AA5342 Down DCA
Joined: Sep 2017
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From: Bremen
Big bus for the Concorde accident WillowRun 6-3 :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Fr..._investigation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Fr..._investigation
In March 2008, Bernard Farret, a deputy prosecutor in Pontoise, outside Paris, asked judges to bring manslaughter charges against Continental Airlines and two of its employees – John Taylor, the mechanic who replaced the wear strip on the DC-10, and his manager Stanley Ford – alleging negligence in the way the repair was carried out.[...] The convictions were overturned by a French appeals court in November 2012, thereby clearing Continental (which had merged with United Airlines by then) and Taylor of criminal responsibility.
Continental still retained the civil liability.
Joined: Jan 2008
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From: Australia
A preliminary caveat is necessary - actually, two caveats. The simpler one is that in my legal career I have not handled personal injury (negligence) matters and, although every attorney licensed in the United States presumably knows at least basics of any given legal subject matter - and even though this is only an internet forum and not practicing law - how the facts relating to the briefing of the approach to 3-3 will impact the liability issues probably will get pretty complicated in the actual lawsuit. (More on this to follow).
...
...
), such that we can better understand the legal side.
Last edited by artee; 30th September 2025 at 23:07.
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From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Legislation regarding ADS-B and other reforms
From Senate Commerce Committee website, following is a summary of the ROTOR Act - Rotorcraft Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform Act. Commerce Committee vote may take place next week.
___________
Rotor Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform (ROTOR) Act
Upgrading In-Flight Safety Technology and Fixing Helicopter Operations to Eliminate Risk
[Sponsors] Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Ted Budd (R-NC), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Roger Marshall (R-KS), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Todd Young (R-IN)
The Problem : The midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and an Army Black Hawk helicopter on January 29th was preventable. For decades, the airspace around the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) operated without an accident, but with thousands of close calls that should have resulted in preventive action. The Black Hawk was likely operating in congested airspace without transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out—a satellite beacon technology that can transmit location, altitude, and velocity to air traffic control and other nearby aircraft faster than radar or other transponders. The airspace is only as safe as its least equipped aircraft, which is why military aircraft must not play by different rules.
The Solution: The ROTOR Act
The ROTOR Act improves aviation safety, addresses FAA knowledge and oversight of ADS-B, and directs the Army Inspector General (OIG) to reevaluate its aviation safety practices. The bill requires:
1. All aircraft operators to equip with ADS-B In technology and transmit such information. ADS-B In is a technology for aircraft to receive location signals from other nearby aircraft and ground technology, improving safety in the sky and on runways.
2. Closes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) loophole that permitted the Army Black Hawk to fly without broadcasting ADS-B Out. The ROTOR Act allows the FAA to only grant exceptions for “sensitive government missions,” not training flights.
3. Requires the FAA to review helicopter routes near airports. The FAA would comprehensively evaluate the airspace at congested airports—where helicopters and airplanes are flying near each other—nationwide.
4. Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army’s aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety.
5. Initiates FAA study on dynamic restricted area for helicopters near airports. The FAA would review whether audio and visual signals could be deployed to reduce airspace confusion and avoid traffic conflicts.
6. Repeals a Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA provision that exempted the Department of Defense from enacted ADS-B transmission requirements.
Why This Matters: The tragic midair collision earlier this year exposed serious and systemic weaknesses in how civilian and military aircraft share and operate in congested airspace. While the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation continues, initial findings show glaring failures in oversight and coordination that must be addressed now, not later. The ROTOR Act was drafted in direct response to the operational shortcomings that led to the midair collision. Deconflicting congested airspace and establishing better communication standards between civilian and military aircraftis not optional—it is essential. The ROTOR Act does exactly that, ensuring American skies remain the safest in the world.
___________
Rotor Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform (ROTOR) Act
Upgrading In-Flight Safety Technology and Fixing Helicopter Operations to Eliminate Risk
[Sponsors] Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Ted Budd (R-NC), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Roger Marshall (R-KS), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Todd Young (R-IN)
The Problem : The midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and an Army Black Hawk helicopter on January 29th was preventable. For decades, the airspace around the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) operated without an accident, but with thousands of close calls that should have resulted in preventive action. The Black Hawk was likely operating in congested airspace without transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out—a satellite beacon technology that can transmit location, altitude, and velocity to air traffic control and other nearby aircraft faster than radar or other transponders. The airspace is only as safe as its least equipped aircraft, which is why military aircraft must not play by different rules.
The Solution: The ROTOR Act
The ROTOR Act improves aviation safety, addresses FAA knowledge and oversight of ADS-B, and directs the Army Inspector General (OIG) to reevaluate its aviation safety practices. The bill requires:
1. All aircraft operators to equip with ADS-B In technology and transmit such information. ADS-B In is a technology for aircraft to receive location signals from other nearby aircraft and ground technology, improving safety in the sky and on runways.
2. Closes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) loophole that permitted the Army Black Hawk to fly without broadcasting ADS-B Out. The ROTOR Act allows the FAA to only grant exceptions for “sensitive government missions,” not training flights.
3. Requires the FAA to review helicopter routes near airports. The FAA would comprehensively evaluate the airspace at congested airports—where helicopters and airplanes are flying near each other—nationwide.
4. Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army’s aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety.
5. Initiates FAA study on dynamic restricted area for helicopters near airports. The FAA would review whether audio and visual signals could be deployed to reduce airspace confusion and avoid traffic conflicts.
6. Repeals a Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA provision that exempted the Department of Defense from enacted ADS-B transmission requirements.
Why This Matters: The tragic midair collision earlier this year exposed serious and systemic weaknesses in how civilian and military aircraft share and operate in congested airspace. While the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation continues, initial findings show glaring failures in oversight and coordination that must be addressed now, not later. The ROTOR Act was drafted in direct response to the operational shortcomings that led to the midair collision. Deconflicting congested airspace and establishing better communication standards between civilian and military aircraftis not optional—it is essential. The ROTOR Act does exactly that, ensuring American skies remain the safest in the world.
Joined: Mar 2002
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From: Seat 1A
What load of codswallop. Now we'll have every dogsbody pilot peering at their ADS-B In screens and asking ATC "is that return going to miss us?". TCAS does not require ADS-B, only a transponder (Mode S best). ADS-B In in busy CTAs/zones will be a distracting nightmare for crews.
Every pax jet is separated by SIDs and STARs, with either lateral and/or vertical separation. That is what is required here with the choppers. Playing TCAS dodgem-cars below 1000ft when you're trying to land is not the way to go.
Point 3 is the only one that makes any real sense. The rest sound good only to the great-unwashed.
Every pax jet is separated by SIDs and STARs, with either lateral and/or vertical separation. That is what is required here with the choppers. Playing TCAS dodgem-cars below 1000ft when you're trying to land is not the way to go.
Point 3 is the only one that makes any real sense. The rest sound good only to the great-unwashed.
Joined: Jul 2013
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Posts: 1,391
Likes: 678
From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
What load of codswallop. Now we'll have every dogsbody pilot peering at their ADS-B In screens and asking ATC "is that return going to miss us?". TCAS does not require ADS-B, only a transponder (Mode S best). ADS-B In in busy CTAs/zones will be a distracting nightmare for crews.
Every pax jet is separated by SIDs and STARs, with either lateral and/or vertical separation. That is what is required here with the choppers. Playing TCAS dodgem-cars below 1000ft when you're trying to land is not the way to go.
Point 3 is the only one that makes any real sense. The rest sound good only to the great-unwashed.
Every pax jet is separated by SIDs and STARs, with either lateral and/or vertical separation. That is what is required here with the choppers. Playing TCAS dodgem-cars below 1000ft when you're trying to land is not the way to go.
Point 3 is the only one that makes any real sense. The rest sound good only to the great-unwashed.
"Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army's aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety."
Why does this not make real sense?
The NTSB will very likely (undoubtedly, I think) include, in its report, quite extensive findings about the Army's operations. It was at least very unusual, if not unprecedented, for the NTSB to issue urgent recommendations to FAA in the immediate aftermath of January 29 with regard to use of the helicopter routes. On these facts, why is it not sensible to require the Army to undergo an IG review?
Although without a service record, I do generally understand the idea that the Army's task and purpose is lethality, at least in the meaning of that term before the assemblage at Quantico earlier this fall. Surely operating in domestic airspace doesn't make safety irrelevant "becasue lethality", does it?
One other aspect of this tragic and from many perspectives senseless midair collision is that very dedicated professional people in the aviation field are going to have their respective actions and failures to act in the events of January 29 scrutinized in the most harshly critical light in a courtroom. Bluntly, their performance will be trashed - the Army pilots, one or more controllers, and as discussed recently on this thread, the airline aviators too. On these facts, and hoping that reasonable minds may differ, I think the IG review isn't just a sensible idea, it's a necessity. It is something owed to those people, who are not going to speak up in their defense, or in their eternal regrets, from the great beyond. The least the United States can do is to find out what to do better. I'll work for the IG project, gratis, .... if they'd take me.
Joined: Dec 2001
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From: Here 'n' there!
As a non-technical poster on this forum I sure as shucks won't comment on the ADS-B content of the proposed legislation. But point 4 of the summary:
"Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army's aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety." Why does this not make real sense? .................... On these facts, why is it not sensible to require the Army to undergo an IG review? .....................
"Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army's aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety." Why does this not make real sense? .................... On these facts, why is it not sensible to require the Army to undergo an IG review? .....................
Here, assuming the original quote is accurate (and nothing suggests it's not!), I suspect my bold highlighting above is key. Given the IG decided not to conduct a review of safety practices himself it looks like someone has just told the IG in no uncertain terms "So you don't want to voluntarily review things? Fine - so now we're ordering you to! Run along now like a good little chap and, by the way, when you report back, we'll be paying very close attention to your conclusions - so don't even think of a white-wash!".
I suspect that this is the unwritten message to the IG given they are even highlighting why they are having to order him to do it!
Last edited by Hot 'n' High; 17th October 2025 at 16:38.
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From: Bremen
"The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army's aviation safety practices."
Not knowing why the Army IG declined, my guess is "we're understaffed and overworked, this isn't our job", and putting that job on a bill means extra funding can be assigned to it. If the IG did it voluntarily, that'd come out of the existing budget. Or it provides justification for dropping some of the other tasks and doing this instead.
Maybe the IG thinks the DoD should provide that report.
We don't really know because the refusal isn't public, so we only know one side of the issue.
And I for one am reluctant to trust a politician over a (inspector) general in this.
Here, assuming the original quote is accurate (and nothing suggests it's not!), I suspect my bold highlighting above is key. Given the IG decided not to conduct a review of safety practices himself it looks like someone has just told the IG in no uncertain terms "So you don't want to voluntarily review things? Fine - so now we're ordering you to! Run along now like a good little chap and, by the way, when you report back, we'll be paying very close attention to your conclusions - so don't even think of a white-wash!".
I suspect that this the unwritten message to the IG given they are even highlighting why they are having to order him to do it!
I suspect that this the unwritten message to the IG given they are even highlighting why they are having to order him to do it!
Maybe the IG thinks the DoD should provide that report.
We don't really know because the refusal isn't public, so we only know one side of the issue.
And I for one am reluctant to trust a politician over a (inspector) general in this.
Joined: Dec 2001
Posts: 1,484
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From: Here 'n' there!
Maybe it is just a case of the politicians stamping their authority........ but to "name and shame" in such a clear way rather implies that there's a bit more to it.
Anyway, hopefully it allays WR's fears and confirms that the Mil usually do take safety seriously. That was the main point I was trying to make.
Last edited by Hot 'n' High; 17th October 2025 at 16:01.
Joined: Sep 2001
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
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From: Toronto
What load of codswallop. Now we'll have every dogsbody pilot peering at their ADS-B In screens and asking ATC "is that return going to miss us?". TCAS does not require ADS-B, only a transponder (Mode S best). ADS-B In in busy CTAs/zones will be a distracting nightmare for crews.
For one example before ADS-B display, ATC once dumped me in front of CAT that required a 90±° bank to avoid. There were other interesting encounters with CAT in Class E - no longer.
As we saw here, ATC can fall short and altitudes can be missed. An ADS-B display is a valuable backstop - for a small fraction of the cost of TCAS.
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From: Virginia, USA
As I recall from the interviews, there was no Army aviation policy about how this technology was to be used during DC area flights. Some crews used it, but most did not.
Joined: Jul 2013
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From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
On the Inspector General portion of the proposed legislation (and I'm taking the summary published by the Senate Commerce Comm. as accurate of what actually is in the proposed legislative measure): I had been under the impression that the various Inspector General offices throughout the federal interagency work on any assignment they are given, that they need to tackle and proceed with the established IG process, and there isn't a project-by-project requisition for funding. In other words whatever work they are assigned, the annual appropriation for the IG function is in place. But not having worked with any IG office - and knowing that "partner in a law firm" is a quite different world, I don't really know.
There's more to the IG part of the proposed legislation than budgeting, however. My first thought when I read the Sen. Commerce Comm. summary was that the IG and - speaking generally here - various senior-level authorities in the Defense (now "War") Department, the Army, and the White House, realized almost immediately after the accident - certainly once the initial set of facts came to light - that an Army IG investigation would be guaranteed to produce one thing at least: free discovery for the accident victims' families and their attorneys. As time has rolled on, and with the first Complaint now on file in federal district court, this dynamic has become even more persuasive imo.
I'll litter the thread with legal stuff only a little more here. Anyone following the thread has seen posts about the application of part of sovereign immunity to claims against the Army and the FAA/DOT, despite the Federal Tort Claims Act. Specifically, sovereign immunity continues to apply where the alleged negligence resulted from a federal entity exercising "discretion" in making some decision based on weighing competing policy interests and requirements (apologies both for repeating myself from prior posts, and for the legal readers, for oversimplifying). I think this case is going to descend very far down "into the weeds" on this issue; the factual development seems very likely to get highly granular. And the reason for this is that ordinarily, the "discretionary function" refers to a specific decision at a particular time based on development of some sort of administrative record. I've resisted the impulse to post a summary of the Varig Airlines case, in which the discretionary function part of sovereign immunity protected the FAA from liability in an aviation accident matter - the FAA had made a specific decision about how to handle inspections of aircraft (again, apologies for oversimplifying). But in the DCA midair ..... I think there was not one decision to which the discretionary function part of sovereign immunity could attach. This was not a case of discretion being exercised by FAA or by the Army at a specific time for making a decision about a particular thing - no, this was for lack of a recognized term - discretionary inertia. A cousin of normalization of deviance.
What does this have to do with the Army IG and higher-ups (and very very higher-ups) telling the IG to stay in their barracks, I mean offices? In examining the presumably many decisions (or just the intertia of informal practices) the Army made about helicopter flights in DCA airspace, and about altimiters, and about NVGs, and all the rest of the actual flying stuff I don't know, the IG would develop a factual record, and a very official one at that, about how far outside the discretionary function exception this situation really was. How much discretionary inertia was at work, and about how many different parts of the factual record. Which in turn would greatly complicate the Army - and FAA/DOT also in my view - defending in court . . . . if not actually sink the sovereign immunity defense pretty early on.
Caveat: there are probably thousands of published court decisions involving the discretionary function exception; I haven't read them (other than Varig Airlines, and that was in law school for my law review article), and I could have botched the analysis here handsomely.
On politicians and opportunists of other sorts: The Senate Commerce Committee has done heavy lifting in the civil aviation sector not long ago, in the aftermath of the MAX accidents. I'd give the professional staff working for the Committee some credit, not to say that I can take a side about ADS-B, but instead that they (and the Senators, obviously) see the greatly impactful aftermath of the DCA midair collision, and want to try to set the system on a better footing. And that's before NTSB's report lands on desks, whether noticed only for a few news cycles (if those even exist still) or instead lands with a thud. I'm anticipating it will be scatching, but many following the thread watched the hearings (and read the interviews), so . . . .
And don't forget, 12.5 billion bucks have been appropriated for new ATC stuff, with another 18 billion waiting, if not in the wings, then in the cloakrooms. Congress never hesitates to try to get in front of where the money is going, and 12 billion here, 18 billion there, pretty soon you're talking..... we hope not another NextGen sad story. Possibly the Senate Committee is staking out territory from which to try to assure this time, modernization gets done and done right. (I know, there are structural issues too, but one hill to die on at a time.)
QUOTE=Propellerhead;11971298]Suing AA is just corporate greed by the lawyers. Don’t see how any of this is the fault of the airline pilots.[/QUOTE]
I entirely agree with the second sentence, and "slapping myself upside of the head" if any of my posts even left the door open to suggesting otherwise. At the same time, the legal process exists to adjudicate claims of injured parties, in this instance, the families of the accident victims. Their lawyers are doing what the system expects them to do, and while lawyers as a group will never, in this society, engender feelings of sweetness and light, I don't think greed is the reason claims against the airline were filed. I'll leave to one side the familiarity (slight though it may be) I happen to have with the lawyers who filed the Complaint - it won't help here to say they've done plenty well, they're consummate professionals, and they are ethically bound to press for significant compensation for their clients. Others will, understandably, scoff and say, "yeah, that's what I meant, lawyers are greedy." (There was, some years ago, a law firm gossip message board known as Greedy Associates, but I digress.)
No, I think the attorneys for the accident victims' families had little choice other than to assert claims against the airline, as wretched as I think those claims are. First, the federal defendants might pull off a Hail Mary of some sort and establish sovereign immunity through the discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Second, there are no punitive damages awards against the federal defendants, even if they are found liable. Third, including these claims helps to develop a thorough (and might I say, persuasive) factual record to argue to the court and to the jury (leaving aside factors about advisory juries in FTCA matters & etc.). One could just say "deep pockets" but I wanted to highlight what I believe was the lawyers' thought process. Of course they'll vehemently assert the airline actually was negligent, meaning the pilots..... wretched, abhorent.
Maybe I can find an organization which would like to intervene in the case, on behalf of professional piloting - the pilots are victims of the screwed up airspace management too, aren't they? - and then become counsel of record in the case. Don't hold any breaths.
There's more to the IG part of the proposed legislation than budgeting, however. My first thought when I read the Sen. Commerce Comm. summary was that the IG and - speaking generally here - various senior-level authorities in the Defense (now "War") Department, the Army, and the White House, realized almost immediately after the accident - certainly once the initial set of facts came to light - that an Army IG investigation would be guaranteed to produce one thing at least: free discovery for the accident victims' families and their attorneys. As time has rolled on, and with the first Complaint now on file in federal district court, this dynamic has become even more persuasive imo.
I'll litter the thread with legal stuff only a little more here. Anyone following the thread has seen posts about the application of part of sovereign immunity to claims against the Army and the FAA/DOT, despite the Federal Tort Claims Act. Specifically, sovereign immunity continues to apply where the alleged negligence resulted from a federal entity exercising "discretion" in making some decision based on weighing competing policy interests and requirements (apologies both for repeating myself from prior posts, and for the legal readers, for oversimplifying). I think this case is going to descend very far down "into the weeds" on this issue; the factual development seems very likely to get highly granular. And the reason for this is that ordinarily, the "discretionary function" refers to a specific decision at a particular time based on development of some sort of administrative record. I've resisted the impulse to post a summary of the Varig Airlines case, in which the discretionary function part of sovereign immunity protected the FAA from liability in an aviation accident matter - the FAA had made a specific decision about how to handle inspections of aircraft (again, apologies for oversimplifying). But in the DCA midair ..... I think there was not one decision to which the discretionary function part of sovereign immunity could attach. This was not a case of discretion being exercised by FAA or by the Army at a specific time for making a decision about a particular thing - no, this was for lack of a recognized term - discretionary inertia. A cousin of normalization of deviance.
What does this have to do with the Army IG and higher-ups (and very very higher-ups) telling the IG to stay in their barracks, I mean offices? In examining the presumably many decisions (or just the intertia of informal practices) the Army made about helicopter flights in DCA airspace, and about altimiters, and about NVGs, and all the rest of the actual flying stuff I don't know, the IG would develop a factual record, and a very official one at that, about how far outside the discretionary function exception this situation really was. How much discretionary inertia was at work, and about how many different parts of the factual record. Which in turn would greatly complicate the Army - and FAA/DOT also in my view - defending in court . . . . if not actually sink the sovereign immunity defense pretty early on.
Caveat: there are probably thousands of published court decisions involving the discretionary function exception; I haven't read them (other than Varig Airlines, and that was in law school for my law review article), and I could have botched the analysis here handsomely.
On politicians and opportunists of other sorts: The Senate Commerce Committee has done heavy lifting in the civil aviation sector not long ago, in the aftermath of the MAX accidents. I'd give the professional staff working for the Committee some credit, not to say that I can take a side about ADS-B, but instead that they (and the Senators, obviously) see the greatly impactful aftermath of the DCA midair collision, and want to try to set the system on a better footing. And that's before NTSB's report lands on desks, whether noticed only for a few news cycles (if those even exist still) or instead lands with a thud. I'm anticipating it will be scatching, but many following the thread watched the hearings (and read the interviews), so . . . .
And don't forget, 12.5 billion bucks have been appropriated for new ATC stuff, with another 18 billion waiting, if not in the wings, then in the cloakrooms. Congress never hesitates to try to get in front of where the money is going, and 12 billion here, 18 billion there, pretty soon you're talking..... we hope not another NextGen sad story. Possibly the Senate Committee is staking out territory from which to try to assure this time, modernization gets done and done right. (I know, there are structural issues too, but one hill to die on at a time.)
QUOTE=Propellerhead;11971298]Suing AA is just corporate greed by the lawyers. Don’t see how any of this is the fault of the airline pilots.[/QUOTE]
I entirely agree with the second sentence, and "slapping myself upside of the head" if any of my posts even left the door open to suggesting otherwise. At the same time, the legal process exists to adjudicate claims of injured parties, in this instance, the families of the accident victims. Their lawyers are doing what the system expects them to do, and while lawyers as a group will never, in this society, engender feelings of sweetness and light, I don't think greed is the reason claims against the airline were filed. I'll leave to one side the familiarity (slight though it may be) I happen to have with the lawyers who filed the Complaint - it won't help here to say they've done plenty well, they're consummate professionals, and they are ethically bound to press for significant compensation for their clients. Others will, understandably, scoff and say, "yeah, that's what I meant, lawyers are greedy." (There was, some years ago, a law firm gossip message board known as Greedy Associates, but I digress.)
No, I think the attorneys for the accident victims' families had little choice other than to assert claims against the airline, as wretched as I think those claims are. First, the federal defendants might pull off a Hail Mary of some sort and establish sovereign immunity through the discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Second, there are no punitive damages awards against the federal defendants, even if they are found liable. Third, including these claims helps to develop a thorough (and might I say, persuasive) factual record to argue to the court and to the jury (leaving aside factors about advisory juries in FTCA matters & etc.). One could just say "deep pockets" but I wanted to highlight what I believe was the lawyers' thought process. Of course they'll vehemently assert the airline actually was negligent, meaning the pilots..... wretched, abhorent.
Maybe I can find an organization which would like to intervene in the case, on behalf of professional piloting - the pilots are victims of the screwed up airspace management too, aren't they? - and then become counsel of record in the case. Don't hold any breaths.
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
Posts: 611
Likes: 474
From: Maryland USA
What load of codswallop. Now we'll have every dogsbody pilot peering at their ADS-B In screens and asking ATC "is that return going to miss us?". TCAS does not require ADS-B, only a transponder (Mode S best). ADS-B In in busy CTAs/zones will be a distracting nightmare for crews.
Every pax jet is separated by SIDs and STARs, with either lateral and/or vertical separation. That is what is required here with the choppers. Playing TCAS dodgem-cars below 1000ft when you're trying to land is not the way to go.
Point 3 is the only one that makes any real sense. The rest sound good only to the great-unwashed.
Every pax jet is separated by SIDs and STARs, with either lateral and/or vertical separation. That is what is required here with the choppers. Playing TCAS dodgem-cars below 1000ft when you're trying to land is not the way to go.
Point 3 is the only one that makes any real sense. The rest sound good only to the great-unwashed.
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
Posts: 611
Likes: 474
From: Maryland USA
Pegase Driver
Joined: May 1997
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Posts: 4,456
Likes: 1,168
From: Europe
I personally do not think ADS-B on the helicopter would have changed anything , From what I understand , if it had it could have been spotted earlier by ATC , the conflict alert might have sounded a couple of seconds earlier , etc .. pure speculation .
It would not have changed much for the AA CRJ either , the TA would have been more precise and maybe a second or two earlier , but he had already 2 TAs and most certainly so short from landing the PF was focusing on the PAPI not his TA display
It might have changed something if the Heli was equipped with a CDTI ( ADS-B in display) as it is a powerful tool to help identify traffic visually. But not separate yourself from another aircraft . One thing people in offices making such statements forget is that to provide separations maneuvers ATC needs a stable radar picture , with antennas firmly on the ground facing North . Inside an aircraft constantly moving the picture moves with it , (as you can see on your TCAS display ) Extremely complex to separate yourself using that kind of picture when both you and the target are moving. AWACS operators are trained to do this , but not your average pilot .
So I think this ADS-B on the Military Helis is a red herring made by politicians wanting to appear to “do something “ and perhaps distract the public from the FAA and regulator failures on both the design of the airspace / routes and the lack of action after numerous previous serious incidents reports ,
It would not have changed much for the AA CRJ either , the TA would have been more precise and maybe a second or two earlier , but he had already 2 TAs and most certainly so short from landing the PF was focusing on the PAPI not his TA display
It might have changed something if the Heli was equipped with a CDTI ( ADS-B in display) as it is a powerful tool to help identify traffic visually. But not separate yourself from another aircraft . One thing people in offices making such statements forget is that to provide separations maneuvers ATC needs a stable radar picture , with antennas firmly on the ground facing North . Inside an aircraft constantly moving the picture moves with it , (as you can see on your TCAS display ) Extremely complex to separate yourself using that kind of picture when both you and the target are moving. AWACS operators are trained to do this , but not your average pilot .
So I think this ADS-B on the Military Helis is a red herring made by politicians wanting to appear to “do something “ and perhaps distract the public from the FAA and regulator failures on both the design of the airspace / routes and the lack of action after numerous previous serious incidents reports ,
Joined: Dec 2001
Posts: 1,484
Likes: 859
From: Here 'n' there!
WR, your Post at #1741 sets out an entirely believable reason why the IG could have been told to keep schtum on the matter and is one I'd not considered - mainly due to the fact that the concept of "discretion" is not one that seems to be prevalent here in the UK. The old "Crown Immunity" was, to me as a layman, possibly our version of "discretion" but that has been reined in over the past few decades.
Here, safety cover-ups (the Mull of Kintyre Chinook fiasco being an immediate example that springs to my mind) seemed more aimed at protecting the reputations of individuals rather than fending off litigation - hence the findings of the RAF's own Board of Inquiry being overturned by Senior Officers to protect those even more Senior Officers above them.
Maybe we live in a simpler legal world here in the UK so your comments are, as ever, quite illuminating to this Brit and highlight things from a different angle which is much appreciated. Whatever the reasons for such obscurification, I do often find myself thinking that the world we live in is not quite as "civilised" and "honest" as we try and make out.
And on that rather depressing observation I'll revert to "lurk mode"!
Here, safety cover-ups (the Mull of Kintyre Chinook fiasco being an immediate example that springs to my mind) seemed more aimed at protecting the reputations of individuals rather than fending off litigation - hence the findings of the RAF's own Board of Inquiry being overturned by Senior Officers to protect those even more Senior Officers above them.
Maybe we live in a simpler legal world here in the UK so your comments are, as ever, quite illuminating to this Brit and highlight things from a different angle which is much appreciated. Whatever the reasons for such obscurification, I do often find myself thinking that the world we live in is not quite as "civilised" and "honest" as we try and make out.
And on that rather depressing observation I'll revert to "lurk mode"!
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
Posts: 611
Likes: 474
From: Maryland USA
I personally do not think ADS-B on the helicopter would have changed anything , From what I understand , if it had it could have been spotted earlier by ATC , the conflict alert might have sounded a couple of seconds earlier , etc .. pure speculation .
It would not have changed much for the AA CRJ either , the TA would have been more precise and maybe a second or two earlier , but he had already 2 TAs and most certainly so short from landing the PF was focusing on the PAPI not his TA display
It might have changed something if the Heli was equipped with a CDTI ( ADS-B in display) as it is a powerful tool to help identify traffic visually. But not separate yourself from another aircraft . One thing people in offices making such statements forget is that to provide separations maneuvers ATC needs a stable radar picture , with antennas firmly on the ground facing North . Inside an aircraft constantly moving the picture moves with it , (as you can see on your TCAS display ) Extremely complex to separate yourself using that kind of picture when both you and the target are moving. AWACS operators are trained to do this , but not your average pilot .
So I think this ADS-B on the Military Helis is a red herring made by politicians wanting to appear to “do something “ and perhaps distract the public from the FAA and regulator failures on both the design of the airspace / routes and the lack of action after numerous previous serious incidents reports ,
It would not have changed much for the AA CRJ either , the TA would have been more precise and maybe a second or two earlier , but he had already 2 TAs and most certainly so short from landing the PF was focusing on the PAPI not his TA display
It might have changed something if the Heli was equipped with a CDTI ( ADS-B in display) as it is a powerful tool to help identify traffic visually. But not separate yourself from another aircraft . One thing people in offices making such statements forget is that to provide separations maneuvers ATC needs a stable radar picture , with antennas firmly on the ground facing North . Inside an aircraft constantly moving the picture moves with it , (as you can see on your TCAS display ) Extremely complex to separate yourself using that kind of picture when both you and the target are moving. AWACS operators are trained to do this , but not your average pilot .
So I think this ADS-B on the Military Helis is a red herring made by politicians wanting to appear to “do something “ and perhaps distract the public from the FAA and regulator failures on both the design of the airspace / routes and the lack of action after numerous previous serious incidents reports ,
Can I add some sympathy for the AA crew - A night over water runway change on final combined with dodging traffic is a LOT to ask of anyone. I can't say for sure what they would have done with ADS-B on the chopper, they said they would miss us, not by how much and we are 30 seconds from landing. The benefit here is the helo crew realizing they are dodging the wrong airplane.
* full disclosure, I have had a close call with the helo traffic there more than once, back in the day they did some crazy stuff. I would have LOVED to have seen them coming on a screen if such a thing had existed.
Last edited by island_airphoto; 18th October 2025 at 12:00.
Joined: Feb 2009
Posts: 2,824
Likes: 110
From: Virginia
IGs generally do (current circumstances excepted) have lump sum annual appropriations to cover all their activities. But they quite possibly lack significant aviation expertise, and their regular funding might not stretch to hiring much in.
Joined: Sep 2001
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
Posts: 2,787
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From: Toronto
Last August, a forestry helo announced it was transiting north of our field (they are regularly moving firefighters back and forth) and a helo symbol appeared on my traffic display. We were getting cozy with little altitude difference and I maneuvered to stay well clear.