JAL incident at Haneda Airport
Absolutely, Luton includes backtracking too. Watching their ATC team and the aircrew coordinating and playing nicely is an education in itself.
I presume this could mean that the confusion derived from saying "no.1" then? It would be a big leap of faith to assume a queue number indicated not only runway clearance but also takeoff clearance!
I guess you could throw in a few recommendations:
I guess you could throw in a few recommendations:
- use of stopbars at all times
- attendant for the runway incursion warning system at all times (and audible alert if false positives are low)
- single direction runways
- replacing queue numbers with another terminology that implies the lack of runway clearance
- use of transponder for non-civilian aircraft at all times in most civilian settings
- use of only a single radio channel at a civilian airport (e.g. no authority given to coastguard radio when ATC is empowered)
I presume this could mean that the confusion derived from saying "no.1" then? It would be a big leap of faith to assume a queue number indicated not only runway clearance but also takeoff clearance!
I guess you could throw in a few recommendations:
I guess you could throw in a few recommendations:
- use of stopbars at all times
- attendant for the runway incursion warning system at all times (and audible alert if false positives are low)
- single direction runways
- replacing queue numbers with another terminology that implies the lack of runway clearance
- use of transponder for non-civilian aircraft at all times in most civilian settings
- use of only a single radio channel at a civilian airport (e.g. no authority given to coastguard radio when ATC is empowered)
I’m surprised that the stopbars were not used 24/7/365 when serviceable in any weather conditions. I think that will be a key finding in the end report of what went wrong. I’m very interested in why they don’t use stopbars 100% of the time when serviceable, if I understand their airport operation correctly.
Quick, positive safety action
"Japan issues improved emergency measures following fatal plane collision at Haneda airport"
https://amp-scmp-com.cdn.ampproject....haneda-airport
"Japan issues improved emergency measures following fatal plane collision at Haneda airport"
https://amp-scmp-com.cdn.ampproject....haneda-airport
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Fiddling while Rome burns.
Better taxiway markings and 24/7 stop bars make sense, but R/T procedure? Messing about with terminology in a communications medium in which messages can be misunderstood because of poor pronunciation or sound quality, missed because you're on a different frequency, or stepped on as at Tenerife?
The actual, central cause of this accident is that the CG aircraft was on the active runway and no-one but its crew knew. If it had been transmitting accurate ADS-B position info like every other aircraft on the aerodrome this incursion, whatever its cause, would not have been missed.
Only one rule is needed: that no aircraft not transmitting full ADS-B is allowed to use the aerodrome. So why are Japan's authorities ignoring this obvious, central problem? Exactly who is being protected from loss of face because the CG aircraft was inadequately specified, or SOPs were inadequate, or both?
Better taxiway markings and 24/7 stop bars make sense, but R/T procedure? Messing about with terminology in a communications medium in which messages can be misunderstood because of poor pronunciation or sound quality, missed because you're on a different frequency, or stepped on as at Tenerife?
The actual, central cause of this accident is that the CG aircraft was on the active runway and no-one but its crew knew. If it had been transmitting accurate ADS-B position info like every other aircraft on the aerodrome this incursion, whatever its cause, would not have been missed.
Only one rule is needed: that no aircraft not transmitting full ADS-B is allowed to use the aerodrome. So why are Japan's authorities ignoring this obvious, central problem? Exactly who is being protected from loss of face because the CG aircraft was inadequately specified, or SOPs were inadequate, or both?
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Speaking of politeness, one thing I found a bit strange about the transcript was the last part of the readback from the -8: "Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you". No other readbacks from the transcript ended with a thank you. While the Japanese are known for being polite, that "thank you" could have some additional meaning. I understand they have been taxiing for almost an hour at that point, in which case the additional meaning of that "thank you" could be "finally!". Also, it may suggest that they did not expect further interaction with the tower. Or I might just be imagining things, and it's just pure politeness.
I am struggling a bit with the debate about use of "number one". Its inclusion in a transmission surely indicates that the aircraft is *not* cleared to enter the runway. Think about it: why would ATC say "line up 34R, number one for departure" or "cleared for takeoff 34R, number one for departure"? They wouldn't, because it would be implicit. The presence of those words must mean that you have been told to hold short. The only possible exception I could think of would be if cleared to line up full length behind an intersection departure, but then you'd be number two, not number one...
As I’ve written previously here, from current known transcriptions the tower ATCO was concise and accurate. They gave no clearance, instructions or implication that the CG should enter the runway.
I’m not throwing the CG crew under the bus here, but in terms of ATC communication, there’s nothing that stands out that would give the impression that they had a runway entry clearance.
I am struggling a bit with the debate about use of "number one". Its inclusion in a transmission surely indicates that the aircraft is *not* cleared to enter the runway. Think about it: why would ATC say "line up 34R, number one for departure" or "cleared for takeoff 34R, number one for departure"? They wouldn't, because it would be implicit. The presence of those words must mean that you have been told to hold short. The only possible exception I could think of would be if cleared to line up full length behind an intersection departure, but then you'd be number two, not number one...
Pegase Driver
Fiddling while Rome burns.
The actual, central cause of this accident is that the CG aircraft was on the active runway and no-one but its crew knew. If it had been transmitting accurate ADS-B position info like every other aircraft on the aerodrome this incursion, whatever its cause, would not have been missed.
?
The actual, central cause of this accident is that the CG aircraft was on the active runway and no-one but its crew knew. If it had been transmitting accurate ADS-B position info like every other aircraft on the aerodrome this incursion, whatever its cause, would not have been missed.
?
The PR also says what was revealed was partial transcript , so it would be interesting to get a transcript of the Dash comms on the GND frequency prior to switching to TWR.
Don't know if you read this post of mine, which summarizes the last few minutes with GND; nothing much essentially.
Pegase Driver
Anything specific you expect to find out on the GND comms ?
Don't know if you read this post of mine, which summarizes the last few minutes with GND; nothing much essentially.
Don't know if you read this post of mine, which summarizes the last few minutes with GND; nothing much essentially.
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Report on Nikkei website:
TOKYO -- A week after a deadly runway collision at Tokyo's Haneda Airport, the Japanese government has rolled out safety measures that aim to prevent such an incident from happening again.
The incoming reforms will focus on air traffic control functions as well as on the aircraft operating side.
Transport Minister Tetsuo Saito told reporters Tuesday that his agency will move forward with permanent safety measures as quickly as possible.
"One of our biggest missions is to restore confidence in aviation as a mass transit system," Saito said. "The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism will launch full-scale efforts to implement measures to ensure safety and security."
For the time being, all airports in Japan will suspend the use of such terms as "No. 1" when issuing air traffic control instructions to aircraft and will use more precise phrases when communicating orders. "No. 1" refers to a plane that is next in line to take off, but it is believed that the crew of the coast guard plane misunderstood the term as permission to enter the runway.
Additionally, all air traffic control crews in Japan will have extra staff to constantly watch monitoring systems that warn about erroneous entry into runways. Extra staff has been in place at Haneda since Saturday, and other airports in Japan will add the dedicated personnel as well.
The monitoring system at Haneda was working properly during the night of the crash, but the air traffic control crew did not notice that the coast guard plane had erroneously entered the runway.
The transport ministry has also ordered airlines to make sure that aircraft crews confirm runways are clear before landing. The pilots on the JAL jetliner were unable to visually confirm the coast guard plane because it was nighttime.
The transport ministry is establishing a committee to explore further measures. One item on the agenda will be upgrades to systems informing pilots and air traffic control about the situation on the runways. The first meeting is expected to take place next week.
Japan tightens air traffic control and pilot protocols with new rules
KOJI MURAKOSHI and SARA MORI, Nikkei staff writers January 10, 2024 03:57 JSTTOKYO -- A week after a deadly runway collision at Tokyo's Haneda Airport, the Japanese government has rolled out safety measures that aim to prevent such an incident from happening again.
The incoming reforms will focus on air traffic control functions as well as on the aircraft operating side.
Transport Minister Tetsuo Saito told reporters Tuesday that his agency will move forward with permanent safety measures as quickly as possible.
"One of our biggest missions is to restore confidence in aviation as a mass transit system," Saito said. "The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism will launch full-scale efforts to implement measures to ensure safety and security."
For the time being, all airports in Japan will suspend the use of such terms as "No. 1" when issuing air traffic control instructions to aircraft and will use more precise phrases when communicating orders. "No. 1" refers to a plane that is next in line to take off, but it is believed that the crew of the coast guard plane misunderstood the term as permission to enter the runway.
Additionally, all air traffic control crews in Japan will have extra staff to constantly watch monitoring systems that warn about erroneous entry into runways. Extra staff has been in place at Haneda since Saturday, and other airports in Japan will add the dedicated personnel as well.
The monitoring system at Haneda was working properly during the night of the crash, but the air traffic control crew did not notice that the coast guard plane had erroneously entered the runway.
The transport ministry has also ordered airlines to make sure that aircraft crews confirm runways are clear before landing. The pilots on the JAL jetliner were unable to visually confirm the coast guard plane because it was nighttime.
The transport ministry is establishing a committee to explore further measures. One item on the agenda will be upgrades to systems informing pilots and air traffic control about the situation on the runways. The first meeting is expected to take place next week.
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The transport ministry has also ordered airlines to make sure that aircraft crews confirm runways are clear before landing. The pilots on the JAL jetliner were unable to visually confirm the coast guard plane because it was nighttime.
It's becoming more and more clear which each list of 'panic reactions' published, that they forget to mention one point on their agenda....
....the hidden agenda point, to keep 'Coast Guard' out of the picture...
....the hidden agenda point, to keep 'Coast Guard' out of the picture...
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The monitoring system at Haneda was working properly during the night of the crash, but the air traffic control crew did not notice that the coast guard plane had erroneously entered the runway.
The transport ministry has also ordered airlines to make sure that aircraft crews confirm runways are clear before landing. The pilots on the JAL jetliner were unable to visually confirm the coast guard plane because it was nighttime.
The transport ministry is establishing a committee to explore further measures. One item on the agenda will be upgrades to systems informing pilots and air traffic control about the situation on the runways. The first meeting is expected to take place next week.
Can nobody just admit that a Japanese crew failed to wait for the words 'line up and wait' or 'cleared for take-off', and that Japanese ATC failed to monitor the equipment that was showing them the incursion - because it wasn't part of their job description?