Every company has a duty of care to its employees, rarely would that extend to oversight of an employees travel arrangements during off duty hours. I think it is way too early to seek to apportion blame. I think I agree with Chicken House now...and I would not worry that anything is going to get over-looked. There is absolutely zero chance of any sort of cover up whatsoever with this one.

....are the words of a man who has never met Willie Mckay.

I'm a chartered accountant and a PPL - I was asked to work for him (in my professional capacity) and refused. He's never asked me to work for him in my other capacity

You might want to Google "denominator neglect" before deleting that nonsense.

Luc Lion ... I'm just a PPL and have flown across the channel many times. From what I've read this pilot is also a PPL and I'm not sure he was instrument rated. (I don't get it where a PPL is flying a pro. footballer when the footballer could very likely afford any kind of flight by any carrier with any kind of pilot.)
My main point though is, this pilot's planned route from Nantes to Cardiff. From Nantes as a PPL holder flying a single engined aircraft I would have flown for as long as possible over land making the sea crossing as short as possible.
I ask myself why he didn't consider flying at a height which would give him the ability to glide to be over land from any point during that flight. This raises several questions of course ... was he IFR rated? i.e. could he fly in an airway? ... Icing conditions at the time and the anti-icing capabilities of the aircraft.
Assuming IFR rated and icing not being an issue ... he'd have been better crossing the channel at around 20,000 feet which would have given him 'friendly' height in the event of an engine failure and allowing him to glide to be over land. I assume this plane can glide for at least 2 miles for each 1,000 feet of height. I haven't accurately measured it but the shortest channel crossing on that route was about 60 miles and from Omonville-la Petite to Portland island in Hampshire, this route not taking them very far from a direct route to Cardiff.
Assuming the worst everywhere here... glide distance with full tanks and two on board, for each 1000 feet of height being just 2 miles (probably a little more) ... a minimum height of 15,000 feet, plus at least 1,000 feet of 'fat' at the point of arrival over land at Portland was required ... as said, 20,000 being ample.
To be at 5,000 feet and then request to fly at just over 2,000 feet for that Channel crossing, presumably in order to be able to fly VFR, is in my opinion irresponsible in a single engine aircraft flying in winter and at night.
As said I am just a private pilot and there are far more experienced pilots who will have a far better grasp of the situation than myself ... it's just my take on it.
Edit: I forgot to add that the reported position of where this aircraft was lost indicates that the route flown was directly from Nantes to Cardiff .... thus avoiding the safer option of staying close to land and when considering that the aircraft was single engined.

A Piper Malibu 310 glides at a bit better than 10:1, i.e., if you’re up at 25,000′ (5 miles) you can hopefully glide more than 47.25sm / 41.25nm miles horizontally. If the glide was commenced at 5,000' he would have only had 9.45sm / 8.25nm until SPLASHDOWN !!! Now with the emphasis on him requesting a descent to 2,300' his glide from there would be less than 4.35sm / 3.8nm if the donkey quit or 2mins 30secs to SPLASHDOWN !!!

Not going to post on this particular subject again, because it is irrelevant to any aspect of flight safety which is the only reason a lot of us will be posting here in the first place. R30, if you want to continue this...

...extremely random speculation, which nobody can possible know the truth of at this stage, then I guess its the internet and you can do so (assuming ofc the Mods don't step in)

CH sums it up imo...

I'll rest until something less speculative comes up.

I don't think you need to ask that question - and whether that happens at 20 thousand feet or 20 the result is the same.

He was just espousing a personal opinion, something we are all entitled to do, as do many on here. I don't think he attached any technical or professional to his opinion.

Very good reason to believe that the surface de-ice was known to be inop on the subject aircraft.

I think we agree, all else being considered, that the aircraft should have been cruising at levels around 15,000 or 20,000 feet.

I have read every thread so far, probably not remembering all I have read. Has anyone mentioned oxygen yet ?

If the aircraft had oxygen, can we guess that the pilot would have been familiar with the system enough to use it and to get the passenger to use it ?

@keni010,
Even putting aside gliding distance considerationsm, flying IFR (or VFR on top ending IFR) was the only reasonable plan possible with this aircraft when you put the following facts together:
1.- The EGFF TAF was forecasting an arrival in conditions below VMC minima.
TAF was:
EGFF 211644Z 2116/2212 22012KT 9999 SCT035 TEMPO 2116/2120 7000 -RA TEMPO
2120/2124 23016G26KT 6000 RA BKN010 PROB30 TEMPO 2120/2124 27020G30KT 4000 RA
BKN006 BECMG 2121/2124 28012KT TEMPO 2208/2212 6000 SHRA BKN010 PROB30 TEMPO
2208/2210 3000 SHRA SHRASN BKN008 PROB30 TEMPO 2210/2212 SHRA TSGS BKN008

2.- Night VFR requires that the ceiling is at minimum 1500 ft in airspace F and G and minimum 2000 ft in airspaces B, C, D, E.

To me, all this means:
- if de-ice equipment inop or pilot not trained : no-go
- if de-ice equipment and pilot are ok : IFR flight plan with fuel for destination EGFF + fuel for a UK alternate (eg: Oxford EGTK) + fuel to come back to Nantes LFRS

That's not a problem with 2 POB : full tank range with economy cruise is +/- 1380 nm, plus 45 min holding

See SERA.5005 in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ...01:0066:EN:PDF
The TAF at EGJJ indicated that the conditions would not be fulfilled over the Channel Islands:
EGJJ 211707Z 2118/2203 20010KT 9999 FEW015 BKN030 TEMPO 2118/2124 -RA BKN015
PROB30 TEMPO 2118/2121 7000 SHRA BKN012 BECMG 2121/2123 22020KT BECMG 2202/2203
31017KT NSW SCT015

3.- The weather maps on a LFRS-EGFF route shows that the tops were between FL100 and FL150 for most of the route with some scattered clouds higher right above EGFF

4.- VFR on top would have been possible but the Cardiff weather would have required an IFR arrival.
Highest possible VFR level being FL195 (in France, not sure if it is not lower in UK).
Of course, an IFR flight above weather was also possible with an arrival in IMC.

5.- In all cases, the di-icing equipment needed to be operational for the arrival, and the pilot trained to using it.
In case of de-icing equipment failure, the closest airport without icing conditions on arrival that I could find was the departure airport LFRS.
TAF LFRS 211700Z 2118/2224 VRB03KT CAVOK
BECMG 2123/2201 18010KT
BECMG 2202/2204 4000 -RA BKN012 BKN030
TEMPO 2204/2207 2500 RA BKN007
BECMG 2207/2209 32010KT CAVOK
BECMG 2213/2215 25007KT
PROB30 TEMPO 2215/2220 4000 SHRA BKN020TCU=

The above quote is is only supposition, my betting is that the Wing De-ice systems were in working order ( leading edge / stabilator / tailplane ) The propeller has de-ice as well.....now the unknown in all this is: Had the pilot read the POH for the PA46 310 ? ( It is 370 pages )

reason for AOC
 

Have to agree with ER . This unfortunate situation is the very reason we have AOC's (To offer protection to passengers) who may well have no idea about non airline flying (or equipment used).
AOC's do not stop accidents, but at least they have an impact on the level of service been offered and reduce the risks.
AOC's are safety related not profit driven, plus are expensive to operate, but they exist to protect travellers from the potential consequences of cost cutting and poor standards.

Whatever happened to this aircraft, I would suggest happened very quickly and was quite dramatic due to the fact it just "disappeared" in an area of good radar cover at 2300ft altitude, and there was no mayday, pan call or informative communication. IF icing was a factor it's possible he flew into or descended into an area of freezing rain which accumulates nasty clear icing very quickly. An aircraft with that low speed and very limited anti/de-icing capability would be in big trouble. IIRC freezing rain brought down a Citation (Mustang?) on approach into Friedrichshafen a year or two ago.

The PA46 is prone to icing and has quite a few quirks such as not having an automatic door for the alternate air source. When this ices up the performance drops off and unless you are on the ball monitoring it can go unnoticed. It is also prone to icing up of the static vents and again know where the alternate static source is located and when to activate it requires a through knowledge of the aircraft. I never flew it low level more than short hops between positioning airfields. I generally always flew it high 20-25,000ft as a rule IFR regardless of conditions and always trying to end up on an Instrument approach where possible. As a VFR aircraft low it has very poor visibility low out the front and requires a lot of work to keep a good look out so was mush easier just to go full IFR.

I have seen the static source freeze on it so that the altimeter and VSI are frozen and of course the reaction could be to shove the nose down further rather than CRM a solution and go to alternate static.