JAL incident at Haneda Airport
Oof, that video is emotionally rough viewing. The child's pleading voice to Kami Sama (God) for help. This one passenger decided to shoot the whole scene 'as it might help in the future'.
Translation would really take some time to do, but definitely worth doing and getting it all right. The comments by the two experienced former staff at the end are to the point. For instance, the 8 cabin crew spent that time with no proper means of communication or coordination trying to judge from the windows where the flames were and which exits not to use, in order not to draw flames inwards. She also mentioned that they must have been grateful for the male passenger who raised his voice to calm people down, in support of the CA.
Translation would really take some time to do, but definitely worth doing and getting it all right. The comments by the two experienced former staff at the end are to the point. For instance, the 8 cabin crew spent that time with no proper means of communication or coordination trying to judge from the windows where the flames were and which exits not to use, in order not to draw flames inwards. She also mentioned that they must have been grateful for the male passenger who raised his voice to calm people down, in support of the CA.
Last edited by jolihokistix; 9th Jan 2024 at 03:48.
Other videos show fire under the A350 while travelling down the runway after the collision. Possibly the source was the center wing box of the CH3 with engines, props and gear jammed underneath along with fuel (I have not seen the remnants in the various wreckage photos). Seemingly it took some time for the A350 center tank to breach, but contents at the end of flight may have been limited. These are all guesses until we have reports from the JTSB.
Oof, that video is emotionally rough viewing. The child's pleading voice to Kami Sama (God) for help. This one passenger decided to shoot the whole scene 'as it might help in the future'.
Translation would really take some time to do, but definitely worth doing and getting it all right. The comments by the two experienced former staff at the end are to the point. For instance, the 8 cabin crew spent that time with no proper means of communication or coordination trying to judge from the windows where the flames were and which exits not to use, in order not to draw flames inwards. She also mentioned that they must have been grateful for the male passenger who raised his voice to calm people down, in support of the CA.
Translation would really take some time to do, but definitely worth doing and getting it all right. The comments by the two experienced former staff at the end are to the point. For instance, the 8 cabin crew spent that time with no proper means of communication or coordination trying to judge from the windows where the flames were and which exits not to use, in order not to draw flames inwards. She also mentioned that they must have been grateful for the male passenger who raised his voice to calm people down, in support of the CA.
Unfortunately I literally left the JAL group this week and am in the midst of induction with a new carrier and above all else my video editing skills are a bit lacking.
Rough transcript, times as per the video ie 30 seconds before the aircraft came to a stop.
Wife husband and child sitting in the rear between L3 and L4.
00:50 CA - Cover your mouth and nose
00:55 Husband - Have you got a towel... wait I'll look
01:06 Husband - Use this cover your nose
01:13 CA - Cover your mouth and nose, stay low
01:17 Wife - Hurry, hurry
01:25 Child - Save us
01:31 CA - Cover your mouth and nose, stay low (please)
01:36 Other passenger - Im scared!!!
Multuple similar shouting between cabin attendants and passengers
2:05 CA - Do not take your baggage, we are confirming the situation
Cabin crew continue to calm the passengers
[interview of the man who filmed: People started to panic somewhat but the crew told us to stay low and remain calm and things did calm back down at this point]
2:48 Child - Get ready to go Dad
2:51 CA - Cover your mouths and noses (do not remove baggage)
3:03 CA - Cover your mouths and noses and stay low
3:10 Child - God please help us
3:16 CA - Cover your mouths and noses and stay low
3:27 CA - Stay low
3:30 Wife - We're gonna be ok (to child)
3:32 Child - Open the doors please
3:35 Wife - We will be ok. Stay calm
3:39 Child - Hurry up and let us out please
3:45 CA - Do not retrieve your baggage
[TV announcer : 3:45 from the start of videoing the aircraft starts to become engulfed by the smoke
Were people trying to get their baggage?
No, no-one around us were doing that. Everyone around us were sitting low properly in general
The doors didn't open straight away?
The cabin attendants were communicating with each other by phone (intercom) but I could hear them saying the doors wouldn't (cannot be) open, can I open this exit, etc.. ]
4:36 Child - Open the doors
4:38 Other passenger - Lets just get your head down
4:39 Husband - Sorry
4:41 Other passenger - The smoke rises so lets just get our heads down low
4:42 Husband - This smoke is getting really bad
4:47 Other passenger - Its ok its ok. Everything will be ok if we follow the crew's instructions
5:02 CA - Continue to cover your mouth and nose and stay low
5:18 CA - Tell us where its safe to open [ between crew]
5:27 CA - Its not open here. We cannot open R3
5:30 CA - L3 is also out
5:34 CA - Is the front open? Can you open the rear?
5:44 CA - Can we open R3?
5:47 Passenger - The fire trucks are here
5:58 CA - I can't confirm what's going on at the front
6:13 CA - The fire trucks are here everything will be fine [to passengers]
6:21 CA - Everybody head to the front of the aircraft
6:30 {Passengers shouting DONT GET YOUR BAGS}
6:36 CA - Do not remove your baggage
[Various passengers - Hurry! Hurry! Go right to the front!]
6:53 CA - Come this way
6:59 CA - Leave your baggage!
7:02 CA - Two at a time. Sit (and slide)
Remember its from 30 seconds before coming to a rest, and people sitting towards the rear.
Lots of small voices in between that were left out. But it gives a good idea of what was going on.
The little girl being so polite but begging them to open the doors was a bit of a tearjerker.
I.e People at the rear were off 6:30 after coming to a standstill in an evac from forward doors only. Big difference from 8:00 before evac commencement people were raging about earlier.
Where's the like button? Good job, Glekichi. Thanks. I too had to fight back tears.
(I am a translator too, but didn't feel I had to time for even half of that! The interview at the end will need doing at some time.)
(I am a translator too, but didn't feel I had to time for even half of that! The interview at the end will need doing at some time.)
Yeah the interview gives a reasonable and balanced explanation about the time it took, the necessity of checking which doors were safe to open whist also being unable to communicate with other crew, and the help of other passengers in keeping things calm.
Now you can compare
Breaking news on NHK etc, (the patch sounds to me like a typical Japanese fudge, personal opinion warning), but they have mandated no further use of the expression 'Number one', at Haneda or any other airport in Japan.
In parallel, the magazine Bungei Shunju carries a five-page article today electronically, and tomorrow in print, by a current ATC member, analyzing the Haneda incident critically. One point they make apparently is that Runway C at Haneda being dual-use, or mixed take-off and landing, is a unique anomaly, in that whereas there are busier airports in the world such as Atlanta or Dubai (?), runways are usually designated solely for take-off or solely for landing. They talk about the pressure on the ATC responsible for that particular runaway.
(Not having read the article it may be that what I have written is not 100% 'correct'. Usual caveats apply. Be prepared for updates.)
In parallel, the magazine Bungei Shunju carries a five-page article today electronically, and tomorrow in print, by a current ATC member, analyzing the Haneda incident critically. One point they make apparently is that Runway C at Haneda being dual-use, or mixed take-off and landing, is a unique anomaly, in that whereas there are busier airports in the world such as Atlanta or Dubai (?), runways are usually designated solely for take-off or solely for landing. They talk about the pressure on the ATC responsible for that particular runaway.
(Not having read the article it may be that what I have written is not 100% 'correct'. Usual caveats apply. Be prepared for updates.)
Pegase Driver
Breaking news on NHK etc, (the patch sounds to me like a typical Japanese fudge, personal opinion warning), but they have mandated no further use of the expression 'Number one', at Haneda or any other airport in Japan.
In parallel, the magazine Bungei Shunju carries a five-page article today electronically, and tomorrow in print, by a current ATC member, analyzing the Haneda incident critically. One point they make apparently is that Runway C at Haneda being dual-use, or mixed take-off and landing, is a unique anomaly, in that whereas there are busier airports in the world such as Atlanta or Dubai (?), runways are usually designated solely for take-off or solely for landing. They talk about the pressure on the ATC responsible for that particular runaway.
(Not having read the article it may be that what I have written is not 100% 'correct'. Usual caveats apply. Be prepared for updates.)
In parallel, the magazine Bungei Shunju carries a five-page article today electronically, and tomorrow in print, by a current ATC member, analyzing the Haneda incident critically. One point they make apparently is that Runway C at Haneda being dual-use, or mixed take-off and landing, is a unique anomaly, in that whereas there are busier airports in the world such as Atlanta or Dubai (?), runways are usually designated solely for take-off or solely for landing. They talk about the pressure on the ATC responsible for that particular runaway.
(Not having read the article it may be that what I have written is not 100% 'correct'. Usual caveats apply. Be prepared for updates.)
As to using same runway for take off and landing, it is done everywhere , and if you look globally only very few large airports have dedicated runways only and always used for departures, but even then ,is it without exceptions? . If you have a rush of departures and few or no arrivals, you can use all the runways at your disposal to expedite the outbound flow. ( and vice versa when you have many inbounds and few departures )
One side question for you , or someone flying regularly to HND might know : are they 2 controllers and 2 frequencies for 34R and L ? or is it the same controller/frequency for both ? The global standard is one runway, . 1 controller 1 frequency .
In parallel, the magazine Bungei Shunju carries a five-page article today electronically, and tomorrow in print, by a current ATC member, analyzing the Haneda incident critically. One point they make apparently is that Runway C at Haneda being dual-use, or mixed take-off and landing, is a unique anomaly, in that whereas there are busier airports in the world such as Atlanta or Dubai (?), runways are usually designated solely for take-off or solely for landing.
That is what I got from the news precis, but they were also saying that the other runways at Haneda are fixed use, C being the exception. (Unique, peculiar, unusual...?)I'll see if I can find the article again.
OK, found the article for a start. 2 hours old. Pasting here before it disappears!
《JAL機炎上事故》現役管制官が緊急告発 「事故が起きた羽田空港C滑走路は離着陸兼用の“異常”な運用だった」 | 文春オンライン (bunshun.jp)
Will need 12 ft ladder to get past paywall... grrr...
OK, found the article for a start. 2 hours old. Pasting here before it disappears!
《JAL機炎上事故》現役管制官が緊急告発 「事故が起きた羽田空港C滑走路は離着陸兼用の“異常”な運用だった」 | 文春オンライン (bunshun.jp)
Will need 12 ft ladder to get past paywall... grrr...
Last edited by jolihokistix; 9th Jan 2024 at 08:55.
Banning the use of “number 1” seems crazy; “what number are we to depart?”
”I can’t tell you”. 🙄
Or "Voldemort".
Seriously, let's hope they don't ban #1 on Ground control positions as this is frequently used. ABC123, number one to traffic on your left/right etc, taxi to the gate (hold short of) etc.
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"JA722A Tokyo Tower good evening, Number 1, taxi to holding point C5".
That "Number 1" could (to my mind) mean:
- Number 1 for departure (seemingly the intended use)
- Number 1 to another aircraft taxying nearby (as in your example)
- Number 1 movement - expedite to depart before the landing traffic (perhaps what was mistakenly understood)
Banning the use of “number 1” seems crazy; “what number are we to depart?”
”I can’t tell you”. 🙄
”I can’t tell you”. 🙄
Every ATCO seeing this incident probably asked themselves whether it could have happened on their frequency. Could it have happened to me? Possibly: there are an awful lot of lights which could easily hide a relatively small aircraft from me and from arriving aircraft; a good chance of arrival and departing aircraft for the same runway being on different frequencies until shortly before being on the runway; surprisingly large aircraft can be lost from our ground radar system; there are many pilots communicating with me without much understanding of the nuances of the English language; the airport is near capacity so that there is often an implied imperative do do things quickly. Mitigations where I work include: 24/7 stop lights (if one was broken I feel confident that they'd be barriered and removed from use regardless of the hit movements); runway incursion monitoring with suitably annoying audible alarm (although I'll admit it only on detected targets); a runway with reasonably good line-of-sight from the tower to the thresholds; strict use of standard phraseology in one language only (luckily my mother tongue) with expectation that inadequate readbacks are immediately challenged and a continuous assessment where I would expect to be challenged if allowing non-standard habits to slip in; an ethos of encouraging pilots to question their clearance if unsure (better to experience the inconvenience of slowing things down for the question than have them really screw things up); a personal habit of checking whether an aircraft is on frequency before giving clearance to use the runway wouldn't have helped here, but helps keep the runway safe.
I could see "Number 1" being confusing when used without qualifiers, as it was multiple times in the transcript of this incident.
"JA722A Tokyo Tower good evening, Number 1, taxi to holding point C5".
That "Number 1" could (to my mind) mean:
"JA722A Tokyo Tower good evening, Number 1, taxi to holding point C5".
That "Number 1" could (to my mind) mean:
- Number 1 for departure (seemingly the intended use)
- Number 1 to another aircraft taxying nearby (as in your example)
- Number 1 movement - expedite to depart before the landing traffic (perhaps what was mistakenly understood)
number one for departure, after one landing
It's noticeable that landing aircraft were advised of a departure, but this departing aircraft was not advised of the next landing approved, which may have been just before it joined the frequency
edit: or would there be some argument that this can still be mistaken for already a departure clearance, conditional on the landing?
Maybe it could just be "we have one landing", which is similar to the advice to others about one departure
Last edited by aox; 9th Jan 2024 at 11:17.
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Although I totally do NOT qualify as the target audience for your question, strictly in relation to this accident only, I can confirm that at least 2 separate TWR frequencies 118.1 (for at least 34L) & 124.35 (for at least 34R and 05) were in use, operated by separate ATCO's. With the 'at least' I mean, these were the positively identified frequencies and runways in use, no idea if additional TWR frequencies were in use (for ex. for GA traffic in the CTR - not on the airfield -), no idea if RWY 04 was in use.
Or in this instance, could it usefully have been
number one for departure, after one landing
It's noticeable that landing aircraft were advised of a departure, but this departing aircraft was not advised of the next landing approved, which may have been just before it joined the frequency
number one for departure, after one landing
It's noticeable that landing aircraft were advised of a departure, but this departing aircraft was not advised of the next landing approved, which may have been just before it joined the frequency
Telling the departure they are number one for departure after one landing every single time, is a waste of frequency bandwidth. The CG here hadn’t been either cleared for takeoff, or had a clearance to enter the runway, (from published transcripts). All they have been informed of is that they are first in the queue. It also builds other crew’s awareness that they have other traffic to depart before themselves.
Losing the “number one” phrase isn’t a good idea in my opinion and experience. The crew receiving that information can then place that in their mental picture. Eg they know that the aircraft taxiing on their left should be giving way to them etc, all subject to confirmation or query as required.
The big brown hole here as I see it, is the lack
of use of stopbars 24/7. If 24/7 use were mandated then crews would be conditioned not to cross any illuminated bar 24/7. That the C stopbars were unserviceable on this night is a moot point, as I understand it had they been serviceable, with the prevailing meteorological conditions (in excess of CAT2), that critical visual clue for the aircrew wouldn’t have been in use anyway. That means one of the final runway protectors, an illuminated “do not pass” stopbar has been deliberately omitted from operating procedures. The risk assessment for that would make interesting reading.