Nimrod Information [Archive] - Page 7

Winco

12th Nov 2007, 20:51

AC OVEE

I have been reading some of your recent postings and am frankly, astonished by some of your comments:

For example, on the subject of flying the Nimrod you said. ‘Yes, I would. And yes, I would do AAR. Why? Because AAR in a Nimrod is no more dangerous than AAR in any other aircraft’
On what exactly do you base that comment? Do you not think that with the several recent AAR fuel leak problems with the MR2 and the loss of 230, AAR in a Nimrod is just slightly more dangerous than say an E-3 or a VC-10 or a fast jet maybe?

You also said: ‘XV230 experienced a fuel fire due to any one of a number of causes, and I know that ALL of those causes have since been identified and mitigated. XV235 suffered ONLY a fuel leak. Yes, it sprayed into the bomb bay, but it would never have become a fire because there was nothing in there to ignite it’
That implies that you know what caused the fire on 230. Can you tell us what it was please? Can you also tell us what exactly has been done to eliminate the possible causes of fire in the bomb bay? I would suggest to you that ‘ONLY’ a fuel leak of the magnitude that 235 appears to have had, is a pretty major event. Certainly it was serious enough for the aircraft to be withdrawn from theatre, so it clearly wasn’t a ‘minor’ incident was it?

And your comment: ‘Those who know what a Mayday means will form the impression that the crew were in imminent danger. They were not. They never were’
This shows a high degree of ignorance on your part and implies that the crew and captain were wrong in their actions. Perhaps you were on board at the time, and can tell us how it really was? FYI I am a captain of a large 4 engine aircraft, and if I had a major fuel leak similar to that of 235, then I wouldn’t hesitate in putting out a MAYDAY, because you ARE in serious and imminent danger, and you DO need immediate assistance (CAP413)

I will refrain from commenting about what you wrote about Fuel and Ignition, because you are fundamentally wrong. High pressure fuel vapour is NOT difficult to ignite at all (why do you think we have such severe restrictions around aircraft during fuelling?)

You are quite correct however, when you say that ‘Crew captains, sat in the front of the jet, trying to locate the tanker in scattered cloud do not want their co-pilots, radar ops and beam lookouts being distracted by thoughts of, "we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"’ But the loss of 230 was a fact, and the fuel leak on 235 WAS a fact, as were all the other incidents of fuel leaks/AAR problems. PPrune isn’t responsible for that, and to suggest that the crews wouldn’t have known about it if they hadn’t read it on PPrune is stupid. And to say that PPrune doesn’t have a voice – how wrong you are! I would think that the postings from the likes of Tappers Dad and others on this forum has been a major factor in the delay in the publication of the BoI.

I look forward to your reply.

The Winco

r supwoods

12th Nov 2007, 21:41

SW

As an aside, I got round to reading JSP 553 Change 5, effective 1 Nov, today. It has an interesting addition that says if any platform can't meet the stated airworthiness targets (or limits as delegated), this must be recognised in the safety case and the appropriate DG informed.

As all FW platforms contribute to the CA AMG, it is a requirement to detail Loss Rates and any High Class Risks. DG CA is a forum member.

Safeware

12th Nov 2007, 21:54

r supwoods,

What I was getting at was the inclusion, at para 1.37.4, of a direct relationship between the 2 immediately preceding targets, and failure to meet them in JSP553, but since you were so dismissive of JSP553 last time out, you probably didn't notice.

:)

sw

AC Ovee

12th Nov 2007, 23:45

Winco,

On what exactly do you base that comment? Do you not think that with the several recent AAR fuel leak problems with the MR2 and the loss of 230, AAR in a Nimrod is just slightly more dangerous than say an E-3 or a VC-10 or a fast jet maybe?

Well, I have conducted AAR on different aircraft throughout the years; tanking and receiving. While different aircraft types route the pipes differently, the same principles and materials are generally used. But, I have heard that there are some types that have double-skinned pipework. The MR2 has the same where the pipe passes through the crew compartment. I agree that the Nimrod is far from the the latest design in AAR, but that doesn't make it unsafe just because of that. What makes it safe, if safe means that it will not suffer a fire, is answered below.

Can you also tell us what exactly has been done to eliminate the possible causes of fire in the bomb bay?

Prior to the accident, Nimrod AAR might have carried a fire risk that is not there now: fuel flowing at high pressure in pipes in the vicinity of other pipes carrying hot air. I cannot say (because I haven't been told) that on 2 Sep 06 fuel leaked from its pipe and then came into contact with a nearby charged up air pipe, but it is a recognised possibility. Due to that possibility, the use of all hot air pipes in the fuselage is now prohibited during flight. The bomb bay and surrounding areas is now cold and dormant. Only fuel, hydraulic fluid and warm air to/from the cabin, pass through there. Yes, there is electricity, but unless you want to believe that there is a risk of a simultaneous major electrical fault, not known to the crew (otherwise they wouldn't do/continue the AAR), any fuel leak in that bay will not ignite. We dump fuel using the same pipes, except for one pipe dedicated to AAR due to an NRV. The pipes, throughout the jet, are liable to leak during dumping and they occasionally do so. Should we now cease dumping for fear of a leak from the same pipes that are used for AAR, despite the fact that dump pipe leaks have occurred regularly, without any fires, throughout the life of the Nimrod?

The system operating limitations we have now imposed on the Nimrod have removed all possible causes of a fuel fire while it is airborne with fully serviceable electrics. Someone here asked about motors and commutators, etc, in the bay. There are one or two in there, but they are sealed units, checked regularly and are not unreliable.

FYI I am a captain of a large 4 engine aircraft, and if I had a major fuel leak similar to that of 235, then I wouldn’t hesitate in putting out a MAYDAY, because you ARE in serious and imminent danger, and you DO need immediate assistance (CAP413)

Firstly, it was reported by the media as a "major" fuel leak. I didn't edit the news, so I might be wrong, but if the crew use "Mayday" it would be a reasonable deduction by the media to report it as a major leak; even you believe it was a major leak. It wasn't. It was a spray that ceased shortly after the disconnect and was later described by the crew themselves as probably a few gallons.

We can argue about the use of Mayday until the cows come home, but if you are on fire: mayday, if you are without engines: mayday; if you are out of control: mayday, if you are about to crash: mayday. If you have 300 pax you might want to get the ATC on your side for lesser problems and a mayday achieves that.

I will refrain from commenting about what you wrote about Fuel and Ignition, because you are fundamentally wrong.

But you didn't refrain:

High pressure fuel vapour is NOT difficult to ignite at all (why do you think we have such severe restrictions around aircraft during fuelling?)

I agree that its not difficult with a naked flame, which is at the core of the severe restrictions. However, remove the naked flame and all heat sources and it becomes very difficult. Aircraft do not power down to take on fuel. 200V is humming everywhere and despite the "no switching" rule, many refuel systems include float switches on the walls of the tanks and electrical contents systems (including your big widebody jet with all the crew and cleaners in there on a refuel stop, yes?). The systems are allowed to switch on/off while refuelling because they are serviceable. We do not cater for double faults: ie a fuel leak/vapour with a simultaneous unrelated electrical fault nearby. Even when we want to deliberately light the fuel on an aircraft we have to employ HE igniters then spread the naked flame around the liners.

PPrune isn’t responsible for that, and to suggest that the crews wouldn’t have known about it if they hadn’t read it on PPrune is stupid.

I wrote that the lesser experienced guys could be influenced by what they read here. we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc" You and others have been writing words to the effect that AAR is not safe. Using the name Winco isn't accidental. I doubt that you left us as an SAC. You write in an authoritative manner and you clearly intend to influence people (as I do). My point is that, while pprune, "etc" might not spawn distractions, your influence and contributions run the risk of adding to them.

And to say that PPrune doesn’t have a voice – how wrong you are!

In the context of my statement, pprune does not have a voice that would influence CAS and others to stop AAR. Anonymity carries no authority. Yes, pprune has a function. TD has asked questions and we have answered some of them with fact, not opinion, unless we said so. Discussions about policy before 2 Sep 07 is clearly useful to those who wish to seek compensation.

Clearly, Winco, we do not share the same opinion on this and I doubt very much that either of us will give much ground to the other. I accept that my comments about the Mayday were cutting, but I simply wished to make it known that it was not a major fuel leak.

Winco

13th Nov 2007, 06:26

AC Ovee,

Thank you for your reply, but as you conclude, we do not agree.

Can you honestly, at any time in your carreer, tell us what other aircraft has EVER experienced the same problems that the Nimrod fleet are curreently experiencing with AAR and fuel leaks? Because I too have flown one or two other military aircraft, all with AAR facilities, and I can categorically assure you that none of them ever had the same level of problems that the MR2's are having. My concern is that you seem to be simply dismissing all of these events in a quite bizarre way. These incidents really happened, and good men died as a result. You give the impression that these incidents no more than a routing operating hazard, but I don't agree. Am I wrong in that assumption? The fact remains that in the last 12 - 18 months, there ahave been a number of incidents, all relating to Fuel leaks and all relating to AAR. Doesn't that concern you just a little bit? And after the 235 incident, are you still as confident with the aircraft as you were before it?

Thank you for explaing what has been done in the Bomb Bay (post XV230) to illiminate the ignition source. But are you now saying that there is NO electrical current running through any wiring systems located in the bomb bay duriong AAR? If there is, even just one, then that is a source of ignition. Thats all it needs, just one little tiny spark. Just read the accident report on the TWA 800 jet, where a single, low voltagle cable brought down the aircraft. There are no aircraft that I know that have naked flames as a matter of course. The flames eminates from a spark or something of that nature, and that is why it is vital that the cause of the fuel leak/pipe failure, whatever, is located. The aircraft is old. The wiring is old, and it is impossible to guarantee the integrity of every bit of wiring on the aircraft I would suggest. Sparks will and do occur. Something ignited XV230 and something else could have ignited 235. To sit back and wait for it to happen again and then look for 'another' solution or fix is madness surely?

The use of a MAYDAY was, IMHO, fully justified, particularly in the hostile environment the crew faced. As it was, their distress call wasn't even answered and had to be relayed by the Tristar. Now, if you need immediate help, like they felt they did, then to NOT use a Distress call would have been irresponsible. As you well know from your training, you can always downgrade it to a Pan or even cancel it. I take it therefore, that in your opinion, the crew were wrong for declaring an emergency?

I think that your comment 'we do not cater for double faults' may well prove to be the crux of the problems you are facing on the Nimrod fleet. The fact that the aircraft is old and tired, is reason enough why you SHOULD be catering for double faults and even more possibly. Modern aircraft have faults granted, but I don't think I have ever had two faults occuring within the same system at the same time on the same aircraft etc. Do you see what I'm getting at? My aircraft is modern and quite new, yours is not, and thereby lies your biggest problem.

I do not blame you or the groundcrew in any way whatsoever. The groundcrew, in particular, are being put in an appalling position by IPT organisations and others who are coming up with, what I consider to be, knee-jerk reactions and 'solutions' to, what is, a very major and serious problem. My dig at CAS and AOC 2Gp is that they are ultimately playing with peoples lives at the end of the day, and that is not right. It is unfair and wrong that you are being further put at risk, in an already risky environment by lack of funding to fix the current problems with your aircraft, as well as getting it right on the MRA4, but that's another argument. The fact that CAS and AOC 2 Gp are not taking this problem by the ba££s and saying, 'no more flying until we sort it' is, I believe, irresponsible, negligent and seriously lacking in judgement.

And finally, let me just say that I do believe that AAR is safe. I did it for many years, on a number of aircraft and I can only ever recount one incident when I had a problem, and that was when the probe tip got snapped off and stayed in the basket. However, do I feel that it is safe at the moment in the MR2? Absolutely not Sir!

The Winco

fleece7

13th Nov 2007, 08:01

Mad Mark,

I read the previous post quite clearly.

It stated that guys of lesser experience would under-perform for their captains as a result of posts on this forum and the opinions contained within them.

Yes those with less experience should be looking for guidance from those who have "been around the bazaars". Yes they should speak to their captians/P1s/Engs/Sqn Execs.

However, to suggest that this forum would degrade their performance and put pressure on the P1 is a slight on their professionalism.

This is my last post on the subject as I don't believe this is the correct forum for current kinloss aircrew to debate such matters,

all of which, if you had taken time to digest my previous post properly, could have been inferred

John Blakeley

13th Nov 2007, 09:36

MHAge
I read your post at 1498 with interest. You said with regard to fixing fuel leaks that they will always be fixed "when they exceed the acceptable leak rates as laid down by Lft 11 in the 2(R)1"

I am not suggesting for one moment that this could leave an unsafe fuel leak coming out of a major servicing, but if you do not fix them when you have the skills, the equipment, the aircraft access and, hopefully, the time but instead leave them to be fixed at station, or worse detachment, level what is the gain - unless of course you are so short of time and/or resources that you have no choice.

I assume, maybe wrongly, that most of the "safe" fuel leaks are in the wing and the QinetiQ report makes some interesting comments on these issues, and particularly whether these fuel leaks are an indication of the overall structural integrity of the wing ie a "safe" fuel leak may be hiding a bigger problem. Their concerns were reinforced by the high AUW sorties being flown in support of Gulf operations.

My background is avionics, but one paragraph of the QQ report, obtained of course under FOI or I would not be quoting it, which stood out for me was:

"The recurrence of significant fuel leaks at several points on the wings of the Nimrod aircraft may be taken as an indication of the age-related deterioration of the basic sealing systems employed in the aircraft as a barrier to leakage. The breakdown of the original interfay sealants is not easily recoverable and the conventional repair processes cannot be expected to prevent or halt that deterioration. This leads to a major concern with respect to the effects of that deterioration on the overall structural integrity of the subject joints, ie corrosion."

The QQ report then offers some recommendations for more detailed examinations using aircraft going to the MRA4 programme which one has to assume the IPT will action - presumably money permitting.

Thus a policy, presumably made from on high, of deliberately sending out aircraft from major servicing with ADD'd fuel leaks even though "safe" seems to be a very short-sighted and potentially expensive (in maintenance terms if nothing else) policy, and the leaks may be more of a problem than they appear.

If I have got it all wrong I am very happy to be corrected.
JB

RAF_Techie101

13th Nov 2007, 09:43

I think the main thing to remember with the MRA4 is that the wings are completely new - and thus so are the integral fuel tanks. So in that respect, the same problems should not occur. Assuming new sealing techniques have been developed since the original Nimrod design of course.

Fuel pipe leaks are a different matter, but again they should be of a completely new design, so I don't think it's fair to compare the two aircraft in regard of fuel leaks.

John Blakeley

13th Nov 2007, 09:53

RAF Techie,

Sorry if the previous post was mis-leading - I did not mean to compare the new wing and the old - the QQ recommendation is to use the old MR2 wings which are presumably scrap to monitor the structural integrity for the remaining MR2 wings - I assume to ensure that the structural integrity and remaining service life are not on opposite sides of the equation!

JB

getsometimein

13th Nov 2007, 10:10

AC Ovee,

I'm sure the crew out there are appreciative of your supportive comments over their recent incident.

The next time you want to go air to air refueling and want to use the bomb bay as a fuel tank, I suggest you weld the doors closed and remove all electrical wiring before hand.

nigegilb

13th Nov 2007, 11:02

AC Ovee's comments about the unnecessary MAYDAY involving XV235 cannot go unchallenged. Neither can his assertion that a leak involving several gallons of fuel should not be referred to as a major leak.

At the time of the incident, fuel was spraying into the bomb bay like water coming out of a garden hose with one's thumb over the end. The Captain made an instant decision to break away and call a MAYDAY. I doubt there are many Captain's reading this thread who would have done anything different.

The fuel was atomising, mixing with oxygen and exposed to a bomb bay wired for electricity. The wiring system on Nimrod is old, and it is not possible to discount arcing and sparking. The Captain would not have known at that stage if the fuel leak would continue, or, indeed, what was causing it. The decision to land at the nearest suitable airfield has been praised by the MoD and many people here on pprune. It would appear AC Ovee stands in a cast of one, by stating that he would have RTB'd without the need for bothering with a MAYDAY. AC Ovee was highly critical of non-specialist contributors on this thread and the effect that comment here is having on his younger crews.

Well Sir, I would suggest that the only person being gung ho here is yourself. I would suggest that criticising the MAYDAY call and offering a blanket guarantee on the safety of the Nimrod bomb bay containing gallons of aviation fuel is foolish in the extreme. I would hope your subordinates are not listening to you. The Captain ordered a ground evacuation after landing, I would hope in the presence of Fire Crews and Med Teams, is this to be considered routine as well? All in a day's work?

The decision to call a MAYDAY was in my opinion, based on sound airmanship. The first thing I was ever told as a pilot, was, where there is doubt there is no doubt. To err on the side of caution, is surely the only way to approach aviation? Not that this Captain was being cautious, he was merely being sensible.

I find it sad that people like yourself think it is acceptable to keep pushing the old girl without the necessary levels of protection. It is becoming increasingly clear that XV230 should have had bomb bay fire protection on board; that the IPT should have been looking at fuel tank protection. It is very easy to say yes to every directive sent down from the MoD and much more difficult to say no.

AC Ovee, people with your attitude were content for the Hercules fleet to have just 5 airframes receive fuel tank protection, in no specific time frame Now, thankfully, every single Hercules exposed to the enemy has this protection on board.

I respectfully invite you to withdraw your criticisms of the Captain of XV235.

I also invite you to tell us your definition of a major fuel leak.

The Swinging Monkey

13th Nov 2007, 12:33

Nice one Nige!

Dave Angel

13th Nov 2007, 17:09

The Captain would not have known at that stage if the fuel leak would continue, or, indeed, what was causing it. The decision to land at the nearest suitable airfield has been praised by the MoD and many people here on pprune. It would appear AC Ovee stands in a cast of one, by stating that he would have RTB'd without the need for bothering with a MAYDAY. AC Ovee was highly critical of non-specialist contributors on this thread and the effect that comment here is having on his younger crews.
Well Sir, I would suggest that the only person being gung ho here is yourself. I would suggest that criticising the MAYDAY call and offering a blanket guarantee on the safety of the Nimrod bomb bay containing gallons of aviation fuel is foolish in the extreme. I would hope your subordinates are not listening to you. The Captain ordered a ground evacuation after landing, I would hope in the presence of Fire Crews and Med Teams, is this to be considered routine as well? All in a day's work?
The decision to call a MAYDAY was in my opinion, based on sound airmanship. The first thing I was ever told as a pilot, was, where there is doubt there is no doubt. To err on the side of caution, is surely the only way to approach aviation? Not that this Captain was being cautious, he was merely being sensible.

Well said Nige, thank you :D

AC Ovee

Table for one? :rolleyes:

Distant Voice

13th Nov 2007, 17:58

ADD's (ADF's) are what they are stated to be: Acceptable Defects (Faults) that are Deferred until the next servicing where they can be rectified. NOT WHEN THEY GET WORSE.

XV230 entered depot servicing with 11 ADD's and 1 limitation, and it came out with 7 ADD's remaining (Extended from 14th Aug 2006 to 30th Jan 2007). Why, when there is a contrctual requirement (according to the QinetiQ report) to release a "leak free" aircraft was this allowed to happen. Who approved the extension? And why -- "time constraints"?

DV

Brain Potter

13th Nov 2007, 19:01

I've never quite understood the reluctance to use MAYDAY demonstrated by some quarters of the UK Mil. It doesn't cost anything and, provided the aircraft has a genuine emergency, no-one other than crew room (and internet) pundits will criticise. It gets you everything you want from ATC (ie mostly silence) - even if the immediate assistance is simply changing your clearance and arranging priority for landing.

Splitting hairs about what is a PAN and what is MAYDAY is all well and good in the familiar Swanick Mil environment, but many parts of the world have never heard of PAN. Even if they have, the UK Mil has decided to change the ICAO PAN PAN x3 to PAN x3. You can pretty much guarantee that any such call will be followed by "Are you declaring emergency?". At least MAYDAY is universally understood.

In my view, high pressure fuel spraying where it shouldn't is serious danger and not just a condition concerning safety.

Chugalug2

13th Nov 2007, 19:56

AC Ovee, you are obviously bold, Sir. Are you yet old?

nigegilb

13th Nov 2007, 20:10

Ways of reducing the chances of a fuel tank explosion. I just wonder how many are covered by the use of the bomb bay as a fuel tank.

"To prevent tank explosions, designers have always assumed a flammable vapor exists in the fuel tanks and adopted standards to preclude ignition sources from the fuel tanks. The following are some of the design measures taken to satisfy that philosophy:

a. Surface temperatures inside the tanks, under normal and failure conditions, are kept at least 50°F below the minimum necessary to ignite a fuel-air mixture. Pump motors are kept cool by an integral passage of circulating fuel. The motors have a temperature fuse which cuts the electrical supply before an unsafe surface temperature is reached. In addition, the pumps and other similar equipment inside the tanks, are designed and tested to explosion-proof standards. Where hot air-conditioning pipes external to fuel tanks are routed close to tank walls, such as the engine bleed air pipes in the wing leading edge, it is current practice to position heat-sensitive detector wires on the structure to protect it from overheat in the event of pipe failure or joint leaks.

b. Electrical components and wiring within a fuel tank are designed to handle 1500 volts ac which is well in excess of the power available on the airplane and the operating voltage of the fuel quantity gauging system.

c. Electrical energy applied to any component in the fuel tank is limited to a value that is 10 times lower than the minimum energy necessary to ignite a fuel-air mixture. The minimum ignition energy (MIE) for hydrocarbon vapors is thought to be about 0.25 mj.

d. During the flow of a hydrocarbon type fuel through pipes, valves, filters, etc., an electrostatic charge can be generated in the fuel, which, if relaxed sufficiently fast, could allow the accumulation of hazardous potential levels inside a receiving tank. This is kept within acceptable safe limits by avoiding very high rates of fuel flow in the refueling system and by controlled distribution of the fuel in the tanks, such as bottom loading and
the use of diffusers on pipe outlets. In addition, meticulous attention is paid to electrical bonding of all metallic parts to dissipate the charge. Some countries around the world insist on the use of static dissipater additives in the fuels to increase the fuel electrical conductivity."

4mastacker

13th Nov 2007, 22:10

Gentlemen, as a non-flying, non-techie, ground-hugging ex-Supplier and before someone yells ’thread creep’ at me, can I make just one post on this very active thread?

A lot of comments have been made about fuel leaks and likely ignition sources with suggestions that any fuel fire may have been ignited in some way by the aircraft’s on-board systems.

Not so very long ago, on the ‘Discovery’ channel, there was a programme about the loss of large ships. One event featured, was that of a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) which caught fire in heavy seas. The ship (the name of which escapes me) was fully laden at the time and suffered a structural failure when part of the bow became detached from the rest of the hull and caused a rupture in the forward tanks. As a result, the cargo started leaking into the sea. The only driver causing the fuel to escape was gravity - no high-pressure pumps, no electrics – and yet the escaping cargo caught fire. The video showed that the fire occurred after the ship, which had already lost part of the bow, had pitched into a large wave and what was left of the bow had risen clear of the water. The cause of this ignition was believed to be static electricity generated in some way by the ship’s movement through the water and not necessarily from a spark caused by broken plates grinding against each other.

Question – Is it possible that a similar phenomenon,i.e a static charge, which apparently caused the VLCC’s leaking cargo to ignite, could also apply to a leak in an aircraft? As I said, I’m a non-flying, non-techie ex-Supplier so please be gentle – but it’s just a thought.

Farfrompuken

13th Nov 2007, 22:26

AC Ovee,

1. You, my friend, resemble the End of a Bell.

2. Either that, or you're a great wind-up artist.

3. Or you're a stunningly low-average aircrew mate.

4. Or quite possibly you have no knowledge of anything aviation-related at all.

If it's 3 or 4, then 1 applies.

If it's 2, then you've got us all hook, line and sinker. And therefore 1 still applies.

FATTER GATOR

13th Nov 2007, 22:39

As an 'Aircrew mate' who is sometimes 1, sometimes 2, once reported on as 3 and certainly not 4; would you care to clarify your point for me who is thick?

FG

dodgysootie

13th Nov 2007, 22:43

Whilst waiting for a reply from a certain person, anyone care to answer:
......prior to media publication, what detailed information from the Qinetiq report percolated downwards to Nimrod sqn personnel (aircrew/groundcrew) at Kinloss??
......."how many QinetiQ recommendations have been taken up?"

1st Question. As groundcrew, I, as a Propulsion Tech at ISK have heard nothing. Not now, not in the last 6 years. I'm a mushroom as far as Data like that is concerned, wrong, I know, but true!

2nd Question. Haven't got a clue! But probably none!

general all rounder

13th Nov 2007, 23:27

I am not an aircrew mate and I have no knowledge of the MR2's fuel system but it strikes me that the chaps who are flying the MR2 need a reasonable degree of assurance that the ac is safe. Clearly this does need to be balanced against the need for the operational task, which I understand is important, but whilst some risk may have to be taken it would obviously be wrong to expect crews to fly in a death trap. I am quite sure that the MR2 is reasonably safe because the MOD says that it is and it would not be in the MOD's interest to be mistaken because of the damage that would be done if it was subsequently found to be wrong.

However, I think that if I was the leader who had decided that the ac was safe to fly, I would be able to think of no better way to persuade my chaps that I had thought the matter through than to fly a couple of missions with them. This is easy for me to say of course because I am neither an aircrew mate nor an AOC nor CAS (and will never be) but nonetheless I have always found that of all leadership styles, by example is the most effective.

Mr Point

14th Nov 2007, 00:23

General All Rounder,
Now there's a great idea, unfortunately I think the only chance of it happening would be:

Dear Jim,

Please could you fix it for me to fly my Nimrod with CDS and CAS ...........

Yours,

Mr Point :}

The Swinging Monkey

14th Nov 2007, 04:21

Hasn't it gone quiet from some people???

tucumseh

14th Nov 2007, 06:59

4mastacker

You ask a very good question. In very simple terms, the answer is electrical bonding.

Too many regard this as a design issue - once designed and implemented, that's it. Forget it. But many factors can adversely affect bonding, and hence the safety of the aircraft. A typical example. Corroded joints in which ground currents are flowing can transmit RF radiation. And when faced with the likes of intergranular corrosion,the reduction in strength due to the corrosion is disproportionate to the reduction in thickness of the metal. It follows that, if you penny pinch and skimp on maintenance, the risk increases. (Just illustrating linkages).

Too much wiggly techy stuff. My brain hurts already. Suffice to say, it is critical to the safety of the aircraft. But to my knowledge there is no suggestion this is relevant to XV230.

Winco

14th Nov 2007, 07:31

s15

I'm sure he is reasonably familiar with the front end of the Nimrod, but I wonder if he would be happy to go tanking in one now???
What do you reckon?
Just a thought.

Mr Point

14th Nov 2007, 07:42

You're too late: CAS is more than familiar with the inside of a Nimrod.

Since last Monday?

4mastacker

14th Nov 2007, 07:49

Tucumseh

Thank you for that answer - I even understood what you said :ok:. I'll now withdraw from this thread and wait for the BOI report.

Distant Voice

14th Nov 2007, 08:16

Dodgysootie; Many thanks for your straight forward, and honest answer to those two questions. As someone at the sharp end at Kinloss, if any "QinetiQ" changes had been introduced over the past 18 mths you would have noticed them.

DV

Distant Voice

14th Nov 2007, 09:08

I note that the BAe Safety report recommends "mandating of heated fuel tank area inerting during flight, and ....... in-service retrofitment of a fuel tank nitrogen inerting system to prevent the occurrence of an explosive vapour in a partially filled tank.

Since the XV230 accident, Nimrods have been flying with drained No 7 tanks (RTI/MIN/173 carried out before every flight). However, drained does not mean completely free of fuel and vapour.

Any thoughts on this one? To me it does not appear to be a safe operating condition.

No 7 tanks featured in the XV227 incident in 2004.

DV

Mick Smith

14th Nov 2007, 10:27

Given the dearth of answers on the QinetiQ report, and the suggestions that it is irrelevant to the issue under discussion, it might be worth giving a little more detail of the report, laying out some of the issues and asking some more explicit questions.

The Qinetiq team visited Kinloss from 14-15 Feb 2006, at which time XV230 was undergoing special attention from MPI. The QinetiQ team had access to XV230 and the three other aircraft with the EO capability that were then in the UK, indeed these were the aircraft it focussed on. The principal author was Qinetiq’s principal airworthiness engineer.

The report, issued on 17 March, was commissioned by the Nimrod Integrated Project Team. It is true of course that it was asked to look at the problem with leaks in the wings, but a number of problems it uncovered were relevant to all the problems with leaks on the MR2 and indeed appear to my admitted inexpert eye to have much wider implications.

A key concern, and one that clearly had implications beyond the wing leaks, centred around problems caused by the contract for the Nimrod Support Group, which:

* was not required to carry out preventive maintenance

* was working to new instructions it had written up itself because the Air Publications the RAF technicians in the RAMS were using were “of little, if any, value” (but had not told the RAMS that this was the case).

* and was not contracted to relay the full extent of the leak problem to the Integrated Project Team.

With regard to this last point, the QinetiQ report said:

“NSG have compiled important datasets of leak maps from major to major that show recurrent problems. This information is not being disseminated effectively. Neither the Nimrod IPT nor BAE Systems appear to be aware of the detailed information available within these datasets.

“NSG have not been required to supply the IPT and BAE Systems with these fuel leak records.”

"Proper interrogation of the existing data would have highlighted a structural problem that needed to be addressed before it became critical.”

With regard to the out-of-date APs, it recommended that: "A system should be set up in the form of a working group to allow contact between Nimrod repair teams at all locations, eg SNCO level where hands-on experience exists. This would provide a mechanism for exchange of information and good working practices.”

So some questions:

Was the Nimrod repair working group ever set up?

Have the APs in the RAMS been updated to the point where they match up to the procedures in use by the NSG?

How could the IPT make any sensible decision relating to the leak problem, including the decision not to follow the BAE Systems recommendation to fit a fire suppression system in the bomb bay, if it didnt know the full extent of the problem?

Are all contracts across the RAF like this and if so what problems are being stored up with other aircraft?

Finally, not a question, perhaps the most damning quote in the whole report, and one that gets to the nub of a problem that clearly still exists:

"It was also suggested that RAMS cannot detect some of the leaks reported in-theatre when the aircraft return to Kinloss. This is partially explained by fuel load in tanks, climatic conditions, ineffective vacuum in tanks, etc, and Qinetiq were unable to establish a clear impression of how these non-detected leaks are addressed.”

Distant Voice

14th Nov 2007, 10:43

The full paragraph, from the BAe report, dated August 2004, reads as follows:

"Maintain watching brief of current civil regulatory developments regarding mandating of heated fuel tank area inerting during flight. (In line with FAA fireworthiness developments following TWA Flight 800 in-flight fuel tank explosion accident investigation findings recommending of fitment on new build, and possibly in-service retrofitment of fuel tank nitrogen inerting system to prevent the occurrence of an explosive vapour in a partially filled tank)"

There is also a strange statement in the Summary of the report, which reads as follows:

"In view of the above summary, and on the assumption that the recommendations made within the report are reviewed, it may be concluded that the design and operational assessment of both types [MR MK2 and R MK1], together with in-service record of both types, indicate that both types are acceptably safe to operate within contexts and in a peacetime service from a fire/explosive safety haxard point of view."

To me, the word "reviewed" is an odd choice. I can not see how the same conclusion can apply to "reviewd and rejected" and "reviewed and accepted".

Legal advice sought.

DV

Chugalug2

14th Nov 2007, 10:54

DV, God forbid that all this is going to end up in the maw of the legal profession, the words Hell and freezing-over come to mind. I predict that the majority of the questions that Mike Smith poses above will go unanswered here, by the BoI, and certainly by the MOD. The core problem here, as has been said before is of a self-regulating, self-protecting and self-preserving system. It is broken, dysfunctional and beyond repair IMHO. It must be broken up and replaced with a system subject to external and independent authority. In short a Military Aircraft Airworthiness Authority. This must be done soon, for time is not on our side, and is of the essence. Further avoidable accidents must be avoided urgently.

Distant Voice

14th Nov 2007, 11:10

Chugalug2: I fully agree, and I am sure that all these issue will be addressed by the coroner.

Many postings on this thread have suggested that people like myself are not "currently" qualified to comment and should wait for the BoI findings. Of course I disagree, and I disagree because the main problems we have uncovered will not be resolve by technical changes to Nimrod, but with changes to the system. And those problems have been uncovered by having the relevant experince and know-how to ask the right questions of the system.

DV

kam

14th Nov 2007, 12:19

DV and Tappers Dad, in your support, I want to lend the following post from the Royal British Legion website
Comment Posted By: Next of Kin (name supplied) Posted: 08/08/2007
I have only just read about the government ‘family friendly’ approach. Officiating basic entitlements, formalising the permission to ask questions and have information about the BOI process is, I believe, tokenistic in the absence of any real, tangible inclusion of families. BOI’s are in house processes and reinforce a closed shop mentality. No matter how soft you make the borders they are not permeable. I think this can be problematic and can cause tension in family - military relations. Family needs and the role of families during the process can be misunderstood, as it is ambiguously defined. This extends to the greater military community and exacerbates rumour and speculation throughout the investigative phase. Despite being encouraged to ask questions, I was also open to judgment and accusation: my liaison officer’s supervisor made hurtful accusations about me, insulting to not only me but also my deceased husband. When widows and bereaved family members ask too many questions they maybe perceived as problematic or adversarial, there is an implicit and subtle pressure to be compliant. This is not a criticism of those who work tirelessly on complicated and demanding inquiries but a criticism of the process itself. Issues of ownership and secrecy of facts because information is limited to a select few, at times for up to a year, enhances anxiety and uncertainty for families. The findings into my husband’s death were presented, respectfully and sensitively however it was a heavily confusing, redacted and complex document. It was impossible to make sense of it and develop insightful questions in the time frame of a day, despite the sincere efforts of the board. To establish equitable relations between family and MOD solicitors in the Corners Court, families may seek assistance from lawyers. From my understanding good legal assistance is difficult to find as defence law is highly specialised and complicated. Families may rely on advice not formally sanctioned, from ‘friendly’ ex or serving military personnel, who may flag, agitate, or expand on issues not covered or identified in BOI’s findings. Although helpful to families they maybe thought of as a hindrance by the military and subject to rebuff from that community. Fundamentally military processes need to be more open and transparent. Families should be included during the investigative, information-gathering phase. I believe that credence and scrutiny can be given to ‘classified’ information, while at the same time information sought could be readily given. This occurs in other nation forces and I believe is achievable in the UK. At times ‘classified’ information/ closed processes maybe used by government to limit inquiry into and prevent critique about their failings. I think the government should expand consultation with all families and make their policies not just friendly but validating.

RAF_Techie101

14th Nov 2007, 13:13

Fuel vapour int he tanks, in this case no 7 tank, is not as much of a problem as most people think in flight. The tanks are constantly vented using ram air taken in at the leading edge, then vented overboard at the trailing edge. Although there are several different ways this happens for the various tanks, the 7 Tank in question is vented by this simple method. This allows for the gas volume to increase when fuel is being emptied from the tank, and also to help get rid of any vapours.

Obviously on the ground this doesn't work...

andgo

14th Nov 2007, 17:13

AC Ov
1. Tanking pilot are we?
2. Off to netjets are we?
3. Self opinionated person i wouldn't like to fly with
I know 3, not sure bout the 1 or 2
The crew are safe having walked away from a fuel leak. The fact that we can now discuss with the Captain and crew means, in my opinion, that they did the right thing.
Capt, WELL DONE

Chugalug2

14th Nov 2007, 17:28

Kam, a very sincere and warm welcome to this thread. Your testimony is from one who has experience of the BOI process and its severe limitations to answer the need for information and explanation concerning the tragic deaths of loved ones. Discussion on this thread, indeed on this forum, tends to be technical and full of jargon, ie scarcely inviting to those not in the know. So also it must be for the BOIs, where NoK have no choice, they must grapple with these unfamiliar processes and language. All the more reason why we all, Air Staff, BOIs, CoC, etc, should do all that is possible to accommodate them. In the incestuous system that is the MOD, I fear that is an unreasonable hope. Secrecy is a way of life, in excess of the need of national security, and quite frequently acting against it. Just as the need of a detached objective independent Airworthiness Authority is becoming ever more obvious, so such an authority is likely to produce detached objective findings following investigations into military aircraft accidents. You have shown that there are other important factors at stake here other than the vital ones of "what happened, and what must be done to stop it happening again?” Thank you Kam, for your brave second PPRune post. May I offer my condolences for your tragic loss and our thanks for your contribution? Please don't make it your last post, for the tragic truth is that there will be more tragedies, more stricken families and more NoK trying to grapple with this strange and forbidding world. They will surely find comfort and support from those like yourself who have travelled this road and are willing to help others do likewise.

Winco

14th Nov 2007, 19:31

There is a distinct lack of input at the moment from some of the so-called 'specialists' and 'current' Nimrod air and groundcrew. Where have you all gone?

OilCan

14th Nov 2007, 19:55

gone flyin'...:p

RAF_Techie101

14th Nov 2007, 20:11

Did my post not count.....?

Granted, no-one actually replied to it, but still.....

enginesuck

14th Nov 2007, 21:27

As current nimrod groundcrew I think it might be unwise to post anything technical on here as many of us have done previously because this is now very high profile and it doesnt take colombo to work out who we are. Not entirely clear on what we are allowed to say anyway. Not that I have anything major to say :ok:

spanners123

14th Nov 2007, 21:32

enginesuck, well said!:D
wrt the recent e-mail leaks, restricted material being published etc, i think it would be very wise for a lot of people to think before they post on this link.

Distant Voice

15th Nov 2007, 12:24

You can always PM

DV

Wrathmonk

15th Nov 2007, 13:09

DV and Mike

Just so I can square this away in my own mind are you seriously encouraging serving members of the Armed Forces to whistleblow and/or break the Official Secrets Act? May not have secret stamped on the top but even if it is restricted it is not for 'public' consumption.

PM are, if I remember correctly, not private! You may not reveal your sources but that still won't stop the witch hunt to find the "leakers" when the information appears in the public domain (say, if you were to publish it). As is happening over the recent leaks to the printed media on defence savings etc.

I think there is a slight difference between people offering up their opinions on JPA against providing technical detail on a current aircraft.

Don't flame me - my view and I'm entitled to it!

Distant Voice

15th Nov 2007, 13:50

Wrathmonk: My views are the same as Mike J's. PM's were only suggested as a means of keeping the thread going. Nothing that has appeared in the press recently came from pprune postings. It came out of genuine FOI requests and documents supplied by serving members who are deeply concerned about the way the Nimrod fleet is being opertated. These sources will continue.

DV

Wrathmonk

15th Nov 2007, 14:31

Mike, DV

Thank you for your comments and I don't want to thread drift too far. The FoI requests - I have, obviously, no problems. My concern is the "documents supplied by serving members". For example, in days of old, a non-entitled person encouraging a serving member of HM Forces to provide documents that would probably not routinely be permitted in the public domain could be, in extreme, to be considered espionage and the person supplying it held fully responsible. Now I'm not saying that is what you are suggesting nor what is happening (I'm not that melodramatic!) but individuals need to be aware of the potential risk to them should the Black Omegas pitch up outside their house!

Now, whether serving personnel giving clear direction to those outside as to what to ask for under the FoI is considered the same is another matter .... particularly after the BoI is released and the available facts and conclusions become known (btw I have faith that the Board will provide an honest report, to the best of their ability, with the information they have been given/able to find out etc - my own opinion and one which I know differs from many contributors to this forum - please take it as that).

nigegilb

15th Nov 2007, 14:54

I think Wrathmonk is being entirely sensible. Emotions were running high for a few days. Sadly, there is no legislation for anyone in the military with life threatening information, to be allowed to come forward. That said, the cat is most definitely out of the bag. A cooling off period is probably a good idea. The thread doesn't have to sit high, if it disappears for a while it won't be a bad thing.

My only concern is the timing of the BoI report. I am hearing it will be next month, but the MoD have of late, tried to bury these reports on or close to the last day of the Parliamentary session. Des Browne, not the greatest Parliamentary performer has a tendency to disappear when big news is breaking. I am writing to HCDC with my concerns. When the report comes, it most definitely must not be buried with mince pies and custard.

Accountability? Yes it is a dirty word in the MoD. Keep your eyes open gentlemen.

Chugalug2

15th Nov 2007, 15:23

Wrathmonk, the OSA, QRs, et al, rather presupposes that the threat is without and defends against that. The concern of myself, and many others who post here I suspect, is that the problem lies within the MOD. Of course that is a matter of opinion, and one must respect those who do not share it. I for one do not attack the RAF Higher Command or the MOD out of self importance or bitterness from lack of promotion, as has been suggested here. I am neither important nor ambitious. I share a passion though for the professionalism and courage of those who serve or have served in the RAF which, I am certain, is undiminished in all trades. What is different though, from the Service that I was in, is that the circle of Flight Safety provision, from incident through to STI has been broken. It is broken within the MOD, where all the Airworthiness Regulation is supposed to originate. It would seem that the missing ingredient is money, but the system does not throw that up and simply covers up the shortfall of provision. That is a dangerous and irresponsible thing to do, totally unbefitting any Airworthiness Authority. It would be difficult to imagine it existing in Civil Aviation, but in this forum there are at least three threads which suggest, at the very least, that this is the case. The truth is slowly emerging, mainly thanks to the courage and resolution of those from within the system. Of course they are denounced by the system but, as has been pointed out, the vast majority of the evidence is now in the public domain. It is very much a question of dotting i's and crossing t's. Others in the corridors of power are as concerned about the incompetence and wastefulness of the MOD as are many of us, but we who are or were members of the aviation fraternity know that if it’s bust you must fix it and quick. Otherwise it kills, again and again!

John Blakeley

15th Nov 2007, 15:54

Chugalug2

You and others are quite right to point to money as the root cause of the airworthiness cycle being broken - even the spokesman "nominated" by MOD for last weeks news items, Andrew Brooks, said: "Can it (the MR2) become unsafe because it's too old for the job - certainly, and if you've got miles and miles of piping there isn't the capability to take the aeroplane away and completely re-pipe it because dare I say it the MOD is not allowed to spend the money it should be spending (my bold)." Well we know it isn't just piping but there is plenty of public domain evidence that the last part of the statement is correct. As different parts of his interview went out at different times I am not sure whether this portion of the interview was ever seen.

One part of his interview which I believe was used was: "I think the Ministry has no option. The Nimrod is crucial in Afghanistan and Iraq to identifying intelligence, to help the troops on the ground. If you pull it out the troops on the ground are going to be blind. It's that sort of decision. I don't think they have any choice unless it really was falling out of the sky (my bold). The pressure to keep it there is intense." I am sure the irony of this statement will not be lost to anyone.

JB

nigegilb

15th Nov 2007, 16:21

Aah, that would be Andrew Brookes who was wheeled out to say a few words about Hercules foam last year?

Whether such a modification to the Hercules could have saved those lives is not clear, says defence analyst Andrew Brookes of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

"Would those 10 men still be alive? I don't know. No-one is saying 'Had this been fitted, these lives would have been saved,'" he said, pointing to other recommendations in the inquiry report such as better intelligence.

The problem is wider than just one piece of equipment, he said, because the MoD is not spending enough on many things, including ships and tanks.

"We can spend money on armouring these planes but is it the best way to use resources?

"We've been flying Hercules in Iraq since 2003 and lost one, which is tragic. But when you crash a car, do you stop everyone driving?"

Every extra modification adds weight to the plane and restricts its mobility, he said.

And the installation of foam would mean taking each aircraft out of service, at a time when they are needed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Well Andrew, I was saying that crew would probably have been saved by foam, as for your comments about restriciting the mobility of the aircraft, well they were laughable.

I would take anything this "expert" says with a pinch of salt.

Mike Rotch

15th Nov 2007, 16:55

Distant Voice

15th Nov 2007, 17:16

Welcome to the thread, Mike Rotch. Clearly you are a man in the know. Perhaps you can come up with some real useful information and tell the families, who lost loved ones on XV230, when the BoI report will be issued.

DV

tucumseh

15th Nov 2007, 18:29

“What do you believe is 'damaging' and what would an English court see as 'damaging'?”

I’ll tell you what IS damaging – to the well-being of our Servicemen and their equipment…… That very senior staff, in fact the most senior, in MoD(PE), DPA, DLO and the MoD in general have, over a period of many years, condoned;

• Mandated airworthiness regulations being willfully ignored

• The willful waste of public funds

I have signed the OSA and am well aware of my responsibilities. However, having pointed the above out to the correct authorities in the correct manner, I have received very polite correspondence from, among others, Ministers of State for the Armed Forces, saying that neither constitutes “wrongdoing”. As has my MP. I’ve even replied making it very clear what they’ve been advised to sign, inviting a change of mind; merely to be told they have “nothing further to add”.

I do not believe my discussing this is ”damaging”. Quite the opposite, it is damaging to both the MoD and the Defence budget, NOT to talk about it. I do not know for sure if what I discuss is widespread, or I just happen to have stumbled across isolated cases (with monotonous regularity over a 20+ year period). I DO know, however, that I have been very publicly instructed to knowingly ignore airworthiness issues and waste of public funds by senior staffs who clearly did not fear censure and were ALWAYS supported by their bosses. My own view is that, if it were isolated, the likes of CDP would have simply said “Thanks for this, but investigation shows it’s a one-off, and won’t happen again”. But they couldn’t, not with the damning evidence of various audits and the Defence Select Committee which is available; not through being obtained or leaked unofficially, but through Hansard, Freedom of Information, the www and their own correspondence to me.

Put it this way. I agree with the Prime Minister that the MoD is wasteful. And with official reports, like the QQ one discussed here, that airworthiness issues are being ignored. My point is – this is not the first time this has been aired. Having been told what they are doing wrong the MoD, despite having a Duty of Care and a responsibility to Parliament for the proper spend of public funds, continues to avoid these obligations. Not only that, they commit resources to protecting those who commit this fraud. Over to you Mr Brown.

Chugalug2

15th Nov 2007, 19:05

Please interpret as you see fit........
What do you believe is 'damaging' and what would an English court see as 'damaging'? Disclosure to those, outside of the MoD, of difficulties with the UK's MPA fleet?
You decide

Are you a lawyer Mike Rotch? I ask because perhaps you may be able to help us. Is it not a citizen's duty to report a crime? If in reporting that crime one commits a further crime under the catch-all OSA, should one still proceed? What is your learned advice? If the law requires that you report the crime to the very organisation responsible for the crime, does that not make the law an ass? Would that not be 'damaging' to the status of the law, and of the politicians that enact such laws? Would such a prosecution under the OSA appear mean and vindictive under the glaring publicity that it would attract, at home and abroad?
You decide.

nigegilb

15th Nov 2007, 19:21

Mike, do you seriously think anyone here wants to damage the Nimrod fleet? More importantly, in the light of your post, would the good men and women of a jury think that?

That was a hell of a first post, I hope you stick around and answer a few questions, rather than put the frighteners out and retire to wherever it is you came from.

There is a belief in here that the MoD is playing safety off against the lives of British servicemen. I have been told by very senior officers that they would love to have more safety equipment on board the Nimrod but there simply is no money to do it with.

Over to you.

nigegilb

15th Nov 2007, 19:58

Whilst we wait for Mike to reply, or the Omega to pull up I would like to relate the following incident. It occurred on climb out from Kabul. A Hercules crew were slowly gaining altitude when a TCAS RA event occurred.
The Herc was over mountainous terrain, the RA was a descend instruction. Just about the worst place to be on a dark night. Turns out, the new arrival plates for Bagram had not been deconflicted with the SID for Kabul. I relate this because I was under the impression that TCAS was mandatory for coalition aircraft. When I was flying over Afg in 2002, there were 2 AWACS aircraft North and South, with not so many aircraft to deconflict. I, myself had a near fatal airmiss because of a lack of TCAS on board. I was intrigued because XV235s MAYDAY call went unanswered. I hear that this is no longer the case (AWACS) and the sky is full of metal.

There have been very many RAs in this airspace. Just wondered if Nimrod had TCAS?

DaveyBoy

15th Nov 2007, 20:18

No, it doesn't. It (usually) has a servicable radar which has a collision-warning mode, and a couple of people looking out of bubble windows (sometimes using NVGs) to help make up for this a little.

Winco

15th Nov 2007, 20:20

Mike,

Thank you for your most informative post, but do you think that none of us know the Official Secrets Act?? I think most of us do.

Perhaps you would do us the honour of introducing yourself and letting us into your background? Are you a CS or military?

Are you quoting the said document to try and scare us off or something? or, as has been said here, a 'legal person' who can offer us some help with this matter?

I look forward to your replies.

Kind regards
The Winco

nigegilb

15th Nov 2007, 20:21

Thanks Dave. I understand there is very little in the way of ATC control/separation available. Are you aware of any other multi-aircraft operating in Afg without the safety of TCAS on board?

I throw that question out to the wider audience.

PS Has anyone acually UOR'd this essential safety equipment for Nimrod?

With reference to your reply Dave, I was saved when my Air Engineer, (On NVGs), spotted the confliction and the Co ( also on NVGs) performed a very aggressive left hand down. Presumably you do not get an instruction to climb or descend with your equipment and you do not know what the conflicting aircraft is going to do?

Brain Potter

15th Nov 2007, 21:05

I don't think that the Harrier (or any of our fast-jets) has TCAS.

The MoD were forced into fitting TCAS to the AT/AAR fleet when Germany specified that the exemption for Military Transport Type Aircraft (MTTA) would cease from 1 Jan 05. After that date MoD owned MTTA would not have been able to fly in German airspace. I suppose that Nimrod was classified as a Reconnaissance aircraft and retained the state exemption.

It is telling that foreign legislation was required before the MoD would find the money to act. They wouldn't even heed the horrific lesson learned by 2 of our closest allies when a GAF Tu-154 collided with a USAF C-141 off West Africa, prompting both those nations to forsake their exemptions.

spanners123

15th Nov 2007, 21:08

Is this not slightly off topic!!:ugh:

nigegilb

15th Nov 2007, 21:11

I hear the Akrotiri eng det is being actively considered when the state exemptions for Mode "S" run out next March. Surely, it makes more sense to fit TCAS to large multi-aircraft? With all the world's air forces operating in Afg airspace and carrier group aircraft on top, it would appear to me to be essential. If the paperwork is not already in, might be worth submitting it. I will try and raise this issue via PQs.

It would be interesting to find out the implications of Nimrod being banned from entering European airspace.

Apologies Spanners, but this issue has been raised with me privately. I will now revert to thread.

spanners123

15th Nov 2007, 21:16

thanks nigegilb:ok:

DaveyBoy

15th Nov 2007, 22:19

Agreed, the TCAS discussion is off-topic, but I hope readers will permit me one last reply to nigegilb to save starting a new thread.

I'm not sure what you've heard, and you won't find people discussing specific details of theatre on an open forum, but the ATC situation is probably not as bad as you thought.

I know nothing of defence procurement but as a layman I would be surprised if we got TCAS on an aircraft that supposedly has only 5(ish) years left.

rudekid

16th Nov 2007, 07:31

Off topic but...

We've had FOUR TCAS RAs in the last week alone in Afghan airspace, one of which caused us some serious alarm and caused me to question my belief in big sky theory! I know of two others within the Telic JOA in the same time frame.

I am somewhat surprised that the Nimrod fleet doesn't have TCAS, a basic safety system which is widely available and previously embodied in other military types, with or without SIFF. I would have to think very carefully whether I would be willing to operate an ac into Telic airspace without TCAS.

Has the Nimrod IPT and command chain been so focussed on making the ac 'relevant' that it's missed some fairly fundamental areas of basic safety?

As an aside...

Theatre comms are notoriously fickle and I'm not in the least surprised that someone didn't hear/respond to the mayday to KAF. Mind you, with all the box switching that occurs, I wouldn't rule out a switch pigs either...

Forgive my intrusion...

Safety_Helmut

16th Nov 2007, 08:18

I know nothing of defence procurement but as a layman I would be surprised if we got TCAS on an aircraft that supposedly has only 5(ish) years left.
I can see your thinking Davey Boy, and this is certainly the way the IPT will think, but the installation of TCAS has to be considered not just from the point of one platform, but from the wider perspective. You cannot make a decision not to fit TCAS, a proven safety system, just by considering the risks to the Nimrod fleet, by definition, it takes two aircraft to have a mid-air.

Rudekid, this was not just an IPT decision, the decision not to fit TCAS/GPWS and other such systems has been made much higher than IPTL level. The installation of these has been recommended in numerous accident and incident reports. Safety has not been the driving factor in the limited installations so far, it has been forced only be the need to use certain parts of the airspace. The MoD spokesmen who constantly trot out the mantra of safety being a priority are nothing much more than l.... !

S_H

tucumseh

16th Nov 2007, 08:42

TCAS, IFF etc

I am glad to see this mentioned on a thread whose focus, as a result of the release under FoI of the QQ report, has shifted slightly to encompass and consider the appalling catalogue of airworthiness failures it reveals. And remember, these are not revelations. EVERY single adverse comment in the report has been notified before. And rejected, so it’ll be interesting to see the MoD reaction. I think this thread is, at last, drawing all this together.

It is important to realise that DE&S (DPA + DLO) does not have thousands of people working on military aviation. It is actually a quite small community, headed by a few. Those few increasingly rely on an important aspect of achieving and maintaining airworthiness, called “retention of Corporate memory”. Experience. Competence. Upkeep of standards. And so on. (All things referred to by QQ as missing, to varying degrees, on Nimrod support). But, just as the report damns the exodus of experience from the RAF, the equivalent experience is being ejected from DE&S. Every loss of an experienced engineer, undermines the airworthiness foundations. And means money has to be diverted to pay premium rates elsewhere.

Few here would disagree that a serviceable and functional (two different things) IFF is vital. Think Tornado/Patriot – the BoI report is available on the MoD site. Consider also that the above staffs have formally ruled that neither necessary. Then, ask if the same people are making similar absolutely barking decisions concerning other safety and airworthiness issues. I simply refer you to the QQ report.

You may recall that earlier this year the MoD in-house rag trumpeted SIFF in these terms – “Latest Puma changes will cut friendly fire risk”. Well done, I say, to the IPTL. But I wonder if he knew that various DGs, CDP and Mins(AF) had specifically ruled to the contrary. Who would you rather have responsible for your safety?

These events/subjects are all linked.

Safety_Helmut

16th Nov 2007, 08:59

Tuc

One of the UK's most rescpected safety professionals once described the MOD as "a hollowed out shell, devoid of competence". He was speaking with regard to safety engineering and safety management. It is a remark that was perhaps unfair on a small minority of people, but as a generalisation, quite reasonable I think.

S_H

nigegilb

16th Nov 2007, 09:28

Rude Kid and I have never always seen eye to eye but I couldn't agree more with his post, esp the following.

Has the Nimrod IPT and command chain been so focussed on making the ac 'relevant' that it's missed some fairly fundamental areas of basic safety?

As has been mentioned, the very fact that Nimrod is allowed to enter Afg airspace without TCAS places other TCAS equipped aircraft at risk. Stationing guys in the bubble reminds me of our methods in Afg. Two GEs in the para doors, their job to call the missile launch and to shout the "break" such was the efficacy of our anti-missile equipment, laughingly called a DAS by Adam Ingram.

Picking up on Brain's post, would I be right in stating that Nimrod is the only multi-ac in the RAF without TCAS?

Mick Smith

16th Nov 2007, 10:22

Mike Rotch

What do you believe is 'damaging' and what would an English court see as 'damaging'? Disclosure to those, outside of the MoD, of difficulties with the UK's MPA fleet?

You decide.

I don't think there is any doubt here what a British court would decide was "damaging" and it doesnt have anything to do with national security. Certainly there are technical breaches of the OSA for any RAF personnel involved and these are open and shut under the law I'm afraid.

But since the video capability is well and truly in the public domain through a series of articles by JDW, both before and since the crash, and the Sunday Times since the crash - and more importantly in legal terms the QinetiQ report, which was released under FOI - a British court's only consideration here would be the safety of RAF aircrew put at risk because a known problem with part of the aircraft wasn't fixed, and in that regard there is a clear public interest in disclosure.

Meanwhile, I asked a series of questions in my previous post and we still don't seem to have had any answers. Let's just concentrate on the first two:

Was the Nimrod repair working group [recommended by the QinetiQ team] ever set up?

A positive answer here could not have any possible security implications, indeed would only serve to dampen some of the anger shown on this thread.

Have the APs in the RAMS been updated to the point where they match up to the procedures in use by the NSG?

Again, a positive answer would have no security implications and could only help moderate the anger on this thread. So why hasn't someone just come up to say: "Yep, both were done,"?

I'm afraid in the absence of any such answers people are entitled to draw the obvious conclusions.

DaveyBoy

16th Nov 2007, 12:04

Safety_Helmut: I'm not saying it's right, I'm just saying that's how I expect the TCAS thing will pan out.

Regarding the 'other TCAS aircraft at risk' comment, we obviously have an IFF with 3/C, so as long as that's working, TCAS-fitted aircraft should see us on surveillance and be able to issue both TA and RAs, with the only caveat that an RA won't have been pre-deconflicted with our own avoiding action.

Again, I'm not saying the status quo is perfect but I don't want people to read this site and think that the situation is worse than it really is.

nigegilb

16th Nov 2007, 12:21

DB, hear what you are saying. The specific example I quoted involved a transporter climbing out over high terrain and a fighter descending on top of. The RA gave a climb for the fighter and a descent for the transporter. That is exactly the sort of time you want both aircraft TCAS equipped.

The other example I quoted, my own experience, involved a head on potential collision at Herc cruise levels. You see you are relying on the other aircraft being able to see you. In my case, neither Herc had TCAS and to this day I don't know how we missed.

One thing is for sure, if this equipment has not been requested, there is no way on earth you will get it on board.

Winco

16th Nov 2007, 14:05

Looks like Mike Roach has gone the same place as AC Ovee has, as well as quite a few others it appears!

JessTheDog

16th Nov 2007, 14:41

Please interpret as you see fit........

OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, 1989

SECTION 5
Information resulting from unauthorised disclosures or entrusted in confidence

(1) Subsection (2) below applies where—
(a) any information, document or other article protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act has come into a person’s possession as a result of having been—
(i) disclosed (whether to him or another) by a Crown servant or government contractor without lawful authority; or
(ii) entrusted to him by a Crown servant or government contractor on terms requiring it to be held in confidence or in circumstances in which the Crown servant or government contractor could reasonably expect that it would be so held; or
(iii) disclosed (whether to him or another) without lawful authority by a person to whom it was entrusted as mentioned in sub-paragraph (ii) above; and
(b) the disclosure without lawful authority of the information, document or article by the person into whose possession it has come is not an offence under any of those provisions.

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below, the person into whose possession the information, document or article has come is guilty of an offence if he discloses it without lawful authority knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it is protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act and that it has come into his possession as mentioned in subsection (1) above.

(3) In the case of information or a document or article protected against disclosure by sections 1 to 3 above, a person does not commit an offence under subsection (2) above unless—
(a) the disclosure by him is damaging; and
(b) he makes it knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it would be damaging;
and the question whether a disclosure is damaging shall be determined for the purposes of this subsection as it would be in relation to a disclosure of that information, document or article by a Crown servant in contravention of section 1(3), 2(1) or 3(1) above.

(4) A person does not commit an offence under subsection (2) above in respect of information or a document or other article which has come into his possession as a result of having been disclosed—
(a) as mentioned in subsection (1)(a)(i) above by a government contractor; or
(b) as mentioned in subsection (1)(a)(iii) above,
unless that disclosure was by a British citizen or took place in the United Kingdom, in any of the Channel Islands or in the Isle of Man or a colony.

(5) For the purposes of this section information or a document or article is protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act if—
(a) it relates to security or intelligence, defence or international relations within the meaning of section 1, 2 or 3 above or is such as is mentioned in section 3(1)(b) above; or
(b) it is information or a document or article to which section 4 above applies;
and information or a document or article is protected against disclosure by sections 1 to 3 above if it falls within paragraph (a) above.
(6) A person is guilty of an offence if without lawful authority he discloses any information, document or other article which he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, to have come into his possession as a result of a contravention of section 1 of the [1911 c. 28.] Official Secrets Act 1911.

What do you believe is 'damaging' and what would an English court see as 'damaging'? Disclosure to those, outside of the MoD, of difficulties with the UK's MPA fleet?

You decide.

The former GCHQ analyst Katharine Gun escaped prosecution under the OSA in 2004, possibly because the MoD didn't want to create a precedent with regard to the defence of "necessity". If concerns about aircraft safety were leaked to the press precisely because they were ignored or over-ruled internally, then this would seem to fit the decision of "necessity".

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3485072.stm

GCHQ translator cleared over leak

A GCHQ translator sacked for revealing a secret e-mail has been cleared of a charge under the Official Secrets Act.

Katharine Gun, 29, from Cheltenham, claimed the e-mail was from US spies asking British officers to tap phones of nations voting on war against Iraq.

She walked free on Wednesday when the prosecution offered no evidence.

Ms Gun had always said she had acted in an effort to prevent the war, and outside court said: "I have no regrets and I would do it again."

The leaking of the e-mail to the Observer newspaper generated a row and saw Ms Gun's case become a cause celebre in the US, with civil rights activist Jesse Jackson and actor Sean Penn lending their support.

Human rights group Liberty, which supported Ms Gun throughout her trial, said it was possible the prosecution's decision followed political intervention.

There has been speculation the government was worried about the disclosure of secret documents during the trial, particularly the advice by Attorney General Lord Goldsmith about the legality of war.

Under the Official Secrets Act, the attorney general has the final decision on whether or not to prosecute.

This needed to get out, the public deserved to know what was going on at the time

But the attorney general's office told the BBC the decision to drop the charge had nothing to do with Lord Goldsmith's advice.

Ms Gun's legal team served documents on the government on Tuesday demanding to see any advice given to ministers about the legality of the war.

But BBC political correspondent Guto Harri said a government spokesperson insisted the decision to drop the case was taken before the demand for documents was made.

The same spokesperson suggested the case might have been dropped as Ms Gun planned to argue she leaked the e-mail to save lives from being lost in a war, something that could persuade a jury and would lead to the reputation of the Official Secrets Act being damaged.

Our correspondent said this suggested the government had made a political calculation that a random selection of a dozen jurors would be likely to be so instinctively anti-war than an acquittal would be likely.

Ms Gun, who was sacked from GCHQ in June and charged on 13 November, thanked her family and friends for helping her through the case.

She told a news conference: "Obviously I'm not prone to leak secrets left, right and centre... but this needed to get out, the public deserved to know what was going on at the time.

"I was pretty horrified and I felt that the British intelligence services were being asked to do something that would undermine the whole UN democratic processes."

Ms Gun revealed she was strongly anti-war but said she had not been looking for a piece of information to leak and embarrass the government.

"I'm just baffled in the 21st century we as human beings are still dropping bombs on each other as a means to resolve issues."

The memo, from January last year, reportedly said the National Security Agency had begun a "surge" in eavesdropping on UN Security Council countries crucial to the vote on a second resolution for action in Iraq.

Officials from Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria, Guinea and Pakistan all had their phones tapped in what the Observer described as a "dirty tricks" operation.

BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner said managers within the intelligence service might now be thinking about talking to members of staff about their concerns to prevent future whistle-blowing.

Shami Chakrabarti, of Liberty, said the decision to charge Mrs Gun in the first place had been political.

"One wonders whether disclosure in this criminal trial might have been a little too embarrassing," she said.

The Liberal Democrats' foreign affairs spokesman Sir Menzies Campbell said: "It is possible the attorney general's legal advice might have been published at last. This is a government retreat.''

Ms Gun pleaded not guilty on Wednesday, after which the prosecution announced it would not be going ahead with its case.

Mark Ellison, for the prosecution, said: "There is no longer sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction.

"It would not be appropriate to go into the reasons for this decision."

The judge, the Recorder of London Michael Hyam, recorded a formal verdict of not guilty.

The defence inquired why it took until Wednesday for the case to be dropped, but the prosecution offered no explanation.

They also want to know why news of the charges being dropped was apparently leaked to the Guardian newspaper last week.

All that is needed for a successful prosecution under the Official Secrets Act is for the prosecution to demonstrate the accused is covered by it, which Ms Gun was, and they have revealed information covered by it, which she also admitted.

Her solicitor James Welch described the prosecution's excuse as "rather lame".

Former spy David Shayler, jailed for revealing secrets, said a blanket of secrecy was used to protect intelligence matters that did not affect national security.

"If the intelligence services are going to do things that are illegal they have to expect people to whistle-blow."

Distant Voice

16th Nov 2007, 17:39

Have you guys seen the Northern Scot front page?

DV

Skeleton

16th Nov 2007, 17:44

As i live in London, funny old thing I have not - do tell.

Sgt.Slabber

16th Nov 2007, 17:54

http://www.northern-scot.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/3350/Frightened_to_go_back_up_in_Nimrods.html

Vage Rot

16th Nov 2007, 18:43

Have you guys seen the Northern Scot front page?

DV

Utter B:mad:ks!

Wasn't going to post again but guys, really!! If any aircrew had refused to fly then this would be THE topic of conversation here at ISK! It's not!

Flew twice this last 3 days in the old girl - nobody bats an eyelid. More media sh:mad:ite I'm afraid. :ugh:

Believe me, I and several others would like to say a lot, lot more. People have not disappeared from the thread for any other reason than there is nothing new - so, until there is why doesn't everyone stop speculating and help us all to do our jobs without wives/friends/families asking us all the time about the integrity of the aircraft.:=

Distant Voice

16th Nov 2007, 20:11

Vage Rot: My statement was not speculation. I simply made reference to an article in a local paper.

Clearly someone called the Northern Scot with the story, and from what I know about the paper they are unlikely to run with small talk.

For all I know, you could be the Stn Cmdr, trying to play things down.

DV

Mr Point

16th Nov 2007, 20:33

For all I know, you could be the Stn Cmdr, trying to play things down.

Sorry Vage but I nearly choked laughing at that one! :}

There are quite a few people with concerns about the aircraft. Vage is playing things down a touch, and others are hamming it up. Somewhere in the middle is the real feeling at ISK (in my opinion).

Vage Rot

16th Nov 2007, 20:55

Sorry Vage but I nearly choked laughing at that one!

Thanks mate!! :rolleyes:I could have been if I'd wanted to you know!! Prob earn more as PAS anyway!!:)

DaveyBoy

17th Nov 2007, 03:06

He's not the Stn Cdr. I was keeping a close eye on the Stn Cdr tonight to make sure he didn't sneak off in the middle of a dining-in night to post under the pseudonym of Vage Rot, and I can exclusively reveal that he didn't.

However, I've never seen AOC 2Gp in the flesh while Vage Rot has been posting messages :)

Winco

17th Nov 2007, 04:56

Vage,
Are you seriously telling us that the author of this report has got it completely wrong, and that NO aircrew at ISK are scared to fly the jet?

I know that to be wrong, as I have a lot of friends still on the fleet, still flying and the vast majority of them telling me that they are 'scared' to a greater or lesser degree.

These are experienced aviators who all have several thousand flying hours under their belts, and so have seen quite a lot and have a lot of experience, but they are still worried.

The jet may be safe under normal everyday CT conditions, however, if there is an AAR slot within the flight, then worries and concerns are very much a reality. None of them have ever refused to fly, and I suspect that personal pride will not allow it in most of them, but that does not negate their concerns and genuine worries about the aircraft.

'why doesn't everyone stop speculating and help us all to do our jobs without wives/friends/families asking us all the time about the integrity of the aircraft'

.......sadly, there was nothing speculative about XV230 or indeed XV235 more recently, and whatever you say, those tragic facts remain, and still haunt many of us. To suggest that current Nimrod aircraft don't feel the same I would suggest is naaive to say the least.

As for AOC 2Gp, I think he has joined AC Ovee (could have been the same guy maybe?) and all the others who would appear to be being proved wrong in their claims and statements.

Wrathmonk

17th Nov 2007, 07:09

Winco

sadly, there was nothing speculative about XV230 or indeed XV235 more recently

This would suggest you would know exactly the true causes of, firstly, a tragic accident and secondly a well-handled in flight emergency.

Care to let the rest of us know so we can put this thread to bed, or at least be able to focus on the exact causes rather than blame everyone and anything?

And as everyone seems to be trying to identify users you wouldn't also be walter kennedy from the Chinook thread would you ;)

Biggus

17th Nov 2007, 07:24

Wrathmonk

I don't think Wincos comments suggest he knows the true causes of the two incidents.

The way it reads to me, and I'm sure to most people with a neutral viewpoint, is that in the midst of all this speculation, conjecture, etc, two facts nobody can dispute is that XV230 (and tragically 14 people) is no longer here and XV235 suffered a fuel leak during AAR........

Winco

17th Nov 2007, 07:27

Wrathmonk

I wish I understood what you mean??

I do NOT know what happened on 230 other than what I have read on here and heard first hand from some Nimrod colleagues who were in theatre at the time. Likewise, I have read the IR on 235, so what more can I say?

I was merely stating that the loss of 230 was NOT speculative, as was the incident with 235. They really did happen. I suspect the same goes for the other incidents regarding Nimrod fuel leaks and AAR, or perhaps you do not agree?

If so, then I bow to your more recent experience of NimOps, but do tell us.

Where on earth you get the idea that I know what EXACTLY and TRUELY caused the loss of 230 and the other incidents is beyone me I'm afraid. Maybe it's a bit early in the morning?

Oh, and by the way, I have no idea who Walter Kennedy is either.

Distant Voice

17th Nov 2007, 07:51

Sadly, there was nothing speculative about XV230. or indeed XV235 more recently

To that I would add XV227, which seemed to provide a source of ignition at a time when there was no AAR. (Although it almost took out No. 7 tank std). Of course after the XV230 accident, the source (SPC) and No. 7 tank were taken out of the equation.

DV

Vage Rot

17th Nov 2007, 08:09

The jet may be safe under normal everyday CT conditions,
At last!!! Someone sees the point!!!:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:
however, if there is an AAR slot within the flight, then worries and concerns are very much a reality
And (starting a sentence with a conjunction, I know!) we do that all the time!!!:rolleyes: (Sarcasm - just in case anyone has completely lost their sense of humour!)
So, seing as we don't, lets stop speculating and wait for the BOI.

zedder

17th Nov 2007, 13:12

I do NOT know what happened on 230 other than what I have read on here and heard first hand from some Nimrod colleagues who were in theatre at the time.

First off Winco were those colleagues "in theatre at the time" in B or S. If S, then give the initials of at least 1 of them and then I will be able to tell whether you are a total bull:mad:er or not.

I'm with VR at the moment, in that I'm not seeing any great fear of flying the jet. With regard AAR then it is definitely true to say that a lot of people would have an issue with doing that. The Stn Cdr has canvassed the views of some of guys on the Sqns about this, so nobody would be able to claim that he is adopting the 'Ivory Tower' approach. Unfortunately, he and a select few have an advantage over the rest of us in that they have had sight of the BOI. At present I am waiting to see this for myself so that I can make my own fully informed decisions without being influenced by the latest sensationalist headlines in the local rag.

However, at the end of the day flying is, and always will be, a risky occupation. Hopefully most people realised that when they signed on the dotted line. Yes I would hope that the risk is reduced to as low as humanly possible, but inevitably there is only so much money to go round, so it may be that we have to accept that things we would like done to the jet can't be afforded. Do we all drive around in the safest car there is, or do some of us decide we can't afford it and thus take some risk?

There have been a few individuals that have declared themselves unwilling to fly in the aftermath of 230. They have been removed from the frontline, and to my mind they should also be removed from the Service. Just imagine frontline troops being unwilling to go on Patrol because they might get shot at. I thought that the latest incident might be the final straw for a couple of others, but I have heard no evidence of this. Personally I feel that if they are going to be flying without being totally focussed on the job, because they are 'worried', then I would prefer they weren't there; effectively that means that once the BOI is published it's put up or shut up time.

Despite all the above though I do think that the Nimrod fleet is in a place it shouldn't be at present. AAR was rushed in as a UOR, but I can see no evidence that anyone ever thought to go back and have a good look at things afterwards. If they had, I would have hoped that the 'issues' with AAR that have come to light since 230 would have come to light a lot sooner. Whether that would have changed the outcome for 230 I do not know, but I have my own strong suspicion.

As for STFs on frontline ac conducting Ops, don't get me started!

DaveyBoy

17th Nov 2007, 13:23

Well said, zedder, as always. Hear, hear. :D

Magnersdrinker

17th Nov 2007, 13:35

Well if it matters any , the report in the Northern Scot was from a pilot recently tied to a desk job.
Not so long ago we had a pilot out in the sandy regions that refused to fly cause he did not belive in the erm war, anyway last we heard he got quietly removed and have not heard any more.

Could this anon report have been leaked from the guy who does not believe in the war and just uses the Nimrods high profile publicity at the moment to make it all better for him refusing to do his job !!

Maybe somebody else will shed some light !! Or maybe im looking too deep :E

and Zedder nice words, spot on indeed :D

spanners123

17th Nov 2007, 13:45

good point Magnersdrinker! Does anyone know the pilot involved?

Magnersdrinker

17th Nov 2007, 13:58

Enginesuck says "As current nimrod groundcrew I think it might be unwise to post anything technical on here as many of us have done previously because this is now very high profile and it doesnt take colombo to work out who we are. Not entirely clear on what we are allowed to say anyway. Not that I have anything major to say :ok:"

Well said m8, i think this thread now has become the talk of the squadron all the way up the chain. The majority of our lot have seen how certain info has been jiggled around and warped to make things look bad and has no reflection on the way things are, it would just make matters worse by giving any info/details only for it to be used to slander our superb fleet in next weeks Sun newspaper. We probably will talk about other things like manpower,cuts,lean and all that :rolleyes: . Saying that we are too busy lately doing what we do best and thats keeping the worlds premier survelliance platform airborne to the best we can.

Im making an exception as its Saturday and the football game is on very shortly , some more Magners then off to pub on a non working weekend :)

Winco

17th Nov 2007, 14:40

zedder,

Thank you for your most informnative post, however, if you think for a second that I would put friends' initials on here, then you are really stupid. What do you take me for a fool? It wouldn't take a great deal to narrow them down would it? and then what? Up in front of the 'old man at the least I would suspect, maybe even worse.

But I simply ask you this....why would I bull$hit you? What do I have to gain by this?

All I am stating are facts that have been expressed to me by fellow aviators who I have kept in touch with since I left the fleet - and I can assure you that some of them are quite 'senior aviators' so not sprogs or inexperienced guys.

I would just reiterate what I said about the jet being safe for a CT, but when AAR ops are introduced it 'causes a problem' for some of the aircrew. I say that because you effectively agreed with me when you wrote...

'I'm not seeing any great fear of flying the jet. With regard AAR then it is definitely true to say that a lot of people would have an issue with doing that'

A lot of people have an issue with it?
So what is your point?
Are a lot of aircrew afraid of AAR ops as you say?
Does the Stn Cdr really appreciate that?
Whats is he doing about it?
Does AOC 2Gp know?
Is it affecting crew compositions for ops?
Has the BoI honestly concluded?

Military flying is a risky business, of course it is and I would entirely agree with you, and as you say, the aircraft should be as safe as humanly possible - unfortunately it isn't though, is it?

And as for your car... would you take your wife and kids out in it if you had had the brakes fail on you the day before, or would you find out what went wrong first? I rest my case.

You chaps must learn to appreciate that most of us on here are NOT against you or the groundcrew or anyone in any way at all, really. We all have a vested interest because most of us lost friends in 230, and we don't want it to happen again - ever, irrespective of what is costs to fix.

The AAR system was fitted, as you say a long time ago. I know, I did several of the initial flight trials when we got the first jet back from Woodford. JR, MC and a few others of us were all involved (mainly due to our V force background) and it was very much a 'Heath Robinson' affair. But it worked well, and did the job. If you suggesting that the whole cobbled together system has not been looked at in detail since, then that is pretty worrying, especially given the short notice in which it was initially fitted.

Regards
The Winco

nigegilb

17th Nov 2007, 15:10

A point on the AAR system. Tri Star has a double skin system, Nimrod MR2 does not. MRA4 does not. I appreciate that part of the pipework on Nimrod is double-skinned but would someone mind confirming whether the AAR pipework in the bomb bay is double skinned or single skinned?
I am fairly sure it is single skinned there.

Design point. If the RAF does not want to pay for a bomb bay fire protection system why not at least insist on safer pipework? The holes in the welding work found in the days after the crash are troubling. I understand that a similar welding technique is being used on MRA4.

Cheers,
NG

Safety_Helmut

17th Nov 2007, 16:56

Hello All

There has been some discussion on here about the adequacy of the MoD safety and airworthiness regulatory regime. I have my own opinions having worked within it, and these are clear from my previous posts. However, I am aware that a report was written 2 or 3 years ago which looked at setting up a MAA, Military Airworthiness/Aviation Authority. I know who wrote the report, but I don't want to put his name on here. He had worked within AD Eng Pol at Wyton so was well aware of some of the issues. I cant remember who he wrote the report for, was it DASC, the DESB/DASB ? I'm not sure. Is anyone aware of the report ? People I know were astonished that it recommended against forming a MAA. I am wondering if the findings of the report actually supported the conclusions, or whether the conclusions were predetermined by the desire to remain the status quo for various departments and people. The head of ADRP at the time would certainly have resisted it, but then I am not sure he would have been able to spell the word change.

S_H

The Swinging Monkey

17th Nov 2007, 17:33

zedder,

Grow up man! What are you asking someone to name names for you idiot?

We could probably all name someone on PPrune, but we don't. To ask someone to do so, just to satisfy your doubts is bl00dy stupid.

What effect do you think it would have the those named??

Please, don't anyone on here name anyone at all - ever.

Thank you

Chugalug2

17th Nov 2007, 18:57

Safety Helmut, I am intrigued to hear that the need for an MAA was studied a couple of years ago. Though I have called for that on this and other threads I had no idea that a formal study had already been done. Having said that it hardly surprises me that an in house report recommended that military airworthiness should remain within the MOD. A contrary finding would have rivalled "Turkeys vote for Christmas" as a shock horror announcement. Obviously the inmates want to go on running the asylum lest their gross negligence (familiar phrase?) be laid bare to the world. This can only be achieved by political will, the imposition of external pressure and the testimony of those whose professional and moral standards have been set upon by the monstrous MOD machine. Only a completely independent inquiry can suffice in such a process, anything less would be fit only for a Yes Minister script.

Mr Point

17th Nov 2007, 21:19

Zedder: Just imagine frontline troops being unwilling to go on Patrol because they might get shot at.

I agree entirely with that statement. However, if under certain conditions a known faulty batch of rounds had previously blown up in the face of the troops, you would have an entirely different argument.

Magnersdrinker

17th Nov 2007, 22:33

I now seen a bitching few posts directed at a few guys that fly the jets we are on about , Id just like to say lay off these lads , they are the ones that choose no matter what to fly , they take that risk with information from the people that know what they are on about. Ive had 17 years as an engineer on these jets and i with my hand on my heart have no isssues with the a/c, other things yes , but thats a diffrent matter. You all sit there and question that you know it all , if you a part of the kipper fleet then yes you have a right to say things that are of concern ,but 90% on this thread dont they speculate and think they know it all. nimrod has problems like all A/c in the inventory, its not down to being a bad aircraft its about spending cash , if you want it to work then spend enough and it will , we all know its not the case.

Gaiscioch

17th Nov 2007, 22:56

For Zedder......... Read Wa*ker...

Lytham Lifeboat

18th Nov 2007, 11:25

A tad confrontational don't you think?

It would appear, like myself, that you are a relative newcomer to this discussion......... It would also appear that you have little or nothing to add to the debate.......

Jobza Guddun

18th Nov 2007, 12:27

Magners,

Point well presented matey. As a non Kipper blokem it makes sense to me, :ok:

Jobza

Distant Voice

18th Nov 2007, 18:24

Magnersdrinker's quote:

The majority of our lot have seen how certain info has been jiggled around and made things look bad and have no reflection on the way things are .......

Can you tell me which statements/recommendations from the QinetiQ report, the BAe safety report and the XV227 UI report have been "jiggled" around and posted as speculations on this thread?

DV

enginesuck

18th Nov 2007, 18:34

Sorry DV but stop wheeling out this BAE safety report and the like without knowing the whole picture, its getting monotonous now. Be patient and wait for the BOI, in the meantime some of us have a job to do.:ugh:

tucumseh

18th Nov 2007, 18:53

The “BAE safety report” is an authoritative document, commissioned by the IPT. They contract the Aircraft Design Authority to be aware of the complete picture, and distill it down to key issues – in this case safety hazards and risks – so that they (the IPT, in consultation with stakeholders) can make informed decisions.

The aim (presumably) is to take a proactive approach to risk management, rather than reactive. Put another way; try to prevent accidents, rather than waiting for one and the subsequent BoI report, before taking action. I sincerely hope the BoI report doesn’t recommend actions which have been already recommended in the BAeS and QQ reports mentioned here, but were not implemented.

I think the point that has been made here and in other threads, on numerous occasions, is that BoI reports often present recommendations as their own exclusive ideas, conveniently omitting that they have been made many times before.

Distant Voice

18th Nov 2007, 18:54

enginesuck: Have you read them?

DV

Safeware

18th Nov 2007, 20:10

enginesuck,stop wheeling out this BAE safety report and the like without knowing the whole picture

It may not be the whole picture, but it is the root that TD, DV etc need to start with. As covered earlier, the BAES safety report is the the prime input to the IPT safety case, which in turn is the prime input to the RTSA safety case. And in the RTS, all the limitations there for the purposes of safety must have an audit trail back to source - primarily the above safety case reports.....

.... or if the next level up decides to do something different, it would need to be justifiied in the safety case at that stage.

sw

zedder

18th Nov 2007, 20:15

Gaiscioch,
Did you type the s and second i by mistake when you signed up? No? Fits though doesn't it!

As far as asking Winco for the initials of someone in theatre at the time, I said give me the initials not post the initials. That's what PMs are for!
The point I was trying to make is that judging by the number of people who have chatted to a mate who was "in theatre at the time", then half the frontline crews must have been there. At least Winco claims to have been passed information first hand. I suspect a lot of what is posted on here is 2nd or 3rd hand etc. That means plenty of opportunity for what was actually said to be 'spun' or misconstrued into something that was not actually said/meant.

For example Winco replied that

And as for your car... would you take your wife and kids out in it if you had had the brakes fail on you the day before, or would you find out what went wrong first? I rest my case.

What I was getting at is do we all drive cars with the best NCAP ratings available, or do we have to compromise because of the potentially high cost of getting the utopian solution.

Mr Point

18th Nov 2007, 21:04

What I was getting at is do we all drive cars with the best NCAP ratings available, or do we have to compromise because of the potentially high cost of getting the Utopian solution.

You are absolutely right that compromise is a necessary part of any procurement. From a Health & Safety perspective though, the term "reasonably practicable" means balancing risk against cost. The greater the risk, the more reasonable it becomes to go to substantial expense, trouble and invention to reduce it.

If the Metropolitan Police can be challenged in court by the HSE, shouldn't the MOD be concerned?

r supwoods

18th Nov 2007, 21:13

Safeware

18th Nov 2007, 21:33

In all the discusion about an MAA (and it may have been covered in the papers alluded to), one of the problems I see needing to be dealt with is the operational aspect. Even as it stands, as things progress towards the RTSA safety case, if something isn't "liked" for operational reasons, justification (however sketchy one may feel) can be made for doing what is "operationally necessary". What would having an an MAA add in this sense? If ACAS wants to sign off an RTS that says "Go do x, regardless of the risk, because the consequences of not doing are ...", I can't see an MAA getting in his way.

What I think is needed is better regulation within the framework that exists, and that includes a better understanding of what it all means by those responsible and honesty in presenting info / taking decisions, such that the crock of Sh!t doesn't become policy.

sw

The Swinging Monkey

19th Nov 2007, 07:20

zedder,

Even if Winco sent you the initials via a PM do you think thats right?

I mean, who are you anyway?
How do we know you are NOT SIB?, RAFP, Stn Cdr, AOC 2Gp, or maybe even CAS himself?
You really must get a grip mate, it was just a stupid thing to say.

And your comment about the cars and NCAP may well be true, but you didn't answer the question I see, which was.....

would you take your wife and kids out in it if you had had the brakes fail on you the day before, or would you find out what went wrong first?

Well....would you?

When you buy a car, you make the decision. Unfortunately as far as Nimrod safety is concerned.....you have NO say in the matter.

Magnersdrinker

With your vast experience and knowledge, perhaps you would enlighten us as to exactly what has been 'jiggled' on this thread please? thank you.

TSM

tucumseh

19th Nov 2007, 07:26

I think the main problem with this initiative is a common one across MoD. The current system is perceived not to work, but nobody stops to ask why a system which worked perfectly well for donkeys years no longer does.

In this case, it’s the same old story. Political dogma demands “efficiencies”. The simple method is cutting funding on the basis that we’ve cut the number of aircraft by x%, so support can be cut by x%. But many of the important things in 05-130 (and the perfectly good Def Stans which already exist) ARE NOT VOLUME RELATED. They cost the same whether you have one a/c or one thousand.

The perfect example is in paragraph 1. The MoD has a “requirement for the establishment and maintenance of airworthiness”. Correct. But a requirement doesn’t become policy unless funded – which is THE basic rule of financial and requirement scrutiny, and it’s completely lost on most in the MoD. This is why the MoD’s “We have a robust regulatory framework” claim is hollow. Yes, good framework, but it merely articulates a requirement. No foundations and no funding, and it falls around you. This is why so many initiatives or programmes progress, apparently successfully, for years, only to flounder at the last minute because the scrutineer says “Yes, good idea, but there’s no money so forget it”. In this case, some very well intentioned people are working on this thinking; it’s a requirement so let’s crack on. But has the sponsor confirmed his funding source?

Chugalug2

19th Nov 2007, 09:36

As ever tuc you hit the nail on the head. The MOD airworthiness "framework" is neither robust nor regulatory. It is a sham, as false as a stage magician's act. As has been said, it is nothing more than a hollow shell, which makes it more dangerous than if it did not exist. It conjures up false hope, like an Orwellian Ministry of Truth. That is the antitheses of Airworthiness and to professional aviators anathema, surely. An external MAA would not be a panacea, civil aircraft accidents and incidents happen despite the CAA's best endeavours. But its business would be what it says on the tin. Divergence away from its standards and regulations would be flagged up, rather as an accountants audit would damn a dodgy company. The easy option of saving defence money 'squandered' otherwise on safe and reliable aircraft would become painful and public. The secrecy surrounding so much of what the MOD does and doesn't do does not protect our armed forces it protects the men in power, uniformed and suited. Time they were outed and shown for the con merchants that they are.

Magnersdrinker

19th Nov 2007, 10:45

Magnersdrinker

With your vast experience and knowledge, perhaps you would enlighten us as to exactly what has been 'jiggled' on this thread please? thank you.

TSM

SM

I am just commenting in general over the newspapers certain info thats been published that aint really true. If i was to trawl through this thread I could find many a snippet here and there thats been published by the press which has in my opinion been blown out of all proportion. As users of the aircraft it is just frustrating to not being able to defend our aircraft and speak openly about it. I should really say no more now,please dont take that the wrong way I have maybe outstepped my mark by making a few comments already.

apoligies

MD

Winco

19th Nov 2007, 11:53

Magners,

Thank you for your reply, but I have yet to see a single post on this thread that makes any reference to the aircrew or grooundcrew in a bad light, certainly not 'bitching few posts directed at a few guys that fly the jets' as you claim. On the contrary, there has been nothing but praise for both aircrew and groundcrew alike.

I appreciate your frankness about newspaper articles and their sensationalist reporting, however, the sad fact is that they appear to have a large degree of truth in them (although I'm sure it isn't 100% factual)

But that is certainly no reason for you not to defend 'your' aircraft. I applaud you and your colleagues for standing up for the old girl. The Nimrod has been an outstanding aircraft in many respects, and I can understand your anger at hearing people (including myself) who are now apparantly giving it a hard time. But we are not really.

You must understand that many of us have flown Nimrods (myself from the early 70's up 'till the late 80's) and the vast majority of us frankly never had any problems, let alone the problems the fleet are experiencing now.

I agree with you that the bottom line is money - end of story really. Continuing defence cuts have caused enormous problems and pressures for the groundcrew to maintain the aircraft, as far as spares etc are concerned, not to mention the manpower problems. To a lesser extent, the same goes for the aircrew.

My argument, and that of most subscribers to this thread, is that the current hierachal regime cannot continue with this policy unless they are prepared to accept the very real possibility of losing another aircraft. And that should not and MUST NOT be allowed to happen.

CAS, ACAS, AOC and Stn Cdr ISK all have a responsibility and duty of care to Nimrod crews. It is high time they exercised that by grounding the fleet, in total, until the AAR and Fuel leak problems are fixed once and for all, and the aircraft is made as safe as possible once again.

Regards
The Winco

Tappers Dad

19th Nov 2007, 12:27

I have refrained from writing on here recently however I must comment on this ."I know something you don't know or I know because I was there" conversation.

Do you not think I spoke to guys in 120 sqd when they arrived back in Nov 2006, some came to Ben's funeral. I am sure all the other families have spoken to people who were out there at the time as well.

We were all told by the RAF at the time what they knew happened, as to why it happened we wait and wait for the BOI. However if you have fuel leaks on an ac and a fire breaks out, then those fuel leaks add to the original problem.

The question is could it have been prevented ?

Skeleton

19th Nov 2007, 12:45

Well said Tappers. Another thread ruined by the "I know something you don't" brigade.

Kids - Playground comes to mind.

Magnersdrinker

19th Nov 2007, 12:49

Winco

Thanks for the reply and I dont want to extend this thread further on my reasons for my words. It is very wrong of me to start being just as bitchy back in a few of my replies. I apoligise.
Ill back of this thread for a bit as im getting involved where I should not really be and is silly of me to make comments, I should learn to lay off the beer and stop going on the PC late at night !!!
So much has been said as of recent which kind of gets you annoyed, so many doubters of the Nimrod but I for one am the opposite, ill stand in her corner for this one. There is so much we could all tell and defend the case but as a blue suiter it would be wrong of me to do so.That is a very frustrating position to be in too.hopefully the BOI will release soon and all answers will be sought.

Regards

MD

Chugalug2

19th Nov 2007, 14:04

... if something isn't "liked" for operational reasons, justification (however sketchy one may feel) can be made for doing what is "operationally necessary". What would having an an MAA add in this sense? If ACAS wants to sign off an RTS that says "Go do x, regardless of the risk, because the consequences of not doing are ...", I can't see an MAA getting in his way

Safeware, agreed, absolutely. Military aviation is not civil aviation. Its aircraft and crews may be expected to be put into harms way if and when the situation warrants. Commander's discretion, that's what he is paid for. That is not the point of an MAA. The aircraft in question should be airworthy, ie fit for purpose. That process begins way back in time and space. If on the day it is deficient in serviceability, role fit, munitions, whatever, and the command is 'go, there is a war on and the mission must be flown, many lives depend on it', that is a military decision. At least the hazardous nature of such a mission would not be made more so because of long term deficiencies in the airworthiness of the aircraft itself.

John Blakeley

19th Nov 2007, 15:02

Chug,

I totally support your last post. Sure the military of whatever service can expect to get into harms way, but there is all the difference in the world between being killed in action fully trained, competently led and with all the right kit, and being killed because somebody does not buy body armour or ESF or keep your aircraft airworthy because they are trying to save money. As TD said on TV the other day, if his son had been killed by a Taliban missile he would still be grieving but he would accept that this was a price his son was also prepared to pay in his chosen career. To be killed when your aircraft has not been kept fully fit for purpose because your "masters" have decided not to fit the right equipment or maintain an airworthy aircraft is quite different. When it is money and not technology that is lacking there is even less of an excuse.

I do not see anything remotely operational about losing an aircraft and crew because of self-imposed airworthiness or equipment deficiencies - and the RAF has not adopted the Kamikaze role yet! Even though it is the RAF's fault that they have got themselves into this hole I am not saying ground the Nimrod fleet as some people are - I am saying start spending the money needed to implement the recommendations that have already been made and do it fast, and change procedures as needed (which at least seems to have saved the aircraft in the last incident) - thanks to the pressure from the media, and even PPRuNe, this seems to have worked for ESF on the C130. It would appear, if the NAO report is correct that the RAF will be operating MR2s until at least 2012 (R Mk1 until ?), and I wouldn't put money against them being around a lot longer (especialy if the same equipment deficiencies on the MRA4 need fixing) so please don't say the expense is not justified.
JB

Headstone

19th Nov 2007, 16:22

Magnersdrinker. This was addressed to you a few responses earlier:-

Magnersdrinker

With your vast experience and knowledge, perhaps you would enlighten us as to exactly what has been 'jiggled' on this thread please? thank you.

TSM

Strangely enough on 31st Oct TSM himself wrote with great authority about a particular BOI findings:-
one of the points that came out of that BoI was a weight restriction to be placed on the back end crew as a result of a seat detaching from the floor on impact.

The cost to the RAF of implementing that was £00.00 NOT a single penny! It was a case of simply stopping those aircrew (and there were quite a few I admit) that were over a certain weight from flying in the aircraft.

All I can say is Wrong - Wrong - Wrong. No such reccomendation was made by the BOI.

It may only be a small point but it was an attempt to say that the RAF/MoD did not carry out the findings of that BOI which was factually incorrect. But it goes to show that there are indeed incorrect posts on this site and maybe all the journos gathering data at this moment ought to be careful where they select their "Facts".

nigegilb

19th Nov 2007, 17:06

I think the RAF and MoD has got itself into a hole over Nimrod. There are clear airworthiness issues of concern over MR2. There are concerns that MRA4 does not have combat survivability at its core design. Adding on survivability and protective devices to MRA4 now will delay ISD and prolong aircrew exposure to MR2 an aircraft with seemingly insoluble leaks. Ground MR2 and the troops on the ground are blind.

Oh dear, how did we ever get to this situation?

It is not acceptable, in my view at least, to continue to fly MR2 until 2012 without additional protection. There is an awful lot riding on the BoI report.

Distant Voice

19th Nov 2007, 17:15

And how long do we intend to fly the Nimrod "R" ?

DV

tucumseh

19th Nov 2007, 17:59

Section 12 of this Def Stan sets out very comprehensively the experience, knowledge and professional qualifications required of personnel employed under this Maintenance Approved Organisation Scheme. Quite rightly so, and any engineer reading this, from apprentice upwards, will understand this. After all, Kinloss, you don’t just grab the nearest administrator when you want an aircraft signed off, do you?

It may or may not come as a surprise to you that similar requirements are not enforced in, for example, DE&S (or PE, AMSO, AML, DLO, DPA before it) when implementing their airworthiness and type approval obligations. There are some highly respected aviators here who know me very well from one particular major aircraft project, and know I spent the best part of 5 years keeping a beady eye on my non-technical boss who was in the habit of granting technical approval, signing off designs, changes, modifications etc off his own back. Unfortunately, one of the designs he sought to implement, but I managed to over-rule at the last minute, was implemented after I left (by whom, I do not know). The BoI condemned the system as unfit for purpose.

I won’t name names obviously; I do believe he thought he was acting for the best. Suffice to say, what I describe is not unusual and I’ve seen it in other IPTs/MDGs. My point is; the “robust regulatory framework” didn’t work. Grossly inexperienced and unsuitable staffs are in unprecedented positions of authority, and woe betide anyone who challenges them. I feel able to relate the tale, as the DG/XD (same one as Nimrod & Chinook) and CDP were content, confirmed under FoI.

I cannot see the situation improving, largely because MoD are actively getting rid of the very engineers they need, so I whole heartedly agree with Chug’s call for a move to an independent airworthiness authority for military aircraft.

Chugalug2

19th Nov 2007, 19:27

tuc, thank you for your endorsement, for what seems blindingly obvious to me may not seem so to others. That someone who has intimate knowledge of the system, knows how it should work and how in effect it does not, sees no alternative other than a complete redesign with airworthiness authority vested outside of the MOD should act as a wake up call to those minded to sit on the fence on this one. This is not about the pros and cons of interfering in the MOD's fiefdom, this is about lives and saving them from needless avoidable accidents. The old system is now, to all intents and purposes, broken irredeemably, like so many of the institutions that have served this country well. May it Rest in Peace, but it must be replaced without delay or yet more chickens will be coming home to roost. Oh, and bad news Gordy, this is going to cost all the money that you denied so far. That is why we are in the mess that we are in. Thank goodness at least that you and your government are full square behind our Armed Forces.....well behind!

nigegilb

19th Nov 2007, 20:02

Good news and bad news for the thread tonight.

The good news will have to wait a little while longer til it is firmed up, but it directly concerns demands made on this thread for more safety protection.

Bad news, in answer to my question about the pipework in the bomb bay, it has been confirmed that it is in fact single skin throughout.

Keep pressing everyone, without saying too much, progress is being made in the background.

Safety_Helmut

19th Nov 2007, 20:26

Nimrod R Mk 1

Project Helix will upgrade the Royal Air Force (RAF) fleet of Nimrod R Mk1 aircraft. This intelligence upgrade to the British Nimrod platform focuses on maintaining the capability of the Nimrod R out to 2025 and includes upgrades to the aircraft mission systems, associated ground stations and training facilities.

http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/products/helix.html

S_H

Safety_Helmut

19th Nov 2007, 20:42

Safeware

Better regulation within the framework that already exists would be a start, but self regulation is in my opinion, no longer an option. The MoD has demonstrably failed in this area. Do you think the organisation is capable of improving matters if left to its own devices, because I, and many others, think not. The remorseless drive to reduce costs, leads to major conflicts of interest within Integrated Project Teams and their respective Release To Service Authorities. That relationship for example is far too cosy.

Time and time in dealings with IPTs it was obvious that the objective was always to avoid spending money if at all possible, and not to maintain or improve safety.

There was a point last year when it was announced that there was no more money to maintain Flight Reference Cards, how on earth can this be allowed to happen ?
Personally, I would like to see the CAA SRG or HSE invited in to conduct a review of safety and airworthiness management. The practice and malpractice that has been allowed to develop within MoD is shocking.

One new IPT leader at Wyton started a Safety Working Group meeting by announcing that technical/engineering language would not be tolerated. This IPT leader you see, was not an engineer.

S_H

Safeware

19th Nov 2007, 21:50

S_H,Do you think the organisation is capable of improving matters if left to its own devices, because I, and many others, think not.
No, but then I would expect that you would have expected that as an an answer from me. As for The remorseless drive to reduce costs, leads to major conflicts of interest within Integrated Project Teams and their respective Release To Service Authorities. That relationship for example is far too cosy. Seen that, with lots of politics thrown in for good measure.

I don't disagree at all with what Chug, tuc and yourself have said about MAA here, I just think that, given today's mindset, that the "it's my trainset" philosophy can't cope with the concept of an independent MAA, lest it get in the way. Not trying to defend it, or reduce the commander's consideration of risk, just trying to play devils advocate in a sense, and show an aspect of potential 'conflict'.

sw

Safety_Helmut

19th Nov 2007, 22:34

You speak with wisdom SW. But it should no longer be an MoD decision. The MoD has demonstrated that it is not capable of making the right decision. It's actions, and particularly its inactions endanger not just military personnel and equipment, but many other airspace users. The refusal to fit TCAS to ALL of it's aircraft is a prime example of this.

S_H

BEagle

20th Nov 2007, 06:14

Winco, unfortunately the yoof-speak argot adopted by some youngsters does somewhat tend to confuse those who were brought up to speak the Queen's English.

Hence 'bitching few posts directed at a few guys that fly the jets' might well have been intended to mean the opposite to the meaning you assumed....:rolleyes:

Research reveals that "bitchin'", as used by slouching, hooded street yoof, is synonymous with "cool" - or "kewel" in their argot. Innit. Like whatever.

Back to the main points, independent audit of airworthiness is an excellent idea. When, some years ago in a private e-mail, I made a similar point about training standards, the Stasi hauled me over the coals. My point was that in the civil world an external regulator maintains fixed standards, whereas in the military world standards can be (not necessarily are) reduced on financial grounds since there is no external regulation.

This is a statement of fact, not a criticism. It applies equally to all areas which, in the civil world, are regulated by the CAA.

What sound reason is there for the military not abiding by similar regulation? Operational imperatives are fine - if routine standards are not bypassed.

nigegilb

20th Nov 2007, 06:28

It has been suggesed to me that Nimrod pilots would dearly love to have TCAS in theatre. I ask the qestion again, has anyone entered a UOR for TCAS? Has it been looked at? There is a very big pot of money outside of the Defence Budget for essential in theatre equipment. Please answer via PM if you prefer.

Winco

20th Nov 2007, 07:14

BEagle or Hey Beegull Man!

I is clearly out of de loop man, and I is sarry about dat! Innit man? (my grandson helped me that that - sorry BEags)

Thanks for 'hedgyoucayting' me dood - cooooell man!

The Winco

BEagle

20th Nov 2007, 07:20

Radical!

.

nigegilb

20th Nov 2007, 07:31

In case anyone wondered, i am going to bat this up to parliamentary level, but I want to be sure of my facts first,

Cheers,

Nige

tucumseh

20th Nov 2007, 07:58

S-H

“One new IPT leader at Wyton started a Safety Working Group meeting by announcing that technical/engineering language would not be tolerated. This IPT leader you see, was not an engineer”.

All too typical, I'm afraid.

chappie

20th Nov 2007, 08:56

:\oh dear!!!

fair enough if it was me running it but an IPT leader?!:{

:ugh: :ugh: :ugh::ugh:

tucumseh

20th Nov 2007, 11:03

Chappie

There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with having a non-engineer as an IPTL. Many IPTs don’t really get involved in engineering and airworthiness matters. (Among them, some aircraft IPTs). I suppose credit should be given to the said IPTL for permitting a Safety Working Group in the first place. Many would have pointed to precedent and not bothered. If, as it seems, he chaired it, then it would seem he has little confidence in his Safety Manager – if he has one. I’m trying to be fair to him, but on balance I’d say he’s a prat. This is the perfect attribute for further promotion so I hope his replacement is better.

Of equal import, S-H’s comment on FRCs drew no comment.

“There was a point last year when it was announced that there was no more money to maintain Flight Reference Cards, how on earth can this be allowed to happen?”

I’ve seen this happen on and off for 16 years. I can be very precise as it commenced when RAF suppliers gained control of the necessary funding. Their attitude was, “if it doesn’t generate a “due-in” on the stock computer, it’s a waste of money”. So, no fault investigations. No AP amendments. No training. Do not address obsolescence. Safety? You must be joking. Yes, the “system” has changed over the years, but the damage was done. The MoD no longer has the corporate knowledge to manage the necessary processes and procedures.

I say on and off, because some learned to bury these critical components of airworthiness in catch-all contract clauses, which would slip under the beancounting adolfs’ radar. But this was firefighting - the fragmented approach irreversibly fragmented the airworthiness audit trails. For example, major mods would be schemed, embodied by contractors, but the APs wouldn’t be amended. Maintainers and aircrew would look at the new kit and say “WTF”. The effect is the same on aircrew if the FRCs aren’t maintained. (And in both cases, how do know the pubs haven’t been maintained? Answer – you must wait for something to go wrong). It is further evidence of the MoD’s increasing incompetence and culpability. It must be totally beyond anyone at an air station how this attitude can prevail, but it does, and very senior staffs simply roll over and let it happen.

Again, I commend…..

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmpubacc/300/30005.htm

Nothings changed.

Chugalug2

20th Nov 2007, 21:54

In case anyone wondered, i am going to bat this up to parliamentary level, but I want to be sure of my facts first,

Nige, I assume by 'this' you mean TCAS. If so good luck, for it is a scandal (along with the myriad others) that this excellent kit is not as standard on military fleets as on civilian ones. But it also points up the sad situation that is under discussion currently on the thread. I cannot believe that TCAS would not have been required by an MAA, in just the same way that it has been by the CAA. Indeed all the military airworthiness aspects of recent or current threads, such as ESF, FADEC problems, FR systems, TCAS, Flight Recorders, etc, etc amount to so many trees, whereas the better solution is surely to tackle the woods, i.e. Airworthiness Regulation. Unless and until that nettle is seized then that list is doomed to grow ever longer. Perhaps that is what needs to be batted up to parliamentary level?

Safety_Helmut

20th Nov 2007, 22:09

Tuc

On a positive note. All in-service aircraft and commodity IPTs hold regular Safety Working Groups, usually chaired by the IPTL.

Safety Manager usually acts as secretary for the meeting, not an ideal responsibility for the IPTs SME at such meetings.

S_H

Distant Voice

21st Nov 2007, 16:44

Are there many NITRILE seals in the AAR fueling system?

DV

enginesuck

21st Nov 2007, 21:57

Yes Loads And Most Are Also Made Of Lox, Also Did You Know That Nimrods Wings Are Made Of Cheese ?

**** Off

MightyHunter AGE

21st Nov 2007, 22:43

Winco wrote
There is a distinct lack of input at the moment from some of the so-called 'specialists' and 'current' Nimrod air and groundcrew. Where have you all gone?

Maybe those so called 'specialists' and 'current' Nimrod air and groundcrew are actually getting on with the job in hand, flying and maintaining the Mighty Hunter.

Maybe they are waiting for something 'original' to be added to the thread and are letting the 'non-specialist' and 'used-to-be current' Nimrod air and ground crew 'speculate' instead of waiting for the BOI findings.

Maybe?.....

Just a thought............

Vage Rot

22nd Nov 2007, 07:36

Maybe they are waiting for something 'original' to be added to the thread and are letting the 'non-specialist' and 'used-to-be current' Nimrod air and ground crew 'speculate' instead of waiting for the BOI findings.

:D:D:D:D:D:D

Winco

22nd Nov 2007, 07:36

MightyHunter AGE

Thank you for that. I simply made the point that people such as yourself and many others appear to have 'deep and silent' and I wondered why???

I'm pleased you are getting on with the job in hand, but we do value your input and have been waiting for you to comment on the various reprts that have surfaced, such as the BAes one and the QinetiQ one??

No comments on them??

MightyHunter AGE

22nd Nov 2007, 08:57

Winco

I (and probably many others at Kinloss) have some concern over the gravity that the QinetiQ report is being held in.

As with all these reports they have recommendations, whether they have been taken up or not I have no idea as i do not work in NSG. RAMS has however now been disbanded and amalgamated into NLS.

Having worked on NLS for 6 years I have never seen QintetiQ or BAe come round our section and report on us.

This is probably because we have our own QA on the Sqn and an internal QA system and section on RAF Kinloss the same as any other RAF station. IF they had any concerns about our working practices and procedures/APs etc then we would know about it in no uncertain terms.

Perhaps the officers who negotiated the new contract for maint in NSG should explain why they didn't include any 'extra' work e.g ADF and LIM work?

I however, cannot comment on a report on another section on station that I do not work in or have no influence over.

nigegilb

22nd Nov 2007, 12:50

Airworthiness issues.

One specific area of Continued Airworthiness that is beginning to impact the world’s airlines is SFAR 88. This is an FAA Special Requirement which, as a result of the TWA 800 accident investigation, requires a review of fuel tank safety.

This exercise comprises a safety assessment of the basic fuel tank and system design (normally carried out by the manufacturer) and an operator review of their fleet to identify any modifications that affect the fuel systems. Once identified these modifications must be assessed by an approved design organisation to determine any unsafe conditions.

The JAA and UKCAA have produced harmonised requirements that reflect the content of SFAR 88 and it is worth noting that the FAA will recognise compliance with either of these.

In the UK, Airworthiness Notice 55 is the mandatory vehicle being used and is applicable to UK industry.

More;

One of the bottom lines is that on modified fuel systems a lot of work / rework needs to be carried out with regards to reducing risk of fire / explosion. Operators that do not comply will have to have the Aux fuel system made inoperable.

]Part of this mod is to install "dual wall" fuel pipes. At present, it is
allowable to shroud a standard rigid pipe with a larger flexible hose
type assembly, with a gland drain that can indentify the source of a
leak to within a certain distance. The hose will go.

This is a description I received of the AAR piping in Nimrod bomb bay.

"The fuel pipes you mentioned are all single skins. The AAR system, whilst being a lash up, has no double skin, simply a flexible pipe routed from the former escape hatch into the bomb bay via sleeves in the frames."

So not only does Nimrod MR2 and MRA4 lack fuel tank protection and bomb bay fire protection, it now looks as though it is coming up well short on more JAR/UKCAA/FAA commercial directives.

Military Airworthiness?

The Swinging Monkey

22nd Nov 2007, 13:27

Nig,

Given what you have just written, can you advise us as to whether or not the MOD are allowed to ignore these rulings?

Are they simply immune from the mandatory implementation of flight safety issues (the Airworthiness Notice) because they are 'military' or what?

Even if they were allowed to ignore the rulings, there is clearly a possible danger of an aircraft (like TWA 800) exploding over a built-up area, which I would have felt made it an absolute 'No No' to ignore the Airworthiness Notice?

And how on earth can the MR4 project have got away with ignoring the notice?

Thanks for the info

TSM

Chugalug2

22nd Nov 2007, 13:34

Military Airworthiness?

You pose the question Nige, rhetorical though it may be, and my reply is why should it be any different? Those in the know, yourself, tuc, JB, SH, etc might well reply that military aviation airworthiness is different because military aviation is different. That is true but only up to the point where civil standards are not practical, ie system redundancy, landing and take off performance, munitions carriage and fit, etc. In short civil standards should apply as a default, and alternative standards only applicable where such conflict is unavoidable. For military airworthiness standards not only protect the military crews and passengers, but civilian ones too (eg where TCAS applies), and populations over which they fly. The MODs failure to meet a duty of care applies to those people as well. That duty needs to be urgently transferred to an MAA so that protection is assured.

nigegilb

22nd Nov 2007, 13:37

I try not to post rumour, I am sourcing these posts on engineering concerns from people I trust. Will get back to you on the points you raise. What concerns me is that we lost XV179 due to a fuel tank explosion. It remains to be seen what finally brought down XV230, but a lot of attention has been paid to tank 7. I would have thought that following the tragic loss of life in both XV230 and XV179 the RAF would be at the forefront of fuel tank safety. Well after XV179 for a while the UK was still the only nation in Europe not to have demanded fuel tank protection on A400M. That changed 2 days after yours truly appeared on C4 News and pointed this out.

Why on earth hasn't someone gripped Nimrod safety. I am very very sorry that all this has to play out in public, but I can guarantee you that as we speak, the RAF has not insisted on any of this increased safety on MRA4.

You could argue that the RAF is breaching health and safety law, in the same way that the Met was taken to court over danger to the public in the Menezes case.

South Bound

22nd Nov 2007, 13:38

My understanding is that Military Airworthiness standards are directed by SofS and along the lines of:

'At least as safe as the civilian equivalent...'

Chugalug2

22nd Nov 2007, 13:47

My understanding is that Military Airworthiness standards are directed by SofS and along the lines of:

'At least as safe as the civilian equivalent...'

Strange, because my understanding is that he doesn't, and if indeed he does, such instructions can no longer be implemented.

Tappers Dad

22nd Nov 2007, 14:36

Here's an easy question for you guys to answer which I am sure won't break any rules.

Are you using OM-15 hydraulic fluid in the radar drive sytem or
MIL-H-83282 ?

Distant Voice

22nd Nov 2007, 14:56

That was a real smart answer, Enginesucks,

Yes loads of them..........and the wings are made of cheese.

See if you can answer the next parts of the question with the same degree of intelligence:

(1) Specified temperture range for NITRILE rubber?

(2) Shelf life for NITRILE seals?

DV

spanners123

22nd Nov 2007, 15:13

DV
A quick search on google will give you the answers, only took me about 2 mins to find the answers!:ugh:

MightyHunter AGE

22nd Nov 2007, 20:20

TD

OM-15

link here http://aero-defense.ihs.com/document/abstract/FFTTCAAAAAAAAAAA

Tappers Dad

22nd Nov 2007, 20:44

Thanks MightyHunter AGE.

enginesuck

22nd Nov 2007, 22:26

DV,

I refer you to spanners123's post. Please forgive my sarcasm but I've had enough of random probings ref the nimrod fuel system , just what exactly are you trying to get at ?

spanners123

23rd Nov 2007, 00:52

enginesuck :D:D,
it's also the way the questions are asked and answers demanded!
if an answer is not posted within a couple of hours, he asks again!
perhaps dv could explain the reasoning behind the questions before demanding answers, he might find people are a bit more helpful!
blue suiters are posting fewer responses because nothing new is happening at the moment.

John Blakeley

23rd Nov 2007, 09:17

The MOD AMS web site currently says the following about Military Airworthiness - note the word is "Regulations":

JSP 553 Military Airworthiness Regulations
(formerly JSP 318B)

JSP 553 details the regulations for the Airworthiness of MOD Aircraft. This document is intended for staffs concerned with the policy aspects of MOD aircraft, Project Sponsorship, and the preparation of Military Aircraft Release, Service Deviations and other Service initiated changes of an operational or engineering nature.

Prior to 1 Jul 03, military airworthiness regulations were published in JSP 318B 4th Edition AL2. JSP 318B has been re-issued as JSP 553 as part of the Military Aviation Regulation Document Set (MARDS). The policy content of the 1st Edition of JSP 553 is identical to that of JSP 318B 4th Edition AL2.

The full MARDS, which is available by accessing the MARDS web site on the RLI comprises:

JSP 550 Military Aviation Policy, Regulations and Directives (formerly JSP 318)
JSP 551 Military Flight Safety Regulations (formerly AP 3207)
JSP 552 Military Air Traffic Service Regulations (formerly JSP 318A)
JSP 553 Military Airworthiness Regulations (formerly JSP 318B)
JSP 554 Military Aviation Aerodrome Criteria and Standards (formerly JSP 455)
JSP 556 Military Test Flying Regulations (formerly Director Flying's Instructions)
JSP 558 Military Aviation Diplomatic Approvals and Clearances (mid 2004) (formerly AP 1158)

You need legal access to the MOD Intranet to look at JSP 553, but no doubt one of the contributors to this site will be able to check the latest definition. The old JSP 318B, which seemed to be more concerned with procedures rather than regulations, defined airworthiness as:

The ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general pubic over which such airborne systems are flown.

Thus by this broad definition airworthiness is not just a "safe" aircraft it is also the correct mission equipment fit eg DAS, ESF etc and if the regulations are met should ensure that MOD has fulfilled its responsibilities for duty of care. As always though it gets woolly when you try to find a definition of "significant" - perhaps JSP 553 is more precise.

JB

nigegilb

23rd Nov 2007, 09:22

John, Military Commanders appear to be using "military risk" as a catch all to send crews to war in aircraft not having sufficient protection or combat survivability. You only have to look at recent history of Hercules, Helos and Nimrod to see this recurring theme.

What is the relationship between military risk and air worthiness?

Furthermore, "or to the general pubic over which such airborne systems are flown." This could prove to be the flaw in the argument. Breach of Health and Safety regulations and breach of duty of care are two areas where the MoD approach would appear to be wanting.

John Blakeley

23rd Nov 2007, 10:29

Nigel,

I do not know what JSP553 says. The old JSP 318B had a section on operating in "Hostilities and situations of Direct Threat" which empowered the Operations Branch to approve flying to the provisions of SDs and OEC releases, for both operational and work-up training flying "but the risks involved as a result of the limited [MOD(PE) as then was] trials carried out for the OEC release and the probable lack of trials for SDs must be borne in mind in approving the amount of such work up."

A further section where the "operational need is overriding" introduced the concept of Operational Necessity Service Deviations (ONSDs) normally requiring approval at 2* or above. ONSDs were to be approved "sparingly, and only when life is at stake (my bold), because the lack of trials results available to the approving authority will make a realistic risk assessment difficult."

Whether these are still the current "rules" I would not know - but bear in mind none of these procedures authorise you to take the further risks of flying an aircraft which is not airworthy - they are there to allow things like UOR equipment to be introduced, flights at higher AUWs, changes to flight limitations, new weapons to be introduced, etc, etc. Unless JSP 553 is different there is as far as I can see no change in the definitions that allows lower airworthiness standards to be applied to operational flying - but maybe a contributor to this thread knows differently!

JB

nigegilb

23rd Nov 2007, 10:35

OK that makes sense. AOC 2Gp did the Op necessity thing 2 days or so after the crash. From what you are saying, if the ac is still deemed not airworthy then this Op Necessity, military risk catch all, cannot be used.

And who would have the authority, outside of the Military to deem the aircraft not airworthy? I am also thinking about the recent trial of the Met, could a member of the public challenge the airworthiness of the Nimrod? Say based on the failure of the MoD to comply with civilian airworthiness directives?

John Blakeley

23rd Nov 2007, 10:47

Nigel,

Don't know without seeing JSP 553, but the old definitions and procedures do not seem to cover accepting the risks associated with deliberately flying an unairworthy aircraft even on operations where life is at stake (and whose life are we talking about anyway the crew or someone else's) - as opposed to flying without, say, the full clearance trials. If the definitions are still the same I do not see that AOC 2 Group had an ONSD route to fly a known unairworthy aircraft - but he clearly thought/thinks differently - perhaps because he was being advised that the aircraft was airworthy!

JB

Distant Voice

23rd Nov 2007, 11:27

In defining airworthiness AP3456 refers to JSP 553 (Introduction), which is as follows:

Airworthiness is defined as the ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown. Airworthiness is not only concerned with engineering aspects, but also with the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated.

DV

John Blakeley

23rd Nov 2007, 11:34

DV,

Thanks very much - an even better definition than the original one in 318B in my view as it also requires, at least by very strong implication if nothing else, the right equipment to be fitted for the operations that are to be carried out, and for the supporting operational procedures to be safe.

JB

Distant Voice

23rd Nov 2007, 11:56

JB

Glad that helps.

I do not have a copy of JSP 553, but AP 3456 clearly indicates that it uses the definition used in that documents introduction section.

DV

rudekid

23rd Nov 2007, 14:53

Guys

Sorry, just couldn't resist...

the general pubic over which such airborne systems are flown.:E

Is the General a friend of the Flt Lt Hare?

Sorry, the puerile, non-relevant moment has passed...

John Blakeley

23rd Nov 2007, 15:16

Rudekid,

Thanks - as a newly qualified OAP I now need all the help I can get! Mind you looking at the Headley Court thread running today it might be an appropriate Freudian slip! I will leave you to make the appropriate connections to the members of the public concerned!

JB

DEL Mode

23rd Nov 2007, 15:55

"Hansard 22 Feb 2000

Mr. Tim Collins (Westmorland and Lonsdale): The Secretary of State referred to safety in RAF training. Will he say more about that in relation to my constituents in Cumbria? They accept the absolute primacy of national security, but they were most concerned about some of the reports as to the possible causes of the air crash in Shap, in Cumbria, at the end of last year. Will the right hon. Gentleman give a categoric assurance to the people of Cumbria, and of other areas affected by low-flying aircraft, that no reductions will interfere with the primacy of safety--of people in the air and on the ground?

Mr. Hoon: I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that issue. I have just given that assurance. Safety is paramount and will continue to be so--both for those who fly the aircraft and for his constituents on the ground. I am happy to be able to repeat the assurance that I gave him in writing when he properly raised those matters with me. "

So then....

The issue that is faced is how do you prove military aviation is safe?

What process do you use?

What regulation do you follow?

European civil aviation is safe - How do we know? Because it is regulated by the Part M regulation. This is similar to Def Stan 05-130.

Part M requires you to set up a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO) which has to demonstrate to EASA (through a bond) that it has sufficent money to fly and maintain the aircraft within it's scope. That would be a novel approach to the current military.

If you think that the Military are different (special needs?) then how come CANForce have implemented something similar? They fly F-18 on operations dont they?

Check out http://admmatapp.dnd.ca/taa/taa/

The reality is that risk management is the culture. Risk implies increased probability.

If the "as maintained airframe" is safe, then ask the company that designed it to underwrite the airworthiness.

The processes in place are flawed. Chug and others are correct. The aircraft should be generated servicable, and if, and only if, at time of WAR the need arises to manage risk occurs, then you should fly, and then recover the fault at the first opportunity, not at a time somewhere down the line that it suits you.

Tappers Dad

24th Nov 2007, 17:03

Not long to wait now !

nigegilb

24th Nov 2007, 17:37

AC Ovee, before he disappeared out of sight posted this;

"Well, I have conducted AAR on different aircraft throughout the years; tanking and receiving. While different aircraft types route the pipes differently, the same principles and materials are generally used. But, I have heard that there are some types that have double-skinned pipework. The MR2 has the same where the pipe passes through the crew compartment. I agree that the Nimrod is far from the the latest design in AAR, but that doesn't make it unsafe just because of that. What makes it safe, if safe means that it will not suffer a fire, is answered below."

I have already outlined recent civilian airworthiness directives and I was under the impression that Nimrod was part AAR pipe double-skinned. Not according to this.

"The AAR pipeline ran from the former escape hatch just above / inboard from the Air Eng. Station and was routed to the rear of the Capt and then into the bomb bay area. There was a solid connection at the point of entry into the flight deck, thereafter, it was a conventional refuelling pipe as seen on a refuelling vehicle. The pipe was covered with a protective skin, but was not "double skinned" in the context we are discussing. It was then routed underfloor below the toilet with a series of tubes, for want of a better description, where the flexible pipe passed through frames and stringers (to prevent fretting and chafing ) en-route to the pipes in the bomb bay and the No1 tank (I think). The confusion may have arisen re the protective rubber coating over the main pipeline...but it was not, and never could be a second skin as such. It would have contained a leak I suppose, but not for long."

OK, so we have had several major fuel leaks in the AAR pipework, engineers have not been able to re-create these leaks on the ground and the RAF refuses to comply with engineering fuel pipe best practice. Crews have been sent up time and time again on AAR missions, just waiting for yet another dangerous fuel leak.

Someone is playing with the lives of aircrew. Tri-Jet has double skin, MRA4 does not. Why is that then, money??

RAF_Techie101

24th Nov 2007, 17:52

Out of pure interest nige, where did that come from?

nigegilb

24th Nov 2007, 18:23

Techie, if you don't mind I would rather not say. My point of issue is the fact that the MRA4 pipework is no safer than the pipework in the aircraft that it replaces. Airliners as little as 3 or 4 years old are undergoing retro-work to bring them up to the latest standards decreed in airworthiness directives.

To say I am not happy with the lack of protection and combat survivability in MRA4 is an understatement.

By all means point out any inaccuracy in my previous post, I don't pretend to be a specialist on the Nimrod, but I do believe in common sense.

Tappers Dad

24th Nov 2007, 19:20

DV said

Airworthiness is defined as the ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown. Airworthiness is not only concerned with engineering aspects, but also with the way an aircraft is flown and how its systems are operated.

FOI reply
2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorised as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..

The Times Nov 4th

The MoD said the safety of all personnel "has been and will remain of paramount importance"

Perhaps they have forgotten the 2496 incidents.

Exrigger

24th Nov 2007, 20:01

TD, as has been said before you have to put these into context, 20 years of incidents, 2496 IRs = 125 a year = 10 a month and this spread over the whole fleet all over different parts of the country and the world. Additionally IRs are raised for air and ground incidents (allthough most are flying related), so bird strikes, near misses, taxy accidents, maintenance/line personnel accidents, instrument failure, hydraulic failure from component failure, bodging the AAR and damaging the probe etc and the fuel leaks when noticed by the aircrew when flying to name a few that may or may not generate an IR and this is dependent on the personnel involved and severity of the issue in their minds. A lot of these cannot be avoided no matter how many safety measures and procedures you put in place, the only way to avoid most of these is to wrap the aircraft in bubble wrap, not fly them and keep all personnel/birds away from them. Try finding out how many IRs are raised across the Tornado fleet and compare the figures against the amount of Tornados there are in their fleet, you will probably find the comparison will be the same percentage wise and the IRs will be for similar things as well, including fuel leaks.

Tappers Dad

24th Nov 2007, 20:35

Exrigger
That sounds like a typical MOD answer to me. Tomorrow I will be able to give you another MOD statement that shows how they put a spin on statistics.
Note the FOI said RAF Nimrods, and how many are there ? 24

So you say there are 10 a month, 10 occurrences involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage, person receiving an injury, discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard.

Well my son and 13 other men were killed because of one of those occurrences.

Vage Rot

24th Nov 2007, 20:51

TD,

I think what Exrigger was trying to say was that not all IRs are raised because of serious problems. Often we will raise an IR to highlight potential problems - we may have noticed something before it became a problem and IR it to prompt the system into addressing it - and so that others can learn from our experience.

Everything from a lightning strike to a cut finger on a sharp bit of metal could prompt an IR.

Nobody from the aircrew side here is saying that we know what caused the loss of our friends, and your son. It is in our interests also to get to the bottom of things but, and it's a big but, lots of the posts on here are simply not accurate.

Keep strong
Kindest Regards,
Vage

Exrigger

24th Nov 2007, 21:01

TD thanks for the response and reminding me of your loss, though I had not forgotten. I have tried to help with technical information in answer to your requests throughout this thread to help you get the answers you are looking for, without hopefully being dis-respectfull of your and other families loss. I have explained before that I am an ex Nimrod airframe tradesman who worked both on the NMSU (as it was) and two Nimrod squadrons after that.

I am fully aware that the it only took one incident to cause the loss of the aircraft and crew, I do not need you to remind me of that. Additionally I am fully aware that the figures are for RAF Nimrods and I am also fully aware of the spin that is and can be put on figures and by who. I was mearly trying to put into context what the figures for IRs mean despite looking extremely alarming, in the same way as people have tried, and obviously failed, when trying to put the fuel leaks into context.

Magnersdrinker

24th Nov 2007, 21:57

I can only say that techie is 100% correct. IR or OR as they call them now can be raised for any reason , we had a Nimrod hit a deer last month on landing , yes a bizzare thing but an OR highlights things at a higher level. The bird spotting man probaly has to check for deer now wandering near the runway as a result of that. (i dont know for sure) but it brings into practise things that can avoid that in future.

Nice to see some old school NMSU about exrigger , I thought we were a dying breed !!!

Just on a note about the AAR system, the refuelling probes that were fitted to Nimrod were I belive ex Vulcan probes !! I only know that as we used to keep a big pile of them on the NMSU many moons back. I rememeber the fit with the huge rubber pipe down the inside of the jet till the mod was done to hide it underfloor. It was one big bulky pipe :)

RAF_Techie101

24th Nov 2007, 21:59

Exrigger - I commend your patience.

TD - As exrigger said, we are aware of your loss, I was on detachment with Ben and went flying with him several times. But as exrigger and yourself pointed out statistics can be made to prove anything. Yes, there were up till a couple of years ago 24 Nimrods. How many were there in 1987? 32 I believe were upgraded to MR2 standard in 1982, plus the 3 R1's.

Beware statistics and numbers.

Winco

24th Nov 2007, 22:04

Vage Rot,
Whllst we know that 'Everything from a lightning strike to a cut finger on a sharp bit of metal could prompt an IR', in reality we all know that they don't, and raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays. As for your comment 'Often we will raise an IR to highlight potential problems - we may have noticed something before it became a problem and IR it to prompt the system into addressing it - and so that others can learn from our experience' I only wish someone had taken a little more notice of the IRs that would have been raised prior to the loss of 230 concerning fuel leaks and AAR. Perhaps we wouldn't then have this thread?

Exrigger,
The point is, that 10 IRs a month for, what is a pitifully small fleet of aircraft, is abnormally high wouldn't you agree? If we go back 20 or 30 years, when we had dozens of frames and were flying in excess of 8 - 10 missions a day (from ISK alone) then I would agree. But I understand that there are very, very few flights at all at the moment, so the numbers of IR's is worrying. It is also of no value at all comparing them to Tornado IRs either. How many Tornados we we currently have compared to Nimrods?

TD, Stay strong my friend

The Winco

Exrigger

24th Nov 2007, 22:21

Winco, thanks for the response, but again, as I have said that those figures average 10 a month over 20 years, and the fleet was a lot larger and sorties more frequent a fact that you concur with, additionally how do you know that over the last 3 years say that the average amount has been a lot less a month due to less aircraft and less sorties (by the way I don't know that figure either).

Additionally the comparison with Tornado IRs over the last 20 years would produce a larger figure (i.e. more aircraft and more sorties), but as I said that percentage wise it would probably be no less or worse than those for the Nimrod fleet or any other fleet for that matter.

Magnersdrinker, thanks, I think that most from the old NMSU, like me have retired, despite WO A it was not a bad time.

santiago15

24th Nov 2007, 22:24

raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays

Winco, you are wrong.

Chugalug2

24th Nov 2007, 22:45

Quote:
"raising an IR is quite a serious matter nowadays"

Winco, you are wrong."

Thank you santiago15 for that reassurance, because the most alarming post in the batch above was the one from Winco.
TD, the IR is the messenger, and if they had started in on shooting that then the whole system would then be shot from top to bottom! But if I know anything of the professionalism of the RAF, both aircrew and ground crew, then that part of the system that is in their hands will be conducted with utter punctiliousness. The answers that you are seeking are, I suspect, not in their domain but that of the staff levels to which their IRs are sent. Lots of messages, b...er all action! As a squadron FSO I encouraged as many IRs (SORs then) to be submitted as possible. One of our training captains obliged me to the letter, and far exceeded anyone else. He was grounded by the Station Commander as being 'Accident Prone'! Bemeddled Buffoons was Tony Hancock's description. I can think of none better.

nigegilb

24th Nov 2007, 22:53

Observer reporting that BoI will be published in 10 days time;

880 'fires' on RAF Nimrods before fatal mid-air explosion

Mark Townsend, defence correspondent
Sunday November 25, 2007
The Observer

Almost 900 fire-related incidents on Nimrod spy planes were reported in the two decades before one of the aircraft exploded above Afghanistan in September last year, killing 14 men.
A report by BAE Systems, the plane's manufacturer, describes the number of blazes or smoke coming from the aircraft as 'frequent', raising fresh concerns that defence officials sent planes to Iraq and Afghanistan that were not airworthy.

The research details 880 incidents during which crews reported fire, smoke, burning or fumes on board between 1982 to 2004, when the report was completed. They include cases in which RAF personnel were burned or were forced to fight flames with hand-held extinguishers.

The revelations come 10 days before an RAF board of inquiry publishes its findings into the explosion of a Nimrod MR2 above Kandahar province in September 2006.
The inquiry is expected to identify a fuel leak in the aircraft as the cause. Last night relatives of those who died said that defence officials had ignored warnings concerning the risk of fire on Nimrods. Graham Knight, whose 25-year-old son, Sgt Ben Knight, was killed in the crash, said: 'It is a disturbing figure and proves that officials knew the Nimrod had a fire risk [for] longer than previously thought. Still they decided to send my son and others to fight in an aircraft that was dangerous.'

Ministry of Defence documents confirm that incidents continued after the BAE report was completed. An MoD spokesman said the high number of reported incidents was due to the meticulous nature of recording such incidents. He said: 'The number of signals generated is a reflection of the RAF's comprehensive reporting system which covers any indication, however minor, of fire, smoke, burning, fumes or smell-related occurrences. This would include, for example, incidents as minor as an overheated resistor.'

Magnersdrinker

24th Nov 2007, 23:34

880 fires . I think thats blown out of context , most that read that think that fire has actually broken out in the airframe ,im afraid thats complete and utter bull**** reporting. 90% of that i guess is fumes in the cockpit which most of the time is down tot he air conditioning side throwing oily crap into the pressure shell. Also electrical burning which is common to all aircraft with many systems on board , if you look at the stats of the E3 i bet you will get the same.

Yet again publishing things to make it sound like a major problem , these things happen, its the nature of flying an aircraft packed with computers and wiggly amp things.
How many times at home have you smelled the tv or pc and thought mmmm thats not right many times im sure, but how many times can you say its went on fire ? not many i guess .So to say 880 fires onboard is complete and utter horse mince sorry i dont buy that one bit !!

Magnersdrinker

24th Nov 2007, 23:42

Just reading ex techies note on the number of frames in 1982, well the other day I just read that there were 49 nimrods built (not including r1s). I dont think all made it to the front line but was just happening to look at a comparison chart for all interchangability of components and it logs many aircraft that i never knew existed !!

Sorry i just thought id add that !! irrelevant im sure :)

Tappers Dad

25th Nov 2007, 08:03

Magnersdrinker

but how many times can you say its went on fire ? not many i guess

78 incidents of Fires were recorded
355 incidents of Fumes/Smoke

John Blakeley

25th Nov 2007, 08:27

Magnesdrinker,

The Sunday Times today carries a similar report regarding the number of incidents (fire and smoke related) that the BAES Fire and Explosive Hazard Report of March 2004 identified. One has to assume that in all cases there must have been some paperwork raised ranging, I assume, from an IR if fire extinguishers were used to a defect report and an engineering investigation. Having been involved in a similar incident in a Shackleton many years ago the smoke/fumes emanating from one of the avionic bays were taken very seriously indeed and following a Pan call we landed with the fire crews deployed so I don't accept that such incidents should be (or are) taken as lightly as you suggest.

Presumably the IPT paid good money to have this report done as they had some concerns about keeping the aircraft in service for at least another 6 years, and, as we now know, somewhat longer! The report covered both the Mk 2 and the RMk1, and was 125 pages long - I have only seen the ES (2 pages) released under FOI, and I have not seen the full analysis of the 880 "incidents".

However, what is a fact is that in the ES, amongst a pile of other findings and recommendations, BAES recommended that "MOD consider utilising the extended range tankage role fit fire detection suppression system in normal operations" (their emphasis not mine). I know others have said that this would not work. I would not know, but BAES are design authority so presumably they had a good idea that this would work, or could be made to work. Although, as is so often the case, the wording is somewhat "fudged" there is little doubt that the BAES assessment that fire/explosion risks could be reduced to the ALARP level was based on the IPT not just reviewing but also actioning their (BAES') recommendations. I also wonder if such protection is now fitted in the MR4 - perhaps someone knows.

I hope the the BOI will look at what happened to the BAES report and its recommendations and comment on why, as appears to be the case, they were never actioned - money being my guess. If it does not then I would start to look at this with the same jaundiced view that I have of the engineering aspects of the Chinook Mull Inquiry - so I hope that this will not be the case.

JB

Da4orce

25th Nov 2007, 08:29

Observer reporting that BoI will be published in 10 days timeI make that 5th December then, judgment day (or not!)

Noting concerns about the 880 fires figure and putting it into context perhaps we should put it into context with the number of fuel leaks over the same period. I believe if that's done most would consider that it was luck rather than judgment that has prevented other incidents like 230 from being fatal.

nigegilb

25th Nov 2007, 08:45

Picking up a point from JB.

JB, the reason I am swinging the bat so hard on this is because the MRA4 does not have fire protection in the bomb bay.

Going back to MR2, nobody current has stated if the long range tanks could still be fitted in the bomb bay. We established that the tanks might have been sold as scrap but not if it was theoretically possible to comply with the BAe report. We did establish that High AUW considerations meant it was impractical to go without the need for AAR, but I wonder if it is possible to take off with the tanks empty and refuel in flight. Not ideal because there is still a risk of fuel migrations but at least there would be some fire protection in the bomb bay.

Finally, it has been suggested to me that the reason MRA4 will be introduced to service without bomb bay protection, fuel tank protection and flight deck armour, as well as single skin AAR piping, is that the RAF is desperate to get it to the front line. Any late changes to design would allow BAe to use it as an excuse to take much longer to get the aircraft in service.

The "clever" plan is to UOR after ISD. To that effect the RAF is starting to look at FDA and OBIGGS for MRA4. I hasten to say that there have been absolutely no official requests to fit this equipment.

Errr MD, I make that December 4th

ORAC

25th Nov 2007, 09:09

The "clever" plan is to UOR after ISD. See my other new thread reference UOR funding (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=301868). if it is the "clever" new plan, the Treasury is being just as "clever" and something else will have to give in the MOD budget to fund it - because the treasury won't.

nigegilb

25th Nov 2007, 09:15

Saw that ORAC, it was only last Monday that I was being reassured there is an unlimited fund of money supplied by the Treasury for UORs, outside of the existing Defence Budget. That will be the end of that promise then.
Anyone else see the flaws in the "clever" plan to UOR Nimrod MRA4 after ISD?

Chugalug2

25th Nov 2007, 10:16

The flaw IMHO to all the plans, clever or otherwise, to oblige the MOD to make airworthy their unairworthy aircraft, whether in service now or in the future, is that it has to balance such expenditure with all the other calls on its budget, shrinking or otherwise. The government is thus off the hook and can move the goalposts adinfinitum, a la UORs. It needs an external authority to oblige the MOD to commit to such expenditure and oblige it to make its air fleets fit for purpose. The answer to MRA4 airworthiness, as it is with every other type, is an MAA. This is a vital imperative. Our armed forces need kit that is fit for purpose to prevail in the wars that they are sent to by this government, that especially includes the aircraft that are an integral part of that effort. The only way to assure that is to establish an MAA without delay.

DEL Mode

25th Nov 2007, 11:05

I bet civil airlines would love to define their own airworthiness guidelines. I can imagine that one going down well with the budget airlines.

I bet they would also love to investigate their own airworthiness incidents.

I know, lets move towards total self regulation in the civil sector. We could avoid the cost of the CAA or EASA. It must be safe we have not had an airliner blow up in the sky recently, therefore we can relax the safety standards. When one happens, the officials could introduce new standards and show how effective they are at managing crisis. Now where is Mr. Brown's e-mail address.

Why do you think the rail industry has had to change. Self regulation does not work.

Last time I looked we were not at war ( I do accept we are in armed conflict). The problem is this government even want you guys to fight war on the cheap.

Magnersdrinker

25th Nov 2007, 11:59

Well TD and JB as an Airframe engineer with over 15 years on this type of aircraft , in that time since 1991 when i arrived on this aircraft I can only recall once in that time I have heard of a fire on board. It was not so long ago and was an electrical fire but was easily dealt with. im sure there has been more but nothing major to suggest thats a problem.
If you are going to all make up figures and bend the information to make the aircraft look bad then go ahead , you guys really are desperate to find anything bad. TD you have came up with different figures already

78 incidents of Fires were recorded
355 incidents of Fumes/Smoke

So 880 fires ? Where the flying **** did that come from

Have you looked at the statistics of all aircraft not just the Nimrod. You have straight away got in your mind that 880 fires on board a Nimrod and its unsafe , for joe public and people that do not work on Nimrod this straight away in there head thinks Ohhh there must be a problem with fires on the aircraft, old granny is now going I heard on PPrune that Nimrods have a bad fire record and this gets spread about.

edit . I do apoligse for TD and JB, I just saying what I reasd although that initial figure came from NigelB, NigelB can you update the thread on them 880 fires please.

RAF_Techie101

25th Nov 2007, 12:12

It is also a well known fact that many fumes in the cabin are caused by the aircrew putting the meals on the top shelf of the oven, despite a label telling them not to...........:rolleyes:

spanners123

25th Nov 2007, 12:21

These numbers don't seem to add up!! :ugh:
This is exactly the type of posts on prune that are doing irreversible harm to the Nimrod Fleet.
RAF_Techie101, good point!:D

Magnersdrinker

25th Nov 2007, 12:32

Yep harm to the fleet from people who dont even work on them and have no idea how its operated. Its all Nimrod but it would make nice compariative reading to other aircraft in service. I think that would quash any rumours that have now been started on the Nimrod basically being an unsafe fire hazard that everytime it gets airborne a fire will start.

For what its worth and this maybe little on this thread, the Nimrod has saved hundreds if not thousands of lives in its career, its been involved in every major conflict, its been at the heart of most disasters around the UK and 24/7 365 days a year it waits to launch to help a sailor/fisherman in distress. many take that protection for granted and have no idea she is there to help but she will when she is asked. Richard Branson is one of a few famous names thats appreciated the help of the kipper fleet. So sure find all you want wrong , but just dont foget the good, the guys out in Afghan that were taken from us were doing good and had probally saved hundreds doing what they do. Sometimes things dont add up and nature is cruel. One thing for sure is that aircraft will have done its utmost to get them guys home as its a life saver too.

spanners123

25th Nov 2007, 12:41

I totally agree Magnersdrinker. Whilst this is a thread on Nimrod, over the same period, how many reports of smoke/fire has there been on VC-10, Tristar, Hercs etc?

Magnersdrinker

25th Nov 2007, 12:51

spanners123 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=177749)

I totally agree Magnersdrinker. Whilst this is a thread on Nimrod, over the same period, how many reports of smoke/fire has there been on VC-10, Tristar, Hercs etc?

I dunno Spanners , Im sure Nigelb will probably give us some stats on the Herc fleet , hes been succesful that end with on board fire suppresion stuff. Im 100% certain they will have a lot more incidents with fire on board than the Rod because of the nature of cargo.

nigegilb

25th Nov 2007, 12:58

Never been a great believer in using stats in an argument. Apologies if posting that Observer article has caused so much trouble. I actually posted it because the Observer was stating the day the BoI is due to be published. Then, hopefully, the speculation will end.

Mr Point

25th Nov 2007, 13:08

Magners,

I agree that the number of fires reported by the media do not add up but I can assure you that there have been more than one.

As has already been stated, galley smoke, burning oil and electrical burning will account for the vast majority of incidents, and prior to around 1995 there were also a number of retro fires.

I have personally experienced two real under-floors (one of which was on the ground), and know of at least three other fires that needed the use of internal fire extinguishers.

Vim_Fuego

25th Nov 2007, 14:30

Agree the figures don't add up...in 11 years I can only think of three 'fires' one of which was told to me second hand and the other two I personally experienced with a HF aerial ablaze on the ground just prior to taxi and a CSDU cooling fan rubbing on it's casing whilst lining up...Plenty of fumes from which not one did we come home early for...the source was always identified and isolated or it just went away...

If I remember correctly the sandwich toaster device was a major source of under floor warnings due to were it vented it's cooking fumes...

RAF_Techie101

25th Nov 2007, 14:35

Oddly enough, the power socket for the toaster is still fitted and labelled just above the galley table...

Would love some toast when I'm sat down the back during a transit on det...

Just add some marmite and cheese...

Now THAT'S In-Flight... :E

John Blakeley

25th Nov 2007, 14:37

Whilst people can argue about the numbers of fires/smoke incidents until the cows come home, and I only have the Press figures to go on, and in truth the actual number is not particularly relevant, I note that very few are picking up on the real point - namely that the IPT commissioned a Design Authority (BAES) Report back in 2004 which came up with some significant recommendations to bring the chances of fire/explosion down to what BAES considered an ALARP level (although even here they hedged their bets by saying the sample investigated was small) and that few, if any, of these recommendations were taken up. Worse, in some cases the recommendations have not been actioned for the MR4.

The fact that the Nimrod has been involved in saving many lives at sea, including an incident today that could have turned very nasty, is relevant to the case for having an aircraft and trained crews available for this essential role - it is not an excuse for using an aircraft that may not be fully airworthy. Let us hope that with such a small fleet of Nimrod 4s, with numbers being driven by cost and not OA, we will still have enough resources to continue as we do now.

JB

Exrigger

25th Nov 2007, 14:42

Considering I keep being told all these figures are for only a small fleet so it is worse than it looks, but even with the recent posts of historical knowledge of actual fires over 40 odd years of service, this is still a long way short of 78. And over what period does the paper article claim the 880 cover.

Spanners123: carefull you have mentioned other aircraft that have the same problems, as has been pointed out to me in no uncertain terms the stats for these aircraft are not relevant to the thread subject. :uhoh:

JB: do you know for a fact what has and has not been incorporated on the MRA4?

Mick Smith

25th Nov 2007, 14:49

Dunno where the figures that dont add up came from - they arent in either of the media reports today - but the 880 figure is beyond a shadow of a doubt.
This is from the BAE Systems report:
Approximately 880 signals over a period from 1982 to the date of issue of this report were identified that may be classified as incidents concerning fire or smoke from unknown origins. In all cases, each identified incident was addressed in the immediate term by one or more of the following:
Crew action to extinguish the fire either by using hand extinguishers or selecting the appropriate crew controlled remote suppression system.
Crew action to identify and remove the ignition source by isolating the offending system (which may be a mechanical, electrical or avionics system or a combination of all)...
It may be assumed with some degree of confidence that the overall probability of a minor fire/smoke related occurrence for any given initiating cause will continue to be FREQUENT.
The FREQUENT is in their capitals not mine.

Exrigger

25th Nov 2007, 14:57

Thanks MS, I would rather take credence from that report than from a newspaper, even though in this case they seem to have actually got their facts right. Allthough I will add the newspaper did not appear to have the timescales, so the comments about making things look worse than they are still stands, why use the full facts when missing some out makes a better story and actually makes things look worse than they are.

With regards to this comment It may be assumed with some degree of confidence that the overall probability of a minor fire/smoke related occurrence for any given initiating cause will continue to be FREQUENT., since this report was issued how many changes have been made to alleviate some of these instances happening again, though I think I know the answer, which is sweet diddly squat (although from one post above they have removed the toaster :)).

John Blakeley

25th Nov 2007, 15:29

Ex-rigger

See post 1724 - are you saying NigeGib is wrong? Mike Smith is of course the journalist who wrote the Sunday Times report and it seems that he has proved his credibility on the numbers beyond a shadow of doubt - thanks for the info Mike.

JB

Exrigger

25th Nov 2007, 15:52

JB, I was asking about;

namely that the IPT commissioned a Design Authority (BAES) Report back in 2004 which came up with some significant recommendations to bring the chances of fire/explosion down to what BAES considered an ALARP level (although even here they hedged their bets by saying the sample investigated was small) and that few, if any, of these recommendations were taken up. Worse, in some cases the recommendations have not been actioned for the MR4.

Cases is plural and I cannot see how this can be construed as meaning that I am saying that NigeGib is wrong in the one item he mentioned some posts back, I was asking if you knew what had or had not been incorporated since this report.

I was not aware that Mike Smith was the author of the news report, but I have acknowledged his post in my last post.

EdSet100

25th Nov 2007, 15:59

TD,

78 incidents of Fires were recorded
355 incidents of Fumes/Smoke

Are you able to tell us where you got the above stats from?

You quoted specific numbers, therefore the stats must be based on a structured analysis. Is it possible that someone has a done a simple word search for "fire" in all the incident reports. This will cause "hits" in routine sentences such as "the crew suspected fire", or "the crew carried out the Fire or Fumes in the Cabin drill"..."

There have not been 78 fires on the Nimrod aircraft. That kind of record on a relatively small fleet, would never have been allowed to build up.

Regards
Ed Set

nigegilb

25th Nov 2007, 16:17

Ex-Rigger, as of last week, the customer has not asked for FDA, OBIGGS, Bomb Bay FP, Probe inerting and under-floor FP on MRA4. Of that I can guarantee you. Design for AAR pipework, essentially the same in MRA4.

We await the recs from BoI.

In the case of XV179, UORs hit the desk the day after the BoI was published.

Fingers crossed for the Nimrod fleet.

Magnersdrinker

25th Nov 2007, 16:24

I just think its unfair to judge an aircraft through stats. everyone is quick to find the bad points and use it as some leverage to try and persuade the government they are not fit to fly. Maybe im picking it up wrong.
The Nimrod has one of the best safety records of all aircraft , until recent events.

The BOI is with us soon and they will tell us what happened that day. Maybe once this report is out all that operate the Nimrod can carry on doing what we do with the knowledge we aint going to be splashed across the front page of every newspaper in the land.
If they find something wrong I can assure you they will do every single thing required to make these aircraft fit to use, that im 100% certain of and have solid faith in the Military to provide this.

tucumseh

25th Nov 2007, 17:09

Anyone care to hazard a guess where Nimrod MR is on this curve?

http://i214.photobucket.com/albums/cc291/exploringtheblue/bathtub1.jpg

Exrigger

25th Nov 2007, 17:17

tucumseh can I be the first to guess, no on second thoughts I would probably get it wrong as it seems to easy. I would hazard a guess though that the MOD think it is still on the bottom line between the middle and the start of the curve upwards at the right

Tightflester

25th Nov 2007, 17:20

Exactly, it's hard to determine as there are no defined scales, I'd guess it's in the same region as the Boeing 747 (similar vintage). It's a simple chart and doesn't lend itself to detailed analysis.

tucumseh

25th Nov 2007, 17:42

Thank you ExRigger.

I must be honest and say I don’t know what the MoD think. However, it will be patently obvious that, as one creeps toward the right hand side and upwards, more funding is required to maintain the build standard. It will be equally obvious that an increasing majority of our kit is accelerating toward that point – some has already shot off the scale at the top right corner.

I do know that there are very few sponsors indeed who now monitor this curve with a view to making the correct materiel and financial provision. In effect, MoD policy assumes the bottom line extends indefinitely, and has done for many years now.

Turning to recent discussions on fire/smoke/fumes. As someone holding delegated airworthiness authority, I’ve been fortunate to come across only three serious cases – all on the same a/c type within days of each other. The same people who assumed the “elongated” X axis instructed me not to do anything about the smoke in the cockpit, and denied me funding to fix it. (They were neither engineers nor aircrew). When faced with such crass incompetence and failure of duty of care, you have a choice. Do the right thing, or do what you’re told. I lied, transferred the money from another project and made the aircraft safe. What I did would be almost impossible nowadays because of IPT stovepiping. Because of examples like this, and there are scores, I don’t have the blind faith others do in the MoD’s ability to get it right.

Da4orce

25th Nov 2007, 17:50

The question as I understand it is:

Was the 2nd September loss of XV230 preventable, if so could reasonable steps have been taken to prevent the incident?

We don't have the full picture yet, we have lots of small pieces mainly in the form of FoI documents and reports, significantly the Qinetiq report and the BAE systems report. They may not make for pleasent reading for relatives, ground or air crew, but in the absence of the BoI and coroners inquest I would suggest that anyone who has seen these documents would be very hard pushed to argue that the 230 incident was not preventable.

The BoI but more importantly the coroners inquest are the missing pieces of the puzzle, the coroner must establish whether reasonable steps could have been taken to prevent the loss of XV230 and if they were not taken why not.

Exrigger

25th Nov 2007, 18:01

Da4orce, well said and nicely put.

Mick Smith

25th Nov 2007, 18:09

Just for the record ExRigger, and not said in anger at all, merely for clarification. You said:

Thanks MS, I would rather take credence from that report than from a newspaper, even though in this case they seem to have actually got their facts right. Allthough I will add the newspaper did not appear to have the timescales, so the comments about making things look worse than they are still stands, why use the full facts when missing some out makes a better story and actually makes things look worse than they are.

If you read
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article2937248.ece
you will see that the first two paragraphs read:

THE manufacturer of the RAF’s Nimrod spy planes had warned of “frequent” fires on board the aircraft 18 months before one exploded over Afghanistan last September, killing all 14 men on board.
The BAE Systems report said there had been 880 fires or “smoke-related incidents” on the aircraft over the preceding 20 years, an average of 40 a year.

It was of course 22 years not 20. But that appears to have been a typing error at some point in the editing process. It was not an attempt to deceive and the average of 40 a years is accurate for 880 over 22 years.

The Observer meanwhile made it clear that the period of the 880 incidents covered the period between 1982 and 2004.

Exrigger

25th Nov 2007, 18:35

MS my profuse apologies for my comments, I fell into the trap of not fully reading what was posted and just saw what I wanted to see in line with other posters comments, but I am not afraid to admit when I have c****d up :O.

thunderbird7

26th Nov 2007, 04:21

Fer ferks sake! How many retro fires are in those numbers! How many ****ty recirc fans!How many rib2 overheats How many ****ty aircon fumes (have a chat to RJ and 757 pilots for some long term health issues) . Lives were lost which we all regret but... you don't join the mob without accepting some risk.

HeartofBlackburn

26th Nov 2007, 06:12

This is my first post after watching and reading with interest for many years and covers a few of the issues within this complex thread. It is therefore a bit rambling so sorry.
As someone who flew Nimrods for 6 years, I was lucky to be involved in only one minor Smoke and Fumes incident. There seem to be quite a few people on this thread who think that recent problems are to do with the age of the Nimrod. It is an old aircraft but IMO that is not the major problem The problem is the Government's lack of financing for the aircraft and insufficient time and servicing personnel to do anything other than patch problems not fully repair them. The ground crew do an excellent job under trying circumstances but are fighting a losing battle.
Attitudes that you joined the Services and risk is part of flying do not help. It is a statement of fact but when the risk is unfairly increased due to funding issues then that is another matter. Most people on here have nothing but admiration for the people who fly the aircraft and the excellent and important job that the aircraft does in all the theatres it operates in, but without proper funds to keep her going, the amount of snags, problems and risk is going to do nothing but increase.
This problem is not isolated to the Nimrod. Serviceability at both Lyneham and Waddington are reported to be shocking and the E3 is not an old aircraft and does not fly at low level or consistently in massive temperature changes, so explain that to me if it is not funding and manpower related.
This is all MY opinion and it is how I perceive the current problem. It is a view shared by many of my current and past crew mates but not all of them. We do not trust our lords and masters and we do not trust our Government. Give us the money and the manning to fix the problems and watch the discontent go back to it's usual low level. I like many of my colleagues want a return to the Forces that we joined, a place that was a career and a way of life. This government is rapidly taking that away and turning it into just another job, so stop having a go at people for leaving and/or moaning. Loyalty only stretches so far and is not a one way street as some seem to think.

Winco

26th Nov 2007, 06:46

HoB

I would agree with a lot of what you have written but would not agree about the fact the aircraft is old. The very fact that it is old is what is making it a less reliable aircraft (airframe wise) and that, coupled with what you rightly say is a lack of funds, is the main cause of the problems.
I'm also not sure the groundcrew will agree with you that they are just 'patching things up' but you may well be correct. The fact is that they are doing the very best they can with what they have.

Likewise, the problem is not unique to the Nimrod fleet. The E-3 fleet is in an appalling state, with many of the frames 'long term' u/s. Perhaps the only mitigating factor there is the fact that we flew about 20 years worth of life out of the jets in the first 8 or so years service at Aviano covering the Balkans wars.

Your point about the government and lack of funding is spot on I'm afraid, and this rate, we will be lucky to even have an Air Force soon! (apart from a nice fleet of Typhoons of course, that will save the world for us I'm certain!)

Safety_Helmut

26th Nov 2007, 07:59

The Nimrod has one of the best safety records of all aircraft , until recent events.

The number of times I heard those same words trotted out by those within the Nimrod IPT at Wyton. If you're reading this you know who you are, we discussed it many times. Think about these though:

Bomb bay flare fire - Aircraft landed at St Mawgan, (tail number ?). Accepted that had this happened further from base it would have resulted in disaster.

XW666 - Ditched in Moray Firth - had this happened on a normal Op sortie, with full crew and kit installed and more than a few miles from shore, this too would have resulted in disaster.

So, two total losses averted by luck ! Of course you could argue that the crews were unlcuky in the first place. The bomb bay fire incident I know little about. But XW666 could and should have been avoided. The failure mode had been identified through previous incidents about 10 years previous. Recommendations were made, and not completely followed up. Those responsible for that...............what happened to them ? Please, do not come on here talking about the Nimrod's excellent safety record.

As for the bathtub curve. First consider the indiividual critical systems before considering the whole aircraft. Most of them certainly are in the "end of life/wear out phase". It is patently obviosu that not enough is being spent to maintain them. Collectively this is a very worrying situation ! I don't imagine for one moment that it is any better on the other fleets either.

As for this MD:

If they find something wrong I can assure you they will do every single thing required to make these aircraft fit to use, that im 100% certain of and have solid faith in the Military to provide this.

As someone else has suggested, probably best to lay off the cider. Becuase this attitude is not borne out by action and evidence. The exact opposite I would suggest.

S_H

tucumseh

26th Nov 2007, 08:34

I agree with the argument that many reported incidents of smoke, fumes etc may have benign origins; for example from the galley. To simply quote the number of incidents never gives the full picture. When presented with such statistics one of the questions I always ask is; following the instruction placed on engineering authorities many years ago to reduce the number of requests for fault investigations, how many incidents now go unreported to the proper authority responsible for maintaining airworthiness? At a stroke, this instruction saw a large reduction in investigations, but a huge increase in omnibus 760s. I have asked before – does an omnibus count as one incident, hiding a bigger problem?

The other effects of this policy are obvious. The act of delaying reporting and saving up incidents for an omnibus wastes time if there is an underlying or secondary problem to address. (I suspect there is an element of this behind the QQ and BAeS reports mentioned here). The policy of course had the desired effect; it reduced expenditure in the short term. In the long term it stored up problems and made full recovery action almost impossible. Note – What I describe is almost entirely hidden from front line. You know what it’s like, you report the incident and the great machine takes over. I doubt if many at air stations know of this “savings measure”.

At post #1718 an MoD spokesman is reported as saying;

'The number of signals generated is a reflection of the RAF's comprehensive reporting system which covers any indication, however minor, of fire, smoke, burning, fumes or smell-related occurrences. This would include, for example, incidents as minor as an overheated resistor.'

As usual, my response is; yes, the RAF (and the RN and Army) have a comprehensive reporting system. However, the MoD does not adequately fund full implementation of the complementary investigative and corrective action system. It’s precisely the same as their “We have a robust airworthiness framework” argument. They do, but they don’t implement it.

The final sentence is appalling; a typically ignorant dismissal of the potential hazards an overheating resistor may cause. I assume the spokesman is reading from a brief and doesn’t understand. Equally, the intended audience (the press presumably) will swallow this as evidence MoD has everything under control. The simple fact is that overheating resistors (especially wire wound varieties) reach quite high temperatures. 600 degrees F is typical if the heat is not dissipating properly through heatsink design, or perhaps proximity to other resistors. The smell/fumes may “only” be the enamel burning, but common sense tells you to investigate why it overheated and what effect it has had on the associated circuitry, wiring, equipment etc. Different resistor types have different failure modes. Open circuit, short circuit, high/low resistance. If the heat isn’t dissipated properly, the practical rating becomes a fraction of that specified. A beancounter may think such an occurrence is minor and not worth investigating; to an engineer it’s potential ignition source.

It may seem that many here have opposing views, and the debate is good. But the catalyst for bringing the “sides” closer together is understanding this simple fact - serviceability and airworthiness are two different things. I guess there are very few here who have maintained aircraft & equipment, and then had the soul destroying experience of trying to maintain airworthiness in the face of intense opposition. When I was head down in an aircraft it never crossed my mind that people above me were actively trying to prevent me doing my job. Yes, I moaned about no spares, faults, APs that weren’t quite right, and all the rest. I was lucky that in “my day” I simply demanded the spare or filled in a 760 or 765; and more often than not I got what I wanted. The support infrastructure was centralised and highly trained specialists were adequately funded to provide that key component of airworthiness – support. Now it’s fragmented and grossly underfunded. Those who (mis)manage it aren’t specialists, except in the sense they specialise in being obstructive and hostile to what we are trying to achieve.