JAL incident at Haneda Airport
I’m surprised that the stopbars were not used 24/7/365 when serviceable in any weather conditions
But ultimately the main cause of the accident is whatever caused the DHC to believe that they had runway clearance and takeoff clearance, and that seems to be a failure of the pilot and/or crew from reading the transcripts of ATC communication, and it should be a "number to call" moment of a much more severe degree
I have been “number 1” for departure so many times in the last 30 years, but never have I entered a runway without permission. I suggest aviators start paying attention, especially when entering a runway area. Or when getting off the bus at the airport for that matter.
Knee-jerk reaction.
Night time of not.
Knee-jerk reaction.
Night time of not.
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Precisely. They could have hung the CG captain out to dry by now. They haven't, and as I've said before are studiously ignoring the most important point: that the CG ADS-B was inadequately specified, was faulty, or was inadequately operated, rendering the aircraft invisible. Someone (or some organisation) somewhere, responsible for this, is being protected.
#1032 "The stop bars at each runway entry point are not individually selectable, the set up is for low vis operations where all runway entry points are blocked."
This infers some reliance on visual detection of incursions in good visibility.
Detection must not be presumed in every situation; night, background clutter from airport / runway lighting, foreground light-clutter in the flight deck, and human limitations - detection, perception, understanding, and time to act.
This infers some reliance on visual detection of incursions in good visibility.
Detection must not be presumed in every situation; night, background clutter from airport / runway lighting, foreground light-clutter in the flight deck, and human limitations - detection, perception, understanding, and time to act.
Pegase Driver
I'd still put it the other way around. For whatever reason, or combination of reasons, a clear runway suddenly wasn't, and no-one knew. Of all the people who needed to know, top of the list was the A350 crew. CG being visible on ADS-B would have revealed it to them, all other factors notwithstanding.
The runway monitoring system was working properly at the time of the accident, but the air traffic controllers apparently failed to notice the blinking indicator, according to a source close to the transport ministry.
As to the Dash being visible to the A350, as I said before ,TCAS is not enough sensitive in azimuth and you cannot on a TCAS display ascertain if the aircraft is on a holding point or on the runway , ASAS , which would have worked here and I think you are refereeing to, is unfortunately is not yet approved . .
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 10th Jan 2024 at 07:34. Reason: addition
Precisely. They could have hung the CG captain out to dry by now. They haven't, and as I've said before are studiously ignoring the most important point: that the CG ADS-B was inadequately specified, was faulty, or was inadequately operated, rendering the aircraft invisible. Someone (or some organisation) somewhere, responsible for this, is being protected.
And all the while even if the system was attended to (with or without the transponder) and the aircraft had been "rescued" from disaster, then there would be an investigation as to why the aircraft had entered the runway without runway clearance and the answer to that question is also the ultimate answer to the current investigation.
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That is one major contributing factor. The main cause. the initial error if you like, is the Dash entering the runway without clearance., and why the entire crew seemed to believed they were clear is what is at stake here, And our job is to prevent it from happening again . Fixing the contributing factors is fine but first address the cause.
The SMR failed because none of the small handful people in a position to see it did, and that handful didn't include the A350 crew. The proper safety net to catch a runway incursion is to enable the maximum number of people to become aware of it, including those most immediately affected by it, maximising the chance that it will be acted upon successfully.
The salient feature of this accident is that for that aerodrome it was caused by a non-standard aircraft operating in a non-standard manner. Had the CG been an Airbus or Boeing broadcasting position and heading information as normal the accident probably wouldn't have happened. Even if ADS-B position is insufficiently precise to show the aircraft on the runway rather than the taxiway, heading would have shown it pointing the wrong way, a rather obvious anomaly.
Last edited by Iron Duck; 10th Jan 2024 at 08:18.
Runway stop bars are in my professional experience in ATC and airfield operations individually selectable. The runway will have a “ring of reds” all holds having an illuminated stopbar. In LVPs there is an override LVP setting that keeps any none Cat1/2/3 holds illuminating Red, and the Cat2/3 stopbars and markings come into play which are further back from the runways. As visibility and/or cloud base decreases the operations become more restrictive, the ATCO can only then select Cat2/3 compliant holds and taxiways.
At some smaller airports some taxiway and roadway blocks are put in place, particularly if the airfield has limited lighting or approach aid capacity, in those instances it’s unlikely to be operational once Cat1 limits are degraded.
Thats ridiculous, and highly unlikely. What you’re saying is if you deselect a holding bar at runway 26 the holding bar at runway 08 goes out as well…. That means if stop bars weren’t individually selectable, every time an ATCO deselected a holding point stopbar, every other bar would deselect too leaving a completely unprotected runway. Please let us know which airfields have this system.
Runway stop bars are in my professional experience in ATC and airfield operations individually selectable. The runway will have a “ring of reds” all holds having an illuminated stopbar. In LVPs there is an override LVP setting that keeps any none Cat1/2/3 holds illuminating Red, and the Cat2/3 stopbars and markings come into play which are further back from the runways. As visibility and/or cloud base decreases the operations become more restrictive, the ATCO can only then select Cat2/3 compliant holds and taxiways.
At some smaller airports some taxiway and roadway blocks are put in place, particularly if the airfield has limited lighting or approach aid capacity, in those instances it’s unlikely to be operational once Cat1 limits are degraded.
Runway stop bars are in my professional experience in ATC and airfield operations individually selectable. The runway will have a “ring of reds” all holds having an illuminated stopbar. In LVPs there is an override LVP setting that keeps any none Cat1/2/3 holds illuminating Red, and the Cat2/3 stopbars and markings come into play which are further back from the runways. As visibility and/or cloud base decreases the operations become more restrictive, the ATCO can only then select Cat2/3 compliant holds and taxiways.
At some smaller airports some taxiway and roadway blocks are put in place, particularly if the airfield has limited lighting or approach aid capacity, in those instances it’s unlikely to be operational once Cat1 limits are degraded.
Really?
In the UK the average is 220/yr, 68% aircraft, 28% vehicles and 8% personnel. In the US it’s 1,500/yr on average. Clearly there’s different volumes of traffic, the US procedure of clearing an aircraft to land predictively allows the incursion possibility to increase to many times that of the UK/European sterile runway mode.
An incursion (Uk) means something has entered the runway strip without authorisation. It could be worst case aircraft on centreline or crossing the reds by a cars length, or an individual simply standing wrong side of the bars. Posters here are losing sight that whilst this accident involved an aircraft, a similar event or worse could have occurred with an airfield operations vehicle collision on the runway, and they don’t have adsb.
That’s why the “cause” of this accident is the incursion, and why the crew entered the runway.
In the UK the average is 220/yr, 68% aircraft, 28% vehicles and 8% personnel. In the US it’s 1,500/yr on average. Clearly there’s different volumes of traffic, the US procedure of clearing an aircraft to land predictively allows the incursion possibility to increase to many times that of the UK/European sterile runway mode.
An incursion (Uk) means something has entered the runway strip without authorisation. It could be worst case aircraft on centreline or crossing the reds by a cars length, or an individual simply standing wrong side of the bars. Posters here are losing sight that whilst this accident involved an aircraft, a similar event or worse could have occurred with an airfield operations vehicle collision on the runway, and they don’t have adsb.
That’s why the “cause” of this accident is the incursion, and why the crew entered the runway.
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Thats ridiculous, and highly unlikely. What you’re saying is if you deselect a holding bar at runway 26 the holding bar at runway 08 goes out as well…. That means if stop bars weren’t individually selectable, every time an ATCO deselected a holding point stopbar, every other bar would deselect too leaving a completely unprotected runway. Please let us know which airfields have this system.
1) Stop Bar Lights are installed at each RWY holding position associated with RWY16L/34R
2) Stop Bar Lights will be operated when the visibility or the lowest RVR of the RWY16L/34R is at or less than 600m.
3) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C1, C2, C13 and C14 are controlled individually by ATC
4) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C3 THRU C12 are not controlled individually by ATC.
5) During the period Stop Bar Lights operated, TWY C3 THRU C12 are not available for departure aircraft.
2) Stop Bar Lights will be operated when the visibility or the lowest RVR of the RWY16L/34R is at or less than 600m.
3) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C1, C2, C13 and C14 are controlled individually by ATC
4) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C3 THRU C12 are not controlled individually by ATC.
5) During the period Stop Bar Lights operated, TWY C3 THRU C12 are not available for departure aircraft.
The way it works is that the taxiway used for queues have individually selectable stopbars, wheres the remainder do not and are used for crossings usually. It believe only a few (five?) have stopbars that are controlled by ATC, with the rest being generic stopbars that can be turned on when the runway is being used for a landing or takeoff. Planes are supposed to takeoff from the end of the runways and the DHC was by far an exception.
I’ve never heard of a generic stopbar, a stopbar is a stopbar regardless of whether it’s a Cat1/2/3. If it’s red, don’t cross hold position regardless if it’s an aircraft, vehicle or person.
Aircraft don’t have to depart from the end of a runway. Depending on traffic and aircraft performance runway intersection departures can and do take place.
Thanks. Reading that (4) closely the airport authority will have questions to answer as to why those stopbars aren’t individually controlled. (5) The stopbars are only in use with 600m viz or less. When that occurs C3-C12 aren’t available for aircraft. The Met that night meant that stop bars weren’t in use and C5 was available for aircraft departures.
Making an assumption here that if C8 is deselected it reads that C3 to C12 simultaneously deselect too, leaving vehicles or an incorrect positioned aircraft no warning they’re at a runway entry point. What could possibly go wrong?
edit: addition
JapanHanuma I understand your generic post now!
Making an assumption here that if C8 is deselected it reads that C3 to C12 simultaneously deselect too, leaving vehicles or an incorrect positioned aircraft no warning they’re at a runway entry point. What could possibly go wrong?
edit: addition
JapanHanuma I understand your generic post now!
Too mean to buy a long personal title
Forgive me (non-pilot) if I'm missing something, but doesn't that design have to be read with the last line: "5) During the period Stop Bar Lights operated, TWY C3 THRU C12 are not available for departure aircraft." If the C3-C12 stop bars are only ever used at times when nobody's allowed to enter the runway there, why would this be a problem? There would be no need to deselect the C8 stop bar, let alone deselect it while aircraft are waiting to enter the runway via any of the other C3-C12 holding points - nobody will be doing so.
Forgive me (non-pilot) if I'm missing something, but doesn't that design have to be read with the last line: "5) During the period Stop Bar Lights operated, TWY C3 THRU C12 are not available for departure aircraft." If the C3-C12 stop bars are only ever used at times when nobody's allowed to enter the runway there, why would this be a problem? There would be no need to deselect the C8 stop bar, let alone deselect it while aircraft are waiting to enter the runway via any of the other C3-C12 holding points - nobody will be doing so.
I find it very surprising that this major airport with its traffic volume doesn’t have a “ring of red”, a stopbar or traffic light for every runway entry point with an individual control. It makes sense to isolate complete sections to allow no use too but to have multiple entry points at night in good visibility (accident weather), with no positive control, for me is a very odd option. The reason for using an intermediate entry point could allow airfield operations or engineering vehicles access to the runway for priority inspection/repair, not aircraft.
In this case it would have made sense, as this aircraft involved in rescue effort elsewhere would be bypassing and gaining on the queue heading for the main holding point C1
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Flying by consensus
Suspect this is the very heart of the matter. A long time ago journalist the late Murray Sayle wrote that for their cockpit crews Japanese airlines had needed to deal with the ingrained cultural instinct in that county to work by consensus. It's common sense that any element of doubt by the GC captain should have automatically been referred to the ATC, not to his team.
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We need to remember, stop bars won't actually stop an aeroplane.
A stop bar is just another easily penetrated slice of cheese
The pilots, who
Take wrong taxiways
Mis-hear transmissions
Miss radio calls
Mis-select frequencies
Line up without clearance
Take off without clearance
Exceed flap speeds
Bust altitudes
Stall aeroplanes
Approach wrong runways
Approach taxiways
Land at wrong airports
Fly into mountains
Etc
Are quite capable of crossing a lit stop bar.
We have to develop and nurture a skill of anticipating and mitigating errors. This comes with experience. Paradoxically, experience is often something you need just before you get it.
A stop bar is just another easily penetrated slice of cheese
The pilots, who
Take wrong taxiways
Mis-hear transmissions
Miss radio calls
Mis-select frequencies
Line up without clearance
Take off without clearance
Exceed flap speeds
Bust altitudes
Stall aeroplanes
Approach wrong runways
Approach taxiways
Land at wrong airports
Fly into mountains
Etc
Are quite capable of crossing a lit stop bar.
We have to develop and nurture a skill of anticipating and mitigating errors. This comes with experience. Paradoxically, experience is often something you need just before you get it.
Last edited by JG1; 10th Jan 2024 at 19:38.
Suspect this is the very heart of the matter. A long time ago journalist the late Murray Sayle wrote that for their cockpit crews Japanese airlines had needed to deal with the ingrained cultural instinct in that county to work by consensus. It's common sense that any element of doubt by the GC captain should have automatically been referred to the ATC, not to his team.