How true, I was an engineer, and led large projects which involved hiring people. Often I encountered applicants who had 20 or 30 years of 'experience' , but who on deeper enquiry had obviously had the same years 'experience' 20 or 30 times. Airline pilots with many thousands of hours may have only actually handled the controls for a tiny fraction of that time. I am a glider pilot with over a thousand hours during which my hands were seldom off the controls for more than a minute or two. There is increasing evidence that this lack of hands on is a contributary cause of some of the accidents we see to commercial flights.

Did he enter the sea in a spin?
 

No, the Night rating has no restrictions. However he did not have one so its a moot point.....

Actually being a skydive pilot myself, your stick and rudder skills improve enormously so I doubt the pilot was lacking in that regard. It's hands on flying all the way.
However I did find that others skills withered from lack of use. I sure wouldn't like to to find myself over the Channel at night in weather without recent practice and I actually held an Instrument rating with plenty of hours in actual IMC.

The possibility of spatial disorientation followed by in flight break up is what the report seems to imply. It's a common enough outcome, inadvertent entry into IMC on a VFR flight.

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So basically, whatever other information comes to light, it was not a legal flight.

I am not so sure about the inflight break up. The sonar seemed to show the wings were still attached and he was pretty low, rather spatial disorientation and high speed impact with the sea, causing the engine to break off and the tail to collapse on the fuselage. Figure 7 seems to show more damage on the right, so perhaps still in a right turn, possibly a spiral dive? Not sure what to make of the outward parts of the wings having broken off, perhaps someone has an idea? Inflight breakup would likely sheer-off an entire wing?

Yes I agree entirely. It's chilling in a way... the old saying, in IMC a VFR pilot has only got 3 minutes to survive. This pilot requested descent to return to VMC.

The initial radar return in the AAIB's track was at 2013:32, 3 minutes 2 seconds later at 2016:34 was the last radar return at the crash site.

Here is an extract from the PA46 Malibu Pilots Operating Handbook.
2.34 ICING INFORMATION "WARNING" Severe icing may result from environmental conditions outside of those for which the airplane is certified. Flight in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, or mixed icing conditions (supercooled liquid water and ice crystals) may result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system, or may result in ice forming aft of the protected surfaces. This ice may not be shed using the ice protection systems, and may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the airplane. During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for which the airplane is certificated shall be determined by the following visual cues. If one or more of these visual cues exists, immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing conditions. Unusually extensive ice accumulation on the airframe and windshield in areas not normally observed to collect ice. Accumulation of ice on the upper surface of the wing, aft of the protected area. Accumulation of ice on the engine nacelles and propeller spinners farther aft than normally observed. Since the autopilot, when installed and operating, may mask tactile cues that indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics, use of the autopilot is prohibited when any of the visual cues specified above exist, or when unusual lateral trim requirements or autopilot trim warnings are encountered while the airplane is in icing conditions. All wing icing inspection lights must be operative prior to flight into known or forecast icing conditions at night.

May be of interest to a previous post about auto pilot malfunction. AS the above reminds us more to the point is pilot`s knowledge about the use and limitations of the auto pilot.

I am surprised by some comments here that assume that the interim report states the illegality of the flight.

I don't read any of that in the report.
It says that, if the flight was organised as a cost sharing flight, the FAA rules would apply ; i.e. pro-rata cost sharing and common purpose.

However, it is pretty obvious that the costs were neither borne by the pilot nor by the passenger.
Possibly by the operator or by a third person.
As the operator does not hold an air carrier certificate, this is a PART 91 flight.
As per FAR §61.113, in such a situation and if the aircraft transports passengers or goods, the pilot MUST hold a CPL licence.
If the aircraft were not carrying passenger or goods (eg: a ferry flight) and the pilot were not receiving any compensation, the flight would have been legal.

So the conclusion is the same : the flight was very probably illegal because the pilot was not holding a commercial licence.
However, this is inferred from other elements than just the report contents.

right but does the FAA also not state that the direct costs are borne by the OCCUPANTS of the craft (up to a maximum of six) on a pro-rata basis? A third party paying for the direct costs would not seem to meet the cost-sharing criteria.

skyrangerpro,

the interim report confirms that

you're right of course, this wasn't a cost-sharing flight, but that's not to say it it wasn't being flown under the auspices of being one. The FAA state for a cost sharing flight that the direct costs are borne by the OCCUPANTS of the craft (up to a maximum of six) on a pro-rata basis. A third party paying for the direct costs would not meet the cost-sharing criteria. But then the corollary of your point is that the pilot knowingly flew a commercial flight and portrayed it as such without the necessary licence which I find extraordinary.

I have been saying for years that the laws requiring licences and log books to be carried on board the aircraft are bonkers, precisely because this means they're likely to be unavailable when they'd be of most interest.

Presumably Bruce Dickinson the chairman of Aeris was also unavailable. Do I remember he also owns an airline of sorts?

The Mail make much of the aircraft changing hands 4 times on the same day in 2015 but this is probably quite usual in the case of a N reg going into trust. I am not sure how the Mail can be certain that Cool Flourish Ltd are the beneficial owners, company returns do not readily confirm this as likely, no great change in the asset situation in 2015 as I recall.

I disagree. Night VFR request good skills of instrument flying. The pilot and the aircaft had everything to cross safely the showers line level through the clouds.

Trying to keep clear of the clouds means putting A/P off, turning and banking, which increases the risk of spatial disorientation. Had the pilot be asleep with autopilot, the aircraft would probably have reached Cardiff by itself...

What a total waste of time and energy this whole thing will become. No doubt we can spin our wheels for the next - what? 2, 3 years before a final report gets published and all for what exactly?

The AAIB and others will consume huge resource and present a lovely comprehensive report to tell us what? The Met looked marginal for his planned flight and his ratings and the cost sharing element is parallel to that. BUT to what end is all of this? Cost sharing pros/cons have been done to death, pilots are aware of the rules, the CAA are aware of the rules and even if there is some item of question in this flight so what the pilot is dead.

What would be a better use of time and resource would be free the AAIB to investigate the remainder of what is on their book in a more timely manner and any resource impact for the CAA to spend time and energy going through the rules they have to ensure they say what they think they mean, oh and maybe do the odd ramp check.

This set of weather data, available before the flight SCREAMS to any sane PPL, even with IMC and Night ratings, and current, and experienced etc etc "Don't Go!" Or at least it does to me. My ex CFI friend says to me that my competence exceeds my confidence and that is the way I like it! If and I say if I had been slightly tempted to do this journey at this time, I would have routed via SAM in clear air, and had a get out of jail free option there. Alas the pilot had a chance to change his mind when overflying Guernsey and didn't take it. In general I like a direct routing but in weather like this, it's best to chunk the journey into safe sectors and be prepared to abandon at any time. I have, of course, had get home-itis in my flying career but this accident reminds us that we all must have a the willingness to "just say NO".

Yes, I am all in agreement with everyone talking about the legalities or lack thereof in this journey but let's learn from this and examine ourselves whether flying privately or commercially.... If you have any nagging hesitancy about any element of a flight, stay on the ground!! And stay on the right side of the competence Vs confidence equation, it's served me well and I intend for it to continue to keep me and my friends alive a long while yet.

Pittsextra, you appear to be missing the rationale of accident investigations by the AAIB.
Ibbotson knew exactly why the accident occurred, if only for a few brief seconds, obviously by then it was far too late for him to get a second chance.
However, others might learn from the investigation, which btw is not to apportion blame.