Nimrod Information

[mad eng]

I must make the distinction here bewteen acceptable pre flight leaks and the in flight leaks being discussed here. Any acceptable leak will be from a tank and will be external, it will usually be a seep and will not even drip. Even any that do drip will be very slow and will not run into any area where it could pool and become a fire hazard. We do not intentionally fly with leaks from pipes or couplings and certainly not leaks in enclosed places. This includes the bomb bay. These acceptable wing leaks are all in places where the minute quantity of fuel would blow off the underside of the wing in flight. They do no not suddenly become major leaks as could a pipe or coupling, they are not under pressure other that the vent system ram air. These LEAKS are of no concern to the safety of the crew or aircraft.

The major leaks being discovered during and after flight are totally different and involve pipes, couplings and the like. Sometimes under pressure and usually leaking into an enclosed area. These are concerning, they could pose a flight safety hazard. These are the leaks you should be talking about, if you want to contribute something useful to the discussion.

[nigegilb]

Mad Eng thank you for your contribution. It would be helpful if the MoD would make the same differentiation, but would that make the seriousness of the situation rather too obvious?

[NimAGE139]

"From my time on Nimrods, I seem to remember doing 'pull off' checks with a device that checked that the probe would leave the drogue properly. This was done before every scheduled AAR trip."

S-H, you're correct. As part of a before flight servicing, the pull off checks are carried out if the aircraft is due to do an AAR sortie. The probe is also checked post flight.

Ground refuel through the probe is carried out after scheduled maintenace or any rectification work on said system.

[AC Ovee]

I don't know whether XV230 had an 'acceptable' leak the day of that fateful flight, but I would assume it did. Sadly, the 'acceptable' leak turned into something a lot more tragic, hence why so many of us feel the accident was avoidable.

Winco, when you use a handle like yours you provide an air of knowledge and authority that members of the public might take at face value. So, I have to challenge the above quote, because it is plainly speculative and leans towards stating it as a fact.

You have no proof, whatsoever, that the fire was started by an extant acceptable fuel leak. In fact, it is highly unlikely that anyone would accept a known leak in the area of the reported fire.

Winco, your speculation borders on accusing front line personnel of negligence.

By all means, have a pop at RAF engineering policy, but leave the line workers out of this.

To answer Safety Helmut's question about the probe adaptor: yes, it is still used before and after every AAR flight, to check the probe for serviceability. It may also be used a diagnostic tool (with a bowser) for reported leaks in the refuel system.

[Winco]

AC Ovee
I fear that you are also getting Twitchy about this, but let me assure you of a couple of things:
I am ex Nimrod (even a humble Pilot Captain) so I do know a little bit about the aircraft pre 1990, when I left the fleet. I also flew the early sorties with MC and JR proving the AAR system prior to our deployment to ASI.
I have never ever accused or even suggested that this accident was the result of neglegence by anyone, including groundcrew. Your suggestion otherwise is quite outrageous.
I have always supported the groundcrew over this at every opportunity and have stated so on numerous occasions that the constraints (and conditions) they are working under is a disgrace and should be reviewed asap. You cannot maintain any aircraft fleet without money, and lots of it with an ageing fleet.
I have never had 'a pop' at RAF Engineering either. I have constantly remarked on the higher authority of the RAF and their lack of leadership over this, especially CAS who, IMHO, should have grounded all of the Nimrod fleet until every leak has been fixed. To allow these aircraft to continue to fly is an appalling decision.
Your comment about me having a go at line workers is completely untrue Sir.

There are posters on this forum who claim to be current Nimrod aircrew, and who are claiming that in general terms, all of the aircraft leak to one degree or another. We have others who claim to fly 'every day' in aircraft leaking fuel. But I don't know whether or not XV230 had an existing fuel leak or not, but based on what the current operators are claiming, I would think that it is highly probable that it did (but you are right, I don't know that for fact)

Likewise, I know nothing about your little charts outlining where leaks are acceptable. But you must step back and ask yourself this.....Is it 'right' that aircraew are being asked to fly aircraft with known leaks, even minor ones? The answer, considering the tragedy of XV230, is a resounding NO, they should not.

You say that I have no proof of what happened that day, and of course you are quite correct I don't. But what we do have is the loss of an aircraft, and its crew, and a lot of Nimrod operators saying that the aircraft always leak. Does that not suggest something to you? because it does to me and probably to most other aviators also.

[Da4orce]

nigegilb wrote:

NimAGE.....Are you doubting whether there was a fuel leak on XV230? Or is it commonplace to smell fuel on the flight deck of a Nimrod? I have completed many AAR sorties in the Herc and never witnessed a leak and never smelled fuel. To be honest, I am shocked by what is regarded as normal on the Nimrod Fleet.

I'm not sure whether it's commonplace nigegilb but it certainly happened at least once since the loss of XV230. Like you I think most people are shocked at what appears to be normal on the fleet.

Dec 2006
http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nirmrodreport1.pdf
"prior to landing the conditioning was turned off as normal and the crew smelt fuel fumes in the aircraft."

[The Poison Dwarf]

This particular thread started with the Panorama programme, but, naturally it has moved on to wider issues.

However, it seems pretty clear that the XV230 loss, along with other situations in all of the services represents the true cost of a succession of "cost saving" measures, from cuts in personnel to a terminal shortage of hot spares and necessary equipment.

For those (few) who seem to snipe at the engineers, don't, like so many others, they're trying to squeeze a quart out of a pint pot.

I am nearly 15 years out of the fleet now, but the rot had already firmly set in then, pressure being brought to bear at all levels to save money (penny pinch) - well, nothing comes without a price, not even cost cutting.

Unfortunately, that price is paid, not by those who set the spending targets, but by others just trying to do do the best they can.

We all know where the buck should stop, but will it? Gusee you'll have to decide for yourselves.

TPD :ugh:

[camelspyyder]

Winco, you're always fishing so here's a bite

Yes. I am current on the MR2
No. I am not a captain
Yes. I have 6000hrs on type
Yes. They Leak
No. I would not fly with a known major/dangerous leak, and more to the point none of the ground engineers would never release the aircraft in that state.

My point for the last few days has been - define "leak" and I think the people in the know have been quite clear on that one in the last 48hrs.

Many of my friends perished last Sept 2nd and God bless them all.

I have no axe to grind but I am keen to replace the hysteria on this forum with good, honest,facts, and I believe that people who know the arcraft today are probably moe likely to supply them than anonymous old has-beens.

CS

[Tappers Dad]

Can anyone tell me who or what is the Nimrod IPT (integrated project team).
What do they do and who makes up the team.
Please PM me if you don't wish to put the information on this forum.

[enginesuck]

Winco
'I am ex Nimrod (even a humble Pilot Captain) so I do know a little bit about the aircraft pre 1990, when I left the fleet. I also flew the early sorties with MC and JR proving the AAR system prior to our deployment to ASI.

There are posters on this forum who claim to be current Nimrod aircrew, and who are claiming that in general terms, all of the aircraft leak to one degree or another. We have others who claim to fly 'every day' in aircraft leaking fuel.

Likewise, I know nothing about your little charts outlining where leaks are acceptable. But you must step back and ask yourself this.....Is it 'right' that aircraew are being asked to fly aircraft with known leaks, even minor ones? The answer, considering the tragedy of XV230, is a resounding NO, they should not.'

Id bet that they leaked even when you flew them. The charts the guys are on about refer to wing fuel leaks in the integral 4, 4a, 3 + 2 tanks. Normally a small fuel stain on the underside of the wing. The reason for the chart is so they can be monitored. Each leak is assessed post refuel for any worsening.

If Raf a/c or any a/c for that matter were grounded for these small insignificant leaks. The skys would be very quiet indeed.

[AC Ovee]

Winco, your words:
I don't know whether XV230 had an 'acceptable' leak the day of that fateful flight, but I would assume it did.

also, your words:
I have never ever accused or even suggested that this accident was the result of neglegence by anyone, including groundcrew.

You clearly indicated in the first statement that you believe the groundcrew were signing off leaks as acceptable faults when, in your opinion, no leaks are acceptable. Therefore you are questioning the judgement of the front line groundcrew. Bad judgement and decisons by leaders and managers in any profession can be thought of as negligence. I chose my words carefully when I suggested that you are bordering on accusing them of negligence. However, I do accept, having read your latest message, that it was not your intent to do so.

Regarding the concept of fuel leaks, I don't know how modern aircraft store fuel in their wings (ie bag tanks or integral tanks with sealant), but the Nimrod uses integral tanks and sealant. It is a fact that fuel can get under the sealant at its edges by access hatches, baffles and components, etc, and seep along the metal under the sealant and appear as a weep at a nearby rivet. The rivet is not the cause; its simply the escape route, so attempting to stop the leak by dealing with the rivet (from the outside) will actually make the leak worse. The proper way of dealing with the leak is to open up the tank and replace the sealant in the area of the leaking rivet(s). However, the simple act of going into the tank will disturb the sealant elsewhere and encourage yet another leak. Years ago it was acceptable for a tradesman to enter the tank with minimal drying time, while the sealant was still damp. Nowadays, the tank has to dry to the point that it is difficult to smell the fuel. This prolonged drying time leads to the sealant drying and hardening and becoming vulnerable to damage. Therefore, the groundcrew do not enter tanks to repair small leaks. I guess the experience of integral tanks might have encouraged the aviation industry to improve the sealants or use bags in modern times.

So, yes, every Nimrod flying today has a number of small wing tank fuel leaks; none of which present a hazard to flight safety. They were there when you flew them and they are there now. Not the same leaks, obviously, just the same problem. As an air eng I have no qualms with this policy.

Finally, we do not, under any circumstance, accept a fuel leak from a pipe. Pipes are removed (with difficulty sometimes), checked, and replaced if necessary, using new rubber seals in all cases. The pipe couplings could be better designed, but they are not purely Nimrod couplings; they are industry standard.

[MightyHunter AGE]

Right then, wrt fuel leaks, the only acceptable leaks as ES says are ones in the integral tanks.

Any other leaks are investigted and rectified full stop.
I or any other engineer will not send an aircraft into the blue yonder with fuel leaks and I personally resent the implications Winco has posted on here.

Integral tank leak rates, off the top of my head from the 2(R)1 are as follows

STAIN: Where fuel wets an area around the leak of an area less then 2" in 2 hours

SEEP: Wets an area of 6" in two hours

HEAVY SEEP: Wets and area of over 6" in two hours but does not drip or run

RUN: Where fuel runs or drips at a rate of less than 10 drips per minute

UNACCEPTABLE LEAK: Where the run or drip rate is more than 10 drips per minute - rectify or lim fuel tank.

These facts are in the 2(R)1 and are for EXTERAL leaks ONLY.

I am currently in the Gulf and am here with the guys that saw the jet off and I can catagorically say that they did NOT send that jet up with known fuel leaks.
Any implications otherwise by members of this forum are slander and I would warn you against posting any more such comments.

[Winco]

Gentlemen,

I think that at last you might have hit the nail on the head!
Yes, when I crewed-in, I very occasionally would find a fuel leak (unless the Eng found it first!) So, what did we do?
1. If it was a loose union, get the groundcrew to tighten it up if possible.
2. If that couldn't be done, and the task was important - frame swap.

The problem today is that you guys don't have the comfort of being able to swap frames. Why? Because basically you are underfunded.

Now I don't in any way blame you guys one jot. On the contrary, I am certain that you are as frustrated, if not more so, than the aircrew are about it. My point is that these new 'acceptable' defects have been imposed upon you by those from above. It was never such before, so why, with an even older aircraft, is it allowed now? I know times have changed, but does anyone at all on this forum know of any other aircraft or fleet that gives you a card outlining where fuel leaks are acceptable?

MightyHunter AGE. Please don't take offence at my comments. They are not directed at you or the rest of your groundcrew and are not meant to belittle the outstanding work you all do. They are meant to highlight the restrictions, limitations etc that are being forced upon you. I don't believe for one minute that you want to send an aircraft airborne with a known fuel leak, but it appears that you are being forced to. Is that correct or am I reading this wrong? Do you as a crew chief, to the best of your knowledge, send an aircraft flying with a known fuel leak of any kind?

I don't know, but AC Ovee says that all the aircraft leak, as does Camelspyyder, indeed some on here go even further and say that they leak like sieves! (tell me Camelspyyder, are these guys all 'anonymous old has-beens'?)

Please stop accusing us of having a go at you. We are not having a go at anyone, least of all the groundcrew. But we must all face the 'facts' as given to us on this forum by current Nimrod operators, which clearly would indicate that the Nimrod fleet has a serious fuel leak problem.

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco said
Do you as a crew chief, to the best of your knowledge, send an aircraft flying with a known fuel leak of any kind?

Of course I send an aircraft up that has known fuel leaks, that is what the adf log is for. If a leak is documented and catogarised in the 704 then that is acceptable iaw the 2(R)1.

What I think you mean is do I send an aircraft up that has a leak other than those documented, the answer to that is no. I have grounded aircraft on several occasions that have had fuel leaks and the aircraft has not flown until the leak has been rectified, period.

Where you are getting the idea that anyone would send an aircraft up with a known fuel leak is beyond me.

[Cpt_Pugwash]

T D,
There are two Nimrod IPTs, one for the MRA4, and probably the one for which you are seeking information, the smaller MR2 team. This open source link http://www.bajars.co.uk/dlo_article_aug2006.htm gives a contact number. Hope this helps.

PW

[nigegilb]

It is good to thrash out the different types of fuel leaks and make some headway in the confusing answers given to PQs. Accepting the idea that there is such a thing as a safe fuel leak, it would appear that serious fuel leaks have occurred with Nimrod during AAR, specifically involving the AAR pipework. Nimrod AGE/Was Nae Me make the point that it is not possible to recreate the pressures the ac experiences in flight when testing on the ground. This concern with AAR Ops is borne out by the changes in Nimrod AAR SOPs following the crash. I made the point earlier that this change in SOP was not able to prevent a huge inflight fuel migration a few months after the XV230 tragedy. It is important not to go down a blind alley with the external fuel leaks and keep in mind the single skin design of the AAR system, the lack of bomb bay fire protection and the lack of fuel tank protection.

Assuming that XV230 was not sent up with a dangerous fuel leak on that fateful day, what was in the acceptable deferred defects page? Has anything changed since the crash that is no longer an acceptable deferred defect? Has there been a realisation about something that what was assumed to be safe, but is no longer deemed so?

[Tappers Dad]

MightyHunter AGE

You said :

Of course I send an aircraft up that has known fuel leaks, that is what the adf log is for. If a leak is documented and categorized in the 704 then that is acceptable law the 2(R)1.

So let me get this right here. You are saying that aircraft can fly if the leak is categorized in the 704.
Am I reading that correctly ?

[BEagle]

Entirely normal.

On most large aircraft of that vintage, a 'fuel map' is included in the F700. There are allowable drip rates from the undersurface beneath the fuel tanks and the known location of any such acceptable leaks is indicated on the 'fuel map'.

Leaks from elsewhere (such as fuel gallery pipes) are NOT acceptable, however.

[Winco]

BEagle,
We are from the same vintage ourselves, but the point that is confusing me is 'all' of these fuel leaks, and the general opinion that appears to exist that as long as they are in the adf log, then they are OK and/or safe. Some of the stories of 'offload' and 'upload' figures are alarming arn't they? Even with a bit of 'massage', the figures about fuel loss make worrying reading, and I would hazzard a guess that, if the figures are correct, the loss has not occurred from a dripping tank.

If we have a fuel tank with a known 'acceptable' leak in it (albeit small), and we suddenly throw a few thousand pounds of fuel into it, at pressure under AAR contiditions, at height and in turbulance, do you not agree that there is a strong possibility that the small leak could develope into a somewhat larger one?

You and I are familiar with minor leaks, and the Crew chief makes the point that all aircraft leak, which I wouldn't entirely disagree with. But my concern is that given the fact that the fleet is old and well past its sell by date: given the fact that some aircraft are reported as leaking like sieves and given the fact that we have lost an aircraft and I understand come close to losing another, do you not feel that there may just be a link between the leaks and the loss of XV230?

Best Wishes
TW

[Tappers Dad]

Open Question

Is it possible for ground crew to say an a/c is operating with a known flaw/defect possibly to do with AAR and it shouldn't fly?

And if it is possible, then due to operational pressures can a decision be taken by Nimrod IPT (integrated project team) to over rule the ground crew and say it must continue to fly ?

Just a Yes or No please

[MOA]

All Nimrods come under the Team Nimrod IPT following the birth of DE&S.

[TheSmiter]

Pugwash provides a link above.

Those of us in possession of the Aug 2006 edition of Preview, the in-house magazine of the DPA (as was), will notice that someone has used an airbrush to erase the a/c no. from the nose of the first MR2 to undergo Equalized Maintenance last July. It (EM).... delivers savings on labour and spares, improves aircraft availability and makes for a simpler and more efficient aircraft maintenance programme.

I think you can guess which airframe it is.

[tucumseh]

To quote from the above article;


"It was also contracted as an incentive scheme under which BAE Systems (the prime service contractor) has the potential to derive profit increases equal to that of the MOD savings".

Taken literally, that means the MoD didn't actually save anything (and therefore generate funding to spend on something else) but rather BAeS derived extra profit at the expense of Operational Capability.

Something not quite right there. On the other hand, is it not now MoD policy (see Defence Industrial Strategy and DSTL Technology Strategy) to hand contracts on a plate to BAeS, thus placing them on a level playing field with Thales and other protected species?

[BEagle]

On the ground, the weight of the aircraft is supported by the three points of the undercarriage.

In flight, the weight of the aircraft is opposed by lift.

It follows that the wing root bending moment on the ground will be unlikely to be the same as that in flight. So the leak rate on the ground may well not be the same in flight - particularly with high centreline weights. This may well be exacerbated by turbulence...

But who can say?

The only real solution is to take firm action to stop any fuel leaks - but that is probably unachievable.

I have recently been advising other nations' AAR forces about the crucial need to ensure that offload figures from the tanker are accurate; receivers must also allow for the burn rate in contact when they resolve their upload figures, of course.

I recall the story of a RN Buccaneer. Recently back from modification with an AAR probe - so the pilot decided to have a joust with a passing tanker. All went fine - except that when the green light was seen and the "fuel flows" call was made by the tanker, nothing was seen to be coming into the receiver. "B£oody old Crab fools" muttered the matelot and buggered off back to the boat. When they unlocked the nose to put the jet on the deck lift, guess what poured out.....? It had been swilling around the Blue Parrot radar. The cause was obvious - one outfit had fitted the probe, but the other mod - to fit the associated pipework - had yet to be incorporated.....:hmm:

However, the same effect would be noted with a serious internal fuel leak - if tanker offload > (receiver state at endAAR - receiver state at startAAR) + (receiver burn from startAAR to endAAR), then there is obviously something amiss. If you have accurate engine fuel flowmeters with resettable counters, it would be possible to measure the burn in contact - but don't forget to allow for different fuel densities and fuel temperatures between tanker and receiver if you measure fuel in terms of mass rather than volume!

[TheSmiter]

I recall the story of a RN Buccaneer. Recently back from modification with an AAR probe - so the pilot decided to have a joust with a passing tanker. All went fine - except that when the green light was seen and the "fuel flows" call was made by the tanker, nothing was seen to be coming into the receiver. "B£oody old Crab fools" muttered the matelot and buggered off back to the boat. When they unlocked the nose to put the jet on the deck lift, guess what poured out.....? It had been swilling around the Blue Parrot radar. The cause was obvious - one outfit had fitted the probe, but the other mod - to fit the associated pipework - had yet to be incorporated.....:hmm:


I take it was then an ex-Parrot Beags? Bananas, bananas. ;)

Is it my imagination, but wasn't the Nimwacs designed to use fuel to cool the radar? Until someone wondered how it would conduct its primary mission on minimums? :ugh:

[Pontius Navigator]

Open Question

Is it possible for ground crew to say an a/c is operating with a known flaw/defect possibly to do with AAR and it shouldn't fly?

Yes

And if it is possible, then due to operational pressures can a decision be taken by Nimrod IPT (integrated project team) to over rule the ground crew and say it must continue to fly ?

No

The IPT has no impact on operational decisions. The ground crew may be over ridden by an Engineering Officer, and Engineering Officer may be overridden by OC Eng Wg, Forward or whoever. OC Eng may be overridden by the Station Commander who, in turn, may be overridden by the AOC and AOCinC.

Once safely safe in the mighty jet the Captain can override the lot.

It was explained very nicely by my boss many years ago. He said, as sqn cdr I can order Flt Lt R to fly. He will accept my order and we will all board the aircraft. He will refuse to fly and, as a crew member, I will get out with the rest of the crew. After due consideration I will order him to fly. etc etc.

On another occasion, on an exercise (Gp Capt promotion exam) a captain at a remote dispersal reported his aircraft was u/s and he would not scramble. The stn cdr ordered him to scramble as his aircraft was a war goer and he wanted the 100% success. The captain refused.

The bottom line is the Captain holds the ultimate responsibility for accepting or rejecting the aircraft, not the IPT or anyone else.

[nigegilb]

PN if the Captain believes it to be safe he will fly. I think that is the point TD is making. Acceptable defects are just that, believed to be acceptable at the time.

You don't need to look far. AOC 2Gp gave specific clearance for the Nimrod to fly AAR in the days after the crash. Exceptional circumstances. As someone has already commented, exceptional circumstances end up being the norm. Is a Captain going to turn round and refuse to fly?

[Pontius Navigator]

Is a Captain going to turn round and refuse to fly?

In all probability he will fly. The context was I believe:

Is it possible for ground crew to say an a/c is operating with a known flaw/defect possibly to do with AAR and it shouldn't fly?

Do we have any evidence that the ground crew said it should not fly?

The context of my reply was intended to show that the IPT may be the design authority but that there are many hands on the paddle even on the station.

On the assumption that an aircraft was declared at above normal level of risk - the old QRA Mandatory Launch for instance - the decision would be made at a higher level.

On one occasion my captain declared that he would not comply with a mandatory launch order, in peacetime, from a 4*. The captain would factor in his own appreciation, operational imperative and superior orders. In the current scenario, and I do not know the mission or its criticality, the mission success might save lives on the ground and the captain would factor that in.

Out.

[SpannerSpinner]

"The context of my reply was intended to show that the IPT may be the design authority"

The IPT ARE NOT the Design Organisation and never will be. That would mean the IPT are judge and jury and rightly so- they are far from it.

In the case of the MR2 it's BAE systems who are the DO and completely independent of the IPT.

Guys I don't post very often but there are an incredible amount of people who are adding dross and innaccuracies to this thread. Granted this is a rumour thread etc etc yawn zzz zzzzzzz but come on! Have some thought for people like TD, who are on here to get the truth and some facts that might help his quest. So too the crews who currently have to fly the Mighty Hunter.

Given the subject and knowing exactly who may read this, I suggest you take a reality check and realistically quantify your credentials for comment. I mean do people seriously think that after 10, 20 years off the fleet that they are STILL upto speed on tactics/equipment/eng procedure and the like? Will those crusty armchair nimrod engineers/safey engineers please step down- you're stifling the truth!

[Tappers Dad]

SS
What is the truth then can they over rule the ground engineers given the senario?

[Da4orce]

Accepting the previous few posts is it possible that the IPT having seen XV230 through Equalized Maintenance became aware of a 'deep' fault, i.e. not immediate enough to warrant grounding of the jet but potentially serious if the one in a million happened? Something that the groundies would not have been aware of.

For example a risk assessment is done and the fault is scored as serious but it's impact in normal operating conditions is scored as minimal, i.e. million to one chance things could go badly wrong.



Any thoughts?

[Chugalug2]

Nigegilb posted on the Parliamentary Questions thread:
Just hope the RAF and MOD see sense over Nimrod safety issues
Little chance of that given the dyed in the wool attitudes being displayed by some on this thread. Talk about Horses and Water! When push comes to shove is when captains earn the status that they enjoy, and saying NO to Fleet Managers, Ops Managers, Engineers, 4*s, Station Commanders, Uncle Tom Cobbley and all and standing firm whenever moral, disciplinary, financial or any other pressure be applied. There seems to be a grim determination to close ranks and resist any help and advice from outside, no matter how experienced or informed that might be. I have a high incidence of suspicion (to use the formulate wording of an old CRM manual) that TD is onto something, knows he's onto something, and is going to keep on at it like a dog at a bone. Nigegilb wants to get a result for the kipper fleet (probably non PC, sorry) similar to what has been achieved for the Herc one. Tucumseh exposes the lies, damn lies, and downright cynicism of the MOD apparatchiks. All these guys are on your side. They want to help you to help yourselves to make your aircraft safer. If I were you I'd consider them, then look at your present circumstances, then look at them again. I think I would be glad of their help, as were the Herc crews IINM, but that's up to you guys!

[SpannerSpinner]

If you mean can an IPT make groundcrew sign off a short term problem such as a fuel leak in theatre.....then absolutely not, and I dont think that they would. Its upto the engineering team in theatre to sort those types of problems out. They are guided and governed by their maintenance manuals and APs and cannot just come up with a quick fix.


Sure they can call on as much advice and technical expertise as they want but no one can make them sign off the jet as serviceable. If there is any doubt on a safety critical system to make the ground crew in any way shape or form doubt its integrity, the ac is going nowhere. Knowing the vast majority of guys at ISK and being proud to have worked alongside them, I can say that with confidence.

An IPTs job is to provide recovery action and logistical support for longer term issues generally, they cannot get involved with short term snags. Thats the job of NLS. If those short term problems display patterns and regularity, then it is the job of the IPT to investigate and correct/monitor/recover. Not to be a 1000 yard screwdriver to situations they are not all that familiar with (ie on ops).

Does that answer your question TD?

[Safety_Helmut]

SpannerSpinner, are you absolutely sure about what you post. The Air Systems Group (formerly ADRP) changed some fairly key definitions in the JSP553 last year, and many people were not happy with the changes I don't have a copy to hand, but they changed the way they refer to designer, design organisation, design authority etc. I don't know if it's been changed back.

They made changes such that the IPT is regarded as the Design Authority, in the sense that they have the ultimate authority over the design of an aircraft. The designer or design organisation can make recommendations, but the IPT can go it's own way. This would obviously be a move that would be fraught with risk, and would take some justification, but it reflects the legal situation. You can't get away from the fact that the MoD owns the aircraft, maintains and operates the aircraft and is also the regulator. So using your strange analogy of judge and jury, yes the MoD is ! Does it all lie within the IPT, good question. IPTL signs the MAR, RTSA looks after the RTS, but look at the size of the IPT and its resources, then look at the RTSA, and you'll see who's really making the decisions.

The front of the JSP553 contains a statement from the SofS for Defence, it states that the MoD will regulate it's aircraft such that airworthiness is maintained to as standard which is at least as good as the civil world. Think about that statement and its implications very carefully. I wonder if anyone could ever show a conflict of interests: owner v operator v regulator ?

S_H

[SpannerSpinner]

SH,

Agreed. I think thats why people like BAE systems, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed are now DO rather than DA. The IPT do not hold sole responsibility for the aircraft though, thats what I'm getting at.

People like the release to service authority, QinetiQ and others all play an important role and the structure/organisation/responsibilies is a complex model.

I felt that PN made it sound as though the IPT are the only players responsible for the airworthiness of the ac.

I'm trying to keep it relatively simple for people not so familiar with the system

[nigegilb]

I am trying to understand the role of IPT along with everyone else. Still not clear if Nimrod IPT act as DA. However consensus appears to be that short term engineering issues are dealt with by the front line, but longer term issues/defects could well be dealt with by IPT?

Certainly in the case of Hercules, the Herc IPT looked at Foam in 2002/03 after a risk analysis was carried out and decided it was not required. Not laying blame here, just trying to set out the decision making process. I understand something similar may have happened with Nimrod. The one in a million scenario?

[nigegilb]

The IPT hold sway, in a longer term engineering sense, over the project. They control the extent of any engineering investigations (& hold the purse strings..). The IPT ‘contracts’ BAE SYSTEMS to investigate issues on MR2. The IPT issue the ‘engineering solution’ to issues on MR2 be it a modification or otherwise. The IPT issue Technical Instructions, Routine/Urgent/Special/Servicing (RTI/UTI/STI/SI). The IPT issue ‘service modifications’ (SM’s) as in the fitting of flight deck Armour to MR2. Within the ‘service’ the IPT is THE engineering authority. Notwithstanding ... The 'end user' (squadron/unit level) has a degree of authority, in a day to day sense, to enable them to carry out taskings (ENGO/SENGO & up etc..).

[Safety_Helmut]

Nige, in safety terms, the IPTL's responsibility, and hence the IPT, is bounded by the Military Aircraft Release (MAR), in theory this should be underpinned by a full Safety Case, in practice there will be a lot of claims for grandfather rights etc, based on the aircraft's previous operating history.

The MAR defines the defines the build (design) standard for the aircraft, it defines how it should be maintained/serviced etc, and of course the limits to how the aircraft can be flown and operated, all this is will be defined in the Aircraft Document Set (ADS).

The Release To Service Authority (RTSA) then produces a Release To Service (RTS) based on the MAR, for a line pilot, the RTS would generally be more restrictive than the MAR. Of course there can be more than one level of RTS, for example a test pilot would be able to use more of the operational envelope. The RTSA may also define different limits for various operational reasons, perhaps be prepared to accept greater risk in certain circumstances. I don’t think this would normally mean the acceptance of greater levels of unserviceability though.

In terms of maintenance and servicing, the IPT defines how the aircraft should be maintained and serviced in the ADS. The Aircraft Operating Authority (AOA) is responsible for ensuring that the aircraft is maintained in accordance with the ADS. It’s all about maintaining that build standard, or design intent, faults are rectified and the aircraft is serviced to prevents to prevent failures. What the people on the line can do is very tightly defined by the IPT, the ADS will contain all sorts of limits, for things like fuel leaks, cracks, husbandry etc. Anything outside these limits has to be referred to higher authority, ultimately up to the IPTL who has delegated responsibility for airworthiness, a responsibility that ultimately comes from SofS.

Simple really !

S_H

[nigegilb]

Oh dear, just when I think I understand it!!!

SH this all sounds very technical, procedural and rigorous. However, how do you explain the ability of AOC2Gp to simply wave his magic wand and ordain that, contrary to serious concerns by aircrew at Kinloss, the Nimrod is granted authority to continue AAR, within days of the crash, solely with his permission?

One of the SDs says that if operationally essential and if no other alternatives exist then the aircraft can tank, albeit with AOC 2 Gp permission. So, we had a jet AARing over Kandahar 4 days after the accident!!

[tucumseh]

Safety-Helmut

“The Air Systems Group (formerly ADRP) changed some fairly key definitions in the JSP553 last year, and many people were not happy with the changes I don't have a copy to hand, but they changed the way they refer to designer, design organisation, design authority etc. I don't know if it's been changed back”.


The reason people weren’t happy is simple. Yet again, faceless people with little or no experience, and without consultation or regard to the consequences, re-invent the wheel and cause havoc.

The bottom line is that there is a perfectly good Def Stan which covers these procedures for Air, Land and Sea. (Its sole purpose is to describe the procedures for maintaining the build standard, including safety. I’d be astonished if the Nimrod IPT even has a copy, and they certainly don’t have the accompanying Specifications it invokes).

If ASG issue a JSP which contradicts the Def Stan, the IPT or project manager must disregard the JSP as the Def Stan sits higher in the mandated “Order of Preference or Hierarchy for the Selection of Standards for MOD Acquisition”. Thus, the IPT appoint the Design Authority or Design Custodian; as they appoint, in agreement with other stakeholder IPTs, the Co-ordinating System Design Authority. (Or would, if they understood what I’m talking about). There are a few cases where the IPT are the Design Authority, Service Engineered Mods being the most obvious. Even then, IPTs routinely breach mandated safety rules which require them to have SEMs appraised by the DAs (both aircraft and equipment). Has this caused safety problems? Yes, most certainly.

[Safeware]

One also has to remember that the RTS is signed off by ACAS, on the advice of those down the chain. Also, remember this:
In the beginning was the plan.
And then came the Assumptions.
And the Assumptions were without form.
And the Plan was without substance.
And darkness was upon the face of the Workers.
And they spoke among themselves, saying,
"It is a crock of ****, and it stinketh."
And the Workers went unto their Supervisors and said,
"It is a pail of dung, and none may abide the odor thereof."
And the Supervisors went unto their Managers, saying,
"It is a container of excrement, and it is very strong,
such that none may abide by it."
And the Managers went unto their Directors, saying,
"It is a vessel of fertilizer, and none may abide its strength."
And the Directors spoke amongst themselves, saying one to another,
"It contains that which aids plant growth, and it is very strong."
And the Directors then went unto the Vice-Presidents, saying unto them,
"It promotes growth, and it is very powerful."
And the Vice-Presidents went unto the President, saying unto him,
"This new plan will actively promote the growth and vigor
of the company, with powerful effects."
And the President Looked upon the Plan, and saw that it was good.
And the Plan became Policy.
This is how **** Happens
So, if someone in the middle wants the aircraft to fly (and I mean any type, not just Nimrod) and they are prepared to "interpret" the information coming in to them, then as it says, "**** happens"
sw

[Safety_Helmut]

However, how do you explain the ability of AOC2Gp to simply wave his magic wand and ordain that, contrary to serious concerns by aircrew at Kinloss, the Nimrod is granted authority to continue AAR, within days of the crash, solely with his permission?

..........and that is where it all breaks down, and why the system of owner-operator-regulator is deeply flawed. Of course the MoD will maintain that it needs the ability to self regulate to sustain operational flexibility.

To answer your question though, the IPT should reconsider the MAR and the RTSA should reconsider the RTS, if they don't change, then the aircraft is still cleared to AAR.

It is a simple principle of safety regulation, and it's also common sense, that those regulating should be free of operational and financial pressures. Is this the case in MoD ?

S_H

[Safety_Helmut]

The reason people weren’t happy is simple. Yet again, faceless people with little or no experience, and without consultation or regard to the consequences, re-invent the wheel and cause havoc.

Absolutely, wholeheartedly agree, some of the people in there are idiots ! But is it their fault, they work within a system that allows people, civil servants and military alike, into such positions.

S_H

[Safeware]

With respect to limitations on AAR etc, the following should have been considered:

Every limitation within the ADS must be directly traceable to a potential hazard identified within the Safety Case, or to a source that shows clearly that it has been introduced for reasons other than safety, eg performance, husbandry. Note, however, that safety may be affected by ‘husbandry’ limitations: eg a reduction in flying hours, to save on fuel or maintenance costs, could lead to lower standards of aircrew currency than had been assumed in the Safety Case, which would therefore needs revision. Limitations that are not already based on the Safety Case cannot be imposed - or relaxed - without appropriate consideration of the continued validity of the Safety Case.

And, as someone once said "Not a lot of people know that", but they should.

sw

[nigegilb]

SW, in all seriousness, could AOC 2Gp possibly have satisfactorily completed this onerous task inside 4 days? It is ridiculous. I have an email from a senior Nimrod pilot who was exasperated by this decision. The subsequent massive fuel migrations caused by pressure spikes and leaks during AAR only bear out his fears.

[mad eng]

Winco,
As I have said in my only post during this discussion, any acceptable wing tank leak, which we get airborne with, is highly unlikely to deteriorate suddenly in flight. Even given all the factors you describe. The tank pressure is minimal and protected by relief valves. Any fuel which does leak would stream off the wing due to airflow, so even if the wing tank ruptured the risk of fire would be minimal. We do not accept any leaks in areas where the fuel could gather. Lots of people on here are still missing the fact that acceptable leaks are acceptable because they pose a minute if not zero threat to aircraft safety. This is due to the nature of what is causing the leak and the location of it. These acceptable leaks you are all talking about did not cause the tragic events which have prompted this discussion. Please, one and all, keep the discussion focussed on the real problems.
Thanks
RIP Boys

[nigegilb]

Bootflap, this means that the SD allowing Nimrod to continue AAR under exceptional circumstances signed off by AOC 2Gp was released by the RTS Authority?

Can you also explain who is/are the RTSA and what is their relationship with AOC 2Gp and Nimrod IPT?

Please... No rush!!:)

[Tappers Dad]

Sorry Guys I can hardly understand a word your saying .

I have two questions to ask, and bear in mind I don't know half the jargon so keep yor answers simple please.

Who is the last person to sign out an a/c saying its acceptable to fly, is it the Flight Engineer or something engineer ?

Have I got this right, a pilot can refuse to fly an a/c if he thinks it's unsafe and no-one can say he has too. Is that right, the pilot has the final say ?


PS Keep it simple

[mad eng]

TD

The captain of the aircraft signs to accept the jet after the whole crew have completed there pre flight checks. They would bring his attention to any malfunction they encountered. It is then up to him to sign as accepting the aircraft. Before this the Before Flight servicing will have been carried out by the ground crew and a dispatch check by the crew chief. Any faults found during this stage would probably stop the crew from even getting to the aircraft, the crew chief will not allow the crew to start their pre flight until he is satisfied the aircraft is servicable, we could of course be carrying unservicable items but these would have to be detailed in the F700 and be deemed safe to fly iaw the servicing manuals. The captain retains the right to refuse an aircraft at any time. So you can see it is a team effort and anyone can flag up problems at any time.

[AC Ovee]

Who is the last person to sign out an a/c saying its acceptable to fly

An experienced Aicraft Ground Engineer (AGE) of SNCO status, who would have carried out a visual inspection of the aircraft as far as is practical (ie he will not open access panels to simply have a look, unless it is officially part of his checks, or if he finds good reason to do so). Other tradesmen will have checked inside the compartments and signed for their safety and access panel security.

Have I got this right, a pilot can refuse to fly an a/c if he thinks it's unsafe and no-one can say he has too. Is that right, the pilot has the final say ?


If the AGE has certified the aircaft as fit to fly, the captain must find evidence to the contrary if he doesn't want to accept it. In order to reject the aircraft, on an engineering basis, he must enter a new defect in the maintenance book. In anticipation of your next question, no, a captain cannot reject an acceptable deferred fault, without substantiating his decision to his commanders. He might be able to convince them that he is right but, if nothing has changed since the certification, its doubtful. We don't work on the principle of, "I want that one".

A example at the heart of this discussion would be: The AGE does his final checks and signs the aircraft as fit to fly. The captain then sees a fuel leak from a charted position and does not believe it is acceptable and wishes to reject the aircraft on that basis. He must either enter that leak in the documents as a new fault and await ground engineering examination to certify it as acceptable or not or, without doing any paperwork, he can (bravely) take his crew away and explain his actions to his Sqn Cdr. Although captains do have the final say, they are still part of a structured organisation and they have to answer for their decisions when they do not go with the plan.

Occasionally, a captain might discover that the aircraft, which is serviceable, does not have the role equipment he needs to carry out his duty, so he can reject it on that basis. Also, if a captain is taking a aircraft away from main base on a deployment with minimal engineering support and the extant acceptable fault(s) are too great for remote ops from home base, he can reject it. These kinds of decisions are usually made well before he is due to go to the aircraft.

[John Blakeley]

Tapper's Dad - please check PMs

Sadly, the captain does not seem to be able to question the under-lying airworthiness of the aircraft he is tasked to fly - something that I guess is of concern to many Nimrod crews at present. If you want a good example look again at the Chinook Crash on the Mull of Kintyre - the NI detachment commander and captain on the day of the accident did not want to use a Chinook Mk 2 because of its known problems, eg performance limitations and flight safety critical distractions such as false engine fail warnings lasting up to 12 seconds (even written up as a warning in the CA RTS recommendations), but he was of course over-ruled. As OC Rotary Wing Squadron, commenting on those same Chinook problems, wrote with amazing prescience earlier on the day of the accident, and after A&AEE had decided to stop flight trials:

Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations.”

I understand from comments in the Sunday Times that the Stn Cdr at RAF Kinloss made similar comments on the standard of his Nimrods that were ignored as well.



JB

[Chugalug2]

The captain then sees a fuel leak from a charted position and does not believe it is acceptable and wishes to reject the aircraft on that basis. He must either enter that leak in the documents as a new fault and await ground engineering examination to certify it as acceptable or not or, without doing any paperwork, he can (bravely) take his crew away and explain his actions to his Sqn Cdr. Although captains do have the final say, they are still part of a structured organisation and they have to answer for their decisions when they do not go with the plan.

AC, WADR that dilemma is common to all Captains, Military and Civil, Multi- and SE. What you characterise as "brave" I would contend is his/hers duty as captain. If you don't like what you see you don't take it, whatever anyone else says. It may lead to you wearing out innumerable carpets so what? You can walk away from them, possibly jobless, poorer, sadder, whatever. At least you walk away, and so can others! Of course I realise there are other considerations not mentioned here, of other lives at risk, operational imperatives etc. At the very least I would expect that would involve discussion not only with one's superiors, who won't be going, but with one's crew, who will be.

[AC Ovee]

I suggested it would be brave to walk away without raising any paperwork. Its always possible that the captain/crew see something differently from the groundcrew and yes, the crew will always take their lead from their captain and nothing can physically stop him and them from walking away. However, he should discuss his concerns with the AGE in the first instance and, if not convinced, he must then raise a maintenance work order. If he doesn't do that, he must expect to explain to his commander why he chose not to raise an entry in the maintenance document and/or why he decided, off his own bat, that he knows better than the engineers what is acceptable and what is not.

[Tappers Dad]

It appears then that an "Aircraft Ground Engineer (AGE) of SNCO status" is the person who having checked the ac, signs to say that the ac is fit to fly.

That is some responsibility then isn't it . I should imagine the poor guy who signed off XV230 has been put through the mill by the BOI questioning him then.

Having read about the command structure I suppose a lot of people have been questioned though.

[Chugalug2]

OK, missed that AC, point taken and agreed. Indeed if a fault that is offered as an acceptable deferred defect is seen as not acceptable by a Captain refusing an aircraft, he has a moral responsibility to the next captain to be so invited to enter the fact that it has not been accepted and why. That then starts one of Tucs "audit trails" which will tell a tale, loud and clear, to those who follow it later. As to:
why he decided, off his own bat, that he knows better than the engineers what is acceptable and what is not.
I refer you to the statement that I made earlier:
If you don't like what you see you don't take it, whatever anyone else says.
His boss may agree or disagree with that decision, either way it was made, and recorded!

[nigegilb]

Chug, refusing to accept a mission on grounds of aircraft safety, be it lack of self-protection or airworthiness is a very difficult thing to do.

Something similar happened on the Herc Fleet a few years ago and it all got very messy. Careers can be ruined, and lots of questions raised about moral fibre etc.

In reality, if the IPT, (in this case), declares the aircraft airworthy, the AOC is happy to state it is safe enough to fly, then it is very difficult to do otherwise. That sadly, is reality.

[Chugalug2]

Nige, I'm not talking about vague concepts as "Airworthiness", or even specific deficiencies such as lack of ESF, which I flew without for my entire career, civil and military! I was discussing with AC the pre flight problems that present themselves on a daily basis to captains. Drips of fuel from wings, damage to tyres, cracks in windscreens, u/s systems etc, all offered as "fit to fly". Nothing philosophical, just plain acceptable or not. If not don't take it. If it then gets very "messy", one should ask oneself if this is a good environment in which to be a captain. To be fair I had nothing but support from my bosses, in the mob and outside. But that was a long time ago, and I'd better stop there before this post is diverted to the "Generic" thread!
PS On consideration, the above may seem a rather flippant response. It was not meant to, but I should have addressed the larger point you made Nige, sorry! I think the dividing line here is between the airworthiness of different aircraft types and marks and of individual airframes. The former is the province of the appropriate authorities the latter of, in respect of this discussion, the authorised captain. Of course if the former have messed up then all the airframes offered to our captain are compromised. His difficulty, unlike theirs, is that he has little or no way of assessing that degree of compromise. None the less the inevitable constraints placed on the operation of such a fleet surely gives room to dissent. "The mission threatened to fall outside the cleared operating envelope" or such like. Again the decision to abort may well be condemned. Tough, you're back to wearing out carpet again. Just as managers have to be prepared to withstand outrageous demands from above, so in the end do captains. For with them the buck finally stops.

[John Blakeley]

Chugalug 2

I think I know what you are getting at, but I do not accept that airworthiness should be a vague concept. Unless things have changed JSP 318 (Regulation of Ministry of Defence Aircraft) defines “Airworthiness” as “the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown.” The elements of an airworthiness system include:



System Definition
Contract Requirements
Design
Development – hardware and software
Qualification testing of components and systems including software verification and validation to the appropriate standards.
Quality Systems and Standards
Flight Trials - both Manufacturer’s and MOD’s
Certification
Release to Service Recommendations from Boscombe Down
RAF Release to Service including Flight Limitations
Configuration Management
Training of air and ground crews.
Documentation, Publications and Orders including such vital publications as Flight Reference Cards (FRCs) – the first line of reference in any emergency.
Servicing Recommendations
Maintenance Standards and Responsibilities
Recording Systems
Defect Investigation and Feedback


The captain could argue that many of these items are well beyond his control, and possibly even knowledge, but I would suggest that even after 20 years if you know that the design is inadequate, and there seems to be plenty of continuing evidence that the Nimrod IFR installation did not meet, or come anywhere near meeting, the AvP970 design requirements for these sytems on military aircraft, then you still have an airworthiness problem as sadly has been tragically demonstrated. The problem was well known so who in the case of the Nimrod decided that they could live with it - or did the fleet just "drift" into this situation without anybody putting the pieces of the jigsaw together?

I wonder if the MRA4 gets a tick in all these boxes as well - is the design any better?

JB

[AC Ovee]

Chugalug you wrote:

Drips of fuel from wings, damage to tyres, cracks in windscreens, u/s systems etc, all offered as "fit to fly"

I know what you're saying, but the examples you quoted are always referred to documented limits, so there is never any decision based on front line opinion, only. Cuts in tyres, cracked windscreens, small fuel leaks, once entered the maintenance document, are always checked against limits in the books, taking the no-go option if there is any doubt. If the defect is clearly in limits and hasn't worsened (and they are usally checked before every flight or daily), the crew are obliged to accept the engineering decision. If the fault isn't in the books the front line engineers are obliged to seek guidance from supporting organisations; usually the IPT, who might then take advice from the manufacturer, etc.

I think we are all singing from the same songsheet, here.

[AC Ovee]

TD, you wrote:

It appears then that an "Aircraft Ground Engineer (AGE) of SNCO status" is the person who having checked the ac, signs to say that the ac is fit to fly.

That is some responsibility then isn't it .

Massive. But, he can only take responsibility for the actions that he signs for. He does not open up panels and doors to check fluid levels. Someone else has already done that (and certified that there is sufficient fluid). However, the AGE will certify that the panels and doors are shut before flight. Overall, systematically, his job is backed up by solid teamwork by those around him in the engineering world and the aircrew themselves.

[Sospan]

The line controller also certifies that all relevant servicings have been carried out and the aircraft is cleared to fly for the number of hours requested.

[Chugalug2]

OK AC, a little bit of role play. You can be handsome, tanned, lean (sorry bad connotations how about lithe?) Eng WO, and for our purposes AGE. Scene F700 office (or whatever), enter left sallow pale self, authorised for circuits and bumps MCT (whatever). Have just looked at cut in left main tyre, having been alerted by my Flt Eng. Don't like what I see. You tell me in a polite measured way that its dimensions in length, depth, width etc all well within book figure. I say that I had a tyre lose its tread/ blew out/ deflated to rim (whatever), and had a cut smaller than this one. You repeat same mantra, even more measured, but somewhat louder, and start calling me captain. This gets everyone's attention, and I am aware that all eyes are now on me. I mutter something about still not being happy with it, you reply "Well, will you accept the aircraft or not, Captain?" Faced with this ultimatum I have to make a decision. "No", I say, hoping to sound convincing and determined, but knowing I appear neither. Suddenly you are all bustle and action. "Just fill this out then please captain, and this, and sign here", and receive the evidence back in triumph. Crew and self re-board bus and go back to squadron. Crew subdued having witnessed scene in Eng Ops. Back at Squadron have to immediately report to boss (you didn't hang about did you AC?). Get bollocking and final warning. You go home to adoring wife and amuse her with tale of numpty pilot, adding that aircraft still flying with same tyre, same cut, same dimensions. I go home to mess and get pissed, receive final warning from PMC. You've done your job and I've done mine as far as I can tell, how about you?
JB, I added a PS to my previous post before reading yours, but in part dealing with some of your points. I do not say that Airworthiness is a vague concept per se, but merely that it is one level above my preceeding thrilling scene , ie the cut tyre IMHO affects the airworthiness of that aircraft, and in AC's opinion it does not, so that really doesn't help us. We deal with the tangible components of airworthiness, and let those more worthy (sorry!) deal with the larger picture, which is Nigegilb's point, I think.

[AC Ovee]

Well, the procedure we went through is, theoretically, the way it should be. But, your previous experience with a similar fault should protect you from the wrath of your boss and some understanding from me. Also, doubtless you would have recorded the details of your previous fault and you might have enquired to the cause after the investigation and wheel change. If that small cut was deemed to be the only cause (no binding brake, excessive wear, or another unseen cut on the underside of the tyre that was on the ground) I would expect the IPT and manufacturer to have already reviewed the acceptable limits. Of course, your previous event could have ocurred yesterday, so the investigation has hardly started. So, in that circumstance I, the Eng WO, and your boss, should be less draconian. The jet would remain on the programme.

However, your specific example is not at all realistic. If the book states that a small cut in a tyre is acceptable, it will be because the manufacturer has provided that assurance. Its not the RAF engineers that have made the decision unilaterally. So, in your example you are suggesting that manufacturers limits are not acceptable. I don't believe that you really mean that.

I'm comfortable that when the ground crew can make a clear "safe or nor not safe" decision (based on quality information), that we can trust them do it. If its safe, its acceptable. When they are faced with a grey area, their instinct is "not safe" and the jet is grounded until further information is received. I'm more than happy with this principle.

I've lost count of the number of times the types I've been associated with have been fleet-grounded over a weekend until the manaufacturer comes to work on Monday morning (you know what I mean) to give advice.

I remain convinced that you and I basically agree.

[Chugalug2]

Well it all sounds rather formulaic, if you don't mind me saying so, AC. To misquote Clouseau, I trust everyone yet I trust no-one. If there were one philosophy that kept me alive to date it would be, "In the final analysis, trust no one". That may sound extreme, but a healthy distrust of assurances and promises is IMHO the secret of living long if not necessarily prospering. Being particularly alert for evidence that is not easily apparent is especially to be commended. I remember when manually produced loadsheets which bore witness to all the mistakes and corrections made in their compilation gave way to computer generated ones. All neat tabulated authoritative columns of figures, but every line a possible gross misrepresentation. Thus I always suspected those the more. I realise that there is an agenda running here, which I have every sympathy with, but if we quote Flight Safety, the only agenda running should be that alone. If the airworthiness of certain fleets is suspect, that is the direct responsibility of senior commanders. If and when they are brought to book you may be sure that they will not say that they were carrying out orders, for that defence bit the dust in 1945. Rather they will blame subordinates, who should have challenged/ advised/ alerted etc. So my advice would be to use every means of reporting deficiencies possible via CoC, MORs etc. Those who post here, well done. it cannot be easy, but it is a means of alerting all in the system that all is not well that would not have been possible just a few years ago. Lack of equipment/ money/ manpower are not absolutes but problems that have to be resolved. If you want airpower, it costs. Endex.

[Safeware]

As regards a captain rejecting an aircraft, if he is unhappy with something in the 703/704, then he could refuse to fly, at least until he had been satisfied that the entry was appropriate.
I've only seen one instance when a jet came to my unit from elsewhere, where the pilot should have rejected the aircraft because of a poorly judged 703 entry, but it turned out ok - we fixed the problem. I've heard of and seen others though, where the entry was rejected on consideration of the captain. Then the maintenance entry raised is to clear that lim / adf.
It shouldn't happen though if the groundcrew and aircrew are working together and talking about problems.
sw

[John Blakeley]

I am sorry to see that nobody apart from Chugalug wants to take up the airworthiness issues in my previous postings and that the thread continues to concentrate on the sharp end issues important as they are (the line chief and the aircrew represent the final links in the airworthiness chain for any aircraft and sortie).

However, the (pre BOI) “fact” remains that XV 230 did not crash because the captain or the line chief failed – clearly in saying this we still need to wait the BOI (which continues to be delayed so inevitably adding to informed speculation and programmes like Panorama – more need to situate the appreciation as on the Chinook perhaps?) - it crashed, if all the leaked reports are to be believed, because it was not an airworthy aircraft, and it would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted, and the rest of the Nimrod fleet may be in the same state. Why is this – because it appears that what should have been a temporary installation to meet the urgent operational needs of the Falklands War has become a permanent fit, and in the meantime other systems in the aging aircraft have been subject to deterioration, eg hot gas leaks, fuel leaks, etc. For a permanent fit the installation design should have been subject to the requirements of AvP 970 Issue 5 Part 5 Powerplant (which covers fuel systems), ) and in particular the following leaflets:

5.1.7 A full safety analysis of the system - I wonder if MOD can confirm that this was carried out for the MRA2 when MOD decided to retain the original “temporary” installation. I also wonder if it has been done for the MRA4 and what the results were/are of this analysis for both aircraft?

5.1.18 A zonal analysis of the installation to identify weak points – again I wonder it has been done for both the MRA4 and the MRA2

5.1.19 A fire analysis (for both marks of aircraft).

5.1.20 An analysis of proper fuel system functioning under all probable operating conditions including all probable equipment failures (which includes hot air leaks) should be shown for the MRA2. Is it being done for the MRA4?

Perhaps somebody can confirm that for the MRA4, even if the installation is similar, at least these analyses have been done and their results incorporated into any necessary design changes. For those who are interested AvP 970 is available on the web via www.dstan.mod.uk

MOD had had twenty plus years to make the Nimrod IFR installation “safe” – I wonder if the BOI will address the question as to why they allegedly did not do it, or, like the Chinook BOI, ignore airworthiness issues altogether. My guess as to why it has not been done is money, just like ESF on the C130, and it is the same command chain (albeit different people) civilian and service, and bean counters as well as engineers and operators which “approves” this happening by letting airworthiness problems (which do not always have an immediate or obvious flight safety issue and which you may feel you can solve with procedures) have a low priority in the funding battle – their position is then compounded by the lower levels in the command chain continuing to accept standards, and even, with the usually commendable “can do” attitude of most people, “paper over” problems that they know have flight safety implications. No, they will not of course offer an aircraft they know at that instant to be non-airworthy or unsafe – rather they will ignore the issues they know the system has “approved” even if they do not agree with them themselves. I am guilty myself!

MOD is always short of money, but as a grumpy old man I now think that we could have had a lot of “airworthiness” and self-protection modifications for 10% of the costs of Main Building and Abbey Wood or some of the failed or late IT systems, or even the MRA4 and Typhoon over-run costs– but then when many of these decisions were made it was always going to be a cold war rather than hot peace enforcement!

Given that budgetary pressures can only get worse I guess things will only change when one of the bereaved families files a “duty of care” criminal charge against a series of people in MOD and wins the day in Court.

JB

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks for you posting JB.
I found it very informative and I agree that the Crash of XV230 would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted.

However as far as bereaved families filing a “duty of care” criminal charge against a series of people in MOD is concerned, we have Distant Voices Catch 22 scenario.


DEF STAN 00-56 also implies that a/c can be flown that are "unacceptable". Because MOD's definition of "unacceptable" is " A level of risk that is tolerable only under exception circumstances" And that, they will claim is what the situation is in Afghanistan.

So even if XV230 was deemed to have airworthiness that was unacceptable it is possible that someone out there in a high ranking position could have over ruled the line chief.

They would therefore say that the ac was at a level of risk that was tolerable due to exception circumstances and any court case would have no chance of success.

[tucumseh]

John Blakeley

Regarding your airworthiness comments, you know we sing from the same hymn sheet. There are so many documented failures in the application of MoD’s own mandated procedures and processes that their incompetence, and abrogation of responsibility and Duty of Care, has not been in doubt for many years.

However, this does not apply across the board. Your list of airworthiness elements at #811, which you acknowledge as incomplete, omits one very important factor - human input. There are good and bad everywhere. That is why, in our field, complex programmes are often delivered with effortless competence, ahead of time, under cost and to a better performance (yes, it can be done), while simple programmes become disasters. The trouble is; the former raise the benchmark of expectation. The “guilty” are termed an “embarrassment to the Department” and are offloaded at the first opportunity. The reason? Simple. If others, who have previously set a much lower benchmark yet been marked high, cannot match the new mark, then they must be marked lower in their next annual report. This is difficult to explain and manage, so it is easier to get rid of the problem. Never mind that the outcome can be huge delays and cost over-runs.

You mention AvP / Def Stan 00-970. I well recall one bollocking I got for insisting this be implemented. “Def Stans are not mandatory”. When asked him what standard I should apply (as I must apply something), I got no reply. His knowledge of standards, never mind their implementation, was on a par with most of MoD – learnt or overheard at a half day seminar (which probably took up one page in a 4 page c.v.). If MoD continues to employ non-technical staff like this as programme managers on technical projects ……. He (and others like him) was clearly pretty clever, in his own field. But if I decide to spend money on making an aircraft safe (which is not just within my remit, but an obligation), I do not want him having the authority to instruct me not to, just because it highlights the fact that he, or one of his mates, screwed up and signed to say it was airworthy in the first place. Nor do I want the 2*, 4* and above supporting him, just to avoid the embarrassment of having to admit their policy of ridding MoD of technical project managers (promulgated in 1996 by CDP) was barking. Another fundamental issue….. As a non-engineer, he/they do not have the “technical approval” signature. Why, then, are they permitted to make engineering design decisions, or over-rule such decisions already made by engineers who have the formal delegation?


Def Stan 00-970 is important. Look at this (everyone, please pay attention, it concerns YOUR aircraft).

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/564AA9D0-8FFF-4858-82DC-E12E1D257583/0/boi_sea_king.pdf

Para 141. The… (anti collision light system) .. DOES NOT COMPLY with Def Stan 00-970 Vol 2 Ch 110 being located in a position detrimental to the crews’ vision. The requirement to turn it off in flight renders it UNFIT FOR PURPOSE.

Note - “Interferes with the crews’ vision”. Earlier in the report - “disorientating”. Pretty damning, eh? The aircraft collided at night. 7 dead. One would think this element would be explored in forensic detail.

But it doesn’t say much else. No indication that anyone asked “Why/How was if fitted. By Whom? Was it appraised by the Aircraft DA? Was it simply read across from another Mark of aircraft without a Trail Installation and proper trials? Given open-source photographic evidence shows it was in the previous iteration of the aircraft (noted in BOI), but removed and not in the Trials Installation aircraft for the new Mark (not noted), did anyone (IPT, BOI or Coroner) ask why it was removed, and then re-fitted? Presumably someone, years before the crash (TI picture is dated 2000, crash 2003), thought it should be removed for some reason. And why was it re-fitted, in the same place, and still, according to the BOI, unfit for purpose? Importantly, was it discussed at the (mandated) Aircraft installation Critical Design Review? Was such a CDR undertaken by MoD, and approved by MoD as part of a formal contract milestone? I’ve known them to be waived! If any of these questions haven’t been answered satisfactorily, may I suggest (a) the MoD have been somewhat less than open with the BOI and Coroner, thus (b) rendering both their verdicts unsafe. Heard that one before.

But then, 00-970 is not mandatory (to some protected species). Not sure the BOI, the Coroner or the families would agree. (And I apologise sincerely if this upsets anyone).

The point I am making here, and which John makes so eloquently, is that there are many common factors between the various incidents discussed here. (Mull, Hercules, Tornado, Sea King, Nimrod). But MoD seeks to deny this. The individual IPTs (none of whom existed when the critical decisions were made) are stovepiped and they just dismiss any notion of systematic failure of process or procedure with “this is the first such accident”, “our procedures are robust” or similar platitudes. But ask yourselves, at what level above the IPTs do these “isolated” factors converge? And what rulings have been made at this level. Oh, delivery of safety and airworthiness is optional. (Not to everyone apparently, just the chosen few). Funding to maintain safety and airworthiness to be slashed. Systems Integration can be ignored. The effects were predictable, predicted, and ignored.

Instead of always thinking of their next promotion, these people would do well to consider their duty. In days gone by this meant something else.

[John Blakeley]

Tapper's Dad,

Please see PMs as well.

I think the test that has to be tried is for how long can MOD leave an aircraft in an unairworthy condition and still say that it is exceptional circumstances? Twenty years? Remember that the Coroner did not accept that MOD's failure to plan for enough body armour could then be over-ridden by the excuse of combat immunity.

JB

[covec]

JB

Is there anything like a Risk Register to formally register/identify/analyse/mitigate risks?

Who "owns the risk"?

Was a formal Risk Assessment needed in the aftermath of XV230?

Was there a case for a formal Flight Trial before AAR resumed?

Or is it the case that we are in an ongoing "exceptional circumstances situation"? In which case I personally feel that as adults, we ahould be kept in the picture and allowed to come to our own, informed decisions. I don't think that there would be a mass exodus although I cannot deny that some may "reconsider" their career path!

[John Blakeley]

First Tucumseh - thanks very much for your further excellent examples of how and why what MOD always claims is a robust system lets the guys in the front line down far too often - as you say the human element which should be the "glue" that makes sure all the links come and work together has been too often the weakest link for many years past, and worse far too many people at the top of the food chain are only too happy to listen to what they perceive to be the good news, for example on coping with budget cuts, without questioning what lies beneath the surface or worse not understanding the implications even when they are explained to them.

Covec - yours is an interesting question, and Tuc may also wish to answer as he is more up to date than me on MOD procedures. However, as far as I am aware although each project should have an up to date risk register (including the MRA4 for example) during the D&M phase this does not translate into a specific in-service risk register - rather flying risks will end up as performance limitations or procedures - engineering risks may well end up as additional inspections, lower component lives etc etc. In other words those areas where you might have a "performance" risk left from the devopment programme should end up somewhere in the paperwork and be clearly visible. As an example if some of the analyses I mentioned for the IFR installation had been carried out (as you will realise I doubt if they were for the MRA2 installation or are being for the MRA4) show a clear risk then in theory you must do something about it unless you can show that the odds of it happening are so low as to be acceptable (and I do not know the current numbers for the clearance of military aircraft). Thus you may change procedures to reduce or eliminate exposure to the risk - you could increase the frequency of inspections to ensure the situation is not deteriorating or, best of all (but most expensive) you could modify the problem out.

Obviously for any in-service aircraft it is the task of the engineering officers and supervisors to make their own assessment of day to day risks eg when offering an aircraft to the aircrew with a deferred defect or flight limitation, and, of course the final link is the captain not just with regard to the acceptance of the safety issues, but also for suitablity for the task. Often there will be formal help eg with published limits for cracks etc and a minimum equipment list and you could, I sppose, regard these as a type of Risk Register. I have always assumed that supervisors on the flying side make similar assessments -but again without any formal "risk register" for operational factors other than the RTS and a knowledge of the capabilities/training of their crews.

I would assume that there will be formal IFR trials for the MRA4 if only for the different aerodynamic configuration, but whether this will make a proper assessment of the installation itself I would not know - it is one of my questions.

JB

[JFZ90]

John, whilst your questions wondering what analyses have been done on MR2/4 etc. are of relevant and of interest, in one of your earlier posts you appeared to have already made up your mind.....

- it crashed, if all the leaked reports are to be believed, because it was not an airworthy aircraft, and it would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted, and the rest of the Nimrod fleet may be in the same state. Why is this – because it appears that what should have been a temporary installation to meet the urgent operational needs of the Falklands War has become a permanent fit,

....other posts have already suggested that the ad-hoc falklands fit was extensively re-engineered (including, I think it would be fair to assume, appropriate failure mode analysis) many years ago. Hence I fear your assumptions that this is the cause are probably flawed - like me you just don't have the facts to make such assertions.

This speculation is dangerous and furthermore you & others are quoting standards and in doing so are superficially appearing knowledgeable on these matters (which maybe true), but as you admit you don't know the details on Nimrod then your speculation is just that - speculation without detailed facts on this particular subject.

You all know that adherance to standards in itself is no guarantee of safety either so implying otherwise is also misleading out of context. Whilst you know this, it seems clear to me that this could be taken out of context by those who perhaps do not understand the detail of what this means from an engineering perspective (i.e. journolists and others following this thread with interest).

[Chugalug2]

The Risk Assessment by a line captain, over and above the criteria mentioned by JB, and published as a Minimum Equipment List etc for his aircraft type, can be broadly characterized as a "feeling in his/her water". In other words experience, especially if one has been scared f***less with a similar condition previously. Hence my dramatised example for AC. He criticised it as a poor example as manufacturers guidance would assure me to the contrary. That is the difference between old pilots and engineers. He believes them, I don't (necessarily). But all this is by the way, because the basic truth here is not a tension between pilots and engineers, but between the front line and the rear echelons in the MOD. The former are at war, and their fate may be determined in the most arbitrary way. The latter, with honourable exceptions, Tuc, are sitting fat dumb and happy having supplied the former with non-airworthy aircraft. That is a bloody disgrace!

[tucumseh]

covec

I could reply at length, but here's the official answer. (Search for Risk). It uses the phrase "the IPT SHOULD" a lot. That is, none of what it says is actually mandated. Also, the first entry refers to the IPT having a risk register. Nowhere does it mention that it is DEC who should initiate the Register. Having got this basic principle wrong, I'd take the rest with a pinch of salt.


http://www.ams.mod.uk/


JFZ90

"You all know that adherance to standards in itself is no guarantee of safety either so implying otherwise is also misleading out of context".

No-one is suggesting adherence to standards guarantees safety, but I think aircrew reading this would prefer me to invoke said standards rather than treating them as an optional nuisance. I sincerely hope you are never placed in the position of being instructed to ignore these standards.

[nigegilb]

My own engineering contacts want the MRA4 to have a double skinned IFR system as well as fuel tank protection. Bomb bay fire protection is also possible. The RAF does not want the program to move right and does not have any money.

[WasNaeMe]

Re Post 824....
"I would assume that there will be formal IFR trials for the MRA4 if only for the different aerodynamic configuration, but whether this will make a proper assessment of the installation itself I would not know - it is one of my questions......."

What 'different aerodynamic configuration'?

The installation is ""retained"" for god sakes..... Same as MR2.

Jeeeez...Us

[JFZ90]

The MR4 is aerodynamically obviously a bit different from the MR2 with all its changes & bulges hence its possible AAR trials will be conducted to ensure the MR4 changes have not introduced any untoward handling/behaviour when refueling. I assume this is what John was referring to.

tuc

No-one is suggesting adherence to standards guarantees safety, but I think aircrew reading this would prefer me to invoke said standards rather than treating them as an optional nuisance. I sincerely hope you are never placed in the position of being instructed to ignore these standards.

I know you know that, but someone reading your post above re the sea king may get the impression that it would have solved the problem. In fact, as I'm sure you'd agreed, the anti col beacon issue is actually quite complicated. I am however rather surprised that the issue was not flagged as not it-for-purpose in any case - I'd argue you shouldn't need a DEF STD to highlight this issue as being rather important during design, let alone trials & acceptance.

[WasNaeMe]

The differences twixt MR2 & MRA4 fwd of the IFR probe, that would affect IFR, are... NIL.

[tucumseh]

As a new Mk is being introduced, a new Aircraft Safety Case is required; as it would be even if the role of the aircraft changed. (And, from the various posts here, that does seem to have changed in recent years for the Mk2, so I assume its Safety Case is wholly up to date).

It may be retained, and may carry the caveat "it was built to standards of the day", but that does not infer automatic read-across. Under the circumstances I think I'd be ensuring it was brought up to latest standards. Perhaps that is what has caused the 7 year, and counting, delay?

[JFZ90]

The differences twixt MR2 & MRA4 fwd of the IFR probe, that would affect IFR, are... NIL.

Yes but John was talking broadly about MR4 AAR trials - trials such as these will consider the whole aero issues of a MR4 airframe in the wake of a tanker to highlight any issues. Issues could stem from any aspect of the revised aero design overall.

If you read his post in this context it does make sense.

[WasNaeMe]

Apologies... & to JB.
Quite right....
T'would appear that I had a bit of a knee-jerk thing going on there (post the barbie & all...). Perhaps a bit too defensive of MRA4 just now...

[AC Ovee]

Its rumoured (here, I think) that the AAR system on the MRA4 will not be released into service. I further understand that the decision was made before the crash. ie it was/is about money at the time.

[WasNaeMe]

As already stated on this forum, The MRA4 AAR system, although fitted, will not be qualified. This is at the behest of the customer.

[buoy15]

It seems everyone is going into the manuals and wer'e losing sight of the origins of this thread
This was a unique, catastrophic and tragic accident that happened to an aircraft that was properly prepared, declared and accepted as serviceable for that sortie - as was XV239, XV256, XV257, XV666, the Chinook, the Hercules, the Comets, Yoke Peter, Yoke Uncle, Yoke Yoke - and all the Lightnings, Chipmunks, JP's, Hunters, Canberras, Harriers, Hastings, Tornados, and all other ac that suffered loss of systems or were exposed to unforseen risk when airborne
So, as Captain, I stand up at briefing and say
"Ok crew, today wer'e doing a 6 hr Ops/Ct which involves a 30min AAR slot for the pilots, but there is a big risk of a fire in the Bomb Bay after refuel, and we might not get back, so I am not taking this ac and cancelling the sortie":ouch:
History will agree with me - "You brief for the best and you plan for the worst"
You cannot prepare for an emergency in a moment - your reactions to an emergency are a result of procedures which you have practised over a period of time - that is why we have IA's supported by check lists and the efforts of the crew!
TD
I have flown many AAR sorties, some not planned - SAR - where my only concern was to establish contact with the tanker when a long way from home
I never had any worries other than to get more gas and I have trusted the plumbing system, pre-and post Falklands fit, and I am here to prove it
This still does not answer the questions - so I suggest we all wait for the BOI report

[John Blakeley]

JFC90

You are, of course, quite right, and I obviously did not make it clear enough that my comments were based on "leaked" and hence inevitably speculative, reports that MOD has done little to counter, including the ST article on remarks by the Stn Cdr Kinloss. Yours is the first time that I have seen a comment that the FI installation was extensively re-engineered - not that this would necessarily meet all of the relevant standards, and carrying out a safety analysis is little use if its results were not to be implemented - were they?

All of this aside having seen how the Chinook BOI was "manipulated" (which I will happily justify in a PM if you wish) I am, like everyone else, very suspicious of the reasons for the continuing delays!

JB

[John Blakeley]

Sorry for getting your name wrong on the last post - it's not as if the C and Z are next to each other!

JB

[Safety_Helmut]

This was a unique, catastrophic and tragic accident .................................exposed to unforseen risk when airborne

Your assertion about the unforeseen accidents is worrying, particularly so given your speech as an aircraft captain. What many people have argued on here, based on supposition of course, is that the circumstances were far from unforeseen. There are numerous techniques that aircraft engineers have at their disposal to identify and analyse hazards, and then design and build aircraft to mitigate the risk. Once aircraft are in service, they are monitored, failings are identified and they should be rectified through modification if neccessary.

You (mis)quote the loss of XW666, I suggest you get hold of the accident report, and read carefully the reason why it was lost. Yes there was a fuel tank fire, yes there was a short circuit in the engine loom, but look at why the starter motor failed, read the report and see that similar failures had happened at least twice previously. A modification programme had been introduced, but, some 10 to 15 years later, XW666 flew with a pre-modification starter motor. If XW666 had not been on a post major air test, if it had happened with a full crew in a less fortuitous location and if the crew had not displayed such skill and judgement we would probably be discussing a tragedy.

When carrying out the safety analysis, the engineer is not allowed to factor in providence (luck) as some on here, and it seems some who are exposed to the greatest risk, would have us do.

Safety_Helmut

[Tappers Dad]

buoy15
As you have said you are a Nimrod captain (I hope I have that right), If one of your aircrew or one of their family members asked you, whats the chances of surviving a Bomb bay fire due to a fuel leak.
Knowing what happened to XV257 when the fire extinguisher had no effect and that XV230 exploded.

What would your answer be?

I have asked a Snr Officer what he would say and was not surprised by his answer.

And perhaps you could tell me what is the procedure that you practise now for a Bomb Bay fire.

[nigegilb]

I am not surprised by the comments of B15, there is no consensus at Kinloss about where to go from here. There is no-one in seniority pushing for fuel tank protection. Energies are being used on coping with the day to day. Attitude to risk varies from person to person.

As an indicator though, take a look at how many people have quit.

This BoI needs to be published ASAP. The lack of info to the families is wrong. No reason given for reconvening. The only thing I can glean is that the boffins keep changing their minds.

[Exrigger]

The only thing I can glean is that the boffins keep changing their minds

I wonder if this is due to attempts to sway the findings so that they:

a. Find a viable & suitable answer that avoids the bean counters having to spend money.
b. Find a viable & suitable answer that does not embarrass the people at the top who have done nothing to sort out this and other problems, that they are fully aware of.
c. Find a suitable answer to avoid litigation against the MOD for failure in 'Duty of Care' which does seem to be lacking in this and other aircraft types.
d. Delay findings untill the MR2 out of service date deadline for making modifications, that was mentioned in an earlier thread, has passed.
e. Or hopefully that this time the actual truth, as best as can be with the evidence, will be delivered and something done about it to avoid another accident.

[buoy15]

Safety Helmut
I have read the BoI for XV666 - as an aside, I took the photo that was on the cover of the report - the starter motor inadvertantly engaged and wound up outside it's design limits, shearing off the retaining nut which then ripped through the engine compartment into the fuel tanks, causing the fire
There had been many reports over the years of starter motor lights "flickering on" during flight, hence the modification - why 666 was not modified during it's major is a mystery - it should have been picked up on its pre-major survey
Tappers Dad
I am no longer a Captain, and in my last post, I intended the brief to be a hypothetical situation which would illustrate to this audience the ramifications of a Captain making such a brief - ie - he would no longer be a Captain despite having the balls to protect his crew
However, the answer you seek is in that brief, because in the event of a Bomb Bay fire, you are in the pooh, unless of course you are in the circuit, as was XV257, and you could get round and down in 2mins 57secs and walk away
SAR kit and torpedoes on fire can be jettisoned - a fuel fire, 'possibly' could be blown out by opening the doors, but that has to be balanced against feeding the fire with a rush of air - much like a blacksmiths furnace
Unfortunately, in the Release to Service, it's not possible to conduct Bomb Bay fire trials for obvious reasons, so design features and procedures are incorporated to negate that risk
However, as mentioned on this and other threads, technology exists where a space the size of the Nimrod Bomb Bay could be overwhelmed with an inert gas (Halon) to douse a fire but that would involve weight, size and expense
Every ac component has a 'life' with a built-in safety factor and is checked according to DA standards for the environment in which it's designed to operate - ie - a grommet, gusset, seal etc may be lifed for 2000 hours and is to be replaced at 1200 - ok in a temperate climate - but sustained exposure to 39 degrees+ for months on end may cause them to perish before their shelf life is up - these components are time related and may be hidden from view, so are not included in an AF/BF schedule, although they may have failed:ooh:
In my humble opinion, Murphy's Law and Sod's Law creeps into this tragic XV230 incident - I have no doubts that Al Squires was happy to accept a perfectly serviceable ac for that sortie, complete it, and bring his crew safely home - and now we all have the benefit of hindsight - wow!!
I'll tell you all something - if it had been me looking down that Bomb Bay periscope, I would have been extremely worried, and even now, long after the event, I'm still not sure how I would have briefed the crew to instill confidence, knowing they were in serious trouble
Re-covening the BoI has Alistair Campbell plastered all over it
And oh! how I despise that man

[JFZ90]

Yours is the first time that I have seen a comment that the FI installation was extensively re-engineered - not that this would necessarily meet all of the relevant standards, and carrying out a safety analysis is little use if its results were not to be implemented - were they?

I'm only going by what others who appear to have the credentials to know have reported - I have no direct knowledge of Nimrod AAR. I do not think they are making it up as their testimony, to me, is entirely convincing for a number of reasons that make it clear they are who they claim to be.

As I've said earlier, adherence to standards is no guarantee of safety, and it should be remembered that safety analysis typically occurs in parallel to design activities, in such a way that safety drivers and features will be an integral part of the design. Failure modes would be considered during the design and mitigated. My experience is that our industry are responsible and diligent in this respect. Safety analysis in this correct sense therefore is not a 'bolt on' activity afterwards when expensive to change design decisions have been taken. Furthermore this does not preclude 3rd party assessment either, both in terms of an Independant Safety Assessor (ISA - or its 1970/80/90s 'equivalent') being involved during design reviews, and also of course having your boscombe down types reviewing design reviews as well. I have no direct knowledge but feel fairly safe to assume this kind of safety analysis would have occured during any AAR re-engineering.

All of this aside having seen how the Chinook BOI was "manipulated" (which I will happily justify in a PM if you wish) I am, like everyone else, very suspicious of the reasons for the continuing delays!

Would like to hear more of your views on this, though to be honest my views on Mull/Chinook are, and I'm afraid some may not like this, is a 99.99% probability that the crew flew a Chinook that was operating normally to all intents and purposes into the Mull. There is much debate on the remote technicality that it could be something else, but when you look at the big picture it is extremely unlikely. I must stress that this is not to say that I agree with the negligence verdict for a number of reasons, but this is a different issue to the airworthiness of the aircraft in question and the bearing this had on the crash (i.e. to all intents and purposes from the balance of evidence available, absolutely none).

[covec]

JB & Tuc

Thank you both for the replies: I was curious as to what formalised engineering decision processes (eg risk assessments) might follow post-accident before allowing an aircraft to fly again.

I had to ask some questions here as my family are not happy about my work now and people at work might take the mick!

I think that I will wait for the BOI now.

[Safety_Helmut]

Bouy15
The aircraft we are discussing was XW666, you talk with seeming authority, unfortunately, you’re wrong in the detail, and more importantly, wrong in your conclusions.

First the detail. Yes there had been a history over the years of ‘flickering’ lights, but these I believe were Air Start Valve (ASV) indications. It was a short on the engine wiring loom of XW666 which caused an Air Start Valve to open, this was indicated on the flight deck by a warning light. This allowed air to go to the starter motor which ran up under no load. Before it’s design maximum rpm, a retaining nut failed. Now this is the real detail. The retaining nut failed because of hydrogen embrittlement, this failure mode had been identified about 10 to 15 years before, on at least two occasions. A modification programme had been instigated to ensure that all starter motor retaining nuts were replaced. This was nothing to do with flickering ASV lights, it was because starter motors could fail before their design maximum rpm. If they failed, as XW666 showed, the effects could be catastrophic.

Now your conclusions:

why 666 was not modified during it's major is a mystery - it should have been picked up on its pre-major survey

A mystery ? This aircraft had been flying for at least 10 years since the failure mode had been identified, it would have been through at least 2 major cycles. That would be 2 majors, 2 minor stars, 4 minors and 8 primary servicings, minimum, and you talk about pre-major surveys and mystery. I haven’t included engine changes. Following the accident the fleet was checked and others found with similar wiring problems, others too with the pre-mod starter motors fitted. So don’t talk about mystery. This was a failure of management, it was a failure of the airworthiness and safety management system. In typical fashion, the BOI does not pay proper attention to this.

In my humble opinion, Murphy's Law and Sod's Law creeps into this tragic XV230 incident

Murphy’s Law and Sod’s Law ? what kind of excuses are these ? As so many on here have debated, this situation seems to have been foreseeable. Certainly any reasonably robust safety analysis would have identified the hazards and the risks associated. You’ve even identified some of the failure modes yourself – possible early failure of seals etc due to exposure to excessive ambient temperatures. Yet you still refer to Murphy and Sod.

Please, leave the engineering to engineers !

S_H

[AC Ovee]

Safety Helmut,
I agree to some extent with your thoughts on the nut on the end of the starter motor on XV666. However, the failure of the nut was not the cause. The nut was/is/will never be expected, under normal conditions, to stop the turbine from coming off the end of the shaft. An automatic speed sensitive device is supposed to close off the air supply at an rpm below which the turbine would overstress the nut. Neither was it the speed sensitive device which failed. Within the same loom on the engine a live wire, operating the engine anti-icing valve (which had just been selected on) short circuited to the wire directly powering the air valve solenoid and bypassed the speed sensitive device. Therefore, the air valve opened, and remained open, and ran up the turbine, uncontrollably, to the point that the nut at the end of the shaft was stressed beyond its capabilities and the turbine came off. Its arguable whether or not a newer, or modified, nut would have retained the turbine, in that circumstance, but the fact is that the root cause was the short circuit bypassing the air valve control system.

[larssnowpharter]

ACOVEE:
Sir, with the greatest respect, it seems that you know little about current methodologies for Root Cause Analysis if you make the statement:
fact is that the root cause was the short circuit bypassing the air valve control system
From my reading of this thread, it seems that this was a known fault that was not dealt with. It would therefore lead me to believe that Safety Helmut has it absolutely right when he says that:
This was a failure of management
When the valve opened (or the nut failed) this would have been a first level causal factor.
Although it is a long time since I wore a blue uniform, it also seems clear from the various reports that I read here that BOIs are still failing to identify ‘Root Causes’ in the proper sense of the phrase.
Perhaps it is time to examine the BOI system.

[tucumseh]

larssnowpharter

Spot on.

It is my understanding that BOIs are not permitted to make recommendations or comments concerning political policy. In the same way that, under the GEMS suggestions scheme, anything relating to MoD policy or politics is automatically rejected. (I once submitted a suggestion that funding should be made available to routinely maintain safety and airworthiness, and should be applied retrospectively. I cited examples of unsafe aircraft and equipment where the root cause was withdrawal of funding. It was thrown out. Still got my copy).

If you look at the BOI reports on any of the incidents mentioned here, none of them go far enough.

[Winco]

buoy15

Sir, might I just refer you to something you wrote earlier, where you said the following:

'which would illustrate to this audience the ramifications of a Captain making such a brief - ie - he would no longer be a Captain despite having the balls to protect his crew'

Now thereby lies perhaps the biggest problem that we have here. You are 100% correct with that statement, in that if you ever did 'scrub' a mission, your flying career would be over in days, if not hours.

There is the famous story of the E-3 Captain who scrubbed a Bosnia mission on the grounds that he and his crew were too tired, as they had been unable to sleep during the day due to building work in the hotel. He scrubbed on flight safety grounds and also to highlight the need for the blunties to relocate his crew to a 'quiet' hotel. The result was that he was removed from the fleet within a couple of weeks.

I would also agree entirely with you in your following statement:

'technology exists where a space the size of the Nimrod Bomb Bay could be overwhelmed with an inert gas (Halon) to douse a fire but that would involve weight, size and expense'

I think that is pretty much what I had said earlier about todays military aircraft being made as safe as possible. MR4 will not have a bomb bay fire suppressant for one reason only, and that is COST. Just because they are miltary aircraft, should not be a reason to deny them the latest kit to fight perhaps our greatest enemy in the air - FIRE. MR4 will no doubt have the very latest in electronics, avionics and goodness knows what else. I think that it should also have an up-to-date fire fighting system. Especially in an area where there have been problems in the past. I will refrain from commenting further on the AAR system.

Lastly Sir, Murpheys Law and Sods law do not exist in todays aviation world, not even in the military. We might have got away with them 10, 15 20 years ago, but not today. I doubt if you or I or indeed anyone would accept either of them as a just reason for the death of a loved one.

[betty swallox]

I have held back for a while on this thread, but find I no longer can.
Winco, you state;
"Now thereby lies perhaps the biggest problem that we have here. You are 100% correct with that statement, in that if you ever did 'scrub' a mission, your flying career would be over in days, if not hours."
As an ex-MR2 captain I, and no doubt others reading your comments, feel insulted. Moreover, if you are insinuating that on the day of the tragic demise of XV230 the captain, known very well to me, didn't scrub because of his flying career, well, words cannot express my sentiments. Certainly nothing printable here.
I insist that you clarify.

[Winco]

Betty,
Please explain why you are getting so irrate with my responce to what buoy15 said? Why are you not asking him to explain his comments to you?
The comments came from him Sir, NOT me. I was merely agreeing with him!

I did not suggest for a second or in any way that the captain of XV230 didn't scrub because of his career, and you should stop reading more into peoples' postings than is actually there.

I am also an ex MR2 captain, and I am well aware of the pressures on captains, especially in 'wartime' to complete the mission at all costs. That is not to say that anyone did or would, but as buoy15 says (another ex MR2 Captain) 'he would no longer be a Captain despite having the balls to protect his crew'

Might I suggest you direct your question to him and not me? Maybe he will be able to give you a more 'current' answer than me.

[betty swallox]

Winco...
I'm not an angry young man, and not getting irate.
P'raps I'm missing the point, but I can't seem to find the quote from buoy15...
I'm just reading between the lines of what is said; maybe I have taken you out of context. If so, apologies...the last thing I want is a Winco/Wigan Warrier type exchange!

Having said that, I agree with his sentiments in waiting for the BOI. But I know I will get flak for saying this again.

[Winco]

Betty,
No apologies needed Sir, I was simply agreeing with the comments from a fellow ex Nimrod Captain.
The Winco

[camelspyyder]

Winco, sorry, THE Winco

Glad to have you back on thread, I thought you might be sulking after being the only one to bite on the anonymous has-beens hook.

On a lighter note, I refused to fly last night because of chronic fatigue - does this mean I will get a dream ticket away from MR2 in the next 2 months?

CS

[camelspyyder]

Winco

You Know the saying:

If the (MOSS BROS) cap fits...

[Tappers Dad]

camelspyyder
I understand you are not the only one who has refused to fly lately either.

Some one out in Afgahanistan also refused.
There must be an epidemic starting.

[L1A2 discharged]

The Winco, sorry, I don't agree with this Lastly Sir, Murpheys Law and Sods law do not exist in todays aviation world, not even in the military. We might have got away with them 10, 15 20 years ago, but not today. I doubt if you or I or indeed anyone would accept either of them as a just reason for the death of a loved one
events based on the old Murphys / Sods laws do still occur, it is just that such events are now identified under 'human factors'.
DASC (and the CAA for our non-military bretheren) do some marvellous courses - get on them to see what is available to minimise these events happening, and to drive down the rate. Rarely does someone go to work to do a bad job, unhappily the errror rate is fairly constant. The major event rate is also fairly constant, as a % of all events.
If the growth in flying continues at the same rate as recently, with the same error rate, aviation - civilian and military -will be killing thousands more people each year. The challenge is to identify, track and eradicate errors by assisting people all through the chain of events to do so in an open 'no blame' culture. If / when someone makes an honest mistake they should be encouraged to own up to it in order to reduce the chances of a similar event being repeated. There is a place for a robust disciplinary system for abusers, thankfully 'we' don't have too many in the organisation. :ok:

[Chugalug2]

There is a place for a robust disciplinary system for abusers, thankfully 'we' don't have too many in the organisation

And when the abusers of the system are 4*, what place for them in your robust military system, LIA2?

[betty swallox]

Chugalug2
Not sure I understand. Please explain. Thank you

[Winco]

L1A2
Sir, I bow to your knowledge of the system but my problem is the same as Chugalug2 I think. I don't believe this is an aircrew problem, nor do I think it is a groundcrew/servicing problem.
The problem lies at the top of the RAF food chain, where very senior officers are out of touch with the reality of continually flying an aircraft that has passed the 'sell-by' date.

Aircraft Captains are reluctant to scrub for the reasons given earlier, and I have sympathy with that. Your comments about a 'no blame culture I would entirely agree with, but I think you are preaching to the converted here. There is nothing that will gain you more respect from your fellow aviators than standing up at a de-brief and saying 'sorry guys, I screwed up there, I made a mistake!' I

t takes an enormous amount of courage and humbleness to do that, even in front of colleagues and friends, but the rewards are equally large. I don't ever, in all my life, seem to recall a very senior officer standing up and saying 'sorry' for anything, does anyone else?

camelspyyder, I haven't really been away or sulking, I've just been a little more careful perhaps! I'm sorry you had to scrub last night, and I am genuingly concerned that you (and presumably your colleagues) are feeling that fatigued that you needed to canx. I'm not sure it will get you a ticket home or out of the fleet, but I'm certain your fellow aviators have even more respect for you than they did before. Did your Captain not notice the fatigue appearing within his crew? There's more to being a good Captain than just good flying and tactics. Perhaps he should go on one of those human factors courses? Do the Air Force still have such things or have they been canx also through lack of funds? Either way, I wish you well and hope you will be feeling better soon, and back on the front line. Best wishes

The Winco

[Chugalug2]

Not sure I understand. Please explain. Thank you

The question was short, and I thought, unambiguous. LIA2 mentioned the robustness of the "military system" while alluding to the civilian one. In the latter CEO's may, and sometimes have, acted inappropriately. The words "dirty" and "tricks" come to mind, for example. When exposed they invariably develop a strong desire to spend more time with their families and/or roses. What they cannot do, IMHO, is to interfere with the system of Flight Safety and Airworthiness, for that lays in the hands of a separate authority and beyond their control. No such arrangement, IMHO, protects your "robust military system". Hence my question re 4*s.

[tucumseh]

L1A2

“The challenge is to identify, track and eradicate errors by assisting people all through the chain of events to do so in an open 'no blame' culture”.


I agree with this, but with caveats. The people in the chain of events (the safety/airworthiness chain in this case) must be properly trained and qualified to do their respective jobs, and their letters of delegation must clearly define their remit.

As I said earlier, there is no place in this chain for people who do not satisfy these criteria and conduct their business outside that remit. If someone, with no training or delegated authority whatsoever, makes a decision and signs-off on safety/airworthiness or technical and financial approval, purely on the premise “I’m more senior to you, so I must be right”; then I’m afraid he’s certifiable and should be removed from any position of authority. Likewise, anyone who condones this.

In saying this, I should concede that I have it in writing from 2*, 4* and various Ministers that I’m wrong. In turn, they concede I’m entitled to my opinion, but must accept the disciplinary consequences. No blame?

[L1A2 discharged]

Gents (I presume), Winco, tecumseh et al,

No snags with your comments on the premise we should be operating under, a more full explaination would take many pages but perhaps I should have said 'a robust and just culture'. e.g nail the reckless and the careless, ensure (as has been said above) that all personnel in the chain are properly trained, qualified, competent and authorised. With relevant checks and balances.

Regards L1

[Chugalug2]

What checks and balances do the head honchos operate under L1A2? My question concerning 4*s remains unanswered. Is it perhaps unanswerable? When those who get "nailed" include the likes of Tucumseh...

In saying this, I should concede that I have it in writing from 2*, 4* and various Ministers that I’m wrong. In turn, they concede I’m entitled to my opinion, but must accept the disciplinary consequences. No blame?

....I begin to take more interest in those doing the nailing, rather than those that they have nailed! In short sir, and with all due respect, I suspect that your system sucks, and in the case of front line fleets more likely detracts from Flight Safety and Airworthiness, rather than enhances them.

[Tappers Dad]

http://news.scotsman.com/uk.cfm?id=1066722007
MoD refuses request to fit Nimrods with new safety system
Mon 9 Jul 2007 The Scotsman
JAMES KIRKUP

DEFENCE chiefs have refused an RAF request to fit its Nimrod aircraft with an early-warning system that might have prevented a near-fatal incident.
The decision has caused unease among airmen, who fear that the ageing Scottish-based spyplanes are increasingly vulnerable to technical failures.
In November 2004, a Nimrod flying from RAF Kinloss in Moray developed a crack in a super-heated air pipe.
The rupture in flight XV227's Supplementary Cooling Pack caused air heated to around 230C to blast against the airframe of the plane, burning through cables and metal.
Seals around the plane's fuel tanks were also damaged, sparking fears of an explosion.
Crucially, the crew of flight XV227 had no indication of a leak while they were in the air - it was only discovered after they returned to their Moray base.
An internal investigation into the 2004 incident by Kinloss commanders last year recommended that all Nimrods be fitted with a warning system to inform pilots and crew about possible future incidents.
But the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has rejected the inquiry's safety recommendation as unnecessary and impractical.
In its formal response to the Kinloss team's request for an air-pipe warning mechanism, the MoD has ruled that there is no need for the new safety system.
"The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected," the MoD said, adding that Nimrod air ducts are expected to last "well beyond" the planes' expected retirement date, early in the next decade.
The ministry also raised practical objections to an upgrade.
"Fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody," the MoD said.
Since the Nimrods are close to retirement, the MoD ruled "the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable".
As a result, the Kinloss inquiry team's recommendation has now been marked "closed".
But the MoD's conclusion that the hot air leak was an "isolated incident" has been challenged.
In September 2006, another Nimrod, flight XV230 from Kinloss, exploded over Afghanistan, killing all 14 people aboard. A formal investigation is due to report soon, but reports have suggested the plane was brought down by leaking fuel that ignited.
However, one Scottish-based RAF source suggested an air pipe rupture was another possible cause: "What if 230C air was to be blasted from a broken duct against a fuel pipe/tank?"

[RCOV 2 ENG]

I know it is of little significance, but I do not think that the Supplementary Cooling Pack ( SCP ) will be cleared again for operation on the MR2 fleet!
That is maybe why there will be no safety devices procured for it.
I know that we are all waiting on the board of inquiry, so I am not going to guess what did happen to " 30 ", but what has been mentioned already, is a possibility. I would also like clarification that sa18 was definitely not a player!
RIP Guys. I think about you all. God speed!
Minzastella

[buoy15]

RCOV 2 ENG
If you check the flight envelope for the SA18 and the height and location the crew were at after refuel, that should answer your question - poss low 4
The SCP safety device is already fitted - it's an ON/OFF switch left in the OFF position with the CB (power supply) tripped and collared - in which case, it will then be annotated in the F700, as not cleared for use
So yes, your post was of little significance, if this makes you feel better:suspect:

[Chugalug2]

My posts on this thread point to the Achilles heel of the RAF Airworthiness and Flight Safety system, whereby its objectiveness is fundamentally compromised by the way it can be subject to interference and misdirection by those in command of the RAF, unlike their civilian counterparts who are under the direction of an independent authority. That contention has yet to be denied. This may or may not have been of significance historically, but in these days of a major part of the RAF being at war, while being under unprecedented financial and manpower restrictions, it is surely a cause of great concern now. Interestingly that leadership is being criticised in a similar way on the "parliamentary" thread re Hercules ESF, and is of course the immovable object in the fight to restore the reputations of the Mull Chinook pilots. It seems all roads are leading to the offices of those at the very top of the RAF. We need to speak the unspeakable if we are to see that leadership exercise some of its most important responsibilities, making the RAF fit for the wars it is fighting!

[Tappers Dad]

Could someone tell me by PM what the FRC Red Card drill is for Bomb Bay fires please. It is mentioned in a report I have.
Thanks

[Tappers Dad]

Where are a the spares for Nimrods ? Well on Ebay of course !!!!

http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/RAF-Nimrod-Aircraft-Nav-instrument-gague-unit_W0QQitemZ130115289990QQihZ003QQcategoryZ2983QQcmdZViewI tem

RAF Nimrod Aircraft Nav instrument gague unit

http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/Fuel-Gauge-Comet-Nimrod-VC10-N-O-S_W0QQitemZ230125549640QQihZ013QQcategoryZ2983QQrdZ1QQssPage NameZWD1VQQcmdZViewItem (http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/Fuel-Gauge-Comet-Nimrod-VC10-N-O-S_W0QQitemZ230125549640QQihZ013QQcategoryZ2983QQrdZ1QQssPage NameZWD1VQQcmdZViewItem)

Fuel Gauge - Comet/Nimrod/VC10 - N.O.S


http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/newhtml_hl?DB=semukparl&STEMMER=en&WORDS=nimrod&ALL=&ANY=&PHRASE=&CATEGORIES=&SIMPLE=nimrod&SPEAKER=&COLOUR=red&STYLE=s&ANCHOR=70716w0006.htm_wqn1&URL=/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070716/text/70716w0006.htm#70716w0006.htm_wqn116

July 2007

Mr. Harper: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many times a (a) C17A Globemaster, (b) Hercules C-130K, (c) Hercules C-130J, (d) Tristar, (e) VC-10 and (f) Nimrod MR2 has been cannibalised for spare parts. [148270]

Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The removal of serviceable parts from one aircraft for use on another is a routine and temporary measure to ensure that the maximum number of aircraft are available to the front line.
The number of these instances over the last 12 months (June 2006-May 2007), by donor aircraft, is given in the following table.


Aircraft type Number of cannibalisations
C17 25

C130J 781

C130K 156

TriStar 188

VC10 116

Nimrod MR2 307

[Da4orce]

23 July 2007 : Column 687W

Nimrod Aircraft

Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made on the Nimrod MRA4 project against the original timetable for work; what effect the time taken on the project has had on the future of the Nimrod MRA4 trainer facility in Kinloss; and if he will make a statement. [149571]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The current forecast In Service date for Nimrod MRA4 is 2010 against an original expectation of 2003 when the contract was let in 1996. The MRA4 training facility has been developed concurrently with the aircraft; the extended development programme for the aircraft has allowed risk to be removed from the training facility development programme through more extensive testing being conducted on site at RAF Kinloss by BAE Systems, assisted by the MOD.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what problems have been encountered with (a) the software and (b) operation of the MRA4 trainer facility at Kinloss; and if he will make a statement. [149572]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility is currently in the design and development phase. It is a sophisticated system which will provide training for aircrew and groundcrew operating one of the most complex weapon systems in the RAF. The recent, extensive, post-commissioning testing has, as intended, identified anomalies in the software which integrates the numerous and complex systems that make up the simulators. These have been addressed and the corrective actions will be consolidated during the planned upgrade of the simulators to the production delivery standard.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the lifetime budget is for the MRA4 trainer at Kinloss. [149573]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility does not have a separate budget. The costs of development and production of the facility form part of the prime contract with BAE Systems for the provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. The costs of the operation and maintenance of the training facility will form part of the contract for the future support of the weapon system, which has yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions departmental Ministers have had with BAE Systems on progress on the MRA4 trainer; and when such discussions took place. [149575]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: There have been no specific discussions between departmental Ministers and BAE Systems over progress on the Nimrod MRA4 training facility.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much has been spent from the public purse on the development of the Nimrod MRA4 since his announcement of the decision to procure the aircraft. [149576]
23 July 2007 : Column 688W

Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Total design and development costs for Nimrod MRA4 to date are some £1.73 billion of which about £215 million has been incurred since the production contract was signed in July 2006.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the running costs of the Nimrod MRA4 trainers at Kinloss have been since the project commenced. [149580]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nimrod MRA4 training facility is currently in the design and development phase, the costs of which form part of the contract with BAE Systems for the provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. Contractual arrangements for operating and maintaining the training system have therefore yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the length is of the contract with BAE Systems for the Nimrod MRA4 trainer at Kinloss; and what contractual provisions are in place to deal with the circumstances where the system does not work. [149582]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The development and production of the Nimrod MRA4 training facility forms part of the prime contract with BAE Systems for the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system. The contract requires the training system to replicate the standard of the first production aircraft and it will only be contractually accepted by MOD when it has successfully completed extensive testing to prove that it will function appropriately. The contract contains default provisions which could be implemented if the system did not meet the contractual requirement. Contractual arrangements for the operation and maintenance of the training facility have yet to be negotiated.
Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has allocated further funds to the Nimrod MRA4 trainer facility at Kinloss to assist its development and against contingencies. [149583]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Development and production of the Nimrod MRA4 training facility forms part of the overall prime contract with BAE Systems for provision of the overall Nimrod MRA4 weapon system and will be funded from the provision made for that contract. No additional funding has been allocated to that contract as a contingency provision for the training system.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070723/text/70723w0009.htm#column_687W

[Tappers Dad]

I understand there was once a fire suppression system fitted in the Bomb bay. Can anyone remember this and if so why it was removed??

PS Ben's brother gets married today.:D

[Headstone]

Apart from continuing the sport of BWoS and MRA4 bashing, although some may compare this sport to shooting fish in a barrel, what did comment 873 from Da4orce achieve?
I can't see how finding out how much money has been spent on the contract or the training simulator will help with finding out the causes of the crash of XV230 and help the families in any way or did I miss something?

[JFZ90]

Headstone - it proved that the questioner was chasing up a blind alley and clearly knew sod all about what he was trying to find out about. All the answers were quite reasonable, and what you'd expect. The only "better" way to do it from a procurement point of view would be to combine development, production and in-service into 1 contract to give MoD the best negotiating position, but given the volatility of the overall programme (how many are we buying etc.) this was almost certainly unrealistic/unlikely to be in the MoDs best interest, and therefore they have almost certainly taken the best approach in the circumstances.

It does usefully prove that many of the "stone throwers" at these kind of programmes are ill-informed mud rakers who should be treated on such occassions with a large amount of contempt.

[Shack37]

Tapper's Dad,
I hope the wedding and the day went well.
Good luck to the happy couple.
s37

[Chugalug2]

TD, just to second Shack37s sentiments, and to wish the very best to the newly weds. I'm sorry that no one seems willing or able to answer your questions. If it is of any consolation mine aren't being answered either. You don't think that the word has gone out by any chance? Well a nod is as good as a wink, so I'll keep on asking, as I'm sure you will!
Regards Chug

[betty swallox]

JFZ90, Headstone.

Ah yes. It's been a few weeks since the MRA4 chaps have had a bashing etc on pprune. I agree that the comments in 873 have ABSOLUTELY nothing to do with 230. But, well, that's how it goes on here. I'm struggling to understand what this post has contributed to the thread; guess I'm missing something too...

[Tappers Dad]

Chugalug2
Yes I think the word has gone out, however I am getting information sent to me some of which is very disturbing. Such as "This is the third ac with fuel leak issues post AAR sorties" and also I understand that an ac had a fuel line rupture whilst refuelling on the day after the crash.

[tucumseh]

I, too, wondered at the questions. I know little of Nimrod MR so can only assume there is a valid underlying reason. Now if the same questions had been asked about a related programme, initiated at the same time, within the same Directorate General, with a fraction of the resources and a more demanding timescale, the answers would have been illuminating, and gone something like this…. The programme was delivered to time and cost, and a better performance than requested by the Customer. The Customer did not ask for, or make financial provision for, a training facility. Lacking this, meeting the ISD would be impossible, as the aircraft could not be deemed operational without trained aircrew. Nevertheless, and despite the direction of senior staff (1* and above), who were completely ignored (a common feature in successful MoD programmes, certainly under that DG) the training facility was delivered and the ISD met. Lesson? There are people in MoD who can do this for fun, and get it right every time with effortless competence. Instead of treating them as “an embarrassment to the department” why not learn from them?


Mr Liddell-Grainger seems to have inherited his predecessors’ tendency to sign without first reading. (That he doesn’t actually understand his responses I take as read). In isolation, the questions and answers mean little. When compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths. I’m sure the monies wasted on Nimrod could have been put to use elsewhere.

[JFZ90]

When compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths.

Not sure I understand - are you suggesting that buying Apaches (is this what you mean?) without a coherent training system acquisition in parallel to the core aircraft development / production programme was a better way of doing things than the answers quoted for MRA4? I don't follow - please explain.

[tucumseh]

JFZ90

Not talking about Apache - that was a relatively simple programme. No conversion / modification programme to worry about, and no operational capability to maintain during fleet conversion, which is where detail and the devil lurk, and which always causes problems if you don't get the properly trained people. The Apache Customer recognised the need to train aircrew and made proper materiel and financial provision. The trouble was PE (at the 1* and 2* level I mentioned - same ones) followed current political dogma and entered into PFI contracting knowing precisely what the outcome would be - delay. Ask why the other programme didn't go PFI, at precisely the same time. Answer (a) it would prevent the ISD being met (b) no firm overseas follow on sales potential - so you fill in a short application for waiver (more a statement of non-intent!) and move swiftly on.


It's like I said in previous posts. If you want to truly understand the issues being discussed here, you must write down the aircraft and equipments, and then list problems, timescales, personalities and related policies of the day. Also, identify the successful programmes and do the same thing. Then you'll see the common denominators and solutions.

[Chugalug2]

In isolation, the questions and answers mean little. When compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths. I’m sure the monies wasted on Nimrod could have been put to use elsewhere.

So there you are JFZ90 & Headstone, the answer to your questions (at least you got one!) and from a man who knows. No one AFAIK is knocking MRA4, but drawing attention to the decision making progress involved in that project, and many others. This country has the talent to do the undo able, like breaking the Nazi Enigma Codes, like creating an imaginary army in South East England poised to invade the Pas de Calais, like launching an 8000 mile counter invasion force to successfully liberate territory 400 miles off an enemy coast. But it is also capable of fiascos like the Millennium Dome, NHS computer projects, and coming shortly the 2012 Olympics (well just you wait and see!). Unfortunately the MOD appears to be well in the latter camp at the moment, with the honourable exceptions cited by Tucumseh the words P***-up and Brewery come to mind, and unlike Millennium Domes compromised aircraft can bite you!

[Tappers Dad]

For those of you who wonder why I and others question the integrity and honesty of the MOD/RAF here is an example:

Nimrod Aircraft 8 May 2007 : Column 66W

Sir Nicholas Winterton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how
many fuel leaks have been reported on Nimrod MR2 R1 aircraft in the last
six months; and if he will make a statement. [134919]


Mr. Ingram: Between the period 1 October 2006 and 31 March 2007 a total
of 25 fuel leaks were reported on Nimrod MR2 and R1 aircraft. A fuel
leak is defined as any leakage of fuel from aircraft couplings, pipes or
fuel tanks. These did not compromise the safety of the aircraft and
were rectified under normal maintenance procedures.


Yet I have proof that in October 2006 XV231 was leaking and could not be repaired in theatre or rectified under normal maintenance procedures and had to return to Kinloss without using AAR.And then was sent to the NSG depth organization for investigation.

Mr. Ingram Armed forces minister was not telling the truth

This is why I question the MOD/RAF

[Exrigger]

XV231 was one of the 25 that had a leak, it could not be fixed in theatre so flew safely all the way to RAF Kinloss without using AAR to be fixed at a MOB, this used to be the normal maintenance procedure, but no doubt I will be proved to be mistaken soon.

I fully accept that you have good reason to question the MOD/RAF about the tragic loss and applaud you wholeheartedly for your unstinting efforts for the truth and hope you find the answers that you want, and no doubt need, for some small solace for your loss and additonally for the peace of mind of those families that have family members and friends that still work/fly within the fleet. I just personally felt that the statement by Mr Ingram is not one that you needed to be side tracked from your goal for.

[JFZ90]

"In isolation, the questions and answers mean little. When compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths. I’m sure the monies wasted on Nimrod could have been put to use elsewhere."

So there you are JFZ90 & Headstone, the answer to your questions (at least you got one!) and from a man who knows.

I'm not sure how this was an answer to anything, certainly nothing to "reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths" has been expanded upon in Tucs answer, unless I'm missing something. Tuc admits freely to know nothing about Nimrod trainer issues yet goes on to imply wrong doing here because of other experiences. I'm afraid this is not useul speculation on this occassion, and rather surprising given Tucs apparent safety anaylsis / certification credentials (I may have read this wrong, but I thought this was his background). Have I missed something Tuc? If so please spell out the "unpalatable and embarrassing truths" regarding the Nimrod trainer capability.

For those of you who wonder why I and others question the integrity and honesty of the MOD/RAF here is an example:

"Sir Nicholas Winterton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many fuel leaks have been reported on Nimrod MR2 R1 aircraft in the last six months; and if he will make a statement."

"These did not compromise the safety of the aircraft and
were rectified under normal maintenance procedures."

TD : Yet I have proof that in October 2006 XV231 was leaking and could not be repaired in theatre or rectified under normal maintenance procedures and had to return to Kinloss without using AAR.And then was sent to the NSG depth organization for investigation.

Sorry TD, I don't see the contradiction here. Either you mean a) safety was compromised - hence in what way was safety compromised?, or b) normal mtn procs were not used - in what way were normal maintenance procedures not used? You imply it had go to back to Kinloss for a certain level of depth of maintenance, hence perhaps you suggest this therefore isn't normal - there is no reason why this should not be entirely "normal" or consistent for the type of fault diagnosed.

[Chugalug2]

JFZ90, far be it for me to answer on behalf of tucumseh (I would not presume to do so), but the first of your quotes is from my post, albeit quoting him and for that nebulous reason alone I feel encouraged to respond. The original question you asked was as to the relevance of an exchange re MRA4 when this thread does not concern that particular aircraft. As one who is trying to follow this and other threads, the connecting link would appear to be the MOD itself and the way that Procurement and specifically Airworthiness aspects of different types (Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook) have been or are being handled at the MOD. Tucumseh says that one can see an oft repeated pattern of shortcomings in these projects that is not thrown up due to the "stovepipe effect" deliberately created by the organisational anomalies of the MOD. This is surely the very antithesis of Flight Safety where everyone should know what anyone knows? There is a worrying miasma within the corridors of the MOD where all should be openness and transparency where Airworthiness and Flight Safety are concerned. I am concerned. TD is concerned, and so I believe are increasing numbers of people!

[JFZ90]

Chug, when referring to the trainer questions, tuc said:

In isolation, the questions and answers mean little. When
compared with other similar programmes however, they reveal unpalatable and embarrassing truths.

I interpreted this as "when you compare the Nimrod training procurement arrangements with other programmes, it isn't very good".

I don't see any evidence at all for this conclusion, however on reflection I don't think this is what Tuc meant. Infact all I think he means is he didn't agree with other decisions the 1/2*s in the same area made on other projects, hence the way they're managing the trainer is probably pants too. Not really a fair or justifiable slur if he's honest, though I understand reason for the sentiment. This is a bit surprising however as I would have thought as a safety guru he would have treated such issues on a case-by-case basis underpinned by facts, rather than assuming all decisions or approaches were flawed.

[Tappers Dad]

JFZ90
I hope you don't think I am nit picking here but to me Joe Public normal maintenance procedures means
1 Normal =an everday occurrence so you are saying its normal to fly 3900 miles to fix a fuel leak?
2.Maintenance= Carry out procedures to preserve from failure or decline not repair.So it is normal that ac out in theatre are sent back to the UK like XV231 and its normal to take up the cabin floors area.
Its normal for XV250 to have leaks so bad the ac has to be replaced in theatre .

If this is normal maintenance that god knows what state they have to be in for an unusual repair.

[Exrigger]

If this is normal maintenance that god knows what state they have to be in for an unusual repair

TD: for unusual repairs (and this would be when the aircraft is in a state beyond local normal maintenance capability and the aircraft is unsafe to fly to an MOB)the aircraft would be grounded on the spot and the repair/depth maintenance personnel would go to the aircraft and fix it in theatre. As we recognise that as a member of Joe public and do not understand what is acceptable/normal/standard procedures within the RAF, we have tried to explain the technical side to help answer your questions(when we can).

Two of us answered your comments about XV231, you have now added XV250 and talk of and its normal to take up the cabin floors area?, (the answer to which is yes, it is normal to lift flooring if what you want to check/fix what is under that flooring).

[JFZ90]

TD

I'm just trying to point out that the mtn occurances you describe could be considered normal depending on the issue.

On some cars you can change the clutch and cambelts quite easily.
On a Porsche 911, changing the clutch is an expensive invasive operation, due in part to its rear engined configuration. On a Ferrari 348, you have to take the engine out to change the cambelts. These are "normal" mtn procedures, but are quite extreme compared to other cars. This doesn't necessarily mean they are badly designed cars (though you could argue the fezza 348 is a bit of a lemon!). The difficulty of a mtn procedure will depend on many things, and some maybe fixed in theatre, some may need return to UK, some even return to the manufacturer (or manf need to send out a dedicated fix it team).

Just trying to help - don't think the various mtn levels requiring different approaches is necessarily a bad thing. Better the job is done properly at the right mtn level, rather than botched in theatre with the wrong tools / procedures!

[tucumseh]

JFZ90

To answer your questions:


“Tuc admits freely to know nothing about Nimrod trainer issues yet goes on to imply wrong doing here because of other experiences”.

I admitted I knew little (but not nothing) about Nimrod MR in the context of a lack of detailed knowledge of the RMPA / MRA4 programme, and why someone would pose the questions on the training facilities. I therefore made no direct comment on this.


“Tucs apparent safety analysis / certification credentials (I may have read this wrong, but I thought this was his background). Have I missed something Tuc?”

Well, a little. This is a bit like saying a pilot is someone who seeks permission to take off.


What I said was that, if you look beyond the apparently bland questions and answers on the Nimrod training facility, you can ascertain useful facts (not speculation) which help a better understand of the MoD system, and which can inform the likes of TD as to where to look for proper answers, and what questions to ask. There are various threads here (Mull of Kintyre, Nimrod, Hercules, Tornado/Patriot are a few) where people have vented their frustration at being continually fobbed off with half truths and outright lies from the MoD. I know little about some of these – but on others I was one of those who accurately warned of problems that later “emerged” in the BOI reports. What I can offer is an overview which wholly refutes the MoD’s standard response that problems were isolated events and completely unrelated. In this particular case (trainers) I simply commented that any problems would not be the first time, by any means, that MoD has got its knickers in a twist over aircrew / maintainer training. The common factors? Someone in the Customer organisation (not the procurers) must identify the requirement up front and make proper materiel and financial provision. MoD, as a rule, no longer does this properly or accurately, which causes financial pressure later in the programme, forcing people to take sometimes dangerous shortcuts. You do NOT initiate the Training Needs Analysis as an afterthought or, worse, take a bloody minded decision to ditch training altogether just because the Customer has forgotten to ask for it, or refused to do his job. (The other programme I mentioned). There needs to be acceptance that the ISD cannot, by definition, be met if the aircrew and maintainers are not properly trained. Training (and accompanying documentation) is a fundamental part of the airworthiness process. (Read the Mull thread – this is a prominent feature).

I say all this as if fact, but fully acknowledge that far more senior people than I think I’m wrong, and have formally ruled that, for example, it is ok to ignore all this (including airworthiness) if it inconveniently clashes with time or cost.

I find this unpalatable. If they read this, I hope they’re embarrassed. Certainly, I have been told my views are both unpalatable and embarrassing – by the very people I warned about at least three of the incidents I have mentioned. To which I say – good!

Best wishes

[Da4orce]

JFZ90 said:

Better the job is done properly at the right mtn level, rather than botched in theatre with the wrong tools / procedures!

Surely the standard of maintenance should be the same whether in theatre or on base? You seem to be implying that it isn't.

[Pontius Navigator]

Da4Force, I suspect that 'botched' was a poor choice of words but to aircrew its meaning was perfectly clear.

As has been said earlier, some repairs require in-depth engineering to undertake a complete repair. The resources in-theatre will never be to the same level as at home (they used to be when we had Maintenance Units in Malta, Cyprus, Aden and Singapore). Where resources in-theatre are sufficient to make the aircraft fit -to-fly a ferry mission back to UK then that will happen.

Where fit-to-fly is beyond local resources a small rectification party will be despatched to make the aircraft fit-to-fly. They will work to a recognised repair scheme authorised by the appropriate authority (DEA? EA? etc). This has the advantages of relieving pressure on the detachment engineers and being the most economical way to recover the aircraft.

Occasionally the repair required may be so extensive that the cost of repairing in situ will be compared with the cost of dismantling and shipping home compared with the remaining life of the airframe. With an old aircraft write-off action becomes an increasingly attractive option.

Bodge? No in these circumstances.

[Tappers Dad]

It does appear to me that normal maintenance procedures are being changed on a regular basis.

After the ruptured super-heated air pipe on Nimrod XV227 November 2004.
A unit inquiry report stated "A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts".
Ergo this was not part of the normal maintenance procedure prior to this incident.

After the fuel leak on XV255 on 3rd Sept 06 they called for a zonal inspection of of all areas between Rib 1 Port & Rib 1 Stbd every 30 days.
Again this appears this was not part of the normal maintenance procedure prior to this incident.

So when Mr. Ingram said between the period 1 October 2006 and 31 March 2007 all leaks were rectified under normal maintenance procedures I think he was incorrect.

I am sure if I ask under the FOI for reports on all those leaks I am sure I will find some of the leaks would not have been detected or rectified under normal maintenance procedures.

[Wader2]

'Normal' maintenance procedures develop over the life of an aircraft.

When new the procedures are based on generic experience and on experience gained during development and trials. As the aircraft settles in to service some routine items are found not to need checking or need checking as frequently as first thought. At the same time other items are found to need checking or checking more frequently.

Over the next few years we might have a steady state. Aircraft may then by cycled through a Major servicing and things might be discovered such that additional checks need to be introduced as normal maintenance checks, for instance checks for spillage and corrosion in the galley or toilet (don't ask).

As the aircraft ages these additions may be more frequent. In the case cited here of an event on 3 Sep and later leaks being tackled under normal maintenance procedures from 1 Oct this is not impossible. It would be difficult to prove otherwise.

[betty swallox]

So, where is this thread actually going? Is it based around XV230, the RAF in general or a slagging for Nimrod MRA4...I've got lost. It appears that all these "issues", and more, are being simply poured into the great melting pot...
May I suggest there be a clear division of effort and understanding; an MRA4 thead does exist on PPRUNE
already. May I suggest that some of the comments, mis-guided or otherwise, are directed there.
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=269867&highlight=Nimrod+MRA4

[Tappers Dad]

Betty perhaps I can help.

This thread ids called Nimrod Information / Panorama Mon 4th June (Merged) .

On Panorama they discussed the delay in the Nimrod MRA4 project and Mr. Liddell-Grainger is my MP who has a special and personal interest in the Nimrod fleet.

See http://www.bridgwatermercury.co.uk/news/bmnewsbridgwater/display.var.1582433.0.air_heros_dad_and_mp_call_for_nimrod_r eplacements.php
Air hero's dad and MP call for Nimrod replacements

[Da4orce]

Pontius thank you for your concise clarification :D

[Headstone]

Betty – thanks for the last. I am still no clearer as to why the post about MRA4 Trainer/Sim was made. How did it contribute to the loss of XV230? I thought this was all about the tragic events leading to the loss of a valuable aircraft and a fine bunch of RAF and Army people.
So lets get on with it. If you want a pop at Mr Dick Evans Black Pudding, Shipbuilding and Aeroplane Manufacturers of Lancs Ltd then there are plenty of threads. If you want or have any other Nimrod Information, I don’t know what but maybe how many pies they eat per hour then again there are loads of threads. Concentrate on the facts that pertain to MR2, include those that have a DIRECT correlation, do away with rumour, conspiracy theories and speculation and we will hopefully get an answer and stop it happening again.

[JFZ90]

Da4Force, I suspect that 'botched' was a poor choice of words but to aircrew its meaning was perfectly clear.

As has been said earlier, some repairs require in-depth engineering to undertake a complete repair. The resources in-theatre will never be to the same level as at home (they used to be when we had Maintenance Units in Malta, Cyprus, Aden and Singapore). Where resources in-theatre are sufficient to make the aircraft fit -to-fly a ferry mission back to UK then that will happen.

Where fit-to-fly is beyond local resources a small rectification party will be despatched to make the aircraft fit-to-fly. They will work to a recognised repair scheme authorised by the appropriate authority (DEA? EA? etc). This has the advantages of relieving pressure on the detachment engineers and being the most economical way to recover the aircraft.

Occasionally the repair required may be so extensive that the cost of repairing in situ will be compared with the cost of dismantling and shipping home compared with the remaining life of the airframe. With an old aircraft write-off action becomes an increasingly attractive option.

Bodge? No in these circumstances.

Thanks PN - quite right, I was not implying any botching. Just saying that a repair needs to be done with the right tools/resources. If this means it needs to go back to the UK to get them, then back to the UK it will go. Issues are properly assessed and treated accordingly. I was suggesting that NOT doing this would be "botching" the repair. You knew what I meant, but crikey you have to be careful how you phrase things here....

[Chugalug2]

Concentrate on the facts that pertain to MR2, include those that have a DIRECT correlation, do away with rumour, conspiracy theories and speculation and we will hopefully get an answer and stop it happening again.
Yes wouldn't that be nice Headstone? If only life were that simple! No more tiresome comment about MRA4, no more dragging in talk of helicopter airworthiness or Hercules ESF, and best of all no more hinting at skulduggery in the MOD! But life isn't simple, the MOD certainly isn't. You choose to discount tucumseh's post where he tells us that from his personal experience:
There are various threads here (Mull of Kintyre, Nimrod, Hercules, Tornado/Patriot are a few) where people have vented their frustration at being continually fobbed off with half truths and outright lies from the MoD. I know little about some of these – but on others I was one of those who accurately warned of problems that later “emerged” in the BOI reports. What I can offer is an overview which wholly refutes the MoD’s standard response that problems were isolated events and completely unrelated......The common factors? Someone in the Customer organisation (not the procurers) must identify the requirement up front and make proper materiel and financial provision. MoD, as a rule, no longer does this properly or accurately, which causes financial pressure later in the programme, forcing people to take sometimes dangerous shortcuts. You do NOT initiate the Training Needs Analysis as an afterthought or, worse, take a bloody minded decision to ditch training altogether just because the Customer has forgotten to ask for it, or refused to do his job. (The other programme I mentioned). There needs to be acceptance that the ISD cannot, by definition, be met if the aircrew and maintainers are not properly trained. Training (and accompanying documentation) is a fundamental part of the airworthiness process. (Read the Mull thread – this is a prominent feature).
You may choose to characterise his testimony as irrelevant to this thread, I do not. It is for others to decide what position they take. For myself all that tucumseh tells us has a "DIRECT correlation" to the loss of XV230 and the:
tragic events leading to the loss of a valuable aircraft and a fine bunch of RAF and Army people.
so, with all due respect, I shall go on posting in the same vein on this thread. I hope others do so as well.

[Tappers Dad]

Can someone tell me what an RTI/Nim/173 is and how long it has been in place ?

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks to those who sent me an answer to the above.

As I have said before "In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends."

[Biggus]

TD

RTI = routine technical instruction. Try a google search with something like "routine technical instruction RAF" and you will get some useful hits.

I'm not an engineer, but I would surmise RTI/173/Nim is the 173rd RTI for the Nimrod fleet. As to what that RTI says I haven't a clue, I haven't seen it .......................

[Tappers Dad]

Biggus
I have found out now basically it means:

RTI/NIM/173, ensures that potential sources of fuel ignition within and around the bomb bay (and panniers for the R Mark 1), including engine crossfeed and Secondary Cooling Ducts have been isolated.

Thanks anyway

[Distant Voice]

In early Sept 2006, a SFS (Serious Fault Signal) was raised citing a fuel fault on XV250, post AAR. The problem was a "well know" fuel line rupture at an attached bracket. Does anyone know when this problem first appeared?

DV

[Wg Co Bingo Handjob]

Distant Voice,

SFS for a 'well known' problem, unlikely. SFS raised for an unusual occurence or failure that the organisation that discovers it feels they should highlight to the EA. The subsequent actions are then decided upon by the IPT. The occurrence of this was probably on the date of the leak and henceforth the leak would have occured within the previous 24 hours, hardly time for it to become 'well known' even if it had a particularly busy social life!

[tucumseh]

Bingo Handjob

“SFS for a 'well known' problem, unlikely. SFS raised for an unusual occurence or failure that the organisation that discovers it feels they should highlight to the EA. The subsequent actions are then decided upon by the IPT. The occurrence of this was probably on the date of the leak and henceforth the leak would have occured within the previous 24 hours, hardly time for it to become 'well known' even if it had a particularly busy social life!”


What you describe is the “ideal”. Consider this real occurrence, one of many……


RAF station raises MF760 (Narrative Fault Report) - cracked gearbox housing.

EA completes MF760A (Fault Investigation Request).

MoD Technical Agency (named individual responsible for airworthiness / type approval of item, usually a Civil Servant engineer) approves 760A.

RAF Supply Manager (age 18.5) refuses to release money. Supported by her boss, RAF Wg Cdr. Grounds? The kit is very old. Reliability improves with age. At this stage there should be no failures. Therefore, no funding. NOTE – Non-engineers making engineering decisions.

Next cracked gearbox, Lyneham (for it was they) try again. Same result.

After many cracked gearboxes, an omnibus 760 is raised (request for investigation into multiple instances – 23 if I recall). Same result.

SFS raised against “well known” problem.

TA completely ignores financiers/suppliers, transfers money from another budget and “cracks” problem.

RAF (suppliers) demand disciplinary action against CS.

Aircraft safe.

[Wg Co Bingo Handjob]

Tucumseh

As ever you are proved correct by your example but for every horror story (completely unacceptable and having worked in that environment the frustration and sometimes, the despair at the operation of the system can be soul destroying) there are the many occasions where the system works as advertised and action is taken and follows the correct path. Highlighting the failures, and one is one too many, doesn't hide the fact that the system works everyday. As you constantly say your knowledge of the Nimrod is not complete and the suggestion from your example could easily give the impression that this instance may have followed that path but without any evidence that this was the case.

I appreciate that this is a rumour forum but many of the comments on it regarding the maintenance and safety of the Nimrod contain hugely loaded statements such as 'well known' - having worked on the Nimrod for a significant portion of the last 25 years this fault is not 'well known'.

You also post on other forums where you, correctly, highlight problems within the airworthiness chain on other platforms. However, if you have no evidence of the same events happening on this platform all it does is darken already murky waters. A generic what's wrong with the MOD thread may be more suited to your comments.

[Chugalug2]

Nice try WCBH, you are the second one on this page to suggest that this Nimrod thread should only
"Concentrate on the facts that pertain to MR2, include those that have a DIRECT correlation, do away with rumour, conspiracy theories and speculation and we will hopefully get an answer and stop it happening again", to quote Headstone.
Strange that the Chinook and Hercules threads have concerned themselves with the RAF higher command and the MOD, ie the state of the woods, in order to make sense of the condition of their particular trees. Never mind a generic thread, IMHO there is already a generic link with those other threads and that is the airworthiness of their eponymous airframes, and the generic link with that is the airworthiness authority for RAF aircraft, and the generic link with that is the MOD. If your house gets broken into every night, only concerning yourself with repairing broken windows and locks is rather missing the point, you have to start getting tough on crime (oh, and with the causes, etc etc!). It's the same here it seems to me. Airworthiness is too important to be left to the whim of Tucumseh's 18.5 year old Supply Manager, or any other individual in the food chain for that matter. We already have a respected and proven Airworthiness Authority in this country. Time to call on them to fix this problem, generic or otherwise!

[tucumseh]

Bingo


Thank you. I accept what you say, in part. I was going to say I didn’t claim this example happened on Nimrod (clearly I was referring to Hercules) but then I remembered the equipment was common across a number of types and, yes, it was fitted to MR1. That is, a Nimrod (or Andover, VC10, Dominie or Jetstream at the time) could have had the same problem. It just so happens Lyneham workshops spotted the problem first.


My point, and Chug makes the same one very well, is that if you ask a given IPT “How many problems have you had on such and such”, they may answer “one” and the MoD immediately says “isolated case”. But if you ask the question (mandated for 760s) “What about affected aircraft, equipment or contractors” the answer may be more than one. That is, not isolated, but a potentially critical trend. Stovepiped IPTs, and the demise of centralised support for maintaining the build standard of equipment (coupled with no money to do it anyway) conveniently hide these trends and make the MoD’s argument seem plausible to those who do not understand the “system”. And such a system means each IPT must contribute financially to the solution, and invariably don’t have the funding.

No, I may not know a lot about the Nimrod airframe but please don’t use that as a reason for dismissing what I say. Here’s another example, which I’ve mentioned before, but nobody likes discussing. Aircraft type A is fitted with a system which the equipment project office has (knowingly, and with 2* support) failed to integrate properly, rendering it unfit for purpose (unsafe). Given this project office is responsible for all such equipment, fitted to the vast majority of aircraft, the “affected aircraft, equipment and contractors” question is asked (by Aircraft A IPT, which is a failure of process and duty of care, as the equipment office shouldn’t need to be told). Specifically, two 2*s are separately advised to order all such systems checked for proper integration and safe function. They ignore this. As does 4*. Some time later Aircraft type B is shot down (2 dead) and the BOI recommends said system “should be integrated”, as if they’ve just worked it out.

To get to the truth you must ask the right question. There is no point asking about Aircraft A. The IPT will say “Isolated case, it was fixed”. Clearly, the BOI for Aircraft B did not dig deeper, as their recommendation only applied to that type. Again, this is a process failure; either the BOI should have looked wider and deeper, or if that wasn’t in their remit they should have recommended such action to the appropriate authority (who’d already refused). They didn’t. Notably, the BOI must have been complicit in burying the fact that this was not an isolated failure of process, but a clear trend which had been identified years previously. And I haven’t mentioned the Coroner’s role. Based on the verdict, he clearly didn’t know the truth.

The point I’m making is that if you study supposedly isolated cases on, say, Chinook, Tornado, Hercules, Nimrod etc you will find trends. (It doesn’t have to apply to all cases, just two or more). I do understand that, quite naturally, people have their own agendas on these aircraft. My advice is, if you find an area of concern, do not jump in and ask a singular question of MoD; rather, seek advice from those looking at the other cases to see if there is commonality. That is, ask the affected aircraft, equipment or contractors question. This restricts the MoD’s room for manoeuvre.

[Distant Voice]

Well WCBH, how about this for fact.

"The detection of a cracked fuel pipe on a 3rd aircraft (XV255) on 4th Sept 2006 (incident happened on 3rd, according to SFS) is well know to the ITP and this matter was addressed by UTI, RTI and F760 action as part of the initial reaction to the aircraft crash. Signed Nim ITPL"

Implication is that it was known about before the crash.

DV

[covec]

Guys

Dunno if this helps....but I is serving out "here" again (thanks politicians & Islamist fascist c**ts) and have done loads of tankin'...no probs.

It maybe that AAR is a "red herring" and that the entire fuel system(!) maybe "fragile" BUT again - we have had no probs.

It could also be that there was a "typical" Flight Safety chain of events that led to this appalling accident.

And yes, I know what it is like to lose someone in the family due to an accident. In my case legally proved to have been avoidable.

[MightyHunter AGE]

DV

The point you make about the fault being well known about by the IPT is void.

This WAS a well known fault only by the implementation of the UTI and inspections being carried out to find other faults, that is what a UTI is there for.

If it had of been known about beforehand then there would have been structured maintenance in place to rectify such a problem before any aircraft was released for flight.

The fact the IPT are saying (if your information is correct) that it was well know could very well have been from the inspections carried out all in one day, once they are found of course they know about it because we report any faults straight to the IPT.

[Tappers Dad]

MightyHunter AGE
I recieved this under the FOI

"Using the DASC database we have compiled a list of recorded incident reports on the Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, which consists of 2496 individual records".

"Aircraft incidents, are categorised as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard and these are recorded by the Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC)".

"Faults identified while the aircraft is on the ground would normally be reported and rectified in accordance with laid-down maintenance and repair procedures, and therefore these faults would not form part of the aircraft incident records held by DASC".

Lets see thats 2496 divided by 20yrs=124.8 incidents a year that resulted in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard.Thats 2 a week.

I am being generous there as well because we all know there have not been 20 ac in the fleet for some time. Makes you think eh !!

[tucumseh]

“recorded incident reports”



Remember that, in the early 90s, funding to investigate equipment faults was largely withdrawn and instructions issued to Engineering Authorities to limit the number of MF760s raised. That set off a chain reaction. Fewer 760s, less spent on investigations, “surplus” money at end of FY, funding cut for next year - so when EA raised a 760 there was less money to spend on maintaining the build standard, which includes safety. (See my previous posts – related to that. Same people made the decision). I wonder if an omnibus report counts as 1? Or if the DASC database contains only a sample?

[Headstone]

Okay tucsemeh you win – I withdraw from this thread and will make no more comment or even read it. I, along with many others, thought that this thread was all about finding answers about the Nimrod crash and help TD and the others in some way. However many of the recent posts have been from people who by their OWN admission know nothing about the causes of the crash, know nothing about the MR2, know nothing about the Training System for the MRA4 but are quite happy to attempt to broaden the thread and post questions and theories. They do nothing to help find out what went wrong and you have no proof whatsoever that they have anything to do with this specific incident.. A lot of people have a thing about both procurement and British Waste of Space and without any proof that in any way those allegations had anything to do with this terrible event will quite happily post their unsupported theories. I will join the likes of SFO who evidently is an experienced pilot of both the MR2 and MRA4 and did post information but after a totally unwarranted and foolish rant posted by TSM he indicated in his final post that he wasn’t bothering to read this any more.

To TD I most sincerely hope that the true cause is found and that at some stage you can have some form of peace. I have lost friends in crashes, my wife and I lost a daughter at a very young age and so in some form I know what you are going through and the long road you still have to

[tucumseh]

Well Headstone, you start off talking about me, but then list subjects which I have not commented or opined about. I have offered advice and, for the benefit of those who have not experienced the MoD’s deceit at close range, I have offered relevant examples. And they are relevant, as they illustrate parallels with other incidents which, clearly, few are interested in. I’m afraid I don’t offer rumour, just simple, verifiable fact based on my collating open source information. You are free to ignore these facts – much higher people than I have. Some here take great delight in reminding me of my admission I know little about the Nimrod airframe and extrapolate this to assume universal ignorance. Yet you don’t comment on my assertion that unqualified staffs routinely make engineering decisions on aircraft and equipment support. What do you prefer; someone who is honest about their background or someone who acts under false pretences?

Tapper’s Dad has sought answers from various sources, including MoD. He has expressed concern about the veracity and relevance of some of those he has received. I seek to help. I read the other similar threads and always think the same thing – dig deeper, look wider.

I’m afraid some of the comments here have a familiar ring. The MoD is fond of saying they have nothing further to add when an awkward question is asked. Or hiding behind the notion that, because incidents/accidents are relatively rare, that must mean they do everything right. Well, they don’t. Their processes and procedures are robust, but implementation is not. God knows it is difficult enough to change this without criticism from the very people we seek to equip, support and keep safe.

If we spoke I think you would find we have more common ground than you think.

[30mRad]

TD, I see what you're trying to imply about the incident reports. You need to find out how many IRs there have been for fuel related incidents if you're trying to prove something. IRs are raised for all sorts of things and they may not be as severe as the DASC quote for the reasons raised. I raised an IR recently for the thrust reverse not deploying on one of my 2 engines. The other one worked fine, I have wheel brakes, a hook and a barrier to stop so hardly serious but raises the trail to investigate why and take steps to correct it on that jet. I also raised one for the reheat not working on take-off. Yes, they're raised for serious events - one I had for an engine failing in-flight. Things like that happen more often than you'd imagine (even on big jets incl 747s etc!) but doesn't mean the aircraft is unsafe.
I was serving out in theatre and was very closely involved on 2 Sep, so my deepest condolences and if I can put your mind to rest about certain aspects then do PM me.
Regards

[Chugalug2]

a totally unwarranted and foolish rant
Well quite, Headstone. Of course you could have just not posted, but that would have prevented you from characterising others with whom you disagree as total ignoramuses, who know nothing at all about all the things that presumably you do know about. What do you think motivates the likes of Tucumseh, and others including myself, to post here, self aggrandisement? Hardly, for we are all conscious of the human tragedy that underlines this thread. For the most part we are serving or retired professionals in the operation, maintenance or management of military aviation. The primary concern that unites us, or should do, is Flight Safety, ie accident prevention. The RAF has an excellent track record in the development and execution of its Flight Safety system. It seems from posts here that it continues to utilise that system to the full. It is clear though that such a system is only as good as its weakest link, which would seem to be lack of money. So the system continues to scrupulously flag up deficiencies, only to have the identified shortcomings left unresolved because someone, usually in the MOD, be it 18.5 year old girl or 60 year old 4*, stops things dead in their tracks as there is no money to pay for it. That is totally unacceptable. No doubt BA would have been tempted to go for that solution after their tragic B737 fire at Manchester. They had no choice, the CAA said fit smoke hoods and floor track lighting to aid evacuation in a smoke filled cabin. BA and every other UK airline were obliged to obey. We need the same degree of obligation on the MOD to ensure that all UK military aircraft are airworthy. By definition that obligation must come from outside as it does for Civil Aviation. Oh, if some are minded to tell me that military flying is potentially dangerous anyway, of course it is. All the more reason for not making it needlessly dangerous!

[Tappers Dad]

Headstone

Thank you for your kind words and I am sorrry for your loss.As someone told me if you shut your eyes they are there on the back of your eye lids.

I hope I do find out the truth, I am very close to doing so through a lot of writing and FOI requests.However the new information I do have needs a wider audience than on here.

[Wg Co Bingo Handjob]

Tucumseh,

Points accepted and my apologies as the suggestion of a generic MOD thread was not intended to remove your views from the thread. However, threw my inarticulateness you may have misunderstood the thrust of my original comments. Your example and the the point I tried to make was that the SFS and the 760(in your case) were raised by the responsible front line engineering unit. Had the leak in the fuel system been 'well known' at the time there would be corporate knowledge of the leak either documented in the F700 or in the ADS( for instance if the leak was accceptable an entry in the LAD or a leaflet in the 2(R)1. The idea that numerous individuals ignored it through a general acceptance is just too shocking to believe.

The suggestion that DV appeared to be making was that it was 'well known' and ignored by all and sundry (including the crews!) and not for the first time on this thread where the insinuation has been made about engineers on the aircraft not being responsible. This is patently wrong in my opinion, irrespective of the decisions made by Range Managers that they do not understand or even attempt too, the robustness of the airworthiness system is only as good as the diligence of those personnel who daily perform the maintenance on the aircraft. To suggest, however inadvertently, that they would ignore fuel leaks anywhere does not do the purpose of this thread any good whatsoever.

Tapper's Dad,

sir, be careful of the trust you show in the statistics, as pointed out above they are often raised for all manner of reasons and not all are for the reasons included in the DASC answer. Also and I am nitpicking here but didn't the MR2 fleet only reach 16 aircraft late in 94 and for a long period of the time mentioned the actual size of the fleet was 25 aircraft. This will no doubt change the number of incidents, but that is neither here nor there. Here are 2 potential scenarios:

Example 1. Crew lands and Cptain reports that he has had an incident and wishes to incident report the RADAR. Responsible Engineers reply that this will have a Knock on effect on the turnround of the aircraft for the next Sortie. Captain replies, no no it's not a hazard and I'll aircrew accept the fault for the next trip. This means that this potential hazard to life, loss of aircraft may now not be investigated for upto 72 hrs.

Example 2 An aircraft has an aging, if not obsolete, Nav Aid but as the aircraft has only a short period until the end of life there is no money in the pot to replace it. At a user meeting it becomes apparent that all the stakeholders want to replace it and there is money available if a flight safety case can be made to replace it. The peice of kit then becomes subject to incident reports over many months if not years and eventually the case is made and the new kit is provisioned and fitted.

As you can see the raw data does not give info you require, the data needs to be crunched and the information extracted from there, sorry if this appears to be teaching you to suck eggs but the bald assertion of information does not make it a fact without understanding the context.

[tucumseh]

Bingo

Thank you.


“The idea that numerous individuals ignored it through a general acceptance is just too shocking to believe”.


While I know nothing (there I go again) of the “well known” Nimrod fuel problem, I have offered an example (involving 2 fatalities) where numerous individuals DID ignore prior warnings. Not generalised warnings, but very specific advice down to which LRUs and functionality to check. I found their refusal to act shocking. Unfortunately, I didn’t find it unbelievable, as it is all too common. As we have discussed, the processes and procedures are robust, but the human input is variable to say the least. The actions of the higher grades/ranks (or rather lack of action) set the tone. Junior staff, in what is a high turnover area given MoD personnel rules, learn what is “acceptable” and follow their “leader”. That is, they don’t rock the boat, can screw up big time, and advance. It is left to fewer and fewer experienced boat rockers to fight the good fight.

What has this got to do with Nimrod? (And Chinook and…….). Same people at the top. Same working practices, edicts and precedents. An example? You can trade out Performance (which includes safety/airworthiness, spares, training………) to meet Time and Cost. The procurement equivalent of a political soundbite. The common denominators I speak of.

In part, as Chug says, it is pressure caused by lack of funding, coupled with reluctance to challenge MoD policy. However, one can look at it the other way, given the same individuals have also ruled that challenging waste is a disciplinary offence, despite it being a legal obligation to PUS. (Again, conflicting and confusing rules and precedents). PM Brown has, apparently, called MoD a “metropolis of waste”. Absolutely right. Now he has the power to do something about it. If I were him, I wouldn’t give them a red cent more until what (and who) I speak of has been eradicated for good. Want £100M to make an aircraft safer (ESF, fuel leaks….)? It would take me 5 minutes to write as robust a case as you would ever see, identify the funding source, yet still maintain time, cost and performance on that source programme. In fact, I’ve done it and been ignored. (Same people again). £200M? 10 minutes I’m afraid as I’d have to check with someone. I’m only one person – MoD has around 10,000 doing this stuff day in, day out but are scared to act. Yes, shocking.

[Chugalug2]

Junior staff, in what is a high turnover area given MoD personnel rules, learn what is “acceptable” and follow their “leader”. That is, they don’t rock the boat, can screw up big time, and advance. It is left to fewer and fewer experienced boat rockers to fight the good fight.

And that in a nutshell, WCBH, is where your SFS, 760, F700, ADS, 2(R)1, etc, etc, action ends up, in the waste paper basket of a junior CS who knows better than to rock the boat! As a taxpayer I agree with Tuc that MOD reform is a sine qua non. However I repeat again my annoying and boring mantra that Military Aviation in the UK must be subject to a Military Aviation Authority (or combined MCAA) external to the MOD. Airworthiness, like wars, costs money, and the temptation to skimp here and cut back there will always compromise that process when the user is its own regulator. Self regulation is a British indulgence that is proven time and time again not to work. The cost in lives alone for compromising airworthiness is totally and completely unacceptable. The brave men and women who operate and maintain our military aircraft need total confidence in the Airworthiness and Flight Safety process. The MOD would assure us that their confidence would be well placed. I for one would not believe them.

[Distant Voice]

Look Bingo, I did not say "well known", it was the IPTL (Gp Capt) who made that statement. What I quoted in my earlier posting is as stated in the report on an SFS raised on 3rd Sept (one day after the crash) for XV255 follow AAR. If something is "well known" on 3rd, then it is reasonable, for any normal person, to think that it was known about before that date.

And, I am not saying that aircrew go off flying into the blue with fuel dripping from the airframe, but they will go if IPT says that certain defects are within newly defined limits. Ground ground crews will serice to the same limits. Operation Medusa started on 2nd Sept and it was important that Nimrods were available at that time. Using MoD's own definitions, unacceptable risks are tolerable under exceptional circumstances.

DV

[dodgysootie]

DV. The incident you refer to on the 3rd of sept (cracked fuel pipe) did result in a SFS, however, the leak was discovered whilst the aircraft (XV255) was being ground refuelled, NOT following AAR. This was NOT a "well known" problem I can assure you. The SFS was raised literally within 1 hour of the leak being discovered which resulted in issue of a UTI to be carried out before "next flight" on the whole of the Nimrod fleet. The timing of the leak being found will always "spook" me, because if it had been found the previous day, IMHO, we would not be reading this thread because it wouldnt exist.
As for operation "Medusa" starting on the 2nd sept and the importance of the Nimrod being there, I can again assure you that the Groundcrew would not allow an unsafe aircraft to fly ( Even if "newly defined limits" where introduced). Flight Safety is Flight Safety no matter what the IPT say. Period.
RIP CXX/3

[Wg Co Bingo Handjob]

Tuc

Once again you misunderstand me, I was suggesting that the guys who maintain the aircraft day to day would not ignore the problem over a period of time and then raise a serious fault signal. what happens after that is out of their control but it would be interesting to see what the reaction to the serious fault signal was rather than dealing in hypotheticals or other instances where the system failed, which we are all agreed is unacceptable.

Chugalug 2

I am not defending the indefensible, if the MOD has nothing to hide then independent regulation should prove no problem to them. However, if as you think there is a problem then they of course will resist it. Bear in mind the current concerns regarding the HSe and the lack of funding preventing their regulatory action and the fact that there are regular incidents in the civilian sector as well.

DV

You used the phrase 'well known' without contextualising it. To then claim that somehow there was a new limit in place (not the case) or that because of the op being carried out that there were blind eyes being turned or that faults outside the usual limits being carried is dangerous and without any foundation. Knowing the guys involved in the ground and having participated in many Ops and a number of conflicts in my personal experience, I have never seen or never heard about the military exemption being used and I would lay bets that no-one on the engineering side would sign of on such a fault. they are in the business of ensuring that people return as they are not just colleagues but friends. Indeed, many people have been described as obstructive for preventing commanders from carrying out their wishes because it compromises safety, is against procedures or is not allowed because of the release to service. I am sorry that the phrasing of the IPTL has allowed you to believe that their is more to this than serious fault found, repair underway, you might like to look at the other ac in light of the previous tragic event.

[Chugalug2]

WCBH, thank you for your response to my call for Independent Regulation. Of course the MOD will resist it, so it would have to be irresistible would it not? The CAA airworthiness standards and regulation have not AFAIK been compromised by lack of funding, but others may know otherwise. There are always incidents, the trick is to stop them becoming accidents, or if not to prevent them from becoming repetitive accidents. The Civil track record in that regard is, I would avow, superior to the Military one. HSE are the ones, are they not, who have been funding the assessment of the incremental safety case for placing a towel on the bathroom floor to step onto when leaving the bath? A case there perhaps for subsuming them into the MOD, the synergies of waste are obvious!

[Distant Voice]

Dodgie sootie: Many thanks for that information. The SFS that I am reading confirms what you have stated; whilst refueling No5 tank. However, it does say that this was found "post AAR" sorties. It is understood that a sortie was flown on 3rd (day after the crash) and is assumed this was undertaken by XV255.

DV

[camelspyyder]

DV

There was no MR2 flight at all on 3 Sep. I was on on the first trip subsequent to the disaster which took place on the 4th. After the wake you definately wouldnt have found anyone sober enough on the 3rd!!

[Da4orce]

I'm not party to much of the FOI Act document that are being referred to although I have seen some very distburbing documents.

I am however an investigator by profession and have 10 years experience working to a high level within the civil service and I can assure you that when something stinks as much as this my experience tells me there is usually something rotten at the source.

Take the example of the cock-pit video from the UK jet that followed 230 down. I have been told by more than one Senior member of the RAF that it does not exist and indeed the MOD state that it does not exist. Yet, I have it on very good authority that it does exist, indeed even that it has been seen to exist. Now even if I step back as Tappers brother, as an investigator I want answers. I start to think ok so why would the MOD and RAF deny the existence of this recording yet reliable sources contradict them.

Ultimately the BOI may provide some answers but a veracious coronor, the FOI Act and people like my dad, DV, Tuc and Chug will ultimately get the answers that the authorities seem so keen to hold on to.

[buoy15]

dodgysootie
Excellent post -thank you!
The more people on this thread who know what they are talking about, the better!

[Chugalug2]

when something stinks as much as this my experience tells me there is usually something rotten at the source.....
Ultimately the BOI may provide some answers but a veracious coronor, the FOI Act and people like my dad, DV, Tuc and Chug will ultimately get the answers that the authorities seem so keen to hold on to.

Da4orce, thank you for your post, I wonder if you have any idea of the relief with which it was read? Rocking the boat, as Tuc so appropriately calls it, is no problem especially if there is a chance of capsizing it and its whole rotten crew, but distressing or upsetting those like yourself who have suffered grievous loss is a constant and real worry when posting here. Knowing that one has your support is very important and greatly appreciated, and I strongly suspect that goes for the other contributors too. Indeed if it encourages others who have held back for reason of understandable diffidence, so much the better. With the infamous DIN now restricting serving personnel, can I especially appeal to those like me who are now retired and fall outside of its scope. If there is to be change at the MOD, and for the future of the Armed Forces there surely must, it will only come about if there is a hue and cry similar to that raised for Mr Pun VC, L/Cpl Rai and SSAFA. It comes best from those, like Tuc, who are experienced and informed about its treacherous ways. Change will only occur from within the system. MPs, especially those who serve on the appropriate Select Committees, are key to this. They can only act on evidence put before them. They may well have reneged on this duty in the past, but there is a general realisation growing that "bemedalled buffoons", as Tony Hancock once characterised them, have betrayed their subordinates, their services and their country for reasons varying from personal incompetence through to naked ambition by following a political diktat that is set to destroy the very services they represent. If you know of this process then IMHO it is your duty to reveal it, if not here then to our democratically elected representatives.
For my own part, and more importantly for the purposes of this thread, there has surely been enough revealed here and on other threads to damn the MOD's custodianship of Miltary Airworthiness and Flight Safety Standards. It is sad to read about the rightful pride and professionalism in those who operate, maintain, and manage our military aircraft, including the MR2, who scrupulously maintain the standards of reporting and implementation placed upon them, when the higher command and their apparatchiks so contemptuously and arbitrarily renege on their own professional duty to them in return. My case, as said before, is to strip the MOD of this responsibility and place it with or alongside the CAA. Obviously there would be many problems, but they could be overcome and confidence in a reformed and reinvigorated Military Airworthiness process restored. Those who have served this system before will be best placed to comment here, whether they be ex BD, Main Building or wherever. Do not think because it worked in your day then it must work now. The shock of discovering that very very little of the RAF that I knew still survives, other than in the skill and bravery of its young men and women, has been profound. There is a chance here for all we BOFs to once again serve our country, I put it at no less than that!

[Tappers Dad]

Just back from an important meeting in Scotland so I have beeen catching up with the postings .

dodgysootie
You said in your last posting that "I can again assure you that the Groundcrew would not allow an unsafe aircraft to fly"

I will let you into a secret and I quote

"Immediate actions taken post the crash of XV230 isolated potential sources of ignition in the Bomb Bay area pending the results of the ongoing BOI investigation. AAR was also withdrawn but in conjuction with RTSA, a sevice Deviation was released to give the Force Commander the operational flexibility to specifically authorize AAR sorties where overriding operational requirements exist."

Question. Why was AAR withdrawn
Answer . It is not deemed to be safe

Question . As AAR is considered not safe can the Groundcrew stop the ac from flying
Answer . NO the Force Commander has the operational flexibility to specifically authorize AAR sorties where overriding operational requirements exist.

[Mad_Mark]

Question. Why was AAR withdrawn
Answer . It is not deemed to be safe


Sorry TD, but again you are too close to this and are reading things into the information you are given :(

My take on this is that AAR was withdrawn as a standard day to day practice as that was the activity that the crew had been doing just prior to the tragic accident. At that time all they knew was that until the BOI returned even an intermediate report (and maybe not even then) then no-one knew whether or not the AAR was linked in any way to the event or not. Other possibly linked actions were also stopped after the loss. AAR was not deemed to be unsafe simply deemed to be POSSIBLY linked, and hence stopped as a standard practice - just in case.

Why could AAR be carried out with certain authority? Because the guys have a real job to do and what they do directly effects the lives of guys on the ground! There are some cases where an aircraft is needed to stay on task longer than a non-AAR sortie will permit. Unfortunately with all the cuts in airframes, manpower (aircrew and ground-crew) and money for spares the fleet is simply unable to send aircraft after aircraft up, thus avoiding AAR. When one crew can be relieved by another then that happens, but it is not always possible.

Certain jobs will see the need to have someone on high take the serious decision as to whether AAR was linked to the accident or not and whether the need is greater than the possible risk. I am certain that decision is not taken lightly and have seen the request for AAR authorisation refused on several occasions. Imagine how the guy would feel if he decides that the task needs outweigh the individual needs, sends a crew flying on an AAR mission and a tragic event occurs due to them carrying out AAR!

Until there is a definite proven link between AAR and the loss of CXX/3 then it is a sad fact that sometimes risks have to be taken. The whole business of military aviating, especially during times of conflict, is risky and the crews are fully aware of that.

Several times I have seen your posts twist the information you have received because you are either too close to the whole thing, don't fully understand the information/terminology you read or both. I lost several good friends on CXX/3 but can't begin to imagine how you and other families must be feeling - but please try and look at the information you receive with an open mind and keep a balanced view.

MadMark!!! :mad:

[Exrigger]

TD: to answer the same questions a slightly different way from the text you quoted and what Dodgysooty wrote re ground crew:

Q: Why was AAR withdrawn
A: Standard procedure while we ascertain a source of ignition in the areas of possible fuel leaks and the possible reason for the fuel leaks and try to remedy as quickly and safely as possible.

Which was found and isolated pending the result of the BOI, according to what you wrote and a solution is/has possibly been ascertained.

Q: As AAR is considered not safe can the Groundcrew stop the ac from flying
A: Yes, they raise a 707B and state that the aircraft has a fuel leak and this needs to be rectified before flying, additionally, because of a what they found above, they can say we have found a source of ignition in a wiring harness and it will be fixed before we can safely sign the aircraft off, it would take a brave man as an engineering officer to say sign the card up and authorise the aircraft to go flying against the experience and advice from the groundcrew and results from the Immediate actions taken post the crash of XV230.

Again don't stop asking questions, but as has been said before there is a lot of Nimrod experienced aircrew/groundcrew, and ex of the same, who also want to help you with a resolution, but are trying to stop you going of in the wrong direction.

[Tappers Dad]

Exrigger & Mad_Mark

The information I posted was dated 29th October 2006 and not straight after the crash to the best of my knowledge using the information I have via the FOI, AAR can still only take place at the Force Commander's discretion and why are No 7 tanks not being used and why is the SCP not being used.
Perhaps you could give me an answer on those questions.

[tucumseh]

Key extract from above…………….
“Unfortunately with all the cuts in airframes, manpower (aircrew and ground-crew) and money for spares the fleet is simply unable to send aircraft after aircraft up, thus avoiding AAR”.

That is, front line is forced to change the risk assessment criteria that underpinned the MAR, RTS and associated SDs. TD, it’s called politics, and people who were previously perfectly sane are subtly given a “career brief on their brief career” if they don’t roll over. I think there are others here who would agree that if the role and/or use of the aircraft is changed for these reasons then an updated whole aircraft safety case is required. (I’d say mandated, but the procedural Def Stans don’t make allowance for such political interference. They were written in the days before airworthiness became optional). I’d almost guarantee a weakness the audit trail. The fallout is borne by operators and maintainers while those responsible advance and retire disgracefully.

[Distant Voice]

In order to answer this question we need to define "Safe". Safe, according to MoD is a condition where risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is broadly acceptable. Let us now examine the following chain of events:

22-11-04 XV227 returns with fractured hot air pie in SPC and a "cooked" No.7 tank (port)

03-08-05 Report issued, but some recommendations not carried out. Preventative maintenance/lifing policy yet to be announced.

02-09-06 XV230 crashes after AAR and bimb bay fire. Explosion in wing root.

03-09-06 Fuel leak from cracked fuel pipe dicovered on XV255. Serious Fault Signal (SFS) raised for incident.

04-09-06 Forward deployed aircraft cleared to fly after "visual inspection"

??-10-06 XV250 fuel leak, post AAR. Aircraft returned to Kinloss.

13-10-06 XV231 fuel leak, post AAR.

20-09-06 XV231 fuel leak. Aicraft returned to Kinloss.

21-10-06 RTI/NIM/173 issued. Calls for SPC to be isolated and draining of No. 7 tank (Pt and Stb) before flight.

29-10-06 SFS raised for XV250 and XV231

02-11-06 Initail report for SFS issued. Claims that XV255 problem was "well known" to IPT.

08-11-06 Air Incident Report raised by aircrew of XV260 for fuel leaks after AAR.

08-12-06 Air Incident Report raised by aircrew of XV232 for fuel leaks after AAR.

N.B. Would by useful to know what the make up off the 52 fuel faults were prior to the accident.

Now that chain of events, by any stretch of the normal imagination, does not demonstrates a level of risk that is broadly acceptable. Therefore, I must agree with Tapper's Dad; the AAR system, No.7 tank and the SCP are "unsafe" until proven otherwise, and isolation is not the answer. Safety has to be proven by evidence, not by the lack of it.

Finally, on the question of whether or not ground crews will sign off defective systems, and aircrews accept them, of course they will not. That, as I read it, is not the issue. If IPT carry out "risk management", which is influenced by the opertional environment, and state that the aircraft are acceptable to fly with tanks and SPC isolated, then the aircraft goes. Regardless of what aircrews and ground crews believe.

DV

[BEagle]

Some EngOs can be rather too keen to sign things off...

Back when Wattisham was still a fine RAF fighter station, one of our F4s was due to go to St Athan for a major. Unfortunately the beast had some problem with its flaps which was proving a bugger to fix.

One Met Brief, OC Eng announced that he'd come up with a solution...

"We'll lock the flaps fully up and isolate the system", he grandly announced. At this, there was much muttering amongst the assembled aircrew, who all knew that the prospect of a flapless landing on a 6000ft RW was somewhat disturbing...

"It's OK - I'll volunteer to go in the back, if you like", he then announced.

"You can go in the bloody front as far as I'm concerned!" came a response from the floor. At this even the Stn Cdr, the excellent T**y P**k, laughed aloud. "I think we'll have another look at getting the flaps fixed, won't you", he said....

A bit of thread drift, but don't assume that all EngOs have as much safety sense as others!

[Chugalug2]

Come now BEags, I think we're rather wandering into the realms of the fanciful, wouldn't you say? You'll be telling us next that an SEngO managed to get airborne in a Lightning on a taxy check, having accidentally gone through the reheat gate and found he couldn't get out of it. No doubt you would add, for dramatic effect, that he had the canopy open and the pins in, which would have been just as well seeing as he wasn't strapped in! Time to come down to earth wouldn't you say? Which I guess is what the SEngO had to do, though not on the same short runway from which he had got airborne. Case of the proverbial black eye and feather in the cap syndrome I guess. Now see what you've started! Thread retrieval, Thread retrieval, Go!

[Tappers Dad]

DV
You said "Therefore, I must agree with Tapper's Dad; the AAR system, No.7 tank and the SCP are "unsafe" until proven otherwise, and isolation is not the answer. Safety has to be proven by evidence, not by the lack of it".

I find it interesting that after the incident on 22-11-04 when XV227 returned with fractured hot air pipe in SPC and a "cooked" No.7 tank were there was proof of the fault they continued to use No7 tanks and the SPC.
And yet after the crash of XV230 they stopped using No 7 tanks and the SCP and stopped AAR yet there is no proof as yet that any of these caused the fire or explosion. Why did they not do this things after the XV227 incident.

[Distant Voice]

TD.

Only God (and MoD) know.

As you know, all these events are regarded as "isolated incidents", until they happen again. Then brave people pay for the lack of action.

DV

[Distant Voice]

TD, on second thoughts, perhaps there has been other incidents between the XV227 event and the crash of XV230 that as yet have got to come out in the wash. Lets face it, to be able to give the go ahead to fly, within 48 hrs after a visual inspection, tends to suggset the "authorities" knew what to look for. As one "current" operator reported to me "Within hours of the accident, most of the possible factors (fuel pipes, tanks, and various hot pipes), were identified and taken out of service, pending the BOI report". Even Exriggers posting suports this point of view by stating that the area of the possible fuel leak and ignition were ascertained and isolated, pending BOI report.

Now you can not take that sort of action unless you have kown indicators.

DV

[Da4orce]

Does anyone know which squadron provided the British fast jet commitment for Operation Herrick prior to 800 Naval Air Squadron being deployed on October 1, 2006?

Can anyone confirm that it was 1(F) Squadron (RAF)

Please PM myself or TappersDad.

[Exrigger]

Da4orce try this link:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Herrick_order_of_battle

I know some say that Wikipedia do not always have the proper gen, if this is not want you want let me know.

Added gen, still not found a definitive answer but it does look likely that you are correct
Kandahar
The Royal Air Force (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Air_Force) (RAF) has deployed a Joint Force Harrier (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Force_Harrier) detachment from RAF Cottesmore (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Cottesmore). Based in Kandahar, it provides close air support and reconnaissance to coalition and NATO forces operating in southern Afghanistan. In October 2006, however, the Royal Air Force turned over the task to 800 Naval Air Squadron, in the first operational deployment of the Fleet Air Arm's Harrier GR7 squadrons. These are the deployed Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and Army Air Corps units:

846 Naval Air Squadron (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/846_Naval_Air_Squadron)
3 Regiment Army Air Corps (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Air_Corps)
9 Regiment Army Air Corps (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Air_Corps)
1 (Fighter) Squadron RAF (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._1_Squadron_RAF), operating the GR7 Harriers
4 (Army Co-operation) Squadron RAF (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._IV_Squadron_RAF), operating the GR7 Harriers

[Da4orce]

Thanks Ex :ok:

[Distant Voice]

I understand that the weld that caused the fuel pipe to fracture on XV255 (3rd Sept) has been replaced by another form of attachment on the MRA4. Anyone got first-hand experience on this one?

DV

[Tappers Dad]

I understand that No 7 tanks now have to be drained before flight, How empty is it when it is drained? Has no fuel? Has some fuel? Has some fuel vapurs? or no fuel and no vapours . Anyone know please

[Tappers Dad]

Have people stopped answering my questions due to DIN 2007DIN03-006. Para 15.

Or is it that no one knows the answers?

[Distant Voice]

TD; The closer you get to the truth, the harder it gets to find the final missing pieces.

DV

[Exrigger]

TD:
You asked: How empty is it when it is drained?

I will answer this by saying depends on the instructions, but here goes:

1. If a normal defuel is carried out there is fuel that remains in the tank and there will be vapours.
2. During normal usage when the tank contents have been used, like your car, there will still be fuel that remains in the tank and there will be vapours.
3. When a tank is drained through the normal drain points, there will be a considerably smaller amount of fuel left in the tank and vapours.
4. If the tank is drained, depuddled and vented, there will be no fuel or vapours.

If the instructions where to carry out 1, 2 or 3 then in degrees there will be fuel and vapours, if the intruction was to do 4 then there will not. To quantify this you have to consider how this information might be relevant, i.e. having fuel and vapours in any fuel tank is not a problem, it only becomes a problem if there is a source of ignition within the tank as it is effectively isolated from the system by all the valves, or there is a big hole in the tank/supply pipe to the tank (allthough if the tank shut off valves are shut then again the tank would normally be deemed safe) this also has to have a nearby source of ignition. As aircraft fuel tanks on a lot of aircraft are in the vicinity of an engine then it is normally assumed that heat alone on the outside of a fuel tank wall would not cause an explosion regardless of the amount of fuel/vapours within that tank.

I hope this is ok, but as with all these things I will no doubt be corrected on any technical errors/assumptions in the above from those who are current on type or more knowledgable on fuel systems than my memory is.

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks for that Exrigger, it all helps to fit the bits of information together.

[Distant Voice]

That's right COVEC, XV230 was a procedural proplem as well --- SCP and No. 7 tank not isolated.

You should re-read the incident report. Rear hinged fairing doors to MAD boom covered in fuel. Flares covered in fuel. Fuel drips of 25 per min. Just a simple procedural problem.

Sorry, Pamorama got it right. As they did about XV227, or was that just another procedural problem?

DV

[RAF_Techie101]

With all due respect guys, if you not connected to the Nimrod, working within the current environment, or anythign similar, you are in no way qualified to say whether or not "Panorama got it right". I could spend pages going over just how many errors there were in that program.

[Tappers Dad]

RECOMMENDATIONS made after the XV227 incident in 22 Nov 04
were that

The SCP duct is with replaced with new manufacture items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.

A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.

Does anyone know if this lifing / maintenance/ replacement policy has been implemented.And if so when was it implemented.

[Distant Voice]

Good point TD. You do not have to be "current" to ask logical questions like that.

DV

[Exrigger]

TD: Da4orce on the 28th June on post #663 posted the answer to those questions which where:

Recommendation
The ruptured duct is replaced with new manufactured items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. All such ducts fitted to in-service aircraft have been replaced with newly manufactured items.

Recommendation
The extent of the hot air leak warning system is reviewed to ensure that all possible duct failures are covered.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. A review of the aircraft warning systems revealed that the affected Supplementary Cooling Pack Duct was the only duct whose failure would not have been detected.

Recommendation
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Action Taken
Recommendation rejected. The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected. All of these ducts have been replaced with newly manufactured items that, based upon the previous 25 fault-free years that the original duct had been fitted, are expected to last well beyond the planned MR2 Out of Service Date (early part of the next decade). Moreover, fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody. Considering the Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2, the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable. Action closed.

Recommendation
A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifing policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.

And before we get into discussions like last time, the lifing policy for the specific duct that ruptured, and has been replaced across the fleet already, see first recommendation/Action Taken, will be from post fitment of this new duct. For all other ducts that did not require replacement immediately, as they did not fail, the lifing policy will be as appropriate from the stated analysis of these other ducts, subsequently these other ducts will get replaced before this analysis indicates the time-line likelyhood of failure and that these other ducts will start being replaced, as required, starting in Dec 07 during a scheduled maintenance task.

TD I hope this helps answer those questions.

[Distant Voice]

Exrigger: That's what TD is asking about. We all know that the defective duct was replaced across the fleet, he is asking about the recommendation for similar pipes. Come on guys, stop going around in circles you sound like MoD.

DV

[Exrigger]

DV: you said he (TD) is asking about the recommendation for similar pipes so what part of A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifing policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.
does no one understand.

[Da4orce]

Tappers Dad wrote:

Does anyone know if this lifing / maintenance/ replacement policy has been implemented.And if so when was it implemented.


A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifing policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.

Accepted Exrigger, I think for further clarity what he is getting at is has scheduled maintenance on any of the airframes involved the replacement of 'similar ducts' if so is this now complete fleet wide or not? Or as you imply, as we're are not yet in December, has no duct replacement programme been implemented yet? Presumably if the programme was ready for implementation earlier than December it could be implemented earlier, unless there os a particular reason to wait until December.

I would think that the longer they wait however the more likely the MOD are to say sorry guys the airframe is now so close to replacement we can't justify this duct replacement programme. (But then my cup is always half full !):oh:

[Exrigger]

Thanks Da4orce, I realise now what was being asked, but only those that currently work on the fleet can answer to that depth of detail, I can only assume from what was written in the text you posted, and I mearly copied and pasted from the source text you posted at #663, that if the implementation plan had been produced early that the duct replacement programme would already be in progress, though this does not appear to be the case. I can only assume again that it is possible that they are waiting for the BOI findings before deciding where to spend/not spend money, your last paragraph is probably closer to the mark.

It is difficult not to sound like a 'man from the MOD' as DV put it, but I am out of the RAF, allthough I still work within the military environment I am no longer close enough to give up to date in depth knowledge of what is happening in the Nimrod fleet today. Most of my responses have been to try and answer the technical systems info that TD and others have asked, and this is from memory of my days within the Nimrod groundcrew world and from the recent platforms that I have fuel system knowledge of, additionally some comments are my own personnel opinions on what is happening and on responses from other posters. If this means that my inputs are not valid or relevant then I will consider waiting for any official outputs on the findings before posting again.

[Distant Voice]

Exrigger: I understand all that was said in the posting, which for the record happens to be the answer to a PQ that Tapper's Dad's MP raised. I also know that a sample analysis on similar pipes was carried out between July 2005 and April 2007 on MR2 a/c returned to BAE on MRA programme. (Obtained under FOI)

TD simply wants to know if the maitenance/lifing progaramme has been defined and when will it swing into action? As things stand at present we could have Nimrods flying around with defective piping.

When did Noah build the Ark ------ before the flood.

DV

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks Da4orce,Distant Voice and Exrigger for your answers.

However what I really wanted to know was if the SCP duct on XV230 was replaced with new manufacture items before the crash

RECOMMENDATIONS made after the XV227 incident in 22 Nov 04
were that
The SCP duct is with replaced with new manufacture items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible

[Exrigger]

TD: I only answered the general question you asked, had you asked that specific question I would have been unable to answer, the only people that can answer that specific question about XV230 are the groundcrew who would of actually signed a job card to do the duct replacement task, or engineering records who would have the card filed away.

DV: Noah had a crystal ball in the form of God, thats why he built the Ark before the flood. I believe the Nimrod personnel are working after the flood with regards to this specific problem i.e. in hindsight, with not much actual evidence to say categorically that we need to spend money on a specific 'Ark', allthough they have decided to go with the SCP duct replacement 'Ark' , again in hindsight after an investigation into one incident.

[Distant Voice]

Exrigger: I think the warning was there with the XV227 incident, and very little was done. A defective pipe was replaced and we then went on flying using the SCP and a filled No. 7 tank. As soon as XV230 was lost we immediately isolate the SCP and No.7 tank. That had to done based on the data from XV227.

XV227 was the word of God, XV 230 was the flood, and MoD are still thinking about building the Ark.

DV

[Exrigger]

Fair enough DV, my intention was not to start or get involved in a war of words and get into a philosophical debate on the subject, as all people have a different perspective on this depending on which part of the system one is sat in. The bottom line is we are all trying to help answer the likes of TD's questions where we can so he and other families can get the answers they need to come to terms with their loss and hopefully prevent the same thing happening again with more unnecessary loss of life.

Allthough I will say that XV227 may have been the word of god, but if XV230 was caused by something else unrelated to the cause of XV227s incident (its only conjecture, but probably a fairly accurate guess for all that, that this is the same root cause for XV230) then it was not the flood, but still agree that the MOD will be still thinking about building the ark long after this aircraft/other aircraft and they themselves have left the RAF.

[AC Ovee]

TD:

However what I really wanted to know was if the SCP duct on XV230 was replaced with new manufacture items before the crash



I can assure you of the folllowing facts:

Immediately following the incident with XX227, the SCP system was taken out of service on all aircraft, although the system itself remained in place. One by one, the SCP ducts were replaced and only those SCPs with replaced ducts were cleared for use.

All aircraft in the Gulf in Sep 06 had replacement SCP ducts fitted.

[Distant Voice]

AC Ovee;

It is understood the the defective duct was replaced on all aircraft within about one year after the XV227 incident. What would be useful to know is whether or not the maintenance programme for "similar" ducts has been introducted.

DV

[Mr Point]

Has anyone heard any suggestions regarding a date for publishing the BOI?

[Da4orce]

It will not be released until parliament return from the summer recess and September is the current suggestion.

[Tappers Dad]

5 days to go until the anniversary of the crash.

360 days gone and still no BOI report.

[Padraig Murphy]

Ex-Rigger/Da4orce/TD,

The recommendations/actions taken, where have these come from?

Firstly you don't recommend a fleet wide replacement until you have established that the duct in question is the root cause of failure and that the proposed recommended fix/corrective action will remove the single point of critical failure entirely. This requires extensive system wide and platform analysis, testing, proving and flight testing first this sounds more like a quick fix.

25 years of previous life is irrelevant how can you determine if it has failed before, if its already not detectable you can't rely on the 25 years of maintenance archives, the duct in question may have been replaced during a primary/minor/major as part of an assembly and not checked for failure, who knows?

The Aircraft Design Office has to maintain the Declaration of Design & Performance (DDP) for the platform and any other platforms it has ADO over, as part of their remittance in maintaining the DDP they must maintain the FMECA and FTA, if this failure has not been identified previously then it must be added to the FMECA and FTA before the DDP can be signed off, if the item's failure still cannot be detected then a preventative maintenance (PM) task with another method of detection must be put in it's place prior to allowing the platform to go on operational duties.

Assuming as the platforms, are and have been operational since the XV227 incident (the DDP must be current) the FMECA and FTA has been updated, the PM task will have already been put in place with the required detection methods.

If I understand you correctly this fault occurred in 2004 and the PM task will not be in place until Dec 2007, would it be fairer to say that the required analysis and testing will not be complete on MRA4 until Dec 2007 and then be retro-fitted across the MR2 fleet. This approach would not be the best way forward as the two platforms are significantly different, different equipment fits, enviroments, cooling, engines, etc, the itself maybe the same fit, form and function but the systems and platform are not read accross would not be recommended.

As an ex-Nimrod techie (10 years of ISK experience), extensive Reliability & Flight Safety experience and with a cousin still flying in normans regularly, I would urge you all to wait until the BOI is published, when it is, if it doesn't clearly address the issues and identify the root cause of failure, then ask the right questions and don't pull punches as there are a lot of other parties other than the lost crew (RIP) and their families, who will not be prepared to shoulder any of the blame, as blame equals £'s and therefore significant pay outs.

Please wait for the BOI!

[Da4orce]

Murphy wrote:

Ex-Rigger/Da4orce/TD,

The recommendations/actions taken, where have these come from?

Firstly you don't recommend a fleet wide replacement until you have established that the duct in question is the root cause of failure and that the proposed recommended fix/corrective action will remove the single point of critical failure entirely. This requires extensive system wide and platform analysis, testing, proving and flight testing first this sounds more like a quick fix.


Maybe your point would be better directed at the RAF as the recommendations were made in a report published in July 2005 into the XV227 incident.

This is not about blame or compensation, nothing can compensate for losing a loved one in such a way, especially one who was so full of life.

361 days and waiting

[Exrigger]

Da4orce you beat me to it. The duct that was replaced was the root cause of the incident with XV227, and an analysis was carried out by BAE Systems into the SCP duct and others in the system and hence the recommended lifing policy that will be/has been introduced to the MR2, as Da4orce said if you wish to know more ask the RAF/MOD/BAE Systems.

25 years history is hardly irrelevant, especially if you are able to trawl the archived maintenance documentation/supply documentation/use the IPT/DA to do a check against the part number of a component and find how many of those components have been replaced and why, this is done in every maintenance/first line environment when something is found that appears out of the 'norm' or post a ground/air incident. Additionally why are you bringing MRA4 into the discussion it is not relevant, the analysis referred to has been carried out on MR2 post XV227 not on MRA4, as you rightly pointed out it is has different systems/engines/layout to the MR2.

Throughout this thread most of the people are advising waiting for the outcome of the BOI, but TD/Da4orce and others have a right to ask technical questions so they can understand what could of gone wrong, to help them ask the right questions under the FOI/understand those responses, to help get closure for their loss and prepare them better to understand the technical content of the BOI when it is released.

[buoy15]

Mr Point
The BoI report will be published on the same day as the DFS furniture sale ends!

[BEagle]

From today's Sunday Times:

September 2, 2007

MoD rejected fire safety plan for doomed Nimrod

Michael Smith

THE manufacturers of the RAF's Nimrod aircraft recommended a fire detection and suppression system be fitted to its bomb bay two years before one of the planes exploded over Afghanistan, killing all 14 on board.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) rejected the proposal on the basis that it was unlikely to be effective. The fire leading to the explosion, a year ago today, started in the bomb bay.

BAE Systems made the recommendation in August 2004 in a "safety case" report commissioned by the MoD to ensure the ageing aircraft was safe to continue flying amid continuing delays to its replacement.

The safety report was needed because the Nimrod aircraft, originally introduced in 1969 and due to go out of service in 1995, had to continue flying on operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Its replacement will not now be introduced until 2010.

The recommendation was one of two warnings concerning the age of the aircraft and the dangers of a fire in the bomb bay given to the MoD. Three months after BAE Systems urged that the fire suppression system be fitted, a leak of superheated air in one of the Nimrod's bomb bays came close to starting a fire.

In an internal report into the incident, the RAF Kinloss station commander said the incident was "a particular concern as the ageing Nimrod MR2 is extended beyond its original out-of-service date", and warned of similar such failures in the future.

The MoD's admission that it did not act on the BAE Systems recommendation was made in response to a freedom of information request from Graham Knight, whose son Ben died onboard.
The statement comes on the first anniversary of the explosion with the families of the 12 dead airmen attending a private memorial service at RAF Kinloss today. The other two killed were special forces radio operators.
Knight said: "Had a fire detection suppression system been fitted to my son's aircraft, it might have bought them the three minutes they needed in which to land. What price does the MoD put on 14 human lives?"
The pilot of the Nimrod reported a fire in his bomb bay. The aircraft's starboard wing exploded, followed a few seconds later by the rest of the aircraft.

The board of inquiry into the explosion has focused on the bomb bay where a combination of leaks of fuel from the air-to-air refueling system and from other pipes carrying hot air are seen as the most likely causes. The leaking air was superheated to temperatures higher than the automatic ignition point of the aircraft's Avtur fuel.

New documents passed to The Sunday Times show that the pipe carrying the superheated air was isolated after last year's crash. At the same time, the number seven tank, which is next to the bomb bay and at the root of the wing, was taken out of use.

Jimmy Jones, a former RAF flight trials engineer, who worked on the Nimrod, said this "clearly indicates that was considered to be a potential risk following the November 2004 incident and therefore before [the plane] exploded".

Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, chief of the defence staff, has insisted that the Nimrod aircraft are safe to continue flying. But Jones said: "It is not good enough for [him] to say that Nimrod has a good safety record, therefore it is safe. "By the MoD's own safety case standard they have to provide 'compelling, comprehensive and valid' evidence the aircraft is safe. It doesn't exist."

The MoD said the BAE Systems recommendation was "only one" of a number of suggestions made. "We needed to take into account the practicalities of the suggested changes and the operational impact on the aircraft. Based on these, it was not thought appropriate to follow their suggestion."

"Not thought appropriate".........??

[Whisperer14]

As I approach my 70th anniversary I am minded of the anniversary that I would rather did not exist - when the MR fleet and 120 Squadron lost one of their aircraft and crews in operations in Afghanistan.

May I take the opportunity to extend my sympathy to all of the families concerned.

I was prompted to post by the article that precedes this one concerning the bomb bay fire system that isn't; I was on board what I believe was the first Nimrod that had a bomb bay fire problem and I know only too well how vulnerable the aircraft is in this area and I was indeed surprised to see that this vulnerability had still not been fixed! The existence of the IFR capability has actually exacerbated this vulnerability.

On that one we were fortunate in that the No 6 tank did not explode with the heat from the fire, as it was, amongst other things, we lost hydraulic services which included one of the primary flying controls services and undercarriage.

We did not have an emergency drill for a bomb bay fire in those days and the engineer on board 'Moose Moxon, was a relative rookie but he coped admirably as did the rest of the crew!

I am sorry but I have digressed from the thread so once again I offer my heartfelt condolences on this sad anniversary.

GT

[Tappers Dad]

Wisperer

Thank you for your kind words. I have been up in Inverness all week and visited ISK on Sunday to lay flowers and Wednesday to talk to one of the senior ranks. I have had a request for information via the FOI turned down which is interesting as it concerned bomb bay fires.

[Tappers Dad]

Can anyone tell me what a Boz Pod is please and what effect it has on
the Rib 7 area.

Thanks

[Exrigger]

The BOZ pods are Pylon mounted CHAFF Dispensers, basically it spits out shredded tin foil. The R Mk1 has it fitted to wing pylons as does the MR2.

From aeroflight web site:

In late 1990 several Nimrod MR.2s were fitted with an underwing FLIR turret under the starboard wing, BOZ pod under the port wing and a Towed Radar Decoy, under the unofficial designation MR.2(GM) - where GM stood for Gulf Mod.

I can only assume that Rib 7 is the Wing Rib that the pylon, then BOZ pod are mounted on, this would not be near the bomb bay and should not be relevant to the incident, but not knowing any of the facts of the incident, I can only make an assumption

And before anyone mentions security this information is readily accessible from the internet.

[Safety_Helmut]

The BOZ pods are Pylon mounted CHAFF Dispensers, basically it spits out shredded tin foil.

The BOZ pod is a pylon mounted Chaff and flare dispenser, BOZ 107 fitted to Nimrod. Adapted from the Tornado for the Nimrod.

S_H

[Exrigger]

Thanks SH, I stand corrected, I was primarily working from memory of my Tornado days and then posted what was written from a web site that did not mention Flare dispensing from same pod.

[Nimman]

See http://www.spyflight.co.uk/nim.htm the 2nd picture down shows a boz pod attaced at rib 7 (on underside of mainplane between the engines and 4a pod tank)

[Exrigger]

Nimman, just pipped me on that one, I was a bit slower finding the pictures.

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks for the answers guys, Exrigger the reason I asked the question is because is was thought by some that the suspension of BOZ pods were causing fuel leaks to emerge at Rib 7. Especially on ac flying over Afghanistan where the stresses were greater.

[Exrigger]

This is always a possibility, but not likely, the aircraft have always had pylon mounts, pylons and missiles fitted, in the mid seventies it was decided that there was no need to carry missiles on these pylons and we removed them. The aircraft would have gone through flight trials and wing load testing, so it could be assumed that to re-use them would not be a problem. I understand what you are saying about Afghanistan, in that a lot of factors could come into play that might not of been considered, least of all the weight difference between the BOZ pod and it's pylon compared with the weight of the missiles on their pylon that might give rise to higher wing flutter, thus fatigue cracking. The turbulance plus heat should not be much difference to the flight profiles that used to be flown (from memory) out in Malta/Cyprus and a few other hot places. Not knowing the flight profiles flown by the current deployed Nimrod aircraft or their equipment fits, I can only say that this is my thoughts on the subject and again I stand to be corrected by those that are more current/have better memory/knowledge than I have shown.

regards Exrigger

[Tappers Dad]

Does anyone know if XV230 had Boz Pods fitted ?

[Safety_Helmut]

Certainly has done in the past TD, a couple of pictures linked below, It's the pointed thing on the pylons under the wing, one one each side.

http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=0837258&WxsIERv=Unjxre%20Fvqqryrl%20Avzebq%20ZE2C%20%28801%29&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=HX%20-%20Nve%20Sbepr&QtODMg=Jnqqvatgba%20%28JGA%20%2F%20RTKJ%29&ERDLTkt=HX%20-%20Ratynaq&ktODMp=Whar%202004&BP=1&WNEb25u=Cnhy%20Uneirl&xsIERvdWdsY=KI230&MgTUQtODMgKE=&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=747&NEb25uZWxs=2005-05-13%2010%3A13%3A11&ODJ9dvCE=30&O89Dcjdg=8005&static=yes&width=1024&height=707&sok=JURER%20%20%28ZNGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccu bgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel%2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2C ert%2Cnvepensg_trarevp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B% 22ki230%22%27%20VA%20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20 cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=11&prev_id=0855304&next_id=0707952
and
http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=0989722&size=L&width=1200&height=812&sok=JURER%20%20%28ZNGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccu bgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel%2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2C ert%2Cnvepensg_trarevp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B% 22ki230%22%27%20VA%20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20 cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=1

[Exrigger]

TD according to the pictures on airliners.net, yes XV230 did have the pod fitted.

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks again all. I hope to make things clearer after the BOI.

[pipistrelle]

Firstly to TD and all the other bereaved families of XV230 my most sincere condolences on this sad anniversary. I was fortunate enough to serve on CXX/3 and a few others during my 14 yrs at ISK.
During my time on the squadrons it was known that the Nimrod was plagued with many problems from corrosion to hydraulics and it speaks volumes for the crews who maintained and operated these planes that the 'Kipper Fleet' managed to fulfil its role, however that was in the seventies and eighties and the Nimrod is still slogging on giving sterling service. I would have hoped that by now the Mighty Hunter in the twilight of of its service would be supported technically and financially to enable it to do just this. I sincerely hope that the BOI will not be a whitewash and that the outcome will prevent another tragedy like this ever happening again.
I can only praise the dedication of TD who is only trying to get at the truth and find it refreshing that he is supported by an MP who is only representing the wishes of the people who democratically elected him.

[Distant Voice]

Did XV230 undergo a primary servicing or a major servicing before going to the Gulf in early 2006?

DV

[Tappers Dad]

DV
According to http://www.janes.com/aerospace/military/news/jdw/jdw060905_1_n.shtml

The Nimrod, which an MoD official said was likely to have crashed because of "technical difficulties", had undergone depot-level maintenance two months prior to the incident, an industry source told Jane's.

I understood that XV230 had been out in the gulf from early in the year about March I think.

[Safety_Helmut]

I seem to remember XV230 featuring quite heavily in the MoD press as the first of the Nimrods to go through the new equalized servicing regime. Does anyone else remember this or have links to the publications it appeared in ? I think it even got some sort of mention on this thread, didn't someone mention that the picture of 230 had been reused, but the number had been edited out ?

I should hope that people are looking very carefully at the servcing regime, the periodicity was extended several years ago and I believe it has fairly recently been extended again.


S_H

[Nimman]

Page 39 entries 775 and 768 of this thread make some reference to the maintenance activity of this ac

[Tappers Dad]

Safety_Helmut

I am indeed looking at the servcing regime very carefully.
I requested the BAE Systems report and it's recommendations in August 2004 in a "safety case that a fire detection and suppression system be fitted to its bomb bay.

Unfortunatly they have turned down my FOI request on the grounds that under Section 43 of the Act (information containing details that are prejudicial to the commercial interests of a supplier).

Mmmmm !!!!

[Distant Voice]

Many thanks for those reminders regarding the new types of "money saving" changes in maintenace programs. Clearly XV 230 did not undergo the normal major servicing in early 2006. I asked the question because I had sight of documentation, dated early 2006, that talks about fuel leaks (of some concern) on XV230 at a time it was due "a Primary"

DV

[MightyHunter AGE]

So DV what are you saying then, that the MU is not doing its job properly? that jets are being sent up with fuel leaks that aren't being rectified? or indeed that the very people who decide what the aircraft maint schedule aren't doing their job either and are putting lives at risk by making the servicing less than they were before?

Every jet in the RAF is moving away from the old style maint to equalized maint, should we doubt all those jets as well?

Don't beat about the bush and give us the benefit of your vast scheduling policy experience.

[Tappers Dad]

I think DV is refering to QinetiQ which is a leading international defence and security company who said in 2006 they believe that the main cause of fuel leaks on Nimrods "was that the age of the airframe and the interlay sealant between the joints (from manufacture) and play on the fasteners between ribs/skin panels, combined with the aggressive tempo with which the RAF are flying the jets in stark temperature shifts.

I may be wrong but I think that is what DV is refering to.

[MightyHunter AGE]

DV

Almost certainly 30 was serviced before it went out to the Gulf otherwise it would not be able to fly due to lack of hours.

I am not sure what you are driving at now but EVERY jet that goes out to the Gulf has to be serviced for the reason given above.

Primary servicings are carried out by RAMS and NLS personnel.

Anything else?