Nimrod Information

[WasNaeMe]

check your PM's

[Safeware]

Winco,

The reason why the only absolutely safe aircraft are the ones that don't fly is because that transport, aviation, and military aviation are, in that increasing order, risky activities. The risks can never be removed completely - risk of systems failure, structural failure, human error (be it aircrew, air traffic or maintenance) - but can only be reduced ALARP. Whether through reducing risks by designing out hazards, redundancy, or high integrity systems for single points of failure, the possibility will always exist that an accident will occur. If you want to try and contract someone to build you an aircraft that is perfectly safe, good luck - it will cost a mint (that is if anyone is prepared to accept the commercial risk of doing so).

I don't know if the risks are intolerable or tolerable - I don't have access to the safety case or the evidence supporting it. But yes, part of an ALARP consideration is a cost benefit analysis to establish that "simply spending money" is "reasonably practical". Unfortunately, those making such decisions may not be best equipped or informed to do so and while a crown censure may make people "uncomfortable", I think that only a court of law would actually hold people to account.

sw

[Biggus]

Everyone,

Once and for all, the Nimrod MRA4, is not a "brand new aircraft", at least not in the way you mean....

Yes, it is "new metal", and yes, it is a "new" design, i.e not just a re-worked MR2. However, the design of the MRA4 was 'frozen' many years ago, probably at least 10 years ago. The design was 'frozen' before bomb bay extinguishers and fuel tank protection were considered issues. Yes, no doubt they could be added - and I'm not saying they shouldn't - but don't assume just because the aircraft are only being built now that they are in any way state of the art!

The design for Typhoon was frozen in the early 90s, F-22 probably at least 10 years ago. There is one school of thought that says by the time any complicated military aircraft enters service these days, given the time taken for the programme (JSF anyone?), it is already obsolete!

[WasNaeMe]

"However, the design of the MRA4 was 'frozen' many years ago, probably at least 10 years ago."

Credibility…..Lost!!

[Biggus]

Touring industry in 1991 I discovered that the design of Typhoon was 90% frozen, with tight weight/space limitations.

While I can fully appreciate that some tweaks to MRA4 will result from the development programme, if you are telling me the design is not largely 'frozen' then I suggest the one lacking credibility is yourself!

Engines, sensors, fitments, basic structural layout, all designed and frozen probably several years ago. Any major changes resulting from prototype development will add years, and a lot of money to the programme.....

Which of course does not mean that major changes have not/will not happen!

[WasNaeMe]

The MRA4 design was 'frozen' (AVDS) last November (NOV 2006)...... Endex

[WasNaeMe]

The AVDS (Air Vehicle Design Standard) was frozen as stated....... The only change to the design will be that which is required to meet said standard or that which is mandated by the customer....

[toddbabe]

Just found this on Egoat! reassuring isn't it? it's from a liney at Kinloss, and people still wonder why we are in the state we are in! the groundies are being treated like ****, poorly supported, undermanned, under equipped and dangerously low on morale, Aircrew are frustrated and hitting skill fade really hard and we are all expected to maintain the op output in an ancient Aircraft with large safety concerns hanging over it:mad:

"We have civvies (ex snec's, 1 ex liney getting paid more now than he did when he was in the mob doing same job and not having the whole gulf / guard / ccs hassle!) working here too now.

The PVR's are starting to hurt the manpower now, along with permenant gulf rotation there is a serious shortage of trade knowledge and experience. I can't even get onto any of the 'q' courses due to lack of manpower! The whole system, is crazy and bordering on unsafe for flying!"

[buoy15]

Quite
It is a newbuild ac based on a proven, relatively elderly design, with a mature fuselage that is built like a brick sh*thouse
Everything else, apart from the tube, is 'brand new' (circa 1997-2007)
How many of you out there are buying washing machines, microwaves, cars etc which are 'brand new' because they haven't been used but were manufactured in 2005?
I think the XV230 BOI and other ac incidents in AFG and IRQ will have an impact on the outcome of the initial front line delivery ac
To say that the design is "frozen" is a political, money saving statement
Engineers that design and build things never 'freeze', they look for new ways and inovation - and the lads at Woodford will find a solution.
The major modifications suggested on this thread could be incorporated much like an SEM, LMI, STI etc, within the overall cost
However, the Baron of Profit at BWOS might scupper that

[ORAC]

Sunday Times: Blast fears as Nimrod planes leak fuel on spy missions (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1937063.ece)

[OHP 15M]

Whoever released the protectively marked documents (available as links on the Sunday Times story) to the press has overstepped the mark :=. Stuff like individuals' names, times, dates, heights, frame no.s etc ... (available on the www) is a bad thing.:=

[Tappers Dad]

Well done Mick, now that is Investigative reporting at its best.

http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nirmrodreport1.pdf

http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nimrodreport2.pdf

Looks like there are two crews lucky to still be here, I won't say which crews, read them yourself !!!

[Dave Angel]

I Have to agree with OHP 15M, the IR's complete with personal details should not have been leaked to the press. I would not be happy if it were my crews details. The person who passed them to the Times should have a serious think about the information they are putting onto the WWW, the protective marking of Restricted is there for a reason :ugh:

TD
I have never directly corresponded with you but I knew Ben (and the other crew members) and I am extremley sorry for your family's loss, he was a great lad, fun to be around and is sorely missed.
Best wishes
DA.

[Distant Voice]

Just read Mick Smith's article. If nothing else it does provide the evidence that the AAR system is flawed. That should answer your point WasNaeMe But nothing so far has been proven to be flawed

And Safeware, I am not sure what the risk factor is for one accident and two major incidents involving AAR in four months (Sept, Nov & Dec). I suspect it is worse than 1:1000.

And we still fly.

DV

[Safeware]

DV,

I'm not in a position to disagree with you. As I said, all I'm trying to do is illustrate objectively what should be happening. I'm not trying to defend what is going on.

sw

[Distant Voice]

Safeware: I undersatand.

It is just frustrating to constantly hear from MoD that Nimrod has a good safety record, and so it is fit to fly. To use their own definition of safety case in DEF STAN 00-56 A Safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given environment

I know it has been said before but, absence of evidence of risk is not the same as evidence of absence of risk


DV

[nigegilb]

The fuel leak incidents referred to in Mick Smith's article occurred after SOP's were changed following the XV230 crash.

An unofficial view.

"Since the incident, the SOP for refuelling nimrods has changed. The carter pump is not switched on until asked to by the Nimrod and it is turned off for the final stage of the refuel. I also think they no longer fill to full.
I am positive there will be no blame whatsoever attached to the Tri-Startanker crew. You cannot refuel at the incorrect pressure as the system is automatic and if a carter pump is left on as the flow rate reduces the system will knock it off. It may be put down to the practise of staying in contact after tanks are full, a practise that was also carried out on the VC10. This could have led to the tanks and the vent system being exposed to pressures the system was not designed for."

Furthermore, the incidents continue, this one happened this year.

One of the Nimrods recently landed with 7 tons of fuel sloshing around in the bomb bay, another fuel migration and one which could have seen a repeat of Afghanistan.
I will dig out the Parliamentary answer and compare.

[Da4orce]

Good work Mick Smith :ok:

Restricted document or not, whoever leaked them obviously feels very strongly that safety is being compromised and has had the balls to do something about it. What it highlights is gross negligence on the part of the RAF and MOD.

I know the Nimrod and it's crews perform a crucial role and I know a new jet cannot just be magically brought on line but for the love of god someone with influence has to find a solution before more people die. They've already lost a £70m > jet and a crew with a combined experience of 200 years, somebody please wake up and smell the coffee. :ugh:

[The Swinging Monkey]

Safeware
Do you think therefore, that all aircraft are inherintly unsafe then? I'm not sure Mr Boeing would agree with you or Airbus Industries, or anyone else for that matter. Don't let the airlines know that their aircraft are unsafe either will you??!!!

The thing is, MR4 may or may not be a new build (depends on who you talk to) but there should be no question that following the loss of the Hercules, and the the loss of XV230, any aircraft coming into service today, should be fitted with todays safety equipment. It is unacceptable to say that as the design/build was done 10 years ago, then it is OK to put 10 years old and out-of-date safety kit onto the aircraft.

We need to get real about this. No one is expecting an aircraft that is 100% safe, but we are expecting is an aircraft that is as safe as it possibly can be. Following the loss of XV230, to NOT fit the bomb bay with some form of fire extinguishant or suppresent is bordering on criminal negligence. It must be done. You appear to be saying that it isn't necessary, and that I find a little uncomfortable. Clearly you don't fly Nimrod for a living!

OHP 15M & DA
I would normally agree with your comments, but on this occasion I don't. I hope that the incident reports get printed in the press, so that MPs, the government and the public can all see what is going on. They are only restricted documents, and if you read the definition of that, then you will understand that there has been no harm done to the service whatsoever. As for the Captains name being published, come on guys, have you never read the RAF news where the whole crew has been named?? Of course you have.

toddbabes comments make for seriously disturbing reading. When you have the groundcrew saying things like that, clearly they are in a bad way and seem to be hurting big time. It makes it even more important and worthwhile therefore that all this stuff gets out into the public domain.

TSM

[TheSmiter]

Nothing to do with current problems, however this thread needs an inject of good news.

Nim mates, esp of the 80's period will be delighted to know that Eric Bedford, a well respected Nav Capt who lost his sight at the age of 44 is alive and kicking and looking good. I know this cos he's just beaten the banker on Deal or No Deal.

On this show, he was not only an inspiration to anyone with impaired vision, but was a credit to the RAF - he displayed all the qualities and values we should all aspire to and gave this organisation the best PR it's had in years.

Well done Eric. :D

[hobie]

As an aside ..... why are Imperial and metric units of measurement being used at the same time ? .....

(LBS and KG)

[AC Ovee]

Hobie,
The 2 aircraft use different units of measurement on their gauges.

[hobie]

Hobie,
The 2 aircraft use different units of measurement on their gauges.

Oh $$$$$$ ...... :(

[old-timer]

To hell with the politics;
I salute all Nimrod crews past & present & todays solo Nimrod overhead Chelmsford en-route to the Mall was for me a very moving tribute albeit for the Falkalnds 25 today, but very appropriate to this thread for all the lost crews - I salute them all, one & all, Aircrews of honour to the very end.
Godspeed to them all & their families & loved ones everywhere.

[AC Ovee]

Well, Old Timer, your thoughts are appreciated. However, the aircrew is only one element of the team that gets the jet to where it is needed. Today is a Sunday and the Nimrod doesn't fly on Sundays, unless operationally (or ceremoniously) needed. We don't have the human resources, any more. OK, the aircrew are not overworked at the moment, while at home, so a bit of weekend flying (yesterday included) is nothing to complain about. In fact it was a good reason to fly. However, the groundcrew supporting the two flights this weekend went into work in addition to their normal work routine. And its Father's Day, today. Again, pride in our our predecessors in the Falklands and the "Proud to be British" sentiment when Trooping the Colour and showing off our Service, suggests no complaints from my groundcrew colleagues, but we must never forget that we are all in the same team.

[Tappers Dad]

Please pause for thought this Fathers Day for the 18 children whose fathers were on XV230 Crew 3 and will never come home.

Today is not a good day for any of the families.

We will remember them XXXXXxxxxxxxxx

[AQAfive]

I have refrained from joining in this thread despite some rather suspect facts being banded about.

However the following by nigeglib:

“One of the Nimrods recently landed with 7 tons of fuel sloshing around in the bomb bay, another fuel migration and one which could have seen a repeat of Afghanistan.
I will dig out the Parliamentary answer and compare.”

I could not ignore. (That’s not a personal dig at you nigeglib, many facts quoted by various people have been wrong).

7 Pints perhaps, 7 gallons at a stretch but 7 tons? That’s nearly 16,000lbs, that’s a lot of petrol. The bomb doors would not take it (that’s a guess), however, the fuel would leak out before that amount could collect.

And that’s the problem with repeating stories without understanding their context. Especially incident signals; unless you are the recipient and understand the engineering aspects, all they do is create uncertainty and alarm.

We all care about the problem because we are or were involved in military flying and to us it is a big issue, but we must let the wheels of investigation turn, we will not find the answers otherwise. If they fail to produce a plausible answer and take action to reduce the risk, then is the time to take up the pen.

From my handle those that know the Nimrod will realise I have flown on them from the early days, have many tanking sorties in my log book and knew some of the guys on 230. I too want to know the answers as much as the next man (oh yes, and woman), but feel too much speculation is pointless at this stage.

Time for my cocoa.

[Safeware]

TSM,
I couldn't decide if you were condescending or hard of thinking. Clearly I don't fly Nimrod for a living, and those that do have my utmost respect. And the families who lost loved ones have my deepest sympathy.
I don't think that all aircraft are inherently unsafe, but all aircraft carry an element of risk. And I didn't say that it isn't necessary to put fire extinguishant or suppressant in the bomb bay. In my last post I explicitly said all I'm trying to do is illustrate objectively what should be happening. I'm not trying to defend what is going on.
To re-cap for you what I did say:
There are 3 levels of risk - Intolerable, Tolerable and Broadly Acceptable. Where risks are tolerable, it is for the duty holder to weigh up the benefits of introducing a safety system against the implications of doing so, ie a judgement of "reasonable practicality". I'm not in a position to judge, based on objective examination of the evidence, whether the argument being made is sound.

As for Mr Boeing and Mr Airbus, I believe that they make aircraft that are tolerably safe. Why only tolerably safe? Because even the certification specifications against which civil aircraft are made do not demand absolute safety:
The aeroplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that –
(1) Any catastrophic failure condition
(i) is extremely improbable; and
(ii) does not result from a single failure;
So, where a civil aircraft is certified (and btw, don't try and ask them for a "safety case") against a technical hull loss probability of 1 in 10 million per flying hour and your pilot is exposed (rounded for simplicity) to 1000 hrs flying hours pa then the level of risk for an individual pilot is in the tolerable zone. Society tolerates this level of risk because of the benefits of air travel.

sw

[Winco]

Safeware,

I must admit that I too am a little bemused at your reply now. First you say that ALL aircraft are dangerous to one degree or another, only to retract that statement by saying that they you don't think they are. So what's it to be?

Before you go and give me another patronising and very lengthy explanation about duty of care, aircraft certification, tolerable, intolerable and acceptable levels of risk, and goodness knows what else, let me just put my cards on the table and explain that with almost 15,000 hours of flying in my log book (Lots in the military and quite a few on Nimrod) I do know just a little bit about aircraft and how they operate, and would rarther you didn't reply as if I were someone who graduated from Cranwell yesterday. Neither am I being condescending!

The fact is that if Mr Boeing finds something that is 'dangerous' on my current aircraft, and it can be replaced or retro-fitted to overcome that danger, then its done. That is because there is a danger to the aircraft and therefore the pax (and me!) Remember the door on a 747/200 that detached in flight? the chances of it happening again were minute, infintisimally small, but the whole fleet were checked and the mechanism replaced. Any ideas how many 747/200 there were at the time? Well I don't know either, but there was a hell of a lot more than a hand full of Nimrods I can assure you. As a follow on, all future 747s (and probably many others types) were fitted with the new mechanism, without question.

Niimrod has been an outstanding aircraft and has served this country wonderfully, but it is sadly out of date and we need to move on with up-to-date aircraft. If we are going to stick with the MR4 then it needs to be brought up to date, not only with avionics and weapons sytems, but with the basic airframe needs, and that means a reliable and competant fire suppression sytem that covers the whole aircraft. It is farcical to think that the bomb bay on this aircraft does not have even a single fire extinguisher! It is ridiculous to put all your weapons in one basket, but not be able put out a fire in that location. I wonder which baffoon dreamt that one up?

You begin to sound like a politician Safeware! Your comment of 'Mr Boeing and Mr Airbus, I believe that they make aircraft that are tolerably safe' I think is inaccurate and false. I would say that they both make aircraft that are as safe as they can possibly be for the year 2007. In 5 years time, they may well be regarded as 'intolerably safe' as standards increase and safety improves, but at the moment they are as safe as they can be made. NIMROD IS NOT! And thereby lies the problem.

The RAF, (as it has had to do for many years now), will have to make do with what they get and like it! I know that MR2s are unsafe, the aircrew at Kinloss know it and so do some of the groundcrew it would appear. It is wrong of you to seemingly defend this level of danger as being within your 'tolerable' limits. Try telling that to the families of those we have lost.

The Winco

[Wader2]

The Winco,

I take your personal point of criticism of Safeway 'patronising and very lengthy explanation' may I make a counter point?

These are open fora where others are reading and learning too. Some of us follow every post, others dip in from time to time. In other words, Safeway may be patronising on a one-to-one basis or had he posted in a PM. Here I think it was not unreasonable.

[Winco]

Wader,
Thank you for coming to the assisstance of Safeware, but you have also failed to see my point Sir.

We all know how the MR4 project will be seen - the RAF will get a new replacement for Nimrod MR2, updated Avionics, better Sonics, better Radar, more powerful engines and a whole miriad of other goodies. and the public will think that all is great in Maritime once more.

What the public will not be told however, is that the aircraft will NOT have foam in the wings, it will not have state of the art fire suppressant. Infact, it won't even have a single fire extinguisher located in the bomb bay. Now forget all about tolerable, intolerable and acceptable levels of risk; this is basic, simple fire precaution/fire fighting stuff. There is nothing more simple than a fire extinguisher is there?

So all this Red Herring stuff about aircraft certification, and that is all it is, has no bearing whatsoever on the fact the the MR4 will still have a 1940s/1950s fire fighting capability, and that cannot be right.

As for the AAR. As I have said, 25 yerars ago it was acceptable, but I'm not convinced that the very same system cannot be improved upon for the inclusion into MR4. Even the Tristar has double thickness pipes throughout, Nimrod MR4 DOES NOT? Why not? Why are you appearing to defend such appalling penny-pinching and cost-saving measures that affect aircraft and therefore aircrew safety?

My point about Mr Boeing is but a simple one. He will make the aircarft of taoday as safe as it is possible to make an aircraft today. In 5 years time it may be out of date, but today it is spot on. Nimrod MR4 will be 10, 20 30 years out of date as soon as it roles out. Not the engines, and not the avionics, but on the fire safety/suppressant side and the AAR side also.

Please try to understand that I am in no way having a go at anyone on this forum, but we have to look at what MR4 is; a (very) old design, with a few gucci bits of kit bolted on but an aircraft that still retains an out of date and (potentially) dangerous lack of fire fighting capability and AAR ability.

The Winco

[nigegilb]

Further to the Winco's post, Mr Boeing provides 215 minutes worth of fire extinguishant in the FWD/AFT Cargo hold of a 747. Mr Boeing is also fitting state of art fuel tank protection to the latest Boeing airliners coming off the line. There have been about 5 attributed fuel tank explosions in airliners in the last 25 years or so. The RAF has had probably 4 in the last 30 months in it's tiny inventory. (anyone see the video of the J on the strip, did you check out the port wing?)

Needless to say civil airliners don't get shot at (with the exception of DHL, which also suffered a fuel tank explosion) and don't do AAR. What does that tell you about cost benefit analysis in the RAF just now?

I am checking out the latest order for 5xJ Hercs from RNAF. I understand that LM is fitting nitrogen gas inerting equipment as standard on the latest Hercs. Maybe this is the way ahead, cut out the customer from the decision making.

[tucumseh]

“Maybe this is the way ahead, cut out the customer from the decision making”.


That’s precisely what the MoD want, I believe. They’re not allowed to “solutionise” anymore by specifying what they want. In turn, this leads to (a) further dumbing down, as the people capable of specifying are considered dinosaurs and ignored, and (b) an inability to act as an intelligent customer.

While not wishing to excuse some of the acquisition blunders of the past, many stem from politics. But the above policy has resulted in a noticeable increase in real schoolboy howlers which are wasting hundreds of millions (and that’s just on a single project I could mention). The outcomes are mixed. Some companies simply deliver the wrong thing in ignorance. Some knowingly deliver the wrong thing, and stand back waiting for the blank cheque to fix it. Others try to educate the MoD. They’re the ones who suffer.

[AQAfive]

Winco

All that you say is true; however, there is one missing fact. Mr Boeing and Mr Airbus will recoup his extra costs over the production run of the ac. If Mr Boeing and Mr Airbus does nothing, he might not sell any more ac, he goes out of business. The Ministry cannot recoup costs and therefore a cost benefit analysis will establish that 2 bomb bay fires over 36 years will justify the non inclusion of fire suppression. Had the first one not occurred in the circuit at St Mawgan, they too might have had an unfortunate end.

Like it or like it not that is how we build military ac. Change the spec and BAES will charge the earth and the costs will have to come from somewhere within the defence budget because this government does not see defence as a priority.

Its not called penny pinching, it's called affordability.

The Nimrod is not Typhoon, therefore is not a priority.

Don't get me wrong, I am in your gang, but alas MOD PE, DPA, DE & S or whatever they chose to call themselves this week, are not.

[thunderbird7]

"It is farcical to think that the bomb bay on this aircraft does not have even a single fire extinguisher! It is ridiculous to put all your weapons in one basket, but not be able put out a fire in that location. I wonder which baffoon dreamt that one up?"
Just wondering what sort of fire extinguisher puts out fires in magnesium, HE or ( out of date but i can't remember the new stuff ) OTTO? No fire suppression in the bomb bay is a bit of risk analysis really. Stores jettison would be the best way of putting out the most likeley source of fire in that location, IMHO.




ps;while I have 42 posts, I would just like to clear the air by stating I never served on the 'monday-to-friday-beach-bum-squadron' :rolleyes:

[Tappers Dad]

thunderbird7

"Just wondering what sort of fire extinguisher puts out fires in magnesium"

Can I refer you to my posting on 16th June 2007, 16:21 #499

And also:

Fires can be extinguished with a MET-L-X powder extinguisher for fires involving combustible metals - magnesium, sodium (spills and in depth), potassium, sodium-potassium alloys uranium and powdered aluminum

[BEagle]

Just remember what happened to the DHL A300 which was hit by a MANPAD system a couple of years ago:

http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/DHLwing.jpg

http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/DHLA300.jpg

The aircraft lost ALL hydraulic systems and ALL flying controls. It was landed with exceptional skill by use of differential thrust.

It is absolutely essential that all future large aircraft AND all present large aircraft are fitted with adequate defence systems and fuel tank explosive suppression systems.

The damage to the DHL aircraft's outer tank was caused by a fuel fire, not by the MANPAD system's warhead.

[dun-testin]

To pick on a point raised previously, actually the ‘stuff about certification’ is important. It’s the airworthiness system in MoD not working as intended that’s at the root of things. Pick any in service IPT and you’ll find the same issues under the rug.

Commercial Aviation

What Mr Boeing and Mr Airbus do is meet the certification requirements in force at the time when the application is made for type certification. They will satisfy mandatory requirements to get the certification from the regulator (minus whatever aspects they can ‘grandfather’ if the aircraft is based on an older one). This is a world away from designing to be as safe as it can ‘possibly be’. No commercial organisation does that. If they say they do its just PR.

The industry functions on the basis that the regulatory compliance ensures an adequate level of safety. There is also a requirement within the regulations themselves to demonstrate safety against a numerical target. As Safeware said previously good luck finding a fully comprehensive example of that being done. The Safety Case concept is not applied in the industry.

Then, once the aircraft is sold to customers, the manufacturer has a requirement to respond to any in service data showing that the design is not meeting the designed level of safety. This is also required by regulation.

The prescriptive regulations prevent anybody from doing anything outrageously stupid for commercial reasons. Shortfalls in designs are fixed after sufficient incidents accrue to force the hand of the parties involved. The regulations also evolve slowly over time in response to technology changes.

MoD

The Military situation is rather different since MoD is its own regulator. This means that the manufacturer proceeds in sole reference to the contracted requirements and the direction it gets from the customer. MoD is full of standards and design criteria. Some are out of date, some are good. However its all entirely dependent on whatever makes it into the contract. That’s under the control of the IPTL.

The regulation JSP 553 provides the baseline criteria for airworthiness. In recent years the move has been away from safety by compliance with specific technical requirements of the kind found in EASA regulations towards safety cases. Basically, ‘do it any way you want just convince us the risk is tolerable’.

There is supposed to be an element of independence built in to the system. The airworthiness reporting chain is supposedly separate. The standard IPTL letter of delegation requires (or did require, been a while since I looked) the IPTL to deliver an airworthy aircraft and calls out JSP 553 and other documents like Defence Standard 00-970 in support. The IPTL is duty bound to satisfy these requirements. That means getting adequate resources to do the job. If this cannot be done work should cease and it be escalated to higher levels of authority.

This assumes a lot. It assumes that the man in post understands his crucial regulatory airworthiness role. It also assumes he is willing to be personally extremely unpopular in the interests of safety. Possibly to the detriment of his career. It assumes the IPTL will stand up and tell other personnel of higher rank in the same organisation that they cant have the equipment needed because there is not enough money allocated to make the risk tolerable.

As there is never enough money the pressure is always to compromise something. With capability compromises the effects are immediately tangible and opposed vocally by end users. Safety compromises often are not immediately obvious and thus meet less resistance. The flexibility of a safety case approach is also its weakness if the safety culture of the organisations involved is not strong enough. Often considerable pressure is brought to bear on IPTLs to make do, this manifests in watered down safety requirements to contractors and pressure on IPT safety managers to recommend things as tolerable. The same pressure often flows down to system engineers within the manufacturers from their management eg “I spoke to IPTL x and he says that that we don’t need this extra safety feature, he cant afford to pay for it and it would slip the schedule”. From the manufacturers management perspective the customer is right, especially as he’s the regulator as well. DECs voicing their opinion on airworthiness issues to contractors management muddies the waters even further.

While on paper the system is still robust its implementation is not in many cases. The widespread resource shortages are undermining the safety culture in the organisation and its not likely to get better in the conceivable future. :*

back in my box now....

[Safeware]

Winco,
It is obvious from your statement above that you aren't actually reading what I've written:
First you say that ALL aircraft are dangerous to one degree or another, only to retract that statement by saying that they you don't think they are. So what's it to be? - I never said that all aircraft were dangerous, then changed my mind to say they weren't.

What I said was The safety case should reflect the level of risk. There may well be a risk of loss of aircraft through fire. The safety case should should identify the hazards leading to such an accident and show that such hazards have been mitigated to an acceptable level (As Low As Reasonably Practical). Such an level doesn't mean no risk though. and then transport, aviation, and military aviation are, in that increasing order, risky activities. The risks can never be removed completely - risk of systems failure, structural failure, human error (be it aircrew, air traffic or maintenance) - but can only be reduced ALARP. So I didn't say that aircraft are dangerous, but that flying carries a risk (even in a 'safe' aircraft).

I followed this with a simple There are 3 levels of risk - Intolerable, Tolerable and Broadly Acceptable. Where risks are tolerable, it is for the duty holder to weigh up the benefits of introducing a safety system against the implications of doing so, ie a judgement of "reasonable practicality". and an explation of the civil safety requirements to show that even they don't expect absolute safety.

I also agree that Mr Boeing and Mr Airbus are making aircraft which, given the currently available technologies are as safe as possible, but once again, don't confuse this level of safety with an absolute absence of risk.

I have no problem with the fact that Mr Boeing and Mr Airbus fix problems when they find something "dangerous". That is also what I think Mr MOD should do with Nimrod.

All I'm trying to point out is that it isn't as simple as you make out - the wheels will be establishing THEIR argument about what THEY are doing (be it right or wrong). You seem to be missing the point that I'm not defending their position so your accusation that I "seemingly defend this level of danger as being within your 'tolerable' limits " is way off mark. What I'm trying to explain is what the CORRECT process is for management of risk.

sw

[AC Ovee]

I want to make a second point about the fire extinguisher and bomb bay issue. Most successful aviation extinguishants rely on the principle of oxygen starvation and compartmentalising the aircraft by design. Tappers Dad quoted the avionic bays in other jets and a modern expanding gas. Well, yes, that system will work because the gas expands into a small, sealed bay and starves the bay of oxygen, or if it is not sealed, it will have a limited ventilation system that will account for the needs of the fire extinguishant.

The Nimrod bomb bay is not sealed in flight. The 4 doors close together for aerodynamic purposes and they leave significant air gaps around them. When the doors are closed, the bomb bay heating system continually delivers warm air into the bay. I don't know what the volumetric rate of air exchange is, but 4 distribution ducts, each the size of domestic tumble drier hoses, are delivering air into the bay. The bay does not pressurize, therefore all of that air leaves the bay at the same rate that it goes in, via the gaps around the doors. So, in the event of a fire in the bay, the heating system will be switched off to prevent further oxygen feed. If, by design, a fire extinguisher was then immediately directed into the bay, 4 tumble drier hoses worth of air and extinguishant would be sucked out of the bay through the effects of flying at 200 kts. So, the volume of designed extinguishant that has to be stored in the jet has to be capable of exceeding the amount of bomb bay heating supply, at the outset, and then continue to smother the fire for a sustained period. The heating air is supplied by the 4 engines, so its a big task for any extinguishant to exceed. Impossible, in my opinion.

The people who designed the Nimrod were intelligent and thoughtful and put extinguishers everywhere they believed they could be needed and where they would be effective. I trusted their judgement when I first found out how the aircraft was built and I still do.

Mr Winco and Tappers Dad, as much as we would wish it otherwise, please accept that the Nimrod bomb bay cannot be protected by fire extinguishers while it is empty.

[The Swinging Monkey]

AC Ovee,

I'm sorry to inform you that you are wrong my dear chap.
The principles you quote are correct and plausable, but the fact remains that the Nimrod bomb bay could, and should have beeen fitted with a fire extinguishant, especially on the MR4, and thats most people are banging on about now. I hate to say it, but to retro fit the bomb bay on the MR2 is probably not worth it given it's short time left in service.

The Nimrod bomb bay is unique in that it is heated as you say by ducted air from the engines, and MR4 is just the same. That said, the heating can be switched off, and in an emergency (unless SOPs have changed) was regularly switched off. At this point, one of the boys down the back would look down the old periscope and check the bay for a fire, smoke or fumes, and the captain would thereafter decide on the best course of action.

But why do you feel that you could not flood the bomb bay at this point with an extinguishant? lets say some form of inert gas? Reason = Cost £££££££
There is no other reason at all. High pressure inert gas is used throughout avaiation for such an event. I would expect the same to go for civilian jets.

But the simple, blunt, distasteful and disturbing reason is because it will cost money, and thereby lies the problem.

Now Mr Safeware has come up with all this statistical nonesence about reasonable risk, acceptable risk blah, and those at MOD and BWOS will have looked at these figures and gone for them in a big way, saying 'hey, we can save a few quid here chaps' Lets not bother with the bomb bay fire senario, because in all the years of Nimrod, we have only had a handful of incidents, and lost only 2 aircraft (I'm including the St Mawgan jet that was eventually cat 5) so as Safeware says, its an 'acceptable risk' (I say bollox it is!)

What The Winco and others are saying is that MR4 should be made as safe a is humanly possible for todays standards, and I agree entirely with them. If XV230 had been fitted with a bomb bay fire-fighting system, who knows whether it would have survived or not? It might have just bought the guys a few more minutes to get the jet on the ground. If that had been the case (and we will never know) does anyone still think its an 'acceptable risk'??

Safeware, your comments read like those of a polititian. Maybe you are one, I don't know. But I find some of your comments in bad taste, especially given the fact that Nimrod 4 is regarded as a 'new jet' by the those who will fly it. It now appears it will be using old parts and old technology, clearly a move to save on costs, and not using state of the art fire fighting kit. That is a shameful and unacceptable way to conduct things, but I suppose the bean counters will be rubbing their greasy little hands, pleased with themselves at having saved a few extra pounds for the asylum seekers, and not bothered that the lives of RAF aurcrew have been put in danger.
Thank God I'm no longer on the fleet.
KInd regards to all
TSM

[nigegilb]

Further to TSM's post a couple of thoughts. Firstly the Nimrod bomb bay is protected by fire extinguishant on certain occasions.


"Regarding the bomb bay fire extinguisher issue. The Nimrod has a 'trooping role' and in order to be used in that manner 6 extended range fuel tanks would be fixed in the bomb bay. With this fit 10 fire extinguishers would also be fitted. However, in the normal fit we do not have either the extended range tanks or the fire extinguishers fitted. That means that day to day there is no fire protection in the bomb bay. However, the bomb bay fire drill calls for all stores to be jettisoned, and to my knowledge there has only been one actual bomb bay fire in the life of the ac. This was caused by an electrical fault causing a flare to ignite when power was supplied to the weapons carrier."

I am sure it doesn't take the brains of a rocket scientist to work out how many would be required for an empty bomb bay.

Secondly, when the Nimrod was originally designed nobody expected it to do AAR. So, if AAR is the weakest link and it is not possible to safely protect the bomb bay then bloody well stop doing AAR and stop letting the likes of AOC2Gp overrule safety decisions.

Furthermore, if hot air is the likely reason for the ignition, (The theory has now been explained to me), TSM is quite correct in that some fire extinguishant may well habe bought the boys enough time to get the aircraft on the deck.

Finally, OBIGGS is a one shot system if it fails to put the fire out in the duration of the nitrogen charge, then the fire could come back. PROBIGGS is a constant nitrogen producing system. But guess what, it costs money.

[betty swallox]

For the record..it's Nimrod MRA 4, not MR or Mk4.

[tucumseh]

TSM
I’m sure Safeware can speak for himself, but what he says is undoubtedly true. Like most of us, he doesn’t make up the rules, but knows them inside out. And uses them positively, for your benefit.

It is the experience and dedication of people like Safeware, who are prepared to fight the beancounters and other sycophants, that provides you with aircraft that, invariably, exceed the required safety standards.

These standards are deemed satisfactory at the time. However, as technology progresses, new requirements emerge and legislation changes then it is quite a different thing to MAINTAIN safety and airworthiness through life. This needs significant investment but, as I have said before, is largely ignored by many in MoD who think it a waste of money. With respect, and I fully agree with most of what you say, your ire should be aimed at others.

Make no mistake, there are those in MoD, both Service and civilian, who don’t give a flying **** about you. They see ANY problem affecting Time or Cost, including safety and airworthiness, as a hindrance to their advancement. As for Performance, word has come down from on high that Customers (Sponsors and Users) must be prepared to trade out more performance (which MAY save on time and cost, but very often doesn’t). As performance includes safety and airworthiness, you would think this edict would carry a suitable caveat. It doesn’t. So, these people happily quote it and accept aircraft and equipment off-contract that don’t come within a country mile of the very minimum standard Safeware speaks of. Luckily, they are in the minority but, increasingly, hold senior posts. But luck shouldn’t come in to it. Successive generations have quickly learned how to get the ticks in boxes – and it’s most definitely NOT by sticking ones head above the parapet on issues like this.

[Da4orce]

I think maybe a crucial point is being missed here.

Spending money fitting fire protection to the Nimrod bomb bay MR2 or MRA4 is surely like buying a gold plated bucket to catch water from a leaking roof. Fix the roof and you don't need the bucket!!!

Stop the fuel escaping into the bomb bay in the first place and the need for bomb bay fire pretection is reduced. I accept that I have simplified the process slightly but surely fixing the source of the leak is a more sensible approach.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

betty swallox. Bearing in mind that the Nimrod is a British aeroplane, why isn't the Mark yet to be delivered a MK 4?

[Safeware]

tuc, thank you.

I think I've explained things in a simple enough manner, if any more is needed, I'm glad to help.

sw

[Tappers Dad]

Information Please

Could someone please please tell me where on a Nimrod MR2 is Fuel tank 7 fitted. I understand there have been problems in this area in the past.

[SpannerSpinner]

Its one fo the smallest tanks on the ac. In between the rear wing area and the fuselage (on both sides). If I can 2nd guess where you're referring to TD, and if memory serves me right, that was where the "seals were melted" (according to panorama tv) on XV227. The heat had had sufficient time to melt some of the PRC sealant in the starboard side 7 tank.

Hope this helps

[WasNaeMe]

TD, Check your PM's

[betty swallox]

GBZ.
I guess it will be. Eventually. I only wanted to highlight the "A" bit. Cheers

[Distant Voice]

I could be missing something in the cross-talk, but A is for Attack.

DV

[Secretsooty]

TD, the area shown on 227 was the ground air start panel, a facility to connect a ground air starter trolley for engine starting if the aircraft's own auxilliary power unit (APU) has failed for any reason. it utilises the same ducting that the tailpack conditioning unit uses (used, now not in use!) to feed air forward. 7 tank starboard is effectively just above this panel, sandwiched in the wing-root between the fuselage and the number 3 engine jet-pipe. There is a full metal rib between the jet pipe and tank though, with a suitable airspace either side of it, and fire detection "firewire" on the jet-pipe side of the rib, indicated as No.3 Zone 2. This area has 2 shots of fire extinguishant available to it if required.

DV, MRA2 - Maritime Reconnaisance and Attack, indeed. It is (was!) a submarine hunter-killer!

Thunderbird7, it's not farcical that there was never a bomb-bay fire extinguishant system, at the time the aircraft was designed there was no system available that could deliver a sufficient volume without causing an unacceptable weight/space penalty in the eyes of the designers. There are various types of system available today, I don't deny that, but at what price? The MOD won't spend that ammount on something that's about to go out of service, but that doesn't excuse the lack of such a system on the MR4, in my opinion.

The "Range extension tanks" referred to previously have never, to the best of my knowledge, ever been fitted to an in-service aircraft. In fact, I can guarantee they have never physically existed at ISK from 1985 to the present day. I did hear that they existed (2 sets only) at Warton in the late 80's.
As for tonnes of fuel in the bomb-doors, it has happened before and will no doubt happen again. I have personal experience.

[nigegilb]

TD, I have been informed from various sources that XV230 suffered a wing root fire before the explosion. It would fit with a problem with tank 7. Further to Sooty's post, there is no reason why MRA4 could not have a fire extinguishant for the bomb bay. The bomb bay in MRA4 is now split into 2. So in theory you could have 1 extinguishing systen covering both bomb bays. All it needs is money and time to test. Something the RAF Top Brass don't appear to have. All hangs on the BoI now, because the RAF does not do "Top Brass" leadership any more.

[betty swallox]

DistantVoice
Uh huh



See
www.naval-technology.com/projects/nimrod/

[Distant Voice]

Secretsootie; I was talking about the MRA 4, which still has a spec as a Maritime Reconnaisance Attack aircraft. Nothing else.

DV

[ase engineer]

Having come late to this thread, a few comments on the recent posts I've managed to read:
"that MR4 should be made as safe a is humanly possible for todays standards"
Well, it'll never fly then. That'll be as safe as we can make it! The best you can hope for is as safe as is reasonably practicable. That puts it into a judgement call of what you can reasonably do, and indeed what is reasonable.

"OBIGGS is a one shot system if it fails to put the fire out in the duration of the nitrogen charge....,"
Err... not quite. It Generates the Inert Gas over a period and once the required concentration is reached it should prevent a fire from starting. If the volume, e.g. bomb bay is so leaky, which it sounds like it is, that you can't build up the N2 content, then you'll never prevent a fire, which would be agood reason for not trying to use it in that environment. There are however several other systems relying on other extinguishants which could be used in that sort of environment and could be activated very (very) quickly by flame detectors or not quite so quickly by firewires.

However although I have to agree that fuel shouldn't be leaking in the first place, it should be a risk that is foreseen and measures put in place to deal with it....if these are reasonably practible.

[JFZ90]

I think I've explained things in a simple enough manner, if any more is needed, I'm glad to help.
sw

I think you've explained things as simply as reasonably practicable (ASARP).

It would be fair to suggest that the risk methodology you outline is considered best practice in safety & engineering circles. Those who mock it should understand that in doing so they are therefore destroying their own credibility.

Any here actually KNOW if you could put effective fire supressant technology into a hugh drafty space like the nimrod bomb bay and what it would take? Intuitively it sounds totally impractical to me, though it would be interesting to know how it could be done (if at all).

[Distant Voice]

Sorry BS, am I missing something? Your link simply supports my statement "The main roles (MRA 4 implied) are, maritime reconnaisance, anti sub warfare and SAR". Not much of that in Iraq and Afghanistan situations.

DV

[betty swallox]

DV
You asked why the A. I pointed you in the right direction. Whilst the Nimrod's job, at present, does not qualify as attack, that's not to say the MRA4 role may be exactly the same as the MR2. Way back, when the contract was in its infancy, its fair to say that attack may have, and may will be in the future, an aspiration. Who can predict the world's affairs in a number of years. Almost impossible to say. Hence, there may be an aspiration to use it in that role, maybe not. It may be comforting to believe that there lies some forethought in this decision making.
Its also not unreasonable to understand that the world is a changed place since the contract was drawn up. But that's not to say MRA4 will not be involved in these roles you point out. Flexibility, etc, etc.

[AQAfive]

Just to clarify, the A in MRA 4 is to emphasise the attack capability of the ac using Harpoon AGM 84 in a maritime role. It was, and is, designed as a maritime platform. That the present MR2 platform undertakes other duties at present will have to will need to be addressed after the ac enters service. To add capability during development is called requirements creep and cannot be undertaken without incurring cost and time delays.


I was once told by a crew chief that ASW stood for Any Sort of Warfare, I guess he was right.

[Distant Voice]

Hi! Ase Engineer. Better late than never. I believe A/C should be made safe; and can fly. Safe means (DEF STAN 00-56) " Risk has been demonstated to have been reduceed to a level that is broadly acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application in a given application in a given operating environment"

And ALARP means; "A risk is ALARP when it has been demonstrated that the cost of any further risk reduction, where cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as finacial or other resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from that risk reduction."

But DEF STAN 00-56 also implies that a/c can be flown that are "unacceptable". Because MOD's definition of "unacceptable" is " A level of risk that is tolerable only under exception circumstances" And that, they will claim is where we are today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But, at the end of the day, I would say to Tapper's Dad and the families of the lost ones, forget the BOI; believe in the inquest. There the truth will be revealed. BOI report will be just part of the evidence.

DV

[Safeware]

DV,

The problem then comes when "exceptional circumstances" become the norm. The norm is then perpetuated and the management forget about the level of risk because everyone is now used to it.

Strapping yourself to the side of an Apache to go get your mate is "exceptional", continuing AAR in a leaky fleet isn't.

sw

[Distant Voice]

Betty; No, I did not ask about the "A". I know what the "A" stands for. I suppose the point that I am making is that we are funding a £4 billion program to develove a MRA a/c when the MRA is no longer the prime task. Everyone believes that the tasks in Iraq and Afgahnistan will get easier with the MRA 4, but the truth is the a/c does not have the kit for those type of tasks. We are producing an a/c for the "cold war", that has long gone. And, please please, do not come back with a "It could return" statement. Because that I will know that you are out of touch with the political situation, which drives all these events.

DV

[Distant Voice]

Safeware: I agree with you. I do not support the definitions in the DEF STAN, I am just quoting them. I believe "unacceptable" means what any normal person would take it to mean. I also believe that that is the way the inquest will view it.

DV

[nigegilb]

DV. But DEF STAN 00-56 also implies that a/c can be flown that are "unacceptable". Because MOD's definition of "unacceptable" is " A level of risk that is tolerable only under exception circumstances"
Exceptional circumstances including continued Ops in Asia and an AAR course at Kinloss days after the crash. I am very experienced at Senior Officers taking risk calls on my behalf. Those AAR sorties were carried out on orders by AOC 2 Gp. It is called military risk, and it is used as a handy management tool.
Nimrod could be made very much safer by protecting the bomb bay and fuel tanks. There is no excuse.

[AQAfive]

DV

Whilst your point is accurate accept this, the MR2 carries out whatever tasks it carries out and is overdue for replacement. If you don’t replace it with a similar platform capable of development, what do you do – keep it flying?

Now we can start talking about UAV’s and other platforms for Afghanistan and the like, however, we are an island nation that relies on sea trade for our survival, not to have a maritime capability is short sighted and irresponsible.

Whether the MRA4 is the right platform, is another debate.

Time for my cocoa again

[WasNaeMe]

Check yer PM's

[betty swallox]

AQAfive.
You took the words right out of my mouth.
DV.
I'm not being objectionable or stick in the mud. Or out of touch. I hope you can accept that.

[nav attacking]

DV

You are obviously unaware of the types of missions the current MR2 is undertaking in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The only thing the current aircraft is missing is a weapons system although I am sure the aircraft could have been retro fitted for 500lb SDB if required.

As for the MRA4 it will not lack that as it is already setup with the required weapons databus to allow it (subject to clearances etc) to carry ANY of the RAFs current weapons systems. It will very easily be able to carry out attacks in the theatres you refer to, if we are still there... You obviously haven't heard of the term "Sensor to shooter", MRA4 will take out the need for the link to the shooter as it would be able to loiter for nearly twice as long as the current aircraft and have the ability to self designate and take out any targets detected. OK the EO needs to be upgraded to latest spec as it is still the old spec and is taking so long to come into service. Given upgraded sensors and weapons
I personally think it would be the platform of choice for any commander involved in either of the theatres you mention...PROVIDED IT GETS THE FUNDING AND SUPPORT!!!

Forget an expensive armed UAV which has its own limitations even compared to the current MR2 and just how 3 will ever be enough god only knows. The current need is for multi-role platforms that can deliver a long loiter ISTAR and attack capability.

[AC Ovee]

Any here actually KNOW if you could put effective fire supressant technology into a hugh drafty space like the nimrod bomb bay and what it would take? Intuitively it sounds totally impractical to me, though it would be interesting to know how it could be done (if at all).

It seems that there are a few here who think they know. When the jet was designed, extinguishers were fitted (routed) into the engine bays, the underfloor bays and the crew compartment (for direction by hand into the avionics crates). That is sufficent evidence to me that fire protection was extensively considered. I don't think the Comet had underfloor extinguishers, but I stand to be corrected. There is no record, but I would guess that fire extinguishant for the bomb bay was discussed by people who did know about quantities and effects. The design was for fuel tanks to go in the bay for extended range, but they were never (I believe) fitted. As I mentioned in my first post, the tanks would have taken up sufficient volume in the bay to facilitate use of extinguishant around them, just like the engines do in their own compartments. So, fire bottles were planned to go in there only if the tanks were fitted.

Just to add to my comments about the ability of the bay to leak vast amounts of air air with the doors shut, approx one third of the cabin pressurization air is exhausted into the bay as well, and it still will not pressurize.

I'm convinced that it cannot be done with an empty bay, even with modern gasses, but thats only my opinion. I'm content and have nothing to prove because I have no argument against the status quo. Those who want to challenge the status quo should contact Graviner and get some qualified information. Otherwise I believe we will simply go around in circles.

The MRA4 has 2 independant bomb bays, so the problem is more than halved. Again, it would only be a guess as to how much extinguishant would be needed. I hope it can be achieved and, if so, I hope it will be given consideration.

[ase engineer]

JF asks
"Any here actually KNOW if you could put effective fire supressant technology into a hugh drafty space like the nimrod bomb bay and what it would take?"

Well, yes. It is. Much larger volumes such as the insides of flour mills (i.e. buildings) are routinely protected against dust explosions by such systems.

Typically will detect an explosion shortly after ignition occurs.It will then discharge an agent to extinguish the explosion flame, typically using a detonator to release Halon or inert powder although pressurised water can also be used. You would need several detectors to ensure that you could see the explosion starting and lots of extinguishers to get the extinguishant to the right places in the right time.

[AC Ovee]

But, are these building moving at 200 kts, or more, having all that extinguishant sucked out at the same time?

and lots of extinguishers to get the extinguishant to the right places in the right time.

"Lots". Thats not a qualified answer. I'm sure that a fire extinguisher company in the avaition field will have computer models that will take into account the volume, the atmospheric pressure, the class of fire and the unavoidable rate of leakage of the extinguishant from the container, etc.

[Winco]

I regret that this thread is simply going round in circles.
On the one hand we have safeware, who I am assured is a highly qualified chap, who can read to us 'chapter and verse' the various levels or degrees of risk and goodness what else. We have AC Ovee who claims that the Nimrod bomb-bay cannot have a fire suppressant system because it is too big and leaks a lot and then when he has things explained to him, questions whether or not grain silos fly through the air at 200 kts!

The fact remains, whoever you listen too, that we lost an aircraft and its crew, to an accident which almost certainly could have been avoided or prevented.

Since then, there have been a number of almost identical incidents, involving Nimrod aircraft where the crews are very lucky to be with us still.
Now, how much more evidence do you guys want? How many more aircraft do we need to lose, before you stand up and say 'just a minute, this is NOT acceptable'??

Nimrod 4 (who cares if its MR/MRA/Mk ??) is going to enter service with the same inherited problems as the MR2, FACT.
The AAR system is going to be the same as the MR2, FACT.
It will NOT have any form of bomb bay fire fighting kit , FACT

Do you not, any of you, given the facts that we have lost an aircarft and crew, and come very close to losing several more, feel the time has not come when those of us who fly these machines, should simply say NO ??
Would you be happy to fly in them?

Let me leave you with one final question........... The next time you get on board one of Mr Boeings finest with your wife and kids, if the captain came down the back and said to you all something along the lines of 'its ok, the aircraft is as safe as it needs to be' (as Mr Torpey quoted the other night) how many of you would get off? Quite a few I would suggest.

This is a problem of money, simple as that, and I have little doubt that the coroners verdict will crucify the RAF. It will show the families and the nation that this governments lack of investment in the Armed Forces is costing lives uneccesarily.

Just off to the Far East for a few days, in an aircraft that is as safe as it is possible to make!

The Winco

[Pontius Navigator]

Just some thoughts on sealing a bomb bay.

If it was not planned to seal the bomb bay then it would be reasonable to make them ventable.

The bomb bay is outside the pressure hull. The aircraft was designed to begin a patrol at 20000 feet and descend rapidly to low level to prosecute a contact. Once low it might open its bomb doors or not and then return to a higher altitude. Bomb bay pressurisation or even a sealed bomb bay would have been an unnecessary techical addition.

If, OTOH, it was desired to create an enclosed space with minimal venting and the ability to contain an extinguishant gas then I am sure doors without vents and with better seals could be fitted or retro fitted. They could be designed in such a way not to be pressurised but to maintain atmospheric pressure. As they have the aforementioned hot air bleeds they would obviously need vents. It follows that it would then need vent closures and well as bleed closures.

Extra additional weight and complication but it does not seem an impossible task. It would of course also need inlet vents to prevent underpressurisation in descent and exhaust vents to prevent overpressure in the climb.

[nigegilb]

Amongst all the bluster a consensus of what actually happened appears to be emerging.

Following/during AAR a large fuel migration occurred, leading to a serious fire in the bomb bay. This fire/heating may have damaged fuel seals/tank 7 leading to a fire/ fuel tank explosion in the wing root area.

Undisputed on this thread are continuing concerns about the safety of AAR, the lack of fire protection in the bomb bay and in the fuel tanks.

CAS, Torpy, is content with the safety of Nimrod. How so? Is it because he doesn't fly in it?

I have it on very good authority that fire extinguishant could be provided in MRA4 and that fire/explosion protection could easily be provided in the fuel tanks.

It isn't, because the likes of CAS and AOC 2Gp and the Defence Ministers have put a price on the cost of a life. Bloody disgraceful.

[I've_got a traveller]

Winco,

That's the most sensible thing I've heard on this thread for a while. I totally agree with you.

IGAT

[Tappers Dad]

Winco
Couldn't agree with you more.
"The fact remains, whoever you listen too, that we lost an aircraft and its crew, to an accident which almost certainly could have been avoided or prevented".

nigegib
Couldn't agree with you more either.

"Undisputed on this thread are continuing concerns about the safety of AAR, the lack of fire protection in the bomb bay and in the fuel tanks".

AC Ovee
"I'm sure that a fire extinguisher company in the avaition field will have computer models that will take into account the volume, the atmospheric pressure, the class of fire and the unavoidable rate of leakage of the extinguishant from the container, etc".

I agree

As we all appear to be singing from the same Hymn Book perhaps the sound of our voices will be heared in the corridors of Whitehall.
Its time they woke up and smelt the Aviation Fuel.

[The Swinging Monkey]

Winco
As always, spot on Sir, well said. Can't add anymore to that!

TD, out with some friends last night and raised another toast to Ben and all the boys. Your still right there with us guys, RIP.

TSM

[Tappers Dad]

Just what is going on at Kinloss?

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/6767259.stm

Nimrod and helicopter's near miss

The Nimrod crew were practising overshooting the runway
A Nimrod aircraft and a helicopter came within 200ft of colliding at RAF Kinloss, it has emerged.
An official report into the incident last October gave it a category A rating - meaning there was a serious risk of collision.

[stickmonkeytamer]

If, God firbid, we lose another one in similar circumstances, would the thoughts of this thread show that the RAF personnel at the grass roots level were making it clear that there was real concerns, and as the higherarchy do read this thread (don't ask how I know...), would they be held responsible for not acting upon opinions/recommendations of the end users?

I lost a good friend whom I'd known for years on that aircraft. I'd been to his wedding and his funeral. It must not happen again. Why has no-one who can make a difference got the moral courage to do so? He/she would be applauded.

Tenuous link: I watched a programme on BFBS last night (which was probably on in the UK about a month ago) about a woman trying to get all Premiership footballers to give a days pay to the nurses charity. If all aircrew (not just the Nimrod fleet) refused to fly for one day in order to raise awareness of the Nimrod problem, would this work? All ground personnel could do the same... Not quite a mutiny or Union action, but who, higher up the chain, would actually step in and force people back to work??? We, the end users, must stand up...

SMT

[ShortFatOne]

"Just off to the Far East for a few days, in an aircraft that is as safe as it is possible to make!"

Yes, within the financial constraints that were imposed the XXXX Aircraft Company (insert name of favourite aircraft manufacturer) finance department. If you seriously believe that Boing or Funbus make aircraft that are as safe as they can be, no matter what the financial implications are, why have there been so many accidents and incidents in commercial aircraft over the years, or is it just that they do not show the 'Aircrash Investigations' programme on your home planet?

[Tappers Dad]

ShortFatOne

"Why have there been so many accidents and incidents in commercial aircraft over the years."

Maybe its because there are more than 12 of them flying around .Well sometimes there are 12 not all flying though, well maybe 9 then.

Oh unless you mean the Comet because that took three fatal crashes between May 1953 and April 1954 for BOAC to withdraw its depleted fleet of Comet airliners.

[Safeware]

SFO,

I think what he meant to say was "in an aircraft that is as safe as required for certification" :)

But I agree with him about not wanting to fly in a Nimrod - so neither should anyone else have to do it.

sw

[hobie]

How many aircraft equivalent to the Nimrod, do the USAF currently operate ...

approx? .... :confused:

[ORAC]

None, the MRA role is carried out by the USN using the P-3 Orion. The P-3 was derived from the Electra (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_L-188_Electra), which entered service around the same time as the Comet. The difference being the USN is replacing their P-3s with new build P-8 Poseidons, based on the 737, by about 2013.

The ongoing P-3C airframe sustainment program inspects and repairs center and outer wings while reducing Fleet inventory to the mandated 130 aircraft by 2010. The P-3C fleet has experienced significant fatigue degradation over its operational life as quantified through the Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP). The Navy has instituted special structural inspections programs and replacement kits to refurbish aircraft structures to sustain airframe life. The 12 active patrol squadrons (down from 24 in 1991) operate P-3C AIP and Update III configured aircraft. Other P-3 variants still in service include one VP-3A executive transport, four NP-3C and eight NP-3D research and development, testing and evaluation and oceanographic survey aircraft. Numerous countries also fly the P-3 Orion, making it one of the more prevalent Navy aircraft available for foreign military sales and support.

[nigegilb]

The P-3 Orion was introduced to the fleet in the early 1960s. It is a derivative of the Lockheed Electra commercial airliner, which was not designed for survivability. More than 40 years later, it remains the Navy’s sole land-based multi-mission aircraft. Several studies were conducted by the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake in the 1980s to assess the survivability needs of the P-3. Those studies concluded that numerous enhancements were needed, including a missile warning system, a countermeasures dispenser, a radio-frequency (RF) jammer of some type, fuel tank protection, dry bay fire suppression, and flight control system hardening. The P-3’s infrared (IR) signature was in need of reduction, and an IR missile seeker jammer was required. Since its introduction, the P-3 has undergone a series of configuration changes to include several updates, the most recent of which addressed survivability with enhancements to the missile warning system, countermeasures dispensing system, and explosive suppressant foam to prevent fuel tank explosions.

[ORAC]

And for the P-8..... Boeing Team to Perform Navy P-8A MMA Fire- Suppression Tests (http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/mma/news/2005/q2/nr_050418m.html)

[JFZ90]

The P-8 is based on the Boeing 737.

I wonder if the P-8 still has only one rudder PCU unit, like all the other Boeing 737s built.

Like the 115 Boeing 737s that have crashed since it entered service, killing over 3200 people. Not all of these crashes were due to the inherent rudder design fault of course.

What was that someone said about "safe as possible"?

[hobie]

I did read recently of the P-8 program ....

To be fair to the P-8, the new aircraft will have the operating experience and design improvements generated on a cumulative 737 fleet of well over 3000 aircraft ..... 3/4 of which are still in operation .....

[AC Ovee]

and then when he has things explained to him, questions whether or not grain silos fly through the air at 200 kts!


Winco, you well know that I was commenting on the fact that grain silos are not subjected to 200 kts of airspeed, which is at the core of the point that was made by someone else: that a grain silo can be filled with extinguishant immediately.

I guess it can, but unlike a bomb bay, that extinguishant is not immediately sucked out of the silo.

I hope we've reached the point of no further discussion in this particular strand.

[The Swinging Monkey]

ShortFatOne

What a stupid thing to say.
Your comments simply confirm your ignorance.

Now let me see now, number of Nimrods = 12 ish, most u/s, flying only a very few hours.

Number of commercial airliners = f889king tens of thousands, all flying a great many hundreds of hours each month.

What a stupid and foolish thing to say, ha ha, what an idiot!!
TSM

ps I hope that when the winco gets back, he hits you with some acurate statistics. I can't stop laughing at you Short Fattie thing, HO HO, HA HA

[ShortFatOne]

TSM
Whateva....


Tapper's Dad

I am truly sorry for your loss. I did not know Ben but I knew many on the aircraft that day, some of them extremely well. I cannot begin to imagine the hurt and pain you feel and I truly hope, for you and your family's sake, that you find the answers you are looking for.

Good Luck

I feel no compunction to add anything further to this debate.

[Strato Q]

What a stupid thing to say.
Your comments simply confirm your ignorance.

TSM - you are showing your ignorance in a childish way. The Short Fat One is a highly experienced Nimrod operator. You can prove anything with statistics, but I do not see too many current operators making negative contributions. I would go back to the Nimrod fleet tomorrow - beats flying a desk.

[Safeware]

Actually, I think TSM is starting to show that he has some understanding:

Lots and lots of airliners flying millions and millions of passenger hours and he isn't worried about 115 crashes. Why? because the level of risk per flying hour is low enough for the acceptance of such risk.

At last!

sw

[AC Ovee]

"The Nimrod has a good safety record". This is one of the first statements confidently given by almost everyone representing the RAF when questioned about the Nimrod. Its not so much said, as pronounced, as though it is an indisputable fact.

I remember hearing those words just after Toronto, then again after the Moray Firth accident. Doubtless it was said when the Nimrod crashed into the woods and now we hear it yet again. Its as though its a shield handed along the line from spokesperson to spokesperson ("just say this and they will go away"). It appears that it is not questioned by the officers who are either briefed to say it, or feel it is a safe thing to say off their own back, and therefore pre-empt any criticism.

Is it a correct statement? Can we draw comfort from it?

[The Swinging Monkey]

Strato Q
I don't believ you Sir, if the shortlittle fat person was a 'highly experienced Nimrod operator' he wouldn't have said such a stupid thing. his comment was just plain stupid! As for going back to the fleet, yes I can't argue with that - I'de feel the same, but I think I'de be a little bit concerned about going back to fly Nimrods!

Safeware
Thanks for the compliment, although I'm sure it wasn't meant! Are you now seriously telling me that modern day airlines are not built to a better safety standard than MR2 WAS and MR4 WILL BE?


AC Ovee
I think it would be fair to say that the aircraft was safe (I have many thousands of hours to prove that) but is it safe today? hmm I think not.
Certainly some serious questions are now being asked, rightly I would suggest.
TSM

[Dave Angel]

"What a stupid and foolish thing to say, ha ha, what an idiot!!
TSM"

Mate, grow up.:rolleyes:

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

My understanding of fire suppressants is the same as AC Ovee's (Srl 541); oxygen starvation. My understanding is also that pyros and OTTO fuel will burn happily in the absence of any external oxygen. So adding lots of weight and expensive kit is not going to make any difference to an event involving the stores on their carriers. The only fire a weapon bay extinguisher would have any effect on is a fuel fire. As DA4orce observed at Srl 546, the solution would appear to be stopping uncontained fuel leaks. Isn't that what we should be concentrating our minds on? Remind me what the argument was against co-ax fuel lines with the outer chamber safely vented? What would happen if AAR was conducted with the weapon bay doors open (limiting speed beneath the AAR envelope?) until the lines were depressurised and purged?

The 4 options seem to be:

a. spend money (to the detriment of another Force Element elsewhere) and modify the aircraft to a higher safety standard.
b. limit AAR serials to essential operational
c. carry on regardless and embrace religion.
d. ground the aircraft until resources can be found to increase its safety

I'm sure that many of you are not working towards option d. but, to a politico, you may be making it look very attractive.

[Tappers Dad]

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

There is one more option.

STOP THE FUEL LEAKS !!!!!

[betty swallox]

The Swinging Monkey.
May I refer you to PPRuNe Forum Rules, reference your inappropriate post 593.
"Be Courteous!
Don't attack others. Personal attacks on others will not be tolerated. Challenge others' points of view and opinions, but do so respectfully and thoughtfully... without insult and personal attack."
Many thanks

[Wigan Warrior]

The SFO IS a highly experienced Nimrod pilot, one of only few Nimrod QFIs left. His input into the MRA4 programme is (and has been) invaluable. You TSM have shown yourself to be an idiot of the highest order and statements such as yours serve no purpose other than to upset the people (MoD / Indusrty) responsible for trying their best (under adversity) to ensure the safety of the Nimrod fleet.

[Wader2]

GBZ, I think, and it is years since, that speed would not be an issue with AAR and bomb bay doors open. IIRC the bomb door limit is 250kts. At height refuelling heights I suspect the IAS will be less than this.

[The Swinging Monkey]

Thanks to all the guys who are giving me a slagging over my comments about the SFO, but you really should read what he said first. His comments about civilan airliners were stupid, wrong and probably liabelous, and as for personal abuse, advise him of the rules also would you please.

I am truly astonished if, as has been pointed out here, that SFO is a 'highly experienced Nimrod pilot, one of only few Nimrod QFIs left'

I am genuingly astonished that someone who would clearly has a great deal of experience, should come out with such a statement concerning the civilain airliner fleet. I hope someone from Boeing or Airbus has read his comments and has the balls to come on here and explain some facts to him.

Now you can say what ever you want to me, I really don't care. I'm here because I feel passionately about the current safety (or lack of it) on the Nimrod fleet and the potential lack of safety on the MR4. Not one of you have come back with a reasonable explanation as to why the MR4 is NOT being fitted with a fire suppressant systen in the bomb bay. Not one of you have explained why the aircraft will be using a single-skinned AAR sytem, almost identical one to that fitted to the MR2 fleet. Why is that?

The reason for your lack of responce? because you, me, Tappers Dad and everyone else all know that at the end of the day, there is NO MONEY to replace/upgrade systems on the existing fleet or on the new one.

Thats NOT you fault, and I in no way blame you. But please don't sit there and try to justify it to me and others, or come up with sad and lame excuses as to why the RAF can have a state of the art aircraft as far as sensors and avionics are concerned, but a 25 year old system for the AAR, and a 50 year old system for the bomb bay. It all comes down to £££££££ or lack of them!

TSM

[The Swinging Monkey]

Gentlemen,

Further to my last, I've just been sent this link ref airliners, accidents and fatalities. http://www.planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm
For the benifit of us all, but especially those of you who question civilan accident rates, especially the short fat chap, please take a close look at them. Especially in regard to your statement about I think you might be surprised, and even a little embarrassed at your previous post that I laughed at. You can read the stats as well as I can, so I won't bore you with them, but may I just read you one statistic from the openig paragraph, it says...

'Accidents are extremely rare, with the probability of a passenger being killed on a single flight at approximately eight million-to-one. If a passenger boarded a flight at random, once a day, everyday, it would be approximately 22,000 years before he or she would be killed.'

22,000 years is a hell of a long time and I know someone will come back and say that you can make stats look and say whatever you want, but these are the facts. It's no consolation of course if you are in that minute % that make the statistics, but just think about that SFO, 22,000 years.

Now, given that, do you still think that MR2 and MR4 have an 'acceptable risk' factor, and would you consider amending your commenst about airliners?

TSM

[tucumseh]

“the probability of a passenger being killed on a single flight at approximately eight million-to-one”.


To even begin attempting a like for like comparison, ask any commercial aircraft manufacturer what these figures would be if he were to factor in something simple; like routinely flying over a war zone and carrying out AAR with a system which (it would appear) does not meet today’s standards. The risk may become less than acceptable, so he may mitigate it with, say, a DAS. However, the act of fitting and integrating (two different things, something the MoD and I differ on) a DAS produces positives and negatives. It provides a degree of protection, but there is a weight and power penalty (which, to him, merely means loss of income; but to us means more a/c required to sustain operational effectiveness). And so on, and on….. Sorry, the process of designing a civilian airliner and a military aircraft coincide at a theory of flight and basic engineering level (sometimes not even then) and diverge almost immediately. I don’t think this a line of argument worth pursuing.


I believe the important thing here, and in other incidents (Mull, C130, Tornado, AEW and more), is that the MoD’s approach to maintaining safety (and in some cases delivering safety in the first place) has been criminally negligent for, at least, 16 years. This figure is based on my own personal experiences of being told to ignore safety issues (instructions I completely ignored); others may think it longer. 16 years is not a great length of time in acquisition terms (so the effects take a while to become apparent); but it is many generations of MoD staffs, both Service and civilian, who have been brought up on a system which regards maintaining safety as a waste of money. Otherwise, why would they (the RAF in particular – sorry but it’s a simple, verifiable fact, as you controlled air support funding in 1991) slash the budgets and cancel contracts whose sole purpose were to maintain the build standard (including safety). Those who know the “system” well will understand that, regrettably, when you offer up money as a savings measure (as the RAF did in 1991) it is nigh on impossible to get it back. As the years pass, the argument becomes “We haven’t had too many losses, so why do you want to regress to routinely maintaining safety?” Give me a gun please.

[AQAfive]

I hate to watch this thread is turning into a mud slinging contest on what constitutes a safe or unsafe ac. A safe ac is one that doesn’t fly. A lot of PPruners give the impression that the management are sending ac airborne not caring if they are safe or not. Do you really believe that? Each ac is checked before it goes flying and if it is deemed unsafe it does not go. Remember they are called ACCEPTABLE deferred defects and limitations and there are rules as to what is acceptable.

If the need for the ac wasn’t so great, I’m sure AAR would cease. Military flying by its nature is risky, that’s why the safety issue cannot be compared with civil ac. Of course cost is an issue, what makes it worse is you cannot recover those costs by selling more ac, therefore, a risk assessment has to be carried out.

Also, there is a lot of duff gen concerning current and future ac floating around on this thread, no doubt some would like to correct but owing to the open forum feel they cannot. So don’t get too excited and rude to people, put forward your views but be wary of ‘facts’ that are second hand.

Why don’t I correct these ‘facts’? Because I ceased to be in the employ of Her Majesty earlier this year and my ‘facts’ may well be out of date.

Historical issues, on the other hand, I am willing to discuss

TSM

I read the link and found it interesting. I compared Nimrod figures and placed them in the table; that backed up your argument mainly because of too few sorties to make the comparison meaningful. However, I did notice the figures quoted only started in 1986, it would be interesting to see what the table was like if we went back to the 60’s.


Too early for cocoa, afternoon tea perhaps.

[The Swinging Monkey]

AQAfive & tucumseh
Yes I know and agree with you gentlemen. The purpose of posting the info was to show the Little short fat chap that his comment about 'recent' airline incidents/accidents was simply not correct.
TSM

[Tightflester]

A classic case of CDD. TSM you suffer from Clue Deficieny Disorder. Put simply, you haven't got a scoobie!
I have read what SFO posted. He is quite correct. He makes the point that money counts... which of course it does. If money was no object, would there never be another aircraft crash (military / civil)? As many people have pointed out the safest option is to keep the aircraft in the hangars, but they have a job to do, so at some point their life and that of their crew is put at a higher level of risk by parting company with terra firma. No doubt safeware has sat in many more safety reviews than I. He tried to explain the complex process of risk identification, review and subsequent mitigation only to be harranged by others suffering from CDD. Risk management is similar throughout companies worldwide and across the military - civil divide, it is not exclusive to the avaiation industry but wherever the principles of risk management are applied, cost is always a consideration..... which is the point I believe SFO was making.

[Safeware]

TSMAre you now seriously telling me that modern day airlines are not built to a better safety standard than MR2 WAS and MR4 WILL BE?

What on earth makes you think that is what I said?

sw

[BEagle]

Interestingly, I have recently had to advise a tanker designer that it is vital for accurate offload figures to be available to the receiver.

This is because the manufacturer has an aircraft which can accept Jet A, Jet A-1 and Jet B yet has instructed the AAR system supplier to use a single fixed mid-range value for assumed fuel density (although this is corrected in flight for actual fuel temperature).

The net result is that the value displayed on the pod control system could be in error by up to 5.6% compared with the value deduced from the tanker fuel quantity indicators..... So Where Has All The Fuel Gone? Is it swilling around inside a receiver between probe and tanks (hands up all those who want a fuel cooled AI radar....) - or has it leaked out to atmosphere?

My advice is that accurate fuel offload values to each and every receiver are absolutely essential. Does anyone see this as being too picky?

[AC Ovee]

The purpose of posting the info was to show the Little short fat chap that his comment about 'recent' airline incidents/accidents was simply not correct.


That was all you needed to write.

Since your outburst, I re-read his contribution and I didn't have any argument with it.

As others have also indicated, civil airlines operate to make money and one of their biggest overheads, in doing so, is safety. I firmly believe that the manufacturers and operators rely on the regulators to establish the safety requirements and then build and fly those aircraft to meet those safety needs at the lowest cost. They make their aircraft as safe as they need to be to get certified. I've not yet heard of any builder or operator inventing and/or fitting an expensive safety feature that was not required by regulation.

So, when a civil airliner crashes, the builder and the operator can say, hand on heart, that the aircaft met the safety standard, so don't blame them. But, the chances are that the aircraft was not as safe as it could be. IMHO, of course.....

[JFZ90]

The SFO was not wrong in any way about his take on civil aircraft. I am at a loss to understand TSMs rather aggressive stand on this - but given TSMs lack of grasp of several things and his inability to read and pick up on pertinent facts on this whole subject, perhaps this should not be surprising.

Not one of you have come back with a reasonable explanation as to why the MR4 is NOT being fitted with a fire suppressant systen in the bomb bay.


Well, it seems to me several have tried to explain some potentially valid & convincing reasons for this but you seem to be unable to grasp the engineering issues behind why it is probably not feasible.


Not one of you have explained why the aircraft will be using a single-skinned AAR sytem, almost identical one to that fitted to the MR2 fleet. Why is that?


Well again several have suggested that you are incorrect in this assertion - indeed SFO has made it clear that to dismissively brand it as "single skinned" is just not true. I'm starting to think TSM is actually a troll.

Finally, have a look at this TSM and tell us again how you naively believe civil aircraft are all "as safe as possible".

http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/B-737Rudder.htm

[Safeware]

If you want to compare UK military aircraft accident rates etc, look here:
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/accidents/accdam/acctab2.html
and browse around some of the other available info if you are interested.
For the record, I'm not going to get into arguments over what the stats say (in terms of implied safety).
sw

[hobie]

If you want to compare UK military aircraft accident rates etc, look here:
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/accidents/accdam/acctab2.html
and browse around some of the other available info if you are interested.
For the record, I'm not going to get into arguments over what the stats say (in terms of implied safety).
sw

Interesting data ... that's for sure ....

here's the data by aircraft role and type ......

http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/accidents/accdam/acctab1.html

[RileyDove]

Comparisons between civil and military types doesn't really mean a great deal. In terms of the 737 it runs a production line of over 5'000 with something like a maximum of five accidents thought to have originated with the rudder PFCU problems. View the rest of the accidents that have
happened to the fleet and it's quite clear that the type is fundamentally very safe. The write off list runs to 130 and amongst these are a broad range of accidents - the majority of which can be attributed to pilot error.
In terms of the military accident rate -it is very low but it's also worth viewing it from the point that a typical military aircraft doesn't do anything like the number of hours per year that a civil airliner would do. Hence exposure to risk is therefore lower.
As for the manufacturers doing the minimum in terms of safety - either they
are incredibly lucky or the minimum standards seem to work. There are set standards for all aircraft fittings and these are set in stone. View the majority of accidents and design and maintainance feature in a very small number.
In terms of Nimrod - if there are concerns regards fuel integrity there needs to be urgent action taken. We should not in a position where the biggest threat to our aircrew is from our own equipment.

[difar69]

TSM, some while back you posted a comment stating you "knew who I was". I would appreciate it if you'd do me the courtesy of sending a PM and giving me a clue of who YOU are. The reason? I, and a fair few others, would be keen to know what makes you the authority on absolutely everything quoted on this thread. For example, how closely involved are you with MRA4? Or, why it is you feel personal insults are an appropriate way of taking part in this discussion?

[Exrigger]

Additionally airliners are designed for one purpose, they take off, climb to x thousand feet, cruise to destination, descend, land and complete cycle repeatably untill aircraft reaches its out of service date and the airlines buy another new one.

Military jets based on airliners, take off may or may not climb and cruise around and then land, they carry out manouvres that the airliner would not. Military aircraft also have extra bits bolted on, get re-engineered etc, change roles that mean the aircraft is doing what it was not 'originally designed to do', and the MOD/RAF do this not the civvie contractor.

As has been said any loss of life is un-acceptable and we cannot say often enough how we feel for those who lost family, but in the previous 30 years this has been the only loss of life from this aircraft attributable to an accident that was caused from a failure of this nature, the two other aircraft losses had nothing to do with the age of the aircraft, nor its AAR capability, nor its wiring, nor their lack of bomb bay suppressant system, nor the single skin fuel pipework, additionally I do not think the MR1? at Moray Firth had this type of problem as it does not have a bomb bay. This to me shows a pretty good safety record for the Nimrod MR2.

For all fuel/hydraulic leaks these have been risk managed and the engineers have done as much as they can, but once in the air vibration temperature fluctuations, turbulance and stress can all loosen pipes, cause cracks in pipes, which is why we have inspections and maintenance periods and we try to mitigate against these risks. As has been said, by looking at historical maintenance data, incidences and accidents, if a trend line shows that we have a specific problem with one specific area of a system, we put in an RTI, MOD, or other suggestion, it gets evaluated, costed and then the MOD/Government bean counters get involved, they way up the cost against likehood of catastrophic failure against possible effect (i.e. injury, fatalities loss of/or damage to aircraft and infrastructures), and as has been said if the risk of something happening is low, the effect of what happens if the failure actually happens is high or low and the cost is prohibitive then it will not get done, especially in todays RAF.

[JFZ90]

RileyDove - you make some fair points I wouldn't argue with.

Boeings attitude to the problem and the fact that the Airworthiness Directive took so long to come are quite interesting for those who blindly believe civil aviation is magically safe.

The accident stats are interesting - whilst you can't generalise due to CFIT/polit error reasons etc, some themes emerge:

Harriers - crash alot more than most fast jets - jaguar being an exception, and the tonka figures are quite high

Helicopters - are known to be complicated and fundamentally quite dangerous things and these figures backthat up. The Squirrel has a very good record though and Sea Kings are good too.

Nimrod - if you flew one every day for an hour it would be 342 years before you had any sort of incident.

[footster]

Firstly my condolenses to Tappers Dad and all the other families whose loved ones died in this appalling accident.I felt I had to post on this thread and am probably going tobe slated for it as I am a civvy.I have been intrigued with this thread since its inception and have followed it very closely.Without sounding patronising I believe our armed forces are second to none and do a fantastic job with the resources available. But looking at the overall situation from the outside looking in the RAF seems to have taken the brunt of the cutbacks with redundancies base closures etc etc and the list goes on eventually something else has to give and it seems to me tobe safety.If health and safety is not acted on in the outside world all hell brakes loose but it seems in the armed forces it can be turned a blind eye too and swept under the carpet which seems tobe the case with the posts I have been reading and quite regularly and its about time all our armed forces get the relevant budgets they deserve instead of cutback after cutback. But gentlemen this thread is very informative and a pleasure to read please dont turn it into a slanging match because if you do this you are not helping Tappers Dad and the rest of the families get the true justice they so rightly deserve.

[Tappers Dad]

Footster

Thank you for your condolences they are appreciated.

The bottom line is statistics on air crashes means little to most people unless you or your loved ones happen to be on an aircraft that crashes.

Ben used to say statistically he was more likely to be killed in a road accident than flying in a Nimrod .So I agree with Footster statistics in this case and to me personally mean very little. Apart from the fact I have got to know more guys who are flying them now and couldn't bear to hear about another Nimrod being lost due to a fuel leak.

[Double Zero]

I've been involved closely with a BOI on a very different aircraft & circumstansces which came out with an outrageous verdict; it was sorted well in the end but took 5 years.

Tappers Dad, I can only guess how you must feel, but it takes a long time to sort out - a blame exercise is no good to anyone, no-one meant it to happen & designs in haste tend to be put up with once they work, even though the engineers responsible thought they were doing a quick temporary fix - if indeed that's what happened, as I say I'm not Nimrod.

There are 2 important factors as I see it;

A, No blame is apportioned to the crew - I am not a Nimrod expert by any means, but it seems there were snags way beyond their control.

B, Learn by it & incorporate mod's so it doesn't happen again.

Justice, as in cleared names let alone compensation, takes a lot of time & stamina, conserve your energy !

In a way there's one good thing, if it can be called that; no-one has had the crass nerve to call this pilot error.

[The Swinging Monkey]

Gentlemen,
I am happy to take all the stick that you want to give me, but please don’t read me the rules for pprune and then ignore them yourselves. You will all see, that it was infact safeware who began the personal insults – but enuf said.
Let me begin by saying that I know very little about the MR4 other than what I read on here and the info I get from some mates at BAe and ISK. I do however, still remember quite a bit about the MR2 and the aircrafts systems, fuel, engines, hydraulics blah, so I’m not a complete ‘numpty’ on the aircraft. So let me just go through a couple of points if I may……
In an earlier posting from SFO, he stated: “Where you are not correct is in giving the impression that the fuel pipework et al is refurbished. It is of a similar/same design but, apart from the fuselage (and one or two minor items) the rest of the aircraft (and pipework) is new build. Indeed, around the important areas (engine bays etc) the fuel pipework will be double skinned.” Is it not right therefore to assume that given the AAR system is a ‘new build’ that all of the AAR pipework should have been double-skinned?
Distant Voice says: “And Safeware, I am not sure what the risk factor is for one accident and two major incidents involving AAR in four months (Sept, Nov & Dec). I suspect it is worse than 1:1000” How can anyone disagree with that? Is that not, at the very least, sufficient cause to re-think the AAR system?
Now lets talk about Bomb Bay fire fighting.
It is a fact that MR2 has NO fire fighting capability in the bomb bay. It is equally true that MR4 will have NO fire-fighting capability in the bomb bay either. Now many on here say that its down to cost, and I would agree entirely. But others claim that it isn’t needed, because the incident rates for bomb-bay fires are small. I would just refer you to my earlier post when I said that any form of extinguishant in the bomb bay might just have afforded XV230 a few extra vital minutes to get the jet safely on the ground. IMHO that is worth serious consideration and should be incorporated in MR4 (I even agreed that to retro fit MR2’s was a non- starter)
Biggus says that:
“The design was 'frozen' before bomb bay extinguishers and fuel tank protection were considered issues. Yes, no doubt they could be added”
Nigel Gilb says:
“Mr Boeing provides 215 minutes worth of fire extinguishant in the FWD/AFT Cargo hold of a 747. Mr Boeing is also fitting state of art fuel tank protection to the latest Boeing airliners coming off the line. There have been about 5 attributed fuel tank explosions in airliners in the last 25 years or so. The RAF has had probably 4 in the last 30 months in it's tiny inventory”
The Winco wrote:
“What the public will not be told however, is that the aircraft will NOT have foam in the wings, it will not have state of the art fire suppressant. Infact, it won't even have a single fire extinguisher located in the bomb bay” Now feel free to ignore me and ridicule me, but are we all wrong about our concerns?
And finally, lets talk about airliner safety. I am not an airline pilot, when I left the mob, I stayed flying, but I do not fly for an airline. But ’the winco’ appears to be an airline pilot, and yet he has also come in for criticism about his comments regarding airline safety. Infact, SFO said the following: “If you seriously believe that Boing or Funbus make aircraft that are as safe as they can be, no matter what the financial implications are, why have there been so many accidents and incidents in commercial aircraft over the years, or is it just that they do not show the 'Aircrash Investigations' programme on your home planet?” (Betty S, do you remember what you said to me: "Be Courteous! Don't attack others. Personal attacks on others will not be tolerated. Challenge others' points of view and opinions, but do so respectfully and thoughtfully... without insult and personal attack.")
Anyway, it was my response to this which has clearly upset some of you, and for that I apologise. But I still think it the wrong thing for SFO to say. How you feel that the loss of a Nimrod, one of only a dozen or so, flying very little, can possibly be compared to the airline industry is beyond me. At best, if all 12 Nimrods flew one trip a day (5 day week) we are looking at very best, at about 3000 trips a year. I think the table I posted, showed tens of millions of trips a year from the airline industry! I’ll leave you all to draw your own conclusions from that.
Gentlemen, I apologise if my mocking of SFO has offended anyone, including SFO (apologies). I would only reiterate that I feel passionately about the state of the fleet and things at ISK in general aswell as for the safety of friends still there. I knew most of the crew on XV230. I had flown with most of them on countless occasions and was as devastated as everyone else at their loss. We all know that the safety of military aircraft is largely governed by the bean-counters, but that doesn’t make it right, and it doesn’t mean that we have to accept it. We must keep plugging away at the safety argument and not just role over and accept it as a ‘done deal’ It isn't!
Difar69:
You and I have also flown together on countless trip during the 80’s and 90’s. I have explained that I am not an expert on MR4 at all. But is anything I have said about MR2 or MR4 factually incorrect? I haven’t heard anyone say it is yet. Like Tappers Dad, I couldn't couldn't bear to hear about another Nimrod being lost due to a fuel leak.
TSM

[tucumseh]

Footser

Good post.

You say “looking at the overall situation from the outside looking in the RAF seems to have taken the brunt of the cutbacks”.

When this subject comes up, especially in the air domain (with apologies to the sailing Navy and ground Navy/Army/RAF), I immediately think of the Halifax savings of 1987. The RN (FAA) took a cut in support funding (and this is what people are actually complaining about here) of a whopping 33%. Permanently. This is huge by anyone’s standards. While the Chief of Fleet Support did not share his thoughts with me (!) it was my opinion this cut was to facilitate the 103 Merlins planned at the time.

However, a few years later, when the FAA’s support and, importantly, their support funding, was under RAF stewardship at Wyton/Brampton, and the RAF were being pressurised into accepting a similar cut, guess who took a double whammy? The FAA. The RAF didn’t take a fair share of the cut and what funding remained was first come, first served – and when it resides at an RAF station where the senior RN rank was a CPO……… You get the picture.

Same old problem. Two year tours, no-one even remembered “Halifax” and when they were told no-one would challenge the airships. Lesson? Continuity is important. If anyone says “It’s water under the bridge”, take a look downstream. There’s a ******* great dam and it’s about to burst.

[Double Zero]

As I say I'm no Nimrod expert - though I used to sail with someone who is ( but he will have his hands tied ) as far as I know the days of dropping flares etc from the bomb bay are gone, I would think fire fighting in the bomb bay pretty unnecessary & bolting the door after the nag has gone, but attention to the AAR from what little I've read seems a good idea - more static discharge prevention, double skinning, for a start ?

Even double skinning has it's own risks, this is not a simple mod' as is proven by the number of posts.

[footster]

Tucusmeh
Thankyou for your comments.
Obviously you are more informed than I am and I appreciate what you are saying.As a civvy my comments were made on reactions to what I have been reading here and in the press etc. The bottom line is that if you want armed forces and highly skilled ones at that which we have you can not keep making cutbacks to their budgets no matter the service.Eventually you end up compromising safety issues . And as I have already said this seems tobe the case in question here.There should be no value for a persons safety it should be of paramount importance.

[Safety_Helmut]

I have watched and read this thread with a great deal of interest, both as an ex Nimrod engineer, and now as a Safety Engineer. Some of the comments made on the thread show a real lack of understanding of the whole airworthiness and safety engineering process.

Safeware, who I know very well, has come in for a lot of stick from people who quite obviously do not know what they are talking about, despite their claimed thousands of flying hours etc. It may not have come across in the best possible way, but what Safeware has said is indisputably correct.

Where does all this nonsense about aircraft being as safe as possible come from ? How many of you commenting on here are familiar with JAR25, CS25, ARP4754, AR4761, DO-178B/ED109, DO-254/ED80 JSP553, Def Stan 00-970, Def Stan 00-56 etc, etc ?

Ask yourself if you understand the ALARP principle, its background, the difference between broadly acceptable, tolerable and intolerable. Do you understand how an ALARP judgement is made, how disproportionality has to be demonstrated, and how the ratio varies according to the risk.

Do people really believe that aircraft are built to be as safe as possible ? Some of these people appear to be very experienced, and probably formerly fairly senior, aircrew. Can they be that niaive ?

I would suggest for some of the idiots (and you know who you are) who have posted on here, that they download EASA Compliance Specification CS25 (formerly JAR25), it’s free ! Then read clause CS25.1309, and then read clause AMC25.1309 in the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC). This will give you a very good idea of the safety targets that large civil aircraft have to meet. Some of the principles are basically the same for the military, but we have also thrown ALARP in to make things more subjective.

I would like to add this to the discussion though. In my experience it is often very difficult for an IPT too properly demonstrate that they should not incorporate major safety modifications. However, in many cases they don’t understand what they are doing, they don’t have the money and they will make some very odd assumptions, particularly those relating to the remaining life of an aircraft, which will have massive implications on the cost benefit analysis.

There is some very good discussion on here particularly from the likes of Safeware and Tucumseh, as ever, but others seem to think that they can just bully others into submission with ill informed rubbish and abuse, dragging a serious debate into disrepute.

Safety_Helmut
Senior Safety Engineer
MSc (Safety Critical Systems Engineering)

[betty swallox]

TSM
Whilst your huge post covered a multitude of issues, I find it reprehensible that you feel it appropriate to throw mud, then withdraw a few days later.
In these computer driven days, its real easy to point accusation, make over-sentimental claims, then say sorry a few hours after the event. Were we ever to have such a discussion in the Scruffs bar at ISK, I for one would have probably asked you outside, away from the view of the visiting P-3 crew and the UAS on Summer Camp and put you to rights. I hope you can understand that you have more than put a few noses out of joint.
I remain in the RAF, not through a sad, boyish dream of bravado, rather that I firmly believe in what I do, and more importantly those that I work with. I believe, warts and all, problems, of which there are many I acknowledge, the MRA4 will, eventually, do what it says on the tin. We WILL get there. We have to. I so understand, as much as I can, the anguish souls like TD must be going through.
That said, we have to be realistic. With the resources, of which money is one, that are available to us, we will do what we can. That is not a "company line", or a "thats what their airships want to hear". We are trying, awfy hard to make this difficult situation a bit better. Please understand that.
My co-workers are, I know of the same opinion. We don't sit on our fat ar$es accepting a sub-standard aircraft. Yes, we have challenges, but which company in 2007 doesn't. The situation is not, as some have said here, untenable. We are doing the best we can (believe you me we are), and the product will, if somewhat late, do the business.
You should take a deep breath and consider your response th SFO and Difar69.

[Papa Whisky Alpha]

Good post Footster, your mention of the possible differences between the Service and Civilian approach to health and safety reminded me that the Health and Safety at work Act is binding on the Crown (although the Secretary of State may overide certain requirements). An employer is required to provide, so far as is reasonably practicable, a safe place of work, safe systems of work, safe plant or machinery, etc. But what is "reasonably practicable"?
Reasonably practicable implies that a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice ( whether in terms of time, money, effort, etc) necessary to avert the risk on the other. If the sacrifice is dissproportionate to the risk the duty is discharged.

When managing risk both the likelyhood of the happening and the severity should it occur must be considered
Was a valid risk management exercise undertaken?

When the outcome was 14 deaths plus the loss of a £30m(?) aircraft what sacrifice would have been necessary in preventative measures before they were considered dissproportionate

This is not meant to imply that those on the ground were not doing their job but that the policy makers who control the purse strings take a lot of convincing.

[The Swinging Monkey]

Betty,
I have only apologised for taking the pi$$ out of SFO, nothing else. I stand by all my comments about you guys flying in an aircraft today that has had, and continues to have major fuel leak problems. Why are you so angry about that?

Why are you angry about my comments of NO bomb bay extinguishant on a new aircraft coming into service? Why is there no foam in the wings etc? When Art S put the jet into the Moray firth, several of the seats detached in the crash. The BoI stated something along the lines of ...'anyone over 12 stone (or whatever) should not fly in Nimrods for fear of the seats detaching in a crash' Do you know how long it took the RAF to implement that recommendation? It finally came in early last year I think it was! That shows the kind of system that you chaps are up against.

Foam in wings - when the C-130 was lost, the BoI stated all kinds of things about foam in the wings blah. As Nimrod is a 'new build' (kind of I know) why are you guys NOT getting that level of protection in a new jet? Don't you think you deserve it? You are claiming that you are spending more and more time out in high conflict areas, where our aircraft have been shot down, so INHO you absolutely deserve all the protection that you can get.

But your not getting it, and it all comes down to cost.

Forget all the stuff about airliners, forget about my 'aggressiveness' and forget about all the other Red Herrings such as 'acceptable Risks' the fact is that you guys are at the centre of a major shooting war(s), and you are NOT getting the level of support you require or deserve, and I feel that is unacceptable.

We are all striving for the same thing here, its just that some of us, who are no longer serving, are prepared to voice our concerns at the continuing use of an unreliable aircaft that is well and truly past its sell-by date. Whats wrong with that?

Betty, I have never-ever said that you sit on your fat ar$es, and I have no doubt that you are doing the very best you can with what little you have got. Unfortunately you haven't got enough, and what you have isn't very good any more, Oh and you deserve better!

TSM

[Da4orce]

JFZ90 wrote: Nimrod - if you flew one every day for an hour it would be 342 years before you had any sort of incident.

I'm willing to stand corrected but are you really saying you would not have any sort of incident? Ignoring the fact that you would probably struggle to find a serviceable Nimrod for an hour everyday I find that statistic extremely hard to believe in light of all the incidents that are emerging.

Gents I think it's clear that we agree on more points than we disagree on:

All the groundies and aircrew at Kinloss are doing their level best with the resources they have - agreed

Lack of funding by successive governments and poor decisions by the MOD are a major contributing factor to the current situation - agreed

In light of the lack of access to substantial remains of the jet the BOI is unlikely to provide all the answers - agreed

[Terry K Rumble]

Gentlemen,

Those of you that know me, will also know that I rarely post on these forums. I love reading them and keeping up to date with what going on in the service since I left, however, the time has come I feel to ask you all for a period of reflection and calm over what has been written here, especially over the past few days.

I have no intention of defending anyone or putting anyone down. Things have been said that have clearly annoyed and upset some people and that is extremely regrettable under the circumstances. I do understand and agree with some of the things that The swinging Monkey has written, although I hope I would have chosen a slightly ‘better’ way of expressing it. The inputs from Safeware, ShortFatOne and other eminent experts such as Safety_Helmut are immensely interesting and have to be agreed with, as do the comments from the Groundcrew, who are far more up-to-date with the day-to-day goings on of the aircraft and their condition etc.than most of us are. But the intense personal attacks have got to stop.

All of us on this forum lost someone who was near and dear to us in XV230. I lost several good friends, and I am not too weak to openly admit that Jane and I have shed a few tears over those losses and others also (you get a bit like that with age I think!) But the dreadful in-fighting on this thread has got to stop chaps. If only for the memories of the crew and those loved ones we have lost, please lets call it a day as far as the ‘bad-mouthing’ is concerned. Keep the debate going by all means, even keep the speculating going, but please, no more slagging each other off. Lets all stop and just think of the crew for a few minutes and ask if they would approve?? I doubt it very much.

Thank you, and I look forward to seeing many of you at Waddo next week.
Kind regards
Terry K Rumble

[Tappers Dad]

TSM's remarks may have come through frustration. I know I have had to switch off my computer on a couple of occasions to prevent me from from posting something that I know I would regret at a later date.

However TSM has apologized and as others have said lets move on.

I for my part have been busying myself with applications under the FOI. For each new piece of evidence I have received I am becoming more convinced that the terrible accident in Sept could have been avoided.

XV230 was bought down due to a fire raging in the bomb bay.

A fire needs 3 elements Oxygen-Ignition-Fuel. Take away any one and the result is no fire.

Oxygen...As it has been pointed out the bomb bay is not air tight so the Oxygen can not be removed Fire extinguishers have been discussed throughly and although someone in the future may come up with a method would the RAF embrace it's use, I doubt it.

Ignition -I am not going to speculate on the cause of ignition I we await the BOI to tell us what the ignition

Fuel..Fuel can be wiring covering or any combustable material. In the case of XV230 the fuel for the fire was aviation fuel in the bomb bay. So if no aviation fuel had leaked, there would not have been a fire.

Conclusion ..To prevent further loss of life the Nimrods fuel leakage problem needs to be addressed.

In the Panorama programme Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, the Chief of Air Staff said the following :

JOFRE: Twenty-five fuel leaks in five months. Is that a lot?

Sir GlennTORPY: It's a lot. I would always like to see the figure reduced to the absolutely lowest minimum.

JOFRE: It sounds like a lot.

Sir GlennTORPY: If you look over the last ten years, the level of fuel leaks that we've had has remained pretty constant over those ten years.

JOFRE: But let's look at the five months up to March, there were 25 fuel leaks, some of them really quite serious. Are you concerned about that?


Sir GlennTORPY: I am very concerned about it, and that's why we have made sure that we analysed every single incidence. There are no underlying themes.

So over the last 10 years Nimrods have been leaking fuel at a constant rate. WHY, what is the problem this is 2007 why can't the fuel leaks be stopped or at the least there should be less fuel leaks .
Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy says there are no underlying themes????
I thought they were talking about Nimrods that had fuel leaks surely this is the main underlying theme THEY ALL LEAK !!!

There I have had my little rant and I have written only facts.So before I say more.

TAXI FOR TAPPERS DAD PLEASE.

[Winco]

Tappers Dad,

Sir, you never cease to amaze me with your attitude towards others. You have undoubtedly gained the respect of everyone on this forum, and I hold you in very high esteem.

Terry, you should also be commended for bringing this thread back to a degree of normality. I won't comment further on the things that have been said either, except to say that I have a certain amount of sympathy for people like TSM who clearly feel a great deal of understandable passion for the safety of his colleagues at Kinloss.

Clearly there are some serious problems with the Nimrod fleet, in poarticular continuing fuel leaks. Lets hope that a fix is found soon, for all concerned. I for one will now wait until the BoI publishes its' findings (assuming it will make some of them public) before I post again.

The Winco

[nav attacking]

TD Well Said.
The slagging off should really stop the important issue is peoples conception of how safe the aircraft is. The official figures at http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/accidents/accdam/acctab1.html for 2000-2006 are in fact at least 1 nimrod out unless they were produced before the ill fated XV 230. I believe the table fails to include XV227 which was written off after the damage shown on Panorama, albeit after it was fully stripped out and flown down to BAE (hats off to that crew). An unfortunate coincidence here was that Al Squires was the QFI on XV227 with Schwarbs as his student when that incident happened, lady luck was not on their side twice.
The inclusion of XV227, and there may be more like it I am unsure, would in fact increase the rate by 20% not good to have lost at least 6 out of a small fleet in the first place! Now how safe does the nimrod look on paper.
I stress the "on paper" as I for one firmly believe that the engineers are doing their best to keep the old lady flying. While fuel leaks are still an issue they are being found now and being rectified or dealt with as safely as possible whilst the aircraft gets on with an important operational role.

Unfortunately it is rarely the snag or fault that you know about that will cause the accident.

[hobie]

JOFRE: But let's look at the five months up to March, there were 25 fuel leaks, some of them really quite serious. Are you concerned about that?

Sir GlennTORPY: I am very concerned about it, and that's why we have made sure that we analysed every single incidence. There are no underlying themes.


I really can't see how you can fly the fleet after the above statement ...... :confused:

[Safety_Helmut]

Unfortunately it is rarely the snag or fault that you know about that will cause the accident.

History has shown us time and time again that accidents are almost never down to one single event, ie a snag or fault. The training that many of us on here have had from the RAF always emphasises a chain of events leading up to an accident, and there are often many oppurtunites to break that chain, and thus prevent an accident.

The accident we are discussing here, is the end consequence of a whole chain of events, which I suppose started with the original design concept. Decisions were made then which affected the outcome for XV230 and her crew. Many subsequent decisions and actions were undoubtedly part of that chain. Look up Rasmussen's Swiss Cheese Model for a good representation.

Another basic part of any safety management system is the analysis of incidents. Again, this is not unfamiliar territory for those in aviation. We are talking about a history of fuel leaks. They were there 10 years ago when I worked Nimrods. Incidents have also pointed to ignition sources in potential fuel leak areas. What has been done ? I wonder how comfortable the Nimrod IPT would be if asked to see the analyses following earlier incidents, and in particular the analysis that demonstrated that the risk had been reduced to acceptable levels.

Think of an iceberg, 90% below the waterline, analagous to incidents, 10% above the waterline, the accidents.

Safety_Helmut

[Secretsooty]

Gents, a few points if I may.

The AAr system as currently installed on the MR Mk2P Nimrod (MRA2, if you wish!) is radically different to the original "falklands lash-up" of the early '80s.
The main feed is now a single pipe running from the rear end of the probe down through the pressure shell, going under the floor at the port rear of the cockpit and then through the pressure shell again into the bomb-bay, quite far forward.
This in itself is a vast safety improvement (risk mimimisation, regardless of whether any incidents had occurred or not) on the early twin rubber hoses that snaked their way down the inside of the crew compartment, constantly getting walked on etc. :\
This single-skinned but thick-walled pipe (metal, not rubber) now runs rearwards down the port side of the bomb-bay before splitting into two and going out into the rib 1 area at the front of the wings. From there, it basically runs rearwards down either rib 1 until it connects to the main refuel gallery. This has eliminated the "lash-up" that utilised some of the 7-tank pipework and valves as AAR valves, considerably shortened the length of fuel pipework (hoses and metal) involved (especially within the crew compartment) and minimised the ammount of fuel pipework routed near "hot zones".
Now, this had to be done for good reason, for the bean-counters to allow such spending for what is a relatively radical and comprehensive re-design, so for anyone who wishes to simply claim that no-one pays heed to safety until it all goes wrong, here is proof that someone did indeed think, before something possibly went wrong. It is with great sadness, however, that something did indeed go wrong, cause as yet unproven.
Unfortunately, this re-design hasn't been without some issues. Pipelines fretting against the AAR pipe and coupling leaks to name but 2. Now, with the best will in the world, and the utmost care and attention by the technicians carrying out these modifications to ensure correct routing and clearances, nothing can take into account the constant flexing of the airframe (if it didn't it'd snap!) and movement due to thermal expansion/contraction causing all the pipework to "settle" into the position that it wants to adopt. That is what causes the fretting/leaks. Maybe there should have still been some hose sections to allow movement? I don't know, as I'm not a designer. I do know, however, that I wouldn't have attached a fuel pipe support bracket to a hot temp control valve....... :ugh:
There are currently so few Nimrods flying, partly due to the rigorous checks and inspections being carried out to hopefully prevent any further catastrophe and unnecessary loss of life, the groundcrew do care and have a personal pride in their own workmanship, (at least, all the ones I personally know do) contrary to some popular beliefs. It seems to me that a lot of emphasis is being placed on AAR, now although this may well have been a possible leak source, there had to be an ignition source as well......

[Da4orce]

More speculation but don't we already have a precedent for the ignition source, namely the 227 incident?

Having read the Unit Inquiry Report its seems to be feasible that the same or a similiar chain of events could have occurred on 230:

....damage (Enclosure 1) to XV227 comprised of
heat damage to:
a. The starboard rear spar at the fuselage joint post attachment point.
b. The starboard mainplane lower skin.
c. The forward face of No 7 Fuel Tank starboard and leaking FRS couplings due to seal damage.
d. The SCP duct, duct fairing and associated assemblies.
e. The aileron output cables and associated pulley.
f. The flap interconnecting cables.
g. Various wiring looms adjacent to the failed duct.

That is unless something has been done since the 227 incident to prevent a similar incident!

[Tappers Dad]

THE SUNDAY TIMES June 23, 2007

Nimrod failure was predicted

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1977632.ece

THE station commander of a Nimrod spyplane that exploded over Afghanistan warned a year earlier that an “unexpected failure” was likely with a similar ageing plane already 10 years past its out-of-service date.
The comments were made in August 2005 at the end of an internal report into a leak of superheated air in the bomb bay of a Nimrod.
In the report, an unnamed group captain says the leak was “a particular concern as the ageing Nimrod MR2 is extended beyond its original out-of-service date” of 1995. ...........

The Nimrod Families Deserve the Truth Now
http://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2007/06/the-nimrod-fami.html
The draft report of the Board of Inquiry into the explosion of Nimrod XV230 over Afghanistan last September in which all 14 of those on board died has been circulating in the MoD and the upper reaches of the RAF for weeks now. I was told by an MoD official in early May that it was already with the MoD lawyers. The families of those who died were told they would see the report this month. Now they are told it will not be released until September. No doubt there will be “good reasons” given but if the report was ready in early May, it is difficult to see why it will take so long to tell the families how their sons, husbands, partners, or fathers died. ............

GOOD WORK MICK SMITH :ok:

21 Jun 2007

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070621/text/70621w0005.htm#07062166000035
Nimrod Aircraft

Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many fuel leaks were recorded aboard RAF Nimrod aircraft in the six months prior to September 2006. [142811]
Mr. Ingram: Between the period 1 March 2006 and 31 August 2006 a total of 52 fuel leaks were reported on Nimrod MR2 and R1 aircraft. A fuel leak is defined as any leakage of fuel from aircraft couplings, pipes or fuel tanks. These did not compromise the safety of the aircraft and were rectified under normal maintenance procedures

[Papa Whisky Alpha]

I also lost my son on XV230.
Since the event there has been as far as I am concerned a serious lack of information from the MoD. Apart from a visit at 23.00 on the 02/09/2066 to inform me of the accident and two letters of condolance from the Commanding Officer and Squadron Commander I have heard nothing. My wife and I found out about the memorial service from someone at Kinloss and phoned to ask for an invitation to attend. Now we find that the only way to obtain any information is to be alerted via this web site to newspaper reports.

Why is it neccesary to provide the report to the legal people months before those who should have the results get to see a sanitised(?) version. Do they think we cannot accept the unadulterated truth?

I notice that the petition by Tapper's Dad seems to have fallen by the wayside, please sign if you haven't already. Both my wife and I are now 75, there is a good chance we may not be around to know the result

[buoy15]

Tappers Dad
The delay will be due to that infamous word - "litigation"
The BOI report, which, I am sure, is in perfectly man-readable English, will have to be "published" in a manner that the MOD requires and the public understands:hmm:

[Tappers Dad]

Papa Whiskey Alpha
Yes you are right we have had little direct contact with the RAF and nothing at all from the MOD.
Having said that we had two VO's ring us, a letter and a senoir officer contact us just before the Panorama programme came out.

Ah the power of the media !!!!

[tucumseh]

I know it’s a different Mk of aircraft, but this may be of interest, given it is a safety issue.





DESIGN, MANUFACTURE & SUPPLY OF ACTIVE NOISE HEADSET INTERFACE BOXES AND CONNECTING LEADS

Summary of Requirements:
The Nimrod IPT has a requirement for the Design, Manufacture and Supply of a replacement Active Noise Reduction (ANR) Headset Interface Box and its Connecting Leads, for use on the Mission System of the Nimrod R Mk1. The box is to be designed to the same size restraints as the existing Headset Interface Box, but is to include provision for the ANR Power Supply to be feed through the box by the addition of extra connectors. The replacement box is required to be new build.

[camelspyyder]

As a current MR2 man who knew all the crew on 230 (some for 25 years), I have to wonder what this thread is acheiving.

from my family's point of view, they find this thread, and the Panorama episode - which I have only just viewed, being on det - quite distressing, and regardless of what I tell them, they will not be reassured while such scaremongering continues.

I may be a naive old fool but I climb on board every day without any fear of a one in a million tech defect causing my wife to claim on the insurance.

The Nimrod is far from the only aircraft type to break in a sudden and catastrophic fashion. Commercial types that fly hundreds of thousands of passengers every day do it too, TWA800 for example.

Whilst I do hope that the BOI can identify a cause and stop it happening again, as they did following XW666's accident, if they cannot then I feel it is time to draw a line under the whole affair, and let the guys and girls who are still flying them now to get on with their jobs without any more undue stress being placed on their families and friends.

I have the utmost respect for everyone who was on crew 3, but the crews that remain must be allowed to get on with their work without all this added pressure.

RIP CXX/3

[30mRad]

Here, here Camelspyder.

[Strato Q]

Spot on Camelspyder. :D

[Charlie Luncher]

I have thought long and hard about posting this.
I cannot agree more with Camelspyder. I watched the Panorama program via the BBC website, and I feel it exploited the families to satisfy the undying need of journalists and their sensationalist scoop vendetta, and for what?
Mrs Q
I thought you were very strong and brave and rightly proud of Q, it brought back memories of better times and lots of Bacardi Breezers. You made this old bugger cry.
TD
I know you want the answers to why you and your family have paid this heavy price, the career Ben chose and loved was not without risk. Military flying is a risky business and accidents do happen, sometimes the cause is never known, what if you never knew why? My friends, colleagues and dear mates at ISK have been heavily wounded, this wound will heal very slowly given their and their families strengths as will yours. Some of the casualties of this tragic event were not on XV230 and are still suffering with no-one to turn to but their mates. Each dig into this wound by journalists, so-called experts and politicians tears the very scab off the wound and it starts the whole healing process once more.
To all on this thread spare a thought for those that are in harms way and their families waiting at home and what your impassioned, point scoring and un-informed posts may cause them to go through. I have faith in the professional approach of the RAF members of the BOI and always have had. The use of this thread to bash the MRA4 and the people working on it is just pathetic. I am no longer with the RAF, but I am in the process of preparing my young crew to deploy to the Middle East in an aircraft of the same vintage conducting the same roles as the MR2, some for the first time. I will be operating alongside our allies including American MPA operators. Can a drone complete the role, no they cannot, despite the many varied types, they have many strengths and many weaknesses. As with Camelspyder I climb aboard and take the risks I volunteered for to make a difference to peoples’ lives. My thoughts are often on 2nd Sept, and not for the first time, sometimes when I am flying, sometimes in the quiet down time.
If you have a problem with what I have said please PM me and we will discuss off thread. To my brothers and sisters in arms mines a Guinness in this life or the next, rest easy.
Charlie sends

[FATTER GATOR]

:uhoh: Still hurts. Well said Charlie Luncher and Camelspyyder.

RIP CXX/3

[Tappers Dad]

camelspyyder

"from my family's point of view, they find this thread, and the Panorama episode - which I have only just viewed, being on det - quite distressing, and regardless of what I tell them, they will not be reassured while such scaremongering continues".

Scaremongering ??? I don't think the Panorama programme said anything that wasn't the truth. If this scares people I am not surprised but it's the truth.

"The Nimrod is far from the only aircraft type to break in a sudden and catastrophic fashion. Commercial types that fly hundreds of thousands of passengers every day do it too, TWA800 for example".

This is true did you read the NTSB findings into the TW A800 crash ??
http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2006/060629.htm

A flawed design and airworthiness certification philosophy that fuel tank explosions could be prevented solely by eliminating all likely ignition sources;

The certification of the Boeing 747 design that had heat sources located beneath the center wing tank with no means to reduce the heat transferred into the fuel tank, and no protection against the flammability of vapors that accumulated in the tank.

Sounds familiar doesn't it?


"Whilst I do hope that the BOI can identify a cause and stop it happening again, as they did following XW666's accident, if they cannot then I feel it is time to draw a line under the whole affair, and let the guys and girls who are still flying them now to get on with their jobs without any more undue stress being placed on their families and friends".

If they cannot then I feel it's time to draw a line under the whole affair. Oh thats what it was an affair, not a tragedy that has left 18 children fatherless,not a tragedy that has left 14 wives/girlfriends and parents heartbroken.
It was just an affair and lets draw a line under it :mad:

Perhaps those fighting for justice in the Chinook and Hercules threads should "draw a line under the whole affair" as well eh??

All accidents have a cause the main cause of this one was a fuel leak.
In the 6 months leading up to the accident 52 leaks were reported. In a 5 month period since 25 leaks reported. Doesn't that mean the a/c is safer now than before the crash ?
I would have thought that fact alone would give some families reassurance that things are getting better.
I also understand times between maintainence have been reduced and AAR kept to a minimum. all reassuring stuff.

Get your head out of the sand and smell the aviation fuel, this AFFAIR will NOT have a line drawn under it until after the Inquest in two or three years time.
At the inquest they will look into why there were 52 leaks in the 6 months prior to the tragedy, they will look into maintainence, Safety cases, other incidents. They will look at the reccommendations following the incident on XV227 22nd Nov 2004 to see if they were carried out.

RECOMMENDATIONS
39. It is recommended that:
a. A maintenance policy is investigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
b. A lifing policy is introduced for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
c. The ruptured duct is with replaced with new manufacture items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
d. A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
e. The extent of the hot air leak warning system is reviewed to ensure that all possible duct failures are covered.
f. This incident is highlighted as a training point for WSOp(E).
g. The FRCs regarding SCP malfunctions are amended to reflect the information in the aircrew manuals.

If anyone knows if all/some of these recommendations were carried out please post it on here ,this is the Nimrod Information thread after all.

Only when the families of the dead know ALL the facts only then can a line be drawn.

Car crashes happen everyday it does worry my family I drive everyday.
And yes aircraft crash, that doesn't stop millions of people flying on them.

As Charlie Luncher says "Military flying is a risky business and accidents do happen". Thats reassuring Charlie isn't it.

[difar69]

Exercising my right to an opinion - santiago15, FATTER GATOR, Charlie Luncher, Strato Q, Just This Once, 30mRad, camelspyyder, well said by all, I agree.

Military life (flying or not) is inherently dangerous, that's partly why some of us do it. I knew all on 230. RIP CXX/3, it still hurts.

[The Swinging Monkey]

TD,
I so very much agree with every word you say 100%.

Clearly there are two schools of thought;
1. We should all keep quiet and say nothing, or
2. Voice concerns and opinions etc.

For fear of having my head shot off again, I'll refrain from further comment other than to say I'm with option 2 and still very much with you TD.

Keep up the great work. Kind regards
TSM

[Wigan Warrior]

"...ha ha, what an idiot!!"
TSM

"...I can't stop laughing at you Short Fattie thing, HO HO, HA HA..."

If you didn't come out with sh1t like that, maybe you wouldn't need to fear getting your "...head shot off again..."

[fin1012]

I'm with camelspyder and charlieluncher on this one. There are clearly two camps - those who believe there is some great conspiracy and cover-up and those who are trying to get on and do their best in an often imperfect system, whilst waiting for the BOI report. Those at the coal face with experience understand some of the pressures that mean we can't always have things exactly as we want, nor limitless funding. I expect to be slagged off for this, but I have made my decision - I'm not going to read this thread anymore as I think it is incapable of resolution to anyones satisfaction.

[camelspyyder]

Just reread what I posted yesterday and I can see that it could offend some.

I certainly do not think the families should let up in their search for the truth - if it ever can be determined.

I do believe, however, that a line should be drawn under this thread. It has been dominated by bitching, one-upmanship and often ill-informed speculation since it started. None of these things are helpful to either the families of the lost, or those that remain.

Until the FACTS are presented, I (and I only speak for myself on this one)will be happy to keep on flying in the Nimrod, and unless those facts damn the heap to hell, and thence the scrappers, I will continue to do so for some time to come.

RIP CXX/3

[Winco]

Wigan Warrior,

TSM made his comments in light of what I wrote on here regarding Airline safety. It was in responce to the comments made to me by the Short Fat one.

Sadly it is now yourself who is looking somewhat silly by dragging up his comments once again! What is your point? TSM has apologised for the tone of his comments and for taking the mickey, but NOT for the accuarcy or content, which is correct as far as airline safety is concerned. I will not venture into the argument on here either, simply because there are some who feel that my experience as an airline pilot is not worth a jot, but hey, whatever, I can live with that. If you chaps feel that you know better, then I am happy with also.

Clearly WW you are in the gang who feel that personal abuse is the way to go, 'If you didn't come out with sh1t like that' and I am not going to lower myself to your standards and argue with you. Try reasoning next time, or trying understanding the frustration that others feel by this sad, sorry and appalling situation.

TD, I also agree entirely with your comments. You must keep searching and keep asking those difficult questions and I am certain that you will find the answers you seek one day very soon I hope.

The Winco

[tucumseh]

This isn’t an easy one, but if even half the statements here, and on other threads, are remotely true, it certainly looks like the MoD have difficult questions to answer.

I believe in TD’s right to search for the truth. He is using a forum where he is probably entitled to believe he can expect support, given he gets little or none from MoD. I also believe the MoD actually rely on bereaved families wanting to forget and move on.

As such, letting this go would be playing into the MoD’s hands. I am no expert, and do not wish to pre-judge the BOI or coroner, but on the face of it this accident was avoidable. It does not seem to have been an unavoidable accident in the sense a bird strike would be. We should avoid the personal conflicts we see here, but the basic issues should be of concern to everyone. I applaud the “can do” attitude of those who fly. I accept the honesty of those who admit they “can’t do”. But I abhor those who can and should, but don’t.

Instead of studying this in isolation, perhaps we should take a wider look, and assess whether other accidents were avoidable, and if there were common factors. Not detailed technical issues like fuel leaks, but whether or not people in authority were forewarned, or shortcuts were taken to save pennies, or funding withheld. The stovepiping we hear of in the MoD has the effect of reducing the number of people who see the big picture on, for example, aircraft safety. It makes it easier to ignore this bigger picture, allowing the MoD to look plausible when they claim any given accident was “isolated”.

Stick with it TD.

[nigegilb]

TD it is as well to remember that the Military is a very conservative organisation. Officers don't get promoted by being controversial or making a noise. I am not suggesting that is what is going on here, but I do believe the majority are uncomfortable with involving press and media in general. I urge you to continue. This thread may have run run it's course for now. But you still have a lot of support for your cause.

If I was still serving, I would absolutely reject the argument that the level of risk being asked of crews is acceptable when very easy safety solutions are on the table. lack of money is a pathetic reason to bury heads in sands. Money is always available to those who know how to ask for it and £500m is already being spent on aircraft self-protection (post XV179).

Good luck with your cause.

[Safeware]

camelspyyder,
I may be a naive old fool but I climb on board every day without any fear of a one in a million tech defect causing my wife to claim on the insurance.
And that's the way it should be. But it can only be so if everyone understands and discharges their responsibilities.

While some may not understand the journey TD is taking, one has to respect that grief takes many forms. I contribute to this thread not to defend or demand but to explain.

For those who continue to take risks on our behalf, you have my respect, for those who wait for answers, you have my best wishes.

sw

[Da4orce]

25 Jun 2007 : Column 128W

Nimrod Aircraft

Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what investigation was undertaken into the ruptured super-heated air pipe on Nimrod XV227 in November 2004; what conclusions were reached; and what steps have been taken in response. [142810]

Mr. Ingram: During a post flight check on Nimrod XV227 on 22 November 2004, it was discovered that a portion of Supplementary Cooling Pack ducting had failed. A unit inquiry was held which concluded that it was caused by pitting and cracking corrosion leading to failure. The unit inquiry made the following recommendations and the table identifies actions taken in response.

Recommendation
The ruptured duct is replaced with new manufactured items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. All such ducts fitted to in-service aircraft have been replaced with newly manufactured items.

Recommendation
A lifting policy is introduced for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
See comments on maintenance policy recommendation. Action ongoing.

Recommendation
A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifting policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.

Recommendation
The extent of the hot air leak warning system is reviewed to ensure that all possible duct failures are covered.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. A review of the aircraft warning systems revealed that the affected Supplementary Cooling Pack Duct was the only duct whose failure would not have been detected.

Recommendation
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Action Taken
Recommendation rejected. The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected. All of these ducts have been replaced with newly manufactured items that, based upon the previous 25 fault-free years that the original duct had been fitted, are expected to last well beyond the planned MR2 Out of Service Date (early part of the next decade). Moreover, fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody. Considering the Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2, the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable. Action closed.

Recommendation
This incident is highlighted as a training point for Air Engineers.
Action Taken
The incident was immediately publicised through the Air Engineer command chain at RAF Kinloss. Action closed.

Recommendation
The Aircrew Flight Reference Cards (FRC) regarding Supplementary Cooling Pack malfunctions are amended to reflect the information in the aircrew manuals.
Action Taken
Amendments were made to Aircrew Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manuals to reflect the incident. Action closed.

[Wigan Warrior]

Winco,

You will be pleased to know that in a battle of wits I never fight with the unarmed.
I was merely pointing out to TSM that his personal attack on SFO was a piece ‘sh1t’.
This is not an opinion held by me alone.
I was making the point that TSM need not fear getting his head shot off as long as he refrained from insulting people. I made no personal insult. Well, not what I would consider an insult…. this is what I would consider a personal insult:
“You are an utter disgrace to yourself, your service and this country as a whole. How on earth did you slip through the net?
You are nothing short of contemptable, and I too am ashamed of you.
The Winco”

Good job you’d never stoop to that level eh :rolleyes:

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks Da4orce

It would appear that the recommendations have not all been carried out then 3 years later.

Recommendation
A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifting policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.

So no duct replacement until after December 2007 them Mmmm

Recommendation
The extent of the hot air leak warning system is reviewed to ensure that all possible duct failures are covered.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. A review of the aircraft warning systems revealed that the affected Supplementary Cooling Pack Duct was the only duct whose failure would not have been detected.

So despite the fact that they recommended extending the warning system to ensure it covered all duct failures, nothing was done Mmmm

Recommendation
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Action Taken
Recommendation rejected. The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected. All of these ducts have been replaced with newly manufactured items that, based upon the previous 25 fault-free years that the original duct had been fitted, are expected to last well beyond the planned MR2 Out of Service Date (early part of the next decade). Moreover, fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody. Considering the Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2, the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable. Action closed.

So no hot air leak warning system then Mmmm

It appers then that the unit inquiry didn't make much difference to safety then. Lets hope the BOI's findings don't go down the same way then.After all the Consideried Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2 is even closer now , so I wonder if making any changes will be deemed as not considered to be practicable.

Until then I wait, I listen, I learn, I collect factual information , I ???????

[BEagle]

Years ago, I was being shown around a Hercules (it must have been a long time ago - it was still in that 2 shades-of-$hit camouflage). The guy showing me around showed me a 'bleed air pressure gauge' (or something like that) and told me it was an essential item to monitor whether there could be a hot air leak....

Roll forward several years and I was on the mighty Tin Triangle. I asked how one could be certain that, with all the engine air switches off, the duct was depressurised as there was no gauge. I was told that it wasn't possible; however, I invented a check of my own involving a check of no Air Ventilated Suit flow with engine airs off. This was easy, as the engines were brought up above 80%, just press the valve on the Personal Equipment Connector and check that there was no airflow. If there was, throttle back each engine in turn to find the culprit. One night I did this as we were about to set off for Cyprus - and we found a stuck air valve as a result. This would have meant that, in the event of a hot air leak, we wouldn't have been able to stop the leak apart from shutting down the associated engine.... So the captain wisely elected to shut down the offending engine and taxi back in.

Some months later, a Waddington (second division) crew were flying to Goose, then Offutt. They received the classic symptoms of a hot air leak, but seemingly didn't know how to confirm whether the engine airs were working properly. However, they pressed on.... On the way into Goose the fuel readings were all over the place - some tanks had seemingly gained 1000 lb of fuel. Later, serious damage was found to have occurred; I think that the aircraft was later donated to Goose as a mascot.

Hot air leaks, and the inability to detect whether a bleed air duct is pressurised, are very serious. The old excuse of 'not practicable due to impending OSD' was often trotted out in V-force days - yet the aged jets kept going for years after the TSR2 was supposed to have been in service.

It seems that the lessons of the past have not been properly 'identified', let alone learned.

Keep up the good work, T's D - and don't let the squirming airships wriggle off the hook!

[tucumseh]

Beagle………

“Hot air leaks, and the inability to detect whether a bleed air duct is pressurised, are very serious. The old excuse of 'not practicable due to impending OSD' was often trotted out in V-force days - yet the aged jets kept going for years after the TSR2 was supposed to have been in service”.


I agree with this wholeheartedly. The OSD issue used to be formalised in the “Five Year Rule”. That is, if you could not demonstrate 5 years useful life, you could not get the funds. This would be open to interpretation. We (HQ staffs) would, for example, bid for the money in 1980, and simply say the a/c will still be in service in 1985. Sometimes we got away with it, but more often than not the beancounters would say “Bid – 1980, LTC approval – 1981, Contract award – 1983, In Service Date – 1987, Full fleet embodiment – 1989…. Plus 5 = 1994. Sorry, OSD is 1993, forget it”. Inevitably, the OSD would slip, but we needed at least a two year slip to get approval. So, announcements were often one year at a time.

The exception was always safety issues. Until 1991 of course, when as a matter of policy funding was no longer automatically available to investigate/rectify safety problems. As I’ve said elsewhere, we were routinely instructed to ignore safety problems. This is still the case.

This was nothing to do with procurement. All the decisions were taken before procurers got involved.

You never hear this talked about now, mainly because it involves a head and a parapet.

[sarsteph]

TD - it might be worth re-reading the recommendations about the ducting and noting the following:


Recommendation
The ruptured duct is replaced with new manufactured items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. All such ducts fitted to in-service aircraft have been replaced with newly manufactured items.


The way I read it, all such ducting on in service Nimrods were replaced in the aftermath of the investigation. The later paragraph you quoted that refers to a replacement program starting in Dec 07 refers to the lifing of the new ducts - therefore the ducts that were replaced after the investigation will be lifed, and replacement of the new ducting will start from late this year.

[Distant Voice]

Sarsteph: I do not think you are reading the second recommendation correctly. It refers not just to the section of piping that ruptured, but all similar piping in the a/c system.

By the way, I undestand that the BOI has been reconvened. Any thoughts, anyone?

DV

[Chugalug2]

CS wrote
I have the utmost respect for everyone who was on crew 3, but the crews that remain must be allowed to get on with their work without all this added pressure
Hear hear! So let's alleviate that pressure, CAS, and institute these safety mods that are so obviously required to this very important component of the UK military air fleet. I find it alarming that the shortcomings in the airworthiness of front line operational types (Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook) are seen as unacceptable, not by the MOD, nor by the Senior Commanders of the RAF, but by those at the work face, both serving and ex, and honourable examples such as Tucumseh who can tell us how the system throws up scandals such as these and then perpetuates them. His quote tells us of the extent of this scandal:
The exception was always safety issues. Until 1991 of course, when as a matter of policy funding was no longer automatically available to investigate/rectify safety problems. As I’ve said elsewhere, we were routinely instructed to ignore safety problems. This is still the case.

In 1965 Hastings TG577 crashed on take off at Abingdon for a training paras drop. All 41 on board died. The entire world wide fleet was grounded, and an expensive and extensive repair of the aircraft tails initiated. Within 3 years that transport fleet was gone, in favour of the Hercules, but safety was paramount. A far more expensive mod was of course done to the Concordes after the tragedy at CDG, only to be followed by their complete withdrawal within a few years. These actions were not wasteful and reckless expenditures, but the proper and prudent reaction to technical deficiencies that had caused or augmented the causes of aircraft accidents. To do otherwise is unprofessional and reckless. It seems that policy has been to do otherwise for some 16 years. That is a scandal!

[Da4orce]

sarsteph wrote:

TD - it might be worth re-reading the recommendations about the ducting and noting the following:

Recommendation
The ruptured duct is replaced with new manufactured items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. All such ducts fitted to in-service aircraft have been replaced with newly manufactured items.

The way I read it, all such ducting on in service Nimrods were replaced in the aftermath of the investigation. The later paragraph you quoted that refers to a replacement program starting in Dec 07 refers to the lifing of the new ducts - therefore the ducts that were replaced after the investigation will be lifed, and replacement of the new ducting will start from late this year.


The second recommendation that you refer to states:

A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.

Noted the ducts have been replaced but still no maintenance programme and it's not clear whether just the ruptured duct was replaced or all similar ducts.

Lets hope that the press and 'MOD insiders' are wrong in attributing the ignition source in XV230 to a hot air duct failure otherwise there have to be serious questions asked as to whether the failure could have been prevented by the implementation of a maintenance programme as recommended some two years prior to the loss of XV230 along with 200 years of combined RAF experience in the shape of crew 3.

[tucumseh]

Da4orce

“Lets hope that the press and 'MOD insiders' are wrong in attributing the ignition source in XV230 to a hot air duct failure otherwise there have to be serious questions asked as to whether the failure could have been prevented by the implementation of a maintenance programme as recommended some two years prior to the loss of XV230 along with 200 years of combined RAF experience in the shape of crew 3”.


While I don’t know anything at all about this aspect of Nimrod, this is precisely what I was advocating a few posts ago. We often read BOI reports which present recommendations as novel ideas (look how honest and clever we are), yet scrape away the thin veneer and you find that very serious issues have been known about for years and ignored. You never see this mentioned in the reports, and it more or less follows that it never gets raised at Coroners’ inquests. That is, MoD can tailor the BOI report to avoid embarrassment, and effectively pre-determine the inquest verdict. I have chosen my words very carefully. There are cases where the problem has been known about, but not fixed for good reason following a risk assessment. But very often it is swept under the carpet as to fix it would embarrass senior staffs or “chosen ones” who have waived safety in order to meet time and cost targets. Remember, this has been condoned in the past by CDP and above.

If you want to check what I’m saying, have a look at the BOI reports from previous fatal “accidents” during GW2. Redacted versions are on the MoD site. Look at the recommendations. One calls a certain system “not fit for purpose” as it blinds and disorientates the pilots, yet the obvious questions - “So who, and what flawed process, allowed it to be fitted in the first place?” and “Why was it removed, and then refitted?” are not asked. Nor were they, apparently, by the Coroner. This is not a state secret. You just have to be able to assimilate open source data from various sources, not just what the MoD wants you to read. (In this case, a picture speaks a thousand words). Or another report which recommends a safety feature is actually integrated properly, so it works. Instead of leaving it at that, why not ask why it wasn’t integrated in the first place, leaving the a/c unsafe, and whether or not the problem had been flagged (rumour has it) 9 months and 3 years before the “accident”, both times to 2*. And whether the same problem had occurred on other a/c requiring precisely the same safety features. And why they were fixed.

If you ask each IPT about these “accidents” they will invariable trot out some stats that show it to be an isolated case on their a/c. Stovepiping in MoD means they are blissfully unaware of cases with similarities or common denominators. Visibility of all the cases I mention only comes at 2* level, minimum. Precisely the level that has ruled safety is optional on these a/c. Well, they’re not going to dob themselves in to a BOI comprising minions, are they?

The solution? Simple application of what are, supposedly, mandated rules. The relevant Def Stan is extant. It hasn’t really needed amending for 17 years, partly because it’s so robust; but mainly because it’s fallen into disuse as its purpose – maintaining the build standard, including safety - is poorly funded and widely ignored.

Do I have faith in BOIs? No. But I do think matters will gradually improve, as the penny has dropped with MoD that the internet and FOI, along with the likes of TD, can be a force for good.

[nigegilb]

A rather remarkable fact has come to my attention in the last few days- the MRA4 actually has less protection than MR2. MR2 has a nitrogen inerting system in the AARprobe to prevent a possible explosive situation developing due to the presence of fuel vapours. I understand that this sensible safety feature has been removed in the MRA4. Presumably, someone thought it a good idea to save a few more pennies?

[JFZ90]

The second recommendation that you refer to states:

A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.

Noted the ducts have been replaced but still no maintenance programme and it's not clear whether just the ruptured duct was replaced or all similar ducts.

Lets hope that the press and 'MOD insiders' are wrong in attributing the ignition source in XV230 to a hot air duct failure otherwise there have to be serious questions asked as to whether the failure could have been prevented by the implementation of a maintenance programme as recommended some two years prior to the loss of XV230 along with 200 years of combined RAF experience in the shape of crew 3.


I think there is some misunderstanding of the measures implemented above. In a nutshell, the ducts (that have been in for 20+ years) have been assessed to require a life based mtn scheme. This is in the process of being set up properly. In the meantime as it says above ALL the ducts have been replaced with brand new components - hence the fleet has all new ducting, as they were built. The mtn policy will be in force from Dec 07, by which time a sensible lifing strategy will have been developed/implemented - now the DA will have looked at the corrosion etc. issues carefully and will recommend an appropriate lifing solution - this could for example be based on flight hours or years fitted. As the original ducting lasted 20+ years, it is quite possible that a safe lifing policy could see them remain in the fleet for 10/15 yrs, before replacement under a managed mtn programme. Hence the new ducting now flying may not need replacement until 2017 in the first refitted aircraft. These are example figures, but it seems pretty clear that the fact that specifics of a mtn policy will not be in place until Dec 07 is NOT a safety issue.

Hope this helps explain.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90; Are you sure you have got that right? It is my understandaing that the only piping that has been replaced is the section which caused the XV227 incident. Not ALL hot piping in the a/c; that is part of the "lifing" study.

DV

[Distant Voice]

Well, we are constantly being told that we should not speculate but wait until the BOI reports. It is now reported that the BOI has been reconvened. Do any of you "MoD Insiders" know why? Is it something we have said on pprune?

DV

[JFZ90]

JFZ90; Are you sure you have got that right? It is my understandaing that the only piping that has been replaced is the section which caused the XV227 incident. Not ALL hot piping in the a/c; that is part of the "lifing" study.

To be fair, I don't know and there is not enough information available, hence I will speculate no further as it is inappropriate. I was just trying to point out in my post that some of the conclusions above that "mtn policy not in place until Dec 07 = bad" is not necessarily a valid conclusion.

From what I can see above however, it appears that:

a) the issue has been taken seriously post BoI and tackled.

b) whilst the detail is not known to me, in broad terms the approach appears valid and robust and contains the kind of measures I would expect. By this I mean it is multifaceted - not just replacing offending pipes (as a car mechanic may do and send you off hoping it doesn't break again), but looking further to try and understand the failure mechanisms and put in place mitigating measures over the long term (as you'd expect a professional airworthiness outfit to do).

[Tappers Dad]

DV
I see that some BOI have in the past took notice of BBC programmes

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/486/48606.htm
Here's 2 extracts:

"As a result of a BBC programme raising doubts as to whether the incident was as a result of enemy fire, the Royal Military Police carried out two investigations............

"There has been considerable delay from completion of the Board of Inquiry to publication in some cases. In some cases, the time taken to publish the report took longer than the inquiry itself. In the case of the Royal Marine landing craft which came under friendly fire south of Basra in March 2003, the inquiry was complete by December 2003 but the finalised report was not published until February 2006, some 26 months later".

Could be in for a very long wait then.

Maybe thats why the have been reconvened because of Panorama or maybe the Sunday Times.

[Distant Voice]

TD: I agree with you, so let's keep digging away.

DV

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90:
in broad terms the approach appears valid and robust

But not swift. By the time the policy comes in force three years will have passed since the incident.

After the XV227 incident the "powers that be" thought they had all the time in the world to implement the recommendations for this "isolated case", then XV230 jumped up and bit them.

The XV227 case would not have been highlighted but for the Panorama programme, now its the main talking point.

DV

[nigegilb]

This is what I have been told about XV227 and the change in procedures following XV230.

"..we had an aircraft scrapped a year ago due to hot air leak
damaging the rear spar, the fuel tank possibly responsible for the ultimate
explosion on XV230 was significantly damaged and could have exploded due to residual fuel boiling. They made a bit of a mess of the whole inspection
procedure and it took some weeks to establish the extent of the damage. We now drain these tanks(7's) before flight and leave them empty, work is
underway to blank them off but the vent system uses the tank."

[FATTER GATOR]

Let's say, for arguments sake, that persons X, Y and Z were found to be ultimately at fault for the loss of our colleagues, friends and families on XV230. What then?

[nigegilb]

I don't really see this is about blame. I see it as dragging the RAF and MOD into the 21st Century and forcing the issue of aircraft safety. We have all seen the result of getting by on a shoestring budget and ignoring sensible aircraft self-protection methods. No-one wants to see more unnecessary death. If the tragedy of XV230 is being seen as an isolated event, then people are deluding themselves. It is a matter of great sadness that bereaved families have deemed it necessary to take on the onerous task for themselves in the absence of any leadership or information from the RAF or MOD.

[FATTER GATOR]

nigegilb

I have never had any hesitation about going flying on a Nimrod either before or after the tragedy. That said I think you are probably right on that one.

[AC Ovee]

Recommendation
A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems).


OK, so the study is complete. BAe Systems would not have carried it out without a formal request from the RAF. Was that request issued before or after 2 Sep 06? The Unit Enquiry recommendation was issued in 2005.

[nigegilb]

FG, completely understand where you are coming from. Aircrew are paid to take risks, it goes with the job. I have taken plenty and my former colleagues have had some unbelievable escapes in recent months. That said, just the other day an old friend took me by the side and thanked me, most sincerely for forcing the issue over "J" foam. He was off to Afg in a couple of days and he quietly made the point that Herc crews and crucially their families were much happier about the situation on the Herc. Someone made the point on this thread that the families of aircrew at Kinloss were unhappy about all the scaremongering. Believe me, the way to fix that unhappiness is to spend the money, invest in safety and some of the anxiety will go away. Since XV179, the Herc community suffered 2 more aircraft losses. This argument is all about preventing further loss. I have no doubt that Kinloss crews will continue to fly, that is what makes the RAF special, but the leadership must realise that taking unnecessary risk on behalf of their men, might save money but is fundamentally, immoral.

[Winco]

Wigan Warrior,
I remember my comments very well. Did you read what it was inresponce to? clearly not!

[Distant Voice]

It is commendable that our aircrews are happy to take risks when they fly, but MoD has a responsibility for the civilian population they fly over. Can you imagine the carnage if XV227 or XV230 had gone down on "finals" over Morayshire.

DV

[Pontius Navigator]

It is commendable that our aircrews are happy to take risks when they fly, but MoD has a responsibility for the civilian population they fly over. Can you imagine the carnage if XV227 or XV230 had gone down on "finals" over Morayshire.DV

At least the minister responsible for defence and for Scotland is one and the same.

[BEagle]

Nimrod inquiry opens again for new evidence

See: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2010126.ece

[Biggus]

The Times article BEagle has placed a link to states:

"......A Harrier aircraft followed the aircraft down and saw the starboard wing explode first, followed a few seconds later by the rest of the aircraft. The base commander said in the inquiry report that more such incidents were likely to occur because the Nimrod was 10 years past its “out of service” date. “The unexpected failure should be ever at the forefront of our minds,” he said......"

My understanding of the sequence of events is that the "base commander" in question is a previous Stn Cdr, and his comments are in relation to the incident with XV227 - indeed they are part of the report into the incident. HIS COMMENTS WERE MADE BEFORE THE TRAGIC LOSS OF XV230! By writing his article the way he has the journalist has DELIBERATELY (apparently/allegedly, etc) created the impression that the statement was made in relation to the loss of XV230 - cheap shot and misleading!

The statement of the Stn Cdr in question is perfectly valid, I am not trying to dispute that, and of relevance to the debate, but there was no need to DELIBERATELY (it would appear to me/allegedly, etc) use it out of context.

I stand ready to be corrected by someone more knowledgeable than myself!

[30mRad]

Biggus, I read it exactly the same way you do - scandoulous journalistic reporting yet again. More so since they're mis-quoting themselves from last week!

Whilst I applaud the efforts to get the truth and to improve the safety for our colleagues who continue to fly, this kind of thing does not help the friends and families of those tragically lost on XV230 nor of those still flying on operations.

I know there is scepticism on BOIs but having spoken to presidents of 2 other BOIs they stood by their comments and findings and would not change things despite pressure from the top, and I honestly believe the same will come of the BOI into XV230.

My thoughts and prayers continue to be with the relatives and friends of crew 3. I was there when it happened, and know how it feels.

[Distant Voice]

I have read Mick Smith's article, and I agree it can give the wrong impression, but I would not call it DELIBERATE or SCANDALOUS. Mick Smith has done some great work in trying to uncover the truth and keep the accident in the public eye, and at worst I would say that the section referred to in the previous postings was simply ambiguous.

What is Deliberate and Scandalous is the information put out this week to the families that all the recommendations made by the XV227 Inquiry Board have been carried. And it is also Scandalous that they haven't.

By the way I understand that the Station Commander who signed off on the XV227 report, and was still in charge when XV230 was lost, has left the service to fly with "Eastern". Is that Deliberate, or Scandalous?

DV

[Chugalug2]

30mRad, I am sure that your ex BOI presidents are being entirely sincere in their beliefs that their findings were sound. The problem is that of "stove piping" highlighted by Tucumseh. The basic principle of Flight Safety, is that "everyone knows what anyone knows". My experience of RAF flight safety stems from some 40 years ago, but is perhaps all the more instructive for that. Great emphasis was put on dissemination, at Squadron, Ops Wing, Station and Command level, using locally and centrally produced newsletters, magazines, film flashes, posters, etc to make everyone aware that Flight Safety concerned them, be they cooks, bottle washers or CinCs! No one was allowed to use rank or influence to obstruct this knowledge, either up or down. I used to be a right pain (as Sqn FSO) by collecting FOD off the apron and dumping it on the OC Ops Wg's desk, albeit in a bin liner (the FOD, not the OC Ops Wg or me), saying that I believed it all belonged to him. "Point taken", he would say between gritted teeth. And that point was everyone had a duty to ensure Flight Safety, not because we were all Cold War wimps, but so that when it became a Hot War we would have a force largely intact, rather than whittled away by "isolated incidents", to quote the CAS. Now we learn from Tucumseh that this culture has been stopped in its tracks for the last 16 years by obstructing the funding for the necessary modifications required for known deficiencies discovered by incident/occurrence reporting or ultimately by BoIs, and that furthermore the free dissemination of information within the system, fundamental to its working, is obstructed by "stove piping". That is why I no longer have faith in BoIs, because what their Presidents should have been advised, of what was already known, was not always revealed.

[camelspyyder]

I guess u guys missed my point.

Yes 12(14) of us died. (AND WE WILL NEVER FORGET THEM)

However there are still 2-300 of us who still fly these things on a voluntary basis.

and still you all are scaring the **** out of our loved ones with all your speculative rubbish and possibly half-true facts.

Why dont you just email each other all your rumours, half-truths and lies
and let the rest of us get on with it - which is our own choice - and do our job. It is so much easier to get on with it when your family are not panicked by every post they read on PPRUNE.

this is a public forum.

consider the feelings of the public who read it.

Dell.

[Chugalug2]

No, CS, you have made your point clearly and succinctly in previous posts. I can only speak for myself when I say that I have the greatest respect for yourself and your comrades manning the thin red line while the likes of I enjoy the freedoms that you defend on our behalf. I take your point that keeping this topic going may cause distress, not only to NOK, but clearly to you and your colleagues. I would not contribute if that were the only effect, but I honestly believe that the paymasters must be made to loosen the purse strings so that what should be done will be done. Nigegilb has shown that it can be done, but it takes a lot of effort and pressure to do that. The ESF thread on this forum undoubtedly aided the success of that campaign, and a lot of the knowledge gained is surely directly applicable here. As with the Hercules tragedy, NOK directly involving themselves in such a campaign infuse it with enormous moral authority, and I commend and applaud TD for his efforts. Having left the RAF some 34 years ago I had not realised the tremendous changes that it has gone through in that time, until reading the many threads here. Many of those changes are, IMHO, for the worse and invariably due to financial strictures. So I have indeed had to wake up and smell the coffee and found it's flavour distinctly bitter. Of course I realise that much here is unrepresentative and should at best be taken with large dollops of salt, but there are some here who shine through and whom I trust. To mention but two; Nigegilb, because his actions alone are his bona fides. Tucumseh because so much of this situation was created not by the RAF but at the MOD, of which I (mercifully) have no direct experience and he has, and is prepared to share that with us and shine a light into some murky corners. If we are wise we should study what he shows us. For myself it is a privilege to post on this forum which I try not to usurp. I am sure that the great majority that post here do so sincerely and knowing the pain that is felt by those who have lost loved ones and friends. If we have but one thing in common it is surely the wish that others should be spared such pain in the future.

[camelspyyder]

more often than not i get flamed on PPRUNE and i have to change my id on a regular basis, since the regular posters are not happy to have anyone challenge the resident point of view.

It makes me sad when persons so remote from my base can be judged to be authorities on what happens here, even though many of them are 20 or 30 years behind the times. It is even more sad that posters like TD and Da4orce are sucking up everything they are told in these forums because they think we are all authorities on what is happening.

I'll say it for the last time.

If you haveFACTS at hand which will help people, then go ahead and post. If you have only rumour or heresay then forget it!!

Dell

[buoy15]

Getting a bit confused here
I thought this was a rumour network - 'Pprune'
Rather than a fact network - 'Ppfane'????

[Da4orce]

camelspyyder wrote:

I guess u guys missed my point.

Yes 12(14) of us died. (AND WE WILL NEVER FORGET THEM)

However there are still 2-300 of us who still fly these things on a voluntary basis.

and still you all are scaring the **** out of our loved ones with all your speculative rubbish and possibly half-true facts.

Why dont you just email each other all your rumours, half-truths and lies
and let the rest of us get on with it - which is our own choice - and do our job. It is so much easier to get on with it when your family are not panicked by every post they read on PPRUNE.

this is a public forum.

consider the feelings of the public who read it.

Dell.

There's an easy answer to to your problem, stop your family from reading pprune, after all it is a rumour forum so if nobody can post rumours then it pretty much makes the site useless. :mad:

[Da4orce]

It is even more sad that posters like TD and Da4orce are sucking up everything they are told in these forums because they think we are all authorities on what is happening.


I personally take everything I read on this rumour network with a pinch of salt but unfortunately the NOK are faced with a wall of silence from the MOD and RAF when it comes to getting answers so yes maybe we are clutching at straws but when straws are all you :mad: have !!!!

[Wigan Warrior]

In order to clarify matters...
"Did you read what it was inresponce to? clearly not!"
I most certainly did. You provided the aforementioned personal insult to someone who's fundemental comment was that he was only in the armed forces for the money (to pay the Mortgage).
Mind you, that was not your best, in my oppinion,
"...go away and stop being an annoying little jerk..."
is one of your better efforts :D
Please don't get personal on me, there's a good chap.... and yes, I did read what your 'annoying little jerk' insult was inresponce to.

[Winco]

OK WW
You win....I give up with you.
Keep on dragging up all the old dirt, and stirring things up, but I'm afraid I don't have the time to deal with your silliness anymore.
The Winco

[Wigan Warrior]

Defending myself against your false accusations is hardly silly.
I stirred nothing up. Your chum / alter ego TSM did that. I have only responded to your accusations to clarify matters. The fundamentals of which are that some experienced (current) Nimrod Aircrew have been insulted in this thread. There is no need for such silly, immature behavior. If one has a point to make in this forum it can be done without getting personal.

The chaps and chapesses operating the Nimrod fleet should be given as much support as possible. They are doing a fantastic job in hard times. Insulting them on here is just not on (IMHO).

[Tappers Dad]

I am going to try and explain my position yet again for those who appear to be unsure.
In the words of Donald Rumsfeld:

"Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know". (52 leaks in Nimrods in the 6 months leading up to the crash, and numerous leaks occurring in Nimrods after AAR since the crash)

"We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know".(What was the cause of ignition)
But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know.(This is why I am asking questions on this site, like the Safety Case this was for me an unknown unknown).

Any rumours I read on here I check them out through various means,I certainly don't go "sucking up everything they are told in these forums because they think we are all authorities on what is happening".
I ask my MP to check things out or I get information via the FOI act and read it for myself.

I just want to touch on scaring the relatives of those flying Nimrods at present. I had constant discussions with my son about air safety, me saying they weren't safe and its dangerous and him saying they were.

Sadly I was right and he was wrong and this will stay with me for the rest of my life.

[Winco]

WW

I am afraid that I can't let you get away with saying things that are patently untrue. Neither I, TSM or indeed anyone on this forum has in any way insulted 'Nimrod aircrew' as you put it, at all and I would ask you to retract your statement. Things were said in responce to other comments, namely from SFO.

I was Nimrod aircrew for many years, and know a great many aircrew still at ISK. They have my utmost respect, as do the groundcrew who are doing an outstanding job with very limited resources.

I am now 'current' on an aircraft slightly bigger than Nimrod, and I would again suggest a great deal safer. Unfortunately, SFO began the abuse after I reported as such. But I still stick by it, and if you yourself are flying a new 'ish B737 you must agree that it is perhaps even just a little bit safer than a Nimrod ?

eg How many fuel leaks have you detected on your entire 737 fleet?
I can tell you that on the B747 fleet that I currently fly, in the last 12 months, I should think you could count them on one hand (and most of them were venting of sorts) Would you not agree that is a damned sight safer than 52 leaks in 6 months, on a fleet of not very many?

No doubt SFO will counter that, but those are the facts I'm afraid.

The Winco

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

I can't even begin to imagine the grief that TD and others who knew the guys who lost their lives in the Nimrod crash must still be feeling but to see this very serious thread with excellent debate on both sides of the divide denigrated by two squabbling schoolgirls in this manner is appalling :=

Winco and WW please take your petty row into PM land and let the adults continue to find some common ground and hopefully some answers :ugh:

[camelspyyder]

A lot of posts on this thread mention vast numbers of fuel leaks.

How many are significant?

I have witnessed 3 very recently. the slowest probably leaked a few drops every 10 minutes: the worst a pint or two - which was rectified in a couple of minutes (airborne).

So whether you have been told there were 25 or 52 or 752,834 fuel leaks in the last 6 months, it is highly unlikely that many of them were dangerous. Viewing any F700 on this fleet, or other types, will show a number of places where fuel escapes - we even have diagrams of the wings so you can mark on where all the known leaks are!

If anyone has valid data on significant fuel leaks or fuel system failures I would like to see them as much as anybody else, but dont quote me random figures when most of the events spill less fuel that we all do filling up our cars at TESCO.

[BEagle]

Spill fuel filling up at Tesco and it catches fire - throw sand over it and leg it sharpish.

Spill fuel inside a sealed compartment in an aeroplane and you can do neither.

Bit of an ar$e post, camelsniper.

[camelspyyder]

Beagle, that was not a flippant post.

Today I watched fuel coming out of a place it shouldn't during a sortie, and now I merely wish to differentiate between "lies, damn lies, and statistics"

If anyone has current data on substantial or dangerous fuel leaks in recent years on this fleet I, as much as anybody who still flies on them, would like to be able to view it.

[Wigan Warrior]

"...ha ha, what an idiot!!"
TSM

"...I can't stop laughing at you Short Fattie thing, HO HO, HA HA..."

Those WINCO are personal insults aimed at CURRENT Nimrod Aircrew - FACT.

:ugh:

[FATTER GATOR]

Chaps. By all means leave your comments and views here. But please take this, now personal argument, elsewhere.

Better still, trade phone numbers and talk it over.

[Tappers Dad]

camelspyyder
"If anyone has valid data on significant fuel leaks or fuel system failures I would like to see them as much as anybody else",

How about "Evidence of fuel was found approximately a third of the way up the flare housings" "There was fuel found covering the plastic base of the flares"

Does that count ????

[nimblast]

CamelSpyder
"Today I watched fuel coming out of a place it shouldn't during a sortie, and now I merely wish to differentiate between "lies, damn lies, and statistics"
I would have thought that ANY fuel coming out of a place it shouldn't on a Nimrod during a sortie is dangerous.
"We even have diagrams of the wings so you can mark on where all the known leaks are!"
I suppose this is what is meant by acceptable risk. We know about the leaks so its not a problem.
If you know there are leaks the MOD should provide the money to fix them or the aircraft should be grounded. The fuel system was not designed to leak the way it is currently doing.

[nigegilb]

"More worrying is the 6 major leaks we have had since the accident and the hurry to resume AAR after each one."

I was told by someone I trust that the RAF would love to have fuel tank protection on-board the Nimrod, but there isn't any money available to do it. I got involved in this thread because Nimrod aircrew contacted me privately with their concerns. I am now in contact with engineers with the same concerns. 6 major leaks since the downing of XV230 is not a record to be proud of.

[thunderbird7]

Camelspyder is making a fair point. What about the Lightning or SR71, both of which leaked like sieves until skin temperature expanded the skin to plug the leaks. Its not so much the leak as what causes the 'spark' on any fire. All aeroplanes leak, to a certain extent, due to the continual thermal and pressure changes on seals and couplings etc in normal operation over extended periods of time. If servicing schedules and item 'life' is being extended in an arbitrary fashion, to cope with 'one off events' that then become continual, then THAT is a problem in itself that could lead to unacceptable leaks or other faults.
That, though is a policy decision relating to 'overstretch' that needs to be addressed as a separate issue. Hopefully, if it were a factor in this incident, then the BOI will bring that out. Historically, BOIs have never been afraid of pointing the finger of blame upwards - its whether 'Their Airships' are prepared to accept those reccomendations
Also, not fully understanding how the system works, would fire suppressant foam actually stop a tank exploding if the explosion is a result of a fire not in a tank? Does it release into the tank as a result of a pressure change in the tank or on temperature? ie: if a leaking fuel has caught fire in another location, where it has pooled and been ignited, no amount of foam in a tank 20 feet away up the wing is going to stop a fire in that other location.

[Mad_Mark]

I must also agree with what camelspyyder is saying.

A fuel leak can be anything from a slight damp stain at a seal, through a slow drip, fast drip, a steady flow or a complete gush akin to a fuel dump. Simply saying that the Nimrod has suffered X number of fuel leaks in Y months is meaningless without classifying the severity of the leaks. One complete fuel gush in 6 months is far worse than 1000 slight stains, however if the statistics reported that the Nimrod had only suffered 1 fuel leak in that 6 month period the unthinking public would probably believe that to be acceptable :ugh:

The "6 major leaks" at least goes part way to clarify the problem, but again - what is a major leak? Quantities, rates, locations - all these play a part in determining the seriousness of a leak. Without the full facts a simple number is meaningless.

MadMark!!! :mad:

[Da4orce]

In response to Mad_Mark and camelspyyder:

Air Incident Ser No Kin 60\2006 (http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nimrodreport2.pdf)

"fluid was seen dripping into the bomb bay at approx 1 drop per sec."

"On landing, the tristar crew reported that the level of venting from the rear of the aircrapt was similar to that of a fuel dump."

Air Incident Ser No Kin 066/06 AL1 (http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nirmrodreport1.pdf)

"The VC10 reported a total offload of 42,900LB. The Nimrod recorded an increase of 30,300LBS into the tanks plus an incontact fuel burn of 4,700LBS. Including the usual 100lb discrepancy, the total recorded uplift comes to 36,000LB"

VC-10 offloads 42,900 lbs Nimrod uplift 36,000 lbs.

There is a discrepancy of 6,900 lbs of fuel.

I can't remember the last time I spilt 6,900 lbs of fuel on Tesco's forecourt! Am I missing something here????

[Mad_Mark]

Da4orce, I am not arguing whether serious fuel leaks have occurred on the Nimrod or not - I already know the answer. What I am agreeing with camelspyyder about is the reporting of simple numbers of leaks without, on the whole, quantifying the degree and location of leakage (a flowing leak from the trailing edge is probably no more dangerous than a fuel dump, whereas a constant drip onto an engine could be disastrous).

The Panorama programme made a great thing of the high number of fuel leaks on the Nimrod in the past few months but failed to mention that the majority of those numbers were minor.

Yes, let the press go ahead and highlight the few possibly dangerous leaks, but don't simply reel off numbers of all leaks no matter how minor they are.

MadMark!!! :mad:

[Distant Voice]

MM: According to statements from MoD the true fuel leak rate (minor and major) is 4 per 50 flying hours. Based on last years flying hours of approx 8000, that equates to about 320 leaks during a 6 month period. So I suspect that the 25 and 52 being talked about are not minor weeps and drips, but something major.

DV

[camelspyyder]

DV, I suspect that 99% of statistics published on this thread are made up on the spot!

[camelspyyder]

Oh I forgot

did you hear about the 43 pax who refused to fly on an airliner out of ADN last week because there was fuel dripping off of the wing.

I bet they'd all watched PANORAMA too!!

CS

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

So would that make them properly cautious or should they have stupidly ignored the bleedin obvious and simply complied with the man in charge :rolleyes:

[camelspyyder]

In my book that would make them innocent victims of media hysteria and hyperbole

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

In my book it makes them a bunch of sensible minded individuals who saw an apparent defect with an aircraft and made an appropriate decision.

After all only an idiot would get into and fly in an aircraft that had a fuel leak..............well wouldn't they :rolleyes:

[camelspyyder]

OK I'm an idiot... I do it every day

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

What you actually admit to getting in an aircraft with known fuel leaks and then flying in it, you must be feckin mad :sad:

[camelspyyder]

Mad! i think not

No I would not get on board if I could see 1000's lbs of fuel pouring out.

but a few seeps from here and there...well, whatever.

My point about the civvy pax was - what the hell do they know?

I travel on coaches and ships regularly and I am not going to curtail my journey if I see a small fluid leak whilst boarding...I am not an insider on the coach/ferry version of pprune and therefore have no concept of the associated risk.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

But surely common sense would see anyone with a healthy sense of self preservation at least having the common sense to ask what the leak was, after all it could be the beginning of a major hydraulic or mechanical failure.

My 20 odd years of flying have taught me that there are no stupid questions and that in general things of a mechanical nature are not supposed to leak, hence it would only be natural to make sure all was ok.........or would you advocate I stick my head in the sand and simply climb on board and hope for the best :sad:

[Tappers Dad]

Camelspydder

"I suspect that 99% of statistics published on this thread are made up on the spot"!

I think you will see if you take the time to look, that DV and myself usually put links on to backup our statistics.

Your reply to Seldomfitforpurpose's question "After all only an idiot would get into and fly in an aircraft that had a fuel leak" was "OK I'm an idiot... I do it every day"


So you admit that everyday you fly in a/c that have fuel leaks then!!
Then appear to chastise those who point out these a/c leak like sieves.

If you want to risk it then thats fine, but if others don't then thats fine too.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Had hoped you were watching and glad I could be of some help TD, best of luck with your quest for the truth.

[Safety_Helmut]

did you hear about the 43 pax who refused to fly on an airliner out of ADN last week because there was fuel dripping off of the wing.
I bet they'd all watched PANORAMA too!!
My point about the civvy pax was - what the hell do they know?

Aloha Airlines, 1988, roof opening up, remember that. Some of the passengers noticed cracks at the side of the entrance door. but said nothing becuase they believed the crew knew best.

British Midland, 1989, engine failure and crash on the M1, remember that ? Some of the passengers and cabin crew felt that the crew may have shut down the wrong engine based on PA announcements and what they could see out of the window. They didn't say anyhting because they thought the crew knew best !

Ever read accident reports Camel ? and I don't just mean the RAF version. I remember someone once saying, that everyone involved in aviation should read as many incident/accident reports as they can.

S_H

[tucumseh]

“I travel on coaches and ships regularly……”

Coaches will gracefully stop. Ships will float. Aircraft will…………


Seldomfit…

“My 20 odd years of flying have taught me that there are no stupid questions”

Absolutely spot on.


Camelspyyder, I agree it’s your decision whether to fly or not. But I’d be asking SENGO, or whoever, what his criteria was for acceptable leaks and where that guidance came from. A “can do” attitude can be taken too far, and often has the effect of hiding problems.

[AC Ovee]

Base on his contributions so far, I reckon Camelspyyder is better able to decide what to do with a fuel leak than a SEngO would be. Its not about can-do, its about knowledge. We cannot demand perfect aircraft, so have to trust our specialists to make the right decisions. These are people on the front line, probably more concerned for the safety of the aircrew than the aircrew themselves. There is no way that aircrew would be sent airborne in a jet known to be hazardous. Yes, there is task driven pressure from people high up (thats their job) but those taskers can never force either a tradesman to sign a deferrment or prevent an air eng from raising a no-go fault.

The point was made by camelspyyder that there are safe leaks and there are not-safe leaks and they will all be treated appropriately. I completely agree with him.

[Winco]

Camelspyyder

Might I ask you what aircraft you fly everyday that have fuel leaks?
Might I also ask why, presuming you report these fuel leaks to the engineers, you are not making a stand and refusing to fly? (I'm asuming they arn't fixing the leaks)

I am reluctant to pass judgement on you (especially after some of the posts on here) but 'irresponsible' seems to rings a bell. Do you fly with a crew and are you the captain? If so, then don't you feel that you have duty of care to the rest of your crew?

To openly admit that you fly an aircraft with those kind of problems every day is the most absurd thing I think I have ever read here. To brush them off as a 'nothing' is crass stupidity.

As for the civvie pax - well let me just say that if anyone popinted out something to me that they were unhappy about and didn't look right, I would take it seriously and check it. Aircraft are NOT designed to leak fuel on the ground (unless its an SR-71 or such like) To ignore it is again stupid and irresponsible. Well done to the pax!

[hobie]

Some of these Civvy leaks/discharges can certainly look alarming to the average passenger ....... :cool:

http://www.alphafloor.net/aviation/nouvelair/a320-nouvelair-8.jpg

http://www.alphafloor.net/aviation/nouvelair/a320-nouvelair-8.jpg

[NimAGE139]

Aircraft fuel leaks are commonplace. For Nimrod there is a specific authority written down which describes the type of leak, the amount of leakage permitted and identifies areas where no leakage is permitted. There is no grey area on this! They are generally only minor leaks but still have to be documented for information/rectification. Camelspyyder is absolutely correct. He probably does fly in a leaking jet every day ( well, when he does actually get a jet to fly! ). Take a look at any of the aircraft F700s and you'll see the description, location and frequency of inspection for these minor leaks. They are not taken lightly and are carefully monitored. When the captain of the aircraft signs for it to go flying, he should be aware of these leaks ( ADF log ) as should all concerned.

To describe the jet as "leaking like a sieve" is total nonsense! No aircraft will go flying with a known fuel leak which has not been assessed. All known leaks are carefully inspected by competent tradesmen and any deferment for repair is considered thoroughly before allowing the aircraft to fly.

[Tappers Dad]

NimAGE139
I have evidence of one a/c operating in the Gulf XV***having 3 serious leaks in 2 months

Dec 06 Evidence of fuel was found under the mid port side of the bomb bay and under the rear fuselage pannier.
Problem: Unknown

Jan 07 Evidence of fuel was found under the mid port side of the bomb bay and under the rear fuselage L pannier.
Problem: Seal failure of coupling on 5 tank feed.

Jan 07 Evidence of fuel was found under the mid port side of the bomb bay and under the rear fuselage pannier.
Problem:2 Fuel feed coupling leaks

Same a/c leaking fuel into the Bomb Bay after AAR .

SOUNDS VERY FAMILAR TO ME

[nigegilb]

Sorry AGE but I must point out the flaw in your logic.

"We had also heard that there was an eye witness account, from a Harrier, of the fire, mid air explosion and subsequent crash. Don't know if HUD footage or any onboard camera recorded the accident. However, we had heard that the fire was at the starboard wing root area of the ac.

Now, there is a fuel pipe in that area which is used in AAR to refuel one of the internal fuselage tanks. Further, on inspection of another ac in theatre a small hole was found in the pipe. The pipe is welded to several brackets which are themselves attached to the supporting rib wall and the hole was close to one of the welds.

It is not uncommon for there to be pressure spikes during the refuelling process as refuel valves are closed elsewhere during the process. It is possible that repeated pressure spikes or repeated applications of normal pressure during either ground refuelling or AAR might have lead to the weakening of the weld and the subsequent hole. Atomised fuel could then escape into the space.

The hole in the pipework of the other AAR Nimrod was only discovered after the crash of XV230. Welding is still a technique used on the pipework of MRA4. You cannot assume that a leaking aircraft is safe.

[Kitbag]

In defence of AGE (although no doubt he is perfectly capable of replying himself), he said: there is a specific authority written down which describes the type of leak, the amount of leakage permitted and identifies areas where no leakage is permitted. There is no grey area
This applies to all aircraft I have been associated with, there is even a seperate AP which is devoted to the description. assessment and categorisation of leaks. Similarly with hyd systems, these decisions are not made lightly and if the opportunity arises the defect will be rectified, however there is a balance to be struck, which is one of the reasons for the Acceptable Deferred Faults log, it does what it says on the tin, acknowledging a problem, describing it, ensuring replacement parts if applicable are on order and providing a time and calendar limitation, additional inspections etc. In general most of these leaks are found and accepted because they are guided overboard by drains for that purpose. Where fluids leak into a compartment however I don't recall any instance of that being acceptable (happy to be corrected on that).

[FE Hoppy]

The Airbus above is venting not leaking.

All aircraft have a leakage schedule. There is no grey area eather mil or civvy. Any Air Eng/Flight Eng or Pilot worth his salt wouldn't take an unservicable aircraft. We need to be very careful with terms like "Leaking like a sieve". Some do but it's within design limits. Others may be outside limits. Thats why both ground and flight crew are trained to recognise and asses leaks and should know what the limits are or how to find them.

[Tappers Dad]

FE Hoppy & NimAGE139

I would be happy to send you some of the information I have on the fuel leaks if you pm me your email addresses. They are not minor leaks they are reported leaks, and yes the a/c wasn't leaking when it took off. They had leaked after their sortie and after AAR just like XV230 did.
In one of these reports http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nirmrodreport1.pdf
VC-10 offloads 42,900 lbs Nimrod uplift 36,000 lbs.
There is a discrepancy of 6,900 lbs of fuel.

http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nimrodreport2.pdf

I have plenty of proof they "LEAK LIKE SIEVES"
52 reported leaks in Nimrods in the 6 months leading up to the crash, and numerous leaks occurring in Nimrods after AAR since the crash.

[NimAGE139]

Tapper's dad,

Your evidence of leaks found on aircraft operating in the gulf is testament to the fact that they were investigated and where possible, rectified. Not leaking and being allowed to go flying again! It happens every day and has done for years. We find leaks and we fix them or deal with it accordingly.

Unfortunately, AAR refuelling is just that. Carried out in flight. How can the pipes be checked post AAR?

Nigegilb,

There is no flaw in my logic. I am not advocating that flight with a fuel leak is safe. Aircraft go flying with known leaks, assessed and accepted as such. Anything which occurs during flight (AAR) uses refuel gallery pipework that is otherwise redundant. How do you expect anyone to find a fuel leak in a pipe, on the ground, that contains no fuel? That defies logic.

All leaks found on the ground will be dealt with. I don't believe that anyone would say otherwise.

I agree that the most likely cause of the demise of XV230 was almost certainly due to a fuel fire but who's to say it was started from an initial fuel leak. SCP ducting passes very close to the area where the flames were sighted coming from the aircraft. What if 230 degree C air was to be blasted from a broken duct against a fuel pipe/tank? Sound familiar?

I just hope we get to the root of the problem and resolve it for everyone's sake.

[Dave Angel]

Camelspyyder

Might I ask you what aircraft you fly everyday that have fuel leaks?
Might I also ask why, presuming you report these fuel leaks to the engineers, you are not making a stand and refusing to fly? (I'm asuming they arn't fixing the leaks)

I am reluctant to pass judgement on you (especially after some of the posts on here) but 'irresponsible' seems to rings a bell. Do you fly with a crew and are you the captain? If so, then don't you feel that you have duty of care to the rest of your crew?

To openly admit that you fly an aircraft with those kind of problems every day is the most absurd thing I think I have ever read here. To brush them off as a 'nothing' is crass stupidity.


Winco,

If you bothered to read back over his posts you would realise that he is a current Nimrod mate:ugh:

Yes - our AC have leaks.
No - We don't ignore them as nothing, as has been previously stated they are all assessed on an individual basis.
No - We don't let our 'stupidity' cloud our better judgement and climb aboard an unsafe AC.

I have nearly 5000Hrs on type and in all my time the AC have always had a fuel leak/seep map. Trust me I wouldn't fly if I had serious doubts and at the moment I'm happy to earn the wage I'm paid by flying on the old girl.

Please Winco, stop the personal attacks or if you are unable take it elsewhere.

Regards to All,
DA

[mary_hinge]

Unfortunately, AAR refuelling is just that. Carried out in flight. How can the pipes be checked post AAR?

In the past this was a fairly standard, regular maintenance practice, carried out on the line, with a probe adaptor hooked on to bowser pressure refuling line. Aircraft was then re-fueled on the ground via the probe, leak checks / inspections then carried out. (Victor, C130 and Tornado anway)

[Safety_Helmut]

certainly done on Nimrod in the past too ! Surely NimAGE139 would know whether it still happens ?

S_H

[Tappers Dad]

mary hinge

They do check them on the ground, however they are not able to reconstruct conditions when AAR takes place like turbulence ,air temperature and fluctuations in AAR pressure.

[mary_hinge]

TD

Good point, missed that.

[NimAGE139]

Thanks Tapper's Dad. It's not a regular check anyway and isn't done on a daily servicing basis.

[nigegilb]

NimAGE, the point I was trying to make, badly, was that at the time XV230 crashed there was another Nimrod, flying operations with a hole in the AAR pipework. That hole was only discovered in the post crash checks carried out to the Fleet and could have resulted in another tragedy.

I understand the crew could smell fumes on the flight deck before the fire on XV230. Are you doubting whether there was a fuel leak on XV230? Or is it commonplace to smell fuel on the flight deck of a Nimrod? I have completed many AAR sorties in the Herc and never witnessed a leak and never smelled fuel. To be honest, I am shocked by what is regarded as normal on the Nimrod Fleet. I don't doubt the integrity of engineering practices but I would hope that someone is standing back and taking a considered view. Herc frames that I flew were all late 1960's models.

You make the point that we do not know the source of ignition. I agree and I also state once more, that fuel tank protection is a must for the Fleet, for that very reason, alone.

[Winco]

David Angel,

You Nimrod guys seem to be getting a bit Twitchy about this fuel leak business that we are banging on about, and I don't understand why.

Other reports on here have stated numerous cases of sever fuel leaks, on the ground, in flight, post AAR, after landing etc. Even a Tristar crew reported a bad leak. It would seem that there is little disagreement with those facts, and you chaps even now claim that you have been given a little chart to ensure that the leaks are coming from areas where leaks are allowed!

My point about Camelspyyder, was that his statement of 'flying a leaking aircraft every day' isn't clever, and nothing to be complacent or proud about. He says himself that he is an idiot (toungue in cheek I know) but it really must be of concern to his crew that he is prepared to just accept these problems every day.

I don't know whether XV230 had an 'acceptable' leak the day of that fateful flight, but I would assume it did. Sadly, the 'acceptable' leak turned into something a lot more tragic, hence why so many of us feel the accident was avoidable. I'm not convinced that continuing to fly aircraft with 'acceptable' fuel leaks is a sensible decision, by anyone under the circumstances. I would suggest that the aircraft captain, and everyone in the command chain has a duty to consider this.

If it does turn out that XV230 did have one of these 'acceptable' leaks, then I would suggest that someone, somewhere, will be getting their dangly bits in a sling when the inquest makes its conclusions.


WW, please stop the PMs, I have explained that I will not respond to you, now knock it off.

[nigegilb]

Winco, I believe you are right.

[hobie]

The Airbus above is venting not leaking.

All aircraft have a leakage schedule. There is no grey area eather mil or civvy. Any Air Eng/Flight Eng or Pilot worth his salt wouldn't take an unservicable aircraft. We need to be very careful with terms like "Leaking like a sieve". Some do but it's within design limits. Others may be outside limits. Thats why both ground and flight crew are trained to recognise and asses leaks and should know what the limits are or how to find them.



did you hear about the 43 pax who refused to fly on an airliner out of ADN last week because there was fuel dripping off of the wing.

I bet they'd all watched PANORAMA too!!


Of course it is venting , but few passengers would be familiar with that process .... :)


..... ps. sadly, half the Airports fire service turned out and practically drowned the poor $$$$ aircraft .... :hmm:

[Safety_Helmut]

It's not a regular check anyway and isn't done on a daily servicing basis.
Has anyone got more complete information on this ?

From my time on Nimrods, I seem to remember doing 'pull off' checks with a device that checked that the probe would leave the drogue properly. This was done before every scheduled AAR trip.

I also remember the sumpys doing refuels through the probe, bowser hose went up a set of aircraft steps and onto an adaptor on the probe. I don't remember whether this was part of sceduled maintenance/OOP etc, or whether done before an AAR sortie. This was on the R fleet.

S_H