AA5342 Down DCA
Joined: Oct 2019
Aviation Qualifications: Non-Aircrew
Posts: 1,698
Likes: 1,079
From: USA
The danger with this generalisation is that it suggests that technology alone solves the problem when time and time again this has proven not to be the case. Access to technology and procedures in use are not mutually exclusive.
I think ADSB-In is great but its absence is not why the DCA collision occurred. There is a line of reasoning that indicates the collision would have occurred in spite of technology.
I think ADSB-In is great but its absence is not why the DCA collision occurred. There is a line of reasoning that indicates the collision would have occurred in spite of technology.
Joined: Dec 2002
Posts: 2,769
Likes: 347
From: UK
Same question - why TCAS, weather radar, communication with ATC? All technology to avoid problems. Why is one system that is designed for the exact purpose of avoiding conflict at a considerable distance and time to respond, without the adverse effect of being shut off because the ground is nearby, rejected as a back-up for a system that had already badly failed?
Are these technologies to be used as the primary means of maintaining safety, or as additional protection to mitigate the variability in everyday operations (mistakes), normally protected by other means - distancing from terrain vs EGPWS, other aircraft ATC vs ACAS.
A choice, use of technology to either detect mistakes or to solve problems; where the latter requires higher accuracy, integrity and reliability - cost; everyone has to be equipped vs restrict the airspace, prohibit the operation.
Joined: Oct 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATPL
Posts: 1,556
Likes: 779
From: The Coal Face
Same question - why TCAS, weather radar, communication with ATC? All technology to avoid problems. Why is one system that is designed for the exact purpose of avoiding conflict at a considerable distance and time to respond, without the adverse effect of being shut off because the ground is nearby, rejected as a back-up for a system that had already badly failed?
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: Non-Aircrew
Posts: 1,390
Likes: 678
From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
NTSB recommendations & FAA "verbiage"
From information made publicly available by the TRB, the link below is the pdf with the Board's safety recommendations, and the FAA's description of its "initial" responses to each (which the FAA representative referred to as "verbiage" during the TRB committee meeting).
There are several other documents which are publicly available and (time permitting) if one or more appear pertinent to discussion on thread, I'll post them also.
https://www.dropbox.com/preview/(Cop...path=&scs=true
There are several other documents which are publicly available and (time permitting) if one or more appear pertinent to discussion on thread, I'll post them also.
https://www.dropbox.com/preview/(Cop...path=&scs=true
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: Non-Aircrew
Posts: 1,390
Likes: 678
From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
The lawsuits & the TRB
A review of the Pacer.gov website for the litigation arising from the midair collision yielded some information about which previous posts have speculated. Specifically, of the two flight attendants working on Bluestreak 5342, one has entered into a settlement of potential claims (which may still require some formal steps in order to become effective). Review of several court filings did not show that the other flight attendant has joined in the lawsuit. Likewise, the names of neither pilot of Bluestreak show up as plaintiffs. Caveat (and please note): this review of the court records was not exhaustive and possibly these "missing names" are in some unexpected filing. (I know I could reach out to defense counsel and inquire . . . .)
One of those pilots was Samuel Lilley. His parents, Tim and Sherri Lilley, and more particularly their quest to see that the safety deficiencies laid bare by the accident are not shunted into, shall we say, bureaucratic verbiage, were the subject of press reports earlier this year.
In the discussion on this thread about whether there is much more to be done in the aftermath of the accident other than the restructure or rearrangement of the airspace by FAA in the immediate aftermath of the accident, the written statement provided to the Transportation Research Board by First Officer Samuel Lilley's parents is, though I am just SLF, more than merely relevant. From the TRB's publicly available information, their statement is reproduced in full, verbatim:
_______
Statemnt Submitted to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
Review of Washington National Airspace System Risk and Coordination
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the committee’s review of the Washington National Capital Region airspace and to provide input regarding systemic safety risks in shared airspace. We respectfully submit the following observations based on our experience following the January 29, 2025 midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
This statement reflects our perspective on systemic safety risks in shared airspace, informed by our experience as the parents of First Officer Sam Lilley, who was killed in the January 29, 2025 midair collision near Washington National Airport. It is further informed by Tim Lilley’s extensive aviation experience as a retired U.S. Army Master Aviator and Black Hawk pilot, as well as his current role as a pilot in a fractional jet operation, and Sheri Lilley’s 30 years of experience in information technology, including 15 years supporting aviation systems and operational environments.
We recognize the committee’s role in evaluating systemic risk across airspace design, interagency coordination, and operational practices. The issue is not limited to a single event. It is whether the system consistently provides safe outcomes in a complex, high-density, mixed-use environment.
Central Concern
The current system within the National Capital Region does not consistently provide flight crews with complete, timely, and actionable visibility of nearby traffic, and instead continues to rely heavily on late-stage conflict detection, procedural coordination, and traditional “see and avoid” assumptions in an environment where those assumptions are increasingly insufficient.
In complex, high-density, mixed-use airspace, safety must increasingly depend not only on the ability to see and avoid, but on a layered system that enables all participants to consistently see and be seen through shared visibility and earlier conflict recognition.
This does not eliminate the importance of visual acquisition or procedural separation. Rather, it recognizes that in the National Capital Region, those methods alone are insufficient to provide the level of resilience required in a highly constrained and operationally complex environment.
Sound system design should not depend on humans performing flawlessly within the system in order for the system to function safely and effectively.
This gap is reflected in repeated near-miss events, longstanding recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board, and the operational realities of National Capital Region airspace.
Key Findings
1. Available surveillance data is not fully utilized
High-quality positional data is already available through existing broadcast surveillance systems. However, that data is not consistently provided to flight crews in a way that supports continuous situational understanding.
In practice, flight crews may not see nearby traffic until late in a developing situation, and available data is used primarily to support automated alerting rather than human decision-making. This represents a fundamental underuse of existing safety capability.
A modern safety architecture should support not only collision avoidance, but continuous shared visibility among all operators in the airspace.
In safety-critical environments, effective system design depends on layered and redundant visibility rather than reliance on a single source of information or a single opportunity for conflict detection.
In complex National Capital Region airspace, resilient system design should include redundant sources of traffic and positional awareness transmitted to all participating aircraft.
2. The system relies too heavily on reactive collision avoidance
Collision avoidance systems are essential, but they are designed as a last line of defense. In current implementations, resolution advisories are suppressed at low altitudes, limiting the availability of deconfliction guidance in terminal environments.
The operational complexity of National Capital Region airspace warrants evaluation of more advanced conflict detection and resolution technologies, including systems with enhanced algorithms capable of addressing limitations associated with low-altitude resolution advisory suppression.
Dependence on these systems indicates that:
• conflicts are identified too late
• crews and controllers are left with reduced time and fewer options
A safe system should enable earlier recognition of developing conflicts through layered visibility and shared situational awareness, not rely primarily on last-moment alerts or visual acquisition.
3. Situational awareness is not consistent across all operators
Shared airspace requires shared visibility.
Differences in equipage and data availability between civil and military aircraft create asymmetry in situational awareness, increasing reliance on assumptions and procedural coordination. This condition introduces risk that procedures alone cannot resolve.
The National Capital Region requires a layered “see and be seen” approach to safety, not reliance on visual acquisition alone.
The continued proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems within and around the National Capital Region will further complicate an already dense and operationally complex environment, reinforcing the need for scalable, layered approaches to shared visibility, conflict recognition, and coordinated situational awareness across all participants in the airspace.
4. Oversight of non-broadcast operations is limited
Military aircraft may operate without broadcasting positional data under approved waivers. While operationally necessary in some cases, this creates increased risk in dense, mixed-use airspace.
When aircraft are not broadcasting:
• they may not appear in shared traffic systems
• visibility is reduced for other operators
• separation depends more heavily on controllers and procedures
The key concern is the lack of consistent, transparent oversight and risk evaluation associated with these operations.
Non-broadcast operations in complex airspace should include:
• clear criteria for use
• cross-agency visibility into those decisions
• ongoing assessment of the risk introduced
Without this, gaps in situational awareness may go undetected in real time.
5. Civil-military coordination depends on incomplete tools
Coordination between civil and military operations often relies on:
• procedural compliance
• verbal communication
• partial data sharing
These methods are inherently limited in high-density airspace.
In the National Capital Region, procedural coordination alone cannot provide the level of safety required in shared civil-military airspace. Operators must not only avoid conflicts, but consistently maintain the ability to see and be seen within a common operational picture.
Effective coordination requires interoperable, shared, real-time visibility, not just procedural alignment.
6. Near-miss patterns indicate risk may be underestimated
Repeated near-miss events in and around DCA indicate persistent and elevated risk, not isolated anomalies.
These patterns suggest that:
• some operations may be consistently assessed as lower risk than conditions warrant
• routine mission characterization may not reflect the full complexity of the airspace
• prior near-misses are not always incorporated into future risk assessments
In this environment, risk may be underestimated at the outset, limiting the effectiveness of downstream mitigations.
A resilient safety system must also be capable of collecting, sharing, and analyzing operational and safety data across agencies and operators. The objective should be to identify precursor events and emerging risk trends early enough to prevent another catastrophic event from occurring.
A resilient system requires that:
• risk assessments reflect actual airspace complexity and traffic density
• recurring events inform future evaluations
• assumptions about routine operations are periodically challenged
Without this, risk may be present but not fully recognized.
Implications for System Design
• provide continuous access to complete traffic data to all aircraft operating in controlled airspace
• incorporate redundant, continuously available sources of traffic and positional awareness to ensure resilient shared visibility across National Capital Region airspace
• enable both automated collision avoidance and earlier human recognition of developing conflicts
• ensure consistent situational awareness across all operators, including civil and military
• apply clear oversight and risk governance when exceptions to standard surveillance practices are permitted
• support coordination through shared, real-time visibility, not solely procedural mechanisms
• support continuous aggregation and analysis of operational and safety data to identify precursor trends and emerging risks before catastrophic outcomes occur
Limiting available data to reactive collision avoidance does not meet these requirements.
Closing
The risks under consideration are not new and are not confined to a single event. They reflect structural characteristics of how shared airspace is currently designed and operated.
Improving safety in the National Capital Region requires moving beyond a safety model based primarily on procedural separation and visual acquisition, toward a layered system in which operators can consistently see and be seen through shared visibility, earlier conflict recognition, and coordinated situational awareness.
Sound system design should account for the realities of human performance and should not depend on flawless execution in order to maintain safe outcomes.
We appreciate the committee’s work and its role in advancing a more comprehensive approach to airspace safety.
Respectfully submitted,
Tim Lilley
[ ....]
Sheri Lilley
[.....]
One of those pilots was Samuel Lilley. His parents, Tim and Sherri Lilley, and more particularly their quest to see that the safety deficiencies laid bare by the accident are not shunted into, shall we say, bureaucratic verbiage, were the subject of press reports earlier this year.
In the discussion on this thread about whether there is much more to be done in the aftermath of the accident other than the restructure or rearrangement of the airspace by FAA in the immediate aftermath of the accident, the written statement provided to the Transportation Research Board by First Officer Samuel Lilley's parents is, though I am just SLF, more than merely relevant. From the TRB's publicly available information, their statement is reproduced in full, verbatim:
_______
Statemnt Submitted to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
Review of Washington National Airspace System Risk and Coordination
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the committee’s review of the Washington National Capital Region airspace and to provide input regarding systemic safety risks in shared airspace. We respectfully submit the following observations based on our experience following the January 29, 2025 midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
This statement reflects our perspective on systemic safety risks in shared airspace, informed by our experience as the parents of First Officer Sam Lilley, who was killed in the January 29, 2025 midair collision near Washington National Airport. It is further informed by Tim Lilley’s extensive aviation experience as a retired U.S. Army Master Aviator and Black Hawk pilot, as well as his current role as a pilot in a fractional jet operation, and Sheri Lilley’s 30 years of experience in information technology, including 15 years supporting aviation systems and operational environments.
We recognize the committee’s role in evaluating systemic risk across airspace design, interagency coordination, and operational practices. The issue is not limited to a single event. It is whether the system consistently provides safe outcomes in a complex, high-density, mixed-use environment.
Central Concern
The current system within the National Capital Region does not consistently provide flight crews with complete, timely, and actionable visibility of nearby traffic, and instead continues to rely heavily on late-stage conflict detection, procedural coordination, and traditional “see and avoid” assumptions in an environment where those assumptions are increasingly insufficient.
In complex, high-density, mixed-use airspace, safety must increasingly depend not only on the ability to see and avoid, but on a layered system that enables all participants to consistently see and be seen through shared visibility and earlier conflict recognition.
This does not eliminate the importance of visual acquisition or procedural separation. Rather, it recognizes that in the National Capital Region, those methods alone are insufficient to provide the level of resilience required in a highly constrained and operationally complex environment.
Sound system design should not depend on humans performing flawlessly within the system in order for the system to function safely and effectively.
This gap is reflected in repeated near-miss events, longstanding recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board, and the operational realities of National Capital Region airspace.
Key Findings
1. Available surveillance data is not fully utilized
High-quality positional data is already available through existing broadcast surveillance systems. However, that data is not consistently provided to flight crews in a way that supports continuous situational understanding.
In practice, flight crews may not see nearby traffic until late in a developing situation, and available data is used primarily to support automated alerting rather than human decision-making. This represents a fundamental underuse of existing safety capability.
A modern safety architecture should support not only collision avoidance, but continuous shared visibility among all operators in the airspace.
In safety-critical environments, effective system design depends on layered and redundant visibility rather than reliance on a single source of information or a single opportunity for conflict detection.
In complex National Capital Region airspace, resilient system design should include redundant sources of traffic and positional awareness transmitted to all participating aircraft.
2. The system relies too heavily on reactive collision avoidance
Collision avoidance systems are essential, but they are designed as a last line of defense. In current implementations, resolution advisories are suppressed at low altitudes, limiting the availability of deconfliction guidance in terminal environments.
The operational complexity of National Capital Region airspace warrants evaluation of more advanced conflict detection and resolution technologies, including systems with enhanced algorithms capable of addressing limitations associated with low-altitude resolution advisory suppression.
Dependence on these systems indicates that:
• conflicts are identified too late
• crews and controllers are left with reduced time and fewer options
A safe system should enable earlier recognition of developing conflicts through layered visibility and shared situational awareness, not rely primarily on last-moment alerts or visual acquisition.
3. Situational awareness is not consistent across all operators
Shared airspace requires shared visibility.
Differences in equipage and data availability between civil and military aircraft create asymmetry in situational awareness, increasing reliance on assumptions and procedural coordination. This condition introduces risk that procedures alone cannot resolve.
The National Capital Region requires a layered “see and be seen” approach to safety, not reliance on visual acquisition alone.
The continued proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems within and around the National Capital Region will further complicate an already dense and operationally complex environment, reinforcing the need for scalable, layered approaches to shared visibility, conflict recognition, and coordinated situational awareness across all participants in the airspace.
4. Oversight of non-broadcast operations is limited
Military aircraft may operate without broadcasting positional data under approved waivers. While operationally necessary in some cases, this creates increased risk in dense, mixed-use airspace.
When aircraft are not broadcasting:
• they may not appear in shared traffic systems
• visibility is reduced for other operators
• separation depends more heavily on controllers and procedures
The key concern is the lack of consistent, transparent oversight and risk evaluation associated with these operations.
Non-broadcast operations in complex airspace should include:
• clear criteria for use
• cross-agency visibility into those decisions
• ongoing assessment of the risk introduced
Without this, gaps in situational awareness may go undetected in real time.
5. Civil-military coordination depends on incomplete tools
Coordination between civil and military operations often relies on:
• procedural compliance
• verbal communication
• partial data sharing
These methods are inherently limited in high-density airspace.
In the National Capital Region, procedural coordination alone cannot provide the level of safety required in shared civil-military airspace. Operators must not only avoid conflicts, but consistently maintain the ability to see and be seen within a common operational picture.
Effective coordination requires interoperable, shared, real-time visibility, not just procedural alignment.
6. Near-miss patterns indicate risk may be underestimated
Repeated near-miss events in and around DCA indicate persistent and elevated risk, not isolated anomalies.
These patterns suggest that:
• some operations may be consistently assessed as lower risk than conditions warrant
• routine mission characterization may not reflect the full complexity of the airspace
• prior near-misses are not always incorporated into future risk assessments
In this environment, risk may be underestimated at the outset, limiting the effectiveness of downstream mitigations.
A resilient safety system must also be capable of collecting, sharing, and analyzing operational and safety data across agencies and operators. The objective should be to identify precursor events and emerging risk trends early enough to prevent another catastrophic event from occurring.
A resilient system requires that:
• risk assessments reflect actual airspace complexity and traffic density
• recurring events inform future evaluations
• assumptions about routine operations are periodically challenged
Without this, risk may be present but not fully recognized.
Implications for System Design
• provide continuous access to complete traffic data to all aircraft operating in controlled airspace
• incorporate redundant, continuously available sources of traffic and positional awareness to ensure resilient shared visibility across National Capital Region airspace
• enable both automated collision avoidance and earlier human recognition of developing conflicts
• ensure consistent situational awareness across all operators, including civil and military
• apply clear oversight and risk governance when exceptions to standard surveillance practices are permitted
• support coordination through shared, real-time visibility, not solely procedural mechanisms
• support continuous aggregation and analysis of operational and safety data to identify precursor trends and emerging risks before catastrophic outcomes occur
Limiting available data to reactive collision avoidance does not meet these requirements.
Closing
The risks under consideration are not new and are not confined to a single event. They reflect structural characteristics of how shared airspace is currently designed and operated.
Improving safety in the National Capital Region requires moving beyond a safety model based primarily on procedural separation and visual acquisition, toward a layered system in which operators can consistently see and be seen through shared visibility, earlier conflict recognition, and coordinated situational awareness.
Sound system design should account for the realities of human performance and should not depend on flawless execution in order to maintain safe outcomes.
We appreciate the committee’s work and its role in advancing a more comprehensive approach to airspace safety.
Respectfully submitted,
Tim Lilley
[ ....]
Sheri Lilley
[.....]
Moderator
Joined: May 1997
Aviation Qualifications: ATCO
Posts: 295
Likes: 137
From: Europe
Sound system design should not depend on humans performing flawlessly within the system in order for the system to function safely and effectively.
But 100% is not achievable , will never be . , looking at the Lufthansa B787 nose gear collapse a couple of days ago , a good example of this .
There is always risk in aviation , finding ways mitigating risks in a cost effective manner is what we do. We learn from errors and improve , all the time.
i am not sure lawsuits are the best way to do that , but they may put pressure to the right people, who knows ? but I am not convinced yet . .
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
Posts: 611
Likes: 473
From: Maryland USA
It isn’t being rejected. Its implementation is being considered. The accident need not have happened if existing technology and procedures were being implemented correctly and with safety foremost in mind. Mandating ADSB-In for military aircraft could endorse hazardous practices rather than fully mitigating risks. This was already covered by prohibiting helicopters flying across final approach at night using visual separation standards. Hardware isn’t the problem.
That said, maybe my experience is unique on here having worked as a CFI near DCA, dodging those
helicopters was a frequent occurrence, they would do stuff like fly under me and over the tree we were doing turns-around-a-point on with me at 800 feet AGL. They operate at speeds, altitudes, and places that put them in conflict with GA traffic all the time. Speaking from a military point of view, wouldn't you want the most information about possible threats to your operation possible?
