inerting system to reduce the risk of fuel tank explosion.

Clearly none of this has happened for the Mk2 despite the basic design of a bomb bay fire detection and suppressant system already being available – I wonder if they have all been actioned for the Mk4. Clearly there is no guarantee that a bomb bay fire suppressant system would have prevented the loss of 230 – but it might have – especially if it had bought them more time to get to Kandahar.

The QinetiQ report was partially covered in the BBC news items, but the full report is far wider ranging than bomb bay fuel leaks alone. It covers for example fuel leaks and the possible resulting corrosion from the wing panels – the potential for failures in structural integrity - the “perils” of only partially replacing bolts in leak areas (presumably for the sake of speed and cost) – the breaks in the airworthiness chain caused by a failure to update APS, to keep up to date with more suitable repair materials, the loss of skill levels and the low standards used for checking aircraft after major servicing of fuel leak repairs, etc, etc. There is no space here to go into all the details, but it shows that once again, this time some 6 months before the crash, the IPT and their senior management were only too well aware of the risks they were running with aircrew lives and the loss of an aircraft with equipment considered essential for operations.

The spokesman “put up” by MOD Andrew Brooks commented along the lines that the Ministry had “no option” as the Nimrod MR Mk2 capability was essential for support of the troops and that unless aircraft were really falling out of the sky the risks had to be taken (although he did later accept that MOD was not being allowed to spend the money it should have been spending and at the end of the interview he had the grace to comment that given the situation he would probably join many of the crews in leaving for the British airline system!). He did not comment on the fact that 230 really had fallen out of the sky and that at least three and possibly four further incidents had taken place with major bomb bay fuel leaks whose cause remains unknown.

In my opinion there seems little doubt that some very poor decisions have been made over the past few years – almost certainly having a bottom line of no money, and maybe because nobody realised just how significant the role of the Nimrod Mk2 and the length of time it would have this role would be. I do not believe that the IPT can continue to ignore the airworthiness issues and if they want to operate the Mk 2 (not forgetting the RMk1 where the corrosion problems at least may be similar) for the next 5 years they have no choice but to spend some money – including a proper clearance of the AAR system ie full flight trials to identify and rectify the cause of so many leaks. I also hope that the tragic lessons that have now been so expensively learnt in the Mk 2 over the last year are being put right in the Mk 4 – but I wonder why I have my doubts!

Finally, for those people who are, rightly, concerned about any loss of MR Mk 2 capability over Afghanistan this MOD Press Release, dated 9 November the same day that Andrew Brooks was saying the MOD had no option, may bring some comfort

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/ReaperTakesToTheAirInAfghanistan.htm

JB

Vage Rot

11th Nov 2007, 10:54

Vage come on now you know that all the experts on here know better than you, remember they have left and are much smarter now

Oh how true!!:)

Mick Smith

11th Nov 2007, 13:15

NigeGilb said:
because as part of the post XV230 procedure a crew member was stationed to look for leaks in the bomb bay.
Santiago15 said:
That is factually incorrect; there is no formal requirement to monitor the bomb bay during AAR.
There might be no “formal” requirement but that is not what NigeGilb said and the air incident follow-up report on the XV235 incident appears to back him up.
It says:
THE DECISION TO MAN THE BOMB BAY PERISCOPE IS A CREW PROCEDURE THAT HAS BEEN USED SINCE SEP 06.

Pontius Navigator

11th Nov 2007, 13:57

Mick,

The IR said "it was a crew procedure"

To a layman this might be construed as a procedure carried out by crews.

Not so.

In that context it would have been SOP - standard operating procedures carried out by all crews.

A crew procedure, on the other hand, is an additional procedure usually additional to SOPs that may have been advised by others (Staneval etc) or in the case of a large crew such as on the Nimrod, by the crew themselves.

We used to have 'crew procedures'. We routinely carried mission mapping that other crews did not. We routinely carried out additional pre-flight checks, as we had time, that had been advised by the standards unit but which were not SOP.

It would be wrong therefore to infer that a crew procedure instituted in Sep 06 was in fact required by higher authority or indeed used by all crews.

Wrathmonk

11th Nov 2007, 14:22

Vage / Charlie

Nicely put.:D

Mr Point

11th Nov 2007, 15:51

Santiago,

You may be splitting hairs but are correct in your comments regarding crew procedures. This was a case of the crew, and particularly the Captain and Flight Engineer, using excellent judgement to monitor the bomb bay during the AAR.

As for speculation, there are plenty of non-specialists, but also a handful of "specialists", making comments regarding the safety of the aircraft. The SCP and bomb bay heating may have been isolated, but until the BoI release their findings none of will know the source of ignition.

Until then there remains serious doubt in my "specialist" mind regarding the safety of the aircraft.

Distant Voice

11th Nov 2007, 17:05

PM, Santiago15 and Mr Point. Sorry, but you "current" guys are not as current as you think you are. The follow up signal says "The decision to man the bomb bay periscope is a procedure that has been used since Sep 06" Of course this could be a load of Bull S**t from Kinloss (The originator) to give the impression that everything was under control.

DV

nigegilb

11th Nov 2007, 17:16

I am just glad the Captain used sound judgement and asked a crew member to carry out a crew procedure that has been in use since September 2006.
Is there a Nimrod crew out there that would not monitor the bomb bay for fuel leaks?

I take exception to anyone here suggesting the actions of the Captain to instigate a Mayday and divert to Kandahar with a fuel leak spraying all over his bomb bay were unnecessary. The actions of the crew were exemplary, anyone stating that it would have been a better to recover to base should state clearly who they are. If the BoI know the source of ignition it should already have been promulgated to the crews. There are people here suggesting it is possible to design out a risk of fuel explosion. I suggest you write to the FAA or Mr Boeing. Airline manufacturers believed for years that through sound engineering practice they could design out the possiblilty of fuel tanks exploding. However, incidents continued to happen. FAA is now in the process of regulating for the mandatory fitment of fuel tank protection.

It was not the fuel that ignited on XV179 it was the fuel vapours in the ullage. I reject any suggestion that a bomb bay full of fuel is safe. The very thought is laughable. Anyone suggesting it is safe should clearly state the cause of the ignition of the fuel/fuel vapour in XV230.

Furthermore, BAe suggested that MR2 should fly with extended range tanks with fuel extinguishant. I am not particularly clever, but even I can work out that at a stroke this would negate the need for AAR and would provide fire protection at the same time. Anyone suggesting here that bomb bay fire protection in XV230 would have made no difference to the outcome is a fool. The guys were 8 miles or so from landing. You simply cannot say that. BAe warned of the possibility of losing aircraft if the recommendation was not taken up. The RAF ignored this warning.

Finally there has been a defence of the CoC on this thread. Your CoC ordered crews to continue AAR sorties 2 days after the crash. This is an absolute failure of leadership in my view. A leadership that has refused to insist on fuel tank protection, bomb bay protection and flight deck armour on the replacement aircraft.

I invite you to read this press release.

SAN DIEGO, July 20 /-- Developed by San Diego-based technology development company Phyre Technologies Inc., the GOBIGGS(TM) (Green On-Board Inert Gas Generation System) is the first environmentally friendly fuel tank safety system developed for large passenger jets. The system, designed to protect aircraft from fuel tank explosions like that of TWA Flight 800 11 years ago, was successfully demonstrated in May 2007 at the FAA's Atlantic City Technology Center.

The result of several years' development in the anticipation of the pending FAA ruling that will require improved fuel tank safety systems on commercial passenger aircraft, the GOBIGGS(TM) fuel tank inerting system reduces flammability levels of fuel tank vapors by dramatically reducing the oxygen level. This removes the likelihood of a potential explosion from an ignition source.

This technology is similar to existing OBIGGS technology, in that it was designed to be used by both commercial and military aircraft, to dramatically reduce the chance of a fuel tank explosion. Yet, unlike existing OBIGGS, which continually exhausts raw fuel vapor into the environment, Phyre's GOBIGGS(TM) system uses a state-of-the-art closed-loop catalyst design that converts the fuel vapor into an inert gas that is recycled back into the fuel tank. This means pollutants, such as hydrocarbons, are not pumped out into the atmosphere. Not only does GOBIGGS(TM) eliminate the damage to the environment caused by the fuel vapor, it also eliminates the hazard to airport personnel.

With the almost certain, yet-pending FAA ruling that will require retrofitting of all, large airplane designs with a fuel tank safety system, the successful debut of Boeing's new Dreamliner 787 aircraft (the first commercial passenger jet built with a non-green inerting system), and the current worldwide focus on global warming, the environmentally friendly GOBIGGS(TM) is positioned to be one of the most significant technologies developed for large passenger aircraft to date.

speeddial

11th Nov 2007, 17:28

Without going into un-necessary detail, does the R1 also suffer from these problems? It would be shocking if the secrecy of its mission was being used to cover up known flight safety risks.

Distant Voice

11th Nov 2007, 17:30

Did IPT arrange for trails to be carried out in order to evaluate the effectiveness, or otherwise, of the bomb bay fire suppression system before rejecting the idea. I doubt it. It was more likely to be a "paper study" judgement.

No one can say it would, or would not work under nornal conditions unless it has been tested. But of course we are now talking about money.

DV

nigegilb

11th Nov 2007, 17:40

A further point about XV179, which was shot down when a round penetrated the fuel tank. Within days tactics in theatre were changed and crews were discouraged from flying low level unless absolutely necessary. This instruction came out almost a year before the BoI was published. Crews were also instructed to manage fuel in the tanks to be in a safer condition, quantity wise when making approaches to hot strips. This instruction came out a full year or so before the BoI report.

Crews should be informed immediately of any findings materially affecting the way missions are carried out or risks inherent.

The fact that a crew member has been stationed to look through a periscope during AAR post Sep 06, confirms that contrary to anything CAS has been saying, there are central themes to these fuel leaks.

I have no idea if the cause of ignition for the fire on XV230 is known, I have no idea if the cause of a possible fuel tank explosion on XV230 is known.. However, if the BoI do know, then I would hope that crews taking big risks on the front line are in the loop.

Not Long Here

11th Nov 2007, 17:40

Nigel,

I believe that the BAe recommendation was for the Long Range Tank Fire Supression System, not the long range tanks. I cannot recall these tanks being fitted anytime between 1978 and my last Nimrod flight in 2005.

Indeed not even sure if the capability is even in the MR2 RTS (or whatever it is called these days).

nigegilb

11th Nov 2007, 17:45

This is how it has been described to me without tanks present. Not massively useful, but better than nothing. I would have thought flying with the tanks is a suitable cobbled together solution.

"On the face of it it would appear to relate to the rational that for most training operations the MR2 carries very little in the bomb bay, as I understand it the standard fit on most training sorties is just the ASR (Air Sea Rescue) kit - dingy packs. This leaves a large portion (volume) of the bomb bay empty.

The fire suppressant is of finite quantity designed to be used when carrying extended range tanks (the volume of which is almost equal to that of the bomb bay) and if discharged into an almost empty bomb bay, as opposed to one where most of the volume is taken up with extended range tanks, would be so diluted as to not be effective as a suppressant. The bomb bay is not airtight either... adding to the dilution.

The suppressant has not only to be discharged into the bay but has to remain in the bay in sufficient concentration for a period of time to ensure that any fire extinguished, does not immediately re-ignite."

More.....

Regarding the bomb bay fire extinguisher issue. The Nimrod has a 'trooping role' and in order to be used in that manner 6 extended range fuel tanks would be fixed in the bomb bay. With this fit 10 fire extinguishers would also be fitted. However, in the normal fit we do not have either the extended range tanks or the fire extinguishers fitted. That means that day to day there is no fire protection in the bomb bay. However, the bomb bay fire drill calls for all stores to be jettisoned, and to my knowledge there has only been one actual bomb bay fire in the life of the ac. This was caused by an electrical fault causing a flare to ignite when power was supplied to the weapons carrier.

Mick Smith

11th Nov 2007, 18:15

Pontius, Santiago and Mr Point

Thanks for the clarification, which given Santiago's original post confirmed my suspicions of what the follow-up report meant.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

On a wider issue, and apologies for the length of this post. I am a complete outsider here. I post as who I am for reasons of honesty and you guys know who I am and that I have no knowledge of aircraft maintenance, and don't pretend to. I do think however that a number of posters have paid something less than respect to a number of people on this thread who do know what they are talking about and whose intentions are entirely honourable.

This is directed and aimed honestly at Charlie Luncher, Vage Rot, Wrathmonk, and others who think like them. Every generation thinks they know everything there is to know. Charlie Luncher you are where you are, so there is no doubt a lot you do know that others don't.

But that doesn't change the fact that those who went before you, have a great deal of experience of keeping aircraft serviceable and in the air, and know what should and should not be done. They aren't idiots. They have the tee-shirt.

Nor does it change the fundamental truth that an aircraft should not have fuel leaking internally at the rate that it has been doing in a number of cases of Nimrod AARing over Afghanistan which have been documented in official reports written by your colleagues.

No-one is criticising anyone at Kinloss. I have read people on this thread suggesting they are but seen absolutely no evidence of it either here or in the media. Reading the QinetiQ report produced six months before Sept 06, it makes clear that the teams trying to keep the MR2 in the air are "highly committed" and producing a "good" standard of workmanship. That point has been made by both the Sunday Times and the BBC.

Your response to the experienced people posting here is:

Vage come on now you know that all the experts on here know better than you, remember they have left and are much smarter now...
I have asked for restraint and consideration on this post but no you just cannot help yourselves. So when and if we meet I will ignore your calls for restraint, take your frustration with your lack of promotion or importance to another cause or shall we have to wait until something other than a Chinook/Herc/Nimrod is lost.

None of the people discussing the issue have ever shouted you down but you feel it is right to talk to them like that. I can't even think why you thought it appropriate to say the passage I have bolded up - or indeed why the mods let you do it. Worse, you are applauded for these comments by both Vage Rot and Wrathmonk.

The last part of your comment repeated your previous suggestion that the media reporting - in particular the leaked emails - has delayed the BOI report. Because you are where you are, when you first made this claim I believed you must know what you were talking about in this regard, although I did express some surprise it might be the case.

I'm glad I only did it in posts on this thread because when I asked senior officers who know far more about the situation with the BOI than you do, they assured me it was not the case. Yet you - who demands restraint - thought it was right in a previous post on the issue to suggest to TD that by passing the emails to Sky he was responsible for delays in the BOI report.

Everyone on this thread is discussing the issue because we don't want - as you put it - "to wait until something other than a Chinook/Herc/Nimrod is lost". The time for restraint will come when it is absolutely certain that we have got beyond that point. Last Monday's incident shows we are still some way from that point.

Distant Voice

11th Nov 2007, 18:23

Mr Point: A simple question for you, what make some one a "specialist"? From several postings on the thread it would appear that the answer to that question is, anyone who flies or maintains a Nimrod. I prefer the official definition, " A person who is trained and experienced in a particular branch of a profession".

The people from QinetiQ were not "current" Nimrod fliers or maintenace crews, but they were specialist in their field. And being specialst, they uncovered facts about Nimrod opertions and maintenance that IPT and MoD should have know about years before their report was published.

DV

Squirrel 41

11th Nov 2007, 19:37

From today's Observer:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,2209288,00.html

Not sure what it adds, but interesting that the Observer has apparently had a leak of the BOI report.

S41

Pontius Navigator

11th Nov 2007, 19:49

Looks more like a creative fishing trip. THE REPORT seems to be the QQ one so the story is just a Sunday rerun of the weeklies.

Da4orce

11th Nov 2007, 20:04

Maybe it's just the way I was reading it but it seems to relate in the main to the Qinetiq report not a leak of the BoI maybe with the exception of this...

Details relating to prospective repairs on the plane that exploded over Afghanistan could not be traced by those examining the fuel tank system of the plane.

Other documents appear to corroborate this view. Something that will of made the BoI a more difficult task that it already was.

The 12 deficiencies mentioned in the Qinetiq report, published in March 2006, focus on mechanics' working practices. They cite staff using out-of-date generic manuals that did not relate to the specifics of the spy plane and the lack of an 'adhesion promoter' to properly carry out repairs to the aircraft's fuel tanks. So alarmed were the authors of the report that they recommend that a team of specialists should review the findings and make urgent improvements.

Did a team of specialists review the findings and make urgent improvements?

'The overall control and quality of the [mechanics'] work was not helped by the loss of venting equipment, inadequate tooling and poor upkeep,' said the report. Experts highlighted a 'critical need to improve the training' of Nimrod mechanics, a 'deficiency of appropriate tooling for sealant stripping', and a 'lack of expertise and critical loss of experienced personnel that has had a major impact on the efficiency of RAMS [mechanics] in carrying out fuel tank repair work'.
The lack of suitably skilled mechanics was serious enough, the report adds, to have 'diminished the consistency of fuel tank repair work with a possible impact on the reliability of those repairs' and may have compromised the 'effective sealing of leaks'.

This Qinetiq report should have the MoD lawyers working overtime trying to wriggle out of a charge of gross negligence.

Safeware

11th Nov 2007, 21:25

As regards overall risk, and there being 6 Hazard Risk Index (HRI) 'B' hazards (and I do wish that those selling themselves as consultants could use the correct terminology ;) ) it would be interesting to see how the IPT manage them - what 'target' were they aiming at, did / do they aggregate risk (6 x HRI B potentially = an overall A) etc.

sw

MightyHunter AGE

11th Nov 2007, 21:44

DV

Once again I find your comments abrasive and frankly quite rude.

Those operators on here who are far more current on the Nimrod than you have stated that the bomb bay periscope is used to monitor the bay during AAR.

Why then would you, an outsider with little knowledge on the matter, then decide to call them liar's?

I have a SIMPLE question for you.
When was the last time you operated or maintained a Nimrod?

An answer of most recent currency will suffice, nothing more.

Far too many times you have come on here demanding or calling people liars.

You have overstepped the mark.

Get back into your box and stay there.

Chugalug2

11th Nov 2007, 21:58

Have I got this right? The bomb bay fire suppressant system is designed to work with the long range tanks filling the bomb bay, and would be ineffective without them. The AR system is highly suspect and is currently not used. Extended endurance is vital for the operational use of this fleet. With long range tanks fitted a much greater endurance would be achieved. So why don't......oh, of course, all the long range fuel tanks would have been sold off as scrap years ago by the beancounters. Well maybe they need to get Gordo to OK some more tinbashing quick time, or more likely I have it wrong and am about to be left in no doubt of that at least!

Steve Austin

11th Nov 2007, 23:16

Nige, I believe we met a number of years ago when we were both stuck in Azi; I respect what you have acheived wrt protection on the Herc and, indeed, what you are now trying to achive with the Nimrod. However, a word of caution now that you are dealing with an aircraft which is not your background (no offence intended at all). Be careful what you post as you can easily lead people astray.

In an earlier post (1464) you state that:

"Furthermore, BAe suggested that MR2 should fly with extended range tanks with fuel extinguishant. I am not particularly clever, but even I can work out that at a stroke this would negate the need for AAR and would provide fire protection at the same time."

This theme has now been picked up by others, but is incorrect. The AAR capability rendered the long range tanks obsolete, but it does not work the otherway round; long range tanks would not negate the need for AAR. You can take-on significatly more fuel through AAR (replenishing now empty tanks) than you can lift off the ground with long range tanks, due to the maximum take-off limitations of the aircraft. Without going into actual figures, if you filled all the fuselage and wing tanks on an MR2, you will be at (or just below) the design maximum take off weight. If long range tanks were available and could be fitted, you would only be able to increase the fuel load up to the overload maximum take-off weight. Not only would this reduce safety margins (especially in the hot climates) and increase fatigue, but it would only increase the endurance of the aircraft by about an hour.

TVM

Mr Point

11th Nov 2007, 23:17

DV,
Easy tiger - the reference to "specialists" was following Santiago15's comment:

Or where non-specialists make incorrect assumptions before going on to discuss hypothetical situations based on these assumptions.

I agree wholeheartedly that there are a range of "specialists" involved in aviation, including QinetiQ staff , but it all comes down to the context of comments made.

Chomsky

11th Nov 2007, 23:21

Posted by DV

Sorry, but you "current" guys are not as current as you think you are. The follow up signal says "The decision to man the bomb bay periscope is a procedure that has been used since Sep 06" Of course this could be a load of Bull S**t from Kinloss (The originator) to give the impression that everything was under control.

DV,

Just how current are you on nimrod ops and procedures!! What gives you the right to accuse the "current guys" of not being current on their type of aircraft!!! It's C**ts like you that post on here like you wrote the manual that wind me up. Maybe you should just step back and become a spectator instead of spouting s**te!!!:mad:

nigegilb

11th Nov 2007, 23:32

Thanks Steve, I stand corrected. What I don't understand is why would BAe recommend the fitting of bomb bay fire extinguishant without the long range tanks if it would be totally ineffective as a fire suppression/extinguishant system?

AC Ovee

11th Nov 2007, 23:35

Would ACoveee state where it says in the Nimrod FRCs that there is no requirement to land at the nearest suitable airfield in the event of a serious internal/external fuel leak?

The FRCs and aircrew manuals are not there to provide airmanship. Even the engine fire drill or the total engine failure drill does not say "land as soon as possible". Therefore, it will not give the opposite advice either. The FRC tells the crew which switches and levers to operate in various circumstances. Thereafter the captain decides what to do.

We have been training and practicing the handling of fuel leaks since the day the Nimrod MR1 first flew. If the leak can be stopped: stop it and think about the next move, and there are many. If the leak cannot be stopped and a fire is a possibility (even in area with fire extinguishant), an immediate diversion has to be considered. If fire isn't a possibility, other options come into play. If the leak has stopped and fire is not a possibility, more options come into consideration. There is no standard answer to any of this, hence no directions in the FRCs.

Nigegilb, please forgive me if you are a relative of the lost crew, but what drives you in this discussion? I am current Nimrod aircrew and I have a vested interest in the aircraft and the safety of my colleagues. As I have indicated earlier this weekend, there are many people here at Kinloss who read this forum and they form opinions (and personal feelings) based on the submissions made by the contributors. As aircrew, some of the lesser experienced people are really desperate to know if AAR is safe. Crew captains, sat in the front of the jet, trying to locate the tanker in scattered cloud do not want their copilots, radar ops and beam lookouts being distracted by thoughts of, "we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"

In anticipation of your answer that you, too, have everyone's safety in mind and that by "exposing" how wrong it is to continue with AAR, that pprune will convince CAS to stop AAR and then we will all be safe: Well, pprune has no voice, so you are wasting your time but, more importantly, you and the other critics of AAR are definitely causing distraction where it is needed least: on the front line, above the enemy and during a much needed procedure.

nigegilb

11th Nov 2007, 23:47

You are probably right. It is time to retire from the argument and wait for the BoI.

NG

AC Ovee

12th Nov 2007, 00:08

Also, what was the point of the tanks if the ac perf was so restricted?

The RE tanks were only available when the MR1 was in Service. The MR1 ZFW was a lot less than the MR2, which meant that the jet had the capability to carry more weight in the fuselage. The designers believed this to be a valuable option so they came up with the RE tanks. As far as I know, they were never used because it was simpler to flag somewhere en route and, besides, once the tanks were fitted the bomb doors could not be opened in flight. Therefore, you would get to your destination and before you could go out and play at ASW you had to remove wet and noxious tanks from the bomb bay. Sadly, the aircraft manufacturer does not always have the full picture of how we operate.

The MR2 basic weight is much greater, so with full normal tanks we cannot carry extra RE fuel due to the max AUW, anyway. So, with that factor in mind, the tanks were scrapped.

We are now left with a cavernous bay that is not in anyway sealable to create a leak proof void to contain a fire that we could smother with inerting gas, foam or powder. As I mentioned before, the bomb bay heating system pumps hundreds of litres of warm air into the bay every minute, supplemented by 2 ram air valves (tumble drier hose size) at 350 kts TAS. The incoming air mix is not exhausted in any special way; it simply flows out around the edges of the doors and the bay does not pressurize. Therefore, if an extinguishant is to be effective (and sustained for approx 30 secs) it has to be supplied directly to the root of the fire (which will require a very smart detection and distribution system) or it has be enormous and space hungry in an already bulked out fuselage. If a system can be found to do this: great, I'm in, but I'm not convinced.

fleece7

12th Nov 2007, 06:29

"do not want their copilots, radar ops and beam lookouts being distracted by thoughts of, "we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"

AC Ovee-

ARE YOU SERIOUS???? do you think anyone weights some anonymous voice over their training, experience and knowledge!!

Can I have a side order of fries with my big fat helping of patronisation?

Mad_Mark

12th Nov 2007, 07:57

Fleece, what really grips my sh!t is people, like you, who don't read what is written properly before criticising the author. What AC O said was...

As aircrew, some of the lesser experienced people are really desperate to know if AAR is safe.

Note the bit that I bolded. He was talking about the new guys, the ones that could be deployed for the very first time, or carrying out AR for the very first time.

I often hear concerns from the newer guys that read misleading information on here and don't understand, due to their lack of experience, what the true facts are. It is nothing to do with training as AR is not a part of the OCU syllabus. When AR training is conducted it is a front-end thing and so not all rear crew members may have experienced it before their first live tanking trip on ops.

As can be seen, not all crew members have the "training, experience and knowledge" and they rely on the "training, experience and knowledge" of those that have been around the bazaars a little longer than them to dispel the fears gained from reading misinformed or misleading comments here and in the press.

Finally we have a fuel leak on the jet that is worth discussing, unlike those that the press and others latched on to recently. This leak was of a significant enough quantity and in an area that could have been disastrous and the crew actions were, IMHO, correct! This incident is worthy of causing concern; much else of what has been speculated about in this thread, mostly by those with little or no experience on type, has not been.

MadMark!!! :mad:

John Blakeley

12th Nov 2007, 08:18

Safeware,
Thank you for your clarification re HRI - as a consultant I am always happy to learn. In fact in other areas where I have done some work HRI does indeed stand for, or is used for, Human Risk Index and as far as I can see the definition of probability of the outcome and the results of the outcome are covered in a similar way, but clearly you are correct here, and Tucumseh has also kindly sent me the references to Def Stan 00-56 and the safety matrix.

Turning to your main point the BAES report said, after defining the six potential HRI B risks:

"These above mentioned hazards will require reference to the IPT for consideration as to whether further risk reduction is practicable or whether they shall remain acceptable without further action. The remainder [not defined in the ES I have seen] are recommended as being broadly acceptacle with MOD approval, as being mitigated to a level considered to be ALARP"

I am sure we both agree that ALARP stands for as low as reasonably practicable, and this was the overall rating that BAES gave to the risk of fire/explosion for both the R Mk1 and the MR2 "based on the assumption that (their) recommendations (from the zonal fire/expolosion assessment) be reviewed" - this is obviously a "woolly" position as the page of recommendations which follows is not prioritised and there is no further assessment of what the HRI case will be if the recommendations are not actioned. I do not know what action the IPT took against the BAES recommendations, but, clearly, the 3 I outlined in my last e-mail were never actioned. (Incidentally I have seen the comment that the ER tank fire suppression fit would not provide any cover - the BAES report says the opposite, but I have no idea who is correct.)

As with so many other things the real level of risk may be obscured by differing definitions, or even no definition, of the terms being used. Generally the definitions can anyway only be qualitative not quantitative.
Looking at the safety matrix of "probability of occurence" and "severity of harm" an "A" ie unacceptable (risk) category applies when:

The probabilty of occurence is "frequent" and the severity of harm is "marginal"
The probability is "probable" and the severity of harm is "critical"
The probability is "occasional" and the severity is "catastrophic"

I do not know what conclusions the IPT reached on the BAES report in 2004 or whether the risks were re-considered in the light of the QinetiQ report, but I would have thought that AAR operations with the Mk2 have been firmly in the A category since the loss of 230 - particlarly as the incidents since September 2006 have had inconclusive causes and the BOI has not reported -if the BOI has identified a definite cause one has to assume that even in the absence of the full report some specific engineering actions would have been taken.

My own view, reinforced by the BBC interview with the MOD "put up" spokesman Andrew Brooks, is that the airworthiness chain has been broken for the MR2 by deliberate actions of the IPT and senior management, and the bottom line reason for this is, as always, inadequate funding for people to do their job properly. I would be the first to admit that I am glad I was not put in the position to make these hard decisions, but the fact remains that aviation is very unforgiving of compromised airworthiness standards no matter how great the operational imperatives.

JB

cm74

12th Nov 2007, 08:49

It seems to me that this thread is mostly hack driven, looking for a story and a few quid off the back of a tragic incident.. nothing new there then.

And to boot, they are goading and baiting reactions from current Nimrod crews, angry at the speculation and crap that gets posted on here amongst a few gems of knowledge.

Go on DV, tell me once again to stop posting on your thread or even call me a few names again - wasn't it fairy the last time? I think you're out of order there.

There is a problem but it is being dealt with; not as fast as some would like, but it is happening. For the sake of the families of 230, I hope we get some knowledge soon.

I think, for now, its a case of we'll fly it, you talk about it.

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 13:14

A very good question Mike J. An even better question is "how many QinetiQ recommendations have been taken up?"

DV

MightyHunter AGE

12th Nov 2007, 14:01

DV
AGAIN I ASK
When was the last time you operated or maintained a Nimrod?

An answer of your most recent currency will suffice, nothing more.

Or are you avoiding the question?

You obviously think you know more than those 'current' guys so let us know your years operating/maintaining the Mighty Hunter.

tucumseh

12th Nov 2007, 14:25

"A very good question Mike J. An even better question is "how many QinetiQ recommendations have been taken up?"

Mike J and Distant V, spot on both of you.

To those who say wait for the BoI, I say wait until you see the QQ report(s). I am utterly astonished it has been released under FoI - if it had still been under MoD control they would have refused to release it in any form, or denied its existence in the first place. And I say well done to whoever knew to ask for it.

I am disgusted at how, in the past, MoD have managed to wriggle out of their responsibilities and duty of care by lying, withholding vital evidence and obstructing natural justice. But I have a feeling in my water about this one.

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 14:30

Mighty Hunter AGE: I will answer your question. It is many years since I worked on Nimrod, but the lack of "currency" on Nimrod does not negate past experience and judgement. You should realise that the final call on this issue will be made by a coroner, not the BoI, and he with not have had any Nimrod experience. But he will have better judgement than a Chief Chief, or a Flight Engineering, in determining the cause of the deaths of 14 service personnel.

Finally, Mighty Hunter AGE, please read what people have said, you seem to be a "specilist" in mis-quoting. I have never called anyone a liar.

If there is another life, do not come back as a fish, ----- you bite to easily.

By the way, how much of the QinetiQ report have you read and understood.?

DV

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 14:51

MJ. I would say very little of the QinetiQ report perculated down to the servicing and operating personnel. Otherwise XV230 would not have left equalized servicing with 7 of the 12 fuel defects that it went in with still present. Please AGE do not talk about ADD's. If you do not fix them on depot servicing, when do you fix them?

DV

Laboratoryqueen

12th Nov 2007, 15:01

Mike Jenvey, you waited 5.5 hrs and still no answer to the question you raised, I posed a question on the 3rd of November, after 9 days, I've still had no one jumping to answer my question, which was

"can anybody here say without doubt or heresay, guessing or speculation exactly what happened on board XV230 on september 2nd 2006 to cause the explosion. Yes there was a bomb bay fire, yes there was a fuel leak, how many of you were actually there and actually do know to be able to give a fully informed answer as to exactly why. It is only speculation otherwise."

RAF_Techie101

12th Nov 2007, 15:06

DV - I suggest you listen to MightyHunterAGE, he knows what he's talking about, as he known to me personally. It was only 5 days ago he forced me to do my fitness test...

Anyway - the fuel leaks you are talkign about and the ones in question are not realted. A fuel leak that would be ADF'd would be from the wings of the aircraft, from bolts, manhole covers, any part of the INTEGRAL tank that it could find it's way out from. As long as they do not exceed set limits, then they are allowable till a time comes when they will be fixed. In flight, any fuel that does leak out of these will be minimal, and will simply be blown instantly into the airstream. Leaks from couplings in fuel lines are a totally different matter. These will never be ADF'd, and will always be fixed.

As has been noted on here previously, Rib 7 leaks are a different matter.

MightyHunter AGE

12th Nov 2007, 15:16

DV

I refer you to post 1463 which you posted yesterday at 18.05.

I quote directly from what you posted
"you "current" guys are not as current as you think you are."

What did you mean by this then? I would wager that guys who fly the aircraft NOW know exactly what they are doing and you are accusing them of not knowing how to operate their own aircraft.

Again I quote
"The follow up signal says "The decision to man the bomb bay periscope is a procedure that has been used since Sep 06" Of course this could be a load of Bull S**t from Kinloss (The originator) to give the impression that everything was under control.

I am a man of the world and if someone calls me a bulls**tter then they are calling me a liar.

You seem to be a "specialist" in slinging mud and then trying to wriggled out of it.

As for your question
If you do not fix them on depot servicing, when do you fix them?

The simple answer to that is "when they exceed the acceptable leak rates as laid down by Lft 11 in the 2(R)1"

Anything else?

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 15:23

RAF Techie101. Thank you for the suggestion, but I also know what I am talking about. The QinetiQ report addresses fuel leak problems in the wings, XV230 went into equalized servicing with 12 ADD (ADF'S) for wing fuel leaks. It came out, almost two months later, with only 5 cleared. The others were extended until Jan 2007. The contractual requirement is to produce a "leak free" aircraft out of NSG.

By the way, what did you run the mile in for your fitness test?

DV

RAF_Techie101

12th Nov 2007, 15:25

Have you seen said contract yourself DV?

And just to prove a point, we haven't ran the mile and a half in over a decade.

cm74

12th Nov 2007, 15:27

You can't tell him anything RAF Techie...

:zzz:

RAF_Techie101

12th Nov 2007, 15:31

I'm beginning to notice that CM...

But I do take it personally when people start saying that I and my workmates can't do our jobs properly when we fix the aircraft.

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 15:36

OK, Mighty Hunter AGE, you claim to be "current" and your friend Techie101 speaks highly of you, so answer these questions:

".. prior to the media publication, what detailed information from the QinetiQ report perculated down to aircrew and ground crews at Kinloss?"

"How many QinetiQ recommendations have been taken up?"

DV

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 15:40

RAF Techie 101. No, I have not seen said contract myself, but it is a statement of fact in the QinetiQ report.

Fitness tests are getting easier, these days

DV

Dimmer Switch

12th Nov 2007, 15:40

Amid much debate about speculation, facts, opinion, expertise and so on within this thread, I thought it might be worth offering a reminder about balance and perspective.

Around 230 people have posted here (yes, I’ve actually counted them). Almost a quarter of the 1500 or so posts have come from just 3 of the contributors, and over half have come from as few as 18 contributors.

I have no objection to free-speech and I completley believe in the right of everyone to their opinion, but please don’t let’s think for one moment that this thread is balanced, broadly-based or representative of the views of more than a very small group of individuals.

P.S. The only flack that I feel would be justified as result of this post would be that which points out how sad, workshy and/or anal I must be to have counted all these posts !!:ok:

RAF_Techie101

12th Nov 2007, 15:44

Dimmer

If your username is related to your job, then I'm guessing you wouldn't have much else to do while you're working, and would so have much more free time than most to count posts.....

If you're not an AEO, I'll shut up ;-)

Dimmer Switch

12th Nov 2007, 16:03

I've been rumbled - time for an ID change! How about "Sun Shade" ?:ok:

RAF_Techie101

12th Nov 2007, 16:05

You can blame my dad for that one - not that he resented having an entire accoustics suite to play with instead of a single switch...

Anyway, bit of thread creep going on here...

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 16:07

RAF Techie101. You like your mentor, Mighty Hunter AGE, are "specialist" at jumping to the wrong conclusions. No one has ever said that you and your workmates are not doing your job properly. It is IPT/MoD who are not doing their job properly. You simply follow the directives from above.

Soon, no doubt, a new RTI will be issued by IPT, which states that if you carry out XYZ checks on the ground, the aircraft should be OK to resume AAR. You will carry out those checks, sign off the aircraft, and the aircrew will accept it. If things go wrong, as they did with XV235, I do not blame you, I BLAME THE PEOPLE WHO DEFINED THE LEVEL OF ACCEPTABLE RISK BY PRODUCED THE LAST SERIES OF STI's.

DV

Laboratoryqueen

12th Nov 2007, 16:24

I'm sorry but I thought it had been stated previously that none of this was about who was to blame. Yet DV, you are now saying who you blame.

It has also been said that this is a debate about events leading up to the accident, that it is not speculating on what happened that day, even though there have been several comments of "could have beens" and some which, if a person came along and who had no experience, would easily read the statements as being an actual account and not given as their opinion.

I asked my question, which MJ I believe you have misread, as I was asking if anyone here knew, as it seems to be a resounding no.

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 16:43

Labqueen: I draw your attention to John Blakeley's posting #1456 (..but it shows once again, this time some 6 months before the crash, the IPT and their senior management were only too well aware of the risk they were taking with aircrew lives...)

This is not John Blakeley speculation, it is the findings of the QinetiQ report.

DV

Mr Point

12th Nov 2007, 16:43

DV,

I'm not sure whether you are intentionally flaming, but comments like...

OK, Mighty Hunter AGE, you claim to be "current"

... are far from endearing.

I agree with your comments regarding the tollerances dictated by the IPT etc. to the engineers, but just like aircrew, engineers also apply experience and knowledge when carrying out their primary duties.

Mighty Hunter AGE,

You'll need to be more careful with your posts otherwise we might suspect you're beginning to like us aircrew! :}

Distant Voice

12th Nov 2007, 16:56

Mr Point, I take your point. On the other hand, Mighty Hunter AGE constantly suggests that if you are not current aircrew or ground crew you should keep your month shut on current issues. Some of the current issues, on an aircraft 35 years old, are repeats.

Anyway, I still await his answer to the two questions.

DV

Safety_Helmut

12th Nov 2007, 16:56

But I have a feeling in my water about this one.

I too wonder whether this will be the one ?

For my last few years working in the MoD, with most of the fixed and rotary wing in-Service IPTs, it was apparent that safety and airworthiness management was in an appalling state. Not just in the IPTs though, but the organisations that were intended to support them. In ADRP (as was) DASC, AD Engineering Policy, the DESB, DASB FWAMG/HAMG etc, there was virtually no understanding of airworthiness and safety. An acquaintance of mine wrote a damning report on the MoD's competence to self regulate, it did not make good reading and it’s distribution any further was blocked. We often talked about a big event (catastrophe) that might change things within the MoD, and I think, finally, that this may be it. XV179 was not enough, the MoD has been able to wriggle and squirm because enemy fire was involved. But the loss of XV230 could have happened during any AAR sortie. The loss of XW666 was also very close to being that catastrophe, although I suspect that management of airworthiness and safety had not descended to such a level of ineptitude.

The information that is coming out now, and the management of the fleet following the loss of XV230 and all her crew is damning. It calls into question the competence, and the leadership of the very top levels of the MoD and the RAF.

The MoD’s privilege of self regulation should be withdrawn forthwith. It was a privilege that was put in place decades ago when the organisation had a core of design and airworthiness expertise. That core has gone, possibly irrecoverably, the right to self regulate is long past its sell by date.

And yes, I am a Specialist in this field !

Safety_Helmut